2012

On the Economic Effects of Policy Responsiveness: The Role of Candidate Selection for General Elections

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Recommended Citation
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DOI: 10.5642/cguetd/34

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On the economic effects of policy responsiveness: The role of
candidate selection for general elections.

by

Marco Alejandro Pérez Mares

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Claremont Graduate University in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the
Graduate Faculty of Economics.

Claremont, California.
2012

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This dissertation has been duly read, reviewed, and critiqued by the Committee listed below, which hereby approves the manuscript of Marco Alejandro Pérez Mares as fulfilling the scope and quality requirements for meriting the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Abstract

On the economic effects of policy responsiveness: The role of candidate selection for general elections.

by

Marco Alejandro Pérez Mares
Claremont Graduate University: 2012

Policy responsiveness to the demands of the whole is important because it is a determinant of growth and development: institutions that make governments more inclusive favor economic progress and factors that make governments more exclusive inhibit prosperity. Growth-enhancing policies likely to please the citizenry include policies that ensure the prevalence of the rule of law, policies that protect property and intellectual rights, and policies that foster competition, access and the perfection of markets. In contrast, growth-retarding policies likely to initiate from the representation efforts of politicians advancing narrow concerns include infringement on property rights, diffuse patent legislation, regulation to rise some price or wage, regulation blocking the entry into specific markets, official protection to monopolistic markets and adoption of legal barriers against international competition.

If policy responsiveness to the interests of the whole favors economic affluence, what political institutions matter for the advancement of wide-encompassing interests through the policy making process? This dissertation examines the idea that the incentives provided by the intra-party candidate selection methods are crucial in order to understand the politicians’
representation efforts. Expressly, increasing participation and democratization of the intra-party nomination process increase the incumbent’s propensity to represent wide-encompassing interests and adopt policies that favor economic affluence. In contrast, elite-centered nomination methods decrease the incumbent’s incentive to be politically responsive to the interests of the whole in favor of the representation of narrow concerns that often demand policies that benefit the group at the expense of overall economic growth.

Empirically, the idea that aspirants to party tickets must first respond to the demands of those with the power to add their names to the electoral ballot finds robust support. In the developed world, candidate nomination appears largely informed by inclusive and democratic practices. Quite the opposite, in the less-developed world events of intraparty participatory politics are for the most part absent, with nomination decisions often monopolized by national party leaders and local party bosses.
To my father, Angel Pérez Ochoa, M.D. Thanks dad!
Acknowledgements

There are many people I would like to thank greatly for helping me make this dissertation possible. My ideas, writing, and this finished product would not be the same without the enthusiastic guidance of my mentors Arthur Denzau, Thomas Borcherding, Darren Filson and Paul Zak. Thank you all, deeply, for the finest education, your encouragement in the early stages and your invaluable insights and advice through all stages of research and writing. This dissertation would certainly not be the same without your exceptional cleverness.

I would like to thank those who had influenced my academic and professional formation on earlier stages; professor Javier Beristain (+), Alonso Lujambio, Otoniel Ochoa, Tonathieu Rodriguez and Emilio Villarreal-Quintanilla. At some point in time, your going “above and beyond” has been a source of professional challenge, intellectual growth and, somehow, inspiration.

A special thank-you goes to all members of the Gonzalez family, Mr. and Mrs. Gonzalez, George, Jackie and Josh. You are infinitely appreciated.

Finally, I want my dad Angel, my mom Gloria, my aunt Nina, my sister Yoyis and our family treasure “la Beba,” to know that I greatly appreciate their company and support throughout all these years. Mom, I know you are always there, with me. I deeply cheer being one of you!!!

The views expresses herein are the author’s own.

April, 2012
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Introduction

“…Yet estimates of the sources of growth, however meticulous, subtle, and useful, do not tell us about the ultimate causes of growth. They do not trace the sources of growth to their fundamental causes; …neither do they explain…the “retardants” of growth (p. 4).” Olson, M. (1982). *The rise and decline of nations: Economic growth, stagflation, and social rigidities*. New Heaven and London: Yale University Press.

Without doubt, unearthing the economic effects of political regimes has proved an elusive quest. At best, the empirical literature finds less than persuasive the evidence of a connection between political regimes and growth rates of income per capita, with the overall effect of democracy on economic growth often regained weakly negative (Sirowy & Inkeles, 1990; Przeworski & Limongi, 1993; Barro, 1996; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000).

Despite the on-going debate on the economic effects of political regimes, in his classic book *The Rise and Decline of Nations*, Mancur Olson [1982] brings attention to an empirical
Introduction

regularity: Economic affluence is regularly observed in a relatively small sub-sample of consolidated democracies; i.e., countries with political institutions prone to advance the interests of the whole. Policy responsiveness occurs if the institutional structure induces the ruling polity to pursue policy frameworks that parallel those favored by the citizenry (Manin, Przeworski, & Stokes, 1999a, p. 9; Powell, 2004, p. 91). What, if any, are the economic consequences of policy responsiveness? Even if we admit policy responsiveness as a growth-enhancing institution, what political institutions matter for the advancement of wide-encompassing interests through the policy making process?

Policy responsiveness is important because it is a determinant of growth and development. Consenting to the view that the politico-institutional structure make politicians exceptionally receptive to the interests of the whole, policies likely to please substantial segments of the citizenry include policies that ensure the prevalence of the rule of law and assert human rights, policies that protect property and intellectual rights, and policies that foster competition and the access and perfection of markets (Barro, 1997, pp. 26-28). Governments advancing the interests of the whole may also spend on public goods such as infrastructure and schools (Barro, 2000; Feng, 2000; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003). These are policies that have an evident tendency to satisfy the citizenry and lead to overall economic growth.

Quite the opposite, growth-retarding policies likely to develop from the representation efforts of government officials advancing narrow concerns include blurry intellectual and property rights legislation, infringement on property rights, diffuse patent legislation, government imposed price controls, legislation to tax some types of income at lower rates than other incomes, enactment of complex tax breaks to protect businesses, inflexible contracts to
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protect the wages of union members, regulation blocking the entry into specific lines of business, official protection to monopolistic markets, import restrictions, and adoption of other legal barriers against international competition (Olson, 1982, pp. 44-46; Feng, 2000; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003).

On balance, the extent in which political institutions advance encompassing interests rather than narrow concerns favors economic efficiency and the rate of economic growth. If policy responsiveness favor the adoption of growth-enhancing policies, what political institutions matter for the advancement of wide-encompassing interests through the policy making process?

Concerning policy responsiveness, earlier studies place regularly scheduled elections as the paramount selection mechanism for politicians to act in the interest of constituents (Dahl, 1956; Downs, 1957; Buchanan & Tullock, 1962). The prospect of reelection, in particular, makes incumbents receptive to the interests of the whole and so influences the kinds of policies public officials pursue (Grofman, 1996). Cohen and Spitzer (1996) examine the relationship between incumbents and voters by means of a game-theoretical model in the form of a Prisoner’s Dilemma. The infinitely iterated game induces rational self-interested incumbents to pursue public oriented policies that signal the incumbents’ future performance in office to voters who look at floor voting records to decide whom to support. Denzau and Munger (1986) show that in the U.S. Congress, the prospect of reelection combined with plurality rule in single-member districts constraint the legislators’ propensity to serve narrow interests in favor of the representation of the more encompassing group of regular, unaffiliated voters. Members of

---

1 Scholars have paid close attention to the effects that various political institutions have on policy responsiveness. Contrary to electoral systems of proportional representation that encourage central control and adherence to party platforms, scholars have long emphasized the keen linkages created between politicians and voters by systems of plurality rule in single-member districts. Term limits in office lessen policy responsiveness. The electoral rule restrains voters from using reelection to keep elected officials politically responsive and incumbents in their last term have no incentives to serve their constituents’ interests since their efforts cannot be rewarded with an additional term in office. Federalism increases policy responsiveness because political power is decentralized to levels closer to the citizenry.
Introduction

Congress may serve organized interest groups in exchange for campaign contributions and political support. However, incumbents act in response to narrow concerns only if the electoral benefits attained from the donors’ contributions exceed the costs of their unpopular policy choices that reduce their chances of reelection by the masses. Lately, the scholarly literature moved forward to examine the politicians’ behavior and policy choices according to the reputation building model of politics. Rogoff’s (1990) seminal work points to the notion that politicians’ incentive to establish a reputation through the use of public policy can have important outcomes. The author constructs a model based on a forward looking electorate that receives the politician’s political stances and policy choices as signals that are indicative of the incumbent’s ability to govern. Electoral prospects create an incentive for politicians to build their reputations with this forward looking electorate who may be judging performance based on the politician’s performance. Only those politicians who desire to run for office again must maintain a reputation of political responsiveness and responsible economic policy among constituents. Hence, the re-election mechanism enhances policy responsiveness which also reduces the incumbent’s opportunistic behavior.

This dissertation examines the notion that the incentives provided by the intra-party candidate selection methods are crucial in order to understand the politicians’ representation efforts. Explicitly, whose preferences will impact actual policy depends on who governs intra-party nomination decisions. Schattschneider (1942), Kirchheimer (1966), Jupp (1968) and Ranney (1981) place the locus of power within political parties on those selecting party nominees for electoral contestation from among the pool of eligibles. The logic of their

---

2 Although political parties usually sanction nationality, age, residence, personal conduct, and holding of public office, only six countries legally address the candidate selection practices observed by political parties: Argentina, Finland, Germany, Norway, Turkey and the US. For the rest of the countries in today’s western democracies, political parties’ systems of leadership election and methods of candidate selection habitually reside within the
argument is straight and simple: Aspirants to party tickets must first respond to the demands of those with the power to add their names to the electoral ballot, or face the threat of losing party nomination. While studying the Indian Congress Party, Weiner (1967) notices that candidate nomination decisions on the hands of the national party oligarchy party make contenders to party tickets willing to advocate the immediate concerns and national policies of party leadership (pp. 48-49). For Chaube (2003), the potential denial of re-nomination is the key element to understand the representation efforts of a member of the legislature to the wishes of those making nomination decisions (p. 212). Hence, together with the power to choose party nominees, key selection groups influence the legislative work.

Consequently, increased participation and democratization of the nomination process enhances policy responsiveness to the interests of the broader electoral constituency. Democratic and inclusive candidate selection refers to the meaningful involvement of the mass public and participation of the party membership in the process of choosing candidates for electoral contestation (Sartori, 1973, pp. 19-20; Hazan, 2002, p. 117). Following Norris (1996), key selection groups may then comprise enfranchised citizens, registered voters, grassroots party members and democratically elected delegates at regional or national party conventions in which nominees are selected by democratic means (p. 203). In his book Congress: The Electoral Connection David Mayhew [1974] develops the case that mandatory party primaries turn incumbents in the U.S. Congress exceptionally receptive to the demands of their electoral constituencies, often at the point of challenging the directives of the central party leadership.

---

3 In contrast, nomination decisions within parties may be centralized by small oligarchic party elites at the national or sub-national level. In this case, key selectorates may be national and regional party bosses, influential regional officers, and faction and affiliated interest group leaders (Norris, 1996, p.203).
Introduction

This happens because the initial step in the process of running for public office corresponds to that of achieving party nomination -i.e., access to the electoral ballot. Inclusive-democratic candidate selection then places potentially large selection groups as the gatekeepers in the process of electing a new legislature. In Mayhew’s view, this condition facilitates the incumbent’s arduous task of answering to the demands of the party’s grassroots members while representing the interests of the electoral constituency as the policy preferences of a large selection group draw near to those of the electoral constituency. For reasons of political survival, incumbents choose policies and assume stances and attitudes that resemble those of the median member within the selection group and the electoral constituency.

This dissertation builds up on these ideas connecting intra-party candidate selection to policy responsiveness, then economic growth and development. My initial motivation is to assess the induced propensity of incumbents in national assemblies to pursue policy frameworks that resemble those preferred by the unorganized, yet encompassing group of regular voters. Special attention is paid to the distinctive efforts of members of congress. By institutional design, in democratic regimes the legislators’ choices define, for the most part, actual public policy.

I posit policy responsiveness by members of national assemblies is largely incidental on the simultaneous occurrence of inclusive-democratic candidate selection within parties and the availability of legislative reelection. Since legislative reelection has been customary practice across contemporary democracies, the degree of democratization of the intraparty nomination procedures becomes the center of attention.\(^4\) The methods employed by political parties to choose candidates for general elections greatly vary across nations and across political parties within nations. However, if the focal point is the occurrence or absence of a democratic process

\(^4\) Only four nations have banned legislative reelection since WWII: Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, and the Philippines. The Philippines allows up to three consecutive legislative terms since 1987 and Ecuador changed its policy to allow for legislative reelection in 1996.
in the intra-party nomination methods, categorization of contemporary electoral states by having or not a politically responsive national assembly suggests an economic difference as well as a difference in the quality of democracy supplied by the countries’ political systems (See Table 1 below).

Table 1. Policy responsiveness by members of national assemblies
68 contemporary electoral states, as in 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislative reelection</th>
<th>Candidate selection within political parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inclusive-democratic candidate selection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia, Canada, Iceland, Ireland, New Zealand, Nordic Nations, UK, US, Western Central Europe.</td>
<td>Africa, Asia (including Japan and the Asian Tigers), Israel, Latin America, Southern Europe: Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Turkey.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: As in 2011, immediate legislative reelection existed in all but two nations: Costa Rica and Mexico. See Appendix A for a list of selected references on candidate selection by country. See Appendix B for a list of selected references on candidate selection by alphabetical order.

The economic effects as well as the political consequences of candidate selection are identified as subjects deserving closer scrutiny. In the developed world, candidate nomination within political parties appears largely informed by inclusive and democratic practices. In contrast, in the less-developed world events of intraparty participatory politics are for the most part absent, with nomination decisions often monopolized by national party leaders and local party bosses.

If we acknowledge economic strategy as the fundamental source of economic progress and policy frameworks as mindful choices, researchers’ efforts ought to expose the policy-
Introduction

makers’ motives. Within this line of thinking, the political economy literature often stresses differences in political institutions in order to explain policy choices, growth and development. While political scientists have long recognized the relevance of the methods employed by political parties to select candidates for general elections, the economic effects of candidate selection have attracted much less attention from researchers in the field of political economy. This dissertation adds to the scholarly literature by connecting the degree of participation and democratization of the methods employed by political parties to select candidates for general elections to the adoption of characteristic policy frameworks, then growth and development.

The reminder of this dissertation is broken into four chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the reader to the empirics of candidate selection from a cross-country, comparative perspective using data on candidate selection by the parties in government from 68 contemporary electoral states. Intriguingly, categorization of modern electoral states into those in which the intra-party practice of candidate selection is carried out through democratic means and those in which party nominations are a prerogative of the party leadership closely resembles the standard categorization of developed and developing countries.

In Chapter 2, I argue that the apparent connection between the parties’ choice of methods to select nominees for general elections and the countries’ economic performance is not accidental, but causal. In order to accomplish this task, I build on Denzau and Munger (1986) to present a model of legislative behavior that formalizes the connection between the political institution of candidate selection, policy responsiveness, and the adoption of characteristic policy frameworks. Expressly, if running for reelection, increased participation and democratization of the intra-party nomination process encourages policy responsiveness, which in turn favors the adoption of growth-enhancing policies. In contrast, elite-centered candidate selection
Introduction

discourages policy responsiveness to the interests of the whole in favor of the representation of narrow concerns that often demand growth-retarding policies.

I overtly recognize that sound policy is common knowledge. Despite the politico-institutional environment, political leaders may choose to commit to strategies that promote economic affluence at any time. However, if we consent to the general view of institutions as growth determinants, the lack of incentives for politicians to act responsive to the interests of the whole may lead to detrimental economic outcomes. Chapter 3 inquires into the effects that elite-centered candidate selection may have on actual policy. Specifically, I argue that candidate selection on the hands of the few enables executive prevalence. A number of studies have found executive term limits related to increases in government spending and taxes (Besley & Case, 1995; Johnson & Crain, 2004; Rose, 2006). Since effective governance requires congressional support to pass laws, these studies raise important questions of how executives, in particular those in institutional regimes of division of powers, are persistently successful in the arduous tasks of building a coalition, preserve the alliance’s cohesiveness, and ostensibly lead the budgetary process despite a likely environment of multi-party politics and periods of divided government.⁵ I propose an alternative view aimed to explain executive prevalence. Members of the governing coalition use an informal reciprocity agreement. From this angle, informal reciprocity norms, the threat of ostracism from the governing coalition and the practice of elite-centered candidate selection facilitate coalition bargaining and put the executive in an advantageous position to further his/her preferences over policy. Using panel data gathered from 1970 to 2004 of 17 Latin American electoral states, I find a positive and robust connection

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⁵ Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh (2004) notice that between 1946 and 1999, coalition governments under presidentialism formed in more than half of the cases in which official parties did not hold a majority in the legislature.
Introduction

between presidential “lame-duck” periods and increases in government spending. Furthermore, even when spending is on the increase in an executive’s binding term, the government seems either unable or unwilling to collect revenue.

Concluding remarks follow in the last section with suggestions for new research directions.

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6 If testing the effect of term limits on the incumbent’s choice between alternative policies, legislative bodies constitute a poor laboratory. In a country sample of 67 electoral states only four nations banned legislative reelection since WWII: Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, and the Philippines.
Chapter 1

Candidate Selection for General Elections in Comparative Perspective

“The nominating process…has become the crucial process of the party. The nature of the nominating procedure determines the nature of the party; he who can make the nominations is the owner of the party (pp. 64, 100).” Schattschneider, E. E. (1942). Party government. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.

This chapter’s motivation is to bring attention to an empirical regularity. In the developed world, the methods employed by political parties to select candidates for general elections appear largely informed by inclusive and democratic practices. In contrast, events of intraparty participatory politics are for the most part absent in the less-developed world, with intra-party nomination decisions often monopolized by national party leaders and local party bosses.

Previous studies have dealt with the issue of intraparty candidate selection from a cross-country perspective. However, nearly all of these studies pay exclusive attention to the nomination procedures across political parties in western consolidated democracies; e.g.,
Chapter 1. Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective

Gallagher and Marsh, 1988; Mair, 1994; Katz and Mair, 1994; Bille, 2001. This chapter introduces the reader to the empirics of candidate selection from a cross-country, comparative perspective using records on candidate selection by the parties in government from 68 contemporary electoral states. Countries in the sample in which the literature identify instances of inclusive-democratic practices within parties are Canada and the United States in the American continent; Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the Nordic Nations -Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden-, Switzerland and the United Kingdom in Western Europe; and Australia and New Zealand in Oceania. Countries in the sample in which, away from democratic practices, nomination decisions are monopolized by the few are Algeria, Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Zambia in Africa; Bangladesh, India, Japan, Malaysia, Nepal, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand in Asia; Israel in the Middle East; Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela in Latin America; and Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey in Southern Europe.

In order to examine the nomination practices within political parties, scholars often rely on the structure provided by the empirics of the “Hermens’s” proposition. In his book *Democracy or Anarchy?* Ferdinand Hermens [1941] states that parties benefit from delegating nomination decisions to constituency party branches in constituencies electing one or no more

---

7 See Appendix A for a list of selected references on candidate selection by country, 68 contemporary electoral states. See Appendix B for a list of selected references on candidate selection by alphabetical order.
than a few representatives. With candidates competing for one or just a few seats within a geographical demarcation, local party organizations, rather than central party authorities, are better positioned to select nominees in each district, since local sections are more competent to discern the who is most likely to win the election. Given that both party nomination and the election itself are locally determined, elected officials find in their own benefit to remain politically responsive to their selection groups rather than to central party authorities.

Conversely, candidates competing in large multi-member constituencies tend to be nominated through more exclusive, elite-centered selection methods. Generally speaking, in electoral systems with large multi-member districts, the resulting distribution of seats among political parties at the interior of the legislative body is intended to mimic the relative distribution of votes among political parties. The electoral formula of proportional representation implied by large multi-member districts thus entails the involvement of the central party organization in the preparation of party lists. Party lists determine the specific order in which candidates obtain a seat in the legislature; with candidates whose names appear at the top of a party list enjoying a better chance to obtain a seat. In terms of policy responsiveness, because central party authorities either determine or strongly influence the process by which political parties generate the party lists, the incumbents’ efforts of representation are associated to the interests of the central party leadership rather than to the people they represent. Moreover, candidates’ and incumbents’ incentive to remain accountable to their political party leaderships positively correlates to their desire to pursue long-run careers in the political arena. Politicians would eventually need the support of their political parties in order to further their careers in either the legislative or the executive branch, at the local, state, or federal levels of government.

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8 District magnitude defines the number of legislative seats in dispute among competing parties in an electoral district. Standard literature considers district magnitude of five or less seats as small, district magnitude between five and ten as medium, and district magnitude higher to 10 seats as large.
Chapter 1. Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective

I follow the structure provided by the Hermens’s proposition and develop this section accordingly. In terms of the methods employed by political parties to select candidates for general elections, nonetheless, I find no systematic evidence in support of Hermens’s claim. Electoral systems do not seem to have an evident impact on the parties’ choice of method to select nominees for general elections (See Table 2 below).

Table 2. Intra-party methods of candidate selection by electoral system
68 contemporary electoral states, as in 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral system</th>
<th>Intra-party candidate selection for general elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inclusive-democratic candidate selection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elite-centered candidate selection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plurality rule in single-member districts</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, France, Iceland, UK, US.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Botswana, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal and South Africa in Africa, Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Nepal, Philippines, Singapore and Sri Lanka in Asia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional representation</td>
<td>Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Switzerland, Ireland, Nordic Nations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Latin America; Israel; Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand in Asia; and Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey in Southern Europe.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Electoral systems, Polity IV dataset.
Political parties’ candidate selection methods, individual sources.

Despite the incentives provided by the electoral system, political parties in today’s democratic world may adopt either inclusive-democratic or elite-centered candidate selection methods to nominate contenders for general elections. In particular, against Hermens’s contention of central party control over the preparation of party lists, inclusive-democratic candidate selection methods are observed in a number of parties in countries applying

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9 In addition, a simple inspection of Table 2 reveals that, in today’s democratic world, political parties have an imminent tendency to choose nomination methods where decisions are made by the few in institutional settings where democratic practices are largely absent.
Chapter 1. Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective

proportional representation formulas, mostly across Western Continental Europe. Also against
Hermens’s argument of a likely involvement of local polities in the nomination of candidates,
exclusive-centralized candidate selection occurs in a number of parties in countries adopting
electoral formulas of plurality rule in single-member districts.

1.1. Inclusive-Democratic Candidate Selection in Single-Member Constituencies

In countries adopting plurality/majority rule to elect representatives from single-member
districts, democratic-inclusive candidate selection within political parties harmonizes with the
Hermens’s proposition. Countries in the sample applying electoral formulas of plurality/majority
rule in single-member districts and in which the scholarly literature identify instances of local
involvement in the nomination of candidates within major, government-forming political parties
include Australia, Canada, France, Iceland, the UK and the US.

In the UK, the law regulating political parties and their activities is at best vague if not
inexistent.10 British parties are thus free to conduct their internal affairs as they wish. In regard to
the selection of candidates for parliamentary elections, each political party has its own
constitution or set of individual rules governing the nomination process. Despite this, candidate
selection within British parties coincides in three important features. First, British party methods
of candidate recruitment and selection are highly bureaucratic. Strict formal rules adopted at the
national and regional levels establish elaborated bureaucratic procedures in order to select
candidates for parliamentary elections (Norris & Lovenduski, 1995). For instance, the Labour

10 Following Andrews (1999), UK’s general legislation on associations makes no explicit reference to political
parties, no laws deal exclusively with political parties as organizations, and election laws focus almost entirely on
candidate requirements rather than political parties. Party affiliations could not even be included in the electoral
ballot until 1969.
Chapter 1. Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective

Party has a comprehensive set of statutes establishing the specific procedure to follow in order to screen aspirants and select candidates. Rules enable regional officers to monitor the process and suggest that all aspirants should be asked the same questions at the final constituency interview (Norris, 1996). In the Liberal Party, rules prescribe a multi-stage process in which party members and party agencies repeatedly interact in order to choose nominees for general elections (Denver, 1988).

Second, perhaps because formal party regulations deny central party agencies the power to directly nominate a candidate for a local constituency on a regular basis (Webb, 1994, p. 120), British parties routinely employ power-sharing schemes in order to select candidates for parliamentary elections. Within each party, the process of candidate recruitment and selection involve close interaction between the national headquarter and local constituencies. Following Norris (1996), British national party agencies may play a front-loaded role by pulling together the initial set of eligible aspirants from which local organizations may choose candidates -e.g., Conservative, Liberal Democrat, and Scottish Nationalist parties. British central party leaderships may also play a back-ended role by refusing endorsement to local nominees -e.g., Labour, Plaid Cymru and SNP (p. 207). Candidate selection thus resembles a multi-stage process in which aspirants have to face more than one selection group during the nomination process.

Third, although nomination processes involve bargaining and agreement between the central party and constituency party branches, centrally determined rules provide for substantial intra-party inclusiveness and democracy. Formal party regulations establish constituency associations in each parliamentary district as the working organizational foundation of British political parties (Webb, 1994, p. 120). For all practical purposes, constituency-level associations in each parliamentary district play the meaningful role in the selection of candidates for
parliamentary elections. The role of constituency-level party organizations entails the advertising of vacancies in the House of Commons, the coordination of a series of meetings in order to screen aspirants and shortlist, and the selection of the local nominees in internal elections regularly decided by simple plurality rule (Norris, 1996). Even though party regulations provide central party agencies with formal powers to encourage or obstruct the candidature of individual aspirants, empirical evidence suggests that these powers are hardly ever exercised. Ranney (1965) found that between 1945 and 1964 only one locally selected Conservative and ten Labour candidates were refused endorsement. Denver (1988) adds to this figures one additional case of a locally selected Conservative and one Labour candidate being refused endorsement on political grounds between 1964 and 1988. Indeed, for all practical purposes, within UK political parties decisions of candidate selection for parliamentary elections are for the most part made by the party at the ground through democratic means.

Unlike the UK, where the law governing political parties and their activities is diffuse, at best, parties in the US enjoy legal recognition under the “Freedom of Association” clause of the constitutional First Amendment. Moreover, Court decisions have ruled that the right of US political parties to govern themselves takes precedent over state law. Despite this, political parties regularly adhere to state laws governing the selection of candidates for Congress and most other elected offices.

In the US state-regulated party primaries are paramount in the process of selecting candidates for general elections. Since the 1960’s, the two major American political forces, the Democrat Party and the Republican Party, have held direct primary elections in each of the 50 states in order to select candidates for general elections. Most states require parties to hold closed primaries. Some other states prescribe open primaries in which registered Democrats,
Republicans and independents may choose to participate in either primary. In either case, direct primaries impede central party leaderships to promote or block nominees at the nomination stage. Some state laws even prohibit party organizations from endorsing individual contenders to party nomination (Katz & Kolodny, 1994, p. 31). State laws also regulate aspirants’ access to party primary and candidates’ access to the electoral ballot. State regulations usually establish low barriers to the entry of potential contenders. In most states, aspirants are only required to deposit a symbolic fee and present several thousands of signatures from their supporters in order to compete in a party convention (Burrell, 1993; Norris, 1996). Because party primaries are customary practice and entry barriers to the political market are low, ordinary party members are the key selection group in the process of choosing nominees to compete in general elections.11

1.2. Inclusive-Democratic Candidate Selection in Multi-Member Constituencies

Conflicting with the Hermens’s expectation of elite-centered candidate nomination in multimember districts, inclusive-democratic candidate selection is common across political parties in countries with national assemblies elected through proportional representation formulas. Countries in the sample adopting electoral systems of proportional representation and in which the scholarly literature identifies instances of local-democratic involvement in the nomination of candidates within major, government-forming political parties include Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland in Central Continental

11 Accordingly, the organization of US parties appears highly decentralized, with each party having state and local branches largely independent of the national agencies (Ranney, 1981). Today, above the local level, party conventions merely ratify the results of individual primary elections. Party conventions may also serve to accord political platforms and party manifestos, and to clarify party issue positions that are not binding on the candidates’ behavior (Katz & Kolodny, 1994).
Chapter 1. Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective

Europe; Ireland in Northern Europe; Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden in the Nordic region; and New Zealand in Oceania.¹²

Legal frameworks concerning political parties and candidate selection in Central Continental and Nordic Europe are rather diffuse. Only Finland, Germany and Norway explicitly regulate candidate nomination procedures; Norwegian parties, however, are not compelled to follow the law. Despite this paucity of legal provisions, nomination decisions across political parties in the region are largely made by democratic means with the parties’ rank-and-file often playing the crucial role (Hazan, 2002, p. 114).¹³

The legal frameworks concerning political parties and candidate selection in Finland, Germany and Norway are quite detailed. Germany and Norway further share an American Heritage. Just after the Nazi surrendered on May 1945, the American, British, and French military administrations consented to the re-organization of the German political system as long as the goals and internal organizations of the emerging parties were satisfactorily democratic (Bawn, 1992). In 1945, Social Democrats met to re-form the SPD, and the new Christian Democrat Union (CDU) was officially recognized.

In order to guarantee that at least a fraction of the Bundestag would be responsive to local constituencies, the American administration advanced the introduction of an “additional member” electoral system. Since then, under the Electoral Law (Wahlgesetz) of 1949, half of the

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¹² I include Germany, Ireland and New Zealand in this category. In Germany, under the Electoral Law (Wahlgesetz) of 1949, half of the Bundestag is elected by plurality rule in single-member districts. The other half of the Bundestag is elected from regional closed party lists at the state (Länd) level. Proportional representation seats are allocated among political forces to reflect in the overall composition of the Bundestag the distribution of votes at the national level. In Ireland, the single transferable vote system (STV) requires voters to rank candidates from party lists in a number of multi-member constituencies, each with a relatively small district magnitude. New Zealand shifted from plurality rule in single-member districts to a mixed electoral system in 1996 after a 1993 referendum.

¹³ In fact, Mair (1994, pp. 5-15) and Bille (2001, p. 378) identify a trend in candidate selection across Central Continental Europe and the Nordic nations towards higher levels of intra-party inclusiveness and democracy between 1960 and 1990.
Bundestag has been elected by plurality rule in single-member districts. The remaining 50% of the seats has been allocated from regional closed party lists in order to match the share of votes won by each political party at the state (Länd) level.

Because of the rather comprehensive regulatory framework, candidate selection across German parties has become a relatively standardized procedure. Article 21 of the 1949 Basic Law requires parties to organize in accordance to democratic principles. Section 17 of the 1967 Party Law makes mandatory the selection of candidates by direct secret ballot of all party members at the constituency level, or by a district nominating committee. Paragraph 21 of the German Electoral Law addresses intra-party nomination procedures in single-member districts. Contenders must achieve party nomination by plurality rule and secret ballot in party primaries or a convention of democratically elected delegates at the district level. Paragraph 27 of the German Electoral Law addresses intra-party nomination procedures in multi-member districts. The selection of list candidates must be either by a convention of local delegates within each Länd or by the Länd party conference itself via extraordinary faculties. Delegates, who may always put forward names, determine the pool of aspirants in selection conventions. Länd party executives may only suggest a list of aspirants. Each place within a party list must be voted on starting at the top of the list. Contenders must obtain an absolute majority of the total delegate vote to become candidates even if there is only one candidate contesting a particular place, and close races may be decided by run-off elections. Aspirants defeated in previous races may compete for lower positions. Successful aspirants in single-member districts are free to pursue dual nomination in a party list (Roberts, 1988; Poguntke & with Boll, 1992; Poguntke, 1994).

In Norway, the legal framework regulating candidate selection dates back to the electoral reform of 1921. Members to the unicameral Storting would no longer be elected by plurality rule
in single-member districts but from party lists in a number of multimember constituencies. Because the 1921 electoral reform was expected to impact intraparty nomination processes, the parliamentary commission in charge of the electoral reform was required to regulate candidate selection. As a result of the Commission’s reliance on the well-documented American precedent, the Norwegian Act of Nominations of 1921 recommended a convention model of candidate selection. Although not compulsory, Norwegian parties have observed the 1921 Act of Nominations with regularity in all but two constituencies, the province surrounding Oslo (Akershus) and Oslo itself. Elsewhere, candidate selection for parliamentary elections has become a relatively standardized procedure with party lists decided by democratic means in party conventions at the constituency level (Valen, 1988, pp. 210-212).

In practice, the process of choosing nominees to Storting elections usually starts by the regional party office appointing a 5-to-15-member constituency nomination committee that often gives no representation to the national headquarters and only partial representation to the constituency party agency. Following Valen (1988), the primary function of each constituency nomination committee is drafting a provisional party list that will assist delegates to organize the debate at the nomination convention. Local party branches rely on nomination meetings open to the participation of dues-paying members in order to draft their proposals. Dues-paying members in the various local party organizations elect delegates to constituency conventions through majority rule. Delegates take final decisions on candidacies and rank ordering of party lists in nomination conventions at the constituency level. Nomination decisions are systematically taken by absolute majority rule in runoff elections and no automatic re-nomination is available to incumbents. Aspirants first compete for the top position in the party list. If no candidate reaches an absolute majority of the delegate vote, a second election is held between the two aspirants
obtaining the most votes in the first round. All positions within the party list are filled following the same procedure (pp. 222-225). Notably, since 1921 central party leaderships and the government itself are legally forbidden from interfering in the selection processes at the constituency level. National party agencies, in particular, lack the power to veto individual candidacies already agreed at the district level (Valen, 1988, pp. 212-215; Svåsand, 1994, pp. 317-320).

In the Netherlands electoral rules prescribe a proportional apportionment of 150 seats to the lower chamber, Tweede Kamer, of the bicameral States General, Staten-Generaal, from a single national district. However, electoral rules allow parties to put forward party lists in 19 different administrative sub-districts if they so wish. Dutch parties have systematically chosen this alternative convention and present sub-district lists on a regular basis (Koole, 1994).

Different from Finland, Germany and Norway, political parties in the Netherlands are free to organize their internal affairs as they wish, and candidate selection for parliamentary elections thus differs across parties. Despite this, the locus of power to select party nominees and the subsequent ordering of party lists largely reside in the parties’ rank-and-file at the relevant constituency level (Leijenaar & Niemöller, 1997, pp. 119-125). Consider, for instance, the progressive Democrats66 (D66) that holds party primaries on a regular basis and, since the 1970s, has given party members the formal right to choose candidates and the ordering of party lists by postal ballot (Koole 1994). In the centrist Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) and the left-wing Labour Party (PvdA), central party agencies may attempt to influence the nomination process, often by submitting an advisory list of candidates and ranks. Yet, candidate selection in each of the 19 electoral sub-districts is virtually monopolized by regional committees of democratically elected delegates from the local party branches (Koole and Leijenaar, 1988). At a
glance, the degree of centralization of the decisions of candidate selection in the liberal People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) seems rather high. As a result of an intra-party dispute prior to the general election of 1982, VVD party branches lost their institutional prerogative over the nomination process to an Election Council of regional delegates presided by the party chairperson. For all practical purposes, however, the process of candidate selection begins with each VVD sub-regional branch suggesting a list of aspirants, and the final order of party lists in each of the 19 electoral sub-districts is determined through democratic means by a democratically elected body of delegates to the party congress (Leijenaar, 1993).

1.3. Elite-Centered Candidate Selection in Single-Member Constituencies

Contrary to the Hermens’s stance of local involvement in the nomination of candidates to compete in single-member constituencies, elite-centered systems of candidate nomination are common across political parties with national assemblies elected trough plurality electoral systems. Countries in the sample in which the literature identifies instances of nomination decisions made by the few through undemocratic means within major, government-forming political parties include Botswana, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal and South Africa in Africa; and Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Nepal, Philippines, Singapore and Sri Lanka in Asia.

In Africa, executive dominance in the form of neopatrimonialism and personal rule hinders the emergence of independent legislative branches. Bratton and van de Walle (1997) identify neopatrimonialism as the prevailing institutional regularity in immediate post-colonial African regimes. Neopatrimonialism defines the incorporation of classic patrimonialism into
modern bureaucratic institutions. Salient characteristics of neopatrimonial regimes include the following. Despite the formal adoption of a written constitution, the right to rule was ascribed to a single individual, often a president for life. Political power was concentrated on the executive and executive acts stood unchallenged and above the law. Through its dominion over the state apparatus, executives and inner circles engaged in systematic patronage and clientelism as the basis of political survival. Offices in the public administration often worked to achieve personal wealth and status, with various forms of illicit rents associated to the office (p. 270).

By the end of the twentieth century, institutional politics changed throughout the African continent. During the 1990s, nearly all 47 sub-Saharan states became officially recognized as multi-party electoral democracies (Doorenspleet, 2003, p. 171). Scholars then relied on the core concept of “personal rule” to characterize African executive dominance. Cranenburgh (2003) studies a sample of 12 African nations classifying at least as minimal democracies. The author finds that, even in those countries in which multi-party and regular elections are the rule, executives concentrate substantial degrees of political power with often “utterly missing forms of power sharing” (p. 203). African rulers dominate the domestic policy-making processes, stand above the law, their decisions are not subject to institutional checks and they often operate under autocratic methods by means of commands, edicts, and decrees (Jackson & Rosberg, 1994). Considerable arbitrary discretion, supported by social, civil and political institutions too weak to perform checks and balances, make African personal rulers the leading executive and policy maker.

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15 Minimal democracies are regimes with relatively free and fair elections, inclusive suffrage and the possibility of competition in the political system.
In today’s electorally democratic Africa, the institutional context surrounding political parties and party politics often contributes to the strengthening of executive dominance. First, initial movements toward multiparty elections were chronically followed by the emergence of one-party systems, frequently without suppressive measures (Doorenspleet, 2003, p. 176). Second, internal organizations and practices of African political parties appear largely informed by the undemocratic heritage of the colonial rule (Salih, 2003, pp. 1-2). Instead of formal rules governing intra-party affairs, small groups of party leaders, often founders, especially those of the party in power, dominate party life and candidate selection (Kopecký and Mair, 2003, p. 289). Consequently, by the late 1990s, in countries such as Botswana, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal and South Africa, official parties frequently controlled an overwhelming majority in parliament and acted as dependent branches of the executive (Cranenburgh, 2003, p. 203).

Furthermore, even if rulers do not intervene in the selection and nomination of candidates for general elections, institutional politics aimed to strengthen party discipline prevents the formation of an independent legislative branch. In addition to the chronic formation of one-party systems and controlled intra-party competition, Bratton and van de Walle (1997) identify high legislative turnover (weakening party personalities relative to the executives) and generous salary and allowances (related to the capacity of members of parliament to access positions in the public administration and engage in redistribute patronage) as conditions lessening legislative independence. Cranenburgh (2003, p. 205) adds the threat of expulsion from parliament as a measure discouraging party defection and conducive to a docile majority in the legislature.

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16 Despite the enduring control of party elites over party life, the literature records a few attempts to institutionalize competitive candidate selection within African political parties. Bratton and van de Walle (1997) identify several instances with at least one intra-party competitive election: Cameroon and Togo in the 1980s; Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia in the 1970s; and Côte d’Ivoire after 1980 (p. 71). In these countries, ruling parties held competitive party primaries or presented multiple candidates in the electoral ballot.
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Following Salih (2003), democratically elected legislatures in African are, with the notable exception of Botswana, Africa’s longest democratic tradition, “nothing more than rubber-stamp officials” (p. 30).

In India, between the first general elections of 1952 and up to 1977, the Indian National Congress Party (NC) ruled unchallenged de facto national politics despite the development of an increasingly multi-party system, free suffrage and regular elections. Although it returned to power two years later, the NC was successfully challenged in the 1977 parliamentary elections by a multi-party coalition headed by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Since then, Indian politics has developed into a consolidated multiparty system drifting towards increasing party fragmentation, factionalism and regionalism (Jana & Sarmah, 2002; Pai, 2002).

Even though party politics has become increasingly competitive, decisions on candidate selection for general elections across political parties remain highly centralized on the hands of the few. A report submitted in 2002 by The National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (available at www.lawmin.nic.in) reveals that, over the last fifty years after independence, political parties exhibit unclear criteria governing candidate selection, show a marked absence of intraparty democratic practices, and deny a meaningful role to local polities in the selection of candidates for general elections (p. 425). Of particular relevance to Indian politics is the National Congress Party, today’s only Indian party with national presence. In the NC, the degree of centralization of candidate selection decisions has always been rather high. Following Dasgupta (2002, p. 25) and Chandra (2004, p. 103), the NC reached its highest level of centralization in 1972 when Indira Gandhi, then party leader of the NC, made the right to allot party posts and nominations the formal and exclusive prerogative of the national leadership.

17 In order to control bossism within party parties, the Report suggests the introduction of democratic procedures for the nomination of party candidates by primary elections or by giving a significant say to local party units.
1.4. Elite-Centered Candidate Selection in Multi-member Constituencies

In countries electing members to their national assemblies from multi-member constituencies, elite-centered candidate selection harmonizes with the Hermens’s notion of central party leaderships being decisive at preparing party lists. Countries in the sample adopting electoral formulas of proportional representation in which the literature identify instances of nomination decisions made by the few through exclusive and undemocratic means within major, government-forming political parties include Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand in Asia, Israel in the Middle East; Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela in Latin America; and Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey in Southern Europe.

In Japan, for instance, the Constitution of 1946 establishes a parliamentary democracy that grants exclusive power over legislation to the bicameral National Diet (Kokkai). Between the two constitutive chambers of the National Diet, the Japanese constitution further affirms the supremacy of the House of Representatives (Shugiin) over the House of Councillors (Sangiin) by vesting the former with exclusive faculties over the appointment of the prime minister, the enactment of laws and the discussion and approval of the annual budget and international treaties.

Since inception of direct democracy after WWII and up to 1994, the Japanese electoral law prescribed simple majority rule and a single non-transferable vote system (SNTV) in multi-
member districts to elect members to the House of Representatives.\textsuperscript{18} An electoral reform in 1994 changed the formula to elect members to the Shugiin to a two-ballot system overlapping plurality rule in a number of single-member districts and proportional representation in 11 multi-member constituencies. Although multi-party politics has been the rule since inception of direct democracy, the Liberal Democratic (LDP) has largely dominated national politics. From foundation in 1955 until the general election of 1993, only in 1976 and 1980 had the LDP relied in coalition politics in order to lead government.

In Japan, the nomination of candidates to Shugiin elections is carried out under a bureaucratic setting of party constitutions and rulebooks empowering national and factional party leaders with the authority to decide on the selection and nomination of candidates. Following Hrebenar (1992), Japanese parties fit Duverger’s 1964 definition of “cadre” party with highly centralized structures, exclusive membership and well-organized and cohesive intra-party factions competing for political influence and financial resources. Accordingly, Shiratori (1988) and Fukai and Fukui (1992) identify intra-party personality-led factions as the key selection groups in the nomination of candidates.

In Latin America, all through the region, candidate nomination is either solely on the hands of the national party leadership or regional party bosses and leaders of intraparty factions control the selection of candidates to general elections (Jones & Hwang, 2005, p. 267). For instance, in Argentina, the Constitution prescribes a presidential and federal system of government with a bicameral legislature. Election of representatives to the lower chamber occurs through a proportional representation formula with closed party lists. Electoral rules establish 23 provincial territories and the federal capital as to form 24 electoral districts with varying district

\textsuperscript{18} In Japan, operation of the SNTV up to 1994 meant that each elector had a single vote to cast in districts electing between three and five members to the Shugiin.
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magnitude. Since 1946, only three political parties have ever played a meaningful role at the national level: the Peronist Party (Partido Justicialista, PJ), the Radical Civic Union (Unión Cívica Radical, UCR) and only recently the Solidarity Country Front (Frente País Solidario, FREPASO). In all three major political forces, party leaders at the provincial level often play the decisive role in the selection of candidates and rank-ordering of party lists (Escudero, 2001). Argentinean governors, in particular, enjoy political recognition and access to public resources that furnish them with effective control over the selection of candidates to legislative elections (De Luca, Jones and Tula, 2002).

In Brazil, as in Argentina, the electoral rule to elect members to the lower chamber is a proportional representation formula applied to a number of multi-member districts. The Brazilian party system, however, greatly differ from most party systems in the Latin American region. In Brazil, the party system is highly fractionalized with just a few parties maintaining a national presence and a large number of political forces playing a relevant role only at the local and regional level.

In regard to the nomination of candidates for general elections, Guzman and Sena de Oliveira (2001) give an account of the crucial role played by the national party leaders and regional party bosses in some of the most relevant national political forces: the Labor Democratic Party (Partido Democratico Trabalhista, PDT), the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (Partido del Movimento Democratico Brasilero, PMDB), and the Brazilian social-democrat Party (Partido de la Social Democracia Brasileña, PSDB). Together with national and regional party officials, Samuels (2002) uncovers the meaningful role played by the Brazilian state governors at preparing party lists when the selection of candidates is carried out at party conventions. Moreover, history shows that state governors have been decisive at determining the
future fate of incumbents in the Brazilian lower chamber as many of them come from and will continue their careers at the state level, a condition lessening legislative independence.

Unlike any other country in the Latin American region, Brazilian parties are legally required to include in their party lists the name of those incumbents willing to run for reelection (candidato nato). At a first sight, the candidate nato stipulation may seem to increase the incumbents’ incentive to remain responsive to regular voters instead of those in the party hierarchy preparing the party list. However, Brazilian party leaders benefit from a set of institutional prerogatives aimed to compel party discipline. Among these conditions strengthening central party control over individual legislators, Cheibub, Figueiredo and Limongi (2000) expose the power of party leaders to include in each party list more candidates than seats available for competition; control over the candidates’ access to free TV time; control over committee assignments, the legislative agenda, and the amendment process; and the relevance of the political parties to advance the politicians’ political careers.

In Chile, the binominal electoral system is fundamentally a proportional representation formula with large minority representation. Applied in a number of two-member districts, the binominal system allocates both seats to the parties polling the largest number of votes, unless the leading political force doubles the number of votes of its closest competitor. In this case, the leading party takes both seats in the electoral district.

Since re-inception of direct democracy in 1989 after a period of military rule, the Chilean binominal formula has produced two long-lasting coalitions with national presence: the “Concertación por la Democracia” and the “Alianza por Chile”. However, the coalition essence of the Chilean party system does not favor the democratization of the candidate selection processes. Following Scully (1995) and Siavelis (2002), in order to guarantee coalition
cohesiveness, party leaders must engage in negotiations that require discretionary decisions in
the nomination of candidates and high levels of party discipline.

In sharp contrast to the tradition of local-democratic candidate nomination methods found
in Continental and Northern Europe, scholars identify instances of rather elite-centered candidate
selection across parties in Southern Europe. In Spain and Portugal, partisan decision-making and
candidate selection are carried out by undemocratic means and outside the realm of regular party
members (Kohler, 1982). Candidate nomination reaches utterly levels of centralization in
Greece, Italy and Turkey, with political parties built around individual personalities and national
party leaders monopolizing candidate nomination decisions.

In Greece, the electoral law stipulates a 3-tier open-list proportional representation
system to elect 300 members to the national assembly from 56 local districts, 13 regional multi-
member constituencies, and a single national district. Since the 1970s, when Greece became fully
democratic after a period of authoritarian regime, the country has developed into an effective
two-party system. Today, only the conservative New Democracy (ND) and the socialist PASOK
play a meaningful role in national politics. In the ND as well as in the PASOK, national party
leaders directly control candidate nomination (Gallagher, 1988a, p. 244). In particular, at its 1977
national congress, ND party members made the practice of elite-centered candidate selection
official by approving complete authority over the nomination of candidates for general elections
to the national party leader (Kohler, 1982, p. 121).

Ever since 1948, Italy has been a republican unitary state and semi-parliamentary
democracy with a bicameral legislature. Since the Italian constitution makes no specific
distinction between the upper Senato della Repubblica and the lower Camera dei Deputati,
legislative authority is equally vested in both houses,
From 1948 and up to 1993, members to the Italian bicameral legislature were elected simultaneously, for terms that may not exceed five years, through a formula of proportional representation applied to a number of multimember districts (open-list for the lower chamber, closed-list for the upper chamber). Even though the Italian Constitution has always recognized political parties as organizations since return to direct democracy after WWII, in pre-1993 Italy there was no legal framework regulating the intra-party nomination practices for parliamentary elections (Wertman, 1988). During this period, Bille (2001) identify national party organs largely controlling candidate nominations and central leaderships’ influence going beyond that stipulated in the rules. Particularly relevant in pre-1993 Italy was the Christian Democratic Party (CD). Even though Italy has been a multi-party democracy since the 1940s with at least eight parties obtaining continuous representation in Parliament, the CD was able to lead most governing coalitions. In regard to candidate selection within the CD, rule books precluded regular party members from participating in the nomination process. Instead, party rules favored provincial CD’s top organs as the key selection groups in the nomination process, with provincial party decisions subject to the approval of the national leadership (Wertman, 1988, p. 149).

The breakdown of the First Republic in the 1990s brought, after an April 1993 referendum, the adoption of new electoral rules. Members to the Italian Parliament in both houses are now elected under a two-ballot mixed formula with roughly 75% of the seats filled by plurality rule in single-member districts and 25% by a system of proportional representation. In contemporary Italy, Bardi and Morlino (1994) identify centralized control over parliamentary recruitment and the power of the national party leadership to determine parliamentary behavior as continuing well effective into the 1990s despite the introduction of new electoral rules in 1993 (p. 260).
Chapter 1. Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective

A simple cross-country inspection of the intra-party nomination practices to select candidates for general elections reveals an empirical regularity. Political systems in countries with government-forming political parties following inclusive-democratic nomination methods are prone to advance economic progress as well as civil and political rights. Quite the opposite, political parties in the less developed world habitually choose exclusive-centralized candidate selection methods. The next chapter sets out to investigate the economic effects of candidate selection of candidate selection.
Chapter 2
The Political Economy of Policy Responsiveness in Democratic Regimes:
The Role of Candidate Selection for General Elections

“Commerce and manufacturers can seldom flourish long in any state which does not enjoy a regular administration of justice, in which the people do not feel themselves secure in the possession of their property, in which the faith of contracts is not supported by law, and in which the authority of the state is not supposed to be regularly employed in enforcing the payment of debts from all those who are able to pay. Commerce and manufacturers, in short, can seldom flourish in any state in which there is not a certain degree of confidence in the justice of government (p. 539).” Smith, A. (1776). An Inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd.

After decades of scholarly work, the debate concerning the economic effects of political regimes is far from settled. In principle, democratic governance advocates political rights and civil liberties; both factors that advance property and contractual rights that, in turn, promote security to work and save, efficient investments and encourage the flow of information in the markets. Ostensibly, democracy precludes reckless expropriation of resources and assets, and predisposes the development of third-party mechanisms of contract enforcement. Yet,
democratic governments, rather than authoritarian regimes, have an understandable tendency to respond to the public’s political pressures and demands. Universal suffrage and the right of workers to unionize threaten private property and property rights, both critical elements for economic affluence (North, 1990). On the other hand, authoritarian regimes vest rulers with the essential command and control to carry out the economic reforms needed to foster growth and development. However, there is nothing to ensure that the autocrats’ commitment will be to growth-enhancing policies. And even if conditions for such commitment do exist, autocrats may not be able to prove this a lasting pledge (Olson, 1991).

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the empirical literature examining the economic effects of political regimes reports mixed results. Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi’s (2000) study of 135 economies find little evidence of a trade-off between the form of government and growth rates of total income. Barro (1996) analyzes the relationship between democracy and economic performance for a sample of 100 countries. After controlling for the rule of law, economic freedom, government consumption, and human capital, the overall effect of democracy on economic growth appears weakly negative. After surveying 21 cross-country studies, Przeworski and Limongi (1993) find less than persuasive the evidence of a connection between political regimes and income per capita growth rates. Sirowy and Inkeles (1990) review thirteen cross-national quantitative studies on the relationship between systems of government and the pace of economic growth; four of which find a positive although conditional correlation, three regain a negative association, and six report no connection whatsoever. Indeed, if we accept the role of political institutions as economic growth determinants, differences in political regimes may not be noteworthy.
Chapter 2. The Political Economy of Policy Responsiveness

Despite the on-going debate on the economic effects of political regimes, in his classic book *The Rise and Decline of Nations*, Mancur Olson [1982] exposes an empirical regularity: economic affluence is regularly observed in a relatively small sub-sample of consolidated democracies; i.e. countries with political institutions prone to advance the interests of the whole.

In the previous chapter, I presented supportive evidence that in the developed world, intra-party candidate selection for general elections is largely informed by inclusive and democratic practices. Quite the opposite, in the less-developed world events of intraparty participatory politics are for the most part absent, with nomination decisions often monopolized by national party leaders and local party bosses. In this chapter, I develop the case that the above empirical regularity is not accidental, but causal. In line with Olson (1982), who works the case that politicians with an incentive to respond to the demands of the whole favor the adoption of growth-enhancing policies, I argue that the incentives provided by the intraparty candidate selection practices are crucial in order to understand the politicians’ representation efforts, then growth and development. Explicitly, if running for reelection, inclusive-democratic intra-party nomination methods turn politicians receptive to wide-encompassing interests and inclined to pursue policies that favor economic affluence. Conversely, away from democratic practices, nomination decisions on the hands of the few turn incumbents responsive to narrow concerns, hence inclined to pursue policies that may benefit the few at the expense of overall economic growth.
2.1. The Economic Effects of Policy Responsiveness

Policy responsiveness occurs if the institutional structure induces the ruling polity to pursue policy frameworks that parallel those favored by the citizenry (Manin, Przeworski, & Stokes, 1999a, p. 9; Powell, 2004, p. 91). Policy responsiveness is important because it is a determinant of growth and development: Institutions that make governments more inclusive favor economic affluence and factors that make governments more exclusive inhibit prosperity.

For instance, in order to explain variations in growth rates of income per capita, Olson (1982) builds on the notion that the incentives facing encompassing organizations are different from those facing organizations representing only a narrow segment of the society. Sufficiently encompassing organizations have an important incentive to be actively concerned about how productive the society is because members of these organizations expect to internalize much of the cost of inefficient policies. Accordingly, inclusive organizations give some weight to economic growth and the interests of society as a whole (p. 53).

Quite the opposite, Olson (1982) expects small, special-interest organizations such as coalitions, cartels, lobbying organizations, professional associations, labor unions, trade associations and oligopolistic collusive groups to engage in rent seeking to derive economic rents from programs and policies that bring direct benefits to their members, even if these programs imply a loss in overall economic efficiency and aggregate output. Olson explains his logic by noticing that interest groups typically represent only a miniscule percentage of the population and the costs of the policies fell disproportionately on the unorganized (p. 43). One of the obvious ways in which a special-interest group can increase the income of its members while
reducing the efficiency and output of the society is by lobbying for legislation to raise some price or wage or to tax some types of income at lower rates than other income (p. 44). Another way is through cartelization; members of the interest group can collude to reduce output and set a higher price just as a single monopolist would have done (p. 43). Moreover, effective cartels must always block entry into the line of business in which they have raised the price. Lobbying for legislation that creates permanent barriers to entry deters new firms to come into the line of business by making initial investments and costs greater (p. 46).

In their 2003 *Logic of Political Survival*, Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow advance the Selectorate Theory. The Selectorate Theory addresses how political institutions for selecting leaders shape the incentives the politicians in power have to pursue policies that promote or inhibit growth and prosperity. The authors build upon two basic concepts: the “selectorate” that represents the citizenry with an institutional right to participate in choosing the country’s government and the “winning coalition,” a subset of the selectorate that includes those whose support is essential to maintain the incumbent leader in office; defection from any member of this group implies the leader’s removal. On the premise that leaders allocate resources to most efficiently reward the group whose backing is essential to keep them in office (p.173), holding the size of the selectorate constant, leaders who are backed by a small coalition have an obvious tendency to use private rewards that only benefit coalition members. As the winning coalition increases in size, incumbents find in their own benefit to pursue publicly oriented policies and pour spending resources on public goods for their coalition of supporters. To the extent that prosperity is widely valued, leaders backed by large winning coalitions and a large selectorate have incentives to pursue policies that promote economic affluence. Hence, universal suffrage, in general, and majoritarian systems, in particular, create a strong push for
leaders to pursue good policies than do other systems with smaller winning coalitions. In a few words, leaders whose base of support is small necessarily favor narrow programs and spending that merely reward coalition members, often at the expense of public welfare. Conversely, leaders who need the support of a large coalition to remain in office promote social welfare and economic affluence by pursuing policies and programs likely to benefit the whole.

Briefly, growth-enhancing policies likely to please the citizenry include policies that ensure the prevalence of the rule of law and assert human rights, policies that protect property and intellectual rights, and policies that foster competition and the access and perfection of markets (Barro, 1997, pp. 26-28). Governments advancing the interests of the whole may also spend on public goods such as infrastructure and schools (Barro, 2000; Feng, 2000; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003). These policies have an evident tendency to satisfy a large number of citizens and lead to overall economic growth. Growth-retarding policies likely to develop from the representation efforts of public officials advancing narrow concerns include blurry intellectual and property rights legislation, infringement on property rights, diffuse patent legislation, government imposed price controls, legislation to tax some types of income at lower rates than other incomes, enactment of complex tax breaks to protect businesses, inflexible contracts to protect the wages of union members, regulation blocking the entry into specific lines of business, official protection to monopolistic markets, import restrictions, and adoption of other legal barriers against international competition (Olson, 1982, pp. 44-46; Feng, 2000; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003).

On balance, the extent in which political institutions advance encompassing interests rather than narrow concerns assists economic efficiency and the rate of economic growth. If policy responsiveness favors the adoption of growth-enhancing policies, what political
institutions matter for the advancement of the interests of the citizenry through the policy making process?

2.2. The Institutional Determinants of Policy Responsiveness

The scholarly literature has evolved to acknowledge policy responsiveness as a variable identifiable along a multi-point scale, depending upon specific institutional arrangements (Powell, 2004; Przeworski, Stokes, & Manin, 1999b). For instance, Powell (2004) looks at policy responsiveness in democratic regimes as an outcome of an ongoing and dynamic multi-stage process that begins with the policy preferences held by citizens, and moves through stages such as the citizens’ voting behavior, election outcomes, coalition and government formation, and the policy-making process itself. In Powell’s view, systematic policy responsiveness may arise through the adoption of enforcing mechanisms of horizontal and vertical accountability at every stage of the chain of political responsiveness.¹⁹

Within the above line of thinking, the scholarly literature pays attention to the effects that several political institutions have on the politicians’ propensity to represent the broader interests through the policy-making process. Concerning policy responsiveness, earlier studies place regularly scheduled elections as the paramount selection mechanism for politicians to act in the interest of constituents (Dahl, 1956; Downs, 1957; Buchanan & Tullock, 1962). The prospect of reelection, in particular, makes incumbents receptive to the interests of their constituencies and

¹⁹ Noticeably, along the literature on democratic institutions and policy responsiveness prevails the view that effective electoral competition and regular elections are at best necessary, yet insufficient instruments of control to keep politicians receptive to the interests of their constituencies. Arguably, for reasons of political survival, voters’ power to replace an unpleasant government through regular elections would make politicians receptive to the demands of their constituencies. However, the complexity of institutional arrangements in which modern democracies present themselves makes uncertain the emergence of policy responsiveness (Manin, Przeworski, & Stokes, 1999b, p. 50).
thus influences the kinds of policies public officials pursue (Grofman, 1996). For instance, Cohen and Spitzer (1996) inquire into the effects that reelection and term limits have on the politicians’ policy choices. Using a game-theoretical model in the form of a Prisoner’s Dilemma, the authors show that the infinitely-iterated game induces rational, self-interested incumbents to pursue public oriented policies. These policies signal the incumbents’ future performance in office to regular voters who look at floor voting records to decide whom to support. In the infinitely-iterated game, policy responsiveness increases the incumbents’ chances to stay in office. Denzau and Munger (1986) show that in the U.S. Congress, the prospect of reelection combined with plurality rule in single-member districts curb the legislators’ propensity to serve narrow interests as opposed to the interests of the more encompassing group of the regular, unaffiliated voters. Politicians serve organized interests groups in exchange for campaign contributions and political support. However, incumbents act in response to the often growth-retarding demands of private interests only up to a point in which their policy choices do not harm their chances of reelection by the growth-oriented masses.

Lately, the scholarly literature moved forward to examine the politicians’ policy choices according to the reputation building model of politics. Rogoff’s (1990) seminal work points to the notion that the incumbents' incentive to establish a reputation through the use of public policy can have important outcomes. The author constructs a model based on a forward looking electorate that receives the politician’s political stances and policy choices as signals that are indicative of the incumbent’s ability to govern. Electoral prospects create an incentive for politicians to build their reputations with this forward looking electorate who may be judging performance based on the politician’s performance. Those politicians who desire to run for office

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20 Reelection refers to the institutional prerogative of incumbents to compete for re-nomination and run for office in consecutive terms.
in consecutive terms must maintain a reputation of political responsiveness and responsible economic policy among constituents. Hence, the re-election mechanism enhances policy responsiveness which also reduces the incumbent’s opportunistic behavior.

In contrast, term limits in office lessen policy responsiveness. The electoral rule restrains voters from using the re-election mechanism to keep incumbents politically responsive. In the Cohen and Spitzer’s (1996) Prisoner’s Dilemma model, term limits produce a non-cooperative outcome. Term limits suppress the electorate’s control over the incumbents’ representation efforts by denying voters the opportunity to express satisfaction or disagreement with the conduct of their representatives. Consequently, incumbents lose the incentive to respond to the demands of their constituencies because voters cannot reward politicians, even those public-oriented, with an additional term in office. Indeed, incumbents in their last term may not be prevented from pursuing policies different from those preferred by their constituencies (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; Cohen & Spitzer, 1996).

Concerning the economic effects of term limits, Besley and Case (1995), Johnson and Crain (2004) and Rose (2006) have confirmed that executive term limits are related to increases in public spending, tax revenue and fiscal volatility. These findings are attributed to the lack of incentives lame-duck executives have to stay responsive to the electorate since a good reputation in matters of economic policy will be of no use for the politicians’ future political purposes (Rogoff, 1990).

Electoral systems may impact political responsiveness.Contrary to systems of proportional representation that encourage central control and adherence to party platforms,

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21 In addition, term limits in office have been related to a number of phenomena influencing policy outcomes. Term limits remove experience and professionalism from the legislature and strengthen the role and influence of interest groups vis-à-vis with the legislature (Polsby, 1991, 1993). Legislative term limits cause a shift of power towards a more powerful executive (Glazer & Wattenberg, 1996). In addition to shifting the balance of political power away from the legislature, legislative term limits shorten the incumbents’ time-horizon preferences over the legislative work (Cohen & Spitzer, 1996; Gerber & Lupia, 1996; Sartori, 1994; Verney, 1992).
scholars have long emphasized the keen linkages created between politicians and voters by systems of plurality rule in single-member districts. Carey and Shugart (1995) develop a method for estimating the relative value to candidates and incumbents to develop personal reputations, as opposed to party reputations, in order to advance their political careers. After controlling for four variables common to all electoral systems, namely access to the electoral ballot, vote pooling, the way in which voters are allowed to cast their votes and district magnitude, the authors’ method produces a multi-point ordinal scoring individual candidates’ incentive to develop personal or party reputations. Overtly, plurality rule in single-member districts induces the highest propensity of contenders to identify and represent the immediate concerns of their constituents.

Federalism is thought to increase policy responsiveness. The normative view to this line of thought can be traced back to Tiebout’s (1956) “pure theory of local expenditures.” Accordingly, federalism brings about forces that resemble those of a free market. Sub-national governments compete with each other for taxpayers that make their residential location decisions depending on the jurisdictions’ offerings of services, provision of public goods, and levels of taxes. Because political power is decentralized to levels closer to the citizenry, federalism

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22 However, an opposing view maintains that systems of proportional representation tend to reproduce in congress the citizenry’s ideological distribution and so may be related to greater policy responsiveness than systems of plurality rule in single-member districts.

23 Empirical studies have found supporting evidence that electoral systems influence policy choices and outcomes. Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno (2002) and Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2007) find that countries electing legislatures through proportional representation systems tend to indulge in fiscal indiscipline with respect to those applying plurality rule in single-member districts. Proportional representation, particularly in large multi-member districts, deteriorates budget outcomes because the electoral rule increases the likelihood of more fragmented legislatures and coalition governments. Following Tullock (1959), fragmented legislatures induce fiscal imbalances because individual claimants cannot be held entirely responsible for the problems associated to a deteriorating budget. To the extent that the benefits from spending accrue to each claimant, while the costs are spread over all members in the coalition, spending transfers increase and fiscal deficits emerge regardless the countercyclical purpose of fiscal policy. As a result, in the long run, government debt tends to be excessively high (Velasco, 2000, pp. 108-109). Briefly, electoral systems of proportional representation are likely to induce deteriorating budgets because the electoral formula increases the likelihood that a “problem of the commons” in fiscal policy will develop.
enables local government officials to tailor programs, taxes and expenditures in order to attract household and businesses who vote with their feet (Musgrave, 1959, 1999; Oates, 1972, 1977, Elazar, 1987, Weingast, 1995). To the extent that households and businesses are free to make their own residential location decisions, federalism creates the right incentives for local politicians to learn and respond to the heterogeneous demands of the local communities.\(^2^4\)

2.2.1. Policy Responsiveness: The Role of Candidate Selection

A research topic largely overlooked by the political economy literature, this section examines the notion that the incentives provided by the intra-party candidate nomination methods are crucial if we want to understand the politicians’ representation efforts.\(^2^5\) The positive stance is simple: Aspirants to party tickets, either newcomers or incumbents interested on reelection, must first respond to the demands of those with the power to add their names to the electoral ballot.

In democratic regimes, political parties have long remained the main gatekeepers in the process of candidate recruitment for public office above organized interest groups, donors and the media (Norris, 1996, p.192). In a context of legal constraints, intra-party rules, informal conventions and even traditions, candidate selection within parties may develop in several

\(^{24}\) However, the economic effects of federalism are still under debate. Oates (1972) contends that jurisdictions competing with each other for taxpayers may lead to suboptimal taxation, hence underprovision of public goods. Treisman (1999) shows that failure to coordinate economic policy across levels of government leads to fiscal indiscipline and macroeconomic instability. Wibbels (2001) find evidence that higher subnational spending and deficits lead to larger deficits at the national level.

\(^{25}\) The political parties’ methods of candidate selection may be more influential at shaping the workings of democratic systems than previous studies on democratic responsiveness have implied up today. Sartori (1976), Schlesinger (1991) and Katz (2001) identify candidate nomination procedures as a defining characteristic of political parties in democratic regimes. For Bille (2001), a political regime ought to be classified as democratic only if it provides for the institutional mechanisms advancing public influence and participation within political parties.
dimensions. Following Norris (1996), nomination decisions may be open to a large group beyond party membership or limited to the participation of party members. Nomination processes may be open to public scrutiny or carried out in privately held meetings. Candidate nomination decisions may also be centralized by a small number of influential party members or dispersed across party branches. Key selection groups may then comprise enfranchised citizens, registered voters, grassroots party members, delegates at regional or national party conventions, regional officers, factions, affiliated interest groups, or national party leaders (p. 206).

Concerning policy responsiveness, whose preferences impact actual policy depends on who governs intra-party nomination decisions. Schattschneider (1942), Kirchheimer (1966), Jupp (1968) and Ranney (1981) place the locus of power within political parties on those choosing party nominees for electoral contestation from among the pool of eligibles. The logic of their argument is straight and simple: Aspirants to party tickets must first respond to the demands of those with the power to add their names to the electoral ballot or face the threat of losing party nomination. While studying the Indian Congress Party, Weiner (1967) notices that candidate nomination decisions on the hands of the national party oligarchy party make contenders to party tickets willing to advocate the immediate concerns and national policies of party leadership (pp. 48-49). For Chaube (2003), the potential denial of re-nomination is the key element to understand the conformity of a member of the legislature with the wishes of those making nomination decisions. Even elected officials must answer to the party gatekeepers’ demands or face the threat of losing party nomination at the time of the next election (p. 212). Hence, together with the power to select party nominees, key selection groups greatly influence the incumbents’ representation efforts.
Amongst the different dimensions in which intra-party candidate selection may develop, increased participation and democratization of the nomination process enhances policy responsiveness. Democratic and inclusive candidate selection refers to the meaningful involvement of the mass public and participation of the party membership in the process of selecting candidates for general elections (Sartori, 1973, pp. 19-20; Hazan, 2002, p. 117). Following Norris (1996), key nomination groups may then comprise enfranchised citizens, registered voters, grassroots party members and democratically elected delegates at regional or national party conventions in which nominees are selected by democratic means (p. 203).

For instance, in his classic book *Congress: The Electoral Connection* David Mayhew [1974] develops the case that mandatory party primaries turn incumbents in the U.S. Congress particularly receptive to the demands of their electoral constituencies, often at the point of challenging the directives of the national party leadership. This happens because the initial step in the process of electing a new legislature corresponds to that of achieving party nomination - i.e., access to the electoral ballot. Inclusive-democratic candidate selection then places potentially large selection groups as the gatekeepers in the process of electing a new legislature. Moreover, in Mayhew’s view, party primaries facilitate the incumbents’ arduous task of responding to the demands of the party’s grassroots members while representing the interests of the electoral constituency as the policy preferences of a large selection group draw near to those of the electoral constituency. For reasons of political survival, incumbents choose policies and assume stances and attitudes that resemble those of the median member in the selection group and the electoral constituency. As a result, in the US Congress, legislating and voting in accordance to the perceptions of their constituencies and identification and fulfillment of their communities’ needs greatly improves the incumbent’s opportunities of re-nomination and
electoral success (Downs, 1957; Mayhew, 1974). Briefly, because newcomers and incumbents seeking reelection must achieve access to the electoral ballot before every election, increasing inclusiveness and democratization of the nomination process turn aspirants to party tickets eager to respond to the demands of the enfranchised. 

In contrast, away from democratic practices, monopolization of the candidate nomination decisions by the few hinders policy responsiveness. Centralized selection methods imply substantial levels of participation and command from oligarchic party elites such as national party leaderships, regional executives, affiliated groups, and faction leaders (Norris, 1996, p. 203). Even if legislative reelection is a de facto alternative, party oligarchies controlling nomination decisions cause newcomers and incumbents to favor party guidelines over their constituencies’ interests. Otherwise, incumbents would face the threat of losing party nomination and newcomers would find themselves in faulty conditions to become serious contenders for party nomination (Gallagher, 1988b; Hazan, 1999, 2002). Moreover, the candidates’ propensity to be responsive to the party leadership correlates with their ambition to pursue long-run careers in the political arena. Politicians will eventually need the support of their political parties in order to further their careers in either the legislative or the executive branch, at the local, state, or federal levels of government.

If we acknowledge economic strategy as the fundamental source of economic progress and policy frameworks as mindful choices, then researchers’ efforts ought to expose the policy-

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26 Even though democratization and geographic decentralization of the nomination decisions may be related phenomena, it is democratic inclusiveness of the intra-party selection process the key to understand the politicians’ incentive to remain political responsive to wide-encompassing interests. It is inclusiveness and massification of the candidate recruitment process that truly define a democratic process of candidate selection (Hazan, 2002, p. 117). If nomination decisions are delegated to local party bosses, decentralization of the nomination decisions does not imply higher levels of intra-party democracy neither the encouragement of policy responsiveness. For instance, the scholarly literature authenticate the occurrence of elite-centered candidate selection within parties and decentralized party structures in countries such as Argentina (Jones, 2002; De Luca, Jones, & Tula, 2002), Brazil (Figueiredo & Limongi, 2000), and Mexico (Story, 1992; Camp, 1993; Lujambio, 1998).
makers’ motives. The methods employed by political parties to select candidates for general elections greatly vary across nations and across political parties within nations. However, if the focal point is the occurrence or absence of a democratic process in the intra-party nomination methods, categorization of contemporary electoral states by having or not a politically responsive national assembly suggests an economic difference as well as a difference in the quality of democracy supplied by the countries’ political systems. In the developed world, candidate nomination within political parties appears largely informed by inclusive and democratic practices. In contrast, in the less-developed world events of intraparty participatory politics are for the most part absent, with nomination decisions often monopolized by national party leaders and local party bosses. The economic effects as well as the political consequences of candidate selection are identified as subjects deserving closer scrutiny.

The political economy literature often stresses differences in political institutions in order to explain policy choices, growth and development. While political scientists have long recognized the relevance of the methods employed by political parties to select candidates for general elections, the economic effects of candidate selection have attracted much less consideration from researchers in the field of political economy. The following section adds to the scholarly literature by formalizing the connection between the degree of participation and democratization of the methods employed by political parties to select candidates for general elections and the adoption of characteristic policy frameworks, then growth and development.
2.3. The Formal Approach to the Economic Effects of Policy Responsiveness

The literature dealing with the issue of political responsiveness in electoral states traditionally emphasizes the agency problems implied by the principle of democratic representation. Voters, the principals, look at elected officials as agents. Limited and asymmetric information, weak monitoring and incomplete contracts create the potential for opportunistic behavior from the part of the agents. The existence of principal-agent and asymmetric information problems may then be conducive to a status of poor democratic representation where politicians could be adopting positions contrary to those that would be pursued if voters were fully informed.

Even though the striking implications that the existence of agency problems have on democratic representation, the orthodox approach treats policy responsiveness as a secondary outcome of a process in which politicians trade off campaign resources for representation efforts of narrow interests that regular voters disprove. Incumbents respond to the unpopular demands of donors provided that the benefits obtained from campaign resources to reach the less informed voters exceed the loss of electoral support from the informed voters (e.g., Austen-Smith, 1987; Bailey, 2004; Baron, 1994; Bawn & Thies, 2003; Clawson, Neustadt, & Weller, 1998; Denzau & Munger, 1986; Grossman & Helpman, 2001; Prat, 2002).

Moreover, implicit in the literature on money and politics is the assumption that politicians are benevolent agents whose judgment becomes impaired by the demands of campaign contributors. This perspective on the role of donors to political campaigns implies that institutional frameworks preventing any role to money in political campaigns would maximize
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the politicians’ response to the interests of the whole. However, if we admit the role of institutions as determinants of the politicians’ behavior and policy choices, the lack of incentives for politicians to act responsive to the narrow interests does not imply higher democratic responsiveness. Even in the absence of incentives to look after narrow concerns, the incumbents’ equilibrium behavior may not favor the quality of democratic representation.

Furthermore, the literature dealing with the issue of campaign contributions and democratic representation usually deems reelection as the relevant institutional mechanism for politicians to act responsive to the demands of the unorganized group of regular voters. It is the reelection mechanism that also predisposes politicians to skew policy towards those choices preferred by narrow interests in exchange for campaign contributions and resources that may help the incumbent to stay in office. Lately, however, the scholarly literature has evolved to acknowledge the effects that several political institutions have on the politicians’ propensity to represent the broader interests through the policy-making process. For instance, the process of running for public office, in general, and that of electing a new legislature, in particular, usually starts by achieving party nomination. The fact that contenders for public office must achieve access to the electoral ballot before every election suggests that the intra-party nomination methods impact the politician’s representation efforts and policy choices once in office. The following section shall address these issues in greater detail.

2.3.1. A Simple Model of Policy Responsiveness with Candidate Selection

This section formalizes the notion that the incentives provided by the intra-party candidate nomination methods are crucial in order to understand the politicians’ representation
efforts, the incumbent’s policy choices and economic outcomes. Expressly, newcomers and incumbents seeking reelection must first respond to the demands of those with the power to add their names to the electoral ballot. Consequently, increasing participation and democratization of the intra-party nomination processes has a positive effect on the incumbent’s propensity to represent the interests of the whole and adopt policies that favor economic affluence. In contrast, elite-centered nomination methods decrease the incumbent’s propensity to respond to the interests of the whole in favor of the representation of narrow interests that often demand policies that benefit the group at the expense of overall economic growth.

The initial motivation is to assess the sensitiveness of members of national assemblies to represent wide-encompassing interests through the policy-making process. Special attention is paid to the distinctive efforts of members of congress. By institutional design, in democratic regimes the legislators’ choices define, for the most part, actual public policy. Even though the actual process of policy-making greatly varies across countries (Lijphart, 1984, 1989, 1991, 1999), legislative outcomes largely determine the countries’ economic and social policies. In today’s democratic world, legislative consent by national assemblies regularly precedes the stage of governmental action.

The model builds on Denzau and Munger’s (1986) constrained maximization model of money and politics. The authors model the decision dilemma that U.S. legislators face if seeking reelection. Rational, self-interested incumbents allocate their representation efforts to both, organized pressure groups that supply campaign resources and regular voters who supply the necessary votes to keep the incumbent in office. Denzau and Munger show that the policy preferences of the growth-oriented regular voters limit the legislator’s willingness to represent the often growth-retarding demands of interest groups. Incumbents respond to the donors’
unpopular demands only if the benefits attained from the contributors’ resources to reach the less-informed voters exceed the loss of electoral support from more-informed voters.

2.3.1.1. The Agents

The legislator’s decision problem is one of effort allocation to represent the demands of interest groups, $E_I$; the demands of those in the political party with the power to add the incumbent’s name to the electoral ballot before every election, $E_P$, and the demands of the unorganized group of voters at the general election, $E_U$. As in Denzau and Munger (1986), “effort is simply the amount of the legislator's time, the time spent by staff, and the amount of office resources a legislator allocates to an activity, and $E$ is the total amount of effort he has available to allocate (p. 93).”

2.3.1.2. The Single Legislator’s Problem if Inclusive-Democratic Candidate Selection

Consider the case of an incumbent interested on reelection. Suppose the electoral rule is such that incumbents must achieve party nomination before every election in a party primary decided by plurality rule. Assume interest groups only care about $E_I$; regular voters care about $E_U$ and $E_I$; and party supporters at the party primary care about $E_P, E_U$ and $E_I$. Explicitly, donors supply campaign resources, $R$, to the legislator in exchange for representation efforts of their narrow concerns. Incumbents may then use campaign resources $R$ to reach the less-informed voters before the next election. Regular voters at the district election care merely about the maximum level of welfare available and the actual state of the economy, hence disapprove the
incumbent’s efforts to represent the demands of interest groups that often extract resources from the economy and reduce welfare.\textsuperscript{27} Party supporters, as a subset of the more encompassing group of regular voters, care about the general state of the economy as well as the incumbent’s stances on salient issues other than the economy and disprove the incumbent’s representation efforts of narrow concerns.

Assuming legislators care only about reelection and allocate their efforts to maximize the votes received at the next election, the single incumbent’s vote share function at the district election is:

\[ V = V_D \{(p/\bar{e})EU(EP), E_1, R(E_1)\} \]

Where

\[ \frac{\partial V_D}{\partial E_U} > 0, \quad \frac{\partial V_D}{\partial EP} > 0, \quad \frac{\partial E_U}{\partial EP} > 0, \quad \frac{\partial V_D}{\partial E_1} < 0, \quad \frac{\partial V_D}{\partial R} > 0, \quad \frac{\partial R}{\partial E_1} > 0 \]

The legislator’s representation efforts to the demands of the district electorate are a function of his/her efforts to represent the demands of participants at the party primary, \( EU(EP) \). Because the initial step in the process of running for public office is that of achieving party nomination, participants at the party primary are the gatekeepers in the process of electing a new

\textsuperscript{27} Much of the economic-voting literature supports the view that the state of economy plays a meaningful role when electors decide whom to support. Jacobson (1990) show that in the US, economic performance is inversely correlated to legislative turnover. Kramer (1971), Hibbing and Alford (1981) and Kiewiet (1983) show that electors deem U.S. representatives of the incumbent government responsible for the state of the economy. Researchers have also shown that legislative professionalism fails to insulate legislative elections in the U.S. from the effects of the national economic conditions (Chubb, 1988) and economic shocks (Chubb, 1988; Hibbing, 1999). In addition to the U.S., evidence of economic voting has been noted in Canada (Johnston, Blais, Brady, & Créte, 1992), France (Lafay, 1991), Germany (Kirchgässner, 1991; Goergen & Norpoth, 1992; Anderson, 1995) and the U.K. (Studlar, McAllister, & Ascui, 1990; Norpoth, 1992).
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legislature. Reelection-seekers must first be responsive to the demands of the party gatekeepers in order to ensure at least a relative majority in the primary election. Alternatively, contenders ignoring the demands of participants at the party primary, \((E_P=0)\), are denied nomination. Together with the denial of re-nomination, incumbents lose the power to represent the demands of the district constituency \((E_U=0)\). Consequently, incumbents cannot be responsive to the district electorate without first being responsive to the demands of party supporters at the party primary.

Moreover, increasing participation and democratization of the nomination process facilitates the incumbent’s task of effort allocation and representation. Let \((p/\bar{e}) \in (0,1)\) characterize the fraction of voters in the district election that participate as well in the party primary. Considering the number of district voters fixed at least for the next election, \((p/\bar{e})\) can be regarded as an indirect measure of the ideological distance between the median voter at the general election and the median voter of the necessarily smaller group of party supporters at the primary election. As \(p \to 0\), only those party supporters with intense political views are likely to participate in the party primary. As \(p \to \bar{e}\), \((p/\bar{e}) \to 1\) meaning that the primary constituency comes to resemble the district constituency. To the extent that the primary election is sufficiently inclusive and decided by democratic means, the incumbent’s representation efforts to the median party supporter are likely to please the median voter at the district level (Mayhew, 1974).

The incumbent’s problem is to find the optimal allocation of effort that maximizes his/her chances to stay in office. Formally:

\[
\text{Max } V = \text{VD}\{(p/\bar{e})E_U(E_P), E_I, R(E_I)\} \text{ subject to } E_P + E_U + E_I = \bar{E}
\]

\(E_P, E_U, E_I\)
As in Denzau and Munger (1986), the first-order conditions can be rearranged to give the legislator’s supply price for servicing narrow interests:

\[
\frac{\partial R}{\partial E_I} \bigg|_{in\text{clusive} - \text{democratic}} = \left[ \frac{(p/\bar{e}) \frac{\partial V_D \partial E_U}{\partial E_P} - \frac{\partial V_D}{\partial E_I}}{\frac{\partial V_D}{\partial R}} \right] > 0
\]

The legislator’s supply price is always positive given \((p/\bar{e}) \in (0,1)\) and \(\partial V_D/\partial E_I < 0\). The party supporters’ participation rate at the primary election is key in order to understand the legislator’s representation efforts once in office. The amount of resources needed to persuade an incumbent to represent narrow concerns is increasing with the level of participation of party supporters at the primary election. Party supporters at the primary election are just a subset of the district electorate and increasing efforts to represent the unpopular demands of interest groups reduces the incumbent’s prospects to win both, the party primary and the district election.

Consider the case in which \(p \rightarrow \bar{e}\). This implies \((p/\bar{e}) \rightarrow 1\) and \(\partial E_U/\partial E_P \rightarrow 1\). If party primaries are sufficiently inclusive and carried out by democratic means, the policy preferences and political stances of members of the party at the ground will resemble those of the general electorate (Mayhew, 1974). Clearly, the legislator’s supply price reaches its maximum from the term \((p/\bar{e}) \frac{\partial V_D \partial E_U}{\partial E_P}\) with \(p = \bar{e}\), and any decrease in the participation rate at the primary election reduces the amount of resources needed to convince an incumbent to represent the demands of interest groups. If \(p = \bar{e}\), the legislator looks at party supporters and the group of regular voters as a single constituency and his/her vote share function becomes that of Denzau and Munger (1986), \(V = V_D(E_U, E_I, R(E_I))\). Consequently, the model of legislative behavior presented in this section anticipates more representation of narrow concerns from the part of incumbents than that
predicted by Denzau and Munger (1986) because instances of relatively small participation at primary elections in comparison to district elections are by far the rule rather than the exception.

Briefly, only contenders prioritizing the demands of party supporters at primary elections will have their names added to the electoral ballot. If reelection is a political purpose, successful incumbents must be responsive to the demands of both, supporters at the primary election and regular voters at the district election. Because participants at the primary election are just a subset of the more encompassing group of regular voters at the district election, increasing participation and democratization of the nomination process favors the adoption of growth-enhancing policies. This happens because the citizenry looks at the state of the economy in order to decide whom to support. As a corollary, increasing participation and democratization of the nomination process increase the amount of resources needed to persuade an incumbent to represent the often growth-retarding demands of interest groups that regular voters disprove.

2.3.1.3. The Single Legislator’s Problem if Elite-Centered Candidate Selection

Consider the alternative case in which, in the absence of a democratic process, nomination decisions are monopolized by party leaders. If elite-centered candidate selection, then party discipline becomes perhaps the legislator’s most valuable political asset in order to achieve party nomination. Contenders must prioritize the party platform, guidelines and demands of the party leadership or face the threat of losing party nomination. Consequently, the legislator’s representation efforts to the demands of regular voters are now conditional to the demands of the party oligarchy making nomination decisions.
Formally, nomination decisions on the hands of the few imply \( p = 0 \) because party rules deny party supporters any role in the selection of candidates for legislative contestation. Given that \( (p/\bar{e}) = 0 \) and \( \left( \frac{p}{\bar{e}} \right) \frac{\partial V_D}{\partial E_U} \frac{\partial E_P}{\partial E} = 0 \), the legislator’s supply price becomes:

\[
\frac{\partial R}{\partial E_1} \bigg|_{\text{elite \ - \ centered}} = -\frac{\partial V_D}{\partial E_1} > 0; \text{ given } \frac{\partial V_D}{\partial E_1} < 0.
\]

The fact that contenders to party tickets do not have to please party supporters but members of the party oligarchy in order to have their names added to the electoral ballot has important consequences on the incumbents’ representation efforts. First, as noted in the previous section, if inclusive-democratic candidate selection, the amount of resources needed to persuade an incumbent to represent narrow interests reaches its maximum when the party primary constituency resembles the district electorate. Any decrease in the participation rate of party supporters at the primary election decreases the incumbent’s supply price. Under elite-centered candidate selection, the legislator’s supply price reaches its minimum implying that the incumbent’s propensity to represent narrow concerns is now at its maximum. Overtly, elite-centered candidate selection favors the representation of the often growth-retarding demands of interest groups through the policy-making process:

\[
\frac{\partial R}{\partial E_1} \bigg|_{\text{elite \ - \ centered}} = -\frac{\partial V_D}{\partial E_1} \left( \frac{p}{\bar{e}} \right) \frac{\partial V_D}{\partial E_U} \frac{\partial E_P}{\partial E} - \frac{\partial V_D}{\partial E_1} \bigg|_{\text{inclusive \ - \ democratic}} = \frac{\partial R}{\partial E_1} \bigg|_{\text{inclusive \ - \ democratic}}
\]
Second, elite-centered candidate selection facilitates to interest groups the otherwise more complicated task of having their demands represented through the policy-making process. Clearly, nomination decisions on the hands of the few reduce the transaction costs incurred by interests groups in search for representation efforts. Instead of engaging in the arduous task of building a coalition of incumbents willing to represent their narrow concerns, special interests may now negotiate directly with a clearly identifiable small group of part leaders. In exchange for representation efforts, interest groups may now contribute campaign resources to the party elite, knowing that incumbents must comply with the demands of the party leadership or face the threat of losing party nomination at the time of the next election.

Third, nominated candidates still need to win the, perhaps competitive, district election. However, the incumbent’s capacity to answer to the demands of regular voters is limited by the legislator’s representation efforts to the party leadership that she/he must prioritize in order to win party nomination. Under conditions of limited representation capabilities to increase his/her district’s vote share, campaign contributions grow to be decisive for the incumbent’s political survival. Even though politicians’ reliance on pork-barrel politics across modern electoral states is well documented, in countries where nomination decisions are under the control of the national party or local party bosses the exploits of clientelism and patronage acquire a pervasive role. For instance, evidence of politicians’ systematic reliance on pork-barrel politics has been noted by the scholarly literature across a number of countries in Africa (e.g., Bates, 1982; Bratton & van de Walle, 1994; Wantchekon, 2003) and Latin America (e.g., Ames, 2001; Benton, 2007; Calvo & Murillo, 2004; Mainwaring, 1999; Martz, 1997).
One important question must be addressed: If we acknowledge party leaders interested on electoral success, why don’t be politically responsive to the interests of the electoral constituency beyond pork-barrel politics? Away from a democratic process and intra-party participatory politics, nomination decisions monopolized by party leaders turn incumbents exceptionally receptive to the demands of the party leadership. To all appearances, aside political platforms, unearthing the policy preferences and demands of party leaders becomes an essential task. A meaningful analysis, however, must address the institutional conditions in which the actual policy-making process is carried out if we want to know who gets represented. The next chapter develops the case and provides supportive evidence that elite-centered candidate selection plays a major role enabling executives to implement her/his preferred policies. Executive prevalence then limits the capacity of party leaders in the governing coalition to use policy beyond clientelism and patronage for electoral gains.
Chapter 3
Elite-Centered Candidate Selection Enables Executives Prevalence:
Evidence from Fiscal Policy in Latin America


Undeniably, sound policy is common knowledge. Despite the politico-institutional environment and the incentives it may create, political leaders may choose to commit to strategies that promote economic affluence at any time. However, if we consent to the generally accepted view of institutions as growth determinants, the lack of incentives for politicians to act responsive to the interests of the whole may lead to detrimental economic outcomes.

This chapter sets out to investigate the effects that term limits have on the politicians’ policy choices and the role that, in democratic regimes, elite-centered candidate selection play as a determinant of the politicians’ ability to implement their preferred policies. This chapter’s thesis is as follows: elite-centered candidate selection plays a meaningful role placing executives
in an advantageous position to further his/her preferences over policy. This chapter then uses fiscal policy as the policy of choice to exemplify what the detrimental effects of executive prevalence and executive term limits are on fiscal outcomes in Latin America. Beyond the confines of the Latin American region, the approach pursued in this chapter may also provide partial explanation for the current fiscal distress experienced by Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal; all countries where nomination decisions, away from democratic practices, are monopolized by party leaders.

3.1. Executive Prevalence: Evidence from Fiscal Policy

From an institutional standpoint a variety of motives can drive fiscal outcomes. Recently, the literature has evolved to study the politicians’ behavior and their policy choices according to the reputation building model of politics. In an attempt to study electoral cycles and fiscal cycles, Rogoff (1990) constructs a model based on a forward looking electorate that receives signals from politicians that is indicative of their ability to govern. Rogoff’s seminal work points to the notion that politicians’ incentive to establish a reputation and/or signal through the use of public policy can have important outcomes. Only those politicians who desire to run for office must maintain a reputation of political responsiveness and responsible economic policy among constituents. If establishing a reputation matters for future political purposes, fiscal policies can be important signals to voters and politicians’ incentive to signal through the use of

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28 Scholars have paid close attention to the effects of various political institutions to fiscal discipline. According to Alesina and Tabellini (1990) public debt is typically used by each government to influence the choices of its successors. Persson and Svensson (1989) find that conservatives run fiscal deficits in order to constrain the spending choices of the elected official, especially if they know a liberal candidate will take office. Federalism is another factor that may contribute to the successes or failures of macroeconomic stabilization and reform. Treisman (1999) shows that failure to coordinate economic policy across levels of government leads to fiscal indiscipline and macroeconomic instability; Wibbels (2001) find evidence that higher subnational spending and deficits lead to larger deficits at the national level.
fiscal spending and taxation can have important outcomes. In Rogoff’s view, keeping spending and tax rates down requires an effort from the part of politicians who pursue these reputation-enhancing policies under the prospect of reelection. This happens because future electoral prospects create an incentive for politicians to build their reputations with this forward looking electorate who may be judging performance based on these signals. In contrast, increases in spending and higher tax rates occur during the incumbent’s last term because a good reputation in these matters will be of no use for the politician’s future political purposes.

Although Rogoff’s (1990) proposition has not been subject of extensive research, the available empirical studies examining fiscal decisions of chief executives find robust support to the view that the imposition of term limits in office of executives alters the incumbent’s behavior. Besley and Case’s (1995) work was the first to test the reputation-building model on fiscal policy across 48 American states, 1950 to 1986. Taking into consideration the factors that could possibly weaken the relationship of term limits and fiscal policy, they control for party loyalty, lack of gubernatorial discretion, and life after governorship. Their results suggest that these other factors are not “strong enough to rein in governors whose days are numbered (p. 775).” The authors find that gubernatorial term limits increase both total government spending and tax rates. Gubernatorial lame-duck periods appear associated to increases in total state spending and receipts in the form of sales, income, corporate, and total taxes, particularly when a Democrat holds office. Their results also indicate that spending and taxes were lower in the first term in two term-limit states. Rose (2006) extends Besley and Case’s (1995) study to examine the effect of fiscal institutions across the American states and found that only in states with strict

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29 If testing the effect of term limits on the incumbent’s choice between alternative policies, legislative bodies constitute a poor laboratory. In a country sample of 68 electoral states only four nations banned legislative reelection since WWII: Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, and the Philippines. Ecuador changed its policy to allow for legislative reelection in 1996 and the Philippines allows up to three consecutive legislative terms since 1987.
prohibitions on deficit carry-overs, neither gubernatorial term limits nor the partisan composition of government appear to significantly affect state government expenditures and revenue.

Having established some empirical validity to the importance of executive term limits on fiscal spending and taxation across American states, Besley and Case’s (1995) study provide the groundwork for expanding the study of term limits to other institutional settings. Johnson and Crain (2004) utilize Besley and Case’s (1995) model to study executive term limits among 48 democracies. The authors find substantial evidence of increasing levels of fiscal spending and tax revenue in democracies with one term limit rule. Government spending grew systematically in countries under single-term rule in comparison to two-term limits or no term limits at all. In addition, countries operating under two-term limits suffered significantly from fiscal volatility though they do not experience a significant increase in government spending over time. Under two-term limits rule, executives also spent more and increased taxes during the lame-duck period.

Although in short supply, the available empirical literature corroborates Rogoff’s (1990) contention that the imposition of term limits alters the behavior of executives, discouraging political accountability and policy responsiveness, and precluding the adoption of reputation-enhancing policies. This raises important questions of how executives, in particular those in institutional regimes of division of powers, seem persistently successful in the arduous tasks of building a coalition, preserving the alliance’s cohesiveness and ostensibly leading the budgetary process despite a likely environment of multi-party politics and periods of divided government.30

30 Empirical evidence supports the notion of coalition-building executives. Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh (2004) notice that between 1946 and 1999 coalition governments under presidentialism formed in more than half of the cases in which official parties did not hold a majority in the legislature.
3.2. The Problem of Effective Governance

In democratic regimes, executives regularly retain a wide degree of latitude in implementing policy. Executives often have the ability to introduce legislation in many policy areas, veto powers, amendatory observations faculties (positive veto) that allows executives to add provisions to legislation and decree powers. All these institutional faculties, where available, give substantial control to the executive in the area of fiscal policy. However, effective governance requires congressional support to pass laws. For an elected government, building and preserving a coalition are perhaps the most important tasks in order to attain governability and lead the policy-making process.

In parliamentary regimes, the executive has to accommodate the demands of coalition members in order to form government and stay in office. The problem of attaining governability may be particularly challenging in systems of division of powers. In presidential systems, executives act unhindered by coalition demands in order to stay in office. Independently elected branches and fixed mandates may hamper cooperation, discourage the formation of coalitions and increase the likelihood of legislative impasses (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997; Ricciuti, 2004).

Regardless the political regime, executives habitually bargain with congressional representatives in order to attain governability. Following Mainwaring (1993), executives looking for support to their programs rely frequently on patronage to induce coalition formation and coalition cohesiveness. Bueno de Mezquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2003) advance the Selectorate Theory. The Selectorate Theory maintains that leaders who seek the support of a
small coalition often favor the use of private rewards that only benefit coalition members. Those who require the support of a large coalition favor the supply of public goods, rather than private benefits, in order to reward their supporters. Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh (2004) show that executives have an incentive to make coalition offers and party leaders to accept these offers once parties are assumed to care about offices and policies in addition to government funds. Following the authors, parties and party leaders must care about offices and policies because parties accrue influence and benefits from the programs and policies carried out by the government. In support of the notion that government ministries matter for parties and party leaders in the coalition, Gamson (1961) anticipate that parties forming government should each get a number of ministries that reflects the share of seats they bring to the coalition (p. 376); a statement known as Gamson’s Law. In a cross-country cross-section study of parliamentary governments, 1997-2005, Carroll and Cox (2007) find evidence in support of Gamson’s Law in governments based on pre-election pacts. The authors also find support in favor of Gamson’s Law in a sample of Western European governments, 1945-2000. In the Latin American context, Geddes (1994) tests forty-four presidential terms via the development of Appointment and Survival Strategy Indices. The author concludes that executives take steps to increase state capacity using funding as well as appointment strategies and the assistance of the bureaucracy to gain the support of elite party organizers. Briefly, this strand of the literature underlines the idea that executives can rely on pork-barrel politics, policy concessions and the resources of the public administration to gain the support of party leaders, increase state capacity and achieve governability.
3.3. A Simple Reciprocity Model of Coalition Bargaining with Executive Prevalence and Elite-Centered Candidate Selection

This section introduces an alternative view to the process of coalition bargaining and cohesiveness. Informal reciprocity norms, the threat of ostracism from the governing coalition and the practice of elite-centered candidate selection facilitate coalition formation and coalition cohesiveness and put the executive in an advantageous position to further his/her preferred policies.

The model builds on the work of Borcherding and Filson (2002) who provide formal conditions under which people who consume in groups use informal reciprocity norms in preference to a price system. The authors show that informal reciprocity agreements are more likely to arise in groups where potential partners are sufficiently patient, members of the group are likely to continue to interact, the time between interactions is short, and the group is small and homogeneous (p. 239).

3.3.1. The Agents

Consider an elected executive who coalesce with a number of party leaders in the legislature to form government and/or increase state capacity. The executive has unambiguous preferences over policy. As per Rogoff (990), elected officials care about their reputations if running for reelection. Fiscal policy is one important way in which reelection seeking executives signal their ability to govern to voters. Concerning fiscal policy, we anticipate reelection seeking executives to further their efforts to keep government spending and tax rates down because a
good reputation in these matters increases their chances to stay in office. This happens because voters use both past performance as well as the expectation of future performance of contenders for office to decide whom to support.

In contrast, executives in their last term have no incentives to pursue reputation-enhancing policies since their efforts will not be rewarded with an additional term in office. Binding term limits, for instance, create fewer incentives for reputation building because the electoral rule eliminates the capacity of the electorate to reward politicians’ past performance with reelection (Grofman, 1996; Doron & Harris, 2001). In line with Rogoff’s (1990) reputation-building model of political behavior, we presume lame-duck executives to exert less effort to keep spending and taxes down since a good reputation in these matters will be of no use for the incumbent’s future political purposes.

Consider now the group of party leaders in the legislature. Party leaders are concerned, above all, about political survival; hence interested on their parties’ electoral success and vulnerable to intra-party competition. Party leaders accrue benefits from public funds, ministries, policy concessions and access to the resources of the public administration that strengthen their leadership within their parties. At any time, party leaders pursue public funds, legislation and concessions that give him/her an amount of resources that is at least equivalent to his/her reservation value; i.e. the minimum amount of resources considered necessary by the party leader to ensure political survival. Consequently, a rational self-interested party leader concerned with political survival has an incentive to negotiate his/her coalition membership and accept the executive’s offer if this offer matches, at least, the party leader’s reservation value.
3.3.2. The Single Party Leader’s Problem

Consider a scenario in which a group of $n$ party leaders in the legislature and the executive study the prospect of coalescing to form government. Assuming that all party leaders are identical, party leader $i$ solves the following utility maximization problem:

$$\max_{x} V(x) - c(x) - T^*n$$

where $x$ denotes the executive’s offer to party leader $i$ that the executive extends with the aim to gain the party leader’s support to the policies of the government in office. Explicitly, $x$ represents the pooled amount of a composed good of public funds, resources of the public administration, positions in the bureaucracy, policy concessions and/or government programs. $V(x)$ represents the benefits in dollars that party leader $i$ accrue from $x$. Assume $V(x)$ is strictly monotonic increasing in $x$. Since $x$ is a composed good, party leader $i$ cares more about the aggregate dollar benefits accrued from $V(x)$ than the specific combination of the basket, $x$.\(^{31}\) Alternatively, there is always a number of different baskets $x$ that yield equal dollar values to the party leader.

Party leaders are concerned about political survival. In democratic regimes, party leaders work through the uncertainties associated to electoral and intra-party competition. To account for this, political vulnerability enters the party leader’s decision problem in the form of a cost function, $c(x)$. Because access to more resources strengthens the leadership position of party

\(^{31}\) The reader may consider a variation of the class of additively separable preferences $V(x) = \sum_{n} u_n(x_n)$. An additively separable utility function on all commodities allows focusing on a group of commodities. This variant, however, complicates the analysis and does not add much to the point of executives tailoring baskets to the needs of individual party leaders in order to induce coalition formation and coalition cohesiveness.
leader $i$ within his/her party as well as the party’s electoral prospects, $c(x)$ is decreasing and unbound in $x$. Hence, party leader $i$’s efforts will be directed to capture as much resources as possible through the coalition bargaining process, even above the party leader’s reservation value, $\bar{x}$.

Transaction costs ($T$) enter in the form of bargaining costs for party leader $i$ to negotiate with the executive and other members in the coalition concessions and resources. The intra-party candidate nomination methods may then have a substantial impact on coalition bargaining costs. Specifically, away from democratic practices, nomination decisions monopolized by oligarchic party elites reduce negotiation costs as well as strengthen the party leader’s position as an effective negotiator. In regard to candidate selection, researchers have long placed the locus of political authority and control within political parties on the hands of those making nomination decisions. Following Norris (1996) and Hazan (2002), if elite-centered candidate selection, then contenders for party nomination must adhere to the directives of the party leadership. Otherwise, newcomers would find themselves in faulty conditions to achieve party nomination and incumbents would face the potential denial of re-nomination.\(^\text{32}\) Overtly, intra-party nomination decisions on the hands of the few reduce coalition bargaining costs by two means. They remove the need for the executive and party leaders to negotiate with members of the legislature on an individual basis. Elite-centered candidate selection also enables party leaders as effective negotiators with the strength to enforce coalition agreements in the legislature.

\(^\text{32}\) Elite-centered nomination methods are common across electoral states in Africa. In Latin America, national party leaders, regional party bosses, or leaders of intraparty factions monopolize, on a regular basis, candidate selection decisions for legislative elections (Jones & Hwang, 2005, p. 267). For a more detailed examination of the methods employed by political parties in Latin America to select candidates for general elections see Mainwaring and Scully (1995), Morgenstern and Nacif (2002) and Siavelis and Morgenstern (2008). Weiner (1967, pp. 48-49) and Chaube (2003, p. 212) develop a similar case in order to explain the high levels of party discipline observed by MP’s in the Indian congress. In Southern Europe, researchers have noticed elite-centered candidate selection across parties in government in Greece (Gallagher, 1988a; Kohler, 1982), Italy (Bardi & Morlino, 1994; Wertman, 1988), Portugal (Colomer, 1996) and Spain (Colomer, 1996; Lundell, 2004).
Chapter 3. Elite-Centered Candidate Selection Enables Executive Prevalence

Unlike party leaders in the legislature, chief executives are interested in the composition of the basket of resources $x$. In line with Rogoff (1990), politicians interested on reelection have an incentive to build a reputation of political responsiveness and responsible economic policy with an electorate that looks at these signals in order to decide whom to support at the time of the next election. Fiscal policy is one important way in which chief executives signal their ability to govern. In order to keep spending and taxes down, a reputation-building executive offers to party leader $i$ a basket $x$ that relies primarily on policy concessions, ministries and/or access to the resources of the public administration, instead of merely public funds. Formally, if running for reelection, political vulnerability enters the executive’s decision problem in the form of a quadratic cost function $c(x)$ initially decreasing in the fiscal component of $x$, but eventually increasing in the amount of public funds supplied to party leaders as the executive’s national electorate starts to perceive deteriorating macro-indicators.

In contrast, executives in their last term reduce their efforts to keep spending and taxes down since a good reputation in these matters will be of no use for future electoral purposes. Even though in their last term, executives may still be interested on achieving conditions for effective governability. Because increasing resources increase the likelihood of a stable coalition, political vulnerability enters the executive’s decision problem in the form of a cost function, $c(x)$; where $c(x)$ is decreasing and unbound in $x$. Notice that, political vulnerability is decreasing in the amount of resources $x$ for both the lame-duck executive and party leaders in the legislature. To the extent that increasing resources strengthens the leadership position of all members in the governing coalition, a spending bias and fiscal imbalances emerge.
Consequently, the executive’s institutional control over most of the potential components of $x$ transforms the task of coalition building and coalition cohesiveness into one of public resources allocation. The executive’s optimal offer of $x$, $x'$, must satisfy the following first-order condition:

$$V'(x') - c'(x') = 0$$

where $V'(x)$ represents the first derivative of $V(x)$ with respect to $x$ and $c'(x)$ represents the first derivative of $c(x)$ with respect to $x$. Coalition cohesiveness is guaranteed if the executive’s offer matches at least the party leader’s reservation value: $x' \geq \bar{x}$.

Moreover, party leaders in the coalition are expected to participate in a substantial, yet unknown, number of coalition meetings. The party leader $i$’s discounted stream of payoffs from belonging to and remaining in the governing coalition, $W_c$, is:

$$W_c = V(x') - c(x') - T^*(n+1) + \delta \frac{\delta}{1-\delta} [V(x') - c(x') - T^*(n+1)]$$

where $\delta$ is an exogenous discount factor bounded between 0 and 1. As in Borcherding and Filson (2002), the discount factor represents a combination of several factors. First, $\delta$ reflects the party leader’s patience. More patient leaders have higher discount factors as they discount future payoffs at lower rates: $\delta=1/(1+r)$, where $r$ is the discount rate. Second, $\delta$ reflects the leaders’ shared belief about the likelihood of having a meeting in the near future. The higher the likelihood of future interactions between the members of a coalition, the higher is the discount.
factor. Third, $\delta$ reflects the time between meetings. The shorter the time between meetings, the higher is the discount factor (p. 241).

In an informal reciprocity agreement, party leader $i$ may deceive his/her coalition membership. For simplicity, consider the case in which an individual party leader abandons the coalition in the first meeting. Party leader $i$’s net present value from defection is:

$$V(x'') - c(x'') - T^* (n + 1)$$

For a coalition to endure, the prospect of ostracism from the coalition must be a credible threat. That is, party leader $i$’s payoff from remaining in the coalition, $W_c$, must be at least as large as the payoff associated with the party leader $i$ deceiving his/her coalition membership:

$$W_c \geq V(x') - c(x'') - T^* (n + 1)$$

The above condition is more likely to be satisfied when $x'$ is larger than $x''$, $\delta$ is high and $n$ is small. Alternatively, informal reciprocity agreements sustaining government coalitions are likely to occur when bargaining costs, the members’ patience, and the probability of meeting again rise, and as the time between meetings and the number of members in the coalition fall.

3.4. Fiscal Policy and Fiscal Outcomes in Latin America

The Latin America debt crisis of the 1980s provoked concerns regarding how to ensure economic progress in the region. The development strategies of the 1960s and 1970s,
Chapter 3. Elite-Centered Candidate Selection Enables Executive Prevalence

emphasizing heavy government involvement, were no longer seen as the solution to underdevelopment. Instead, these strategies became the culprit for massive government debts, high rates of inflation, distorted economic incentives and decreasing entrepreneurship (Dornbusch & Edwards, 1991; Gilpin, 2001).

While broad agreement centered on freer markets and trade liberalization, one of the most emphasized remedies of structural adjustment was the reduced role of the state in the economy. For reformers, fiscal discipline was a primary target. During the 1990s, the case for fiscal restraint became stronger as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico went into crisis. Consequently, governments across the region initiated several reforms to combat the growth of federal and state deficits. While Brazil’s federal government established a fiscal responsibility law and debt restructuring agreements with sub-national public administrations, Peru’s Fiscal Responsibility and Transparency Law aimed to reduce the deficit of the combined public sector.

Notwithstanding the reform efforts to curtail spending, Latin American countries routinely live with large deficits. The debt structure of countries throughout the region does not improve, with budget deficits actually worsening during the latter half of the 1990s and early 2000s and public debt averaging 44% of GDP (Clements, Faircloth, & Verhoeven, 2007). Moreover, a number of studies identifies the fiscal instability seen in Latin America as one of the main determinants for the stop-go growth experience in the region. Fiscal volatility impacts growth patterns because it signals a lack of consistency and predictability in policy, which hinders investment in productivity-enhancing areas. Between the years 1960-2000, fiscal volatility in Latin America was higher than in other regions and is closely associated with lower growth performance (Hausmann & Gavin, 1996; Gavin, Hausmann, Perotti, & Talvi, 1996).
Chapter 3. Elite-Centered Candidate Selection Enables Executive Prevalence

Despite the emphasis put on fiscal responsibility, why do public spending and budget imbalances appear persistently increasing across countries in the Latin American region?

3.4.1. The Empirics: Model Specification and Variable Definitions

This section connects Latin American political institutions to fiscal policy outcomes by investigating the impact of presidential term limits on government expenditure and aggregate revenue. The study uses panel data from 17 Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The data samples cover the period 1970-2004. Several nations across the Latin American region were characterized as authoritarian during the 1970s and early 1980s. Countries that underwent a change of regime during the period of study do not enter the sample unless they classify at least as electoral states.

The model specification is an extended version of that of Johnson and Crain’s (2004) which examines the effect of executive term limits on fiscal outcomes in 48 democracies, 1972-1990: 33

\[ P_{ct} = \alpha T_{ct} + \beta L_{ct} + \gamma Z_{ct} + \varepsilon_{ct} \]

where c and t are country and time identifiers. The dependent variables are aggregate government expenditure and aggregate tax revenue as shares of GDP in constant dollars. The

33 In line with Rogoff (1990), Johnson and Crain (2004) find countries with one-term limit connected to increases in public spending and tax revenue, while countries with two-term limits also experience fiscal volatility.
The main variable of interest is T, a dichotomous variable for whether the executive is in his/her last term in office. T equals one (1) if the executive is in the lame-duck period and zero otherwise.

The model specification extends that of Johnson and Crain (2004) to include controls for coalition and congress fragmentation. The main variable of interest is no more than a dummy indicator for whether executives are in their last term. Conceptually, changes in public spending and government revenue may come from policies sanctioned by the legislature. Within this line of thought, much scholarly work examines the “weak government hypothesis:” the idea that the more fragmented a government, the higher the public spending, deficits, and debt, and the lower the chances for tax increases. In his seminal 1959 work, Gordon Tullock thinks of fiscal policy making in democratic regimes as an example of the Tragedy of the Commons. If the political and pecuniary costs incurred per additional unit of public spending is evenly distributed among all budget claimants, a spending bias would emerge because individual claimants cannot be held entirely responsible for the problems associated to a deteriorating budget. Researchers test this hypothesis and find, by the greater part, supportive evidence of a Tragedy of the Commons problem in fiscal policy; e.g., Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006); Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (2007). In the Latin American context, Stein, Talvi, and Grisanti (1999) find that electoral formulas of proportional representation in large multi-member districts deteriorate budget outcomes because the electoral rule increases the likelihood of more fragmented legislatures and coalition governments. In the model specification, L represents a vector of control variables for

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34 Velasco (2000) formalizes Tullock’s discernment in a setting in which the government’s net income is a “common property” out of which influential interest groups extract resources to finance expenditures on their preferred items. To the extent in which the benefits from spending accrue to each group, while the costs are spread over all claimants, a spending bias emerges: transfers are higher than a benevolent planner would choose them to be, fiscal deficits emerge regardless the countercyclical purpose of fiscal policy, and in the long run, government debt tends to be excessively high (pp. 108-109).

coalition fragmentation and total membership of the parties in government that I include to examine the “weak government” hypothesis. I use the probability that two deputies picked at random from among the parties in government will be of different parties (GOVFRAC) as a proxy for coalition fragmentation. The proxies for total membership within the parties in government are the sum of the squared seat shares of all parties in government (HERFGOV) and the fraction of seats held by all government parties with respect to the total number of seats in the legislature (MAJ).

**Table 3. Data sources**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Source</th>
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<tr>
<td>Government expenditures / GDP</td>
<td>Penn World Tables 6.2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax revenues / GDP</td>
<td>DataGov-Governance Indicators Database. Inter-American Development Bank. Available at <a href="http://www.iadb.org/datagob/">http://www.iadb.org/datagob/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income per capita</td>
<td>Penn World Tables 6.2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Penn World Tables 6.2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density</td>
<td>Penn World Tables 6.2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>IMF World Economic Outlook.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade openness</td>
<td>Penn World Tables 6.2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive term limits</td>
<td>Stateman’s Yearbook.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Z represents a vector of economic, demographic, and institutional control variables that have been shown determinants of fiscal policy. Control variables include real income per capita, population, population density, average rate of inflation, and Sachs measure of trade openness.
According to Wagner’s law, the demand for government services is income elastic and is expected to rise with higher levels of income. I use the seven-point Gastil Index of Political Rights to control for the effect of democratic government on fiscal policy. Democratic governments, rather than authoritarian regimes, have an eminent tendency to respond to popular pressures which should affect fiscal spending and tax rates. I add controls for the initial levels of government spending and revenue in order to account for differences among the nations’ levels of public welfare.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All</th>
<th>One-term limit rule</th>
<th>Two-term limit rule</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government expenditures</td>
<td>18.6074</td>
<td>19.4845</td>
<td>19.6958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.93)</td>
<td>(5.86)</td>
<td>(3.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax revenues</td>
<td>14.6613</td>
<td>14.3540</td>
<td>13.6807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.61)</td>
<td>(3.69)</td>
<td>(1.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income per capita</td>
<td>4707.5110</td>
<td>4581.50</td>
<td>6187.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2478.90)</td>
<td>(2193.91)</td>
<td>(2942.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>25825.55</td>
<td>31394.23</td>
<td>59109.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(38923.84)</td>
<td>(41716.87)</td>
<td>(61122.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density</td>
<td>53.2982</td>
<td>65.3058</td>
<td>22.6711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(64.65)</td>
<td>(73.66)</td>
<td>(11.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average inflation (%)</td>
<td>15.3601</td>
<td>16.8775</td>
<td>8.5130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8.48)</td>
<td>(8.05)</td>
<td>(10.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade openness</td>
<td>43.3353</td>
<td>45.2208</td>
<td>31.1543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(22.06)</td>
<td>(21.60)</td>
<td>(12.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gastil index</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>2.7317</td>
<td>3.5652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.29)</td>
<td>(1.12)</td>
<td>(1.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOVFRAC</td>
<td>0.1800</td>
<td>0.1859</td>
<td>0.4035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HERFGOV</td>
<td>0.8226</td>
<td>0.8175</td>
<td>0.5996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>0.5780</td>
<td>0.5639</td>
<td>0.6275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.4.2. Government Expenditures and Tax Revenues

Table 5 (below) reports the results for the effect of executive term limits on aggregate public expenditures as a share of GDP. I first replicate Johnson and Crain (2004) formulation to investigate the effect of executive term limits on government spending. In Model (1), left- and right-hand side data enter without transformations. Model (2) replicates Model (1) specification except that left- and right-hand variables enter the model as natural logarithms. The results indicate that government spending during executive lame-duck terms increases by 16% in comparison to those periods in which presidents are up for re-election.

Table 5. Government expenditures and executive term limits
17 Latin American electoral states, 1970-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive Lame-Duck</td>
<td>2.1403*** (0.34)</td>
<td>0.1493*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.1332*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.1333*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.1594*** (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Per Capita</td>
<td>0.0001*** (0.00)</td>
<td>0.0435*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.0477*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.0477*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.0491*** (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Growth</td>
<td>0.0000*** (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.0488*** (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.0410*** (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.0410*** (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.0521*** (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td>0.0034 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.0072 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.0024 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.0024 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.0040 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Inflation</td>
<td>0.0008*** (0.00)</td>
<td>0.0269*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.0293*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.0293*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.0251*** (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Openness</td>
<td>-0.0221*** (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.0422*** (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.0386*** (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.0386*** (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.0530*** (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gastil Index</td>
<td>-0.1262 (0.10)</td>
<td>-0.0060 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.0110* (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.0109* (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.0076 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov. Expenditure 1970</td>
<td>0.5976*** (0.06)</td>
<td>0.5382*** (0.04)</td>
<td>0.5131*** (0.04)</td>
<td>0.5132*** (0.04)</td>
<td>0.5317*** (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOVFRAC</td>
<td>0.0399 (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.0406 (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.0406 (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.0406 (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.0406 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HERFGOV</td>
<td>-0.046 (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.0526 (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.0526 (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.0526 (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.0526 (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.4454</td>
<td>0.5037</td>
<td>0.5137</td>
<td>0.5138</td>
<td>0.5073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob &gt; X²</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>395</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at 90% confidence level, ** significant at 95% confidence level, *** significant at 99% confidence level.
Chapter 3. Elite-Centered Candidate Selection Enables Executive Prevalence

Models (3) to (5) in Table 5 extend Model (2) to include the controls for coalition fragmentation (GOVFRAC) and coalition membership (HERFGOV, MAJ). Coalition fragmentation and total membership of the parties in government appear to have a positive impact on government spending although this connection shows below the 90% level of confidence. Variations in coalition fragmentation and coalition membership do not have a major statistical impact on aggregate government expenditures despite the fact that electoral rules of proportional representation are likely to back congressional politics. These results diverge in part from those in the literature finding unequivocal evidence of a Tragedy of the Commons problem in fiscal policy across countries in the Latin American region (Stein et al., 1999).

Briefly, throughout Table 5 there is a positive connection above the 99% level of confidence between the indicator variable for executives in the lame-duck period (T) and the size of the budget as a share of GDP. This connection remains robust to changes in model specification and robust to the inclusion of controls for coalition fragmentation and overall coalition membership. In line with Rogoff (1990), Latin American presidents in their last term reduce their efforts to keep spending down.

Table 6 (below) reports the results for the effect of executive term limits on tax revenue as a share of GDP. I first replicate the methodology used to study government expenditures running a series of random-effects GLS regressions. Throughout Table 6, the control indicator for executives in the lame-duck period (T) appears persistently associated to decreases in tax revenue although this association remains below the 90% level of confidence.\(^{36}\)

\(^{36}\) As a robustness check, I replicate the study using aggregate government revenue as a share of GDP as dependent variable. Reliable time series of aggregate government revenue for Latin American countries are rather scarce. I use panel data 1990-2004 from the IMF International Financial Statistics and Government Finance Statistics to run a series of random-effects GLS regressions. Allowing for some variations in the details, results stay consistent with those from the main study.
Against Rogoff’s (1990) contention, Latin American executives seem not to reduce their efforts to keep taxes down during their last term in office. A plausible explanation may be found in the chief executives’ prospects for future employment. In a prisoner-dilemma-alike theoretical framework, Cohen and Spitzer (1996) show that term limits make politicians prone to service private interests. Because no higher position in the public administration is available for chief executives after their last term, potential after-term employment may likely come from businesses and industries that deal directly with the government. In line with Cohen and Spitzer, I presume executives to care about private interests because political responsiveness toward influential interest groups increases their chances of subsequent employment.

### Table 6. Tax revenues and executive term limits
17 Latin American electoral states, 1970-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive Lame-Duck</td>
<td>-1.6413**</td>
<td>-0.0576</td>
<td>-0.0695</td>
<td>-0.0695</td>
<td>-0.0721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(68)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Per Capita</td>
<td>0.0010***</td>
<td>0.5752***</td>
<td>0.6100***</td>
<td>0.6097***</td>
<td>0.5630***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Growth</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>-0.1474</td>
<td>-0.1725*</td>
<td>-0.1724*</td>
<td>-0.1462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td>0.0047</td>
<td>-0.1601</td>
<td>-0.1605</td>
<td>-0.1603</td>
<td>-0.1513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Inflation</td>
<td>-0.0003*</td>
<td>-0.0763****</td>
<td>-0.0741***</td>
<td>-0.0742***</td>
<td>-0.0776***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Openness</td>
<td>0.0026</td>
<td>0.1205</td>
<td>0.0536</td>
<td>0.0538</td>
<td>0.0824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gastil Index</td>
<td>-0.0871</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>-0.0003</td>
<td>-0.0003</td>
<td>-0.0027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov. Revenue 1970</td>
<td>0.1006</td>
<td>0.3227**</td>
<td>0.3293*</td>
<td>0.3293*</td>
<td>0.3340**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOVFRAC</td>
<td>0.0681</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HERFGOV</td>
<td>-0.0085</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>0.0134</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.2448</td>
<td>0.3167</td>
<td>0.3462</td>
<td>0.3463</td>
<td>0.3170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob &gt; X²</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses.

* Significant at 90% confidence level, ** significant at 95% confidence level, *** significant at 99% confidence level.
Model (3) in Table 6 introduces the control for coalition fragmentation. Higher coalition fragmentation seems to positively impact tax revenue, although this association shows below the 90% level of confidence. In Models (4) and (5) in Table 6, I introduce the controls for total membership of all parties in government on an individual basis. In both cases, the variable indicators for overall coalition membership fall short of statistical significance as well.

The results on the control variables appear as expected. Income per capita and population appear associated to increases in government spending and tax revenue as shares of GDP. In Latin America, like in Western Europe, trade openness seems to go along with fiscal restraint as part of the neoliberal reform packages. The Gastil Index of Political Rights appears negatively associated to government spending and tax revenue. This finding contradicts the conventional wisdom that more democratic institutions favor spending and preclude tax increases, even under governments with conservative ideology. The controls for the initial levels of government spending and tax revenue show positively associated and statistically significant above the 90% level of confidence.

In sum, even though executive term limits in Latin America affect spending behavior in the same manner as they do in U.S. states and other democracies, Latin American presidents seem not to reduce their efforts to keep taxes down during their last term. Coalition fragmentation appears to play at best a marginal role at explaining aggregate spending and aggregate tax revenue. Different from Johnson and Crain (2004) who find that tax revenues increase during an incumbent’s binding term, in Latin America tax revenues decrease, suggesting that spending practices have an even more disastrous effect by creating fiscal deficits. Considering that revenues may be lower either because of less general effort or because politicians’ grant tax breaks just before elections for the same reasons that they spend more, the
Chapter 3. Elite-Centered Candidate Selection Enables Executive Prevalence

...trend is that incumbent’s policies in their binding term are serving short-term benefits to some at the expense of longer-term costs to everyone. These findings have disturbing consequences for the region since revenues are not complementing spending, and the fiscal state of each country is left in disequilibrium. In the next section, I discuss the recent presidential term limit changes and examine the varying impact that these institutional differences have on fiscal outcomes.

3.4.3. One-Term vs. Two-Term Limits

...Between 1970 and 2004, most Latin American presidents were institutionally constrained to run for reelection. In the last 15 years, several Latin American countries have initiated constitutional changes to presidential term limits. Executive term limit rules have changed in six Latin American countries. Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru and Venezuela have had constitutional reforms that changed presidential term limits from a one-term rule to a two-term limit rule. Argentina was the first to change the term limit rule. A 1994 constitutional reform reduced the presidential term to four years and limited the president and vice president to two consecutive terms. Presidents are now allowed to stand for a third term or more after an interval of at least one term. In 1995, Peru adopted the two-term limit rule for the executive. After one interim term, former presidents may be reelected. A 1996 law allowed President Alberto Fujimori to run for a third term, but this was due to the fact that his first term began prior to the 1995 constitutional amendments. In Brazil, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso proposed to amend the Constitution in order to be re-elected. By 1997 the Brazilian Congress voted for the re-election amendment in the constitution, and Cardoso became the first Brazilian president to be re-elected for a second term. In Venezuela, as Hugo Chavez took power in 1999,
Chapter 3. Elite-Centered Candidate Selection Enables Executive Prevalence

various constitutional changes took place, including one allowing the president to run for two consecutive terms and the passage of a 2009 amendment that allows the president to run for reelection indefinitely. In Costa Rica, a constitutional ban for incumbents to run for re-election was overturned in 2004. An incumbent, however, has to await an inter-term period before running again for office. In Colombia, President Alvaro Uribe sought a constitutional amendment during his first term that allowed him to run for office again. Uribe was re-elected in the 2006 presidential race.

These changes in term limits in several Latin American offer a unique opportunity to test the for the effects of alternative presidential term limit rules on fiscal responsibility. The implications from the reputation building model of politics establishes that two-term limits create different incentives than binding term limits, making politicians act differently under these two institutional environments (Besley & Case, 1995; Johnson & Crain, 2004).

I test for the difference on fiscal outcomes between executive lame-duck periods in countries under single-term vs. two-term limits rule. For the case of government spending, I use separate dummy variables for the one-term and two-term limit countries and run a series of OLS regressions correlated panels corrected standard errors for the period 1970-2004. Table 7 (below) reports the results. Throughout Table 7, left- and right-hand side variables enter as natural logarithms. Model (1) shows the case in which we add separate dummy variables for the one-term and two-term limit countries. The results resemble those of Johnson and Crain (2004) who found robust evidence of lame-duck executives under single-term limit rule spending more on average than those in countries under two term-limit rule. The coefficient of the one-term limit country is positive and statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. The coefficient on the lame duck indicator in two-term limit countries is positive and statistically significant at the
99% confidence level as well. Spending as a share of GDP increases 2% more during the lame duck of one-term limit presidents compared to the lame duck term of two-term limit presidents. However, controlling for executive lame-duck periods under one- and two-term limits rule does not improve significantly the R2 (0.5054) in comparison to our results when we do not control for the alternative rules (0.5037).

In order to study the problem of the commons in government spending, Models (2) to (4) in Table 7 introduce the controls for coalition fragmentation (GOVFRAC) and total membership of the parties in government (HERFGOV, MAJ) for the case in which the executive is always in his/her last term. Models (5) to (7) in Table 7 introduce the controls for coalition fragmentation for the case in which the executive is in the lame-duck period under two-term limit rule. By means of controlling for the alternative term-limit rules, the results diverge from those in which executives are in their final period regardless the term-limit rule. Throughout Table 7, there is evidence of an increasing role of party politics on government spending decisions, in particular during the lame-duck period of executives under two-term limit rule. In this case, higher coalition fragmentation appears associated to increases in spending above the 99% level of confidence. Increases in total membership of the parties in government show a robust connection to increases in government spending above the 99% level of confidence as well.
Table 7. Government expenditures and alternative executive term-limit rules
17 Latin American electoral states, 1970-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive Lame-Duck (one-term limit rule)</td>
<td>0.0648***</td>
<td>0.0525***</td>
<td>0.0525***</td>
<td>0.0629***</td>
<td>0.0044</td>
<td>0.0042</td>
<td>0.0055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Lame-Duck (two-term limit rule)</td>
<td>0.0495***</td>
<td>-0.0342*</td>
<td>-0.0342*</td>
<td>-0.0458***</td>
<td>-0.0357**</td>
<td>-0.0357**</td>
<td>-0.0526***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Per Capita</td>
<td>0.0456***</td>
<td>-0.0269***</td>
<td>-0.0269***</td>
<td>-0.0346***</td>
<td>-0.0010</td>
<td>-0.0010</td>
<td>-0.0007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Growth</td>
<td>0.0403***</td>
<td>-0.0269***</td>
<td>-0.0269***</td>
<td>-0.0346***</td>
<td>-0.0010</td>
<td>-0.0010</td>
<td>-0.0007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td>0.0092*</td>
<td>0.0017</td>
<td>0.0016</td>
<td>-0.0053</td>
<td>0.0224***</td>
<td>0.0224***</td>
<td>0.0177***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Inflation</td>
<td>0.0233***</td>
<td>0.0230***</td>
<td>0.0230***</td>
<td>0.0177***</td>
<td>0.0354***</td>
<td>0.0354***</td>
<td>0.0314***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Openness</td>
<td>-0.0571***</td>
<td>-0.0507***</td>
<td>-0.0507***</td>
<td>-0.0662***</td>
<td>-0.0156</td>
<td>-0.0155</td>
<td>-0.0215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gastiñ Index</td>
<td>-0.0071***</td>
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<td>-0.0039*</td>
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Model Specification: OLS regressions, correlated panels corrected standard errors.

Standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at 90% confidence level, ** significant at 95% confidence level, *** significant at 99% confidence level.
Chapter 3. Elite-Centered Candidate Selection Enables Executive Prevalence

I examine the effect of the alternative executive term-limits rules and the problem of the commons on tax revenues. I replicate the methodology used to study government spending except that I run a series of random-effects GLS regressions, 1970-2004. Table 8 (below) reports the results.

Model (1) in Table 8 shows the results for the case in which I add separate dummy variables for the executive one-term and two-term limit countries. The results for the Latin American region differ from those of Johnson and Crain (2004) who found a positive connection between government revenue and their variable indicators for the alternative executive term-limit rules. In Model (1), the coefficient of the one-term limit country is negative and below the 90% level of confidence. The coefficient of the lame duck indicator in two-term limit countries is positive and statistically insignificant. Moreover, controlling for executive lame-duck periods under one- and two-term limits rules does not improve the value of the $R^2$ (0.3167) in comparison to the case where there is no control for the alternative rules (0.3151).

Models (2) to (4) in Table 8 introduce the controls for coalition fragmentation (GOVFRAC) and total membership of the parties in government (HERFGOV, MAJ) for the case in which a single term-limit rule constrains the executive to run for reelection. In all three models, the coefficient indicator for lame-duck executives shows negative and statistically insignificant below the 90% level of confidence. Models (5) to (7) in Table 8 introduce the controls for coalition fragmentation and total membership of the parties in government for the case in which the executive is in the lame-duck period under two-term limit rule.
Table 8. Tax revenues and alternative executive term-limit rules

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<td>Executive Lame-Duck (one-term limit rule)</td>
<td>-0.0513 (0.05)</td>
<td>-0.0695 (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.0694 (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.0721 (0.05)</td>
<td>0.1039 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.1039 (0.07)</td>
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<td>Executive Lame-Duck (two-term limit rule)</td>
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<td>Income Per Capita</td>
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<td>-0.1725* (0.12)</td>
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<td>-0.1462 (0.12)</td>
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<td>-0.1971** (0.12)</td>
<td>-0.1771* (0.12)</td>
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<td>Population Growth</td>
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<td>0.1603 (0.10)</td>
<td>0.1513 (0.10)</td>
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<td>Population Density</td>
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<td>Average Inflation</td>
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<td>0.0824 (0.12)</td>
<td>0.0453 (0.12)</td>
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<td>0.0871 (0.12)</td>
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<td>Trade Openness</td>
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<td>-0.0003 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.0027 (0.01)</td>
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<td>0.0011 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.0007 (0.01)</td>
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<td>Gini Index</td>
<td>0.3363** (0.17)</td>
<td>0.3293* (0.18)</td>
<td>0.3293* (0.18)</td>
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<td>Gov. Revenue 1990</td>
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<td>-0.0685 (0.05)</td>
<td>-0.0685 (0.05)</td>
<td>0.0134 (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.0032 (0.07)</td>
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<td>GOVFRAC</td>
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<td>HERFOOV</td>
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<td>MAJ</td>
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<td>0.3463 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.3170 (0.07)</td>
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Standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at 90% confidence level, ** significant at 95% confidence level, *** significant at 99% confidence level.
In Models (5) to (7) in Table 8 (above), the coefficient indicator for lame-duck executives shows positive and statistically insignificant. Latin American presidents under single term-limits rule do not reduce their efforts to keep taxes down. In contrast, lame-duck chief executives under two-term limits rule appear to care less about their reputations in this matter. Higher coalition fragmentation appears to have a positive effect on taxation decisions regardless the executive term-limits rule. However, this association remains short of statistical significance below the 90% level of confidence. Overall, the results support the view that institutional differences in executive term-limits rules do impact fiscal performance.

Summarizing, while mixed evidence supports alternative theories explaining fiscal outcomes, and the empirical approach in this section dismisses the existence of a Tragedy of the Commons problem in fiscal policy, it is evident that the results raise the prospect that Latin American presidents may actually prevail on fiscal policy. I measure presidential term limits’ effects on fiscal spending and aggregate revenue. Results indicate a positive and robust connection between executive lame-duck periods and increases in government spending. Executive term limits, however, appear not to have a significant impact on tax revenue. Party fragmentation within the government coalition and total membership of the parties in government appear to play only a marginal role at explaining aggregate spending and taxation outcomes.

To conclude, the above findings have alarming consequences for the region since revenues may not be complementing spending, and the fiscal state of each country may be left in disequilibrium. Indeed, the results suggest that the lack of incentives for fiscal discipline creates the conditions wherein economic mishaps are fostered. This chapter then complements recent scholarship on budgetary outcomes which illustrates the negative impact that powerful presidents...
have upon budgetary outcomes. In Colombia, for instance, budget deficits have worsened since the increased concentration of power in the executive branch (Cardenas, Mejia, & Olivera, 2007). In Peru, a powerful president at the expense of a weak Congress has led to opportunistic behavior in the executive branch (Valderrama, Carranza, & Chávez, 2007).
Conclusions


Efforts in the scholarly literature to identify the economic sources of growth and prosperity are plenty. Not so abundant, however, studies examining the conditions under which governments in general, and public officials in particular, are likely to pursue sound policies. This dissertation adds to the political economy literature by introducing the intra-party candidate nomination methods as an essential institutional aspect that must be taken into account if we want to understand the politicians’ representation efforts and policy choices. Because the initial step in the process of running for public office is that of achieving party nomination before every
Conclusions

election, incumbents interested on reelection must first be responsive to the demands of the party
gatekeepers with the power to add the politician’s name to the electoral ballot.

While political scientists have long recognized the relevance of the methods employed by
political parties to select candidates for general elections, the economic effects of candidate
selection have attracted much less consideration from researchers in the field of political
economy. Using a simple constrained maximization model, I show that, if running for reelection,
increasing participation and democratization of the candidate selection methods increases the
incumbent’s induced propensity to represent the interests of regular voters that habitually value
economic affluence. Quite the opposite, away from a democratic process, party nomination
decisions on the hands of the few increase the incumbent’s responsiveness to the often growth-
retarding demands of narrow concerns. According to this view, a simple cross-country inspection of the intra-party candidate nomination
methods reveals an empirical regularity: In the developed world intra-party nomination decisions
appear largely informed by inclusive and democratic practices; in the less-developed world
events of intraparty participatory politics are for the most part absent, with nomination decisions
often monopolized by national party leaders and local party bosses.

Consequently, this dissertation adds to the literature finding institutions a precursor of
economic affluence and prosperity (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; North & Thomas, 1970, 1973;
North, 1981, 1990; Knack & Keefer, 1995; Hall & Jones, 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson &
Robinson, 2001, 2002; Easterly & Levine, 2003; Dollar & Kraay, 2003; Rodrik, Subramanian &

37 Indeed, in democratic regimes, regularly scheduled elections and rotation in office may not be enough to deter
politicians from representing the often growth-retarding demands of special interests.
Conclusions

The alternative view sees institutional development as an eventual outcome of a process that may begin with a, perhaps autocratic, pro-growth ruler adopting policies conducive to physical and human capital accumulation, increased education and wealth that eventually lead to institutional improvement and democratic governance (Lipset, 1960; Barro, 1999; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub & Limongi, 2000; Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 2003; Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 2004). Instead, this dissertation advances the idea that in democratic regimes where the institutional structure, in general, and candidate selection, in particular, induce the polity to represent the interests of the whole, prosperity will follow.

Much is left to be done. If we consent to the idea that the economic consequences of the parties’ choice of method to nominate candidates may be substantial, understanding the motives behind these choices becomes crucial. Historically, sustained economic growth, particularly in per capita terms, first occurred in England some time in the latter part of seventeenth century. Even though incipient by modern standards, the development of private property was well under way. In addition, a patent system and laws protecting intellectual rights, and a functioning legal system of common law with the power to enforce contracts made possible that factors of production, including land and labor, received their pecuniary values. Prices, rewards and subsidies were also used, for the most part, to encourage innovation and productivity growth (North & Thomas, 1970, p. 16). The specific conditions that motivated the English Crown and members of Parliament to create an institutional structure that encouraged economic affluence by the end of the 1600’s are all subject of further research.

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38 This line of research can actually be traced back to Montesquieu (1748) and Smith (1776) who made a case of a limited government as a growth promoting institution.
Conclusions

In Olson’s (1982) view, the advancement of civil and political rights require the polity to pursue policies that benefit the whole. The effects of alternative candidate nomination methods might prove crucial in order to understand the induced propensity of politicians to advance policies that improve the quality of democracy. Interestingly, Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal, all countries in which nomination decisions are on the hands of oligarchic party elites, are consistently ranked below their counterparts in Western Europe by the 7-point scale Gastil index (www.Freedomhouse.org) used by the Freedom House to measure political rights and civil liberties on a yearly basis.

Sound policy is common knowledge. Yet, we have witnessed the failure of many governments over the world to adopt and maintain over time policy frameworks that promote economic affluence. If we acknowledge economic strategy as the fundamental source of economic progress and policy frameworks as mindful choices, then researchers’ efforts ought to expose the policy-makers’ motives. Ever since Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) demonstrated the prevalence of political institution as a growth determinant, the political economy literature has often stressed differences in political institutions in order to explain policy variations, then growth and development. This dissertation explored the detrimental effects that political institutions such as term limits and centralized candidate selection have on the politicians’ policy choices and economic outcomes. Within the same line of thought, in the US, Colorado and Oklahoma followed California’s political path by voting in 1992 to impose term limits on their state legislatures. As of today, more than twenty states in the US incorporate some type of term limits on their respective assemblies. The national debate over term limit legislation started back in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s under the premises that there was a perceived lack of responsiveness and accountability from the state legislators. Opponents of term
limits believed exactly the opposite and viewed imposition of term limits as a tool for reducing legislator’s motivation and responsiveness to the public. Clearly, both positions cannot be simultaneously true. Scholars may find the idea of growth-retarding institutions a source of inspiration for research purposes.

To conclude, I would like to state the obvious. Overlooking the details, there are about 30 countries in which the political system has been able to provide the conditions for economic affluence and prosperity to take place. With 30 cases in record, it should not be that difficult to build a reach country on purpose.
Bibliography


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Bibliography


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Bibliography


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Appendix A

Selected References on Candidate Selection by Country
68 Contemporary Electoral States
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Appendix B

Complete References on Candidate Selection by Alphabetical Order


Appendix B


Appendix B


Appendix B


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Kitzinger, Uwe (1960: 64) German Electoral Politics. London: Oxford University Press.


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