The EU Budget's Impact on Public Opinion

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THE EU BUDGET'S IMPACT ON PUBLIC OPINION

KAI STERN
University of Washington

Abstract
Public opinion on the European Union (EU) is significant and therefore a worthwhile topic of consideration. Analyses have identified and ordered the factors that impact public opinion on the EU, as well analyzed the efficacy of EU funds. Yet the confluence of these two lines of inquiry is understudied. Some Member States have surpluses and others deficits relative to the EU budget, which could impact citizens’ perceptions of the EU. To gauge this potential relationship, this article notes deficit and surplus Member States and responses to one Eurobarometer question about trust in the European Commission from 2000-2013. These variables are used to evaluate the EU budget’s impact on public opinion towards the EU. The data suggest that there is a limited correlation between the two. EU funds are overshadowed as a cause of public opinion formation on the EU by other forces, but can still influence it at the margins.

Keywords
European Commission, European Union budget, political trust, public opinion
INTRODUCTION

Public opinion on the European Union (EU) is highly consequential. It can have a significant impact on politics and policy in the EU. Attitudes towards European integration as an idea or the EU as an institution have manifested themselves in a spectacular fashion through national referenda on EU membership and treaties. They do so in more quotidian modes through regional, national, and supranational elections and public consultation with government institutions. The EU as an institution is dependent on maintaining some level of public support and legitimization.

The importance of public opinion’s impact on EU politics and policymaking means that understanding how public attitudes towards the EU are formed and why they change is a vital topic of consideration. Hypothesizing about the reasons behind individuals’ attitudes towards the EU has tended to center on either identity related or utilitarian rationales. Most analyses in the latter category have focused on the broader economic implications of the EU, seeing the EU as primarily economic in nature and theorizing that the distributional consequences of integration have a strong causative impact on individual attitudes towards the EU. Yet, the specific impact of the EU budget has been only marginally analyzed, despite its attractions. The direct pecuniary mechanisms available to the EU are restricted to its budget. Furthermore, unlike the more nebulous benefits proceeding from the common market, the EU budget has a tangible and traceable quality. Individuals can see the impact of and may be subsidized by programs financed by the EU budget, such as those targeting regional development. Whether the EU can influence public attitudes through budgetary allocations is consequential to the extent that the EU may utilize such mechanisms to enhance its legitimacy. Thus, an understanding of the extent to which the EU budget affects public opinion towards the EU is politically as well as academically important. Using public opinion and budgetary data derived from the Standard Eurobarometer surveys and the European Commission, this analysis argues that national surpluses or deficits relative to the EU budget have a small but present impact on public opinion towards the EU if there are no other strong economic factors such as recessions.

This article will proceed by reviewing the relevant literature on public opinion on the EU. Its strengths and weaknesses will be explored. It will then introduce its own empirical contribution based on the underexplored gaps in the literature. The research design and methodology will be discussed, followed by an analysis of the data. It will conclude by assessing the implications of the findings for current academic debates and future policymaking.

PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

There are a variety of hypothesized variables impacting individual opinion on the EU, generally specified as European integration. In an extensive analysis of the relative validity of each of these explanations, Gabel (1998) identifies five different theoretical approaches. These are: cognitive mobilization, political values, utilitarian appraisals of integrative policy, class partisanship, and support for national government (Gabel, 1998). Each of these variables has been argued to significantly structure individual attitudes to the EU. Yet, cognitive mobilization and political values, which can be subsumed under the classification of identity-related rationales, and utilitarian theory have proved most enduring (Gabel, 1998; Hooghe and Marks, 2004; Garry and Tilley, 2009).
Identity-related issues are argued to be highly consequential for individual opinion formation and change. Hooghe and Marks (2004) claim that, “citizens do indeed take into account the economic consequences of European integration, but conceptions of group membership appear to be more powerful” (p. 415). An individuals’ identity structures the modes by which they then formulate opinions on the EU (Hooghe and Marks, 2005). Additional integration may have increased the salience of identity-related concerns by highlighting the possibility of social-policy harmonization (Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007). National identity is clearly very much a part of individual opinion formation and change.

Yet utilitarian appraisals should not be dismissed as less relevant or impactful. The idea that individual opinion on the EU is most affected by utilitarian appraisals has been both theoretically enduring and empirically successful. Various economic ramifications of EU integration have been shown in multiple analyses to be highly correlated with public opinion on the EU (Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993; Anderson and Reichert, 1996; Gabel, 1998; Verhaegen, Hooghe, and Quintelier, 2014). Indeed, Gabel (1998) discovered that economic considerations were more impactful than any other posited variables and that “the utilitarian theory provides a robust explanation for variation in support for integration” (p. 350-351). Identity was found to be much less important (Gabel, 1998; McLaren, 2004). More recently, Garry and Tilley (2009) argue that identity is a function of and conditioned by utilitarian appraisals. Economic concerns are still very much a valid independent variable affecting public opinion.

Utilitarian appraisals are rationalized by the institutional logic and structure of the EU. EU membership results in direct and indirect economic costs and benefits (Anderson & Reichert 1996, p. 233). Directly, as has been noted, the EU budget redistributes money amongst Member States and allocates funds to specific causes and individuals. Indirectly, it can offer increased “trade with EU members [and] opportunities for professional mobility” (Anderson & Reichert, 1996, p. 233). With regard to individual opinion formation, these benefits can either take the form of advantages for the nation to which the individual belongs or personal perquisites. Individuals’ “differences in economic welfare shape their attitudes toward integration . . . [so] that citizens’ support for integration is positively related to their welfare gains from integrative policy” (Gabel, 1998, p. 336). Thus, individuals are driven by pecuniary concerns for themselves or their country and formulate opinions based on these facts.

Common to most scholarly work on individual attitudes towards the EU has been the operationalized dependent variable. Previous studies have utilized one question from the Eurobarometer surveys: “generally speaking, do you think (your country’s) membership in the Community is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?” (Anderson & Reichart, 1996, p. 239; Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993, p. 518; Gabel & Whitten, 1997, p. 86). In doing so, they have hypothesized relationships between numerous independent variables and public opinion on EU membership more generally. They have usually done so in order to investigate the causes of public-opinion formation and change on European integration (Anderson & Reichert, 1996; Gabel, 1998; Garry & Tilley, 2009). The use of this question as the dependent variable is open to several critiques. It is extremely general to query individuals on their feelings towards group membership in a relatively nebulous organization. Individuals’ attitudes towards the specific institutions comprising the EU are therefore muddled. Only a few analyses have corrected for this by focusing on the
EU as an institution (Harteveld, van der Meer, & De Vries, 2013). An individual with strong conceptions about democratic representation might have a positive image of the European Parliament and its national government, as elected bodies, but a negative one of the bureaucratic European Commission. Furthermore, with regards to the EU budget, the European Commission is heavily involved in its distribution, in contrast to institutions directly representative of the Member States, such as the Council of the European Union. Rather than associating EU funds with a generalized notion of national membership in the EU, individuals might instead connect them—and the derivative budgetary surpluses and deficits—with the institution responsible for them. Previous analyses of individual attitudes towards the EU would thus benefit from corroboration with more specific causal and impacted variables.

THE EFFICACY OF EU FUNDS

Scholarly work on the EU budget represents another distinct subfield of EU politics. Analyses of the budget have generally taken the form of evaluations to determine the efficacy of the EU budget in the fulfillment of programmatic goals. The structure and objectives of the EU budget have meant that most of these have assessed the economic ramifications of EU funds, attempting to discover their impact on variables such as growth and regional convergence, either generally or in specific economic sectors. Only when programs are socially oriented have scholars analyzed their noneconomic impacts (Mitchell, 2015).

Analyses focusing on the efficacy of EU funds have typically taken the form of assessments of funds’ economic impacts and have generally focused on cohesion policy and structural funds. The results of these investigations have been strikingly inconclusive. It has been argued that “EU regional support through the structural fund has a significant and positive impact on the growth performance on European regions and, hence, contributes to greater equality in productivity and income in Europe,” thereby fulfilling its programmatic goal of cohesion (Cappelen, Castellacci, Fagerberg, & Verspagen, 2003, p. 640). Others have concluded that there is some association between EU funds and cross-national convergence targets (Barry, 2003). Katsaitis and Doulos (2009) nuance this view, noting that national institutional quality significantly impacted the economic ramifications of EU structural funds. While “for countries with high quality institutions [structural funds] have a positive impact on FDI . . . for countries with low quality institutions the impact can be negative” (Katsaitis & Doulos, 2009, p. 573). This corroborates earlier research suggesting that the EU funds’ efficacy is conditional on national institutional quality (Ederveen, de Groot, & Nahuis, 2006). Other reports have also been critical of the degree to which cohesion policy has successfully achieved its goals (Boldrin & Canova, 2001). This broad variation demonstrates that the verdict is still out on the economic successes engendered by EU funds, a proxy for their general value.

Certain EU-funded programs lend themselves to analyses of social ramifications. One example is the academic debate about the impact of the Erasmus program, a transnational exchange arrangement for students (Mitchell, 2015; Van Mol, 2013). Here the focus has been on assessing whether the introduction of young persons to other cultural environments promotes the creation and development of a European identity (Mitchell, 2015; Sigalas, 2010). Some scholars have concluded that the program has mixed social effects (Sigalas, 2010). By contrast, others argue that “Erasmus students’ identities do change over
the course of their sojourn” (Mitchell, 2015, p. 345). In contrast to pecuniary enhancements, the social impacts of EU programs are less studied, although here too their relative effects are inconclusive.

In being limited to wide-ranging but inconclusive studies of economic-value added generated by EU funds and narrow programmatic evaluations of societal implications, alternative metrics for evaluating the efficacy of EU funds have generally been ignored. For instance, if the allocation of EU funds is positively correlated with a more positive image of or greater trust in European institutions, EU funds could still be considered worthwhile. No scholarly work has been dedicated to the elucidation of this relationship and the most related analyses have instead been subsumed under the broader literature of individual attitudes towards European integration (Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993). The literature on EU funds would benefit from additional research on EU funds’ social implications and alternate means of assessing their value.

**DATA AND METHODOLOGY**

This analysis seeks to offer some redress for the previously elucidated weaknesses in prior work on both individual attitudes towards the EU and the EU budget. It focuses specifically on identifying the impact of EU funds on public-opinion formation and change with regards to the EU as an institution. To do so, it analyzes the differences in individual trust in the European Commission in Member States with surpluses and deficits relative to the EU budget from 2000-2013, drawing on data from the European Commission and the Standard Eurobarometer surveys.

The EU budget should have an impact on individual attitudes towards the EU. Although the indirect benefits associated with EU membership might outweigh those derived from the EU budget, they are more nebulous. It is difficult enough for individuals to locate responsibility for decisions with tangible implications, let alone those that operate through a series of interrelated and contingent mechanisms. By contrast, the EU budget is a much simpler and more comprehensible system for understanding the costs and benefits of EU membership. Directly, the EU funds numerous causes through its budgetary allocations. It enables the existence of a variety of programs whose goals range from agricultural subsidization to the creation of regional transportation networks. The types of projects funded by the EU ensure that its budget can have an impact despite its comparatively small size. The European Commission emphasizes that “EU and national budgets serve different, yet complementary purposes. The EU budget targets areas where EU money can generate added value” (European Commission, 2015). Importantly, it does not spend any money on national prerogatives such as defense or social security (European Commission, 2015). By subsidizing areas such as the agricultural industry, where it has assumed many of the roles of the national governments, the EU has an impact greater than a mere comparison of budgetary size might suggest.

The EU budget affects Member States in a differential fashion. Member States’ relationship with the EU budget can be broadly characterized into those with a surplus and those with a deficit relative to it. Some Member States contribute more to the budget than they receive and thus can be seen to subsidize the EU. Others receive much more than they contribute and consequently are subsidized by the budget. These deficits and surpluses can be quite significant: In 2013, Sweden operated on a deficit equal to .51%
of gross national income (GNI), while Hungary operated on a surplus equal to 5.33% of GNI (EUR-Lex, 2014). Member States that pay into the budget more than they receive from it are subsidizing programs whose benefits do not accrue directly to them. The EU is much more heterogeneous than other polities that redistribute funds through federal fiscal transfers, such as Germany and the United States. EU citizens do not generally share similar historical backgrounds, ethnic traditions, or languages. Individuals should be unlikely to appreciate the use of their country’s tax revenues in the subsidization of other countries. That individuals’ perceptions of national economic performance impact their opinions is an accepted regularity in the social sciences. Within the context of the United States, the most enduring “individual-level evidence for economic voting . . . has come from questions that ask respondents about general business conditions or the country’s ‘economic situation’” (Duch, 2007, p. 811). In the European context, “support for the EC is indeed related to national economic conditions,” although here “citizen support for European integration is influenced by a combination of domestic and international factors” (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993, p. 521, 528). That individuals’ perceptions of their country’s welfare relative to the EU budget would affect their attitudes towards the EU is therefore a reasonable assumption. Insofar as citizens are aware of the fiscal transfer inherent in the EU budget, their attitudes towards the EU should be affected. Citizens of countries that benefit in the aggregate from EU funds should have a more positive image of EU institutions than those that subsidize EU programs. In other words, public opinion on the EU should vary in accordance with their countries’ operating budgetary balance in dealings with the EU. Higher relative surpluses should be associated with more positive opinions and greater relative deficits with negative ones.

The European Commission is a reasonable choice to analyze the impact of EU budgetary allocations. Of all the EU institutions, the European Commission is the most involved in the management and implementation of the budget. Although “some 76% of the budget is spent under what is known as ‘shared management,’ with individual EU countries actually distributing funds and managing expenditure,” the European Commission is still the most appropriate actor to analyze (European Commission, 2015). It manages 22% of EU funds directly and “ultimate responsibility for implementing the budget lies with the European Commission” (European Commission, 2015). Discursively, the budget is labeled as the EU budget, not that of individual Member States. Individuals should therefore be more likely to associate the EU budget with either the EU as a general institution or with the European Commission.

EU expenditures are coded using financial data provided by the European Commission. Details of the 2000-2006, 2007-2013, and 2014-2020 budgetary cycles are readily available (EUR-Lex, 2014). From this information, a comprehensive picture of the income and expenditure of the EU can be reconstructed. The net operating surplus or deficit as a percentage of GNI of each Member State is recorded. Thus, the relative amount that each Member State either subsidizes or gains from membership in the EU is readily available. In order to gauge the impact of Member States’ surpluses and deficits on public opinion towards the European Commission, Member States are divided into those with surpluses and those with deficits relative to the EU budget. These placements are performed on a yearly basis. Although this resulted in some idiosyncratic dispositions (for example, the United Kingdom is among the surplus countries for 2001) it is the most intuitive method by
which to divide the Member States. Only Member States that had been part of the EU for the whole year are considered. Thus, the countries that acceded during the 2004 enlargement are not incorporated until 2005 because they had not officially received membership until May first. By contrast, Bulgaria and Romania, which entered on January 1, 2007, are considered Member States for the 2007 analysis.

The mean responses of individuals in surplus and deficit Member States to a single Eurobarometer query are then computed, along with their population standard deviations. This question inquired: “For each of the following European bodies, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it. The European Commission.” (European Commission, 2014). It has been asked in every standard Eurobarometer public-opinion survey during the period covered by this study. The standard Eurobarometer surveys are carried out by national institutes but coordinated by the European Commission (European Commission, 2014). Interviews are conducted with approximately 1,000 people selected as a representative sample of the population aged fifteen years and older in each Member State (European Commission, 2014). Data generated by Eurobarometer public-opinion surveys are often used in the scholarly literature and form a reliable source of information with extensive temporal comparability (Hooghe & Marks, 2005). Other scholars have instead used the European Social Survey, but this data source is not as extensive for the purposes of this project (Kumlin, 2009). Only the responses “tend to trust” and “tend not to trust” are recorded. Since the response “don’t know” can either denote indifference or a lack of knowledge, it would be inappropriate to include it. The standard deviations used mean scores of individual countries as single data points, rather than every response in both the spring and autumn Eurobarometer surveys. This slightly reduces the size of the standard deviations. In the interests of time, the standard errors were calculated using the computed standard deviations. The point of the standard deviations and standard errors is to demonstrate the relative strength of the association between a country’s budgetary relationship with the EU and individual opinion within that country. Therefore, computing them based on annual country response makes sense.

RESULTS

The analysis demonstrates a weak but present correlation between Member States’ surpluses and deficits relative to the EU budget and individuals’ trust in the European Commission. Individuals in Member States with a surplus relative to the EU budget are generally more likely to say that they trust the European Commission and less likely to say that they do not trust it than those in Member States with a deficit. This holds true from 2000 to 2010 among respondents who said they tend to trust the European Commission and from 2000 to 2012 among those who said they tend not to trust it. The timing of the disruption of the relationship suggests that the EU budget impacts public opinion during times of economic growth and does not hold when disturbed by more powerful events such as recessions.

° See the tables at the end of this article.
Respondents in Member States with a surplus who tended to trust the European Commission were more likely to do so by more than one standard deviation\(^2\) in 2000, 2002-2004, and 2006, and by nearly one standard deviation in 2005. Individuals in Member States with a surplus who tended not to trust the European Commission were less likely to do so by more than two standard deviations in 2003-2006, by almost two standard deviations in 2002, by more than one standard deviation in 2000, 2007, and 2008, and by almost one standard deviation in 2001. The relatively strong relationship between individuals in Member States with a surplus and greater levels of trust and lesser levels of distrust in the European Commission only starts to break down after 2007-2008. At the same time, time standard deviations start to increase, from a minimum of 2.63 in 2003 and a relatively low 5.45 in 2008 to 12.34 by 2013 in the case of those that tended to trust the European Commission. For those that tended not to trust the European Commission, the standard deviations increased from a minimum of 3.75 in 2003 and a relatively low 5.51 in 2008 to a high of 16.4 in 2013. This could be symptomatic of the impact of economic recession, whose effects on GNI are much greater than the EU budget. This seems particularly likely given the increase in standard deviation. Levels of trust in Greece and Spain plummeted after the recession, just as levels of distrust soared. Changes and differences in standard errors are somewhat more pronounced.

The conclusiveness of these results is questionable. As with all analyses, particularly those dealing with complex phenomena, there are many possible independent variables that may be impactful. Furthermore, these may be causative at different strengths and in varying combinations. This test of the relationship between public trust in the European Commission and citizenship in Member States with surpluses and deficits relative to the EU budget is certainly a simple one. Many more omitted and intervening variables would need to be tested for the described relationships to become truly convincing. Nevertheless, the data do demonstrate a certain degree of correlation. While small relative to larger economic trends, such as a recession, it exerts some influence in economic equilibrium.

**IMPLICATIONS**

The results of this analysis possess important implications for the literatures on individual opinion on the EU, the efficacy of EU funds, and the attribution of accountability within the EU. It has clearly demonstrated that the distribution of EU funds on a national level has some impact on individual opinion about the European Commission. This contradicts two earlier sets of findings. Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) argue “that the net return from the EC budget has virtually no impact on citizen support for the community” (p. 525). On the contrary, there is some impact, at least on individual trust in the responsible agency. The conclusions of Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) were corroborated by a more specific assessment of the impact of budgetary allocations on recipient groups, when being involved in an economic sector subsidized by the EU was found to be uncorrelated with individual opinion (Anderson & Reichart, 1996). However, this assumes that individuals formulate their opinions based on their personal economic situation. As has been discussed, perceptions of the performance of the national economy are more likely to influence public-opinion formation (Duch, 2007, p. 811; Maravall, 2007, p. 916). Therefore, farmers

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\(^2\) The standard deviations cited here are all based on the responses of Member States with surpluses.
might not incorporate their personal subsidization by the EU as much as their country’s subsidization of or by the EU. Individuals’ trust in the European Commission is affected by national welfare gains from the EU budget.

If individuals’ perceptions of the European Commission are shaped by their country’s budgetary relationship with the EU, then they are capable of attributing supranational budgetary responsibility. That individuals’ trust in the European Commission correlates to whether their Member State has a surplus or deficit relative to the EU budget suggests that they can ascribe responsibility to specific institutions. Rather than merely relating budgetary allocations to the EU as a general concept, they do so to the specific body charged with their disbursement. This has the potential to inform the literature on the attribution of blame within the EU and other multilevel governance structures more generally. It may be more significant as this is a new and developing field (Hobolt & Tilley, 2014a; Hobolt & Tilley, 2014b). In the first comprehensive study of citizens’ attribution of responsibility in the EU, Hobolt & Tilley (2014b) argue that “European citizens appear capable of making distinctions in terms of what different levels of governments do” (p. 809). The results of this analysis lend credence to their position, strengthening the hypothesis that individuals are capable of successful attributing policy outcomes to the bodies responsible for their construction.

This analysis also re-emphasizes an overlooked metric for the evaluation of EU funds. Previous work has emphasized the economic or social impacts of EU funds in a narrow mode (Bachtler & Gorzelak, 2007; Mitchell, 2015). Only in a tangential and program-specific fashion, or as part of larger studies incorporating independent variables beyond EU funds have scholars explored the relationship between budgetary dynamics and institutional legitimacy (Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993; Van Mol, 2013). EU funds could be considered worthwhile if they contribute to the legitimacy of either associated institutions or the organization in general, which it appears they might.

This is certainly the most significant policy implication to be drawn from this analysis. The redistribution undertaken by the EU budget is correlated with individuals’ opinion of the EU. This should inject an additional note of caution into the debt negotiations currently underway with Greece as well as with the broader policy of national bailouts. It should also temper optimism about the success of integrating policies that would require further redistribution. At the same time, it offers a potentially encouraging conclusion. Once European economies return to states of growth, EU funds could offer a limited means of reconstructing public trust in the EU.

**Conclusion**

Individual opinion on the EU, operating at the aggregate level, is consequential. Citizens regularly indicate their preferences through formal and informal channels by voting and participating in social organizations. More generally, the legitimacy of the EU as a polity is dependent on the maintenance of a plural permissive consensus, if not on active popular support. What causes individual opinions about the EU and European integration to form and change is therefore a highly developed and impactful field of study. Despite the differentiation between advocates of identity and utilitarian rationales, most analyses have focused on support for membership within the EU as a proxy for European integration, against which they have tested a barrage of hypothesized independent variables. In doing
so, they have often overlooked a secondary dependent variable: support for the EU as an institution. This study hypothesizes that this variable, operationalized by individual trust in the European Commission, should be correlated with Member States’ surpluses or deficits relative to the EU budget. It discovered that such a relationship exists to a restricted degree in times of economic growth but has been disrupted by the recent recession.

Besides the literature on individual attitudes towards the EU, this conclusion has implications for future scholarship on EU funds and accountability. It offers a different metric for evaluating the impact, and thus the value of EU funds, which have previously been viewed narrowly in economic terms, except where programs were social in nature. It also corroborates the conclusions of those researching the attribution of responsibility within the EU that citizens are capable to some degree of correctly associating institutions with programs.

**TABLES**

Question relevant for Table 1 and Table 2: “For each of the following European bodies, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it. The European Commission.” (European Commission, 2014).

**Table 1: Respondents who “Tend to Trust” the European Commission**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Responses of Member States’ with surpluses (standard deviation/standard error)</th>
<th>Responses of Member States’ with deficits (standard deviation/standard error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>41.44 (12.34/3.09)</td>
<td>44.05 (11.38/3.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>43.87 (10.52/2.71)</td>
<td>44.92 (11.27/2.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>44.19 (7.84/1.96)</td>
<td>44.82 (12.34/3.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>51.47 (8.02/2.01)</td>
<td>49.73 (11.84/3.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>52.61 (6.46/1.73)</td>
<td>49.35 (10.06/2.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>53.93 (5.45/1.41)</td>
<td>50.25 (10.56/3.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>57.8 (6.32/1.63)</td>
<td>52.54 (9.89/2.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>56.61 (6.46/1.73)</td>
<td>49.73 (9.86/2.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>54.12 (5.39/1.67)</td>
<td>48.64 (9.93/2.99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>59.75 (3.29/1.65)</td>
<td>52.27 (10.15/3.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>57.88 (2.63/1.32)</td>
<td>50.55 (9.74/2.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>57.25 (3.44/1.72)</td>
<td>52.09 (10.48/3.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>51.2 (11.16/4.99)</td>
<td>45.95 (10.17/2.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>54.42 (7.19/2.94)</td>
<td>44.5 (11.12/3.7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** European Commission (2014).
### Table 2: Respondents who “Tend not to trust” the European Commission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Trend not to Trust</th>
<th>Trust</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>43.63 (16.4/4.1)</td>
<td>41.27 (7.79/2.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>39.4 (14.65/3.78)</td>
<td>40.33 (9.69/2.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>35.19 (11.47/2.87)</td>
<td>37.32 (8.72/2.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>30 (10.31/2.58)</td>
<td>34.5 (9.35/2.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>27.07 (8.93/2.58)</td>
<td>31.52 (7.91/2.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>21.3 (5.51/1.42)</td>
<td>30.54 (7.01/2.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>19.93 (6.57/1.7)</td>
<td>29.42 (6.54/1.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>20.39 (5.47/1.46)</td>
<td>31.96 (6.72/2.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>22.43 (5.5/1.59)</td>
<td>34.27 (6.49/1.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>18.38 (4.3/2.15)</td>
<td>29.59 (5.92/1.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>19.75 (3.75/1.88)</td>
<td>28.86 (6.72/2.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>17.38 (4.51/2.56)</td>
<td>26.36 (7.15/2.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>21.2 (7.93/3.55)</td>
<td>28.45 (8.12/2.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>22.83 (12.02/4.91)</td>
<td>35.56 (6.33/2.11)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** European Commission (2014).

### Table 3: Member States’ Relationship with the EU Budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Member States with surpluses</th>
<th>Member States with deficits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia</td>
<td>Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia</td>
<td>Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia</td>
<td>Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia</td>
<td>Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia</td>
<td>Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia</td>
<td>Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2007 | Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia | Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom |
2006 | Czech Republic, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia | Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom |
2005 | Czech Republic, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia | Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom |
2004 | Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal | Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom |
2003 | Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal | Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom |
2002 | Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal | Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom |
2001 | Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal, United Kingdom | Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Sweden |
2000 | Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal | Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom |

**Source:** EUR-Lex (2014).

**ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

The author would like to thank Mark A. Smith, in whose course the idea for this article was developed, and Christine Ingebritsen, who acted as the article’s affiliated faculty member.

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