
Andre Wakefield
Pitzer College

Recommended Citation
La société des princes, XVie–XVIIIe siècle. By Lucien Bély. 

However brilliantly they shone in the eyes of their contemporaries, early modern royal courts and the “society of princes” they accommodated have been curiously invisible to historians until recently. To be sure, the biographers of major and minor court personalities have provided many small windows onto the early modern court as a means of shedding light on the lives of their respective subjects, just as scholars of the fine arts have long been illuminating the dynamics of court patronage. But it was only about twenty years ago, when the previously neglected work of Norbert Elias was translated and republished in new editions, that the royal court as an integral institution began to attract the focused attention of historians as had other extensions of the early modern state, such as the army, the judiciary, and the fisc, with more established traditions of scholarship behind them. Even Versailles, the most conspicuous and influential court in Europe during the early modern era, remains today in many respects understudied and misunderstood.

Most recent studies of princely entourages have been confined to individual examples, an understandable and probably necessary result of the fact that most princes left rich archives behind for historians to master. But as time has passed it is has become increasingly evident that a comparative perspective is needed to address certain specific issues, such as the origins of court ceremonials and their international diffusion, as well as broader ones, such as the relationship of courts to society at large. If for no other reason, this study by Lucien Bély, professor of modern history at the Sorbonne, is welcome, since the book deals with the “society of princes” in its various settings from Portugal to Russia over the entire early modern era—that is, the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries. Bély examines an enormous number of topics relating to princes and their courts—from the breast-feeding of infant princes and the diplomacy of royal marriages to the conduct of foreign policy and the use of the arts as instruments of politics. Having authored and edited six books on early modern French politics and European international relations during the last decade, Bély comes particularly well prepared to undertake this task, which would have daunted most historians. His grasp of the primary sources is impressive, and he draws effectively on the secondary literature, including the work of his own students, to fill in the gaps left by his own considerable archival investigations.

Although the author paints on a vast canvas, his style is pointilliste. While acknowledging that the history of nations cannot be reduced to the lives of its sovereigns, Bély sets out to revalorize the personal careers of individual princes rather than to delineate the general mechanisms and guiding conceptions of the state. Appropriately entitling the first section of this book “The Simple Humanity of the Prince,” Bély devotes a great deal of attention to studies of specific princes and the extensive genealogical interrelationships prevailing among such major houses as the Bourbons and Habsburgs and minor ones such as that of the Palatine counts. In support of this approach, one can only concur with Bély’s not very revolutionary premise that the outcome of state-
craft in the early modern period was often intimately tied to the personal lives of the rulers who occupied the thrones of Europe. Despite growing bureaucratization, princes and their entourages typically provided the only unifying institution within heavily fragmented states, while the claims of nations in international conflicts were normally expressed in the language of rights accruing to their ruling houses. Moreover, the increasing tendency for members of sovereign families to marry into other sovereign families, rather than forging marital alliances with their own subjects, promoted a kind of royal caste formation, which, critical as it was to state interrelations—as Bely shows—has received much less attention than the process of nation building during the same period.

At the same time, I cannot help but conclude that the author’s pointilliste method has resulted in his getting the worst of two worlds. On the one hand, a great deal—though not all—of the biographical and genealogical detail provided about the many figures who populate this work is common knowledge, and it is insufficiently integrated to create much sense of their “simple humanity.” At times the reader gains the impression that he/she is reading a reference work, not a historical narrative. On the other hand, the effort to “humanize” secular historical processes through reliance on cameo biographies—which, apart from details, could have been written a century ago—means that many issues that a cross-national approach might have helped clarify go unresolved. To be sure, the author does occasionally illuminate intriguing and relatively unexplored facets of court life, such as the use of the incognito by heads of state traveling abroad. But in a comparative study of this sort one very well could have expected far more light upon a whole range of larger questions that have arisen out of recent studies of domestic and international political culture. To raise but a small number: How different were rules of succession from one state to the other, and What do these differences reveal about the respective political cultures from which they emerged? How differently were female rulers viewed from male sovereigns, and What were their prospects of governing as effectively? To what extent did courts function as promoters of social mobility or immobility? How much and in what ways did courts borrow from one another, both as regards ceremonial and practice? How did they interact with religious establishments in their respective areas of authority? How, if at all, did they promote or discourage nationalism?

In sum, this richly detailed and well-documented book makes a step, if only a modest one, toward a comparative study of European courtly society in the early modern period. The wealth of information and occasional insights it contains should facilitate the taking of the next one.

THOMAS E. KAISER

University of Arkansas at Little Rock


Linnaeus. The name alone provokes visions of dried botanical specimens and Latin binomials, of obsessive ordering and compulsive classification. But Lisbet Koerner has something else in mind. Her Linnaeus is fallible, ambitious, absurd, and, above all, local—a man wholly bound to his eighteenth-century Swedish homeland. Still, Linnaeus: Nature and Nation is more than a quaint biography. It is also a strikingly original study of the relationship between natural knowledge and political economy in the En-
lightenment. With Linnaeus as guide, Koerner introduces us to a world in which natural history was virtually unthinkable without “oeconomy,” a world in which one could imagine “Lapland plantations of nutmeg, mace, and cinnamon” (p. 80). It is a delightful book, full of pungent asides, vivid descriptions, and lively anecdotes.

*Linnaeus: Nature and Nation*, as Koerner herself points out, reads like a collection of stories about Linnaeus’s life and work, and this is fortunate because Koerner is a very good storyteller. Yet her stories have a unifying theme. They are about Linnaeus’s “economics,” which is to say, they are about his notions of nature and nation. Linnaeus viewed nature as a prelapsarian paradise, “an infinite larder” capable of fulfilling mankind’s every need (p. 92). At the same time, he was acutely aware of the deadly famines that periodically decimated his fellow countrymen. How could there be famine in paradise? This, claims Koerner, was the central riddle for Linnaeus, and his natural history represented one possible solution to that riddle. She also argues that Linnaeus was an orthodox cameralist who had a “zero-sum view of the economy” (p. 2), saw trade as parasitic, advocated a positive trade balance, and equated wealth with barrels of gold. In Koerner’s narrative these dual conceptions of nature and nation, of natural economy and human economy, create the dynamic that generates Linnaean economics.

For all the interest of the larger theoretical framework, however, Koerner’s best work appears in the guts of the book. She shows Linnaeus “in his manifold and constructed personae—as a son and student, traveler, physician, botanist, economist, theologian, teacher, husband, and father” (p. 10). Koerner emphasizes the importance of local circumstances. Linnaeus was, she points out, a kind of country bumpkin, and it is this “parochiality” which explains his importance for the Enlightenment. She shows, for example, how his most famous invention—the binomial nomenclature—developed haphazardly and almost by accident out of immediate local circumstances. Linnaeus, that is, introduced binomials as a “stopgap” measure to make his students more effective “support staff” for his economic botany. It was, in other words, “his belief in economic utility that fueled his floral innovation” (p. 55).

Throughout the rest of the book, Koerner’s narrative illustrates how the dynamic of nature and nation played itself out in the schemes and projects of Linnaean economics. Linnaeus’s dual commitment to Edenic nature and cameralist economics made him believe that he could “re-create a colonial economy within his Nordic homeland because of the relationship he assumed between a human science, or economics, and a divine order, or theology” (p. 192). She traces the manifestations of this chimerical dream as Linnaeus travels north in search of the “happy Lapp,” as he works to acclimatize tropical plants to the frigid Uppsala environs, and as he sends his students off to suffer and die in the tropics. Her chapter on the Linnaean mythology of the “happy Lapp” (i.e., the Sami) deserves special mention. In it she recounts how Linnaeus dressed himself up in “authentic Lapp” garb—Koerner points out that no self-respecting Sami would have donned Linnaeus’s absurd costume—and paraded around Amsterdam. He told tall tales about his Lapland adventures. He imagined Lapland as a Swedish Eden. At the same time, however, he saw Lapland as Sweden’s “West Indies,” a place brimming with potential for colonial development.

Despite the resolutely local focus of the book, Koerner does make some general claims. She argues, for example, that Linnaeus believed in the “cameralist concept of a local modernity” (p. 1). For Koerner, this model of society, with its promotion of “rationalistically governed autarkies,” represents a third way between Romantic anti-modernism and the self-regulating global modernity of the Classical economists. She sees in cameralism, then, a model of society shared by seventeenth-century civil servants, nineteenth-century isolationists, and twentieth-century neo-Marxist dependency.
The danger, of course—and Koerner recognizes this—is that such a general definition of “cameralism” will sap the category of all meaning. Perhaps this explains why she adheres to a narrower and more orthodox definition of the term throughout most of the book. Under this “narrow” definition, cameralism is a theory of fiscal and economic governance propounded by “Scandinavian and German courtiers and civil servants from c. 1650 to c. 1780” (p. 187). Koerner, who complains quite rightly about the “limited historiography of cameralism” (p. 12), seems to rely almost exclusively on the older works of Eli Heckscher and Albion Small in her treatment of the subject. But the historiography of cameralism is not quite so limited as she suggests. More recent scholarship, especially work by Keith Tribe and David Lindenfeld, has challenged the static picture of cameralism propounded by Heckscher and Small, thus making it more difficult to generalize about “typical” cameralist theories and policies. Koerner’s picture of Linnaean cameralism might have benefited from their insights.

Linnaeus: Nature and Nation should be of interest to historians working in a number of fields. Because the book offers entirely new ways to conceive of the relationship between natural history and political economy during the eighteenth century, it will be of great interest to historians of science and economics. Eighteenth-century historians should come away with a fresh picture—or at least a picture—of the Scandinavian Enlightenment. Cultural and intellectual historians will be intrigued by Koerner’s attempt to reconstruct the life and thought of a grand Enlightenment figure through local history. In fact, the book will be of interest to anyone who might enjoy a well-told and original story, full of humor and irony, about one of the major figures of the Enlightenment.

R. ANDREW WAKEFIELD

Dibner Institute for the History of Science and Technology


This is a very good text in a somewhat cramped format. Winfried Baumgart is without doubt the leading German authority on the international relations of his period. Moreover, he has made his name not as an expert on “1866 and all that” but on the Crimean War. That war was a genuinely international conflict, not a “war of national unification.” The Crimean War, in retrospect often seen as a sort of exotic sideshow, was also, as he reminds us, the only war in the period that involved more than two of the European powers and that threatened to turn into a general conflagration.

The century after Waterloo involves a series of paradoxes: It saw a frightful rise in the destructiveness of military weapons, but it was probably the most peaceful period of European history, with the few conflicts there were reduced to short, sharp clashes like the Seven Weeks’ War that once and for all decided the duel between Prussia and Austria. The nineteenth century was also a pioneer of globalism—cheaper transport made the world much smaller than ever before—yet overseas conflicts played far less of a part in European politics than before. The old continent was effectively insulated from the overseas world by British naval hegemony, a mastery that was conducted so unobtrusively that Baumgart feels compelled to agree with Robert Seeley’s famous
quote that the British seemed “to have conquered half the world in a fit of absence of mind” (p. 490).

As a result, this is very much a book about European politics. The Americas are mentioned in passing. Baumgart rightly points out that as far as undisguised expansionism is concerned, the United States certainly topped the list, at least as far as the first half of the century is concerned. Its dealings with Mexico weigh heavily in the scales against the claim that democracies almost by definition do not lead aggressive wars. (The map very clearly puts the Texan southern frontier in 1845 at the river Nueces, not the Rio Grande.) In terms of the narrative, the Mexican war is a sideshow, but in terms of the book’s overriding theme the questions it raises are central to the story. United States governments were not just supremely subject to popular pressures; they were also not members of the club, that is, not integrated into the Concert of Europe. The title of the book, after all, consists of a juxtaposition of the Concert of Europe and the national movements. What the years after 1848 witnessed was the dialectic of conservative old elites meeting popular pressures and responding to them. Baumgart clearly does not like the result.

Baumgart is a clear-headed realist who does not easily fall into the trap of ideological rationalization. The one instance where he is vulnerable, though, is his tendency to idealize the Concert of Europe. His Metternich is Kissinger’s rather than the bogeyman of the German Liberals. After 1848, European solidarity was increasingly thrown overboard; what triumphed was the Machtgedanke (p. 158), a term that does not lend itself easily to translation. (“Concept of power as a guiding principle” might perhaps convey its meaning.) He approvingly quotes Count Rechberg’s lament on that topic, even as he adds that the Austrian foreign secretary was only observing the phenomenon, not looking for its causes.

To some extent, that criticism might be leveled at Baumgart himself. If so, it must immediately be added, that is not really his fault, however, but that of the general outlay of the series. The interaction between professional elites and popular pressures would be worthy of a debate that ranges far and wide. But the structure of a handbook does not allow of any such free-wheeling arguments. The second half of the book consists of a state-of-the-art narrative of international politics. The first half of it is devoted to a groundwork of basic information: it includes a survey of the domestic arrangements of the five leading players. (The Ottoman Empire, which was such a bone of contention, might profitably have been added!) It also includes a checklist of “profound forces” that includes a great deal of information and insights, but that material is necessarily presented in isolation. If this whole reference section (or at least most of it) had been integrated into one essay summarizing Baumgart’s conclusions, the result would have been more satisfying. As it is, the résumé is a perfunctory three-and-a-half pages.

Whether a handbook of international relations is actually needed, can be debated. The book is certainly too expensive for the student. Monographs that are tailored to an author’s particular strengths and weaknesses usually create more of a momentum. On the other hand, sometimes there are certain economies of scale in the marketing of academic texts, too. Funding and publicity are easier to obtain for prestigious series rather than individual studies. With all these qualifications, Baumgart deserves special praise. If most textbooks suffer from blandness and a surfeit of well-meaning abstractions, not so this one. Baumgart is gifted with a down-to-earth approach and a vivid style, and he does not mince words. (Just see his judgments on President Polk and the
54′40′ lot.) Once again, this is a very good and worthwhile book by a master in the field that perhaps has suffered a little bit from having been turned into a handbook.

LOTHAR HOBELT

University of Vienna


A generation ago, police history was in its infancy. At that time the “study” of police had long been, in fact, the celebration of heroic crime fighters or a cloak for conservative commentators to defend the status quo against thugs, robbers, and the “dangerous classes.” From the 1960s, however, the police—now perceived as a modern institution like many others—came to be seen as a quasi-political arm of the government employed against not only criminals but protesters, rioters, and radicalized working men and women. Most recently, and in less turbulent times, historians have seen police, more broadly, as agents of a modernizing state, purveyors of national law over regional custom and popular justice. Clive Emsley’s book is part of this trend.

Gendarmes and the State in Nineteenth-Century Europe demonstrates the importance of Napoleonic France in this process of police innovation and, by extension, the lengthening reach of the state and its enforcement of law on the continent of Europe. Iain Cameron, Jacques Lorgnier, François Dieu, and many older authors have correctly identified France as the pioneer of modern policing. By contrast, England, with its affection for “liberty,” was long loath to develop efficient centralized policing institutions, restricting such pioneering efforts to the governance of Ireland, its turbulent Celtic western island.

In his book’s three-stage analysis, Emsley argues that France, from early in the nineteenth century, reshaped its eighteenth-century maréchaussée into an armed national police force whose task was to regulate, supervise, and enforce national laws throughout the entire country. Second, Napoleonic France then exported the concept into lands militarily conquered before 1815. Finally, in the decades after Napoleon was defeated, these experiments in gendarmerie came to be adopted as permanent police in various Continental countries.

The product of extensive archival research in France, Italy, Germany, and Austria, fully conversant with the secondary literature, and amply footnoted, Emsley’s succinct survey is as vivid and engagingly written as such institutional histories can be. Three-fifths of the book covers France; the remainder, Continental police developments. Most discussion targets the first half of the nineteenth century. The book abounds in anecdotes and case histories but along the way, if intermittently, the reader is also treated to much solid analysis and some generalizations. These concentrate on the forces and the gendarmes themselves, less so on crime, criminal statistics, or the political context of the police. Emsley’s sixteen-page synthetic conclusion is so well done that the reader wishes it were longer.

The French Revolution transformed the inherited rural quasi-military maréchaussée into a gendarmerie (1791) whose members were pledged now, not to the fleur de lys but to force à la loi (p. 42), the phrase itself stamped on the men’s tunic buttons. Laws of 1798 and 1801 raised recruiting standards and increased force size to ten thousand
and then sixteen thousand men (at which level it stabilized, growing to twenty thousand only in 1870). The force in Napoleonic France came to be efficient and respected. It was dedicated to crime prevention and apprehension (there was little spying) and was relatively free of corruption. Despite persistent tensions with local authorities and occasional seismic tremors (1830, 1848, 1870–71), the gendarmerie (amended by laws of 1820 and 1854) served “to watch over the public peace . . . [and] ensure respect for the law” (Capt. F. DeBouyn, 1857, quoted p. 127). The gendarmes hunted criminals, harried conscripts, broke up petty fights and disorders, regulated the marketplace, supervised flood and fire control, contained food riots, and enforced a variety of national laws over popular customs. Throughout, and despite the predictable personal lapses, the gendarme—resplendent in uniform and heir to “the orders of chivalry”—was to act as the model citizen as well as be “the law’s sentinel” (Insp. Gen. Ambert, quoted p. 136).

Stage 2 came with the export, often literally, of France’s gendarmerie to lands conquered by Napoleon in the years 1799–1815. Into Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Spain, and Italy came Revolutionary France’s new laws and their policemen. “Show the people, now French, what a good Gendarmerie is. Prove that it has no other guide but the law, . . . and the respect, the confidence that will surround you, will double your authority” (General Orders, Gendarmerie, Piedmont, 1802, quoted p. 160). Even beyond the frontiers of Napoleon’s empire, heads of Continental states emulated France’s gendarmerie because in the French model they saw elements that “they could shape to their own advantage and use to strengthen the kind of state which they sought to develop” (p. 173). Thus, in the years before 1815, experiments with the new police occurred in Italy (Parma, Modena, Tuscany, the Papal States, and Piedmont’s seminal Carabinieri of 1814) as well as in Germany (Baden, Bavaria, Württemberg, Hessen-Darmstadt, and Prussia, though in this last state Junker landlords favoring personalistic Herrschaft kept the force small).

Stage 3, the legacy of Napoleon’s gendarmes—namely, the creation of permanent state police in Europe after 1815—forms only about one-fourth of the book. Offering only very brief remarks on state police in Denmark, Spain, Russia, and even Ireland, Emsley has chosen to focus his attention (and archival researches) on Italy, Germany, and the Habsburg empire. After Italian unification, the Carabinieri (sixteen thousand strong by 1861, rising to twenty-five thousand by 1900) developed into a glamorous, at times brutal, usually respected and effective agent of law enforcement. “Perhaps more than anywhere else in Europe, the Italian variant of the Gendarmerie had a central role in building the state” (p. 206). By contrast, in the Prussia-dominated unified Germany well after 1866 the Gendarmeriekorps or Landjaegerskorps (significantly, both words were used) were thin on the ground because of opposition from liberals and Junkers defensive of their prescriptive rights. Throughout the Austro-Hungarian empire, the fourteen police forces known as Landesgendarmeriekommandos (LGK), originally created (1849) to counter popular protest (in 1846–48), were also rather too scarce to be effective (even by 1914 there were only fourteen thousand men for a population of 50 million). The LGK were also too military to be an effective police, and they never evolved into the necessary transcultural/translingual force that could help to build a unified state as had the Italian Carabinieri.

In conclusion, Clive Emsley clearly shows the importance of France’s largely rural state police as a model for other European nations to emulate. These police were each nation’s uniformed emissaries of the new order of power: the formal representatives of the central government and its laws that now penetrated the farthest recesses of the countryside. Gendarmes were models of citizen behavior (ideally, at least: sober, punc-
tual, and regular in habits), and, more to the point, they served as constant visual reminders of the power of the state and its laws. Like other contemporary historical actors—the church, the courts, schoolmasters, and capitalism itself—these unheroic gendarmes going about their routine daily rounds were instrumental in shaping the modern societies we live in today.

STANLEY H. PALMER

University of Texas, Arlington


Illuminating the multifaceted nature of modern Jewish identity is arguably the most central concern in modern Jewish historical writing today. Contemporary research, influenced in the past two decades by social history, anthropology, and the new cultural history, is now rendering more complex our understanding of the transformation of Jewish life under the impact of modernization. The necessary realignment of religious, national, class, and social loyalties at both the individual and communal levels is no longer seen merely as a linear progression from a state of identity possession to one of identity loss. Binary oppositions such as these have given way to a more complex understanding of human behavior and motivation that refigure our heretofore one-dimensional assimilationists in flight from Judaism into cultural mediators who find themselves caught between conflicting sets of loyalties and demands.

It is clearly in the spirit of the new Jewish historiography that Rainer Liedtke’s comparative work on the history of nineteenth-century Jewish welfare is written. Liedtke sets out to analyze the transformation of modern Jewish identity by focusing on the expanding Jewish welfare systems in the industrial cities of Hamburg and Manchester from the second half of the nineteenth century until the eve of the First World War. Jewish welfare as an arena of Jewish social engagement, identity formation, and the articulation of class status has been largely overlooked, partly because it was of peripheral interest to ideologically minded historians, and partly (as Liedtke rightly points out) because historians have tended to focus more on forces that detract from communal cohesion rather than those acting to preserve it (pp. 11–12). His central question turns on the extent to which a separate Jewish welfare system could serve simultaneously as an obstacle to and catalyst for Jewish integration into the larger society (p. 2). Equally important, his work also serves to counter a major shortcoming of Jewish historiography, the decidedly ahistorical tendency to invoke a set of timeless Jewish values or attitudes to explain concrete historical developments. Undiscriminating historical studies identify “Jewish ethics” and “the traditions of the medieval Jewish community” as the core factors motivating modern Jews to maintain extensive welfare systems. Far more than any memory of traditional Jewish ethics, however, it was the variety and complexity of historical circumstances—and of Jewish responses to these circumstances—that led to the formation of these networks of associations, no matter how frequently such “eternal” values were invoked.

Leading us through an intricate maze of German and British Jewish charitable organizations, the author attempts to explain why Jewish welfare expanded during the precise period in which Jews had attained full inclusion within the scope of the state’s welfare system. The most obvious cause for institutional expansion was the immigra-
tion of Jews from eastern Europe. In Manchester, where the east European population presented a significant challenge to the welfare system, greater philanthropic organization was needed as the character of the needy changed from the aged and infirm to a steadily growing industrial proletariat (p. 73). Even while not required by law to care for their own, Jewish leaders in both cities hoped to protect the uneasy social position of Jews by keeping to a minimum the number of Jewish wards relying on state support. But Hamburg’s Jewish welfare system grew even as relatively few east European Jews were permitted to settle here, demonstrating its centrality for the formation and display of an emerging and secularizing Jewish middle class. Liedtke relates a fascinating episode in Hamburg’s history when the city’s Jewish leaders were given the option of eliminating separate Jewish welfare altogether. They opted to remain separate not merely to cater to the specific religious needs of Jews but primarily because they believed that otherwise they risked the mass defection of those who would remain part of the community only so long as it retained its emphasis on providing relief for the poor (p. 83). Even as Hamburg and Manchester Jews continued to justify the maintenance of separate systems on religious grounds, religious observance was often overridden by concerns with conforming to the ideals of the time (p. 113). Thus, whereas Manchester’s Jews had once objected to incarcerating Jewish subjects in the workhouse because of the problems it posed for ritual observance, leading Jewish Mancunians later not only began incarcerating the abandoned wives of east European immigrants as a means of social control but singled out these women for harsher treatment than any other group, justifying an act of “seeming harshness” as “the truest kindness” (pp. 154–55).

What is most unique and ambitious in this study is its comparative focus. Through painstaking historical reconstruction, the author has created order out of a patchwork of meeting protocols, Verein statutes, and other archival sources. Yet the rich detail that is the strength of Liedtke’s book is, in some ways, also its weakness. While the book commences and closes with a set of larger questions about identity and social change, too often the answers to these questions consist of no more than a few simple sentences at the end of a section that seem occasionally to be tacked on. And though he touches on every important issue relating to the history of social welfare—such as shifting definitions of the deviant, social control, and the emergence of scientific social work—one wishes Liedtke would have sacrificed some of the detail to further expand on themes he raises but which remain undeveloped.

Nonetheless this work is indeed a significant contribution to British, German, and Jewish historiography. Liedtke’s conclusion that through their welfare activities, Jews in Hamburg and Manchester created an exclusively Jewish sphere, mirrors David Sorkin’s notion of a subculture that, though intended to foster integration, in reality served as the basis for continued group distinctiveness (p. 241). The existence of a Jewish subculture in Hamburg and Manchester contributed to a pronounced and durable social separation between Jews and non-Jews, promoting Jewish cohesion even as Jews secularized. Fortunately for the Jews, since their work served the commonweal, neither non-Jewish Germans nor Britons begrudged the Jews their separate activities, submitting that this type of Jewish separatism was “the right kind of clannishness” (p. 235).

SHARON GILLERMAN

Hebrew Union College

In this broad-ranging and innovative book, Richard Cándida Smith uses the public success of the famously hermetic symbolist poet Stéphane Mallarmé to raise a much larger question about how we might conceive aesthetic intellectuals “as a distinct social formation.” In late nineteenth-century France and the United States, (mostly) petty bourgeois male artists paradoxically legitimated their claims to speak for humanity by asserting their elite status: they were specialized professionals who affirmed their technical expertise by the “difficulty” of their work. Young poets and artists sought professional recognition in the rapidly modernizing and thus increasingly fragmented and automated world whose alienating, dehumanizing character they also sought to critique. In this argument, the much heralded or much scorned “difficulty” often associated with the work of symbolist poets and their heirs on both sides of the Atlantic proves really to be a particularly revolutionary lyric form expressing radical democratic aspirations.

Literary critics and theorists have long insisted on the symbolists’ break with a Parnassian elitism—they were republicans, socialists, and anarchists; they borrowed colloquialisms and refrains from popular culture. Smith instead places their challenge to the sonnet and fixed meaning (i.e., to constrained poetic form) in a much larger social and intellectual context: not only in the increasingly complex and necessary relationship between cultural producers and the marketplace but also within the trans-Atlantic, multidisciplinary challenge to positivism in the arts (literature and painting) and sciences (linguistics and psychology) that he dubs a “renewal of experience.” Works by William James, Stuart Merrill, Floyd Dell, and Max Eastman in the United States, and by painters Paul Signac and Henri-Edmond Cross in France, mirrored Mallarmé’s celebration of a poetic practice linking our rational, reflective faculties to the immediacy of bodily sensation. They all engaged in analogous efforts to rescue human “experience” of the world from the ossified thought categories and conventions in which positivist science had embedded it.

Mallarmé’s “children” (René Ghil, Jean Ajalbert, Jean Moréas, Gustave Kahn, and others), inspired by the master, effected a shift away from the content and meaning of poetry to another focus on literary form. Mallarmé had insisted on the double origin of language: its everyday utility and thus conventional meaning and an underlying realm of connections that made meaning possible. It was this realm that he sought to liberate from the habits of association wrought by conventional usage: he sought to “induct his readers into the processes that led to interpretation” (p. 21) and thus to recreate the whole experience of making meaning. The playful but rigorously constructed language games associated with symbolist poetry underscored the arbitrary nature of meaning, and its frisson-inducing eloquence evoked the beauty that exceeded language itself and thus marked the incommensurability between the sayable and the said. The poet’s “science” both revealed the hidden but universal laws by which meaning is created and expressed their “truth” in an involuntary bodily shudder.

Smith terms this project a “praxis of the subject, not a theory” (p. 112), and he links poets’ quest to discover the universal, underlying “being” of the world to increasingly specialized, modernizing societies in which alienation was now a central experience. In the United States, William James’s efforts to grasp the “flow” of mind—to understand how the mind processes experience—outside the conventional categories that organize thought paralleled Mallarmé’s own emphasis on that which exceeded lin-
guistic expression. Moreover, an entire group of American thinkers who defined their project in slightly different terms also engaged in salvaging experience from its linguistic and social prison houses. Mallarmé and his disciples celebrated the capacity of poetry to expose the arbitrariness of linguistic convention and thus to renew human “being” in the world, paradoxically, through the virtuosity of technically proficient and difficult poets. The poet’s social alienation from the masses was a condition of democratic renewal that took the form of a poetic practice linking mind and body in quest of truth. Smith argues that the circle around the radical American journal *Masses* aestheticized images of “working girls” to renew the alienated world of work. Writers thereby represented the purity and vitality of nature—of eroticism, nurturing, and privacy that women symbolized—as an intrinsic quality of labor. Aesthetic labor was both a product of the mind and an “attitude of the body” (p. 171) that renewed social life by restoring and renewing the full experience of self in the world: “Poetry appeared useless, but it disrupted the knowledges that societies had come to value” (p. 172). The Americans used rhetoric about the liberating and authenticating power of free love, eroticism, and sexuality to set themselves apart from the putatively puritanical society they criticized, and, in so doing, established an authoritative, professional voice in the mass media on which their livelihoods depended. Like their French counterparts, they too were “professionalized dreamers” (p. 251).

Smith’s approach, as he acknowledges, is “archaeological.” It unearths diverse developments in poetry, psychology, and painting and then painstakingly rebuilds lost linkages and relations not only between ideas and persons but also between ideas and the contexts within which they emerged. He does so to argue that avant-garde aesthetic practice is not an “escape from modernity but a key constituent element in the modern organization of intellectual and symbolic work” (p. 251). Though he contextualizes this argument by cross-cultural comparison and biography (rather than by a detailed analysis of the relation between texts and more thickly defined cultural contexts), his argument is persuasive. By demonstrating to what extent the avant-garde and symbolism in particular emerged as a social and political critique that changed the terms of cultural producers’ relation to the social world, he challenges the still-dominant perspective on modernism: that modernist art is a form of escape into the psyche, that it recreates totality no longer possible in the world, that the modernist artist cynically exploits the marketplace even as he critiques it. This is an important, original, and optimistic assessment of the modernist legacy. Smith might have emphasized better the importance of his contribution by framing the argument more effectively. Rather than placing it in the context of debates about modernism or current debates about “experience,” Smith uses Julia Kristeva’s magisterial study of poetic language as a point of departure. But that work is far too narrow (and too much itself a part of these larger debates) to serve as an adequate framework for this wonderful book.

*Carolyn Dean*

Brown University


The notion of the fact pervades many modern disciplines. It is difficult today to know how one could do physics or chemistry—or, for that matter, history—without seeking, sorting, and respecting facts. What reasonable people think about their surroundings is
supposed to be constrained by “the” facts, and those whose conclusions are not so constrained are commonly deemed unreasonable, if not mad. But for all its ubiquity and power, the concept of the fact is not itself a timeless or natural one; indeed, that combination has made it an appealing scholarly target. In recent years the fact has attracted the attention of writers eager to bring to light historical foundations for what are apparently the most self-evident elements of modern culture: elements like objectivity, truth, and rationality. Barbara Shapiro’s new book elegantly and economically describes the scope of this effort.

Shapiro’s book is a general survey, and, as befits a work of this kind, many of its contentions will not be new to readers familiar with the more technical literature in its field. Lorraine Daston, Peter Dear, Mary Poovey, Simon Schaffer, and Steven Shapin are only the most prominent writers to have published sophisticated research on the development and consequences of the fact, and Shapiro draws on all their labors. She does so, however, in order to construct a synthetic account that is often broader in scope than their rather more specialized efforts. Principally, she reconstructs for non-specialists the story of how the fact became such a common cultural term in the first place. The book begins with the origins of what she variously calls “the concept ‘fact’” or “the discourse of fact” in the English legal system of the sixteenth century. From there it tracks how writers of history in the later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries adopted this entity. Finally, it shows how the concept of the fact further dispersed into a range of areas of English culture, including religion, literature, news reporting, and, most important of all, science. By the early eighteenth century the concept had become part of everyday life, such that the English of Defoe’s time lived their lives within a “culture of fact.”

Shapiro’s central thesis concerns the question of why this change mattered. She argues that throughout this process the fact retained some of the distinctive features it had acquired in its original legal setting. In that setting, a fact had been an act or event perpetrated by humans, the “truth” of which was to be arrived at (or denied) on the basis of reliable testimony. In furnishing and assessing such testimony, then, the procedures of the common-law courts provided bases for the methods later adopted in other enterprises—such as science—in pursuing their own brands of fact. Furthermore, because the courts began at just this time to rely on juries to judge “matters of fact,” an appreciable section of society became familiar with the legal conventions for determining facts and was thus equipped to recognize them as authoritative when they were applied in new contexts. So the legal-origins story (the part of her narrative that Shapiro represents as most controversial) serves a dual purpose: it explains both why the fact itself became so authoritative a cultural item and why society recognized it as such.

The natural sciences occupy the greatest part of Shapiro’s account, and justifiably so. Here again the story she tells is not, in the main, an unfamiliar one. It proceeds in orderly fashion from Francis Bacon, who adopted the terminology of facts from the law and grafted it onto natural history, through the Hartlibians and the Oxford experimentalists of the 1650s, to the Royal Society in the Restoration. Shapiro’s account of the society’s work represents an admirable brief synthesis of much of the best recent history of science produced about this oft-discussed period. Nonetheless, inasmuch as she has an argumentative point to prove, it emerges in her reaction to that literature. Shapiro diverges repeatedly from her story to challenge the work of Steven Shapin (A Social History of Truth [Chicago, 1994]) for stressing the importance of gentility in the formation of scientific facts at the expense of the legal procedures she herself emphasizes. What strikes the reader of both books, however, is not their disagreement on this issue but their concurrence on virtually everything else. Both see the fact as a
historical entity, not a natural one; both place its origin in English culture at much the same time; both, indeed, stress the legal as well as social origins of the concept (Shapiro understates how much common ground she and Shapin share in this); and, at the most basic level, both think that cultural change often happens via creative appropriation of such concepts across cultural boundaries—science, for example, changes when the idea of the fact is introduced from the law rather than by its creation de novo. It is, then, unfortunate that Shapiro chooses to dwell on this rather contrived confrontation.

For the most part, however, A Culture of Fact is primer rather than polemic, and as primer it surely succeeds. What it says, it says clearly and well. Its willingness to chase its quarry across various seventeenth-century fields is also most welcome. True, Shapiro’s is only an introduction to the field, and it has the gaps and peculiarities inevitable in a survey. For example, her discussion never actually addresses the creation of any particular fact, preferring to talk in more abstract terms about how in general this would be achieved, and she generally reads actors’ statements about this subject as a historian of ideas would, seeing in them glimpses of a set of doctrines rather than a cluster of practical conventions. Moreover, she makes little distinction between the speakers who made these statements or the contexts in which they did so: a figure like the Laudian Peter Heylyn, universally recognized by his contemporaries as doctrinaire, is scarcely distinguished here from a John Wilkins or a John Selden, whose statements about objectivity were far more likely to be widely credited. But for nuances like these, readers will no doubt look to Shapin, Schaffer, Dear, and the rest. In the meantime many of them will have been introduced to the subject by Shapiro, and that is no bad thing.

ADRIAN JOHNS

California Institute of Technology


Paul Slack has devoted a long and distinguished career to the study of social welfare in early modern England. This publication of his Ford Lectures, delivered in 1994 and 1995, offers advanced students and specialists in the field a concentrated survey of scholarship on the subject, set within a penetrating analysis of the way both the provision and the language of social welfare developed from the late fifteenth through the mid-eighteenth centuries.

Slack spends little time discussing policies and attitudes toward public welfare in their material context, arguing that while efforts at organized relief were obviously redoubled during years of economic crisis, the correlation between want and relief is otherwise weak. He directs attention instead to the political, moral, and religious interests at stake in rhetorics of reform and improvement, as well as to the institutional agents that attempted to translate those discursive aspirations into concrete practice.

Mediating ideology and action was the crucial issue of authority, a topic to which Slack returns repeatedly: “In whose hands did the initiative for reform properly lie?” (p. 12). The answers, of course, were never univocal and were always contested, but the dominant actors involved in managing or relieving the poor, and their aims and techniques for doing so, did shift over time. In the sixteenth century, for example, lay
governors influenced by civic humanism claimed greater authority in sanitizing the commonwealth by punishing sin and suppressing idleness in the poor. Their efforts produced the first genuinely English innovation in public welfare: the workhouse (not the Poor Law, as popularly believed). The Reformation granted even greater latitude to lay hands as the Tudor regime was forced to rely, faute de mieux, on intermediate corporate bodies to fill the breach created by the suppressed religious orders and fraternities.

Municipal or local impulses toward reform grew even more comprehensive and insistent under the social discipline enjoined by the growing ranks of godly ministers and magistrates. But on this point Slack cautions that the particular targets of godly reformers were much less distinctive than the sheer vigor with which they urged speedy reform and the extent to which they infused public welfare and social order with transcendent significance. As he notes, “the ultimate purpose of Puritan social reform, of the fashioning of welfare according to the dictates of justice and mercy, was public edification” (p. 49). Such an aggressive and grandiose program was bound to founder on its own impossible goals and on the hostility and social discord it aroused.

A similar fate lay in store for the contemporaneous efforts by Elizabeth I and the early Stuarts to advance public welfare as a means of extending royal power. Slack detects conciliar initiative in the issuance of plague orders and (more obscurely) in efforts to adjust supplies of grain in rural areas during periods of dearth. Certainly the Caroline Book of Orders (1631) manifests the Crown’s attempts—however ineffectual—to have the rural poor rated and apprenticeships bestowed on pauper children. Much more often than not, the royal reach exceeded its grasp, a failure compounded by the fact that these statist objectives of rebuilding the capital in brick and stone or of converting wasteland into arable land became enmeshed with inconsistent and self-defeating schemes for raising royal revenue or enriching interested parties at court. As a consequence, by 1630 these “absolutist” initiatives appeared “bankrupt intellectually because they were bankrupt financially” (p. 74).

As in so many other areas of English life, the mid-seventeenth century marked a watershed in thinking about and providing for public welfare, although it took some time for the direction of the new conceptual and institutional currents to become clear. The new tone can be heard in Samuel Hartlib’s call for projects to advance the “public good,” a term that Slack identifies with a more scientific and secular approach to social welfare seen by then more “in terms of felicity and improvement” than in “its older guises of correction, restoration and edification” (p. 83). Here was born an idea of linear progress, of a future that aspired to more than a return to a less corrupted past. In a corresponding evolution at the level of technique, the measurement of this social betterment lay at hand with the coeval elaboration of political arithmetic by Sir William Petty, Sir William Davenant, and John Graunt.

At the same time, Parliament assumed a new importance in advancing social welfare through an unprecedented volume of social and economic legislation, notably, the creation of municipal Corporations of the Poor. This legislative activity was supplemented, moreover, by the growth of voluntary, “civil” associations and foundations (such as the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge or Thomas Coram’s Foundling Hospital) as well as for-profit ventures (like insurance companies) that charted their own, often controversial path to social improvement. By 1740 this “mixed economy of welfare,” in which public and private, national and local, parochial and corporate institutions all had a hand in relieving and controlling the poor, the sick, and the idle, had been well established. As much as this new system pointed ahead to the welfare agenda of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, it also “restored and refurbished”
the fifteenth-century array of “guilds, fraternities, and feoffees as well as parishes and municipal corporations” (p. 148) that the Reformation had sent into decline. The progress of social welfare in early modern England ran, therefore, along a Vichian spiral rather than a linear track.

Just as Slack highlights these long temporal continuities in England’s history, he also stresses the enduring intellectual and institutional continuities that placed England’s experience in social welfare in a spectrum of approaches in other countries of western Europe: “There was no stark contrast between an essentially voluntarist England and the ‘statist’ approaches to welfare elsewhere” (p. 157). But if Slack ushers English exceptionalism out the front door, he reintroduces it through the back by observing that “England seems to have been able, more easily than other countries, to enjoy the benefits of both a flourishing corporate and voluntary sector and a powerful central authority and legal system, without the second smothering the first” (p. 163). In the end, the remarkable commensalism exhibited by the English state and civil society makes it difficult, once again, to dispel that hoary old myth of a unique English moderation.

GEOFFREY CLARK

SUNY College at Potsdam


Specialists and intelligent lay readers alike will find this book a pleasure to dip into. It bears all the marks that one has come to expect of Paul Langford’s work: deep and broad reading in an imaginative range of primary sources, a wealth of illustrative anecdotes, elegance of style, and a good-natured empathy for his subject. Oxford University Press clearly wants to reach out to a nonacademic audience with this volume—its chapter headings are accompanied by Gillrayesque caricatures, and its price is not as outrageous as one has come to expect from OUP—and I hope they will succeed.

The task that Langford sets himself is to illustrate how a number of traits that came to be seen as typically English (and not “British” or “Celtic”) by insiders and outsiders alike—energy, candor, decency, taciturnity, reserve, eccentricity, and a host of associated qualities—were defined and redefined over this broad span of years. In 1650, the English served as “a standing reminder” to Europeans “of the spasmodic vigour of a people close to barbarism” (p. 5), but by the early nineteenth century they were widely seen to represent the most advanced state of civilization. What accounted for this dramatic shift in perception? One important factor, according to Langford, was the gradual refashioning of a number of national stereotypes: from a stress on the unpredictable and potentially destructive energy of the English to a stress on their reliable industriousness, from rough incivility to a respectable reserve that facilitated commercial exchange, from wayward originality to a harmless eccentricity that acted as a social bond, from antisocial taciturnity to a clubbability that permitted the English to associate with each for a variety of constructive purposes despite their natural diffidence.

This transformation of the English image was both a success story and a cautionary tale. While it was seen to represent and to contribute to England’s obvious commercial and political flourishing by the early nineteenth century, many observers at home and
abroad felt that this very achievement had changed England from a land of cheerful barbarians who provided a refreshing corrective to the artificial aristocratic manners of the Continent to a land of snobs whose obsession with status prevented social intimacy. Indeed, Langford’s most suggestive chapter elaborates on this more negative reassessment of Englishness. In a relatively open and profoundly commercial society, asserting one’s superior status all too often involved putting others in their place. Domestic servants, for instance, were comparatively well provided for but were not treated on the intimate terms that they enjoyed in Continental societies in which the distance between the great and the small was more clearly demarcated. By the late eighteenth century, moreover, social climbers ran a perpetual risk of being “cut dead” by fashionable ladies and gentlemen who tacitly agreed with the artist Joseph Farington’s opinion that in England, “rights being equal, and the laws effective, manners alone can preserve that subordination which is allowed to be necessary” (p. 262).

What historical factors help to account for these changing perceptions of English national identity both at home and abroad? One of the most important, according to Langford, was Britain’s spectacular economic and military success during the long eighteenth century. Contemporaries in search of an explanation for English ascendancy were prone to reassess their stereotypes accordingly, turning English incivility into purposeful self-sufficiency, English xenophobia into truculent self-confidence. The other significant factors were the growth of empire; the Evangelical Revival, which instilled a stronger sense of social discipline and public duty; the French Revolution, which enabled the ostensibly wayward and impetuous English to portray themselves as “the conservationists of Europe” (p. 310); and the emergence of a middle class, which “self-consciously embodied the integrity and vigour of English civilization” and strove to discipline the “unconscious assemblage of those above and those below, [who were] united not by wealth but by temperamental unreliability that reflected their weaker sense of national responsibility” (p. 316). Langford does not put enough flesh on these historical explanations to give them much weight. While he is perceptive about the ways in which the French Revolution prompted reassessments of national character, he has nothing substantial to say about the growth of empire and the influence of evangelicalism, and his nod toward the influence of what used to be called “bourgeois values” is too slight to be convincing. In an age when the social and political elite was subjecting itself to a thorough reexamination of its leadership role, one might well suppose, and indeed most historians now do suppose, that it had at least as much to contribute to the reshaping of national identity as did the middling sort.

This sort of criticism is churlish, however, for the task that Langford undertakes here is more a descriptive than an explanatory one. His book fascinates through its shrewd and detailed observations of what contemporary observers themselves thought it was that made the English English: a belief in the value of independence that prompted many of them to let their children run loose in city streets, for instance; a strikingly reticent “sociability” that caused foreigners to liken drinking in an English alehouse to attending a funeral; a taste for physicality and rough sport that prompted George IV to place eighteen prizefighters in royal livery to guard the avenues leading to Westminster Hall on his coronation day; the rough-and-tumble of English plebeian life, which many foreigners contrasted with the relative orderliness of humbler English folk when they thronged together; a love of domestic privacy that clashed with Continental notions of open-door hospitality, and a fear of casual self-revelation that made it a torture for English travelers to ask directions of strangers or to sit down with them at a table.
d’hôte. The abundance and resonance of these examples of English manners make this a difficult book to summarize but also a difficult book to put down.

PHILIP HARLING

University of Kentucky

Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000. Pp. xxiv + 262. $49.95 (cloth); $18.95 (paper).

Eliga H. Gould examines here one thousand pamphlets—written, in the main, during four decades, from the early 1740s to the early 1780s—in an endeavor to discover as best he can the dimensions of contemporary British political consciousness. In less skillful hands such a task might well prove awkward and confusing. Gould, however, never allows his ample evidence to overwhelm the reader. Indeed, such is the clarity of the narrative and the keenness of the analysis that, were it not for the copious and well-presented footnotes, the reader might easily forget the thousand pamphlets altogether.

The Persistence of Empire is one of the two or three most important books on mid-eighteenth-century British politics written during the past quarter century. In every chapter, replete with paradoxes within paradoxes, Gould convincingly explicates some variant of the perennial question of why so many British subjects for so long accepted their government’s ill-fated American policy. In the process he unleashes a wealth of new interpretations on the nature of British political culture and on the mind-set of the ruling classes that will keep scholarly commentators busy for years.

The substance of the work involves a discussion of the imperial implications of popular and generally negative British opinion, especially metropolitan opinion, toward Europe during the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years’ War. It examines how such sentiment engendered a peculiar form of disengaged patriotism and concludes that neither the pronounced anti-Europeanism nor the detached *amor patriae* prepared Great Britain properly for the long struggle against its North American colonies.

In some ways, this work is an extended meditation on Britain’s natural insularity, made possible of course by the channel and the fleet, and the resulting anti-Europeanism—toward both Catholic and, more interestingly, Protestant Europe—that such insularity fostered. For example, few traces of the “Protestant hero,” Frederick II, survive Gould’s investigations. As has become almost de rigueur in a book by an American on the 1776 Revolution, Gould draws parallels to the Vietnam War. He might, more usefully, have drawn his contemporary comparisons to the Europhile/Euroskeptic debate now consuming British politics. As Martin Wiener’s *English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit* (Cambridge, 1981) became a meaningful text for Margaret Thatcher, Gould’s *Persistence of Empire* might well become one for William Hague.

A Whig assize sermon from the 1730s, which Gould quotes at great length, seems from a certain perspective quite correct. The British were the “chosen People of God,” latter-day Israelites whom Providence had separated from the “rest of Mankind” and
given a government more perfect than “any European State can boast of” (p. 4). Such popular isolationism certainly explains much about British history during the long eighteenth century, from the unpopularity of the early Hanoverians to the silence of Jane Austen’s characters in *Pride and Prejudice* on the French wars. For his purposes, Gould draws interesting and subtle conclusions from such postures. Hanoverian Britain was a “nation of armchair patriots” (p. 71) in a fashion not possible for their less geographically favored neighbors. They vastly enjoyed the public spectacles their rulers provided but, as the widespread opposition to even the lauded Pitt’s Militia Act (1757) makes clear, were not anxious to see their patriotism sustained by any extended personal participation. There was thus a curious disjunction between the rhetoric of Hanoverian loyalism and what such self-professed patriots were actually willing to undertake. Hence, unlike France in 1790 or 1792, patriotism in Britain on the eve of the American Revolution was like a collective act of theater, with symbolic meaning but fewer deeper consequences.

The conclusion, however bogus, that the armchair patriots drew from the 1756–63 war was that withdrawing from Europe and turning to William Pitt’s blue-water imperialism was the path to continued greatness. The conclusion that Pitt’s less talented ministerial successors drew from the war was that, as in Pitt’s case during that war, the road to popularity and success lay in non-European struggles for trade and empire. The problem was that Pitt’s blue-water imperialism was not cheap—hence, the taxation of the Americans.

If Gould is correct that isolationism and distaste for Europeans were nearly universal popular sentiments during and after the victorious Seven Years’ War, does the widespread inculcation of such provincialism help explain how quickly the British recovered from the effects of their unsuccessful war against the Americans? Gould quite correctly maintains that the most striking feature about the American War of Independence was how little it did to disrupt the ordinary course of British domestic concerns. Indeed, it is one of Gould’s most striking paradoxes that the Whig regime of George III was as secure in 1783 after Saratoga and Yorktown as it was in 1763 after the Plains of Abraham and Plassey. Win or lose, popular British attitudes remained smug, self-satisfied, and, above all, mercantile. No “Recessional” with captains and king departing or Nineveh’s and Tyre’s collapsing for George III or Adam Smith’s Great Britain.

The Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture in Williamsburg has overseen the production of very clear and useful maps and excellently reproduced prints. Yet, even such a remarkable book, so eloquently written, raises a few minor questions. Is it quite correct to call the Elder Pitt a prime minister before 1766? Is it not somewhat anachronistic to describe Oxford University in the early 1760s as “firmly” (p. 16) in the hands of Tories and Jacobites and assert it was Jacobite in sympathy as late as the 1770s? Finally, at the risk of antiquarian affectation, Gould might do well, like many in his generation, to consult more frequently *Burke’s Peerage, Baronetage, and Landed Gentry*. Too often, a Lord John Perceval is conflated into a Lord Perceval. The titles of wives of knights or baronets are confused with courtesy titles of the daughters of the higher nobility. Then, when writing on the late eighteenth-century relationships of Cavendish (Devonshire) and Spencer women, Gould mixes up duchesses and countesses, mothers and daughters. Amanda Foreman would not be amused.

*Book Reviews  669*

James J. Sack

*University of Illinois at Chicago*


The past twenty-five years or so have seen much excellent work appear on the eighteenth-century English press and vigorous debate about the significance of the press in politics. This in turn has resonated in one of the central debates about the century: whether England was then more an ancien régime with much in common with the rest of prerevolutionary Europe or a distinctively different “open society.” But very little of the work on the press has been about the last three decades of the century. For these, apart from some fine local studies, articles, and theses, historians have had to rely largely on much older works. For this reason alone, this tightly argued and soundly substantiated study is particularly valuable. It deals with newspapers, their readers, and their politics, first in London and then in the provinces in the later 1770s and 1780s, with particular reference to the movement for parliamentary reform over the years from 1779 to 1785.

London newspapers in Barker’s period were, she suggests, larger-scale operations than is often realized, dependent much more for their profitability on circulation and advertising than on subsidies from political parties. They therefore needed to engage actively with their readers. Provincial papers, although rapidly increasing in number, remained small-scale and reliant on London papers for their news. Yet they are not properly seen, as they so often have been, as mere “scissors and paste” parasites on the London press. Barker’s discovery of account books for two successful papers allows her to demonstrate that provincial papers, too, could be highly profitable concerns—if their proprietors had the entrepreneurial skills to respond to local concerns and to tailor their presentation of national news accordingly.

Barker’s originality lies chiefly in this insistence on the active interaction with readers into which newspapers were drawn by the commercial imperative to maximize sales. She is well aware of the many problems involved in determining circulation and describing readership. Nevertheless, she makes skilful if critical use of “content analysis” to demonstrate the likelihood of a more socially varied and wider readership of London papers than is sometimes supposed. A similar analysis of provincial papers suggests their readership was narrower and more homogeneous. In both cases, the political stance of a newspaper was chiefly determined, Barker argues, by the editor’s response to its particular readership. Provincial papers, like London ones, were no mere passive recipients of planted political material. Their editors’ decisions were determined not by payment or even by the editors’ views but “by the perceived opinion of their readers and the need to cater for local preoccupations and concerns” (p. 158).

In two substantial chapters on the treatment of the campaign for reform in both London and provincial papers, Barker further explores the significance of this interaction with readers. Unsurprisingly, she can add little new about the course of the campaign or the divisions that emerged between radical and moderate reformers, but she gives valuable details on discussion in the press. In London, she argues, the newspapers’ more extensive and diverse readership helped to determine a diversity of views, ranging from those of radicals, increasingly ready to appeal beyond institutions to the people as initiators of reform, to those of conservatives, angrily fearful of mob rule. In the provinces, Barker claims that the response of newspapers can chart the rise and fall of support for reform, suggesting a greater degree of support than has been hitherto recognized and indicating divisions that could force neutrality on some newspapers. But common to all, she says, if less intense in the provinces, was a growing distrust
of politicians, an increasing emphasis on the political nation beyond parliament, and identification of it with their readerships. Conservatives did not dismiss this wider opinion; rather, they tended to define it somewhat more narrowly, in terms of property, and to deny that it supported the radicals. The newspapers were not only reflecting their diverse readerships; they were also constructing the meaning of “the people” and “public opinion” in terms of those readerships. The reform movement may have faded without any immediate effect on the constitution, but it thus brought about, Barker would argue, a permanent alteration in the terms of political debate.

Barker’s monograph still bears some of the marks of its origin as a thesis: restriction of her discussion of the press’s political role to this one example; too much tentativeness and repetition of argument; some lack of perspective over time, which leads her to overemphasize the novelty of her arguments. Her bibliography cites none of Linda Colley’s or John Brewer’s articles (or, for that matter, my own) on earlier periods, which might have tempered her argument about the novelty of the role her newspapers claimed for “the people.” Barker’s work would have been more useful to the nonspecialist had she had space to describe more fully the press world of the 1770s and 1780s and compare it with other periods in the century. More important, it is unfortunate that her brief conclusion, while usefully moving the debate to a European context by suggesting contrasts between the “public spheres” of most continental countries and that of England, leaves untouched the major questions raised by the relatively light penetration of the English press into the rural areas where most people still lived and by the failure of the reform movement.

Nevertheless, by demonstrating an independent press as a vital part of a popular political culture that was “vigor and dynamic” (p. 7) in both metropolis and provinces, Barker makes a significant contribution to the debate about the nature of eighteenth-century England. Her study may lack the verve and breadth of either of the Harrises, Michael or Bob, on the earlier part of the century. But her careful examination of newspapers’ relations with their readers provides a vital methodological link in confidently connecting their content with those slippery concepts, “public opinion” and the “political nation.” This strength indeed gives, as Barker claims, a much greater specificity to our understanding of the press and politics in the later eighteenth century.

Marie Peters

Christchurch, New Zealand


Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2000. Pp. x + 405. $65.00 (cloth); $24.95 (paper).

This book is a lengthy narrative of the powerful religious revival of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that contributed so much to shaping Victorian England. Written from a conservative point of view, the book defends religion, evangelical Christianity, and the Victorians. The author, a senior research associate at the Ethics and Public Policy Center in Washington, D.C., reveals something of a desire to turn the clock back. His book is not strikingly original—it is more a survey based on secondary sources than a product of original research or fresh analysis—but it is well written and offers a welcome reminder of the central importance of religion to the English of the
early nineteenth century, especially to the people of the middle class. Useful as it is, however, the book lacks analytical depth and a sharply defined focus.

The volume begins with the familiar story of the evangelical revolt against the rationalism and complacency of the eighteenth century. Schlossberg pictures the eighteenth century in England as one of religious decline, survival of pagan vestiges in the countryside, blood sports, crime, and brutality. The sleepiness of the Church of England contributed to the problem. But the evangelicals, whose psychology and sociology Schlossberg does not explore, generated a religious revival that revitalized English Christianity and improved the manners and morals of English society. He does not accept that they had any hidden motives or guilty impulses. They wanted simply to express “the rightness of their cultural and social values and a responsibility to share those values with others—for the benefit of others” (p. 71).

Schlossberg provides a useful description of the moral fervor and philanthropic activities of the evangelicals, both in the church and in the dissenting denominations. Yet he has little to say about the appeals of evangelicalism to different social strata, and he is surprisingly weak on evangelical theology, which to him is simply salvation by faith. He says nothing about the evangelicals’ theology of original sin, saving grace, sanctification, or good works. His emphasis on the spirit of evangelicalism enables him to blur theological controversies between the evangelicals and the high and broad churchmen. Thus he treats in an unproblematic way both Tractarians like John Henry Newman and liberal churchmen like Thomas Arnold as linked to the evangelicals in the religious revival.

Schlossberg sees this religious revival as the principal force that transformed English culture, morality, and institutions. The evangelicals and their allies promoted schooling for the middle and working classes; they transformed reading materials to reflect their values; and they elevated to cultural prominence intellectual moralists like Carlyle, Dickens, and Ruskin, all of whom were influenced by evangelicalism. Further, the evangelicals attacked slavery, cruelty, and traditional pub culture while promoting respectability, the family, and the “religious style” one associates with the Victorians (p. 241). The religious revival made the English uniquely moralistic among the European nations. It also profoundly changed institutions like the Indian Empire, the public schools, and prisons. All this amounted to a revolution.

Likewise, the evangelicals addressed the “condition of England” question. Here Schlossberg shows that he has not quite digested the latest historiography of the industrial revolution. Schlossberg is aware of work by historians like Boyd Hilton, who argue that many evangelicals became advocates of political economy, despite its obvious inconsistency with some of Christ’s teachings, but he knows that many other early Victorians such as Lord Shaftesbury and Richard Oastler rejected political economy and adopted paternalism precisely because they were evangelicals. Likewise, Schlossberg agrees with earlier scholars in saying that in many policies the evangelicals converged with the utilitarians, who were archdescendants of the Enlightenment. He insists that the evangelicals were progressive, not individualistic in their social views, even though their theology of salvation was intensely personal and introverted. Such paradoxes have long challenged historians of the period. Schlossberg’s solution to these thorny problems is to resort to the “climate of opinion” and the “ameliorative impulse” without explaining where these shadowy forces came from (p. 203).

Schlossberg is certainly correct in emphasizing, as did Elie Halévy, J. Kitson Clark, and many others before him, the significance of evangelical Christianity to early nineteenth-century England. He has gathered a great deal of information and synthesized it in a smooth and clear story of how a corrupt and cruel old England of the eighteenth
century became the good and progressive England of the nineteenth. Yet his narrative remains unsatisfying. The problems are three: (1) in his analysis of evangelicals Schlossberg is content to take them at their word, and this makes his account almost entirely uncritical and thus incapable of explaining why everyone did not become an evangelical; (2) his social analysis is inadequate, especially in regard to the role of evangelicalism in the construction of class and gender; and (3) he does not distinguish among several important but very different themes, and they get in each other’s way: evangelicalism and its manifestations, English Christianity in general, the process by which England was “civilized,” and the emergence of Victorian values and institutions. Schlossberg evidently wishes to discuss all these things, presumably in hopes of inspiring emulation of the Victorians today. But he mixes these themes together and thus admits a degree of incoherence to an otherwise earnest and well-informed account.

THOMAS WILLIAM HEYCK

Northwestern University


The question of national identity has become a popular one in recent years, in histories of nearly all parts of the world. Such studies have particularly flourished in the field of English/British history (where the very multiplicity of names for the country indicates deep-rooted unresolved identity questions). Many studies have examined aspects of national identity making, from the Middle Ages on, within the territories that became the United Kingdom. In the last few years the scope of this inquiry has widened to embrace social scientists and literary scholars, who have published such stimulating contributions as Ian Baucom’s Out of Place: Englishness, Empire, and the Locations of Identity (Princeton, N.J., 1999) and Eve Darian-Smith’s Bridging Divides: The Channel Tunnel and English Legal Identity in the New Europe (Berkeley, 1999).

Stephanie Barczewski carries on this inquiry, focusing on the nineteenth century, which has been less examined in regard to this question than have earlier centuries, and choosing as a lens the contrasting myths of King Arthur and of Robin Hood, both of which flourished in nineteenth-century Britain as never before. Basing her study on a wide reading of many minor and generally forgotten literary works, she closely examines how each of these two medieval figures of questionable authenticity became the center of a complex of values, sentiments, and ideas about nationhood. She argues that although these myths developed over centuries they took on a new role beginning in the later eighteenth century, as rivalry with other states heightened and an empire was recognized to have come into existence. Both the king and the outlaw became explicitly national heroes. Barczewski charts how each myth both contributed to and challenged “the attempt to build a consensual, celebratory national ‘history’ based on the notion of Britain’s uniquely felicitous political evolution and a related sense of a distinctive national character” (p. 1). Faces of these myths that are either supportive or subversive of the existing order are each given their due (with Arthur’s being primarily supportive and Robin Hood’s leaning to the subversive).

Barczewski first traces the emergence of these two myths in their new role and examines the meanings given to them by various publics. She then follows the development of this new role through a series of topical chapters, relating first the myth of
Arthur and then that of Robin Hood to the rise of English studies, Anglo-Saxon racialism, and imperialism. Finally, she discusses their relationship to changing notions of womanhood, concluding with a brief assessment of how the images and roles of Arthur and Robin Hood changed in the new circumstances of the twentieth century.

In the course of the nineteenth century, one of the chief ways the English language became part of the essence of British (seen as virtually identical with English) nationality was through the establishment of a national literature—a process that has come to be a major subject for literary scholars. Barczewski demonstrates how this movement increased the importance and the influence of the Arthurian and Robin Hood myths, and how they in turn contributed to this movement, as the *Morte d’Arthur* and the Robin Hood ballads became incorporated in the national canon. As Anglo-Saxon racialism rose, both Arthur, the Celtic king, and Robin Hood became quintessentially English. Indeed, particularly through the enormous influence of Scott’s *Ivanhoe* (1820), Robin Hood became the archetypal Saxon hero, fighting against the alien Norman yoke. It was more difficult to transmute Arthur into an English ideal, but, with the aid of Tennyson’s *Idylls of the King* (1859), followed by many more simplistic writers, it was accomplished. Imperialism highlighted the opposite tendencies of the myths, Arthur’s easily supporting and elevating the empire, Robin Hood’s providing an alternative national ideal for those who disliked or criticized it. The noble knights going out through the world in search of the Holy Grail stood in sharp contrast to the freeborn Englishmen of Sherwood Forest seeking their birthrights, endangered because of a king who had forsaken the care of his people for a distant crusade. Again, the conservative picture of dangerous and misbehaving women at Arthur’s court contrasted with the “liberated” Maid Marian, who won more favor from Victorian writers and readers than might have been expected—suggesting, as in other spheres, that “Victorian values” were more complicated and strained than once was thought. As Barczewski concludes, the fact that two such different figures could simultaneously function as national heroes “suggests that British national identity is more complex than historians have often assumed” (p. 246).

Barczewski demonstrates that even by the close of the period discussed by her mentor, Linda Colley, in the influential book *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837* (New Haven, Conn., 1992), much about the national identity remained in play. She also shows convincingly that in continuing to explore the ongoing process of national identity formation these two myths are most useful lenses. Perhaps the most interesting chapter is that on the rise of Anglo-Saxon racialism, where the uses given to the two myths aptly highlight not only a strengthening racial thinking but also an accompanying English cultural imperialism, retrospectively claiming non-English parts of Britain as essentially English. Further, this work’s extensive use of literary sources, even very “uncanonical” ones, valuably introduces a broad range of hitherto-ignored sources and affords greater access to the cultural work done by imaginative writing, however humble its literary merits.

At the same time, however, the accompanying near-exclusion of nonliterary materials and approaches also limits what Barczewski can find. For all the insistence on complexity, this work often relies on ideal types and sharp and perhaps unreal polarities, and this is most apparent in the chapter on women. Structured on a contest between repressive “separate spheres” and liberating “autonomy” notions, this chapter drastically simplifies each “side”; nineteenth-century notions of gender can only be squeezed into so tight a corset with serious distortion. In general, as Barczewski acknowledges, she has less that is new to contribute to the well-studied Arthurian side of the story, and the value of this work ultimately lies chiefly in its interesting and fresh treatment
of the uses of the Robin Hood myth and in its thoughtful comparisons between the two.

Following the Arthur and the Robin Hood myths, we see the processes of Western national identity construction from a fresh angle. We are also able to discern what was distinctively British in this big story, such as the special tension between Englishness and Britishness and the related but separate tension between an imperial and an island identity—both of these overlying the almost universally shared struggle between central and local identities. Also, looking at Robin Hood’s image in the Victorian mind as well as the more often studied images of Arthur and his court brings out the duality of national conceptions in Britain: widely influential “conservative” and “radical” myths coexisted through the century, neither able to vanquish the other. Nineteenth-century Britain was indeed a more complicated “nation” than once supposed.

Rice University


The exhibitions of the nineteenth century were the showcases of modernity. In the systematic display of the national product, ruling regimes provided a telling show of visual and technological capital and their command of large-scale planning and logistics. As Jeffrey Auerbach recognizes in his impressive study of this hugely successful mother of all exhibitions, such an exercise was “the product of a manifestly political process” (p. 228). Here is a prime occasion for examining the competing agendas and ideologies of dominant interests, exposed in the urgency of staging a great national production on time and up to expectations. The phenomenon has been replayed in Britain’s Millennium Dome, lending Auerbach’s book an additional timeliness—in 2001, major anniversaries of both the Exhibition and Victoria’s death will be marked with a grand conference in London. The commemorative saliency of the Great Exhibition, with its challenge to reassess its epochal significance, is no doubt a further attraction for the historian.

Auerbach pays little direct attention to the theme and literature of modernity, though necessarily acknowledging its most conspicuous manifestation in Joseph Paxton’s boldly adventurous design for the “Crystal Palace” that housed the Great Exhibition in London’s Hyde Park. This vast greenhouse of prefabricated and standardized modules of glass and iron was the first great modernist arcade. A spectacle in itself, the Crystal Palace and its panorama of exhibits achieved a dramatic magnification of the delusional optics of capitalist modernity, constituting what Walter Benjamin would term “an ironic Utopia” whose dreamlike properties produced culture shock among many of its six million visitors. In its anticipation of the department store and the mall, the Crystal Palace was, as other historians have noted, a key institution in the schooling of the modern consumer. For Karl Marx—one of the visitors whose observations are surpris ingly not recorded in the book’s extensive review of contemporary testimony—the Great Exhibition was a prime site of commodity fetishism. It was also the scene of much eating and drinking, revealing the opportunities for modern mass catering that historians have ignored but that the contractor J. Schweppe was to parlay into a fortune marketing the new soft drinks. Following Tony Bennett’s application of Foucault’s model of governmentality to the nineteenth-century museum, we might also discern
the operation of a new “soft” technology of state control at the Great Exhibition, for its organization of space, numbers, and scopic fields would have induced a similar collective self-policing among its visitors. Thus, “to see and be seen,” which Auerbach discovers as a coinage of the London Times, denotes not only the pleasures of social display but also a new dimension of cultural hegemony.

While acknowledging the role of the Great Exhibition in “the coming of age” of a consumer society, Auerbach places greater emphasis on its productivist message. Its prime significance, he contends, was that it “defined Britain as an industrial nation” (p. 127). The Great Exhibition collapsed an older meaning of industry as exemplary human labor into a new image of industry as market-driven mechanized production. Henry Cole, the tireless civil servant who was the original author of the scheme, also urged an improvement in taste and design but was disappointed by British manufacturers interested more in quantity than quality. Among the many critics of its aesthetic deficiencies, the young William Morris declared the Great Exhibition “wonderfully ugly” (though he never actually went inside).

If this was a political event, it was one from which the politicians initially kept their distance, wary of the partisan implications of a public venture that invoked a common national interest yet set free trade against protectionism. Cole and his cadre of notables functioned as what Kitson Clark called “statesmen in disguise,” fashioning an inoffensive but appealing rhetoric of inclusion that dissolved the misgivings of politicians and public alike. Cole converted Prince Albert, who overcame an early reluctance to become a veritable standard bearer for the Great Exhibition, earning the popular favor the British public had hitherto withheld from their Queen’s German consort. Victoria too was won over, making more than a score of visits and declaring it “a complete and beautiful triumph.” As Auerbach adroitly demonstrates, Cole and company secured a comprehensive public relations success, advancing the claims of a new liberal polity by the Great Exhibition’s successful mix of centralized planning and ardent voluntarism—it was financed entirely by public subscription. The exemplary conduct of working-class visitors on the cheaper “shilling days” allayed immediate bourgeois fears of renewed Chartist agitation such as threatened London with insurrection in 1848. Henry Vincent, still working for the cause, regarded the Great Exhibition as “a movement to wean the people off politics” (p. 134). This kind of judgment has established the Great Exhibition of 1851 as the key event in securing passage from the social and political storms of the early Victorian era to the calmer seas of a mid-Victorian “age of equipoise.”

In effect, Auerbach both advances and dispels claims for any such epochal or threshold status. In alerting us to its complex contradictions of meaning, the bold profile of the Great Exhibition materialized and symbolized by its iconic Crystal Palace tends to dissipate. Thus he identifies, plausibly enough, strong evidence both of integration and segregation (of the classes), of pacifism and aggressive triumphalism (the exhibition as a “warlike event,” p. 189). While the Great Exhibition effected some redefinition in national identity, it also dramatized what proved to be long-running issues and anxieties in British society.

The first comprehensive academic study of the Great Exhibition, this is a valuable addition to the growing scholarship on modern festivals. (Keith Walden, Becoming Modern in Toronto: The Industrial Exhibition and the Shaping of a Late Victorian Culture [Toronto, 1997] is a fine example of recent work in the field.) It is packaged in a handsome, richly illustrated volume befitting its august subject. Auerbach proves
as earnest and industrious as Cole, if occasionally too much so in footnotes with more ballast than cargo—does the point that deviant dress causes cultural anxiety require support from a monograph on cross-dressing?

Peter Bailey

University of Manitoba


Protestantism failed to establish more than a minority presence in France, but the reformations of the sixteenth century continue to inflect historians’ understanding of the country’s social and cultural development. Although nineteenth-century scholarship contributed to this historiographical centrality, in its current form it derives chiefly from Lucien Febvre, cofounder of the Annales and of the history of mentalities. Febvre stressed the pervasiveness of religion in early modern life, a pervasiveness that diminished (he believed) only with the scientific and philosophical innovations of the mid-seventeenth century. In this mental world, according to his well-known formulation, atheism was unthinkable, and men and women employed mental tools that differed radically from our own. For Febvre and his intellectual heirs, the history of early modern mentalities largely overlapped with the history of religious belief, for religion structured all other domains of cultural and psychological life. The historian’s task was to make sense of these radically different structures.

The two works here under review demonstrate the continuing force of Febvre’s intellectual legacy, despite the criticisms it has received in recent years from such scholars as Roger Chartier, G. E. R. Lloyd, and Michael Buckley. In some respects the two works represent very different historical approaches. Thierry Wanegffelen is concerned mainly with theologians and the history of ideas. His sources are correspondingly literary and philosophical, and his chronological interests very broad; the book moves from the late Middle Ages, through the Council of Trent, and then to the debates surrounding Jansenism in the later seventeenth century. Ann W. Ramsey, in contrast, is mainly interested in religion as practiced by ordinary Catholics at one (extraordinary) moment: the political and religious crisis of the Catholic League, the movement that in 1589 took control of Paris and several other leading cities and sought to institute wide-ranging social and governmental reforms. Accordingly, her sources are mainly archival and local; though she considers some theologians and extends her gaze back to 1540 and forward to 1630, this is essentially a book about Parisian piety in 1590.

But despite their differences, the two books can usefully be read together as efforts to grapple with Febvre’s legacy on his own empirical terrain, that of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Wanegffelen invokes Febvre explicitly and often; in the book’s preface, Pierre Chaunu accurately describes Wanegffelen as a Febvre disciple. Ramsey offers no such explicit references; Febvre appears in neither her index nor her
notes. Yet her book directly pursues his concerns, both substantive and methodological,
and in some ways she is actually the more faithful disciple. The two books share another
trait. Both convey intense engagement with the religious issues they analyze. Wanegff-
elen writes from an explicitly Christian perspective and seeks to understand the alter-
native paths that the church might have taken in the religious crises of the sixteenth
century—and thus, he implies, the paths that it might take today. Ramsey’s commit-
ments again remain mostly unstated, but she makes it clear that she is seeking to rescue
a valid form of Catholic piety from the “Politique historians [of the sixteenth century]
and their secularist successors in the French Revolution and the Third Republic” and
from “the secular imperatives at the heart of modern history” (p. 219). We need, she
argues, to take religion more seriously as an autonomous historical force.

Her rescue effort involves exploring forms of religious practice that shocked some
sixteenth-century thinkers and that seem very alien to the twenty-first-century world.
In the sixteenth century, she argues, militant Catholics made little distinction between
body and soul. Their piety was “performative” and “immanent” (her terms), meaning
that they believed sacred forces to be constantly present in the physical world and that
the Christian should enact religious doctrines—experience them bodily as well as in-
tellectually. Echoing Febvre’s claims about the mental possibilities of distant eras,
Ramsey believes that a Christian of this sort “surely did not understand the . . . di-
chotomy between civil and sacred because both domains were integral to his religious
experience and his ontology of self” (p. 127). Such readiness to mix sacred and profane
outraged both Protestants and Catholic royalists, who argued that political obligations
superseded the demands of piety and that true Christian belief was internal, not a matter
for armed marches and rebellions. A deep cultural divide thus characterized sixteenth-
century Paris. On the one side stood advocates of a new royalist political philosophy,
who argued that spiritual life should be limited to the private sphere and should not
affect the running of the state. On the other were those who preserved older traditions
that integrated public and private, corporeal and spiritual, and sacred and profane. The
violent upheavals of the League expressed the clash between opposing ways of seeing
the world.

To document these interpretations, Ramsey turns to a difficult and important source,
the 727 surviving testaments that Parisians passed before notaries in 1590, when the
League controlled the city against a besieging royalist army. For comparative purposes,
she also considers smaller samples from 1543–44 and 1630. Analysis of this rich source
material forms the core of her book, and her method further attaches her work to
Febvre’s vision of the history of mentalities. Like Febvre, she wants to quantify cultural
values, mapping from scattered indications in the documents the shape of an otherwise
unknowable mental world. Other scholars, of course, have used testaments as a way to
understand popular religious values, but Ramsey has undertaken an especially close
examination. She attempts to quantify the full range of symbolic gestures that the
testaments contain, measuring how closely individual testators conformed to her model
of a Christianity that acted through physical objects and in the physical world. On this
basis, she argues for a complicated relationship between the spirituality of devoted
Leaguers, those responsible for the movement’s radicalism, and other Parisians. Leagu-
ers (she claims) felt an especially intense spirituality, and their testaments insisted with
particular force on the connectedness of religion and daily life. In these ways they
differed from other Parisians, but in other ways their spirituality was an inheritance
from the late medieval past that all Parisians shared. Partly for that reason, it would
have an important influence on the Catholic renewal that characterized seventeenth-
century France.
Yet if Ramsey’s work shows the continuing appeal of a quantitative history of mentalities, the sort that Febvre called for, it also abundantly illustrates the problems in such an approach, problems that have led many historians to abandon quantification altogether. For despite her heroic efforts, counting proves an awkward tool for capturing the nuances of gesture and symbolism that she sees as crucial to sixteenth-century piety; there are simply too many gestures and too many subtle differences among the testators. As a result, much of the book in fact consists of close readings of individual testaments, which is very much in the spirit of recent cultural historians’ explorations of individual cases and microhistories. These close readings, together with the intricate statistical distinctions that Ramsey seeks to draw, leave the reader ultimately uncertain about the concept of a unitary League piety, for the analysis divides the Leaguers into an expanding array of small subgroupings, many of them too small for reliable inference. But Ramsey seems determined to resist the skeptical implications of her data, and in the end she falls back on a classic conclusion, arguing that cultural crisis marked the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, as inherited forms of spirituality came under attack from political and religious reformers. “The culture that the Leaguers sought to defend” (p. 213) involved ultimately a view of the person and a larger ontology, both of which refused to divide the profane from the sacred. Ramsey’s conclusions return wholeheartedly to Febvre’s, stressing the sixteenth century’s inability to make intellectual distinctions that we find elementary.

Wanegffelen likewise sees cultural crisis in the sixteenth century, but it is a strikingly different one and attaches his history to a different aspect of Febvre’s thought. Whereas Ramsey presents an updated version of Febvre’s history of mentalities, Wanegffelen pursues Febvre’s interest in the Erasmian culture that attracted so many sixteenth-century intellectuals, cutting across the apparently straightforward division between Catholic and Protestant. From this starting point, he proposes a broad reconceptualization of the course of sixteenth-century religious history. What historians have conventionally presented as Martin Luther’s radical innovations did not necessarily seem so at the time. Many late medieval theologians accepted the idea of justification by faith, and Luther’s questions about the power of the church hierarchy fitted widely accepted traditions. For Wanegffelen, religious revolution came not from Luther’s reflections, which the church might easily have accommodated, but from its response to him. Most important, the church radically redefined itself during the Council of Trent in response to the papacy’s strategic needs. Only at this point did the doctrine of works come to be fully established, and only then did the Mass come to be defined as an exalted sacrifice; only at this point as well was there categorical affirmation of the church hierarchy, which increasingly diminished lay participation in church ritual. Historians have long suggested that Trent cleared up uncertainties that had accumulated in medieval Catholicism. Wanegffelen pushes this conventional wisdom much farther, arguing that Trent constituted a fundamentally new notion of Catholic belief. He thus shares with Ramsey a view of the later sixteenth century as a radical, ultimately destructive divergence from medieval religious traditions that might well have developed in altogether different directions. But his view of medieval Christianity and of the broader relations between medieval and modern cultures differs sharply from hers. No unbridgeable gap separates us from the religious culture of the Middle Ages, his work implies; its thought remains in important respects familiar to us and addresses problems relevant to our spiritual lives. Despite his references to Febvre, Wanegffelen has in some ways questioned the central problematic of the history of mentalities itself. His work gives less attention to the otherness of the past than to its points of similarity and contact with the present.
Wanegffelen documents this argument with a wide range of texts, and the work displays an impressive command of scholastic opinions. He makes an altogether persuasive case that these strands existed in medieval religious thought and that Tridentine decisions reoriented Catholic thought rather than merely clarifying it. But his work too raises problems of method, especially when we set it against the kind of approach that Ramsey has adopted. Above all, it raises questions about the relationship between church doctrine and the practices of ordinary Catholics. Of particular importance to the French case, how are we to understand the shock that Protestantism generated among these ordinary Catholics during the sixteenth century? Ramsey writes within an intellectual tradition that offers coherent answers to these questions, by stressing the radicalism of Protestant innovations and their challenge to long-standing ideas about personality and community; when they fought over religion, on this view, sixteenth-century men and women fought over basic social and cultural values. It is less clear how we are to understand religious violence if we accept Wanegffelen’s view that Catholicism might so easily have absorbed the reformers. Are we to see Catholic rioters as only misguided and manipulated, responding only to the labels that Catholic authorities attached to Protestantism?

Febvre believed that he had laid bare the mental structures of the sixteenth century and that he could define even the areas that it found unthinkable. No historian today can share his jaunty overconfidence, yet Febvre’s questions and methods retain surprising force. In their different ways, Wanegffelen and Ramsey recall historians’ attention to the borderline between religious ideas and broader cultural practices. Their books require that we think seriously about how the work of intellectuals intersected with the spiritual needs of ordinary Christians, and, more broadly still, that we think about the nature of the break between the sixteenth century and the modernities that followed.

Jonathan Dewald


The success of Molière’s 1663 comedy, *L’école des femmes*, provoked vicious print attacks on both the play and the author. The *querelle* lasted for half a year, during which time Molière wrote two remarkable one-act plays, both staged by his troupe as a response to his critics. The first, *La critique de l’école des femmes*, presented a group of Parisian elites in a private residence discussing the merits of Molière’s controversial play immediately after attending its performance. Through witty characterizations and innuendoes, Molière offered a smart rebuttal to his jealous critics. When the latter refused to relent in their criticism, however, Molière penned a second response, the *Impromptu de Versailles*, set in an antechamber at the court of Louis XIV. In this second riposte, the playwright depicts himself and the other members of his troupe in the process of rehearsing a play to be performed before the Sun King. While waiting for the royal summons, “Molière” and his colleagues discuss the merits of the attacks made on his work. Both the *Critique* and the *Impromptu* served as models for genres that lasted well into the eighteenth century. Since then, along with several other self-
referential passages in the Molière canon, they have tempted literary critics and historians to read them as transparent representations of the celebrated playwright and his public.

Larry Norman’s careful monographic study takes up the challenge posed by Molière’s baroque self-reflexivity. In the century just ended, Norman writes, there has been a tendency to downplay contemporary satirical references in Molière in favor of universal, moralizing messages about hypocrites, misers, and other “types” targeted by the playwright’s satirical quill. This emphasis has served the needs of literary critics and stage directors, both of whom fear their audiences’ inability to engage with the issues and behaviors that mattered so much to Molière’s contemporaries. Norman, however, argues that it is necessary to see the plays as “public mirrors,” a term the playwright himself used to describe the vivid exchanges between performers and audience members that took place in Parisian theaters and private elite gatherings in the 1660s. In the first part of the book, dubbed “Creation,” Norman compares the ending of the Critique, where the characters agree it might be worthwhile to write up their ruminations and submit them to Molière for staging, with evidence in memoirs and elsewhere that this was, in fact, a popular pastime among le monde in the 1660s. Donneau de Visé, a journalist and dramaturgical contemporary of Molière, claims to have witnessed Molière at elite gatherings and to have overheard conversations in which the preparation of such memoirs was planned. In other words, without denying Molière’s creative contribution to his plays, Norman suggests his spectators were significant collaborators in his dramaturgic project. In the second part of the work, however, titled “Recognition,” Norman points out that the shock of spectator self-recognition on the stage carried dangers for both the playwright and his overly eager audience. The solipsism of the Impromptu, or of Pierre Corneille’s Illusion comique, is not a result of these authors’ desire to play on the universal paradoxes of theatrical illusion. Rather, it reflects their determination, at a specific point in the history of the West, to point out the similarities between self-fashioning onstage and outside the walls of the theater. For Molière’s audience, society itself is a comedy of manners, and the theater that reflects this comedy is both endlessly intriguing and threatening. Finally, in the last part of the book, “Dramaturgy,” Norman turns to the Misanthrope, a play that satirizes social satirists themselves, holding up the public mirror to Molière’s own activity. In so doing, Norman moves from an analysis of the mechanisms of representing social commerce in Molière to a discussion of the moral intent of the author. Through the play’s leading characters, Alceste and Célimène, Molière criticizes the entire spectrum of French society. Yet at the end of the play their future happiness, and that of society at large, is in question. Relentless satirical criticism of others, by his characters or implicitly by Molière, has not guaranteed individual happiness or moral reform. The play’s ultimate purpose, and Molière’s most important message, Norman suggests, is to make the audience more aware of the constructed nature of self-identity. As the play ends, spectators and readers are more aware of “our system of representing ourselves” (p. 209).

While Norman’s recontextualization of Molière’s social satire makes for vivid literary criticism, historians who turn to its pages may not find that it resolves all the problems inherent in using theater sources as guides to the past. In fairness, it should be noted that Norman has not set out to write a social or cultural history of the early years of Louis XIV’s personal rule. His accounts of creative collaboration between Molière and his audience rely almost exclusively on intensive readings of the last scene of the Critique and on a few passages from Donneau de Visé. But there may have been other modes of interaction in the theaters and ruelles that did not replicate the polite
conversation depicted in the Critique; police reports on audience behavior in the parterres, or pits, of this period indicate the potential for greater violence and disruptiveness in the playhouse than one would guess from reading Molière and his critics. Norman’s larger theoretical view of French “self-fashioning” in the 1660s is heavily indebted to Norbert Elias’s view of the civilizing process at the court of Louis XIV, but Elias relies primarily on the memoirs of the Duc de Saint-Simon, an observer at Versailles a generation after the period of Molière’s activity. Furthermore, as Roger Chartier has recently demonstrated, the reception of Molière at court in the 1660s, where the plays were often part of elaborate festivities that also involved dance, music, and feasting, differed dramatically from the reception of the pared-down performances in the public theaters of the capital. Finally, while the attention Norman devotes to the Misanthrope in the final third of the work makes sense from a literary perspective, it may not be a sure guide to the taste of the playwright’s contemporaries. Box office receipts indicate that the play was far less popular in the 1660s than other full-length plays by Molière, a fact that calls into question its use as a measure of Parisians’ engagement with Molière’s exploration of the social uses of satire.

These criticisms notwithstanding, Norman has written a sustained and considerable meditation on Molière’s depiction of “social commerce,” or the fashioning of individual identity through social interaction with others, in the early reign of the Sun King. Those interested in the history of subjectivity and curious about the plays of Molière as a guide to their topic will find much to ponder in this work.

JEFFREY S. RAVEL

Massachusetts Institute of Technology


University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000. Pp. x + 292. $65.00 (cloth); $19.95 (paper).

Good historians do not just stumble across a great source, they “make” the source by realizing what can be done with documents that others might have dismissed as mundane. Christine Adams deserves full credit for figuring out how best to use the unusually large trove of personal letters—some three hundred of them—exchanged between members of an upper-middle-class family from Bordeaux in the middle of the eighteenth century. There was nothing very remarkable about the Lamothes, a comfortably well-off clan of provincial professionals: the barrister Daniel de Lamothe and his wife had seven dutiful children, five sons who followed honorable callings (three lawyers, a doctor, and a priest), and two daughters who never married. But the very obscurity of the family coupled with the depth of knowledge that Adams achieves about them—she supplements the letters with a wide range of other sources—are precisely what make this book both mesmerizing and illuminating.

At first, the Lamothes seem too good to be true. They are introduced to us through their family relationships in letters that ooze sentimental devotion. The patriarch Daniel and his wife enjoyed an “affectionate and mutually respectful marriage” (p. 28). They made sacrifices to pay for the sons’ expensive educations, the sons showed properly effusive gratitude, and the daughters devoted their lives to fussing over their brothers and parents. (While Adams presents an appropriately nuanced picture of these relations, one wishes that she had delved deeper into possible motives and models for this sen-
timentalization of family life.) It is a relief when, in the course of Adams’s account, these paragons show signs of being real human beings, as when the brothers Alexis and Victor turn out to be well acquainted with local actress courtesans, Alexis has sexual longings for a married acquaintance, or Alexandre requests that his brother send him a couple of pornographic pamphlets from Paris. The funniest incident has to do with a family crisis involving relations with the uppity Parisian relatives who are looking out for young Victor in the capital and scarf down in his absence the poule dinde his family has sent him as a gift: a flurry of letters are devoted to figuring out a way subtly to berate the gluttonous Parisians without burning any useful bridges.

No family, thank goodness, is without its oddities. The most curious feature of this conventionally loving clan is that only one of the seven offspring, Delphin, married and had children. At least one of the unwed sons expressed explicit distaste for marriage, but Adams wisely refrains from delving too far into possible psychological causes. While no single explanation would suffice, Adams points out that this odd pattern of celibacy seems in keeping with the family’s overall strategy, evident in testamentary dispositions as well, of pooling their resources and keeping the family fortune as undivided as possible.

The Lamothes’ combination of extreme financial caution and sentimentalized devotion to the nuclear family irresistibly conjures up the word “bourgeois,” which appears in Adams’s title. While Adams is tentative in her conclusion (“A budding class consciousness? Perhaps” [p. 259]), this microhistory stands as a significant contribution to the reemerging debate about the existence and identity of a bourgeoisie or middle class in prerevolutionary France. The Lamothes are anything but bourgeois in the marxian sense, keeping as they do a careful distance from anybody linked to trade, even in France’s most commercial city. At first glance they appear to embody a section of the “mixed elite” identified by revisionist arguments: they cultivate, as the book’s title puts it, “comfort and status,” buy landed property as well as urban real estate, mix with the city elites in local learned academies, and marry into the lower end of the robe nobility.

One might expect such a family to have their eyes firmly trained on the aristocratic prize, but their choices point to a different set of ideals. As Adams notes, it is remarkable that a family whose professional tradition was the law never directed their resources toward purchasing a venal office, the standard route to ennoblement. Instead, they chose at the cost of considerable financial difficulty to invest in expensive professional educations for all of their sons. Predictably, family members showed no sign of any clear middle-class consciousness, or even any discernible animus toward the nobility. The allegiances they proclaimed were to family, region (Bordeaux was their patrie), and above all profession. What is most striking in Adams’s two excellent chapters on professional identity is the extent to which the lawyer Delphin and the physician Victor proclaimed an ethic of service, of dedication to the public good. Neither profession was especially lucrative, and the Lamothe sons seemed mostly interested in using their professional skills to further social progress. Delphin and Alexis idealized their lawyerly calling and participated in campaigns for legal and penal reform; Victor showed active concern for indigent mothers and newborn, and he sought to promote smallpox vaccination and the use of artificial milk.

If we were to call these members of the provincial professional class “bourgeois,” we would need to redefine the term drastically. Conspicuously lacking in the Lamothes’ ethos is any inclination toward individualism—their words and deeds show, on the contrary, a dogged devotion to the collective good of both the family and society. If their culture prefigures the Revolution in any way, it is not in any inclination toward the free market or personal ambition but in the cultivation of a strong ideal of public
service. Adams’s vivid and moving recreation of one family’s universe suggests that we still have much to learn about the French middle classes, a group that does not fit easily into the neat categories historians have devised for it.

SARAH MAZA

Northwestern University


For some time signs have accumulated that the conventional wisdom surrounding the Paris Clinical School has been in need of revision. The orthodoxy was established by two oddly paired books, Erwin Ackerknecht’s Medicine at the Paris Hospital, 1794–1848 (Baltimore, 1967) and Michel Foucault’s Birth of the Clinic (London, 1973, originally published as Naissance de la clinique [Paris, 1963]), which, despite radically different approaches, argued some crucial, shared points about Paris medicine in the wake of the French Revolution. Chief among these was the view that it was the Paris school that first established the procedures of pathological anatomy and linked knowledge gained from bedside observation with that obtained by postmortem dissection. The valuation placed on such knowledge by Ackerknecht and Foucault differed dramatically: Ackerknecht celebrated this development as little less than the origin of modern medicine while Foucault decried the intrusiveness of the clinician’s “gaze.” Nevertheless, they were at one in ascribing dramatic developments to the Paris Clinical School.

As Caroline Hannaway and Ann La Berge explain in their lucid overview of historical “constructions” of Paris medicine, Ackerknecht also attributed other key innovations to the Paris Clinical School: the union of medicine and surgery, the institutionalization of clinical training, the adoption of active methods of physical examination, the privileging of the hospital as the site of research and teaching, and the routine use of medical statistics. The editors also recall Ackerknecht’s claim that Paris’s preeminence was demonstrated by its position, secure until midcentury, as the medical “mecca” that drew greater numbers of aspiring students from foreign lands than any other.

Constructing Paris Medicine constitutes a sustained challenge to this interpretation of Paris medicine. The product of a conference held at the College of Physicians of Philadelphia in 1992, the volume presents a remarkably coherent and unified examination of its subject. Aside from the historiographical overview, the volume consists of eight essays, four of which are focused on individuals. L. S. Jacyna examines the interrelation of textual and pictorial representation in the famed dermatologic atlases of J. L. Alibert, arguing that Alibert established the physician himself at the center of a pathology characterized by moralizing and pathos. W. R. Albury’s essay on Corvisart and Broussais explores what he sees as the most significant “rupture” effected by the
Paris school: the demise of the generally benign cast of Hippocratic medicine, in which, so he argues, subjective feelings of good health were trusted, and the transition to a pervasive condition of medical anxiety induced by emphasis on hidden organic lesions. Drawing on her new biography of Laennec, Jacalyn Duffin explores the rivalry of Laennec and François Broussais, arguing that the putatively united Paris Clinical School was in fact riven with dissension and that the bitter exchanges between Laennec and Broussais revealed the lack of a shared language in which these dissensions could be expressed. Finally, Joy Harvey argues for the vitality of the Paris Clinical School in the years after 1848 by examining the correspondence of one insider—Paul Broca—and one student-visitor, the American physician Mary Putnam Jacobi.

Four essays in the volume focus on themes central to the historiography of the Paris Clinical School. Of all the historians working in this field, Othmar Keel has been and continues to be the most determined to overthrow the view that the Paris school was dramatically innovative. Just as he previously argued that Paris was not the model for innovations in clinical teaching but a latecomer to them, Keel claims here that, far from initiating the techniques collectively known as pathological anatomy, Paris appropriated prior work accomplished by eighteenth-century physicians elsewhere in Europe, especially John Hunter. Not only does Keel reject Foucault’s statement that between G. B. Morgagni and Xavier Bichat there gaped forty years of inactivity; he also denies the significance of Bichat’s contribution, characterizing it as programmatic and marred by a “mania” for classification. Keel provides a much-needed corrective to a tradition that has overemphasized the originality of the Paris Clinical School while undervaluing the work of eighteenth-century physicians, especially Morgagni and Hunter. One may nonetheless quarrel with features of Keel’s case. The piece includes much hectoring of other historians, especially Russell Maulitz, whose work on the English “migration” to Paris and the importation into Britain of Bichatian techniques becomes, needlessly, a centerpiece of Keel’s discussion. Keel would have done better to use this space to make his own substantive case, especially by presenting evidence for his almost wholly speculative claim that English clinicians of the nineteenth century themselves disregarded the “Hunterian” tradition—and judged the work of Bichat “revolutionary”—only because of professional jockeying over reform issues. These criticisms aside, however, this is an essential work of revision.

L. W. B. Brockliss seeks in his essay to counter the view, argued by Ackerknecht but ultimately resting on polemics of the Revolutionary era itself, that French medical education of the eighteenth century was slavishly traditional and opposed to all innovation, especially in respect to clinical instruction and openness to the “accessory sciences.” Here Brockliss amasses new evidence in support of an argument he has been making for some time, and, depending on how extreme a version of the original argument is kept in mind, he makes a persuasive case. Historians have recognized for some time that the failings of the pre-1789 system of medical education have been exaggerated. Yet as Brockliss himself says, only a “plausible hypothesis” (p. 99)—to the effect that the history of medical education between the late ancien régime and the early nineteenth century is one of more continuity than change—will be possible until a comprehensive study of the eighteenth-century faculties is undertaken.

Ann La Berge’s nuanced history of microscopy in Paris overturns the old claim that the microscope was uniformly disdained in Paris; at the same time she recognizes that hostility toward the new instrument, and toward the “German science” it was thought to represent, was widespread even after midcentury. La Berge makes common cause with John Lesch and others who have argued against Ackerknecht’s perception of a rigid divide between clinical medicine and “science.” It is to be hoped that these works
will encourage a full-scale examination of the integration of “laboratory” with “clinical” medicine in Paris, especially in the years after the purported “dead end” of 1848.

Finally, John Harley Warner explores the motivations of American physicians who traveled to Paris for medical education in the heyday of the Paris Clinical School and their gradual abandonment of Paris for Vienna and Berlin in the later nineteenth century. Like other contributors, Warner pursues to new depths a theme he has taken up elsewhere, especially his general challenge to the view that the flocking of students to a medical center may be taken as evidence of its intellectual superiority over competitors. Warner argues that American students went to Paris not to sit at the feet of professorial luminaries but to gain experience at the bedside and the dissecting table. Thanks chiefly to the institution of the “private course,” American students were able to accomplish this task in early nineteenth-century Paris more easily than anywhere else. By contrast, in later years, especially after private courses were banned as too intrusive for patients, students went elsewhere.

So, where does the historiography of the Paris Clinical School stand after the appearance of this volume? Certainly the Ackerknechtian orthodoxy has been seriously undermined. Similarly, those who have chosen to read Foucault’s works as empirical history of medicine may be discouraged from doing so by the assessments offered here. All the same, as the editors of the volume themselves affirm, no new synthesis in respect to the Paris Clinical School is yet possible. This is so not only because much work will be required to pursue the lines of investigation encouraged here but also because no definitive judgments about the Paris Clinical School can be made in isolation from study of those medical centers whose history has been effaced thanks in good part to the dazzling light thrown off by Paris. In brief, a comparative perspective is needed. Ackerknecht conceived of Paris medicine as he did not only, as is validly suggested at several points in this volume, because of his training and experience as a clinician but also because, like all historians of his era, he was inclined to see history through the prism of national experience, especially the seemingly earth-changing events of the French Revolution. Medicine is far from being the only field in which the impact of the French Revolution—long thought uniquely consequential—has come under close scrutiny. Although not suggested by this volume, this larger political perspective must, I think, figure prominently in any thoroughgoing revision of the place of the Paris Clinical School in the coming of medical modernity.

Whatever the larger significance of the Paris Clinical School, its key figures continue to fascinate medical historians, as Dora Weiner’s new biography of Philippe Pinel indicates. A meticulously researched account of Pinel’s life and activities, Weiner’s work is concerned to save Pinel’s reputation from what she sees as unfair or misleading accounts offered by his contemporaries and by medical historians. Weiner is dismissive of those historians who have challenged the originality of the Paris Clinical School, and she seeks to make a case for Pinel’s own originality while simultaneously undermining what she calls the “myth” of Pinel. The central element of the myth is the claim that it was Pinel personally who unchained the unfortunates at Bicêtre; Weiner takes pains to show that it was Pinel’s assistant Jean Baptiste Pussin who made this famous move, not Pinel himself. More generally, she denounces as self-serving the accounts offered of Pinel by his one-time disciple and then rival Jean Etienne Dominique Esquirol and by Pinel’s own son, both of whom portrayed him as a well-meaning philanthropist while diminishing his stature as a clinician and theorist of mental disorders. Weiner admires Pinel the philanthropist and humanitarian, but she also sees him as a clinician and scientist of brilliance and originality.

Weiner is at her best detailing the results of her own eager archival digging and that of French scholars recently active in the lively field of Pinelian scholarship. She un-
earths new information, for example, about Pinel’s domestic arrangements, especially his relations with Pussin and his wife Marguerite Jubline, who were instrumental in managing patients at Bicêtre and the Salpêtrière. She also attends closely to works by Pinel—writings, presentations to learned societies, and professorial offerings at the Paris faculty—that previously have been little discussed.

Weiner seems to have two analytic aims in this work: first, to argue that Pinel was well attuned to the scientific and medical developments of his day both in France and elsewhere; and second, to argue that Pinel himself should not be associated with unpleasant or repressive features of mental medicine or the asylum. In respect to the first, Weiner rejects suggestions made by Jan Goldstein and others that Pinel’s “moral treatment” owed much to the theatricality of the ancien régime medical charlatan (Weiner dismisses Goldstein’s analysis as a “caricature”), while accepting—despite her general assertion of Pinel’s originality—that Pinel drew heavily on other medical figures and traditions, especially the Montpellier training of his youth and the work of William Cullen. In respect to the second, she lays whatever blame might be assessed (while cautioning that the subject is fraught with anachronistic squeamishness) first on Pussin and later on the perversions of Pinel’s approach introduced by Esquirol. Whereas Pinel’s own practice furnished “le modèle d’une psychiatrie humaniste” (p. 154), Pussin’s administrative approach constituted—here she borrows from Marcel Gauchet and Gladys Swain—a “machine à socialiser” (p. 155). Similarly, where the republican and anticlerical Pinel was committed to humanitarianism and kindness, his errant disciple Esquirol, an ambitious fellow traveler of resurgent authoritarianism, did not guard adequately against abuses.

Historians interested in Pinel and the Paris Clinical School will be grateful to Weiner for her reproduction of such archival gleanings as a chart showing salaries paid to personnel at the Salpêtrière. In her sensitivity to vivid detail and in her skill in the archives, Weiner has few competitors. It seems unlikely, however, that her general assessment of Pinel will command assent among those inclined to view him, and the enterprise of mental medicine, more critically. Her insistence on the beneficence of Pinel’s scientism and humanitarianism will carry weight only with those who are willing, as she is, to take at their word the testimony of Pinel and his admirers. One example may be adduced. Upon learning from an admiring éloge that large numbers of Pinel’s onetime patients, most of them old women, accompanied his funeral cortège, Weiner does not ask—as a skeptic would—who organized these frail creatures for this demonstration of regret.

In respect to the issues raised by Constructing Paris Medicine, Weiner’s study lends support in competing directions. Somewhat in spite of herself, she gives credence to Keel’s claim that Paris clinicians took much from their British counterparts. Weiner accepts, for example, that Pinel, who performed few autopsies and was not interested in searching for the local lesions to which some believed mental ills must be ascribed, owed his classificatory interest in tissue pathology to Hunter. On another key issue, Weiner convincingly demonstrates that Pinel was attuned to developments in the “accessory sciences.” Yet her demonstration is strongest in respect to natural history, especially the nascent “natural history of man,” and this perspective tends to reinforce the view that the leading Paris clinicians were interested in descriptive and static rather than experimental and dynamic approaches. Regarding Pinel’s own originality in the domain of mental medicine, Weiner is adamant, but, as mental medicine itself has never figured centrally in interpretations of the significance of the Paris Clinical School, this argument remains on the periphery of the debates engaged in Constructing Paris Medicine.

E LIZABETH A. W ILLIAMS

Oklahoma State University

It is certainly no novelty to suggest that religion has a considerable influence on social norms and behavior. However, the exact nature and extent of this influence, and its relationship to other factors, remain as controversial today as in Max Weber’s day. Kevin McQuillan’s book deals with the influence of religion on demographic behavior. He begins by noting that models of fertility and mortality couched exclusively in terms of economic self-interest have generally been inadequate, so he proposes to consider cultural factors as well. Quite rightly emphasizing religion as a major cultural factor, his work deals, in particular, with the differences between the demographic behaviors of Catholics and Protestants. In the end, he can demonstrate this difference very convincingly; his efforts to explain it, though, are rather less successful.

The book takes the form of a regional case study, comparing Lutherans and Catholics in Alsace from the mid-eighteenth century through the first two-thirds of the nineteenth. Developing detailed vital statistics through family reconstitution for five villages, and supplementing the data with summary figures from twenty-one more, McQuillan shows a whole range of demographic differences between the confessions. Marital fertility rates were lower among Protestants than Catholics at the beginning of the period he studied, and these rates declined some 20 percent among Protestants in the subsequent 120 years, while staying largely the same for Catholics. The implication of the confessionally different practice of birth control in these broad statistics is supported by other indicators. Already in 1750, the mean for mother’s age at the birth of the last child was 2.4 years lower for Protestants than Catholics; by the mid-nineteenth century, the gap had increased to four years. Births were consistently more widely spaced in Protestant families as well.

Yet these considerable differences in fertility rates did not add up to larger Catholic families. A substantially higher proportion of Catholics than Protestants never married, and age at first marriage was consistently two years higher among Catholics (for both men and women) than Protestants. Mortality rates for infants and particularly for young children, ages one–four, were higher among Catholics as well.

The author’s demographic analysis is meticulous and technically well crafted. He is always careful to control for social class in his comparisons, although these controls generally do not change anything about the interconfessional differences in vital statistics. His use of the advanced and particularly powerful technique of logit regression to study influences on infant mortality is an unusually good example of effective multivariate, statistical analysis (pp. 152–58). I found McQuillan’s assertions of these broad differences between the confessions especially credible precisely because his analysis is not monocausal. He notes certain areas where other factors held sway. Age differences between spouses had nothing to do with religion and everything to do with social class: they were greatest in bourgeois marriages. In regard to whether and how soon someone would remarry after the death of a spouse, gender held sway, with both Protestant and Catholic men being much more likely to remarry than women, doing it noticeably sooner, and continuing to remarry at more advanced ages.

If the book’s strength is its demonstration of clear and substantial differences between members of two religious confessions in intimate behavior, its weakness lies in
its efforts to explain them. Problems begin with McQuillan’s use of the idea of the
demographic transition to frame his research. By now, there is a small mountain of
evidence against this notion of a universally valid, three-step process of changes in
vital rates from a “traditional” pattern of high, “natural” mortality and fertility, to a
transition period of declining mortality and high fertility, to a “modern” regime of low
mortality and low, controlled fertility. McQuillan himself shows that birth rates in
Alsace at the middle of the eighteenth century were already differentiated by confession
and that the decline in fertility rates among the Protestant population occurred before
there was much of any decline in mortality.

The largest difficulty I had with this book, though, is that McQuillan, after having
so carefully and effectively worked out the interconfessional differences in vital events,
could provide no effective explanation of them. An introductory chapter on sociological
theory only yields such truisms as the study of culture cannot be “cut off from the
social structures which support it and with which it interacts” (p. 6), “the cultural system
interacts with other elements of social structure, helping to shape aspects of social
organization while being itself refashioned by economic, environmental and political
forces” (p. 12), or “the greater the conflict between the material interests of individuals
and the values of their group, the greater the likelihood that the values will be ignored,
or, more likely, change in response to circumstances” (pp. 12–13).

By contrast, a concluding chapter offers a relatively concrete and quite plausible
explanation, suggesting that differences in vital behavior reflected the greater extent of
the process of secularization of the Protestants of Alsace in comparison with the Cath-
olics. However, this suggestion is not based on McQuillan’s own research but on
citations from a few secondary works, and the author cannot link these instances of
secularization, generally noted in regard to church attendance, political orientation, or
newspaper reading, to individuals’ and married couple’s sex lives or child rearing
practices. Another way to put it might be to say that there remains a conceptual and
empirical gap between the broad, universalizing (and sometimes tautological) socio-
logical concepts used by McQuillan to frame his study and the detailed empirical
evidence he provides. Of course, noting this gap is as much an invitation to further
research as it is a criticism of this thought-provoking study.

Jonathan Sperber

University of Missouri, Columbia

Religion and Identity in Modern France: The Modernization of the Protestant
Community in Languedoc, 1815–1848. By James C. Deming.

It is difficult to read the history of modern France without encountering the remarkable
influence of French Protestants. Although Protestants constituted a small minority—
typically close to 2 percent of the population—they made disproportionately large
contributions in a broad range of fields, including education, journalism, banking, the
textile industry, science, politics, and the historical profession.

Many authors have recognized the importance of Protestantism to their subject, but
few have paid detailed attention to it. Most recently, Philip Nord devoted a chapter to
the Liberal Protestantism of the 1850s and 1860s, in order to explain the importance
of Protestants in the development of French republicanism, in The Republican Moment:
Yet there exist few books in English examining this influential community. Burdette C. Poland produced the only volume with broad scope in 1957. His French Protestantism and the French Revolution: A Study in Church and State, Thought and Religion, 1685–1815 (Princeton, N.J., 1957) is now somewhat dated but remains a valuable survey of the period between the revocation of the Edict of Nantes and the Napoleonic settlement.

Two doctoral dissertations on Protestantism in modern France have reached print in the past half century. Stuart R. Schram brought out his Columbia University political science dissertation, which underscores André Siegfried’s observation of the role of Protestantism on the left in French politics. However, it was published only in an English-language edition in France and remains a rare book (Protestantism and Politics in France [Alençon, 1954]). More recently, James L. Osen turned his Wisconsin dissertation into a biography of pastor Adolphe Monod, which is at the same time a good introduction to early nineteenth-century Protestantism (Prophet and Peacemaker: The Life of Adolphe Monod [Lanham, Md., 1984]).

It is therefore welcome news that James C. Deming of Princeton Theological Seminary has added to this list by publishing a revision of his University of Notre Dame dissertation as Religion and Identity in Modern France: The Modernization of the Protestant Community in Languedoc, 1815–1848. This is a case study of the Calvinist community in the Cévennes, where many of the Huguenots (once 33 percent of the French population) had taken refuge. It focuses on the department of the Gard (31 percent Protestant according to the census of 1851), and especially the Protestant stronghold of Nîmes (27 percent Protestant), which is also home to one of the richest departmental archives in France. The large Calvinist communities in the adjacent departments of Ardèche, Lozère, and Hérault do not form part of this study. Moreover, it is an internal history of French Protestantism, exploring a period of spiritual renewal, rather than an external history looking at Protestant connections to the rest of French society.

Deming’s book is a valuable addition to the literature. Early chapters provide readers with two introductions. The first is to the socioeconomic structure of the Gard, depicting a predominantly rural Protestant population living on relatively poor soil to the north and northwest of Nîmes, surviving chiefly through viticulture, cultivation of mulberry trees, and the silk industry. The second introduction is to the Protestant community, tracing Occitan Huguenots from the sixteenth century (when Languedoc was dominated by Protestants) through two centuries of persecution of the tenacious Église du désert (the forbidden church that met in secret, outdoors).

The heart of the book is a series of chapters that examine the great transformation that shaped nineteenth-century Protestantism—the “awakening,” known in France as le Réveil—and the consequences it had in France. It was an evangelical, orthodox Protestantism that awakened, bearing comparison (and owing some debts) to Methodism in Britain and Pietism in Germany. Deming has produced the first detailed introduction to the Réveil in English, and it should prove useful to scholars and teachers in several fields. As a regional case study, it cannot dislodge Daniel Robert’s masterwork, which covered all of France (Les Églises réformées en France, 1800–1830 [Paris, 1961]), nor Alice Wemyss’s detailed monograph (Histoire du réveil, 1790–1849 [Paris, 1977]), but Deming has provided much more information on the Gard and has better explored the Archives départementales than either of his predecessors.

The history of the Protestant spiritual revival is not a simple story of rekindled faith and its spread, and Deming’s best contribution is his careful explanation of the Protestant schism, which grew as the Réveil did. The theology of the awakening strength-
ened the position of orthodox Protestants who retained traditional Calvinist dogma and
desired to see all members of the church adhere to its historic Confession of Faith.
Deming effectively explains the split between orthodoxy and liberal Protestantism: the
latter championed the priesthood of believers and the individualist corollary of free
inquiry, a combination that allowed many members of the Église Réformée to question
traditional beliefs, such as the resurrection.

The most valuable chapter of Religion and Identity in Modern France, entitled “Con-
flict and Crisis,” traces the Nimois debate between zealous evangelicals and philo-
sophical liberals. Nîmes produced one of the most famous advocates of liberal Pro-
estantism, Pastor Samuel Vincent, and his influence made the Consistory of Nîmes a
center of liberalism for the remainder of the century. As his title indicates, Deming
focuses on the period to 1848; during that time the liberals remained strong enough to
prevent church assemblies from adopting a Confession of Faith as a test of church
membership. He actually carries the story farther than the title suggests, however: an
epilogue treats the events of 1859 (the tricentenary of the founding of the Reformed
Church), from which the orthodox gained new strength that would ultimately lead them
to victory in the Synod of 1872.

STEVEN C. HAUSE

University of Missouri—St. Louis

Educating the Faithful: Religion, Schooling, and Society in Nineteenth-Century
France. By Sarah A. Curtis.

Historians have long recognized the importance of educational policy in the early
French Third Republic. The Ferry Laws of 1881 and 1882, which made state-supported
primary schooling mandatory for all French children, are widely regarded as corner-
stones of the new secular political and social order. Republicans at the time insisted
that “only a state-sponsored system of obligatory primary schools, divorced from the
influence of the Catholic church, could regenerate France after her defeat by the Prus-
sians” (p. 107). Echoing the rhetoric of late nineteenth-century observers, modern
scholars have credited the republican school with disseminating many of the new ideas
promoted by the government of the early Third Republic, thereby bringing about pro-
found social, cultural, and political change. According to Eugen Weber (Peasants into
for example, the establishment of a broad network of public primary schools was
fundamental not only to the widespread inculcation of republican values but also to
the formation of a sense of national identity among the disparate and still predominantly
rural French population. Though numerous scholars have since challenged Weber’s
portrait of a strictly Paris-formulated secular educational policy imposed on a premod-
ern and pious provincial France, few have questioned the republican origins of the
universal schooling project.

Sarah A. Curtis does precisely that in her original and important study of Catholic
schooling in nineteenth-century France. Until now, Catholic schools have received
scant attention from historians, who have regarded them either as largely irrelevant to
the vast public education project of the late nineteenth century or strictly as adversaries
of republicans in their struggle for the hearts and minds of French schoolchildren. Curtis
argues instead that “Catholic primary schools provided an essential link between the
schools of the Old Regime and those of modern France” (p. 8). Republicans of the late nineteenth century owed an enormous debt to Catholic education despite their overt hostility toward the religious schools and the teaching congregations that staffed them. It was the church that first responded to the local demand for primary education and devised methods for financing and staffing both private and public schools throughout the country. At a time when lay teachers were scarce and resources to pay them even scarcer, the Catholic teaching congregations provided inexpensive and competent instruction in religion as well as basic academic skills. Most importantly, “the church provided a powerful model of schooling that was assimilated by lay educators, from the idea of the teacher as missionary to the somewhat dubious concept that schools could mold minds and deliver ideology” (p. 173). Until the establishment of the Third Republic in the 1870s, the state readily supported Catholic education; municipalities and parishes alike competed for the services of the religious teachers. As Curtis rightly observes, in the case of education, “political rhetoric notwithstanding, the relationship of the Catholic church to the French state was more often interdependent than contradictory” (p. 175).

Curtis grounds her argument in a richly detailed study of the diocese of Lyon, a diverse region that included the rapidly industrializing city of Saint-Etienne and its coal-rich surroundings, the craft-based urban center of Lyon itself, and the more pious villages and towns of the rural countryside. Curtis has examined an enormous amount of archival material (much of it from notoriously difficult-to-access congregational repositories) to paint an elaborate canvas detailing everything from the funding of individual schools and the development of curricular priorities, to the recruitment of novices and the appointment of teachers, to turn-of-the-century schemes to encourage false secularization among members of religious teaching orders. Using personal letters, account books, manuals, and reports from eight different teaching congregations, Curtis not only explores the policies and professional activities of the orders but also manages at times to evoke the individual lives of their thousands of members.

The first half of the book, which focuses on the development of the Catholic primary school system in the first half of the century, is largely descriptive, establishing the importance of the teaching congregations both as educational institutions and as sites of associational and professional life. Curtis aptly notes that the opportunities for professional engagement offered by the congregations made them particularly attractive to women, who dominated the ranks of religious teachers throughout the century. She also proposes that women may have been drawn to the life of a religious teacher because its unisex, communal lifestyle allowed them to escape the burdens of marriage and maternity without risking social condemnation.

The second half of the book revolves around the Catholic response to the educational reforms of the Third Republic. Although the anticlerical governments of the 1880s invested considerable political energy in promoting the virtues of state-sponsored public education and condemning the teaching congregations, Curtis shows that, in fact, many religious schools survived the onslaught, devising innovative strategies for evading the various legal strictures that strove to eliminate members of Catholic orders from the classroom. Numerous communities continued to send their children (especially their girls) to Catholic school, sometimes of choice but other times of necessity, as many of the remotest rural villages perennially struggled to attract and retain lay teachers.

The Catholic schools faced their greatest challenges in the opening years of the twentieth century, culminating in 1904 with the passage of legislation prohibiting all teaching activities by religious congregations. Yet even under direct threat, they proved remarkably resilient and adaptive. To some extent, the congregations accommodated
the increasingly inhospitable climate by “reducing their numbers, changing their activities, moving abroad” (p. 146). But a significant number turned instead to elaborate subterfuge, encouraging members to “secularize” by donning lay clothing and feigning separation from the order. “By so doing,” Curtis notes, “they remained as teachers in parish schools throughout France, saving both the Catholic school and their own careers” (pp. 146–47).

Though at times overwhelming in its recounting of the minutiae of congregational rules and routines, Educating the Faithful has provided an enormous service to historians of modern France. By illuminating a vital aspect of French social, political, and cultural life, Curtis successfully demonstrates that religious schooling lay at the heart—not on the periphery—of nineteenth-century French society.

*Katrin Schultheiss*

*University of Illinois at Chicago*


Any book on southern Italy in the early modern period is, almost by definition, a welcome sight. The region has traditionally received little attention from the Anglo-American historical community, and so Tommaso Astarita’s new book is noteworthy simply by virtue of its geographic focus on the kingdom of Naples. It is also one of the few English language studies focusing on the eighteenth century, a relatively neglected period in Italian history.

But Astarita’s work is worth reading for many more reasons besides. This is, frankly, a unique book. At first glance, it looks like a typical local study in the Italian microhistorical mold. But even a cursory reading reveals that it defies easy categorization. It is microhistory, certainly, but it is also much more. It is conceptually innovative, thoroughly and subtly researched, and it strikes an impressive balance between specific documentary evidence and broader conclusions (the traditional weakness of the microhistorical genre).

Astarita takes as his point of departure a murder trial that took place during 1710 and 1711 in a local feudal court of the kingdom of Naples. The principal protagonists were four residents of Pentidattilo, a remote village on the southernmost tip of Calabria: Domenica Orlando, her husband Antonino Cuzzucli, her lover Pietro Crea, and her neighbor Anna de Amico. Domenica stood accused of murdering Antonino so that she could be free to marry Pietro, while Anna had provided the arsenic used in the commission of the crime. During the trial that followed, the focus shifted slowly from Domenica and Pietro, the coconspirators, to Anna, as it emerged that in addition to helping Domenica to poison Antonino, she had also performed abortions for several village women, including Domenica. By its conclusion, the trial was less about the murder of Antonino than it was about honor, reputation, and the local ties of the three defendants. Thus Domenica was allowed to flee, Pietro was acquitted, and Anna bore the brunt of the court’s punishment, a fifteen-year prison sentence.

In this regard the book appears to be standard microhistorical fare: a local study based on trial records. But Astarita does not limit the scope of his investigation to the confines of Pentidattilo. Rather, he focuses on specific aspects of the case, connecting
them to broader developments in juridical practice in both the kingdom of Naples and Europe more generally. In this sense, the book is really about the interaction between the rationalizing impulses of the early modern state and local traditions and norms. Astarita shows that, far from being excluded from participation in the rational state and the disciplining society of the eighteenth century, local traditions, social structures, and oral traditions were crucial to the ability of the rational state to impose its will. He convincingly argues that local, popular culture did not merely define itself in opposition to the elite culture of the center but interacted with it in ways that were important to the establishment of real judicial practices. He further argues that it was only through the mediating optic of local family ties and community mores that the state could hope to extend its power through the judicial process. The courts understood crimes and criminals not abstractly but rather in the very terms that the local population itself employed.

The book begins with a summary of the events of the trial. Six chapters follow. The first looks at Pentidattilo in the larger context of the history of Naples. Astarita covers the geographic, economic, and demographic history of Calabria; the local institutional structures of the kingdom; and the history of the fiefdom of Pentidattilo (the village was the seat of a local lord). Each of the following five chapters examines the trial itself, integrating the specific analysis of the case with larger arguments about early modern jurisprudence. Chapter 2 covers Neapolitan and European judicial practices and how the trial failed to respect them when they conflicted with local norms. Chapter 3 looks at the local social and economic hierarchies through an examination of local catasto records. By integrating the fiscal and demographic data of the catasto with the trial transcripts, Astarita shows how elite citizens played a different role in the trial than their less-important neighbors. The poorer members of the community provided the facts of the case by recounting various rumors and stories about the defendants, while the elite members of the village affirmed that the court had proceeded properly in its investigation and interpretation of those facts. Chapter 4 looks at the trial from the perspective of local family and social networks. Here Astarita argues that Domenica’s status as a native of the village, with many family ties, helps account for the fact that she was helped to escape while Anna, a relative outsider, was allowed to bear the burden of punishment. Chapter 5 looks at the problems of evidence and procedure that early modern courts faced when they had to distinguish between sin and crime. This was especially problematic, Astarita argues, when the court had to deal with women; ultimately, the court had to rely on the community’s values when prosecuting such cases. Chapter 6 focuses on the interaction of the official morality of the church and the local norms of the village. Here Astarita concludes that, far from being brought under the normative sway of the church and state, local standards prevailed throughout the early modern period, as evidenced by the outcome of the trial, especially the acquittal of Pietro, the only male defendant.

One might argue that Astarita reads some of the evidence tendentiously, especially when he states, rather unproblematically, that the various depositions show how even illiterate witnesses “were accustomed to the process of giving testimony and of interacting with the language and rituals of the law” (p. 64). But the sum and variety of evidence Astarita brings into play clearly support his case. His conclusion that even in the early eighteenth century state practices can only be understood in terms of local traditions seems fully warranted, as is his argument that this problematic reliance on local norms required the thorough overhaul of many European legal systems in the later eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

K ARL A PPUHN

Columbia University
When the Nationalists won the Spanish Civil War in 1939, they were not satisfied solely with achieving a military victory. Franco and his allies crusaded against the ideological remnants of the Second Republic. In answer to the “Godless communism” of the Republic, Franco countered with National Catholicism. While scholars of Spain have analyzed many of the ideological premises behind National Catholicism, very few have looked at its gendered underpinnings.

Aurora G. Morcillo’s monograph is the first in English to discuss how Franco’s program of National Catholicism depended on well-defined notions of gender. In fact, according to Morcillo, “Gender difference was a crucial element in this national enterprise” (p. 4). Her work explores “the official discourse on femininity”—what she terms “true Catholic womanhood”—and analyzes “the ways different Catholic organizations responded to that discourse with their own definitions of Catholic femininity” (p. 4). She also demonstrates how Spain’s integration into the Western consumer economy in the 1950s required a redefinition of gender ideology. What makes Morcillo’s work valuable to historians of Spain and to post–World War II historians is that she shows how Spanish women contended with the paradox of being both vessels of reproductive life and keepers of the hearth, while simultaneously participating in a consumer economy that often required them to work outside the home to pay for the new consumer goods. Through a careful analysis of legislation, educational practices, Catholic and Falangist archival materials, and some oral histories, Morcillo examines how Catholic doctrine and a gendered notion of the state were promoted, and she begins to fill a gaping hole in both the historiography of the Franco Regime and gender studies.

The Nationalists’ victory provided Franco with the means to derail the modernization process and to refashion the state along the lines of a peculiar model that synthesized nationalism and Catholicism and that required a clear articulation of gender roles. In Franco’s new state, masculinity depended on service to the nation via participation in the so-called public world of politics, higher education, economics, and the military. True Catholic womanhood, conversely, delineated women’s place as nation builders within the private realm of the family. By upholding the traditional Catholic values of virtue, modesty, and obedience to their husbands—enforced legally through pronatalist policies and women’s exclusion from the workforce—women would provide succor to the men rebuilding the strong Spanish nation. The ideology of true Catholic womanhood was reinforced through five separate avenues: (1) a new educational system that limited women’s access to a university education and channeled women into domestic roles; (2) devotion to saintly figures such as Santa Teresa de Jesús and the Virgin del Pilar; (3) treatises by the Renaissance figures Fray Luis de León and Juan Luis Vives; (4) the papal encyclicals Divini Illius Magistri (1929) and Casti Connubii (1930); and (5) the Women’s Section of the Falange, which set up a system of social service to mold girls and women according to the precepts of Francoist ideology.

But the 1950s brought changes that challenged this hegemonic discourse. While the Franco Regime tried to maintain the traditionalist path set for women in the 1940s, this proved impossible, given Spain’s reentry into the Western consumer economy and the cultural changes that went with it. Domestic and foreign influences encouraged Spanish women to buy, buy, buy. Morcillo argues that this economic transformation required redefining true Catholic womanhood from the “1940s reproductive female model to the consumer-housewife model of the next two decades” (p. 4).

Women needed to enter the workforce to pay for the consumer goods advertised on
television and in magazines. Their increased participation in the Spanish universities in the 1950s and 1960s and the passing of the Law of Political, Professional, and Labor Rights of Women in 1961 provided middle-class women with new careers to fuel the consumer economy. But women were still “channeled into primary and professional training ‘appropriate’ to their gender in Christian terms” (p. 92)—for example, the nurturing professions of nursing, teaching, tourism, and social work. The main disseminator of these Catholic values, the Women’s Section of the Falange, trained women to “reconcile modernity with Catholicism” (p. 76).

Chapter 6, the most compelling chapter in the book, discusses how various Catholic women’s groups—namely, the Teresian Institute, the Catholic Action’s Young Women’s Association, and the Association of Spanish University Women—provided discourses of femininity for right-wing Catholic women that differed from those offered by the Women’s Section of the Falange. Their success with right-wing women—and within the framework of the Franco Regime—lay in their supposedly apolitical nature. They favored women’s participation in the public world as long as it did not threaten the ideology of family and motherhood. These groups believed in the “transcendental equality of the sexes” (p. 160) without resorting to what they saw as the masculinizing tendencies of modern secular feminism. Because these groups stood outside of formal politics and presented their ideas in a manner acceptable within the ideology of true Catholic womanhood, many women “created a public space of their own within the Franco Regime” (p. 160). Thus, Morcillo constructs a model for women’s agency within a regime that is often thought to have turned all women into passive objects of state policy.

The strengths of this book lie in Morcillo’s detailed analysis of how groups such as the Women’s Section of the Falange tried to transmit the values of Francoism in daily practice, and in her oral histories, which flesh out the personal details of Francoist gender policies. At times, her book could have used a more comparative framework, which she provides in the introduction and conclusion but does not apply consistently throughout. For example, how did Franco’s pronatalist policies differ from other authoritarian regimes in the 1940s, and were they so different from policies in other European countries in the 1950s? How did the Spanish experience of consumerism compare with the Italian one, given the Catholic context of both countries?

These are but minor quibbles. This work is important because it shows that the process of national consolidation is much more gendered than scholars would like to admit. By looking at women under Franco’s thirty-six-year authoritarian regime, she aptly demonstrates how women straddled the odd divide between traditionalism and consumerism and how women tried to create a space for themselves within the constraints of a long dictatorship. This study not only offers us a new perspective on the Franco Regime but also constitutes a major contribution to scholarship on gender and authoritarianism and on gender and consumer culture.

University of Oklahoma

SANDIE HOLGUÍN


Since the early 1980s, Steven Ozment has argued tenaciously in several publications that the premodern European family, in its essential functions, did not differ from the modern. Despite five centuries of sweeping changes in the demographic, socioeco-
nomic, and political contexts of private and public life, the family, he affirmed, had been and remained a perdurable institution, in which deep emotional and sentimental attachments characterized the relations between husbands and wives and parents and children. In making this argument, Ozment has doggedly challenged the grand models of Philippe Ariès, Edward Shorter, and Lawrence Stone, who have variously claimed that the early modern family, particularly in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, lacked genuine affection.

In *Flesh and Spirit*, Ozment fires another salvo in his campaign. As in his earlier works, he illuminates private life in Reformation Germany through the examination of personal records, especially private letters, diaries, and account books. Each of the five chapters in *Flesh and Spirit* spotlights the family life of a single individual from sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century Nuremberg, a major urban center in southern Germany. The first chapter details Lucas Friedrich Behaim’s courtship, in 1612–13, of Anna Maria Pfinzing, both children of prominent Nuremberg families. Next comes a rich and finely nuanced study of the attention and affection that Christoph Scheurl, the city’s renowned sixteenth-century jurist and diplomat, showered on his two surviving sons during their earliest years. The third chapter addresses the difficulties of late adolescence by recounting Paul Behaim II’s two and a half years of travel and study in Italy and his artful and sometimes testy pleas to his widowed mother for funds to support his not-too-frugal lifestyle. Pursuing this theme further, Ozment then explores the curious religious behavior of Sebald Welser, the eldest son of a wealthy and powerful patrician family, during his studies in Louvain in 1577. The final chapter focuses on the family life of Lorenz Dürnhöfer, a late sixteenth-century Nuremberg pastor who was deeply disappointed by the academic failures of two of his sons.

Through his engaging prose and careful reconstruction of the historical settings, Ozment presents with genuine warmth and immediacy the personal and familial dramas that absorbed these individuals. Their hopes, fears, joys, and heartaches reveal the emotional intensity of premodern private life. Moreover, the first two chapters address, although seldom profoundly, issues pertinent to the characterization of the early modern family—issues such as secret marriage vows, premarital sex and its punishment, breastfeeding practices, and the chastisement of children. And many of the narrative details are quite telling. In citing the teasingly salacious letter that Lucas Friedrich Behaim received from his cousin, Ozment offers a playful reminder that the dour religious concerns of the period had not banished prurience from private life. Scheurl’s generous assistance to the live-in wet nurse and nanny, including his hosting of a wedding dinner and dance for one of them, and his taking in of poor relations’ children, finely illustrate paternalism at work in a large urban elite household.

*Flesh and Spirit* also notes unexpected intersections between religious change and private life. For example, Scheurl, who remained a faithful Catholic after Nuremberg’s official adoption of the Reformation in 1525, repeatedly sent generous gifts to the inmates of Saint Clara’s convent in return for their intercessory prayers in behalf of his sons. Lucas Friedrich Behaim, in contrast, drew on the idiom of Lutheran theology to express his love for his fiancée. In the case of Welser, who, despite his devout Lutheran upbringing in Nuremberg, kissed a monstrance and purchased an indulgence while abroad, Ozment perceives a personal adaptiveness that Welser first learned at home. But besides recounting these and similar incidents, Ozment does not introduce any new perspectives on still open scholarly debates concerning the Reformation’s impact on early modern family life.

*Flesh and Spirit* has other shortcomings. First, based largely on the records of five men, the work presents an extremely male-centered vision of private life. Of course,
far fewer personal records from Reformation Germany have survived for women than for men, and Ozment portrays as vividly as possible those women who do appear in any way in the case studies. Nevertheless, it is peculiarly ironic that in the chapter on Paul Behaim II, titled “Mothering,” the mother never speaks directly, and Ozment surmises her concerns almost entirely from the contents of her son’s letters. More troubling, Ozment never reflects on how the absence of women’s voices might impoverish his findings about family life.

Second, scholars already know a great deal about private life in Nuremberg, primarily because of two of Ozment’s earlier works plus articles and a fine monograph by Mathias Beer (Eltern und Kinder des späten Mittelalters in ihren Briefen: Familienleben in der Stadt des Spätmittelalters und der frühen Neuzeit mit besonderer Berücksichtigung Nürnbergs, 1400–1550 [Nuremberg, 1990]). Although an exceptionally handsome work, Flesh and Spirit does not break new ground. Well-designed comparative studies will possibly lead to the next frontier.

Some of Ozment’s conclusions also seem suspect. The common German household has no place in his depiction of family life, which rests squarely on evidence from the mercantile, political, and clerical elites in a powerful and cosmopolitan central European city. Thus the family cohesion that Ozment finds so striking and characteristic of the age probably reflected only the dense web of commercial and social ties that urban elite households cultivated among themselves in order to maintain their wealth and status. Lower down the social scale, where economic hardships often strained the family fabric and the threat of disinheritance had less disciplinary force, cohesion undoubtedly lost its conspicuousness.

Ozment also suggests that “families in the past were not so easily bullied by an official outside world” (p. 266) and that family life provided Scheurl and Dürrhofer a retreat from the buffets of religious change. But Ozment does not appreciate the full complexity of this issue. Did the state fail to bully effectively because, as recently suggested by Joel Harrington (Reordering Marriage and Society in Reformation Germany [Cambridge, 1995]), it lacked the administrative wherewithal to challenge the family? Despite this purported weakness, the state’s interest in controlling family life expanded noticeably during the Reformation. For sixteenth-century Nuremberg itself, Ozment’s very own bailiwick, Harrington has shown how the magistrates’ deep concern over penurious parents who allegedly raised their children to become beggars resulted in various coercive measures directed at these parents (“‘Singing for His Supper’: The Reinvention of Juvenile Streetsinging in Early Modern Nuremberg,” Social History 22 [January 1997]: 27–45, and “Bad Parents, the State, and the Early Modern Civilizing Process,” German History 16, no. 1 [1998]: 16–28). By attending only to elites, Flesh and Spirit overlooks important points of friction between the state and the family and, thus, renders an incomplete account of private life in early modern Germany.

TERENCE McINTOSH

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill


Recent research on Germany during the Second Empire has devoted considerable attention to the Kulturkampf. For many scholars, the attack on the Catholic Church illustrates why authoritarianism triumphed over liberalism in Imperial Germany. The
Kulturkampf figures, thus, as a major element in Germany’s *Sonderweg* to the Third Reich. For others, the Kulturkampf stands as the defining moment of Imperial German political culture: it mobilized German Catholics into a powerful political force, while also preventing a full assimilation of Catholics into the national community. Ronald J. Ross’s excellent study on this seminal event challenges conventional understandings of the Bismarckian state while adding additional nuance to our knowledge of how the Kulturkampf affected Germany’s Catholics.

Ross devotes his attention to a single question: why did the Kulturkampf fail? He argues that a weak administrative and coercive regime, not defective policy against the Catholic church, was at fault. In short, Bismarck’s state lacked “political institutions and managerial arrangements for imposing the government’s religious policy on an unwilling Catholic populace” (p. 13). Not only did it operate on flawed assumptions about the Catholic community and how to force it into compliance, but within Prussia the organization of power and the fiscal and administrative constraints on enforcement precluded a reliable and efficacious execution of the anti-Catholic measures.

The main points of the book’s argument emerge with exemplary clarity, supporting Ross’s fundamental assertion that Bismarck’s Prussia was not as authoritarian as we all thought. To begin with, Ross notes, Bismarck did not have a free hand in executing his anti-Catholic program. He feuded constantly with his ministers about the style and substance of the campaign and frequently found both emperor and empress sympathetic to the misfortunes of individual Catholic priests. Moreover, anti-Catholic sentiment never translated into widespread support for the Kulturkampf legislation, in part because of the illiberal quality of some of the laws and their drawbacks for state Protestantism.

Lack of current “intelligence” about the Catholic community also undermined the effectiveness of government action. Bismarck and his ministers assumed that major sections of the Catholic population (and even some clergy) would favor the forced depoliticization of the church. Traditional coercive measures, thus, would quickly make the church fold. But the Catholic revival of the 1850s and 1860s actually strengthened the bonds between clergy and laity. And once persecution of the clergy began, Catholics in the Rhineland and in Prussian Poland not only did not desert their spiritual leaders but also engaged in both active and passive forms of resistance. Finally, although the Prussian state had placed such high hope (but little financial assistance) in the Old Catholic movement as a serious alternative to the Roman church, the renewed vitality of the latter meant that Old Catholicism never developed a wide following.

Important as internal division and Catholic unity were, Ross maintains that the central problem that dogged the Kulturkampf was the organization of the Bismarckian state itself. This is perhaps the most important insight of the entire volume. Ross contends that Bismarck’s failure to modernize Prussia’s administrative, fiscal, and enforcement apparatus prevented him from forcing his views on his colleagues and local administrative and police authorities, to say nothing of the Catholic population. The May Laws, for example, presumed Catholic compliance, so details on enforcement were overlooked. Even in the face of growing Catholic opposition, the Prussian state held to the position that all it had to do was find “the right increment of coercive power necessary to compel obedience” (p. 55).

The extent of Catholic protest and resistance to the Kulturkampf measures also prevented an inadequate police force from enforcing the law and preventing riots and disturbances. Lay Catholics helped clergy evade authorities, while informal arrangements kept dioceses functioning, at times with the tacit approval of the state. To Bismarck’s chagrin, local officials—Catholic and Protestant—did not always apply the laws to their full extent. Moreover, juridical traditions emphasizing due process (the
Rechtstaat), loopholes in the laws, and the Kulturkampf’s foundation in Prussian rather than imperial law provided Catholics many opportunities to escape the state’s coercive power.

Ironically, in the course of the Kulturkampf, the Prussian state discovered it was considerably dependent on religious orders and Catholic newspapers: the former to provide social services and the latter to disseminate official announcements. Since the tight Prussian budget prohibited the state taking over these functions, many orders and newspapers survived Bismarck’s attacks. Without discounting the considerable suffering that the Kulturkampf inflicted on the Catholic church, Ross concludes that actual damage was much less than it might have been because of the institutional limits on Prussia’s coercive power.

Thus, whereas many historians, notably Hans-Ulrich Wehler, have argued that the archaic characteristics of the imperial regime promoted authoritarianism, Ross posits that these same features (e.g., collegial government, the principle of the Rechtstaat, and the legalistic approach to religious policy) in fact prevented the regime from becoming truly authoritarian. Bismarck could have centralized administrative power within Prussia and reorganized the empire to give the state the necessary coercive power, but the effort would have deprived him of his position as the “holder of the constitutional balance” (p. 190) in both Prussia and the Reich. Thus Bismarck chose, in effect, to keep his power base rather than win the Kulturkampf.

This masterfully written and researched monograph merits the serious attention of specialists in modern German history as well as scholars of the modern state. Yet, given the centrality that policy formation and implementation at the ministerial level has in this account, greater attention to the organization and workings of the interior ministry and the Kultusministerium would have been welcome. Furthermore, Ross argues convincingly that Bismarck did not revolutionize the state so as to increase its coercive, hence authoritarian, capacity. While he clearly believes this development was positive from the perspective of German Catholics, Ross does not tie it back to the larger issue of German state formation: just how efficient should a modern German state be?

In raising such issues, this outstanding piece of writing has put the Kulturkampf in a new context. Moreover, it will certainly provoke both debate over and needed research into the Kaiserreich’s institutions and their role in shaping state policy.

Anthony J. Steinhoff

University of Tennessee at Chattanooga


This is a study both of professional specialization and of the abuse of medical powers that culminated in euthanasia. Franz-Werner Kersting offers a finely researched analysis of a highly significant cohort of professionals, laced within a broader national and international context. Throughout he keeps a firm eye on the period of Nazism in Westphalia, the region where the bishop of Münster preached his celebrated sermon against euthanasia in 1941.

The growth of institutions and patient numbers were a necessary precondition for the expansion of psychiatry. As patient numbers quadrupled between 1900 and 1938,
medical posts increased by nearly three-and-one-half times. It is interesting to note that patient numbers increased substantially between 1931 and 1938. This “Sondersituation” is in part explained by the transfer of patients from private institutions. Kersting makes interesting allusions to the United States, and to women’s entry into psychiatry. Again, the presence of women came to the fore under Nazism. The economic and employment conditions of doctors are carefully considered, particularly the finely graduated career hierarchy. Inflation, economic upswing, the demand for titles all demonstrate how psychiatrists were not insulated in their institutions but affected by broader social currents. The year 1937 saw a major reform, again improving career prospects. One requirement was a higher level of expertise in psychiatry and neurology. Nazism thus can be seen as accelerating the scientization of medicine.

The second part of the study tackles social structures and the social recruitment of psychiatrists. Kersting notes that there was a tendency to recruitment from lower social classes, a phenomenon first evident among medical students, particularly during the Weimar “student boom” of the mid-1920s. The tendency increased also for regional recruitment during the 1920s and 1930s. Given the sectarian division of institutions, religion played an important role. The Catholic cohort in Westphalia was the highest in the Weimar Republic, reaching nearly 60 percent, and tailing off to 50 percent in the Third Reich. Jewish psychiatrists seem not to be present in this region.

The political profile shows that left-wing sympathizers increased after World War I, although they remained a tiny minority. Liberals were more in evidence. The First World War had a politizing effect. The reforming psychiatrist Hermann Simon (renowned for occupational therapy) moved from liberal politics in the 1920s to a depoliticized stance. Nazism spread rapidly among psychiatrists after 1933, with 65 percent in the National Socialist Party (NSDAP) compared to 45 percent of physicians nationally. Kersting analyzes the affinity in terms of age: youth was a differentiating factor in the lurch to Nazism, whereas religion was not. Kersting also examines academic and personal networks, as well as doctoral dissertations, which reveal significant ideological biases.

The scene is thus set for an analysis of the coordination (Gleichschaltung) of psychiatrists. Kersting gives a fascinating account of the role of leading psychiatrists in their local communities. By way of contrast, certain more liberal-minded psychiatrists were forced into retirement. The widespread acceptance of heredity as fundamental in the cause of psychotic states led to a ready acceptance of sterilization measures as well as the establishment of a hereditary biological commission in 1934. Psychiatrists not only furthered euthanasia but also were active in concentration camps. One wonders whether Fritz Wernicke, who was drafted into Posen in 1940, was the son of the bacteriologist Carl Wernicke, who until 1919 ran the Posen Hygiene Institute. Fritz Wernicke was an enthusiastic supporter of Nazi area planning (Raumplanung) and population policy in the east, where he selected psychiatric patients for killing. Kersting carefully documents how the murderers of adult and child patients advanced their careers, as well as demonstrating the views of doctors more widely. Most had knowledge of what was going on and were complicit; dissent was a rarity.

The study is rounded off with an account of the transition to the Federal Republic. There was one suicide, nine premature retirements, and eight suspensions; a Westphalian euthanasia trial was conducted against three doctors for T4 killings, although child euthanasia was overlooked. Those placed on trial were acquitted. Denazification was also handled lightly. Wernicke, for example, was merely graded a fellow traveler (Mitläufer). Biographical data given by Ernst Klee (“Euthanasie” im NS-Staat [Frankfurt, 1983]) are corrected and modified.
This is an in-depth and rounded study. One wishes for similar analyses of other regions in Germany and Austria. A map would have been helpful as well as a full listing of individuals analyzed for statistical purposes. But this is a model and thought-provoking study.

PAUL WEINDLING

Oxford Brookes University


Interest in “the other Germany,” the Germany of opposition and resistance to National Socialism, seems to grow as the era of the Third Reich recedes further into the past. The two books under review here, completely different in scope and method, are but two recent examples of a small publishing wave, if not quite a boom.

In some cases, titles do tell all. Rainer Behring is at pains to prove that German Social Democrats in exile developed highly democratic conceptions of foreign policy and of Germany’s place in the post-Nazi world order. His foil is the better known conservative-national opposition, especially the Kreisau Circle and, linked to it, the officers involved in the attempted assassination of Hitler on July 20, 1944. For many decades the conservative-nationals served as the sole representatives of resistance in West German public memory, and they are still the only ones for whom a national day of commemoration exists. Yet as Hans Mommsen, Peter Steinbach, and others have shown, the conservative-national resistance remained embedded in the antidemocratic, authoritarian politics of Weimar and Imperial Germany.

Behring’s task, it must be said, is not a difficult one, since Social Democrats in exile left behind prolific public and private writings, and their democratic convictions are, by and large, not in question. Still, in the best German academic tradition, he has amassed a wealth of detail in what was, originally, a doctoral dissertation. He examines the views not only of the Sopade—the Social Democratic Party Executive in Exile, first in Prague, then in Paris—but also of scattered émigré groups in Sweden, Great Britain, the United States, and elsewhere. He also explores the views of the smaller left-wing groups that split off from the Social Democratic Party (SPD), notably the Socialist Workers Party (SAP), the International Socialist Fighting League (ISK), and New Beginning. The result is a rich tableau of social democratic and socialist views as they developed in confrontation with the realities of Allied as well as Nazi power over the course of the World War II era.

The picture is not always a flattering one, despite Behring’s best intentions. Illusions ran high among Social Democrats of all stripes, as Behring admits. In the 1930s, they hoped that the Nazi regime would not last long and, with some exceptions, continually underestimated the popular appeal of National Socialism. Only grudgingly did they
come to the realization that a post-Nazi Germany would not be able to determine its own fate; the partition under Allied power was a deeply felt wound. Into the war years, the left-wing socialists continued to believe in the possibilities of a popular, worker-led, socialist revolution in Germany and Europe that would create a new world order. Some of them banked on an alliance with the Soviet Union as a means of creating a democratic socialist Europe.

Nonetheless, Social Democrats, argues Behring, developed concepts that would ultimately help solidify a liberal Western Europe and ease their own way into governance in West Germany in the 1960s—not without irony, since it was one of the major left-wing socialists of the 1930s and 1940s, Willy Brandt, and Herbert Wehner, a communist until 1943, who would lead the SPD into the government. Here Behring has another foil—namely, Kurt Schumacher, the concentration camp veteran and leader of the postwar SPD until his death in 1952. Schumacher’s staunch opposition to every form of cooperation with the Western allies, from the Schumann Plan to NATO, was not the only set of Social Democratic ideas on foreign policy. The ideas circulated in exile would be retrieved by the SPD a few years after Schumacher’s death.

Behring’s detail-laden study will interest specialists in the history of the SPD, of exile politics, and of the German Resistance. Curiously, Behring has little to say about how the exiles interpreted domestic social and political developments in Germany, and even less on their reactions to news of the wartime atrocities committed by the Nazis. Nor does he make any effort to account for the views of rank-and-file activists who remained in the country, where a notable impatience developed with the cautious politics of Sopade.

Erich Brost became the publisher of the most widely read regional newspaper in West Germany, the Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung. He was a Social Democrat with a record of resistance against the Nazis. Raised in the Free City of Danzig—so created by the Versailles Peace Treaty—Brost joined the SPD at a young age and became a well-known activist by the mid-1930s. The particular conditions of Danzig, a city under international control, allowed a degree of political liberty for a few years after the Nazis assumed power. Brost kept up a high level of anti-Nazi agitation in a city in which the Nazis scored 51.0 percent of the votes in 1933 and 59.3 percent in 1935. Brost was ultimately forced into exile in Poland, Sweden, Finland, and, finally, Great Britain, where he worked for the BBC’s German-language broadcasts during the war.

This biography is in two parts. The first, by the Polish historian Marek Andrzejewski, covers Brost’s life as an SPD activist and journalist until 1945. The second, by the German historian Hubert Rinklake, is concerned with Brost’s life as a publisher in the postwar years, a period in which his activism waned in favor of journalism. Both parts of the book are remarkably uncritical; in fact, they read like a hagiography of a man seen as an anti-Nazi fighter and defender of democratic liberties. Still, there are interesting descriptions of the difficulties of anti-Nazi agitation in the 1930s and of the tribulations of exile. Unlike many of his contemporaries, including some among the SPD, Brost seems to have been remarkably free of anti-Polish prejudices and early on sought Polish-German reconciliation. Like the Social Democrats studied more thoroughly by Behring, his biography can stand for the long, slow, difficult Social Democratic accommodation with the world of liberal capitalism.

E R I C  D. W E I T Z

University of Minnesota

The “revolutionary university” is one of the more intriguing oxymorons. Functionally, universities (like all kinds of schools) are bound to be “traditional,” literally “handing on” received knowledge among the generations. Attempts to sever tradition and force them to serve the experimental agenda of revolutionary forces have most often ended badly yet have also often provided the stimulus for reform and innovation. In modern capitalist societies, universities have been less subject to dissolution or radical upheaval but instead have been forced to evolve or go under. The tensions between traditional and utilitarian roles are expressed in such antinomies as “teaching versus research,” “elitism versus social mission,” “academic freedom versus partisan interference,” and many others.

What did the “revolutionary” agenda of Marxism-Leninism, especially in its real-existing, Soviet-derived form, mean for higher educational and research institutions in Central and Eastern Europe after World War II? Answers have long been available, but they have often been unsatisfying for any number of reasons: framed in cold war rhetoric, or narrowly focused in topics, or devoted only to individual institutions or national systems, or handicapped by secrecy and mendacity. The habit of thinking of “Eastern Europe” is itself a cold war product, glibly jamming together countries, societies, and educational systems that had little in common except relative proximity to the USSR. At the same time, “proletarian internationalism” did not translate into many comparative studies of educational systems among the “fraternal socialist block” countries and their scholars, who generally pursued research within a national framework.

In this sense a study of the East German university system offers an advantageous perspective. The new masters in the Soviet Zone of Occupation (SBZ, 1945–49) and later German Democratic Republic (GDR, 1949–90) lacked the luxury of merely taking control of an existing system, purging it of politically troublesome people, and introducing some elements of Soviet ideology, educational purpose, and research practice. They also had to build on the ruins of what had been until recently one of the world’s most respected higher education systems, attempting to borrow some of its reputation, while concurrently attempting to provide an attractive progressive alternative to the “restorationist,” tradition-bound system in the Federal Republic of Germany. Uniquely in the “Soviet sphere,” the GDR higher education system (like many other features of the regime) had to compete directly not only with the “West” in general but with another vigorous claimant to the national heritage.

Ralph Jessen’s massive study of the professorate in East Germany offers a definitive set of answers, with some limits in scope. It examines the first quarter century, not the entire forty-five years between the war’s end and the “unification” of the GDR with the Federal Republic. It does not examine institutional structures, students, graduates, and other matters in detail (although it gives useful information here, too). It does show the vagaries of government and party policy; the difficulties, resistance, and successes they encountered; and the transformation of the “academic elite” in the process. Jessen uses a prosopographical method very effectively but also skillfully weaves individual biographies into his story to lend a human dimension to it.

As one would expect from a Habilitationsschrift originating under Jürgen Kocka’s
direction at Berlin’s Free University, this work abounds in careful statistical analysis, tables, and graphs, but it also shows a sure grasp of the political shifts in East Germany’s educational and overall goals. The text is readable, sophisticated, and occasionally wry, thorough without being exhausting. The text is organized into a very useful introduction, laying out the traditions of German higher education in general and the professorate in particular, the changes undertaken by the Nazis, and the situation at the end of World War II. It then proceeds through a chronological narrative of changes in the professorial occupation from 1945 to 1971. After that, it analyzes the contours of that occupation along such parameters as institutional rivalries fostered by the Socialist Unity Party (SED), erosion of the authority of the full professor chair holders and institute directors, issues of rewards and punishments, and the definition of socialization roles. The final sections deal with generational change and its connection to structural change.

It is impossible to summarize the many rich findings of this book in a short review, but here are a few of the more salient. East German universities could not be transformed overnight into an instrument of “communist dictatorship.” Like other parts of Germany, the postwar SBZ suffered from material and personnel problems and could not immediately get by without (for example) eventually reemploying “bourgeois” professors compromised by the years of Nazi rule. As the regime moved away from “popular front” to a more Stalinist program, it could not carry out fully its hopes of bringing universities into line with the SED’s ideology. For example, the regime’s desperate need to build up its technological and economic base conflicted with its desire to guarantee the meek submission of the professorate to Party leadership. Especially in fields such as the hard sciences and medicine (at the other extreme one finds economics and Marxism-Leninism), the professorate could salvage to some degree older traditions of autonomy. (The fact that East German professors could easily, before the 1961 Berlin Wall, leave for the West if they felt mistreated may also have tempered the regime.) By the 1960s the SED could press ahead with reforms in its sense, abolishing such traditional German university institutions as the Habilitation (second doctorate) and institutes (with their powerful, independent directors).

While the SED regime had largely succeeded by the 1970s in transforming higher education (and research) in its own sense, as measured by the loyalty and conformity of a professorate increasingly populated by “new men,” it failed in some of its social-engineering goals. If the professorate was “de-bourgeoisified” (p. 372), it was by no means populated by children of the proletariat, even less so by women, whose access to education was not matched by their access to academic positions. A de-emphasis on research and a trend toward inbreeding and increased Party memberships round out an overall picture of the long-term restructuring carried out by the regime. As Jessen concludes, “Neither the terror and ‘co-ordination’ under National Socialism nor the West German student movement and the university reforms following it changed the profession, structure and milieu of the academic elite in Germany as fundamentally as the totalitarian social experiment of the SED” (p. 429). This scrupulously researched work offers much evidence to back such a claim, which in turn provides justification for the post-1990 purges of parts of the professorate in the “New States” of the Federal Republic.

CHARLES E. MCCLELLAND

University of New Mexico
The historiography of post-1945 Germany is in flux. The collapse of the German Democratic Republic has not only turned East German history into one of the major growth industries in the field, it has also created the possibility for a genuinely comparative analysis of the parallel and divergent paths of both Germanies on opposite sides of the cold war. Antonia Maria Humm’s solid and innovative study of two local communities in East and West Germany—Bernstadt in Baden Württemberg and Niederzimmern in Thuringia—represents an important contribution to this emerging comparative history of both postwar Germanies. Her focus on agricultural politics, rural society, and village culture fills a gap in postwar social history, which has primarily focused on urban working-class or bourgeois milieus. Moreover, her study moves beyond the still dominant concentration on the first postwar decade and brings into focus the late 1950s and 1960s as a crucial, transformative period in both postwar societies.

Humm’s primary questions, however, are derived from the specific problems of East German history. She seeks to analyze the extent to which the Socialist Unity Party’s (SED) project of the “construction of socialism,” as it was proclaimed at the Second Party Conference in 1952, succeeded in transforming rural society in East Germany. She therefore analyzes first official state policies and their impact on local socioeconomic structures. Based on local archival records and interviews, she then also investigates the responses of the local population to the far-reaching interventions of the socialist state into rural economy, politics, and culture. Employing such concepts as Resistenz (nonconformity) and Eigensinn (the individual appropriation of official policies and intentions), which have also been used for analyzing popular behavior under the Nazi dictatorship, she stresses, along with other historians, the “limitations of the East German dictatorship.” While her study is therefore not designed as a symmetrical comparison between East and West, the references to the West German village nevertheless serve as a useful “foil of comparison” for highlighting the specificity of East German developments.

Against the background of larger patterns of demographic and socioeconomic change in both communities, Humm focuses on the collectivization of agriculture in East Germany between 1952 and 1960. Humm leaves no doubt that collectivization was ultimately less effective in increasing agricultural productivity than the combination of state subsidies and concurrent market pressures for modernization in West Germany. The productivity of East German agriculture increased significantly only over the course of the 1960s, yet it still continued lagging behind West German levels. Collectivization also provoked widespread Resistenz among East German peasants. In perhaps the most interesting section of her book, Humm traces the various strategies of peasants in Niederzimmern to preserve their economic autonomy and to avoid membership in one of the newly founded “agricultural producers’ cooperatives” (LPGs). During the 1950s, LPGs were only attractive to former landless laborers and peasants who had owned small and economically no longer viable farms. Peasants operating more prof-

---

itable farms entered LPGs only as a result of the increasingly coercive measures of the SED in 1960. Humm, however, interprets these peasants' decision to form type I LPGs (which demanded only the collectivization of the land and left the use of machines and animal husbandry to the private disposition of its members) instead of type III (which collectivized all agricultural activity) as indication of East German peasants' persistent Eigensinn, which subverted the socialist transformation of East German agriculture.

Peasants in Bernstadt exhibited a similar effort to maintain the independence of their farms, which was supported by the West German state's ideological commitment to the small family farm. Yet during the late 1950s and 1960s, West German owners of smaller farms increasingly abandoned agriculture in favor of more lucrative occupations in industry or service, while midsized farmers sought to maintain the profitability of their farms through increased mechanization and specialization.

Besides her analysis of agricultural production, Humm also examines local politics and village culture in both communities. She persuasively demonstrates the SED's widespread failure to mobilize the local population in Niedernzimmern or to establish a distinctly socialist village culture. Local clubs in Niedernzimmern, for example, developed a "counter-discourse" (p. 316) against official efforts at enlisting them for the socialist cause by emphasizing their pre-1945 traditions or by giving distinctly non-political meanings to their appearances at official political events. Likewise, youth in Niedernzimmern was more interested in cultivating traditional village festivals such as the Kirmesburschenschaft than in joining the activities of the SED's youth organization, the Free German Youth. It was only during the 1960s that a younger generation of East Germans developed new forms of accommodation to the regime. Humm's parallel discussion of local politics and village culture in the West (which regrettably does not include a discussion of West German youth culture) reveals the longer persistence of traditional social elites in Bernstadt while demonstrating a similarly important function of local clubs and associations in West German village culture. Interestingly, Humm identifies a marked difference regarding the significance of religion in both communities. Whereas church attendance in Niedernzimmern dropped considerably, the church maintained its central position in village life much longer in Bernstadt. The anticlerical policies of the SED thus seemed to have been somewhat more successful than the efforts at winning over the local population for the party.

This is microhistory at its best. Humm's study truly opens up a window into the "life worlds" of villagers in East and West Germany while, at the same time, embedding this analysis of local culture and popular agency within larger socioeconomic structures. At times, however, these links between local culture and larger contexts could have been explored even more explicitly. For the most part, the inhabitants of these two local communities appear largely as rather isolated and "fixed" in their local identities. The cold war or the division of Germany, for example, hardly appear in Humm's narrative. It would have been interesting, therefore, to know more about the ways in which the local identities of the inhabitants of Bernstadt and Niedernzimmern intersected with their identities as citizens of a divided country on the forefront of the cold war.

Her study, moreover, also significantly expands our knowledge of the social history of the GDR. Her findings again confirm the widespread failure of the SED to realize its totalitarian ambitions of "politically mobilizing the entire population" (p. 22) or of creating a "socialist personality" (p. 322). However, using the SED's own utopian goals as a yardstick for evaluating the "success" or "failure" of the socialist experiment might also hinder a more nuanced assessment of popular reactions to SED policies. Former landless laborers or small peasants might have perceived the collectivization of agri-
culture somewhat differently than the traditional village elite, which primarily informs Humm’s analysis.

But these are only very minor objections to an outstanding study that should be of considerable interest to anybody concerned with the history of rural society in the twentieth century, with post-1945 German history, and with the social and cultural history of the East German dictatorship.

Frank Biess

University of California, San Diego


Éva Hunyadi-Balázs is the distinguished matron of eighteenth-century Hungarian historiography and professor emeritus at Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest. Now well into her eighties, she began her career before the Second World War as a student of the renowned Elemér Mályusz but found herself compelled in her most productive period to labor under the constraints of the communist tyranny in her country. If it can be said that of all former “East European” historians Hungarians proved to be the most agile in skirting the rhetorical and ideological excesses of communist orthodoxy, then it can be said without doubt that Balázs was among the most successful of these.

Originally intending to be a medievalist, she was channeled into eighteenth-century studies by the pedagogical demands of the regime and soon found herself converted to the charms of the history of this period. In the early and mid-1950s she was harnessed to a team of Hungarian historians charged with rewriting secondary and postsecondary texts of Hungarian history, and she produced successive editions of the volume covering the period from the Peace of Szatmár (1711) to the death of Joseph II (1790). In the period after 1956 she began increasingly to concentrate on the period of Joseph II and soon discovered the fascinating Hungarian “Josephinist” reformer and Freemason, Gergely Berzeviczy, on whom she was to produce her magnum opus published in Budapest in 1967, Berzeviczy Gergely, a reformpolitikus, 1763–1795 [Gergely Berzeviczy the reform politician]—the first of a projected two-volume study, whose second volume is still eagerly awaited.

The West began to become acquainted with Balázs from the late 1960s onward, as the communist regime gingerly began to allow contact with select Western academic communities, particularly that of France, which was adjudged the most congenial fellow traveller—or, less charitably, dupe—of marxist orthodoxy. In the subsequent two decades numerous articles by Balázs began to appear in French, either in French publications or in Hungarian publications intended for the Western market. Gradually also essays in German began to be published through neighboring neutral Austria, so that by the mid-1980s she was a well-known and respected figure among all students of the eighteenth-century Habsburg monarchy.

For the most part these essays explored various dimensions of enlightened absolutism, in particular aspects of the problem stimulated by her work on Berzeviczy, such as the relations of the Hungarian nobility to the Enlightenment and the spread of Freemasonry. In these publications Balázs was also among the first to emphasize the importance of the Habsburg state chancellor, Prince Wenzel Anton Kaunitz, to the development of domestic reform in the monarchy and to work extensively on Joseph II’s
liberal finance minister, Karl von Zinzendorf. Exploring up-to-then little-known or little-used archival sources, and writing close to her sources, gave these works their characteristic vigor and scholarly value.

In 1987 this disparate research was drawn together into a coherent picture in a volume deliberately essayistic and popular in style, dispensing with footnotes but including numerous illustrations: Bécs és Pest-Buda a régi százvégen, 1765–1800 [Vienna and Pest-Buda in the age of enlightenment, 1765–1800]. Though an English translation by Tim Wilkinson was undertaken shortly after the appearance of the volume and was completed by the early 1990s, it was not until 1997 that the volume was finally published under the present title. Those dissatisfied with the lack of scholarly apparatus in the original Bécs és Pest-Buda could find most of the material reiterated (often verbatim) in a more classically scholarly fashion, complete with full references, in the chapters contributed by Balázs to the monumental Magyarország Története tíz kötetben ([Hungarian history in ten volumes]—a bit of a misnomer since each of the ten “volumes” consisted of two separate tomes) published by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences under the general editorship of Zsigmond Pál Pach. The two volumes covering the period 1686–1790 (edited by Gyöző Ember and Gusztáv Heckenast) to which Balázs contributed appeared in 1989, and these included archival references and exhaustive bibliographies that gave a good sense of the broad base on which Bécs és Pest-Buda had been built. Now both footnotes and select bibliography as well as an index have been added to the English translation, though the text itself retains much of the accessible style that characterized the original. The delay in publication of the translation also allowed Balázs to make small changes both to text and footnotes to reflect the new scholarship that had appeared in the meantime.

On the whole, however, Hungary and the Habsburgs remains very much the volume that Bécs és Pest-Buda had been, and as such it is a classic illustration of how far Hungarian historiography had managed to emancipate itself from communist cant and falsification by the mid-1980s. Some of Balázs’s arguments have now been superseded by new research, but this does not detract from the power and grace of this elegant volume, whose lasting influence on the younger generation of new Hungarian scholars cannot be underestimated. Balázs did much to reveal the dynamic character of Hungarian society in the generation following the Seven Years’ War and to show how much the famous era of emerging liberalism in the early nineteenth century owed to the reform impetus (both from the top down and from the bottom up) of the age of enlightened absolutism.

For the English-language reader, Hungary and the Habsburgs therefore serves as a convenient précis of the life’s work of a courageous woman, unstintingly scrupulous and honest with her sources, stimulating in her often uncanny insights, and generous and supportive to a fault with her fellow scholars. Its easy accessibility and traditional narrative may seem out of step with today’s historiographical fashions and preoccupations, but it is devoutly to be hoped that the eminently human and humane heart of her work never ceases to inspire.

FRANZ A. J. SZABÓ

University of Alberta
When Nationalism Began to Hate: Imagining Modern Politics in Nineteenth-Century Poland. By Brian Porter.

Polish nationalism has been refashioned at least as often as Polish or Polish-Lithuanian states have grown, metamorphosed, fallen, and risen again over the centuries. The twentieth-century political formation that did most to give Polish nationalism a chauvinistic reputation was the prewar National Democracy (known from its initials as the Endecja), which retains many admirers today. Brian Porter’s book is at one level about the Endecja’s intellectual genesis, but its implications extend further. It was not inevitable, he argues, that Polish nationalism became an ideology of hatred. In doing so, he challenges two widely held concepts that link modernity with nationalism. The first is that the entry of the masses into politics produces a democratic national movement. On the contrary, he argues, closer acquaintance with the masses intensified the desire of nationalist intellectuals to control and discipline them. The second is that popular xenophobia forces nationalists to abandon the ideal of brotherhood between nations. Here Porter shows that Polish nationalists had crossed this bridge before they had any opportunity to act on or with the masses.

In order to support this thesis, Porter traces the evolution of Polish nationalist ideology in the nineteenth century. Romantic nationalism had little or nothing to do with the “ethnonation,” focusing entirely on “the deed” (czyn) in the service of a resurrected Polish state. It was based on a messianic faith in historical time. The culmination of Romantic nationalism came with the uprising of 1863–64 against Russian rule, when Polishness was open to all on the basis of their contribution to the national cause. The failure of the insurrection led in the 1860s and 1870s to criticism of Romantic nationalism by those who advocated improving the existing nation, which they imagined sociologically in cultural and ethnographic categories. However, national ideology was not yet exclusionist or disciplined, because a progressive vision of time held sway—present maladies would be cured in the march toward the liberal utopia. In the 1880s, however, the desire to return to “the deed” took hold of the niepokorni—defiant young men—disenchanted with liberal capitalism who were impatient to act on behalf of the nation now. It was during the next two decades that Polish nationalism split, although, as Porter stresses, this was a gradual process, and well into the 1890s the two strands could cooperate. Those activists who lost their faith in historical time still accepted the sociological “reality” of the nation. They saw nations as mutually exclusive competing bodies and thought it imperative to discipline the masses if Poland were not to fall victim in a world of eternal struggle. The need for unity and authority came to take precedence over all other moral considerations. They became the National Democrats (Endeks). Polish Socialists, who also imagined the nation sociologically, retained their faith in progress by adopting a Marxist and revolutionary teleology. They therefore encouraged the very “disruption” that the Endeks came to view as harmful to the national interest. Only later did the socialists have to choose between the national cause and the cause of the international proletariat.

Porter views the nation as a community imagined by intellectuals, in which the masses talk back but do not set the agenda. Is this historiosophical reductionism? Not entirely. Porter does not ignore factors such as rising literacy and the mass experience of Russification, but he argues that they did not determine the choices made by intellectuals. Hence the need to show how the discursive frameworks available at the beginning of the twentieth century were constructed, and it is here that Porter points to historical time as the decisive factor.
Porter has rendered some notable services in overturning various “Western” stereotypes. In exploring the common roots of the Endeks and the socialists, he reveals the difficulties in classifying Polish nationalism as either left- or right-wing. He shows conclusively that the evolution of Polish nationalism does not fit into the neat “ethnic” or “political” categories commonly thought to be characteristic of “Eastern” and “Western” Europe respectively. He makes proper distinctions between various Polish attitudes to Jews and other peoples that fall short of standards of late twentieth-century multiculturalism, and he also avoids the trap of treating “others” as undifferentiated masses. His discussion of the changing attitudes to Jewish assimilation is masterly.

Porter’s chief contribution to Polish historiography is to escape from the “realist-idealism” polarity. This has focused primarily on the arguments conducted in the nineteenth century between advocates of accommodation with the regimes that had partitioned Poland-Lithuania between 1772 and 1815 and the advocates of noncooperation or armed resistance. These positions are also termed “positivism” and “romanticism,” respectively, in Poland. He contests the tendency to view the “darker side” of the Endecja as a regrettable degeneration of a “realist” strategy and places it instead at its ideological core. He is thus able to link it with European fascist movements—characterized by a pessimistic outlook of unremitted struggle among nations, combined with activism and a cult of authority and leadership. The approach also allows Polish “positivists” to be assessed in an international context as liberals.

Criticizing an author for what he has left out is legitimate when the jacket and introduction promise more than the book delivers. The book’s concentration on the Russian Kingdom of Poland (or, from 1874, Vistula-land) is not properly advertised. There is virtually nothing on Prussian-German Poznania (the Kulturkampf is not mentioned) and little on Austrian Galicia. The former was vitally important for the formation of Endek ideology, and Porter is perforce unable to explain adequately Roman Dmowski’s preference for a tactical compromise with Russia as opposed to Germany. Galicia is crucial to any discussion of the Polish fin-de-siècle; Porter emphasizes the emergence of Endek ideology from “the cauldron of fin de siècle modernism” (p. 192), but the Młoda Polska (Young Poland) movement is not considered. Instead, Porter writes of “Poland” as if it were obvious where it was, or as if his conclusions were applicable to all three partitions. Generally, he is better at analyzing ideology in its own terms than at assessing its reception. If reception were to be accorded a more prominent role, literature, which was of immense importance to nation building in the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Polish lands, could not be ignored. There is no mention of hugely influential writers such as Stanisław Wyspiański, Henryk Sienkiewicz, or Władysław Reymont. The journalism of Bolesław Prus and Eliza Orzeszkowa and the diary of Stefan Żeromski are cited, but not their more widely read literary works, despite their political and didactic messages. If this book is meant to be a monograph based on the late nineteenth-century press in the Kingdom, it would be honest to say so. Perhaps publishing considerations have weighed too heavily.

Porter devotes insufficient attention to the role of the Roman Catholic Church and religious ideas, at least after the passing of Romantic Messianism. He even quotes a passage from Dmowski concerning the loss of religious faith among the educated elite without passing judgment (p. 195). He has, alas, reflected some popular stereotypes. Polish Catholics appear as Judeophobic parish priests and their unenlightened rural flocks, and Porter tars aristocratic conservatives with same antisemitic brush (pp. 41, 159, 164, 176). The terms “Judeophobia” and “antisemitism” are neither explicitly distinguished from each other nor used interchangeably. In contrast, his guide to the Polish terminology of “nation” and “nationalism” is exemplary.
The frequent repetition of the book’s thesis does not allow the reader to forget where he has come from and where he is heading. This is helpful, but perhaps some of this repetition might have been dispensible had terms such as “diachronic,” “synchronic,” “chronotope,” and even “historiosophical hermeneutics” (p. 159) been avoided.

It is a pity that the author could not engage with Tomasz Kizwalter’s investigation of the “modernity” of the Polish nation (O Nowoczesności Narodu. Przypadek Polski [Warsaw, 1999]). This work, which also ends with the formulation of National Democratic ideology at the beginning of the twentieth century, is less inclined to shunt sociological factors to the margins and devotes more attention to the tradition of the pre-1795 Commonwealth.

Oxford University Press have imposed an infuriating layout on this book. The end-notes are abbreviated, with full details given only in the bibliography, which means that often the page has to be turned twice in order to check a reference.

Given the continuing influence of Endek ideology on most of the Polish “right,” When Nationalism Began to Hate should provoke polemics in Poland. It deserves translation into Polish. For students of nineteenth- and twentieth-century nationalism, this generally impressive and arresting book has much to offer. Its sins are mostly those of omission. It challenges existing theories and offers a thought-provoking alternative. Porter’s questioning of the link between “modernity” and democracy might suggest a very gloomy conclusion. However, he argues that, while modernity does not necessarily bring democracy in its wake, neither does it inevitably herald totalitarianism. It is for nation building intellectuals to respond to the challenge of modernity. Instead of Ernest Gellner’s industrial determinism or Eric Hobsbawm’s hope that invented nations can be uninvented, Porter concludes with a plea to serve “wonderful and noble delusions, full of potential for formulating a national politics for the modern world” (p. 238).

Richard J. Butterwick

Queen’s University, Belfast


If Tsar Nicholas I is ever liberated from the damning verdict of “frozen Russia,” a good share of the credit will be due to R. M. Haywood. Emperor of Russia from 1825 until his death in 1855, appropriately from a winter chill and pneumonia, Nicholas has traditionally been villified as an “iron tyrant” who presided over an especially bleak period of reactionary repression. But this book and its prequel, Haywood’s The Beginnings of Railway Development in Russia in the Reign of Nicholas I, 1835–1842 (Durham, N.C., 1969), use the crucial issue of railway development to argue that in economic affairs the reign witnessed some considerable movement. The tsar is portrayed as a determined advocate of railway transport who expected that consequent gains in efficiency, national wealth, and industrial growth would strengthen the existing social system. For Haywood, Nicholas was not simply a political reactionary but also an intelligent, competent monarch who was genuinely concerned with economic modernization and who, by taking Russia into the railway age, laid a solid technical and administrative foundation for the future development of the country’s economy.

Using a comprehensive range of sources, this book focuses primarily on the con-
struction of the mainline railway between the capital, St. Petersburg, and the former capital, Moscow, in 1842–51. This subject is certainly appropriate for a case study. Not only was railway transport fundamental in nineteenth-century Russian industrialization, but this particular railway was also “the largest and most expensive single construction project undertaken in Russia since the creation of the city of St. Petersburg by Peter the Great” in the early eighteenth century (p. 2), and one can see this venture as a radical state-sponsored change “from above” in response to the challenge of economic modernization. That said, the researcher has little other choice in the realm of Russian railway development to 1855, for the St. Petersburg-Moscow railway was one of only three lines under construction in the empire during this period and was the only one in Russia proper to be completed before the Crimean War.

In general terms, chapters are divided into sections with such themes as administration, finance, civil engineering, and rolling stock, such that each main theme can be followed in isolation relatively easily if desired. Chapter 1 chronicles the preparations for constructing the Petersburg-Moscow railway in 1842–43, concentrating on the creation of an administrative bureaucracy, the land surveys and choice of route, questions of equipment supply, and the procurement of a labor force. Chapter 2 focuses on the first phase of construction in 1843–46 and blames the worsening delays mainly on difficulties with finding reliable private contractors, shortages of finance, and tardiness in approving designs. Chapter 3 shows how the financial difficulties necessitated a much slower tempo of work in 1847–49, though it plays down the notion that military mobilization in response to Europe’s 1848 revolutions and especially Nicholas’s intervention in Hungary caused these funding problems. Chapter 4 reveals how, in 1850, the tsar personally pressed for quicker progress so that the railway could open the following year, and it argues that the railway’s operation initially had a more limited economic and social impact than hoped because of bureaucratic restrictions on travel, a lack of onward rail connections, and high operating costs. Chapter 5 and the epilogue briefly describe the construction of the state-sponsored St. Petersburg–Warsaw Railway (1851–62), a variety of private proposals in 1843–55, and the discussions of the concept of a railway network; the absence of much progress is attributed to the “insubstantial” character of the private proposals and a “lack of confidence” among possible investors in the success of privately built railways in Russia (see pp. 563–64). Supporting this text are four useful maps in the same style as those in Haywood’s earlier volume.

It is disappointing that, having broached the broad theme of state-led modernization, Haywood defines his primary purpose modestly as the provision of a thoroughly detailed narrative. Nonetheless there is indeed much here to demonstrate the regime’s modernizing purpose. For instance, in place of the derogatory old legend that Nicholas autocratically decided the route by drawing a straight line on a map with his sword is a detailed account of traffic forecasts, planning, and land surveys. General themes such as the role of the state, technology transfer, the use of foreign expertise, financial constraints, and military considerations are analyzed thoughtfully. Particularly interesting, for example, are the account of how the regime struggled unsuccessfully to interest Russian companies in starting production of rails and rolling stock bodies, and the argument that the contractors—not the regime—were the main cause of the famously atrocious conditions of service endured by the construction workers. As for obstacles to modernization, not least was ignorance, as in the Potemkinian tale of how the tsar’s inspection train slipped to a halt on a gradient because the rails were prettified for him with an oily black paint; whether the local supervisor’s reward of promotion and a medal was a monument to the tsar’s tact or to bureaucratic absurdity is left for conjecture.
However, one might argue that the role of Count P. A. Kleinmichel undermines the modernizing argument. Notwithstanding some important interventions by Nicholas, Kleinmichel was the dominant personality of the proceedings as, in effect, minister for transport from 1842 to 1855. His dictatorial manner helped to ensure the project’s completion but was also sometimes inappropriate for this technically complex enterprise. His decision making was often shaped less by technical and commercial criteria than by a fawning desire to please his sovereign, which on one occasion helped to cause a head-on collision between two trains. Crucially, Kleinmichel was profoundly convinced that the state should control and fund railway construction. By stubbornly refusing to recognize that the aim of building a whole network with state funds was simply impossible, he arguably helped to delay the proliferation of railway construction in Russia for perhaps fifteen years. Having gained its first public railway in 1837, at roughly the same time as did rival powers like France and Austria, Russia subsequently lagged woefully behind as these countries experienced booms in railway building from the 1840s. From this perspective, one might suggest that Russia did not really enter the railway age until Kleinmichel’s successor opened the door to private foreign capital after the Crimean War and thereby helped to stimulate Russia’s own first railway boom.

At 635 pages with a mass of detail, this volume may daunt even the specialist. But the subject is important, and this book provides much thought-provoking material that can usefully inform comparative analysis of industrial development as well as reassessments of Nicholas I’s Russia.

ANTHONY HEYWOOD

University of Bradford

Castration and the Heavenly Kingdom: A Russian Folktale. By Laura Engelstein.

Until relatively recently historical studies of European popular piety were largely restricted to the early modern period. Questioning the boundaries between what is considered “traditional” and “modern,” a number of historians of modern Europe have disproved the conventional secularization thesis that links the decline of religion to modernization. In their work they have examined how common people both made their way in the modern world and kept and strengthened their religious beliefs. Laura Engelstein’s latest monograph, an eloquently written study of one of the most persecuted of Russian sectarian groups, the “self-castrated” (Skoptsy), is part of this innovative trend. But whereas historians of popular piety in modern Europe are struggling against the model of a “progressive” secular West, Engelstein is reacting against the paradigm of “backward” Russia, isolated from modernity. She explains how her study is a departure from notions of Russian exceptionalism: “like the many sects that continue to dot the American religious landscape, the self-castrators were not the remnants of a remote past but features of an increasingly modern setting” (p. xiii).

This book follows her groundbreaking monograph about the cultural meanings of sexuality, The Keys to Happiness: Sex and the Search for Modernity in Fin-de-Siècle Russia (Ithaca, N.Y., 1992). When she began this new project, her interest was primarily in examining the meanings attached to the absence of sex. She eventually realized, however, that her book was not about sex but about faith. Intent on discovering “in the enactment of extremes some link to the host environment or to the basic human con-
dition” (p. xi), Engelstein utilizes the voices of the largely illiterate sect comprised mainly of peasants and townspeople to reconstruct the spiritual motives behind the sect’s practice of self-castration. She uncovers these never-before-heard voices in a wide variety of rich sources, ranging from trial transcripts and defectors’ denunciations to oral verse and personal letters.

The book is divided both chronologically and thematically. Against the backdrop of a discussion of folk piety, Engelstein devotes the first chapter to reconstructing skillfully the emergence of the sect and the story of its first charismatic leader, Selivanov, during Catherine the Great’s reign. The middle three chapters interweave and compare a variety of self-representational narratives by Skoptsy with representations by prerevolutionary bureaucrats, ethnographers, revolutionaries, theologians, and physicians. She also employs institutional sources such as the records of police searches to provide ethnographic data on the sect’s existence. The fifth and final chapter of the book is devoted to the sect in the early Soviet period. Relying extensively on the lengthy correspondence between a self-taught writer from the sect, Nikolai Latyshev, and the Bolshevik Vladimir Bonch-Bruevich, Engelstein considers the experience of a millennial group in revolution and the attitude of the new government toward sectarian. As she notes, “their vision of heaven on earth had no political dimension” (p. 190), and therefore the sect remained relatively indifferent to changes in government, although they professed loyalty to any regime in power. By focusing mainly on a close reading of the texts of one individual, she avoids the pitfalls that numerous Russianists researching the complicated interplay between belief in communism and religious faith have encountered. She also carefully considers the role of Skoptsy “intellectuals” as bearers of a tradition practiced by their uneducated brethren. The text is nicely complemented by a large selection of photographs of Skoptsy, their dwellings, and their religious art. Unfortunately, the book does not include a conclusion or bibliography.

Because Engelstein explores virtually all aspects of the Skoptsy’s world, her book succeeds in fulfilling her initial aim of presenting the Skoptsy not simply as aberrations but also as representatives of the broader society in which they lived and of religious communities in general. Reading this book, I was struck that many of the characteristics that she attributes to the Skoptsy, such as their modern fascination with themselves as subjects and their disdain for politics, were commonplace among Russians in the late imperial period. Many of the dimensions of their faith that she analyzes, such as selective borrowing, the conflict ensuing from interacting with the fallen temporal world while remaining untainted by it, the transposition of the symbolic onto the literal, and their dual understanding of time, are also indicative of many religious worldviews.

Although Engelstein emphasizes that her subject is the self-perceptions of the Skoptsy, her discussion of representations of the sect is also superb. Given the longue durée that she examines, she is able to provide unique insight into how government objectives toward its citizenry changed and how these objectives were codified in the reasons different regimes feared the Skoptsy and deemed them criminals. The shared attributes that the wide variety of educated Russians associated with this marginalized group also provide a mirror reflecting the common values that transcended Russian social and political boundaries. One example is the anticommercial attitudes associated with the sect, who, like Jews, were commonly depicted as greedy and exploitative. These attitudes were not only widespread; they also remained remarkably consistent over the course of the Imperial and Soviet periods, indicating deeply rooted cultural traditions. My only criticism of this section of the book is that Engelstein assumes that the intellectuals she examined all shared an inherently secular and Western orientation, an assumption that has not been borne out by recent studies.
Any historian researching a rural Russian sectarian group is faced with a major dilemma: because of religious persecution, the vast expanse of the country, and rampant illiteracy in the countryside, Russian sectarian groups tended to be internally heterogeneous. Although Engelstein demonstrates convincingly that the members of the sect perceived of themselves as a cohesive group, and that they were considered so by others, the Skoptsy are no exception to this pattern of variance. For example, not all underwent castration, there was disagreement over which of their prophets represented Christ incarnate, and not all believed that castration engendered imminent salvation. Even taking this internal diversity into account, the reader would have benefited from a more explicit discussion of the overarching contours of the sect’s lived religion. Throughout the book Engelstein mentions that many sect members, in addition to their own forms of worship, attended the same church services, revered a number of the same icons, recited some of the same prayers, and read several of the same devotional pamphlets of mainstream Orthodoxy. Given that Engelstein demonstrates that self-castration was not the sole criterion for the group’s self-definition, these findings raise a central issue that the author mentions but does not fully answer: what was the relation of the Skoptsy to the Orthodox Church, the faith practiced by the majority of the ethnic Russian population (and the religion from which the members of the sect converted)? This issue is particularly interesting since Orthodox publicists in late imperial Russia, while united in their condemnation of any mutilation of the body, were deeply divided over conceptions of the body and sexuality.

The book raises a number of interesting questions about gender. Engelstein establishes that women were far less likely to undergo genital mutilation than men. As she points out, because prophets were not uniformly castrated, the lesser frequency of excision of tissue among women did not necessarily diminish their standing in the sect. As is often the case in religious movements outside of institutional churches, women played a relatively significant role in the Skoptsy leadership. Yet Engelstein argues that peasant patriarchal order continued to dictate the sect’s existence. Given the widespread portrayal of women in Russian folklore as powerful temptresses, why weren’t Skoptsy women circumcised (as they are among African Muslims)? Was it because the sect feared the power of women and were therefore afraid to tamper with women’s sexuality? Did belief in the power of women’s sexuality make it possible for them to accept female prophets and male sexuality as more impure? Or, by castrating men, were they protecting the men from the women? These questions, criticisms, and comments, however, only indicate the depth of this fertile subject and in no way detract from Engelstein’s significant achievement in bringing to a wide audience a riveting tale.

Laurie Manchester

Arizona State University


Oleg Kharkhordin begins his reflections by observing that, when the Soviet Union dissolved, individualism and privacy were both highly valued, despite the fact that Soviet society had officially promulgated a commitment to collective values. Soviet citizens were by no means robots motivated solely by collective norms. Rather, they...
were individuals, albeit individuals who had been socialized in a particular manner. Their individualism, their expression of the relation between individual and society, took on a shape that differed from what was to be found in Western European societies. In this book, Kharkhordin examines this specific Soviet form of “individualization” and probes its origins. In his attempt to examine the specific type of socialization experienced by individuals in Soviet society, Kharkhordin employs Michel Foucault’s framework of the development of Western European individualism, placing particular emphasis on what Foucault calls the “technologies de soi,” the forms in which individuals spoke about their “selves.”

Confession—in particular, in its institutionalized form, private, auricular confession—was for centuries, according to Foucault, the predominant Western form of self-thematization, creating the Western type of “individual.” Kharkhordin contrasts this with the orthodox world, where public penance by public rituals prevailed. Kharkhordin notes that the Bolsheviks, and the Soviet state they created, took human beings as the object of their interest precisely insofar as they were citizens of the state and potential members of the party. For the vast majority of members, it was the party that gave them, for the first time in their lives, an opportunity to think, to speak, and to write about themselves. For them, therefore, the party was a kind of entry point into the “practices of being a self.” It was not, however, a selfhood oriented, as in the West, toward the autonomy of the individual and the claims of privacy, but rather a uniquely Soviet form of individual selfhood (pp. 4–5).

Ideally, the “person” (lichnost’) of the party member took its specific shape through a “disclosure process” (oblichnie) in which he showed his true “face” (lico) in public, before the other members of the party cell. It was only through this process of disclosing, or revealing, or “publication” of one’s self (publicatio suis) that the individual could create his own identity, for he only recognized himself through the eyes of this public audience. The individual member of the Stalinist party viewed his own self, experienced the form of his own selfhood, through the gaze of the collective party membership. Kharkhordin traces this form of oblichnie back to its roots in the practices of public confession in the Orthodox Church (pp. 226–28).

A second “subjectifying practice,” a technique of “working on oneself,” was the practice of identifying with certain prescribed heroic models. Kharkhordin traces its origin to the Christian practices of imitatio Dei. In the construction of hero figures the individual’s true self is once again revealed through a process of oblichnie. The real Soviet individual is the hero. Nicolai Izotov, a forerunner of Alexei Stachanov, wrote an autobiography that reproduces, word for word, his statements during the 1933 purge. At its conclusion the party secretary calls Izotov “teacher” and “leader” and returns to him, to the thunderous applause of the membership present, his party membership card. It is important to note that during the 1933 purge some 76 percent of all party members (all members, that is, who emerged unscathed from the purge) went through a similar process of public acceptance and approval of their identities as good party members (p. 215).

In the post-Stalinist era, different subjectivizing practices emerged in a private sphere that was concealed from the public realm. Differentiations in lifestyle and in possessions were all to coalesce into the “privatization” and “individualization” of Soviet society noted at the beginning of this review.

A historian reviewing Kharkhordin’s book will have some general problems with the author’s source materials. In his introduction Kharkhordin claims to have studied the processes through which “Soviet individualism” was constructed by investigating “the practices of individualization rather than discourse about individualism” (p. 3). In
fact, however, Kharkhordin bases his conclusions on tracts, handbooks, and rules of conduct (p. 33). Instead of examining archival source material detailing the actual practices of confession and penance, he has relied on normative literature on the subject. This is unfortunate. The archives are full of materials documenting a discursive subjectivizing, including transcripts of “purge sessions” during which “criticism and self-criticism” (kritika i samkritika) took place. One of the practical methods for promoting “self-thematization” — in the Soviet period perhaps the predominant method — was precisely that of “criticism and self-criticism.” Kharkhordin himself strikes just this tone in his introduction when he admits the work’s “multiple shortcomings” (p. xii) as if hoping thereby to mollify potential critics. This is one of the functions of self-criticism: framing one’s own, relatively mild version of one’s failings in order to forestall potentially harsher criticism by others.

Kharkhordin frankly admits one shortcoming of his investigation: “I have not discovered what made party discourse blend ‘criticism’ and ‘self-criticism’” (p. 143). In my view the integral interconnection between “criticism and self-criticism” can be seen in a standard formulation found in nearly every self-criticism from this period: “I was led to this anti-party attitude by X, etc.” Or “I committed this error because of X, etc.” Self-criticism always involves criticism of other wrongdoers. There is always at least one other person involved. In my opinion this shows two things. First, “criticism and self-criticism” will have a dynamic element; a “self-criticism” can implicate a whole chain of individuals, encompassing wide networks of acquaintances, even whole milieus. Second, a well-constructed “self-criticism” can be transformed into an attack.

Kharkhordin believes that self-criticism only rarely took on the shape of self-accusation (p. 145). The main purpose of self-criticism was not self-incrimination; it was, rather, the public expression of one’s self before the party collective. For sessions in the framework of regular purges (Chistki), which are Kharkhordin’s focus, this is largely true. For the most part what one finds in these sessions are self-presentations in the form of self-justifications in front of the membership of the party cell. But even as early as the Chistki of 1929 and 1933, self-accusations, in public, of political “deviations” and personal shortcomings occurred. And in party sessions dedicated to the case (delo) of individuals who were actually accused of some wrongdoing, the minutes indicate that self-accusation by the accused individual was the rule. The fact that Kharkhordin has overlooked this important form of self-criticism may be due to his source materials, to the fact that he did not make use of archival materials. And this reflects the fact that his book is not a historical one.

Kharkhordin’s book is freighted with theory. Nevertheless it is highly superior to those basically imitative works that want to demonstrate their continuity with Western research by making lavish use of terms culled from the supermarket of theories and fashionable trends. What they really show is an intellectual colonization of Russia. Kharkhordin, even when he employs theories and models developed in a “Western” context, charts an independent course and reaches conclusions that do more than simply reiterate conventional opinions about the Soviet system and its people. He also manages to avoid another fault shared by many works based on Foucault’s theorems, namely, presenting everything as though it had happened just as Foucault described it. Kharkhordin’s portrayal differs from Foucault’s model. Kharkhordin summarizes the basic difference as follows (pp. 355–56): in the West, the individual, according to Foucault’s outline, developed into a subject through the institution of private confession addressed to authorized specialists (whether the priest or the psychoanalyst); for the Soviet individual, the development proceeded via public confession within a collectivity, that is, within a society of those who were essentially equal.
Kharkhordin’s book provides a highly original impetus for the further study of individuality, subjectivity, selfhood, and personal identity in the Soviet Union. His basic lines of interpretation and the wealth of ideas presented in his book (of which this short review can give only the briefest indication) should now be put to the test against the wealth of available archival materials by professional historians. They will find plenty of inspiration in Kharkhordin’s analysis.

BERTHOLD UNFRIED

Vienna


Anthony Heywood tells four interrelated stories in this impressive monograph, each providing an array of insights into important elements of early Soviet economic reconstruction and development. Each is meticulously researched in Russian, English, European, and American archives. At a moment when economic history is largely out of favor among American historians of Russia and the USSR, Modernizing Lenin’s Russia demonstrates the enduring value of well-conceived and carefully executed “traditional” studies. Readers may even discern parallels between the economic disarray of the first years of the Soviet and the post-Soviet regimes, although this is not Heywood’s concern.

The first story concerns the Bolsheviks’ radical plans for economic modernization, developed during (and in part because of) the devastation of war communism. Heywood effectively challenges the paradigm of “collapse and gradual recovery” underlying much of the writing on the transition to the new economic policy (NEP) by showing how Russia’s desperate predicament in 1920 was seen by some as a unique opportunity for revolutionary economic reconstruction. While grandiose visions in this period are most commonly associated with massive electrification, envisioned as the technological miracle of modernity, Heywood shows that the first wonder of the world was actually the railroads, whose massive expansion and modernization would literally haul Soviet Russia into the new era.

This prompted an extraordinary foreign economic policy in late 1920, one that involved the projected expenditure of some 40 percent of Russia’s gold reserves on locomotives and other railroad equipment manufactured abroad. The second interesting story here is about the implications of this policy and the complexities of its implementation. An alternative to spending such a huge portion of Russia’s reserves (and one Heywood suggests might have represented a more appropriate policy) was to retain them as collateral for foreign loans, as Sergei Witte essentially did. Another might have been to invest these resources in domestic production, the protectionist policy Stalin later favored. As Heywood demonstrates, foreign economic policy in this period thus had profound (and contentious) implications not only for Soviet domestic development but also in terms of regime perspectives on the capacity and integrity of the early Soviet workforce.

The story of Leonid Krasin’s trade missions, beginning in 1920, constitute the third related part of Heywood’s exploration, and one of the most interesting. The author presents in fascinating detail the confusions and imbroglios of different negotiations,
the naïveté of Soviet expectations, even the chicanery that individual contracts seemed sometimes to require. Here Heywood argues convincingly that because of its longer term procurement of railroad equipment, the value of Soviet imports in this period was substantially greater than has been supposed, putting the history of the coterminous efforts at international revolution advocated by Leon Trotsky and the Comintern in a somewhat new light. It is also evident that there was actually no effective monopoly on foreign trade, despite the efforts (and pretensions) of the Commissariat of Foreign Trade, and that some in the Commissariat of Transport pursued the interests of their sector with a highly personalized single-mindedness.

The most prominent of these was Iu. V. Lomonosov, graduate with distinction from the Imperial Institute of Communication, member in 1913 of the prestigious Engineering Council at the age of thirty-six, and, after 1917, while clearly committed to the Soviet cause, as quarrelsome and contentious a “bourgeois specialist” as the Bolshevik leadership could manage. One of the most interesting aspects of Heywood’s study is his weaving of this individual career with the broader problems of economic reconstruction. In the detail of heavy-handed contract negotiations, broken and renegotiated agreements, the “greasing” of deliveries, and especially what seem to have been endless arguments about railroad technology and the value of specific procurements, one can see clearly how early Soviet trade politics actually worked. One of Heywood’s most interesting conclusions concerns the weight of individual agency during this period: little of this important activity, he argues, was ideologically driven. (Under investigation and mired in controversy, some of which involved large payroll payments to his wife, Lomonosov refused an order to return to Moscow in 1927 and, after the execution of Lev Kamenev, a friend and patron, became a British citizen. His archive is at the University of Leeds.)

Heywood believes this early strategy to modernize rapidly through railway imports was ill-conceived, overly optimistic, and naive. In this he may underestimate both the continued hope at the time for European revolution, as well as the willingness especially of the British to provide even well-collateralized loans, as they and others had done for Witte. The very chaos Heywood describes so well obviated any neat outcomes, of course. Optimism (and even a bit of naïveté) were clearly more energizing and productive than their opposites, as this excellent study testifies so judiciously.

William G. Rosenberg

University of Michigan, Ann Arbor


“What was considered normal and abnormal in Soviet society during the 1920s and '30s?,” (p. 15) asks Natal'ia Lebina, a professor of history at the St. Petersburg University of Economics and Finance. Answering this deceptively simple question is the “main task” of this book, which is devoted to everyday life in Petrograd/Leningrad and was published as a contribution to the Finnish Renvall Institute's project entitled “Norms, Values, and Transition in Soviet Society during the 1920s–1950s.”

Much of the complexity of the answer to the question inheres in the nature of revolutionary societies. Certainly in the case of Soviet Russia, where the prerevolutionary elites found themselves despised and deprived of civil rights while the previously
downtrodden and marginalized gained a rhetorical place within the “ruling class,” the world and its values appeared to have been turned upside down. Another complicating factor is the semiotic weight in the Soviet period of the Russian word for “norm,” which came to mean not only the rate or quota for a job but also the amount of food and other goods, living space, and much else that was administratively distributed. At least during the civil war years of hunger, ration levels often did not even approach minimum quantities for survival (and in practice did not amount to what was mandated), so legal norms and “normality” bore no similarity whatsoever. Finally, the disjuncture between officially prescribed norms and those prevailing in popular milieus requires considerable methodological sophistication in dealing with issues of values, conformity, and deviance.

Lebina’s analysis of everyday life, framed by the classical sociological concepts of anomie and deviance pioneered by Emile Durkheim, is also indebted to the French poststructuralists’ insights into the power of discourse. It draws on a broad range of archival material, newspapers, and official publications, and it makes deft use of memoirs and diaries, many recently published. The book is divided into four parts. The first, “Traditional Anomalies and Soviet Specificity,” has chapters on alcoholism, crime, prostitution, and death. Part 2, “The Inversion of Norms and Pathologies,” deals with the godless life, the new religion, and the commune. In part 3, Lebina turns her attention to officially prescribed norms in housing and clothing and, in part 4, to leisure activities and private life. Each chapter is organized chronologically, beginning with the pertinent laws and prevailing social attitudes in late imperial Russia and proceeding through the years of revolution and civil war, the New Economic Policy (NEP) of the 1920s, and the prewar Stalin era.

While its periodization is conventional, the book offers fresh insights into the contortions of official policies and the evolution of popular mentalities and behavior. It also sheds new light on some of the old controversies in Western historiography. Lebina notes, for example, that Durkheim’s hypothesis concerning a direct correlation between the degree of social stability and suicide rates is confirmed by the data at hand. The average suicide rate in Petersburg was 10.6 cases for every 100,000 residents during the First World War, rising to 33.3 cases in 1924 and a high of 37.5 cases in 1928, before falling to 23 cases in 1932 and 22 cases in 1940. The very normality of these rates and other data associated with suicide leads her to argue that “in Soviet society suicide was a traditional pathology,” which by implication contradicts “the idea of the complete supremacy of the totalitarian type of personality in Soviet society in the 1920s and ’30s” (p. 108).

As for official attitudes, Lebina emphasizes that, whereas initially alcoholism, prostitution, and other forms of deviant behavior were interpreted as socially induced pathologies inherited from “bourgeois society,” in the course of Stalin’s “socialist offensive” of the late 1920s and early 1930s they became criminalized and politicized. The proclaimed achievement of socialism in the mid-1930s was accompanied by both an intensification of repressive measures and the ideological co-option of certain social practices that had proven ineradicable. Thus, in 1936 Anastas Mikoyan, the commissar of the food industry, could proclaim “in all seriousness, that ‘before the Revolution people drank namely to get drunk and forget their unhappy lives . . . [but] now life has become more joyous. From the good life you don’t get drunk. Life has become joyous, so one can drink.” (p. 42). While mass terror reigned the champagne and vodka flowed.

The welter of subcultures and undergrounds, particularly prevalent in the 1920s, illustrates the tenuousness of Bolshevik control over the population and makes for fascinating reading. I at least had not heard of Count Panel’nyi, the criminal-aristocrat
who roamed Vasil’evskii Island with his bride, the “rare beauty” Niusia Gopnitsa, or Len’ka Panteleev, the Petrograd Robin Hood, whose legendary exploits during the early years of NEP represented a popular adaptation of Lenin’s earlier injunction to “rob from the robbers.” Nor had I considered narcotics addiction as a “protest against customary everyday standards of which one can be considered the consumption of alcohol.” “In this context,” Lebina notes, narcotism was “the most anomalous of anomalies” (p. 28).

Lebina devotes much attention, appropriately enough, to the younger generation—students, young workers, and Komsomol activists. Actively encouraged to defy parents who were religious or of “alien” social classes, youth experienced the full force of the new revolutionary culture of the 1920s. But the party’s and Komsomol’s own ambivalence concerning proper behavior—or what Lebina refers to as “normative chaos”—as well as the presence of commercial outlets enabled youth to experiment with a broad range of lifestyles characteristic of modern urban life.

This is ground that Anne Gorsuch, Richard Stites, and other Western historians have covered, but Lebina’s keen semiotic eye picks out some arresting details, particularly in the area of personal appearance. She notes that the loss of prestige of the leather jacket in the mid-1920s “was a sign of the demilitarization of life . . . and the stabilization of NEP” (p. 212). Oxford trousers and “Jim” lace-boots became all the rage, but their popularity was eclipsed late in the decade when the political importance of asceticism in dress was heightened and, in any case, it became difficult to find or afford new clothing of any kind. The anti-intellectualism of these years, Lebina notes, made even Sergei Kirov, Leningrad party boss, afraid to be seen in public wearing glasses. By this time, the guitar was being replaced by the accordion as the officially approved instrument of popular music, and such NEP-era pastimes as card playing and the foxtrot were driven underground. With the full flowering of Stalinism in the 1930s came the ubiquity of . . . flowers, the popularity of cinematic musical comedies, and other light entertainment.

The book contains fascinating photographs from the Central State Archive of Film and Photographic Documents as well as two quite useful indexes but also a regrettable number of typographical errors. Not everything, of course, catches Lebina’s eye. Working life is not addressed, and there is nothing on sport. But there is otherwise much to learn from this outstanding work of social and cultural history.

---


Sheila Fitzpatrick’s latest monograph is a study of everyday life in Russian towns and cities during the Stalinist 1930s. The book was more than ten years in the making, and it shows. Meticulously researched, imaginatively organized, and fluidly written, it deserves a wide audience.

Thematically, Fitzpatrick’s study ranges broadly. Individual chapters focus on the internal culture of the Party and the characteristics of the “ideal” communist; the struggle for survival in an economy of shortage; the utopianism of the era, including the pervasiveness of the myth of a “radiant future” in official and unofficial discourse; the
lifestyles of the pampered, if deeply insecure, Stalinist elite; the fate of those stigma-
tized as “other” and, more broadly, the effects of shame on the Soviet psyche; the
dynamics of family life at the upper and lower rungs of society; the spread of a culture
of mutual surveillance, denunciation, and complaint; and the dynamics of the Great
Terror, including the experience of those who fell victim to and/or lived through it.
Fitzpatrick’s panoramic view of Stalin’s Russia is based on research in a wide range
of sources, including documents from central and regional archives of the former Soviet
Union, Soviet newspapers and journals of the 1930s, literary and cinematic artifacts of
Stalinist culture, and collections of interviews of postwar émigrés (e.g., the Harvard
Interview Project). Fitzpatrick also displays an impressive command of the secondary
literature; throughout the monograph, she is generous in her assessment of the research
of colleagues whom she admires, whether they wrote at the height of the cold war or
only recently received a Ph.D.

According to Fitzpatrick, everyday life in the Soviet 1930s was structured above all
by, first, the material shortages that became endemic to the Stalinist economic system
and, second, the pervasiveness of the Stalinist state. The fact that the regime replaced
the market with a state-run economy that chronically failed to supply consumers with
the necessities of life had significant implications. It meant that status and privilege
were a function of access to goods rather than ownership of the means of production;
that the Party, as the ultimate allocator of scarce goods, enjoyed tremendous leverage
over the population; and that one’s survival depended on winning favor among the
right people (e.g., employees of state retail outlets), growing food wherever land was
available, and standing in line for hours, if not days, at a time. Not surprisingly, the
system exacted a heavy toll in terms of waste, inefficiency, and corruption. There were
social costs as well, such as the simmering resentment of those excluded from the
closed shops and private cafeterias of the new elite. Besides shaping the behavior and
outlook of Homo Sovieticus (Fitzpatrick’s term), the economy of shortage profoundly
affected official and unofficial culture: the procurement of life’s necessities was accom-
panied by a new set of descriptive terms (e.g., “deficit goods,” “just in case” bags); the
“radiant future” portrayed in works of socialist realism typically included unrestrained
images of plenty; and subversive jokes and chastushki (short rhymed poems) revolved
around categories such as “us” (those who suffered from the shortages) and “them”
(those who did not).

As for the “state”—a term that Fitzpatrick uses in place of the more precise if
awkward “Party-state”—its relentless expansion during the 1930s, accompanied by
campaigns to suppress the church as well as the market, made it by far the most
important institution outside the family. Consequently, Fitzpatrick focuses throughout
on those “everyday interactions that in some way involved the state” (p. 3). Such
interactions included applying for (and then producing on demand) identity documents
such as an internal passport; applying for a job or social welfare benefit; complaining
about abuses by local officials to the press or the Control Commission; petitioning for
restoration of one’s civil rights or membership in the Party; requesting legal assistance
in tracking down a delinquent spouse; denouncing a troublesome neighbor or unpopular
boss to the security police; and so forth. Like the economy of shortage, the pervasive
and pathological Stalinist state profoundly shaped the evolution of Homo Sovieticus;
rendering him conformist, dependent, fatalistic, passive, and untrusting of all but his
closest friends and relatives.

Any study of a subject as broad as “everyday life” in the Stalinist 1930s is bound
to leave out something important. In this case, that something is the experience of
work. Fitzpatrick justifies her decision to avoid the topic by claiming that she is “in-
interested in the experiences and practices that were common to the urban population as a whole, not just parts of it” (p. 11). Of course, if she had applied that standard consistently, she would have published a much shorter book, since most of the chapters here focus, in fact, on one or another subset of urban society (e.g., the elite, the disfranchised, women). Given that the 1930s was a decade in which millions of Soviet peasants and women entered the industrial labor force for the first time and in which the majority of adult urban dwellers spent up to half their waking hours on the job (typically, at a factory or other state enterprise), the lack of attention to the work environment is puzzling. Even more puzzling, however, is the confidence with which Fitzpatrick dismisses the findings of some scholars (including myself) who have made Stalinist industry the focus of their research. Perhaps Fitzpatrick is right in asserting that class was not a significant category of social identity in the 1930s, that exploitation was not a term that workers would have used to describe their experience on the shop floor, and that working-class protest was relatively insignificant. The jury is out, however, until those sympathetic to such claims contend with the archival sources that Fitzpatrick consciously failed to consult while carrying out research for her otherwise impressive monograph.

While there is a need, then, for further and more specialized studies of everyday life under Stalin, Fitzpatrick has written the book that will serve as the starting point for future discussions of the topic. A short review cannot do justice to the subtlety and richness of this pioneering piece of scholarship. Suffice it to say that specialists and nonspecialists alike will find much of value in *Everyday Stalinism*, whose scope and accessibility make it an appropriate text for graduate students and even advanced undergraduates.

JEFFREY J. ROSSMAN

*University of Virginia*