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Failed-State Operational Environment Concepts

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In the September-October 1996 issue of Military Review, retired Army Lieutenant Colonel John B. Hunt provides many crucial contributions to the debate surrounding failed-state operations known as operations other than war (OOTW) and stability and support operations (SASO). Given Hunt's former position in the Corps and Division Doctrine Directorate, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, he offers an in-sider's perspective on recent SASO doctrine history and current SASO doctrine status. His synopsis of the April 1996 draft of US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-20, Stability and Support Operations, which for the first time in doctrine addresses peace-enforcement execution, ethnic conflict and failed states, is of particular value.

Hunt corrects the factual error in my November-December 1995 Military Review article that describes contingency operations as "an early forerunner of OOTW" and points out serious Army shortcomings in OOTW/SASO concept and doctrine development, which I had not realized existed. Hunt also provides three important insights on which I wish to comment, conceptually expand and, when necessary, repostulate as a means to further promote Army doctrinal development for operations that occur in failed states.

Failed-State Operational Environment

The first of Hunt's insights concerns the Army's basic conceptual approach to OOTW/SASO or what I term "non-Western warfare." Hunt states, "Over the years, the Army has entertained many ideas about 'not war-not peace' situations." Later he says, "The term's major fault is that it obscures OOTW's warlike aspects, the 'not war-not peace' situations that FM 100-5, Operations, refers to as 'conflict'." He also mentions that "We must name 'not war-not peace' situations, but what the name should be is unimportant." These sentences' significance is the focus on the "not war-not peace" environmental concept as an organizational premise.

The Army continues to view failed-state operations as existing in the "not war-not peace" environment. We have made progress in recognizing that some OOTW missions are forms of warfare and not conflict. However, Hunt's approach to SASO as the warlike aspect of the "not war-not peace" environment is still conceptually flawed. When I described non-Western warfare in my article, I did not mean it was the warlike aspect of the "not war-not peace" concept-only that it was a form of war. Hunt could not know this because I did not propose an alternative conceptual model to the range of military operations in the theater-strategic environment-only that one was needed.

Hunt's reliance on the "not war-not peace" concept suggests why Army doctrine writers have not yet been able to properly define OOTW or develop a satisfactory model. In my article, I state that "because current US Army doctrine is so bound to Clausewitzian thought, many doctrinal questions... must be reexamined." The Army has failed to do so in regard to its conceptual approach to SASO because it is institutionally constrained by Clausewitzian thinking.
To help the Army redefine operations in failed states, I propose a new politico-military model. This operational environment model would be composed of a four-cell matrix that would include "war and crime," "war," "crime" and "peace." Three of the cells - war, crime and peace - would pertain to traditional Clausewitzian issues; the fourth - war and crime - would pertain to an emergent neo-Clausewitzian one. To extrapolate the model, we begin with the condition of war. This environment is one of "military issues" that occur between nation-states. It defines the rationale behind US Army operations, as stated in the June 1993 FM 100-5, that after war breaks out, seeks to achieve decisive victory against military forces of belligerent nation-states or their coalitions.

Peace is the domain of "diplomatic issues" between nation-states. Treaties and arms control as well as maintaining a strong army are central to this environment because, when integrated into a national security strategy, they help deter war.

A state of political tension could be said to exist on the borderline between the war and peace environments as defined by the Cold War. This transitional environment was imprecisely conceptualized in the two figures critiqued in my 1995 Military Review article. Fluctuating levels of political tension accurately describe the Cold War, which can be "characterized by war-related activities conducted in the political situation of peace time" and which came to dominate Army thinking. However, this logic falters when categorizing Cold War tension as "conflict," then applying it to OOTW.

Crime is the last Clausewitzian cell. This is the focus of "law-enforcement issues" and principally occurs within nation-states, although it can sometimes be transnational as in the case of cross-border drug smuggling. This cell also includes nonviolent forms of nontraditional missions, such as disaster relief and humanitarian aid that occasionally occur in a stable nation-state.

While the Army has occasionally assisted in domestic situations to suppress civil unrest, as in the 1991 Los Angeles riots, crime is a virtually overlooked environment in Army doctrinal thinking. This is an outcome of Posse Comitatus, which constrains the US Army, except under congressional mandate, from engaging in domestic law-enforcement issues. These operations do not fit into the Clausewitzian war and peace continuum that involves the military forces of other nation-states.

The last cell in the model concerns failed states. This "war and crime" environment represents a nation-state where the governmental system has broken down and there is no rule of law. This environment encompasses challenges within a state to its government by domestic- and foreign-based nongovernment organizations. Chaos and anarchy rather than peace reflect an "anti" Hobbesian order of human association. Thomas Hobbes insisted that the first requirement of political and moral institutions is that they should provide citizens with security.

Rather than reflecting a "not war-not peace" situation, this failed-state environment is based on a blurring of crime and war-a "not war-not crime" situation now occurring throughout the world. In this operational environment, US Army forces face neither other legitimate soldiers fielded by nation-states nor typical criminals generally found on US streets. Instead, they face criminal-soldiers representing nonstate entities such as clans, local militias, mercenary forces, private armies, corporations, guerrillas and drug cartels.

Such a reality is utterly alien to a Clausewitzian-based US Army. In the words of US Army Reserve Lieutenant Colonel Michael H. Hoffman, in "War, Peace, and Interventional Armed Conflict: Solving the Peace Enforcer's Paradox," Parameters, Winter 1995-1996, it represents "the peace enforcer's
paradox." The implications of this emerging warfare form are cause for great concern. We are witnessing nation-states' breakdown in many regions of the non-Western world. In its absence, "societal warfare" is taking place between competing nonstate entities, often between the "haves" and the "have nots." The potential for such strife someday occurring domestically is not lost on military and academic scholars.

While this model represents the antithesis of the US Army's traditional Clausewitzian role, I argue that it more accurately reflects our radically changing world. Because of the unique operational environment failed states pose, a "capability gap" now exists that our domestic law-enforcement and military services do not address. Police officers train to fight crime and soldiers train to wage war, but there is no public institution to effectively operate in the "not war-not crime" environment found in failed states.

**Breaking the Bond**

The second insight Hunt provides concerns "what OOTW really is." He says, "OOTW's chief approach to war is the incorporation of political strategy. OOTW does not seek to defeat enemy military forces by head-on combat. Instead, it turns their power against them, undermines their political support and destroys their morale and discipline." This observation is one of Hunt's most significant. The question of what form of warfare Western peacekeeping and enforcement forces are up against is crucial. However, Hunt falls short in his OOTW analysis because he did not fully articulate his estimation of the security environment US forces now face.

I agree that the basis of what he calls "conflict-related OOTW" can be conceptually drawn to "the political-military struggle used by Vietnam's communist forces." Yet, that basis has since drastically mutated. We no longer solely face nationalistic movements (communist-influenced or otherwise) intent on changing their nation's government. Instead global societal- and criminal-based warfare that pits ethnic, clan, religious and organized crime groups against one another and their indigenous country's legitimate government continues to flourish. Such endemic intrastate warfare that nonstate actors wage represents a qualitatively different reality than the earlier political struggles that the communist Vietnamese and other communist or communist-supported revolutionaries waged.

Understanding the nature of non-Western warfare is also important. From the opposition's perspective, one can argue that non-Western warfare's effect is to undermine Western society's cohesion with which the nonstate force is in conflict. Hunt fully agrees that non-Western warfare is currently incapable of destroying the US material capacity to fight. US Armed Forces were not physically defeated on the battlefield in Vietnam, Lebanon or Somalia. Yet US Armed Forces lost each of these engagements because public opinion turned against government policy. Once this bond between the people and the government was broken, our nation-state was both politically and socially defeated by a nonstate force; a communist-backed, nationalistic movement; an Islamic terrorist organization; and a local warlord.

Based on this logic, we can see that non-Western warfare seeks to affect the nation-state "target set" differently than the Western conduct of war. Our military's target set is composed of the elements that constitute the Clausewitzian trinity - military, government and people.

The US Army is great at destroying things, killing opposing soldiers and seizing terrain. Attrition, annihilation and maneuver are all too familiar concepts. The aspect of the nation-state target set that nonstate forces seek to attack has nothing to do with destroying material things and killing people. Those who are killed-the 241 Marines in Beirut, 18 Rangers in Mogadishu or even the 167 US citizens in Oklahoma City - are not these attacks' primary target. Instead, they provide the means to target the bonds that hold together our nation's Clausewitzian trinity. The effects such terror attacks generate actually
break the bonds themselves. This produces ominous implications: the battlefield is no longer confined to
the geographic region in which an overseas operation takes place but, instead, now extends back to our
homeland. This aspect of the "CNN effect" can be easily recognized.

What is also unique about the relationship targeting of the Western nation-state by nonstate forces is
that it cannot be placed within the Clausewitzian cells of the Failed-State Operational Environment
Model. Rather, it represents an attribute of the neo-Clausewitzian war and crime cell. There is no other
way that terrorism-defined by the US government as a criminal act and by scholars as a non-Western
operational concept-can be considered. Terrorism directed against US military forces is responsible for
our nation's inability to successfully engage in failed-state operations. From a relationship targeting
perspective, the bombings of the Marine barracks in Beirut and the Federal building in Oklahoma City
are conceptually no different.

Fourth Epoch Transition

The last of Hunt's insights pertains to his perspectives on "future war." I take issue with his direct
references to future warfare based on Alvin and Heidi Toffler's "Third Wave Warfare." The Tofflers base
their concept on "waves" or war forms that have no actual basis in Western history. Because of this and
other serious problems with their concepts, I seriously question their credibility as respected military
theorists. As futurists, they accurately portray the fundamental importance information will have on
21st-century operations. For example, while terrorism itself is information-driven, this alone does not
signify the Tofflers understand warfighting's future strategic context.

Rather, future security environments will be more in line with the writings of Brian Jenkins, Martin van
Creveld, Ralph Peters, Robert Kaplan, William Lind, Samuel Huntington and Charles Dunlap Jr. I argue
that we are in a transition to a fourth, or postmodern, epoch in Western civilization that will be of the
same magnitude as the two earlier "revolutions in political and military affairs." The first, from 378 to
732, witnessed the classical world's demise and the medieval world's birth. The second, from 1346 to
1648, saw the medieval world's fall and the modern world's emergence. Today we can similarly expect
the failure of the dominant state form, a blurring of crime and war, the rise of the nonstate soldier, the
emergence of competing war-making entities, the development of a new form of battlespace, the fielding
of qualitatively advanced technology, a shift in economic and social structures and, ultimately, the
appearance of a new energy foundation and state form. During these transitions, war will become less
about struggles between the dominant polity form and its coalitions and more about what social and
political form will take its place.

What we have witnessed so far is an early stage in the fourth-epoch transition-the breakdown of the
Western nation-state model in many world regions. As a result, the US Army has been increasingly
tasked to stabilize and support failed states, much as a medical trauma team would treat a patient. Instead
of asking our soldiers to fight and win our nation's wars, we now ask them to engage in intrastate
operations to stop the spread of internal anarchy to other still-viable nation-states. For example, the
rationale behind the Bosnia operation is to ensure the Balkans' stability so NATO allies' homelands will
not eventually be threatened.

While the institutional US Army loathes this type mission, such will become increasingly important. For
instance, one reality facing us is that drug cartels are "Colombianizing" Mexico. There is rampant
corruption in the Mexican government and law-enforcement agencies. Now, the cartels are undermining
the Mexican military, which has been tasked to engage in the drug war. The cartels are also bringing
their "not war-not crime" operational environment to the US southern border.
With tens of billions of dollars in economic might and well-armed private armies composed of criminal-soldiers at their disposal, such ruthless free corporations represent an emergent war-making entity. The cartels are actively challenging the modern nation-state's legitimacy in Colombia and now Mexico, which makes them an important national-security concern.

The way Army doctrine addresses these and other security concerns, based on the failed-state operational environment, will greatly impact our nation's future. While this environment existed far from our borders, we did not fully take it seriously. Now the "not war-not crime" operational environment closer to home is directly threatening our nation. Therefore, the US Army must openly confront this doctrinal issue by placing it in its proper politico-military context. We could then develop practical guidance from politico-military to operational and tactical levels. Doing so would represent a proposed alternative to the "operations are operations" approach in the current draft of FM 100-5. The alternative that US Army Colonel David A. Fastabend and the School of Advanced Military Studies writing team propose includes four categories of operations: offense, defense, support and stability, all of which can occur in a theater. However, in a mission in a failed-state environment, stability operations might dominate.

Fastabend suggests that this revised approach to categorizing operations would reduce the Army's compulsion to wholesale "categorical thinking" in the hope that a declaration of category can bring to bear a host of imperatives, guidelines and so on that would solve the problem at all institutional levels. While such thinking is acknowledged to have its uses, in our current strategic environment, it is generally viewed as offering only limited utility.

I would suggest, however, that this approach may render the politico-military environment-war, peace and crime-in which a force undertakes a mission, irrelevant to operational concerns. In a time of increasing global uncertainty and a rise in domestic terrorism, such a potential development is disturbing. Decoupling doctrine from US government political conventions would acknowledge that ongoing attempts to create politico-military models within which to place failed-state operations in strategic context are untenable.

By implication, we have witnessed a breakdown of government guidance on this matter. As a result, the US Army is divorcing the nontraditional missions it now conducts from a higher form of political rationale or strategy. It has no choice, because traditional national security perceptions have proved insufficient and newer ones have yet to be developed. Thus, this doctrinal trend could be cause for concern because operations represent a means to attain well-defined national security objectives and are not an end in themselves. Fastabend, however, argues that categorizing operations according to purpose is in fact a superior method of linking doctrine to strategy.

Regardless of the strategic category or label we use, military planners and executors must evaluate the strategic direction, end state and objectives. Given these potential benefits, this approach to post-OOTW era doctrine may, in fact, be far superior to the proposed SASO operational concept. **MR**

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Combined Arms and Services Staff School Updates Website

The Combined Arms and Services Staff School's (CAS3's) Curriculum Affairs, Standardization and Evaluation Division is rapidly updating its webpage for access by Reserve Component (RC) Total Army School System (TASS) brigades and battalions. The website now includes all student courseware and instructor slides for F121 *staff Techniques*; F543 *Training, Mobilization and Deployment*; and draft F636 *Preparation for Combat* courses. All material is Total Army Training System Courseware formatted using Microsoft Office software. It can be printed directly off the website or downloaded by the user for technology assisted learning.

CAS3 is interested in receiving comments from its RC field users and TASS brigade and battalion instructors. E-mail your comments to Lieutenant Colonel Steve Hammerstone at: <hammerss@leav-emh1.army.mil> or call (913) 684-3835.

Beverly Allen's book is a testimony to and analysis of the horrifying phenomenon of what she calls "a military policy of rape for the purpose of genocide." According to Allen, all forms of genocidal rape constitute the crime of genocide as described in Article II, *United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* (1948). While the US military would never advocate such a policy, we unfortunately have been or will become involved with nations that do. Allen writes that rape warfare is "currently practiced in Bosnia-Herzegovina (B-H) and Croatia by members of the Yugoslav army, Bosnian Serb forces, Serb militias in Croatia and B-H, irregular Serb forces known as Chetniks and Serb civilians."