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"La Generación Ni Ni" and the Exodus of Spanish Youth: National Crisis or Functioning European Union Market?

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“LA GENERACIÓN NI NI” AND THE EXODUS OF SPANISH YOUTH: A
NATIONAL CRISIS OR FUNCTIONING EUROPEAN UNION MARKET?

by

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Chapter 1: Introduction

“Cuando un Español termina su carrera tiene 3 opciones: por tierra, por mar, o por aire.”

The semester I studied in Madrid impacted my life in many ways, one of those being the great friends that I made overseas. After I returned to the United States I remained in contact with my Spanish friends. I was struck to learn that many of them left Spain in search of work. The Spaniards I know have gone to England, Germany and Switzerland to work because they could not find jobs at home that were well paying and that reflected their level of education and intelligence. The youth unemployment rate in Spain has now reached 51%, the highest unemployment rate in Europe, and the situation is not improving.¹ As the necessity of leaving my home and culture in search of work was never something I needed to consider, I was shocked to find out that this is now considered normal in Spain. This left me with many questions and inspired this research project.

1.1 Spain’s economic situation

The 2000s were years of Economic boom for Spain. Historically a poor country, in the 21st century Spain reached a level of income and economic structure similar to the top-tier European countries. Spain implemented new liberalization techniques, furthered openness to international markets, and large business players such as Telefonica and Banco Santander grew to a global scale. Spain focused on expanding in markets where it wouldn’t have to compete with traditional global powers so, with the help of the cheap credit, the construction

¹ European Commission. (2011, September 30).

sector expanded rapidly. Immigrants came flooding in from Latin America, Northern Africa, and Eastern Europe, to fill the demand for jobs. After more than 4 million immigrants arrived, the unemployment rate was still the lowest it had ever been, 12.2% in 2004. In 2007 Spain surpassed Italy in terms of GDP per capita. Spain became a global economic powerhouse in the early 2000s.²

The world economic crash in 2008 hit Spain hard. The construction and tourism industries, Spain's primary sources of income, were the first to be affected in the economic recession because taking a vacation or buying a new home became luxuries many could no longer afford. Spain's construction sector completely collapsed when the banks stopped lending. This meant that civilians could no longer buy the new homes that had sprung up in droves in the past years. Real estate companies owed the Spanish banks millions of dollars that they could not repay because their houses remained unpurchased. Also, the collapse of the construction sector eliminated 2 million jobs.³ In short, Spain quickly turned from a wealthy country to a country burdened by debt and economic recession.

Four years later, Spain has continued to struggle with high unemployment, a weak banking sector, tight credit, and heavy private sector debt. This has led major credit rating companies, like Moody's, to downgrade Spain's sovereign debt rating from A1 to Aa2.⁴ Moody's has cited continued vulnerability to market stress and event risk as the primary reasons for the downgrade. The current Spanish Prime Minister, Rajoy, has begun to implement austerity measures in an

² Hooper, J. (2008, March 5).

³ Rainsford, S. (2011, February 3).

⁴ Muehlbronner, K. (2011, October 18).

attempt to reign in the burdensome debt level. It is clear that in 2012 Spain continues to suffer the consequences of the financial crash in 2008.

The Spanish youth have been hit particularly hard by the crisis. Currently, the Spanish unemployment rate for those searching for work under the age of 25 is an astonishing 51%.⁵ One in five of Spaniards under 30 years old are still looking for their first job.⁶ Newspapers are calling the Spanish youth the “Lost Generation” or “Generación Ni Ni” because of the desolate outlook for their future. “La Generación Ni Ni” identifies the young adult generation that is not in school or work; they have finished school but cannot find a job after having obtained a university degree. Spanish papers lament that this generation represents the first generation in Spain that will be worse off than their parents. The statistics demonstrate that the percentage of youth that fall into the category “Generación Ni Ni” is significantly higher than the percentage of adults who cannot find work.

As job prospects are dismal, the Spanish youth are looking elsewhere for employment. In 2011, “some 68 percent of young Spaniards are considering emigrating, an EU survey showed.”⁷ Statistics from Censo Españoles Residentes Ausentes show that since 2008 the number of Spaniards living abroad has increased 21.9%. Primarily, they are looking abroad for the answer to their employment woes, commonly the UK, Switzerland, and Germany. The same CERA survey demonstrates an increase of Spaniards in these locations; the UK

⁵ Govan, F. (2012, January 27).

⁶ Younge, G. (2011, March 29).

⁷ Sills, B. (2012, March 29).

has seen a rise of 16.4% of Spaniards, Switzerland 6.8% and Germany 5.9%.⁸ Also, the Latin American countries with strong economies, such as Brazil, are seeing a massive increase in migration from Spain. These statistics show a striking boost in emigration since the beginning of the economic recession.

Mass emigration is not a foreign concept for Spaniards. In the 1960s, Spain was going through a period of industrial development and many people were moving to the cities. Agriculture could no longer provide a good means of living for many Spaniards, however the new industrial jobs did not have the capacity to absorb the excess in labor. The Instituto Español de Inmigración [Spanish Institute of Immigration] began to sponsor out-migration as an unemployment escape valve for Spain. At the same time, West Germany was undergoing many rebuilding projects after the World Wars and was in great need of un-skilled or semi-skilled workers. An agreement was made between Germany and Spain to relieve both countries employment needs. In the decade that ensued, hundreds of thousands of Spaniards left Spain, many of them going to Germany to find work.

Spain has experienced emigration in the past, but the fact that this exodus represents the well-educated youth is new. More than 300,000 Spaniards have left Spain since 2008 and “en su mayoría, jóvenes altamente cualificados: ingenieros, arquitectos e informáticos, especialmente.” [the majority are young and highly qualified, engineers, architects and computer scientists, especially].⁹ This phenomenon is unprecedented in that “[u]nlike the Spanish emigration patterns of

⁸ Sills, B. (2012, March 29).

⁹ Más de 300.000 jóvenes han emigrado buscando trabajo. (2012, January 2).

the 1960s and 70s, when low-skilled workers left [Spain] in search of work, most of those leaving this time are well-educated.”¹⁰ The distinction between the emigrating demographics is a puzzling phenomenon.

Spanish newspapers frequently make note of the emigration trend, which illustrates the concern of the community. Recent headlines include: “Los jóvenes ya no sacan su currículum para trabajar, sino su pasaporte”, “La crisis dispara un 22% la emigración española, en su mayoría jóvenes” o “Más de 300.000 jóvenes españoles han emigrado buscando trabajo”. The emigration of the well-educated Spanish youth is a concerning phenomenon to the Spanish community because of its unusual nature.

Research Question:

Why is this mass emigration of well-educated Spanish youth taking place and what factors contribute to this particular demographic leaving Spain?

1.2 Literature Review

Why is Spain’s unemployment rate particularly high?

The Spanish newspapers that report on the emigration of the youth cite the domestic economic situation as the stimulus for the emigration. Spain was hit by the global financial crisis with greater impact than other nations. As such, certain preconditions exist in Spain that have led Spain to a particularly high youth unemployment rate. One theory that speaks to the high youth unemployment rate is the rigid Spanish labor market. Spain is different from other developed countries in terms of its labor laws; it has what is called a “two-tiered” or “dual

¹⁰ Younge, G. (2011, March 29).

labor market”. The two-tiered labor market breeds two types of jobs, temporary jobs and jobs for life. It is very difficult for Spanish companies to fire someone once they have been hired fulltime. Companies within Spain face larger fees and more red tape when terminating workers than most companies in other countries. The difficult legal hurdles that must be overcome in order to fire someone contributes to the propensity for companies to use temporary job contracts that can last up to two years. Historically, in Spain, 33% of all workers are temporary.¹¹ The Spanish youth are more likely to be hired on a temporary contract than older Spaniards because they lack the job experience required for more permanent positions. Consequently, it is likely that the labor laws have contributed to the high unemployment rate.

Another theory to explain the high unemployment rate is that many people worked in the construction sector that is now stagnant. Spain relied more heavily on the construction sector than other countries because of its rigid labor market. “In effect, as a result of Spain's higher inflation, real interest rates fell by 6 percentage points when the euro was introduced, against 1.5 percentage points in France. This fuelled a strong investment boom in the Spanish construction industry for at least two reasons.”¹² One reason the construction industry was the focus of investment was the rigidity of the labor market; it did not allow for Spanish companies to be investing in more innovative industries that require more labor flexibility to accommodate for the higher risk involved. Also, because of the influx in immigrants at this period of time, Spain had a wealth of unskilled labor

¹¹ Benotlila et al. (2011, January 22).

¹² Benotlila et al. (2011, January 22).

that was well suited for work in the construction industry. The inclination to invest in the construction industry and the availability of workers fueled the construction bubble in Spain. When Spain's construction bubble burst 35% of unskilled jobs were eliminated.¹³

The rigid, two-tier labor market and the collapse of the construction sector help to explain the astronomically high unemployment rates in Spain. Yet, the decision to leave the country is not an automatic result of high unemployment rates. In the early 1990s Spanish unemployment rates were on the rise and in 1994 a peak was reached at 21.4% unemployment, a rate almost as high as the current unemployment rate.¹⁴ However, the unemployment rate at that time did not incite a mass emigration. Therefore, further theories are required that can speak to why Spain's situation has resulted in an exodus of youth.

Why do people migrate internationally?

Different theorists have attempted to explain why labor migrations take place. They look at a variety of factors that have an effect on the propensity to migrate such as microeconomics, macroeconomics, law, political environments and social situations. First there is a distinction made between voluntary and compulsory migration. Migrants may migrate voluntarily because "economic conditions, living standards, and personal conditions at home are not as desirable as abroad" or they are "lured by the attractiveness of a more cosmopolitan,

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Data taken from Google Public Data:

http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=z8o7pt6rd5uqa6_&met_y=unemployment_rate&idim=country:es&fdim_y=seasonality:sa&dl=en&hl=en&q=unemployment+rate+spain

academic, or professional environment”.¹⁵ They may migrate compulsorily “because of financial crises, political turmoil, or pogroms dictate they do so”.¹⁶ The cost-benefit model, neoliberal policy theory, Albert Hirschman’s *Exit, Voice and Loyalty* theory, and the relative deprivation and relative frustration model represent prominent theories from varied disciplines that attempt to explain voluntary migration.¹⁷

The cost-benefit model explains labor migrations as a function of the relative difference between costs for migration and benefits of migration. It says, “A potential migrant is likely to move if the present value of all future monetary benefits from moving is greater than the monetary costs of moving”.¹⁸ A migrant would be more likely to move if they will be making more money at another location. Thus, the wage differential between emigration and immigration countries is the most important factor when considering migration. This claim is substantiated by an examination of the modal international migration patterns. The majority of migrants travel from South to North, or Developing to Developed countries, meaning that in general they travel from poorer to more economically advanced regions. Thus as the model hypothesizes, the future monetary benefits will be greater than costs.

However, this reasoning implies that the person most likely to migrate is the poorest person from the emigrant community. Spain is experiencing a flight of its well-educated, highly qualified, youth. By definition it is likely that this

¹⁵ Solimano A. (2010), 24.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Hirschman, A. (1970).

¹⁸ Faist, T. (2000), 35.

demographic is not the poorest demographic in Spain. Additionally, this is a one-dimensional model that only takes monetary costs into account. When applied to the Spanish guest worker migration in the 60s the model falls flat. In the historical example, the same factor of a troubled home economy existed before and after the phase of emigration. Yet, in 1973 “ the effective reason [for the reduction in migration was] the demand of West European countries for foreign migrant workers.”¹⁹ Therefore, the cost-benefit model alone cannot sufficiently explain the exodus of this demographic.

None of the microeconomic migration models address the market on an international scale. Spain resides in a common market and the Spanish emigration must be discussed in a European Union context. Spain’s membership in the European Union has brought with it exposure to neoliberal economic policies. Neoliberal policies support the opening of markets, free trade, deregulation and privatization. Frequently, globalization is seen as a synonym to neoliberalism. The neoliberal policies in the European Union enhance the internal market by opening borders to facilitate free movement of goods and people. As such, Spain is exposed to a high degree of free movement within Europe. That being said, it is clear that the open borders in Europe do not imply free movement, “as for the mobility of labor, this also has not been significantly enhanced by the removal of border controls.”²⁰ Even though Spain is a member of the European Union and affected by the internal market, the movement of labor is not significantly

¹⁹ Faist, T. (2000), 36.

²⁰ Hatt, S. & Gardner, F. (2002), 184.

increased by that fact. Clearly, the existence of neoliberal policies are not sufficient to describe the emigration of Spanish youth.

Albert Hirschman picks up where the internal market discussion leaves off, by focusing on the nation's role in migration. In *Exit, Voice and Loyalty*, he investigates "under what conditions will the exit option prevail over the voice option and vice versa?" Hirschman's model was originally formulated in terms of an organization; therefore exit and voice are defined accordingly. He defines the exit option as when "some customers stop buying the firm's products or some members leave the organization. As a result, revenues drop, membership declines, and management are impelled to search for a way to correct whatever faults have led to the exit." The voice option is defined as "the firm's customers or the organization's members express their dissatisfaction directly to management...or through general protest addressed to anyone who cares to listen...As a result, management once again engages in a search for the causes and possible cures of customer's and member's dissatisfaction."²¹ The two options, exit and voice, provide different mechanisms for the individual to express dissatisfaction, either depart the organization or attempt to change it.

Hirschman identifies the conditions that allow exit to prevail over voice and vice versa. In his model, exit is the most simple and therefore first choice for citizens. After exit is considered then, "[w]hoever does not exit is a candidate for voice and voice depends, like exit, on the quality elasticity of demand". Exit is the action taken first and "[t]he role of voice would increase as the opportunities for

²¹ Hirschman, A. (1970), 4.

exit decline, up to the point where, with exit wholly unavailable, voice must carry the entire burden of alerting management of its failings”.²² However, another factor comes into play when choosing between exit and voice and that is loyalty. Loyalty is based on an “evaluation of the chances of the firm getting back on track”.²³ Loyalty is a much more important factor when speaking about citizenship than about an affinity to buy one product over another. When applied to the Spanish emigration, if a citizen uses these evaluations and decides he will be loyal to his country, he will choose voice over exit. A student discussing her eminent emigration to Germany makes clear the importance of loyalty to her nation, "I'd prefer to stay in Spain with my family and friends, but without work it's impossible."²⁴ Her loyalty to Spain is clear, so the model suggests she will choose to use her voice before exiting. Only, when voice is proven ineffective, exit is then acted upon. The Spanish youth as a collective did attempt to make clear to the government their discontent with Spain, they did so in the form of protest movements called 15-M under the slogan, “they don’t represent us”. After the underwhelming response to the protest movement, the loyalty to Spain was eroded and exit was the chosen option.

Hirschman’s model successfully describes the environment in Spain that is required to push Spaniards elsewhere, but it lacks a measure as to when voice is no longer the best option and exit is chosen. By delving into the social psychological side of migration, the relative deprivation and relative frustration

²² Hirschman, A. (1970), 34.

²³ Hirschman, A. (1970), 38.

²⁴ Rainsford, S. (2011, February 3).

model, addresses the degree of frustration that necessitates migration. This model assumes that if migrants, as rational individuals, experience an “unfavorable gap between what a person feels he is entitled to and what, in fact, he is receiving [then activism is encouraged]”. This might happen if “he sees some other persons as having x” or if “he sees it feasible that he should have x.”²⁵ If activism is taken in the form of migration, this model implies that a migrant emigrates because he is frustrated by his deprivation, believes he deserves more, and migrates to achieve it. This model is applicable to the Spanish brain drain because the well-educated youth grew up in a time of economic prosperity in Spain. They feel entitled to the good jobs that they saw their peers obtain and they are frustrated by their inability to obtain them. This model applies not only to the economy in Spain but also the lack of youth political representation. As Spanish youth live in a democracy they feel entitled to use their voice in the political discussions. However, the Spanish government does not take heed to the youth’s voice or demands, leaving the youth deprived and frustrated. Due to their degree of dissatisfaction, they migrate in search of something better.

This model does not explain why migration, instead of democratic participation to make change, is the action chosen in response to the high degree of dissatisfaction. The author, Faist, attempts to deal with this issue in the model by hypothesizing about the reason an individual would choose migration over political participation. Faist states that “the example migration sets for others results in a self-reinforcing process in which individual motivations become

²⁵ Faist, T. (2000), 44.

correspondingly less important than the collective expectation to use exit complementary to voice.”²⁶ Thus, the actions of one’s peer group influences their decision to leave and “as opportunities for migration increase, the frustration among stayers increases even faster.”²⁷ Taking into consideration the expanded hypothesis, the collective frustration creates disillusionment within the country and disintegrates loyalty, which inspires exit.

How does the literature explain the emigration of educated Spanish youth?

None of the previous theories describe the specificity of the Spanish youth emigration, they each only address pieces of the puzzle. Hence, a further investigation into the situation is required. The exodus of well-educated youth constitutes a brain drain. The term “brain drain” was first coined in the 1950s and 60s when referring to the flight of British scientists and technologists to the U.S. and Canada. It is typically defined as “the emigration of a nation’s most highly skilled individuals” and can be calculated as the “share of all individuals for a [particular] education level at the age of 25 over [those] born in that country who live abroad.”²⁸ The Spanish phenomenon does not typify a brain drain because it is comprised of well-educated youth instead of adults, but still falls in line with the definition.

The Spanish brain drain is alarming because it is an unusual phenomenon for Spain. As Spain loses its well-educated youth, it loses those that will help make the country better in the future, both by economic contributions and

²⁶ Faist, T. (2000), 44.

²⁷ Faist, T. (2000), 44.

²⁸ Gibson, J. (2011), 108.

politically making changes. Other literature on international migration lacks a holistic viewpoint, yet this holistic viewpoint is needed to understand the specificity of the emigration of the well-educated youth demographic. This thesis will look at international economics, European Union rights and citizenship realities, and Spanish domestic politics to understand the mass exodus of well-educated Spanish youth. This thesis will produce important new academic insights on a demographic of international migrants that is generally overlooked, the well-educated youth. Identifying the causes of the exodus of Spanish youth will contribute policy suggestions that allow key changes to be made to reverse the phenomenon. Not only will the conclusions about the youth demographic be important, the existence of Spain within the EU sheds light on the nature of interdependence in the European Union.

Hypothesis:

The exodus of well-educated youth from Spain is taking place for a threefold reason. (1) The poor economic factors in Spain are pushing Spaniards out and the stronger economic factors in the receiving countries are pulling Spaniards in. (2) The reality of a European Union membership implies greater intra-European migration for both social and legal reasons. (3) The lack of youth political representation has created disillusionment with the country of Spain as a whole, eroding the loyalty youth feel to their home and incentivizing migration.

1.3 Chapter Organization:

The second chapter identifies Spain's membership in the European Union and neoliberal economic policies that contribute to the propensity for international migration. It argues that low unemployment rates and a dearth of skilled workers function to pull educated Spanish youth to migrate internationally, while at the same time poor economic prospects within Spain push youth out, incentivizing international migration. Additional aspects of the integrated market, such as the emphasis on multilingualism and the Schengen Agreement further facilitate the emigration but are not the primary cause. Thus, membership in the EU and access to the internal market spurs emigration from Spain. However, this conclusion cannot explain the specificity of the well-educated youth demographic that is leaving Spain, a further explanation is needed.

The third chapter argues the political environment within Spain also plays an important role in the exodus of the Spanish youth. Spanish youth are loyal to their home nation and do not want to leave in search of work. They demonstrate their loyalty by protesting and utilizing their voice within the political system. The youth have been preconditioned to be distrustful of the democratic system within Spain because of the authoritarian history of Spanish democracy and the continual demonstration of a lack of interest in youth. Their distrust of the government was affirmed by the governmental response to their protest movements; the response was lackluster and ignored that the ultimate goal of the youth's protest movement was to achieve better political representation. As the government did not properly address the youth's expression of political opinions, exit is the resulting option for youth. The political disillusionment of the youth

overwhelms their loyalty to their country and inspires international emigration. Thus, the national political environment is an important contributing factor in pushing the well-educated Spanish youth to migrate.

Finally, the concluding chapter extrapolates on the arguments of the previous chapters and applies them to the nature of interdependence in the European Union. The free movement of Spanish people functions as an achievement of the internal market because it exemplifies the supply and demand of human capital; labor is flowing where it is needed. From an economic standpoint the migration represents a success. At the same time the argument of the third chapter reveals that national borders remain relevant and exist (at least ideologically) for citizens. As Spain is a member of the European Union, it has forfeited a degree of national sovereignty. Because of the neoliberal EU policies Spain cannot actively stop the free movement of its citizens. Therefore, the emigration of youth is a crisis both to the Spanish people who have to leave their home and to the Spanish government who have lost legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. The emigration is a demonstration of the tensions between the market and national sovereignty in the European Union because the contradictory descriptions “national crisis” and “functioning internal market” both accurately describe the emigration of Spanish youth. These realizations suggest further policy recommendations.

Since the 2008 global financial crisis, almost 300,000 young Spaniards have left Spain, most of them well-educated. The brain drain represents a crisis to the Spanish government and community. This thesis investigates the factors that

contribute to the Spanish emigration. In the next chapter I will examine the significance of Spain's European Union membership and the significance of the EU internal market that encourages labor mobility.

Chapter 2: The Role of the European Union in the Brain Drain

It may be said that the European Union is the most ambitious transnational project of our time. Originally created as an economic community to bind the European states to one another and keep them from warring against each other, it has evolved into a supranational governing system with legal and political power. Within the European Union, an individual nation no longer has absolute authority over its domestic politics. The member nations participate in decision making procedures for many transnational issues and sometimes, if member nations are using qualitative majority voting, a nation can be overruled and obligated to comply with a policy it does not approve of. This degree of sovereignty for an international organization is unique to the European Union.

Spain, as a full acting member of the European Union, both influences and is affected by the economic and legal environment within the EU. Spain's close affiliation with the European Union brings up the question of whether the European Union environment incites the youth emigration. The goal of the European Union is to create a liberal economic market within Europe. As such, EU lawmakers have sought to promote open borders and free labor mobility in the hopes that these policies will facilitate a strong European economy. Spain's position within the European Union contributes to the exodus of educated Spanish youth because the closely integrated European market increases intra-EU labor mobility.

2.1 Economic Push-Pull Factors

Spain's economic situation is linked to the European Union due to the shared currency and the closely intertwined economies. This analysis will not cover factors that contributed to the high unemployment rate and level of debt in Spain; it will assume this precondition and then look at economic factors that contribute to the migration of Spanish citizens. Consequently, the European Union is a catalyst for push-pull factors economic factors that influence migration.

Economic factors influence the migration from Spain by either pushing people from Spain or pulling them to other nations. The poor economic situation effectively pushes the well-educated Spanish youth from Spain to look for careers elsewhere. The current generation of young Spaniards are the best educated in Spanish history; 38% have graduated from university.²⁹ As the youth have spent many years preparing for professional careers, the inability to work in a position that represents their qualifications is a source of extreme frustration.

Se trata de la generación más formada de nuestra historia contemporánea a la que ahora no podemos corresponder con un empleo. Resulta que se han formado, como les dijimos, han acudido a la universidad, como les indicamos, pero en el momento de incorporarse al mercado de trabajo no tenemos oportunidades que ofrecerles, como sí les prometimos.³⁰

Spanish young people went to school because they were instructed that this would help them get jobs, but at the time of completion of their schooling there are no jobs to offer them. Thus, the Spanish youth feel deprived of opportunities to

²⁹ Más de 300.000 jóvenes españoles han emigrado buscando trabajo. (2012, February 1)

³⁰ Más de 300.000 jóvenes españoles han emigrado buscando trabajo. (2012, February 1)

which they were promised and this has resulted in pushing the Spanish youth to look abroad for work.

Interviews with Spanish University students support the theory that the economy is a contributing factor to the exodus of educated youth. A BBC correspondent recently asked students in Spain's biggest university, La Universidad Complutense, whether they thought they would be able to find a job in Spain next year. A couple of students raised their hand in response to this question. However, when asked if they thought they would find a good job, nobody answered in the affirmative.³¹ This response speaks to the level of confidence Spanish youth have in the economy of their country. They believe that they won't be able to find key entry-level experience they need to start a career so newly educated Spaniards are searching abroad.

In addition to the economic push factors, other economic factors function to pull Spaniards abroad. A BBC article states, "[a]ccording to the recruitment agency Adecco, 110,000 people left [Spain] in the two years from April 2008. Most were skilled males under 35."³² Germany, a country with a growing economy and a need to fill skilled labor positions, is a primary receiver of the Spanish youth. Germany's Federal Employment Agency has predicted that there will be a shortage of 5 million workers in Germany by 2030. Half of that shortage will be for skilled, university educated, workers.³³ Germany's Federal Employment Agency is working with Eures, the EU commission's Internet job

³¹ Rainsford, S. (2011, February 3).

³² Rainsford, S. (2011, February 3).

³³ Peters, F. (2011, July 24).

exchange, to recruit laborers from countries hit by the economic crisis. In addition, during a press conference in Spain Angela Merkel personally invited Spanish students to work in Germany. Germany's economy grew by 3.2% in 2010 and it needs skilled workers to fuel the growing economy.³⁴ For many Spanish youth Germany is the answer to their search for employment, implying that strong economic prospects there pull the youth away from Spain.

Economic theories of international labor migration additionally validate the anecdotal evidence in suggesting that economic incentives may push migrants from a country or pull them to another country. Migrants will take into account the utility that can be gained by investing in a move internationally. The utility gained usually comes in the form of better pay, more stable work, or work that better fits the degree of education. "According to neo-classical economic theory, international labor flows exist as a consequence of wage differences between countries."³⁵ Thus, "based on the assumption that GDP per capita is directly correlated with international wage differentials...GDP per capita has a positive effect on net international migration."³⁶ In addition, Keynesian and dual labor market theories explain that because international migration is mainly driven by pull factors "unemployment has a negative effect on net international migration."³⁷ Therefore, Spanish youth will be drawn to countries that have higher GDP per capita and lower unemployment rates.

³⁴ Peters, F. (2011, July 24).

³⁵ Jennissen, R. (2002, October 2), 173.

³⁶ Ibid.


³⁷ Jennissen, R. (2002, October 2), 174.

Comparison of Spanish and German GDP's Per Capita and Unemployment Rates

		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Spain	GDP per capita (\$)	27,988.83	32,129.57	34,988.19	31,891.39	30,541.61
	Unemployment rate	8.3%	8.8%	14.9%	19.1%	20.4%
Germany	GDP per capita (\$)	35,429.48	40,467.87	44,264.06	40,658.58	40,508.87
	Unemployment rate	9.6%	8.2%	7.3%	7.6%	6.6%

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Unemployment rates of Spain and Germany from 2000-2011



39

Percent Difference of German and Spanish GDP Per Capita and Unemployment Rate

	GDP per capita	Unemployment rate
2006	21.00%	13.54%
2007	20.60%	6.81%
2008	20.95%	51.01%
2009	21.56%	60.21%
2010	24.61%	67.65%

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³⁸ Data taken from Google Public Data

³⁹ Image taken from Google Public Data

⁴⁰ Self-made calculations using the formula $((X-Y)/X) \times 100$

Analysis of the GDP per capita and unemployment rate in the sending country, Spain, and a major receiving country, Germany, support the theory that economic factors likely play a role in the observed negative net immigration rate. In this case study, the wage differentials between the two countries did not significantly change after the 2008 financial crisis; both before and after 2008 the difference between the two GDP's per capita was about 21%. This is not an insignificant percent difference between Spain and Germany's GDP per capita. However, because the percent difference has remained relatively constant since 2008 it is clear that the wage differential is not the main driver of Spanish youth emigration.

On the other hand, the unemployment rate is likely an influential factor for this phenomenon of emigration from Spain. Before 2008 the unemployment rate in Spain was lower than in Germany. However, the unemployment rates have diverged drastically since the 2008 financial crisis. In 2010 Spain's overall unemployment rate was 20.4% as compared to 6.6% in Germany, meaning there was a 67.65% difference between the unemployment rates in the sending and receiving countries. The significant difference between the two unemployment rates supports the theory that opportunities in the receiving country, by way of employment options, are influential in pulling migrants to the receiving country. The current phenomenon of youth Spanish brain drain falls in line with the neo-classical economic theory that suggests that unemployment rate will be an important factor in influencing international migration. The well-educated youth are choosing to migrate to Germany because Germany has a low unemployment

rate and a need for skilled workers, giving better opportunities for them to start a career in a job with good prospects.

2.2 The European Reality of Multilingualism Facilitates Intra-European Migration

Spain lies within the context of the EU framework and as such is affected by certain European realities. One particular reality, the tendency towards multilingualism, also ameliorates emigration from Spain and further explains the specificity of the well-educated youth demographic. The privileges of a European lifestyle that these young people are afforded reduce the difficulties of migration and decrease the relative cost of moving. In a cost-benefit analysis, as the costs are less significant, the benefits will more likely outweigh the cost, and the well-educated youth will more likely choose to emigrate.

During the historical emigration to Germany, the Spanish emigrants working in Germany were burdened with their inability to speak German. “Given the major barrier or obstacle of an unknown language, social relationships with Germans were strictly functional, whether at work, in daily shopping etc.”⁴¹ At this point in time Spain was an isolated country in which foreign cultures and languages were not well known and distrusted.⁴² After its entrance into the European Union, the average Spanish citizen’s ability to speak foreign languages has improved. It is clear that language acquisition is an important factor in migration because after the crisis, “[i]n Spain, schools teaching German have seen

⁴¹ Gualda Caballera, E. (n.d.)

⁴² A Correspondent in Spain. (1962, June 9).

the number of students rocket.”⁴³ In the hopes that learning German will help them get a job in Germany, Spaniards are going back to school. Because of its position in the European Union, the younger demographic have a better handle on other European languages than the older demographic. This reduces the cost of migration in the eyes of the youth and makes the benefit of a move to Germany weigh stronger.

In addition, educated Spaniards are at an advantage when looking for work abroad because they also are more proficient at multiple languages. In general, Spaniards are known for being less able at foreign languages than other Europeans. At 46.6% of Spaniards that cannot speak another language, only Portugal, Romania and Hungary had less of their population polled as multilingual.⁴⁴ Therefore, learning a foreign language is not as well entrenched in the Spanish schooling system as other European countries. But in Europe “a large majority, 65%, named language lessons in school as a way they have used to learn foreign languages.”⁴⁵ The smaller percentage of Spaniards that speak foreign languages suggests that the Spanish public school system does not support language acquisition well. Thus, the Spaniards that can afford extra schooling will be at a greater advantage in learning a foreign language. As school is the primary method of learning other languages, the well-educated youth likely know more languages and therefore can more easily move to another country.

⁴³ Ageing Germany Looks to Spain for Workers . (n.d.)

⁴⁴ Martínez Prasca, M. C. (n.d.).

⁴⁵ European Commission (2006, February)

Language ability makes international migration easier for current Spanish migrants. Other realities of the European Union also facilitate the youth emigration. These include the popular intra-European study abroad program Erasmus, and the Bologna Agreement that standardizes EU education requirements. Erasmus and the Bologna Agreement additionally favor the university-educated youth because of their affiliation with university education. This thesis will not discuss these programs in greater detail because they substantiate the same point as multilingualism. Economic push and pull factors incentivize the migration from Spain and realities of a European lifestyle also facilitate the well-educated youth exodus from Spain.

As fundamental realities of a EU lifestyle make intra-European migration easier, so also do fundamental rights upon which the Union was based.

2.3 The Right for Free Movement of People within the European Union

An original aspect of the common market within the European Union is the right for free movement of people. The European Union started as the European Coal and Steel Community with the objective of intertwining the economies of Europe so that they could never go to war against one another again. The ECSC evolved into the European Union operating a Single European Market. The benefit to a single market is the increased movement of goods, leading to an increase in trade between member states. With strong trade ties among the EU members the EU can become more powerful economically. The SEM has four pillars holding up the market. The first pillar is the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital between member states. The right for free

movement of people, intrinsic to the first pillar, was first articulated in the Treaty of Rome in 1957. This right allows “citizens of one member state to seek and take up work in any other member state.”⁴⁶ As a fundamental right of European citizenship, one can look for work in other European countries. Historically this right necessitated work permits and travel visas, however the right for free movement has evolved since its implementation and is currently manifested in the Schengen Agreement. The Schengen Agreement provides for the Schengen area of freedom, security and justice and it eliminates internal European border controls. Incorporated into European Union law with the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, the Schengen Agreement has been an evolving process since its creation in 1985.

A European Commission white paper from 1985, *Completing the Internal Market*, made recommendations to complete the internal market in the European Community. It recommended further removal of border controls because the bureaucratic obligations, such as requiring residence permits, could discourage movement throughout the European community.⁴⁷ Most member states were reluctant to accept the recommendations because they believed a better policy dealing with crossing the EU external borders was needed. Because the European Council required unanimity at this time to make transnational decisions, a policy could not be decided upon.⁴⁸ Finally, as an agreement among all members could not be made, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands

⁴⁶ Hix, S. (2005), 347.

⁴⁷ European Commission. (1985).

⁴⁸ Hix, S. (2005), 348.

agreed among themselves to eliminate internal borders and allow for the free movement of all persons.⁴⁹ This agreement allowing for “an area of freedom, security and justice” was called the Schengen Agreement and was signed in 1985. At this time, the Schengen Agreement was an intergovernmental agreement and not affiliated with an EU treaty. Shortly after, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Norway (although Norway was not an EU member) joined the intergovernmental agreement. It wasn’t until the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 that the Schengen Agreement became EU law. To work towards greater intergovernmental cooperation, the Schengen Agreement standardized visas, asylum, immigration, gun controls, extraditions, and the police right of “hot pursuit”.

The Schengen Agreement intends to provide a borderless zone that contributes to the mutually beneficial exchange between those seeking work and those seeking workers, thus furthering the internal market. The job of a “...market is to promote voluntary exchange, [consequently] society relies on the free movement of workers among employers to allocate labor in a way that achieves maximum satisfaction for both workers and consumers.”⁵⁰ The right to work in another European state “offer[s] better opportunities for job seekers and allows for a better matching of skills and qualifications in the internal market.”⁵¹ If one country needs a high volume of labor to produce its product and another country needs skilled labor, labor migration is the most efficient method to meet these

⁴⁹ "The Schengen Area and Cooperation."(2009, March 8).

⁵⁰ Ehrenberg R., & Smith R. (2003), 310.

⁵¹ Hix, S. (2005), 347.

needs. EU Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, Laszlo Andor, highlights the EU support of this reasoning. He says, "moving between countries offers real opportunities and economic benefits for both the host countries and the EU as a whole. We see that geographical mobility very much depends on the trends of the economy and where the jobs are".⁵² The Schengen Agreement eases economic integration to further the internal market.

The process of the implementation of the Schengen Agreement highlights the tension between national sovereignty and European economic integration and speaks to Spain's sovereign position within the EU. The elapsed years between the idea for a common market and the realization of a borderless zone demonstrates the difficulty of coming to this transitional agreement. Spain's decision to participate in the Schengen Agreement forfeits some of Spain's sovereign control over its borders and flow of goods and labor. As such, it is possible that Spain's affiliation with the borderless zone makes it more vulnerable to the emigration of its citizens.

2.4 Comparing Emigration from Spain Before and After the Schengen Agreement

To determine whether Spain's European Union membership and the associated right for free movement of people has been a contributing factor in the exodus of Spanish youth from Spain, a comparison of emigration from before and after the Schengen Agreement will be made. If the nature of the emigration from Spain during the historic guest worker phase is different than the nature of the

⁵² "Report Shows Overall Positive Impact of Mobility of Bulgarian and Romanian Workers on EU Economy." (2011, November 11).

current emigration, than Spain's entrance into the European Union and the Spanish's access to EU citizenship rights furthers intra-European migration.

When the guest workers were emigrating from Spain to Germany in the 60s and 70s the Schengen Agreement did not yet exist, yet Spanish citizens still migrated. Although the right for free movement, with applicable visas and permits, did exist in the European Economic Community (the name of the European Union at this time), Spain was not a member of the Community so the guest workers did not have access to those citizenship rights. Spanish laws did allow for emigration but exit could be obstructed: "the police [obstructed] skilled workers who appl[ied] for exit permits by insisting on formalities, papers, sponsors, guarantors and so on."⁵³ Officially, "any worker intending to emigrate [had] only to show that he has a firm contract" but sometimes there were more hurdles to overcome than that.⁵⁴ However, the Spaniard's "limited permits for work and residency depended on the whims of the labor market."⁵⁵ These bureaucratic difficulties sometimes led Spaniards to make clandestine trips abroad. The secret trips potentially had worse results for the Spanish if caught in the receiving country without the legal permission to be there. Although there were bureaucratic hurdles, this didn't stop "the pull of much higher European wage-rates [from] being felt" and in 1962 more than 74,000 Spanish citizens were working in West Germany.⁵⁶ The number of people emigrating continued to escalate, approximately 600,000 people moved to Germany in the period of 1964

⁵³ A Correspondent in Spain. (1962, June 9).

⁵⁴ A Correspondent in Spain. (1962, June 9).

⁵⁵ Gualda Caballera, E. (n.d.).

⁵⁶ A Correspondent in Spain. (1962, June 9).

to 1971.⁵⁷ These figures make clear that the lack of the Schengen Agreement and the necessity of work permits did not stop the Spanish from migrating. The feature most intimidating about leaving Spain was “the Spanish...distrust of foreign-speaking countries” but the social barriers were more intimidating than the legal ones.

The impressive statistics reveal that the lack of the Schengen Agreement and EU free movement citizenship rights in the 60s and 70s did not stop the Spanish from moving for economic reasons. Approximately 600,000 citizens moved to Germany in the span of 10 years, proving that people always move towards better economic opportunities. In the past, economic pulls were bigger emigration drivers than social or legal hurdles were impediments; the benefits of higher wages outweighed the costs of visa attainment or illegal migration.

Spain is a member of the European Union and the Spanish concept of a European citizenship has evolved. In 2010 there were 111,000 Spaniards working in Germany, and this number is rising rapidly.⁵⁸ Currently, the well-educated youth Spanish emigrants are still moving to Germany for economic reasons but their European Union citizenship endows them with the right for free movement, which eliminates the legal barriers that the historical migrants had to overcome. Furthermore, the greatest fear of the historical migrants was their distrust of foreign nations and foreign citizens. Spain’s location within the European Union bestows Spanish youth with realities of EU citizenship; it gives them a European, cosmopolitan awareness and linguistic ability which previous Spanish emigrants

⁵⁷ Turmo, I. (2011, January 22).

⁵⁸ Sedghi, A. (2012, January 26).

did not have. Therefore, the comparison of two phases of Spanish emigration implies that Spain's EU membership facilitates intra-European migration.

2.5 Romanian and Bulgarian Experiences with the Schengen Agreement

The previous section spoke to the right for free movement from the perspective of the Spanish migrant and demonstrated the lack of control Spain has within the context of the internal market. Like the historical example of Spaniards emigrating from Spain, Romanians and Bulgarians also do not have complete access to the right for free movement of people. Although governments can attempt to impose transition periods and impede the migration of Romanians and Bulgarians, these migrants further support the theory that economic incentives trump social or legal restrictions. At the same time, the case study reveals that access to the Schengen Agreement does facilitate migration and consequently the Spanish government has lost a degree of control over its borders.

The Schengen Agreement, because of concerns about national sovereignties, does not apply equally to all EU member states. Thus Romanians and Bulgarians are treated differently than other European Union citizens and have work permit and visa requirements when entering certain EU countries. The EU law defers to national preference when each nation decides to impose a transition period on new member states. A common fear in relation to the Schengen Agreement was that EU member nations would be flooded with migrants from the new member countries. Particularly Germany and Austria voiced concerns that as a result of EU enlargement they would experience significant labor market disruptions. The EU members fear that migrants will

move to access well paying jobs and social security benefits not available in their home countries. This would put the original citizens of the Western European countries at a disadvantage by having to compete for jobs and benefits. To dispel that fear, the member states implemented a transition period in which citizens of the new member states did not get full access to the free movement of people privileges.

The transition periods function to retain a degree national sovereignty for EU member nations. Each EU nation decides for itself whether to implement the transition period on the new EU members, thus a few of the newest Eastern European members may have access to the labor markets of some Western European nations while others do not. The transition period can be implemented in 3 stages. First, after the admittance of the new member states, other EU member states can restrict access for 2 years. Then by appealing to the EU commission the member states can restrict access for a further 3 years. Finally, if the member states prove that the access to the labor market by the new citizens could cause a negative disruption in the labor market, the nation is allowed to prevent access for a final 2 years.⁵⁹ For a total of 7 years citizens from a new EU member state may be restricted from the labor markets of other EU member states. The supranational EU lawmakers strove to achieve an effective internal market however, because of national cultures and preferences, a complete internal market was not achieved within the continent and the Schengen Agreement has transition periods associated with it.

⁵⁹ "Report Shows Overall Positive Impact of Mobility of Bulgarian and Romanian Workers on EU Economy." (2011, November 11).

Romanian and Bulgarian migrants reveal that transition periods do not hinder their migration, which demonstrates that migrants move for economic reasons despite legal barriers; the conclusions from this situation additionally show that facilitates migration. Romania and Bulgaria are the only EU nations that still have transition periods imposed on their citizens. Ten EU countries do not provide full access to Romanians and Bulgarians. These countries include the strongest economies in the EU such as Germany, France and the United Kingdom. The 10 withholding countries will come to the end of the 7-year maximum transition period on January 1st 2014 and Romanians and Bulgarians will be allowed full access to the labor markets of all other European nations.

Open borders do not incite intra-European migration but it does make this migration easier. Despite fears of a swarm of immigrants, the accession of 10 new member states did not bring about a massive western migration.⁶⁰ This fact brings to light the point that open borders do not imply more migration among member states; people do not migrate just because they can. Historically, “[t]he removal of border controls in the single market has not necessarily facilitated the rise in migration... Rather migration rose after the collapse of communism, conflicts in the Balkans and Asia, and crises in northern, eastern and central Africa.”⁶¹ Therefore, labor movement was not influenced by the ease of movement but crises in the home country. This assertion implies that the transition periods currently enforced on Romania and Bulgaria would not have an effect on the movements of the laborers from those countries. In fact, “Bulgarian migration is

⁶⁰ Hix, S. (2005), 350.

⁶¹ Hix, S. (2005), 361.

not influenced by travel restrictions but by economic factors.”⁶² In 2007 Spain opened its doors to Romanian and Bulgarian citizens and Germany did not, but “statistics...show no difference in the flow of Bulgarian migrants to these two countries after Bulgaria’s accession to the EU on January 1 2007.”⁶³ On the contrary, there is a significant difference in the number of Romanian citizens in Spain than in Germany, 823,000 in Spain in comparison to 500,000 in Germany.⁶⁴ The Romanians and Bulgarians are entering the primary receiving countries in Europe (Germany) despite legal restrictions because the economic factors pulling them to Germany weigh more strongly than the legal barriers stopping them. However, the fact that there are more Romanians in Spain than Germany brings to light the fact that open borders do make migration easier.

Spain has recently decided to go back on its initial stance and begin requiring visas for Romanians and Bulgarians because of its high unemployment rate. It has done so because its labor market cannot absorb additional people. The Commissioner of Labor for the European Union adds “The Commission understands why, at this particular juncture — because of the dramatic employment situation and the very complex financial environment — the Spanish authorities wish to step back from full free movement.”⁶⁵ The action of stepping back from free movement is a clear demonstration of the equation of free movement and labor migration. The Spanish government conjectures that by

⁶² Angelov, G., & Vankova, Z. (2011, December 2).

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Romanian Diaspora Romanian Population Statistics - countries compared. (n.d.).

⁶⁵ Castle, S., Dempsey, J. (2011, August 11).

closing their borders Romanians and Bulgarians will be less likely to migrate to Spain. ““It is a backlash that is not really addressing the real problem, which is the lack of more flexible labor markets,’ said Heather Grabbe, director of the Open Society Institute — Brussels. ‘It is a limit on free movement, which is a fundamental underpinning of Europe’s single market. What needs to happen is for market problems to be addressed, rather than pushing back on free movement.’”⁶⁶ This discussion exposes contradicting desires of the EU and Spain. The EU wants to further the internal market and Spain wants to utilize sovereign control for self-interest reasons. Although Spain has implemented transition periods to attempt to impede migration, the Bulgarians moved to Germany despite transition periods. Hence, the tendency to migrate for economic reasons will override the obstacle of Spain’s transition periods and further demonstrate Spain’s exposure to the European Union ebb and flow of labor.

As demonstrated by both the historic and current case study of European migration, migrants move for economic reasons despite social or legal barriers. As the goal of the right for free movement of people is to facilitate economic movement of goods and people, it adds to economic migration. Additionally, the Schengen Agreement and European Union citizenship eliminates some social and legal barriers to migration, further encouraging intra-European migration. This realization implies that Spanish youth leaving Spain in search of work are aided by their European Union citizenship as it gives them access to the right for free movement of people and eliminates legal hurdles.

⁶⁶ Castle, S., Dempsey, J. (2011, August 11).

2.6 Conclusion

The closely integrated market of Europe increases labor mobility, implying that the market may promote the emigration of Spanish youth. Clearly, economic push-pull factors incite the Spanish youth exodus; poor career prospects within Spain that do not represent the qualifications of the youth push Spaniards to look elsewhere for work, and the need for skilled workers functions to pull the educated young Spaniards to the primary receiving country, Germany. Additional aspects of the integrated market, such as the emphasis on multilingualism and the Schengen Agreement further facilitate the emigration but are not the primary cause. These conclusions reveal that Spain's location within the world's most integrated market exposes Spain to the ebb and flow of its citizens. As such, Spain has lost a degree of control of its borders and seceded that control to the supranational European power.

Chapter 3: Spanish Domestic Politics' Role in the Brain Drain

The previous chapter demonstrated that Spain's affiliation with the European Union exposes it to an integrated market and EU citizenship ideals. That being said, the aforementioned factors relating to the integrated market within the European Union are not the only factors that hold explicative value for the emigration of Spanish youth. If intra-European migration were only based upon economic disparities and access to European Union rights and realities, then the flow of migrants would be seen throughout Europe. Multiple European countries are experiencing an economic recession, but it is one of only three European countries experiencing the crisis of the exodus of its well-educated youth (the other two being Portugal and Ireland). Thus, an additional explanation is needed to understand the emigration of Spanish youth, a domestic political explanation. The next chapter will underscore how the sentiment of political disillusionment among the Spanish youth erodes the youth's loyalty to Spain and encourages international migration. The specificity of the well-educated youth demographic that is choosing to emigrate is further explained by examining the domestic political environment within Spain.

Strong psychological and sociological ties connect people to their home community and country. Emigration from one's home necessitates a break in those communal ties. Hence, a domestic problem must exist to inspire the consideration of international migration. The *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* framework by Albert Hirschman, as discussed in the literature review, analyzes the degree of frustration that is required to overcome one's loyalty to their home so as to leave.

Hirschman reveals that communal ties would influence youth to create change in the state rather than leave it. Only after the utilization of voice to make change fails, is exit, or emigration, the next option. The Spanish youth emigration supports the Hirschman theory, so this theory will be used to guide and understand the analysis of the emigration. Hirschman's framework will be used to identify which domestic political factors contribute to the youth emigration from Spain. The analysis will make clear that the Spanish democratic system has not allowed for significant representation of youth, resulting in a political disillusionment that has spurred Spanish youth to leave Spain.

3.1 Loyalty: Nationalism and Citizenship

When faced with a difficult situation, one often chooses to exit the dilemma. However, "exit is ordinarily unthinkable, though not always wholly impossible, from such primordial human groupings as family, tribe, church and state."⁶⁷ This characteristic Hirschman titles "loyalty". A crisis on a national scale does not immediately induce exit because people identify as citizens of a nation and as members of a community; qualities such as nationalism, and citizenship bring about strong ties to a place. Thus, loyalty plays an important role in a nation when a crisis arises.

The political ideologies of nationalism and citizenship illustrate the bond of loyalty a citizen feels for their home country. The modern world order is broken up by nations and in many cases nations are the most salient socio-political unit with which an individual identifies. Nations bring together people

⁶⁷ Hirschman, A. (1970), 76.

from myriad backgrounds and ethnicities and identify them under one imagined community, the political state. The political ideologies, nationalism and citizenship deal with a strong identification to a group and to a state, respectively. To feel nationalism, “[individuals] are recognizing their status as members of a cultural group (however defined). The feeling associated with this kind of identity is love of a nation and consciousness of its traditions. Therefore, knowledge of what had made and still makes a nation ‘great’ is a required kind of competence.”⁶⁸ Nationalism infers a love of your country and community and a belief in the positive attributes of that country. Citizenship, as a political ideology, is similar but it defines the identity of an individual with a state rather than a community.

[Citizenship] defines the relationship of an individual not to another individual, or to a group, but essentially to the idea of a state. The civic identity is enshrined in the rights conveyed by the state and the duties performed by the individual citizens, who are all autonomous persons, equal in status. Good citizens are those who feel an allegiance to the state and have a sense of responsibility in discharging their duties.⁶⁹

Citizenship is distinct from nationalism because it requires the individual to act on behalf of the state and “discharge duties”. These duties may include, voting, or being actively involved in the governmental system. Citizenship, a legal tie, and nationalism, a political sentiment, both come naturally when living in a country and imply a strong tie to that country.

Spain experiences nationalism and citizenship differently than most other countries. The autonomous communities within Spain are the communities that

⁶⁸ Heater (2004), 2.

⁶⁹ Heater (2004), 2.

most Spaniards identify with strongly. People from Barcelona, which lies within Catalonia, tend not to call themselves Spanish; rather, most identify as Catalans. In 2010 the Spanish court decreed that Catalonia did not have the right to call itself a nation, bringing about furious protests in Barcelona. However, the “love of the nation and consciousness of its traditions” still exists strongly. Although they may not have the legal right to call themselves a nation, within Spain nationalism in terms of identification with the autonomous communities supercedes identification with the country as a whole. At the same time, Spaniards are citizens of the state of Spain. The majority are involved citizens; Spain has a high percentage of voting aged citizens who turnout for elections, 76.03% compared to 64.36% in the United States.⁷⁰ Although the idea of nationalism is different in Spain than in other countries, Spaniards actively participate as good citizens of the state more than people of other nationalities do; Spain has a strong tradition of civic involvement and electoral participation and its citizens are loyal to the nation.

3.2 Voice: Democracy and Political Participation

Spaniards feel strong ties to their communities and are loyal to them. The action Hirschman titles “voice” is born from loyalty to an organization; voice is the attempt of members of an organization to better that organization. Hirschman describes both loyalty and voice’s role in a national setting by citing the quote “our country, right or wrong” from Charles Schurz. He states, “that paradigm of loyalty, ‘our country, right or wrong’ surely makes no sense whatever if it were

⁷⁰ Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

expected that ‘our’ country were to continue forever to do nothing but wrong. Implicit in that phrase is the expectation that our country can be moved again in the right direction...”⁷¹ Thus, the act of being loyal to one’s country, and because of loyalty choosing voice over exit, implies that with voice one sees the opportunity of making the change they desire. Since Spaniards experience loyalty, voice is the logical next step to express dissatisfaction, according to the Hirschman model.

Voice is manifested in a variety of mechanisms. In a democratic state manifestations of voice occur through democratic institutions. As democracy is the “ruling of the people by the people” an example of fully engaged citizens taking advantage of democracy is the utilization of voice, citizens attempting to guide the country in the direction they desire. The manifestations of voice within a democracy may include, voting, lobbying the congress, educating the public via media outlets, or utilizing free speech rights and protesting. Within a successful democracy, “the question is not whether a society has encountered a specific solution to challenges of public policy and social justice but whether it affords citizens an engaging public arena within which they may contemplate, discuss if they wish, and ultimately choose among competing views, alternatives and proposals.”⁷² Societies should propose solutions to issues by way of voice, the majority should decide which solution is the best, and the government should adhere to the majority opinion. One method of making their voices heard by the government is protesting: “they took over the streets and plazas of their countries

⁷¹ Hirschman, A. (1970), 78.

⁷² Fishman, R. (2004), 9.

in an effort to hold public officials accountable...”⁷³ Protesting is an effective method to utilize voice, hold government officials accountable, and steer governments in the direction the people want.

However, the utilization of voice in a democratic institution is not always successful. Two major political theorists, Alexis de Tocqueville and Gramsci, describe issues that may stem from voice within a democracy. “Both theorists are concerned with the conditions that encourage the emergence and public communication of one or more alternatives to dominant ideas...For Tocqueville the danger is what he terms the “tyranny of the majority,” whereas for Gramsci the issue is hegemony in class relations.”⁷⁴ Tocqueville describes the tyranny of the majority as something that occurs in the American democracy because there are not outlets for the minority to properly dissent the majoritarian opinion. Tocqueville explains that under tyranny of the majority, “however iniquitous or unreasonable the measure which hurts you, you must submit.”⁷⁵ For Tocqueville, the solution to the tyranny of majority is the strong municipal governments and political associations. These organizations would ensure that the minorities could be heard at a local level and their opinion brought to the larger group. Gramsci, on the other hand, who was “concerned specifically with the ability of subordinate social groups to challenge dominant ideas and interests, placed his trust instead in the existence of a network of politically oriented intellectuals linked to other actors in a wide array of social settings, such as neighborhoods, schools and

⁷³ Kaplan, T. (2003), 1.

⁷⁴ Fishman, R. (2004), 9.

⁷⁵ Tocqueville, A. (1840), 233.

workplaces.”⁷⁶ Both Tocqueville and Gramsci concern themselves with the possibility that individuals may not effectively express their opinions in democratic settings. Tocqueville lobbies for strong local governments to be the solution to this failure in democracy while Gramsci describes a network of intellectuals as the proper solution.

In a successful democratic state, the utilization of voice produces a sound democracy and the issues proposed by Tocqueville and Gramsci’s are avoided. If voice is not taken heed to, the democratic state is not functioning correctly. However, in Spain “young people are hardly interested in and very mistrustful of politics. Fifty percent are not interested in politics at all, which is a higher percent than four years ago when the number of those not interested in politics at all stood at 38%.”⁷⁷ As Tocqueville theorized, the youth do not feel well represented by the democratic government and suffer from a tyranny of the majority, for this reason they are “mistrustful” of the Spanish political system. The misrepresentation of Spanish youth has led to a political disillusionment, which is demonstrated by an avoidance of standard democratic procedures, like voting. Therefore, the youth choose to use their voice in organized youth protest movements.

3.3 “Los Indignados”- The 15-M Spanish Youth Protest Movement

Despite the evidence of disaffectedness among Spanish youth, there has been a significant exercise of voice within Spain. During elections, the Spanish submit blank votes to vocalize their dissatisfaction with all political candidates. Spanish national elections that took place in 2011 demonstrated the frustration

⁷⁶ Fishman, R. (2004), 9.

⁷⁷ Youth Partnership (2009, February), 11.

youth feel by their lack of political representation. The youth, protesters, “and people like them might normally have voted for left-wing parties. [Yet], on May 22nd, the socialists lost 1.5m or one in five, of their votes.”⁷⁸ The other large political parties in Spain only partially picked up the socialist votes. The United Left (communist party) saw an increase in 210,000 votes and the Partido Popular (conservative party) saw an increase in 560,000.⁷⁹ Thus, about half of the usual socialist votes either went to small parties or were blank votes. It is likely that they were blank votes because this is a common tactic in Spain to express frustration with the political system. One Spanish campaign site describes the tactic known as the blank vote or “voto en blanco”: “The Blank Vote is a democratic rejection of all the current political options, with a continued belief in democracy. It is the vote most appropriate when all the parties are corrupt, or when their intentions are not attractive, or when they breach these programs, or when they have exceeded their lawful power, or when they have perverted the system...”⁸⁰ The Spanish youth that usually vote for the socialist party, PSOE, were so frustrated with the state of the political system that they cast blank votes instead of voting for any particular party. This demonstrates a precondition of mistrust of the Spanish political system, but an activation of voice nonetheless.

In addition, protests have been organized in response to the frustrating political and economic environment. After dealing with two years of rapidly rising youth unemployment rates, and watching politicians make policies that did

⁷⁸ Banks, M. (2011, May 26).

⁷⁹ Banks, M. (2011, May 26).

⁸⁰ Blank Vote - the protest vote that says “None of the above.” (n.d.).

not fix the situation, on the 15th of May, 2011 the self defined “indignados” [indignants] took to the streets to express their discontent with the Spanish government. Titled the 15-M movement because of its starting date, “los indignados” continued to organize their peers in an attempt to make their voices heard. “The 15-M movement in Spain, which organized demonstrations in 58 cities earlier this year under the slogan ‘they don't represent us’, embodies a similar yearning for a new political framework to arise.”⁸¹ Inspired in part by the Arab Spring protests, the 15-M rely heavily on social media to get the word out about upcoming protests or meeting places. They often use the catch phrase #spanishrevolution to brand their Twitter or Facebook posts. The movement:

has filled city squares, coordinated online actions and targeted specific topics like banking and electoral reform. It has experimented with bottom-up networked approaches to challenge the rigid, top-down, party driven system that has dominated Spanish political life since 1978.⁸²

The 15-M movement has drawn crowds of 200,000 people in the main squares of Madrid with the goal telling the politicians that the youth feel underrepresented.

The movement is a grassroots, bottom-up movement that defies top-down corruption. “The movement has studiously avoided engaging with ideological agendas, unions and, most importantly, professional politicians.”⁸³ The grassroots nature of the movement is vital in maintaining its legitimacy among the youth. “‘We don't want to form a political party because it would destroy the horizontal nature of the movement,’ says Carlos Pederes, an IT worker who has been

⁸¹ Shenker, J. (2011, August 13).

⁸² Beas, D. (2011, October 15).

⁸³ Beas, D. (2011, October 15).

involved in the protests from the beginning. ‘[Plus] the system is rigged so that only the two big parties can win, so it would be pointless.’”⁸⁴ The bottom-up structure of the movement furthers its goal of representing the people more accurately. By avoiding standard democratic mechanisms, like political parties, the 15-M movement does not allow for corruption, oligarchic tendencies, or a rigid party system to get in the way of its mission.

Spanish young people are particularly inclined to protest because they are “optimistic about what they can contribute to politics and pessimistic about what they can expect from politics and politicians.”⁸⁵ They believe that they can contribute to politics via their right to freedom of speech. However, because of the Spanish youth’s mistrust of politics and politicians, they are not as likely to participate in standard democratic procedures, like voting. The goal of the 15-M protest is to make the people’s voices heard and make clear that the youth feel the government does not represent them. The fact that the goal of the movement was to create better democratic representation further shows the mistrust youth feel for politicians; they do not feel that the Spanish democratic system functions effectively or that their opinions are properly acknowledged. Spanish youth are in general cynical about the effectiveness of Spanish democracy and have a sense of disaffectedness. For this reason, protesting is their preferred method of voicing concerns.

By way of “voice” mechanisms such as protesting, the Spanish youth have made clear that they aimed to see the politicians taking actions that also benefit

⁸⁴ Shenker, J. (2011, August 13).

⁸⁵ Youth Partnership (2009, February), 11.

them. Instead, they have seen greater austerity measures that worsen the social welfare of the people and youth unemployment rates that continue to rise. The governmental response to the 15-M movement was inefficient in proving to the Spanish youth that when attempting to use their voice, they would be heard. The lack of a satisfactory response has contributed to the emigration of the Spanish youth.

3.4 Insufficient Response to the 15-M Movement

The 15-M movement was the Spanish youth's attempt to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the government in a method that they believed would be acknowledged. However, the response to the protest did not adequately address the issues at hand, and the Spanish youth remain underrepresented. A variety of hypotheses exist as to why the Spanish democracy is not appropriately representing the youth demographic. One explanation is that institutional conditions prevail that make democratic expression less effective and less likely to be transmitted into change. Spain, a liberal democracy, only transitioned to a democratic system at the writing of its constitution in 1978 after General Franco's death. For this reason, Spain's democratic system is marked with its authoritarian past. Spain's dictatorial history leads the Spanish government to function within a top-down culture, thus alienating the Spanish youth.

At General Franco's death Spain peacefully transitioned from a dictatorship to a democracy. This led the government to allow many of the officials during the Franco regime to remain in place. The decision to keep some people from the public administration, army and judiciary in power ensured that

the Francoist culture would remain partially intact. “Needless to say, the Franco dictatorship had concentrated political power around the executive and around the figure of the Caudillo himself, and so institutional continuities would tend to reinforce the power of the executive, and in particular the prime minister”.⁸⁶ The Spanish transition from dictatorship to democracy that did not result in a military coup is an impressive anomaly. At the same time, the peaceful transition resulted in a culture of concentrated power among the single leader. Therefore, in the new democracy, the prime minister is the most powerful figure who deals with few checks on his power.

Not only did the past Francoist culture pervade the new democratic system, a precedent was set of behind the scenes deals that also compromised the power of the parliament to represent their constituents. At the time of transition, the multitude of interest groups had to come to difficult compromises;

[p]aradoxically, consensus weakened Parliament: because of the difficulty of the compromises the parties had to make, and the need to ensure the acquiescence of extra-parliamentary forces (such as the army, the church, and big business), the real action took place behind the scenes. This set a precedent which has proved difficult to shake off...parliamentary parties have tended to be subordinate to their leaderships, and parliament as a whole has rarely challenged the dominant position of the prime minister and executive.⁸⁷

As the pattern of behind the scenes deals is in place, the parliament does not challenge their leadership. Parliamentarians are the figures that should directly represent the people who live in their district, however if they cannot challenge their leadership, they cannot accurately represent their constituents.

⁸⁶ Poguntke, T., & Webb, P. (2005), 108.

⁸⁷ Poguntke, T., & Webb, P. (2005), 108.

In addition, the structure of the political parties in Spain supports the idea that Spanish citizens are not well represented by the government. There are two primary political parties who have traded off power of the country since the transition to democracy, PSOE, the socialist party, and Partido Popular, the conservative party. Within the Spanish parliamentary system the citizens vote for the party they wish to rule them rather than the person, and the party in turn chooses their leader. This chosen leader will become the Prime Minister if his political party is elected. This structure does not demand a Prime Minister chosen by the people. Furthermore in Spain, “the parties are hierarchical and top-down organizations with strong oligarchic tendencies, concentrating power at the highest echelons of the party in the hands of a small elite.”⁸⁸ Power is concentrated at the highest echelon of the party in the leader that is not chosen by the people, giving the political parties the means to make decisions disregarding the citizen’s voice.

The precondition of centrally concentrated power has negatively affected impressions of the Spanish democracy. Youth are aware of the political environment and are fed up with “‘favoritismo’ y la ‘corrupción’ de la clase política actual [the favoritism and corruption of the current political class].”⁸⁹ For this reason they are particularly distrustful of standard democratic mechanisms for expressing political opinions like voting. In addition, given that traditional avenues of civic expression like voting tend to be relatively ineffective as a conduit for expressing the interests of youth, Spanish youth chose to make their

⁸⁸ Poguntke, T., & Webb, P. (2005), 111.

⁸⁹ Ríos, S. (2011, May 16).

case via their right for free speech and protests movements. However, the culture of concentrated political power made the response to the grassroots 15-M protest unsatisfactory. The response to the movement lied on the shoulders of a few powerful politicians and they proved the protesters right in their claim that the politicians to do not represent the people.

The majority of Spanish political parties chose not to react to the movement by refusing to comment on the issue. The Prime Minister Zapatero “habló en un mitin en Sevilla y comentó que hay que tener "sensibilidad" para escuchar las peticiones de los manifestantes, que ha resumido en empleo y vivienda” [spoke at a rally en Seville and commented that sensitivity was needed when listening to the petitions of the protesters, which he summarized as protesting about employment and living conditions]. Zapatero acknowledged the protest movement but ignored its primary purpose, to show that the Spanish democracy does not represent the people. Zapatero later acknowledged that the protesters were planning on demonstrating their discontent with the government by not voting in the next election, and he pleaded that they exercise their democratic right to vote. Some politicians chose not to respond to the youth’s calls and the Prime Minister avoided the primary issue “los indignados” brought up. The lack of response discourages the utilization of voice because their work is falling on deaf ears. By not listening to the voices of the youth, Zapatero denied their right to participate in democracy and attempt to make change.

Furthermore, the Partido Popular used the movement in their campaign for election, furthering the sentiment of the people as “goods in the hands of

politicians". Vice President of the Partido Popular used the movement to make a political plug before elections. He claimed the Prime Minister Zapatero is "tan poco democrático que lo que merece es que este domingo todos vayan a votar al PP para decirle que en España mandan los españoles" [so undemocratic that what he deserves is for everyone to vote for PP on Sunday and show him that in Spain, the Spaniards rule the country].⁹⁰ His statement attempts to turn the movement that is striving for better democracy and representation in Spain on its head and claim that the method to achieve better representation is to vote for his party. However, he disregards the disillusionment the youth feel with the political system as it stands. His ignorance of the goal of their movement ironically supports the protest by shedding light on the fact that the politicians are removed from the goals of the youth. Mariano Rajoy added insult to injury by claiming that the youth were taking the easy way out, "[I]o fácil es descalificar a la política y a los políticos" [the easy thing is to discredit politics and the politicians].⁹¹ The youth were not taking the easy way out but were showing their loyalty to their country by attempting to make their voices heard in a mechanism that they still trusted, protesting. But the powerful politicians continued to demonstrate their distance from the issues by insulting the goals of the protest movement and then attempting to use the momentum of the movement in the campaign for election.

Initially, the politicians made little acknowledgement of the protest movement. However a recent change in leadership has manipulated the nature of the responses. Partido Popular won the most recent national election and currently

⁹⁰ Europa Press. (2011, May 17).

⁹¹ Ibid.

Mariano Rajoy is the Spanish Prime Minister. The more extreme responses to the movement under his leadership have worsened the outlet of voice. Previously, Zapatero refused to acknowledge the protests, however, Rajoy, the new Prime Minister has chosen to respond harshly rather than cooperate with the protesters. Most autonomous communities in Spain are now run by PP, and during February 2012 in Valencia, Spain, a community run by Partido Popular, there were many arrests, injuries and detainments in regards to the 15-M demonstrations. The police and high school students clashed during protests against austerity measures. Further, clashes ensued when youth took to the streets in solidarity for their friends who had been arrested. In total 43 arrests have been made. The protesters “complain about brutal police tactics, and the police claim they were attacked by demonstrators hurling bottles.”⁹² The recent regime change from PSOE to Partido Popular has resulted in a change in response to the protests and worsens the outlet of voice. Youth that attempted to make their voice heard were treated with violence, thus discouraging future youth participation in the Spanish democracy.

Spain’s history has marked its current democratic system. The transition to dictatorship brought with it a culture of authoritarian rule and a precedent for back room deals. Furthermore, the structure of the political parties does not require the Spanish leader to represent the people. The precondition of centrally concentrated power made the Spanish youth distrustful of their representation via the democratic route of voting. For this reason, the Spanish youth chose to express

⁹² Valencia anti-austerity protesters arrested – video. (2012, February 21).

their discontent via organized protests, in which their goal was to make it clear that they felt underrepresented by the government. Instead of acknowledging the youth's attempts to make their stake in the political environment, the previous Prime Minister, Zapatero, ignored them and the current Prime Minister, Rajoy, relies on police punishment. As the abrupt change in response to the 15-M protests make clear, the Prime Minister wields great power in Spanish politics. The lackluster response to the youth's efforts to create change in their country further supports the youth's sentiment that they are not well represented by their government, discouraging them from attempting to participate in the Spanish democracy.

3.5 Conclusion: Exit due to Political and Social Disillusionment

The Exit, Voice and Loyalty framework makes clear that without a certain degree of loyalty, the people in an organization will exit. The youth have loyalty to their home country because of the political ideologies of nationalism and citizenship. At the same time, the stronger identification with the autonomous community, rather than the nation as a whole, may lessen the youth's loyalty to Spain. That being said, in general Spaniards are "good" citizens. However, the youth are disillusioned with the government because of preconceived notions that the government is corrupt and doesn't represent the youth, and sometimes vote with blank ballots. As the youth are not as loyal to the country as a whole, exit comes easier than if they were more loyal.

The Spanish youth showed their loyalty to Spain by attempting to change the problems that were pushing them to exit. Through the 15-M movement, they

expressed their disillusionment with the government. However, the government, both PSOE and PP, did not take heed to the message of the 15-M movement; Zapatero ignored the protesters and Rajoy responded with police force. The Spanish youth do have loyalty to their home country and tried to use their voice to make change, but they were denied the chance to make the change they desired to see. The political disillusionment of the Spanish youth spurs the belief that the change they wish to see will not occur and erodes the sense of loyalty to the state, thus exit is the youth's ultimate option. Domestic political disillusionment is a requirement for international migration.

In addition, the media, sometimes known as the fourth branch of government in the United States, furthered the youth's feelings of inadequacy. Rather than attempt to aid the youth, the media reported on the 15-M protests and labeled all youth involved either "La Generación Ni Ni" [The Generation Ni Ni], or "La Generación Perdida" [the lost generation]. They are a generation "ni escuela, ni trabajo", meaning they are no longer in school but they do not work. The Spanish newspapers describe the youth generation as "tan vulnerables y perdidos" [very vulnerable and lost].⁹³ Those words usually describe people who have not attempted to change their situation. The organized protests and the utilization of voice prove that the Spanish youth are not vulnerable and lost. The Spanish youth refuse to become the "Lost Generation". Because the youth were not represented in Spain, and were "lost" in the political environment there, they have chosen to leave. They are emigrating from the land where they are not

⁹³ Barbería, J. L. (n.d.).

listened to and they do not have opportunities. Despite their attempts to better their lives at home, exit is their best option at this point in time.

In a conversation with a young Spanish friend who has left Spain and now works in London, I told him that I found a job after college. His response was “Oh, because you live in a real country.” His disillusionment with Spain as a whole is clear from this statement. He is so frustrated with the economic, political, and social situation in his home that he does not anymore consider it a “real country”. This disillusionment has resulted in the exit of Spain’s best-educated and brightest young people. Moreover, Spain is not only losing a productive labor force, but also a cohort of citizens with the potential to make positive changes through the political system in the future.

Chapter 4: Conclusion: National Crisis or Functioning European Union Market?

This thesis explicates the factors contributing to the brain drain of Spanish well-educated youth. It concludes that in an EU context, economic forces and political disillusionment encourage intra-European migration. Poor employment prospects within Spain push Spanish youth to look elsewhere for opportunities, and better job prospects in other European countries pull the migrants from Spain. Moreover, there are features of the European Union, like the Schengen Agreement and the emphasis on being multilingual that facilitate the exodus. Additionally, political disillusionment within Spain erodes the sense of national loyalty among youth further promoting emigration. Therefore, a position within the EU, a lack of jobs in Spain, an availability of jobs elsewhere, and a lack of confidence on the part of Spanish youth that the Spanish political system can address these issues, spur the emigration of well-educated youth from Spain. These conclusions demonstrate that within a community as integrated as the European Union, tensions between international markets and national sovereignty are bound to permeate the community.

One such tension is manifested in the word choice to describe the emigration. For Spain the emigration of its well-educated youth is a “national crisis”. The Vice President of the Spanish Labor Commission stated, “estamos experimentando una peligrosa huida de conocimiento que obstaculizará nuestro desarrollo hacia una economía de valor añadido” [we are experiencing a dangerous knowledge escape that will hinder our development of a value-added

economy].⁹⁴ In terms of the Spanish economy the phenomenon is disastrous and constitutes a national crisis. Additionally, Spain's residence within the European Union, and the integrated market strategies of the EU, has left Spain with little control over its domestic economic situation. Not only is the EU influencing the emigration from Spain, it has also tied Spain's hands in terms of dealing with the emigration. Spain is handicapped as a nation by its lack of sovereign power, "the ability to control population movement and borders is one of the key factors defining the nation state and competencies over rights of entry and residence are traditionally one of the primordial powers of government."⁹⁵ The unexpected exodus of Spanish youth represents a national crisis for the Spanish government because it is losing influential citizens and it does not have the capacity to address the emigration of its people.

At the same time, the exodus of the Spanish youth can be seen as a natural extension of increasing labor mobility in the context of greater market integration. If the Spanish youth emigration were only viewed in terms of the supply and demand of labor within the international market, it would not be significant because the Spanish youth emigration is an example of the international market functioning successfully. One EU commissioner "expressed his strong desire to see all labor market restrictions lifted adding: 'Restricting the free movement of workers in Europe is not the answer to high unemployment. What we need to do

⁹⁴ Más de 300.000 jóvenes españoles han emigrado buscando trabajo. (2012, February 1).

⁹⁵ Hatt, H. & Gardner, F. (2002), 116.

is really to focus our efforts on creating new job opportunities.”⁹⁶ From the European Union perspective, the free movement of Spaniards is an accomplishment of the internal market; it exemplifies the European Union market functioning effectively. This free movement of human capital is a success in terms of market economics, yet it is a “dangerous” crisis in the eyes of the Spanish government. The contradiction between the international market functioning successfully and the Spanish brain drain highlights the tension between markets and nations in the European Union.

The tensions that we are seeing within the European Union speak to an age-old debate between neoliberalism and economic nationalism. Theoretical lenses such as neoliberalism and economic nationalism explicate the crisis of international migration within the EU. The argument of the second chapter of this thesis can be defined in neoliberal terms. It makes the argument that economic push and pull factors influence international migration. Migration due to economics strongly supports the neoliberal paradigm because neoliberals believe markets are the defining force in the world order. That being said, this Spanish youth case study also demonstrates that factors other than solely the economic market play a role international migration. The third chapter makes the argument that disillusionment with national politics additionally influences the emigration of Spanish youth. Thus borders have not dissolved in the eyes of Spanish citizens and the nation is an important unit of analysis within the decision to migrate internationally. This argument supports the economic nationalist paradigm that

⁹⁶“Report Shows Overall Positive Impact of Mobility of Bulgarian and Romanian Workers on EU Economy.” (2011, November 11).

promotes the relevance of sovereign states in the world order. These theoretical frameworks demonstrate that even within the European Union, the most integrated market in the world, sovereign nations remain very much relevant. Hence, the tension between the competing forces is a salient issue in the EU. This realization validates both the “national crisis” and the “functioning market” descriptions of the emigration.

The predicament of competing economic and political forces within the European Union is manifested in other arenas beyond the Spanish youth emigration. Frequently condemned for its democratic deficit, the European Union is said to delegate too much responsibility to inaccessible bureaucrats and away from EU citizens. The delegation pushes its governance over the democratic threshold, implying a frustration at the focus of the EU on economics instead of political procedures.⁹⁷ Additionally, Journalist Jack Shenker notes that the Spanish 15-M protests were inspired by European neoliberal economic policies that have transcended national boundaries. He states:

At this moment in history we're seeing a shared sense of deprivation among the young, a shared sense of there being a democracy deficit across the world. In all these places neoliberal economic policies have intensified their hold and affected young people most directly, young people looking for employment and study prospects. I think it has cut young people to the bone, and they're confronting it directly.⁹⁸

Shenker identifies the neoliberal policies as the cause of youth protests. As these criticisms of the EU exemplify, the interconnectedness of international markets

⁹⁷ Dahl, R. (1999), 21.

⁹⁸ Shenker, J. (2011, August 13).

and sovereign nations within the European Union provides a tension within the community.

The European Union sits at the intersection of the neoliberal and nationalist tensions and potentially offers a way of mediating those tensions. Even though the original goal of the Union was to integrate markets, it has the capacity to function as a solution to the collective action problem in international politics. The European Union's role in the emigration of Spanish youth, in terms of the right for free movement of people, exemplifies the mediating function of the European Union. The right for free movement of people reduces the collective action problem because it furthers European integration; it facilitates individual nations to be more competitive internationally, while at the same time allows nations to opt out or decide on a sovereign national basis whether they will implement transition periods. The European Union functions to mitigate the two diverging political ideologies by creating policies that reduce the collective action problem and force European cooperation, but still allow for nations to have individual national identities. This policy exemplifies the European Union's potential to mediate the competing forces and reduce the sense of crisis in Europe. The fact remains that despite the existence of this policy the Spanish brain drain is defined as a crisis, hence the EU could ramp up its mediating behavior.

That being said, Spain remains a relevant institution that is responsible to its citizenry and must act to quell the crisis. The identification of contributing factors to the brain drain enable policy recommendations to stop the exodus. This conclusion determines that economics in an EU context and national politics are

the dually important contributing factors. Spain cannot change the economic pull of other job opportunities, but by creating jobs within Spain that reflect the caliber of education of its youth Spain can stop the push of its citizens. Furthermore, Spain can control its national political environment. If it concentrates on retaining democratic participation of the youth, and the politicians successfully address issues that are important to Spanish youth, the youth may remain loyal to Spain. Although it is easy for the Spanish government to overlook “la generación ni ni” and their protests movements, they represent a fissure in Spanish democracy that the state of Spain must address. By doing do those young people who will become the future of the country, may choose to return to their home.

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