2013

The Grand Paris Express: An Analysis of Social and Political Trends towards Mass Transit Planning in the Île-de-France Region

Charlotte M. Leasia
Scripps College

Recommended Citation
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/213

This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Scripps Student Scholarship at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scripps Senior Theses by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more information, please contact scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.
The Grand Paris Express: An Analysis of Social and Political Trends towards Mass Transit Planning in the Île-de-France Region

By Charlotte Leasia

Submitted to Scripps College in Partial Fulfillment of the Degree of Bachelor of Arts

Readers
Professor Fazia Aitel
Professor Anna Joo Kim
Professor Thomas P. Kim

April 26, 2013
# Table of Contents

Social and Urban Inquiries from a Curious and Inspired Visitor ......................... 1

Chapter One: The Grand Paris Express: Reasons, Causes, and Expectations .......... 4

The Literature on French Urban Planning and Sociology ................................. 12
  French Intégration: Le Pari Difficile .............................................. 16
  A Social Control of the City? ......................................................... 17
  Constructing Spatial Inequality .................................................. 19
  Who now constructs the Île-de-France? ........................................... 22
  Methodology and Limitations .................................................................. 25

Chapter Two: Through the Eyes of Paris’s Architects ......................................... 28
  Crowding in: Expanding Outwards to Let People In ................................ 32
  Theories for Creating Space: The Sociology of Space and Identity in the Region .... 38
  Keys to the City: To Contract or Create ........................................... 40

Chapter Three: Vying Voices for Change ....................................................... 45
   Le Mal Nommé: Cité, Banlieue, Zone Urbaine, et Les Grands Ensembles .......... 48
  Recognition and Denial: Two Addresses from the State ............................. 50
  The Banlieue Debate at Large .................................................................. 52

Chapter Four: Engaging in the Dialogue ............................................................ 56
  Insiders and Outsiders: Where they Collide .......................................... 59
  Campaigning and Mobilization: Using Metro Space as a Political Sphere ....... 61
  Providing Spaces to Live: The Necessities of a Home ............................... 65
  The Here and Now: Movement Towards Better Development? .................... 69
  Systems of Change and Movement Forward ......................................... 73

Chapter Five: What to Expect from the Grand Paris Express ............................... 75
  How People Effectively Alter a Space .................................................. 76
  Drawing Connections: Grassroots versus State Led .................................... 81
  Size and Scope ...................................................................................... 85
  A New French Model for Solidarity ....................................................... 87
  Seducing Outsiders in: The Process of Integration for Paris’s Grands Ensembles .... 89

Concluding Thoughts: Questions and Hopes for The Grand Paris Express ........... 92

Bibliography ................................................................................................. 97

APPENDIX A ............................................................................................. 105

APPENDIX B ............................................................................................. 113

APPENDIX C ............................................................................................. 116

APPENDIX D ............................................................................................. 118
Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to Scripps College and its professors for inspiring me to think critically and analytically in all of my courses. My time abroad attending the American University Center in Provence challenged me inside and outside the classroom and was of indispensable value to my growth as a learner. My love and thanks to friends and family who supported, listened, and boosted my spirits throughout the entire process.

To Professor Klinkenborg for helping me remember the joys of writing. Finally, my biggest thanks to my readers and advisors Professor Fazia Aitel, Professor Anna Joo Kim and Professor Thomas Kim. Their commitment and tremendous help through each step of my thesis gave me the courage to explore my topic through a variety of lenses as well as the motivation to continue.
Social and Urban Inquiries from a Curious and Inspired Visitor

I have always been drawn to my environments. I enjoy learning about their histories and how I place myself within them. Cities have a particular allure to me, largely because they are so multifaceted, each containing distinctive features. I’ve noticed in my years of moving and academic transitioning that individuals are highly influenced by environments. I felt this awareness acutely when I studied abroad in France for the spring of my junior year in Aix-en-Provence.

It was there abroad, with the multiple barriers I encountered – language, cultural, academic and individual, that I became most aware of my movements through space. It was the first time I was living in a foreign country for an extended period of time. I had to make changes to my daily habits due to the newness and unfamiliarity of Aix. One adjustment that I grew to love was my daily walk or commute by bus into the center of the city. I enjoyed the tranquil lull of the ride in the morning, listening to my ipod, but mostly, I enjoyed people watching. It was a perceptibly informative experience. It was almost as if in that moving space alone, I was discovering an obscure lesson about the cultural environment of French cities.

In other French cities, using buses, the TGV train, and the Parisian metro brought to my attention both the attractiveness and accessibility of public transit. In my discussions with French students, cars for them were preferable, but as a foreigner, I developed an appreciation for the common good of public transportation. Mass utilization of public transit was opened up to me when I was abroad.

Furthermore, I happened to be overseas during a rare match in politics for France and the United States. Only once every 20\(^1\) years do their presidential election seasons align because of differing term lengths. Seeing news covering France’s presidential campaign as well the U.S.’s made clear our political differences. As an American, I was challenged

\(^1\) See Olivier Duhamel’s piece for an analysis on France’s political term lengths.
during the campaigning to explain exactly what it was that I noticed. Their domestic concerns, the economy, as well as social and civic issues were comparable, yet subtly and distinguishably different. One facet that did starkly stand out was France’s keen focus on social welfare projects to revitalize the state of its economy. Reading the current news, I came across respective political parties’ plans and goals, covering everything from boosting engineering and technology industries, to revitalizing their state infrastructure. All planning seemed to be based upon a social welfare oriented state that was striving to be capitalistically competitive. One specific plan I came across was the Grand Paris Express. It was this project that struck me as the most lucidly French. French because it aspires to solve their state’s economy through an infrastructural project that faces a new model, but with noticeably and somewhat poignantly French designed features.

From my perspective, it was these dual concepts, mass transit planning and the political and social environment that I found myself in, which ignited a fascination to more closely observe the underlying foundations of French cities and how they have grown over the years. From my location in and connection to them, I saw myself as an observer and temporary participant, able to communicate and pass through, but also unable to fully comprehend their histories. After my return back to the United States, I began to look at American cities and their arrangement with probing eyes. I wanted to understand what it was I sensed in their semblance and what made them different from French cities.

It is for these reasons I want to preface beforehand that I am approaching this topic as an observant American from an academic angle. In my urban and social inquiries, I wish to remain neutral. However, delving into this issue presents areas for debate. My opinions presented come from my studies and interviews, as well as my American upbringing. This thesis is not intended to be comparative. However, the arguments I present forth pose the nature of the Grand Paris Express from my American perspective.
The Grand Paris Express: A Vessel for Change in the Île-de-France

This thesis examines the Grand Paris Express project currently underway in the Île-de-France. The basis of this project is a series of new and renovated railway lines to connect and span across the entirety of the region. They are being planned with the hopes to improve urbanization for the outlying suburbs. The Île-de-France is the wealthiest region in France, but it has high economic inequality between its departments. One hard hit area is Seine-St-Denis. This is the area I will be focusing primarily on. Department number 93, its urban landscape holds histories of rioting, unemployment, and large immigrant populations. In its underdeveloped growth, residents are calling for socio-spatial justice. Professor of Urban and Regional planning Edward Soja (1980) coins this as a “social-spatial dialectic” (208), where any given space is inherently political. Currently, residents in Department 93 are engaged in this “dialectic”, taking action by means of redefining the places where they live. In addition to demands for spatial equality is a more complex and hidden protest: the demand from marginalized citizens for an adjusted French ideology with respect to national identity. In their spatial marginalization, groups are contesting the egalitarian claims of the state based on where they live. I explore the historical significance of the Seine-St-Denis department in the Île-de-France’s urbanizing efforts. This thesis argues that planning for the Grand Paris Express represents the effects of a new French identity in formation. But while Paris is being recreated to accommodate those living in the outer communes, an anti-immigrant state narrative is also resulting in reformed urban planning in an existing discriminatory French ideology. However, as I plan to prove later in my research, the Grand Paris Express will provide more social access for France’s marginalized citizens.
Chapter One: The Grand Paris Express: Reasons, Causes, and Expectations

Paris is in the midst of a vast metamorphosis. The Société du Grand Paris, a state-owned company that works with regional government representatives, is currently moving forward with planning a new network of rail transit. First envisioned by Nicholas Sarkozy in 2007, the Grand Paris Express is comprised of four lines that will connect the outer suburbs to one another and central Paris. Completion of the lines and utilization is expected from 2018 to 2025. There are high hopes and expectations for this project. The new series of lines envision a well-connected and economically booming region. At a parallel moment, France’s middle class is slowly transforming. Though unknown to most, even with frequent discrimination, entry into middle class status is slowly occurring. The means of this result from public schooling, free access to state-supported universities usually outside city centers and the resources available from civic associations. Historically marginalized, immigrants of North-African and Maghribi descent are establishing their place in more secure jobs. This subtle shift is creating a more heterogeneous middle class. Moreover, in the recent 2012 French Presidential elections, there was the highest reported turnout of non-European country votership in the Île-de-France region, changing politically and demographically the face of French participation in its democratic processes. During the presidential campaigns, there was strong criticism against Sarkozian rhetoric and his failed economic promises for the state. Jean-Marie Le Guen, the deputy mayor of health in Paris, stresses the disconnect Sarkozy held from the general public in his visions for a Grand Paris. Disillusioned with a “want for grandeur” he was blind to an actual need for a “revolution” (jmlg.fr). In critiquing his presidency, Le Guen stresses the need for more egalitarian democratic practices in France. Similar to France’s new middle class, the Grand Paris project is multiform as well. While founded

\footnote{Le Grand Paris. Projected timeline from the société du grand Paris.}{Wenden, Catherine Wihtol, 3.}{Jean-Marie Le Guen.}
under his administration, Sarkozy’s *Grand Paris* is no longer under state governance alone. The expansion of regional transit signifies a significant step of outer periphery integration into French Society.

In my political and historical analyses, the immediate attention to widespread transit planning and regional development occurring in the Île-de-France is a direct tie to the rioting of 2005. At its outbreak, two teenage boys of Malian and Tunisian descent, Zyed Benna, and Bouna Traoré, were electrocuted after they climbed into an electricity relay station while fleeing police. The incident set off a cascade of emotions, anger and riots across suburbs in France. The events left the country deeply shaken and disturbed by the levels of violence and despair. Described by the French press as both *émeutes* (riots) and as *révoltes* (rebellions), the degree of violence and destruction carried out made it clear that for a long time, tension and national dissent had been boiling in Paris’s outer departments. Beginning in late October in Clichy-Sous-Bois, burning of cars, schools, and public buildings spread out to other French cities. There was such a high degree of destruction that executive measures were ordered by Prime Minister Villepin, including a limited state of emergency and curfew, which had not been enabled since the 1955 law adopted during the Algerian war. Additionally, in efforts to reach out to the Parisian suburbs, Villepin rallied youth under the state’s Republican values, pledging money, jobs, teacher aids for schools in state-classified bad areas, and state-delegated prefects for equal opportunity. In their chaotic and unorganized behavior, the riots propelled French officials and policy makers into addressing the multitude of problems, youth unemployment, poor housing, and discrimination in the *banlieues.*

---

5 For a detailed account see Soumahoro, Maboula
6 For more analysis of rioting framework see, Balibar, Etienne, and James Ingram.
7 Wenden, 2.
8 Ossman, Terrio. 6.
9 I use the term *banlieue* (the French word for suburb) in my thesis because it carries a specific French linguistic colloquialism that is not associated with the American idea of a suburb. For scholars on this issue see Waddington (2009), Dikeç (2006).
Characteristics of the rioting were primarily around burning cars and public buildings, and investigation into the reasons given behind the events ranged from youth unemployment and lack of opportunities to radical Islam insurgency.\textsuperscript{10} This civil unrest, explicitly presented by the widespread rioting across all of France, illustrates that discontentment moved beyond unemployment and limited social access. Instead, it has led to a state of social exclusion and isolation. Hypotheses about the riots and their roots have been examined in many social, political, and economic realms.

Cesari, a principal research fellow at the National Center for Scientific Research in Paris and associated professor at Harvard University, argues that violence in the suburbs is nothing new, rather, the \textit{banlieues} of Paris have had a longstanding period of urban degradation. This urban decay is now socially adjoined to the residents who live in these social housing establishments. Crucial to avoid is associating and conflating the discourse based on race, ethnicity, religion, and poverty.\textsuperscript{11} Kastoryano, a senior research fellow at the CNRS asserts that there is no relevantly new basis of the rioting, that they only lasted longer as a result of a rage that has settled into the outer peripheries of the Île-de-France.\textsuperscript{12} From an economic standpoint, a root cause of the riots was simply the staggeringly low employment rate of the young in France. A large concentration of them were especially, low-skilled young men.\textsuperscript{13} Resolving these issues through more access to jobs, school, and reformed policies for equal opportunity remains the dominant narrative. In as much as they are effective, questions of long and short-term outcomes from these policies are what is of key importance. However, as Salanié, professor of economics at Columbia University and \textit{École Polytechnique} concludes, “policies seem to be more directed towards the symptoms than towards the causes; they satisfy the public’s cry for immediate action, but they do not attack the roots of the disease” (6).

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{10}] Wenden 1.
\item[\textsuperscript{11}] Cesari, 6.
\item[\textsuperscript{12}] Kastoryano 7.
\item[\textsuperscript{13}] Salanié, 1.
\end{itemize}
These arguments immediately following the rioting were all close examinations of failure. The failure of residential livelihood in the banlieues was ignored by state governance. As providers of social housing welfare, the state was sheltered away from the real failures looming upon them in the onset of the riots. It is difficult to say if there was a complete and utter blindness to what was to come. Then, two years later, in a vastly ambitious and sweeping address to the French republic, Sarkozy presented his Grand Paris plan as one that would absolve economic disparity through beautiful park additions, state of the art transit systems and renovated housing. It was to all help progress Paris simultaneously into its power as a capitalist, global city.\textsuperscript{14} By no mere coincidence, Sarkozy’s plan was presented in an overarching and grandiose manner to transition Paris into a “global city.” In plainer terms, Sarkozy’s speech can be stripped to one feature. The memory of the rioting two years earlier was still at the forefront of the state’s mind, and they needed a solution to absolve it immediately. The demands from these residents on Paris’s peripheries have been contextualized into a grander, idealistic vision for the future of the Île-de-France. At the basis of Sarkozy’s vision for a “global city” is a turbulent protest from a disunited citizenry of France. Yet in their disunity, the rioters proved to be the rooted and effective catalyst for Sarkozy’s urban, neo-liberal expansion.

For the banlieues today, it is imperative to look at the effects of these riots on a changed state discourse towards equality and the direction that regional planners for Grand Paris Express have taken. There is no doubt that the riots sparked a heightened awareness of the glaring inequalities between those living in the center of French cities those who lived on their outskirts. The problems brought up are multi-fold. To begin, the Île-de-France region is organized in very economically segregated poles, though not in the traditional core outer periphery form as is normally the case. Rather there is an East and West split. Thus, the low-income classes are found concentrated in Seine-Saint-Denis,

\textsuperscript{14} See Sarkozy’s inaugural address of the Grand Paris.
one of the Île-de-France’s 8 departments in the North Eastern part of the city. What makes explaining the riots so difficult are their multiple frameworks for interpretation.

When he was interior minister to France, Nicolas Sarkozy described the problem as street gang members fighting over drug territory. In other veins, members of the political far right described Muslim fundamentalism as the foundation of the rioting.15 In the wide array of social and political misrepresentation, residents faced a void of avenues for agency and political mobilization. Clearly the rioting was not being attributed to any singular root cause. Yet in its ambiguousness, it created individual political movements that have proven to be both effective and problematic in addressing the fundamental needs of residents living in outlying banlieues. As with all democratic institutions, through the governing framework already established, the needs of some citizens are simply not addressed. However, the political power they did hold through their violence incited responses from the state, media and the world at large. This in and of itself, places these residents in a political position of power. What is important to address is how much rhetoric has stemmed away from the racialized, drug warring, Islamophobic sentiments against these residents towards an appeasement for economic and democratic equality.

Planning for future public transportation, as formally addressed by Sarkozy in 2009, provides a glimmer of social mobility for the residents in Seine-St-Denis. Initially laid out as the mètre grand Paris by the French central government in 2009, the Grand Paris Express is now a comprised government and regional project. Members of the Société du Grand Paris voted unanimously in May 2011 for its planning16. A massive project, the new metro lines will cover 175km with 72 new stations. Preliminary construction and planning has started with official construction beginning in 2014, and

---

15 See Mestries (2007).
16 For projected plans see Freemark.
full completion in 2025. The budget is 20.5 billion Euros but there are still issues about where funding will come from as far as regional and state budgeting is concerned.\textsuperscript{17}

The Paris metro system supports and sustains the flow and function of the city. Of the 11.5 million inhabitants in the Île-de-France region, almost 60\% of all trips are made by foot, bus or train. Even with expansion, the city’s growth has remained dense and compact, creating access to transit systems for the majority of residents.\textsuperscript{18} However, the outer departments do not have a reliable method, relying on tramways and buses with slow speeds and limited access to transportation into the city.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure1.png}
\caption{Map of Current RER Lines}
\end{figure}

In a series of heavily debated public meetings and conferences between local, regional and national officials, the Grand Paris Express will be the largest transit

\textsuperscript{17} For coverage of debates see Vincendon’s \textit{Grand Paris et Petit Detours}.
\textsuperscript{18} Freemark, 2.
\textsuperscript{19} “Les Réseaux de transports en Île-de-France: Réseaux express regional” http://www.stif.fr.
expansion on the continent and one of the most massive in the world. As laid out by the Société du Grand Paris, a comprised national and commercial company for the Grand Paris Express, the specific focus of the project is to build the lines and facility structures that will promote quicker transit and easier access for residents on the outskirts of Paris. The new focus on the outer departments is a direct investment to provide mass transit that is as efficient as Paris’s renowned underground metro system.

Figure 2. Map of Planned Grand Paris Express Lines

Pictured in figure 2, the four new lines cover impressive ground. Focusing specifically on the Seine-Saint-Denis department, where rioting began in 2005, residents

---

20 Freemark, 2.
are receiving a large circular line. In total, it will cover 100 km with a speed between 55 and 60 km/h. This red line will directly connect the northeastern neighborhood towns to one another and other departments of Paris, with aims to cut back on commuter travel time. Construction of tramway lines makes routes ideal between suburbs and denser neighborhoods, where movement is more controlled to regional areas in and around Paris. Thus, by creating a new orbital corridor, the neighborhoods in and around Seine-St-Denis are more easily accessible one to the other via a tramway route. From the orbital corridors already existent in the central city, these new tramways will create a larger ring of movement, encouraging development throughout the suburbs themselves. By final completion, the Grand Paris Express will encircle and connect the Île-de-France’s 8 departments through its four new orbital corridors.

Since their initial construction and planning, the banlieues lacked adequate means of transportation. Transportation for the masses is a fundamental aspect of city planning, and in comparison to most American cities, France provides efficient means of public transportation. At the heart of Paris is the metro itself: providing the very essence of mobility for Parisians with fast and frequent service. Buses and tramways to the outlying suburbs provide mobility but are inadequate in providing a system that works for the masses in the outer corridors of Paris. For the purposes of looking at where this project began, it is important to ask where the need was first addressed.

Prior to the project’s passing, local and regional campaigning in the Île-de-France region passed measures to create solutions for inadequate metro lines. It was at this point that disagreements met at the national and regional level. After Sarkozy’s large proposal, many regional planners argued that his plan, in its right to use “eminent domain in station area zones” would essentially produce “bourgeois enclaves” providing little for the

---

23 Yonah. 1.
24 Ibid. 2
existing adjacent communities. It is at this point that the need arises for the unique situation of the Île-de-France: while the city has the most efficient public transportation, the dense surrounding suburbs have limited transit.

At the national and regional level, joint forces provide the funding and planning for the additional orbital lines. However, this need has been implicit for the outer banlieues of Paris since their inception. Why at this moment are there multiple levels of governance to address the lack of transportation for the residents of these outer neighborhoods? The framework of the Grand Paris Express was organized under the convergence of the Arc Express and the Public Transport Network of Grand Paris, (RTPGP) whose overall goals aligned for transit-led development. According to Theresa Enright, whose dissertation examines Sarkozy’s Grand Paris project, the scheming for the Grand Paris Express has been executed with conservative neo-liberal policies in mind. Planning and construction are oriented around economic growth, competition, and private investment, which can only reproduce the social and spatial hierarchies it sets out to address. Therefore the Grand Paris Express is run solely through an elite class that has access to wealth and decision making powers. Thus, this project is only a dominating process of urban spatial production. Furthermore, it will only depoliticize the invention of common worlds. Taken from this standpoint, the process of urbanization for the banlieues looks bleak.

The Literature on French Urban Planning and Sociology

25 Ibid. 3.
26 For an in depth examination of the Grand Paris’s development and converging of state and regional actors see, Enright, (2012).
27 Enright, 145.
28 Ibid, 4.
In converging the urban planning and political discourse underway in the Île-de-France region, this thesis begins by outlining multiple schools of thought that address the spatial, political, and socio-economic problems residents in Seine-Saint-Denis face. Surrounding scholarship in American and French literature discusses the problems of the rioting and inequalities for residents in the neighborhoods of Seine St. Denis as implicit problems for France’s failure to address its immigration and integration policies colliding with a state narrative of égalité and universalism. Furthermore, in looking at the urban growth and planning of Paris it is apparent that spatial segregation has continually resulted despite France’s efforts for social mixité. This convergence of spatial planning and national identity has resulted in many contesting ideas over the future of France’s approach to immigration and integration.

**Race, Class, Nation: Explaining the Riots**

What transpired after les émeutes has been taken into the larger context of addressing contesting ideological views of a French national identity. An issue heavily debated in current social and political discourse is the stubborn resistance both ideologically and institutionally in the French republic over dissenting views of French égalité. In terms of France’s staunch admission to state secularism or laïcité, Balibar warns that to address the events in merely Huntington’s “clash of civilization terms” and “religious fact” would, “make it a mere cloak of ‘real’ social processes when it is in fact a component of them, and against the temptation of a ‘religious (or culturalist-theological) reading’ of current conflicts, that for its part, conceals real dynamics.”

29 The real dynamics that Balibar discusses in this case illustrates a paradigm of a social struggle not addressed by the French government. The civil unrest that spread across the outskirts of Paris is reflective of a group of citizens subsumed by a Universalist perspective on French society. Therefore, to assess the problems of the rioting as merely the clash of

29 Balibar 55.
religious differences between Muslim immigrants and a secular state would be an oversimplified assumption of a more socially complex issue.

In their book *Race Class Nation*, Étienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein draw upon the discourse of “Western Marxism,” and contend that the problem of racism is not actually receding but progressing into the contemporary world. Balibar begins by claiming there is a new racism, a *neo-racism* that is now dominant in contemporary French society. He writes,

“It is a racism whose dominant theme is not biological heredity but the insurmountability of cultural differences, a racism which, at first sight, does not postulate the superiority of certain groups or peoples in relation to others but ‘only’ the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of life-styles and traditions.”

There is a fear that France is loosing cultural unity, where a collective identity is being taken away. Balibar emphasizes throughout his arguments that at the core of the French nation-state is an implicit enforcement of assimilation based off of the collective need to have a shared identity. The French uphold their conception of the nation state as an equalizing basis shared by all citizens. However, Balibar argues that racism is incarnated inherently from a French nationalism. He writes, “In France, the elaboration of an ideology of the ‘French race’ rooted in the past of ‘the soil and the dead’, coincides with the beginning of mass immigration.” The influx of immigrants has resulted in a simultaneous concern for France’s national identity. But concerning the concept that France is encountering a ‘new-racism,’ as Balibar argues, ignores that a class-based racism has been implicit in the French mindset since its 19th century *belle époque*. In many ways the *neo-racism* is merely a reincarnation of the class based racism, where the new workers are now merely the large stream of mass immigration to France.


31 Balibar, Wallerstein, 21.

32 Balibar, Wallerstein, 53.
Returning to his examination of race, class and the French nation state, Balibar examines the multiple factors that contributed to the riots. His findings present that in one sense, the riots were the manifestations of an uprising from an unsupported group of society separate from the political power based on their race and class status. This combination illustrates the integral tie between his previous neo-racism and an older embedded class discrimination. He writes about the exclusivity of the political process and how the,

“fusion of racial and class exclusions on which I insisted above: precisely to precipitate, and to sanction, the exteriority of the new populace in relation to ‘politics’ – all the more effectively to the extent that class discrimination is assumed not to exist” (63) 33

Thus, the rioters, left with no political avenues were cornered into a separate sphere of political action, which manifested into violence and social turmoil. Balibar describes the extremity of violence as both self-destructive and narcissistic given their powerlessness in the political spectrum.34 While the act of rioting can be self-destructive to the capital of the actors involved and narcissistic because of its ostensibly purposeless incentives, the rioting from the youth has resulted in strong policy changes, suggesting that riots can serve a higher political purpose than Balibar originally assumed. Because the rioters had no other political avenues, their actions were focalized on as heavily violent relative to other more democratic processes.

In his explanation of the use of burning cars and buildings as an expression of rage, the location of the cités themselves, “is the subject of violence, claimed by the young rioters as a place of origin, stigmatized by politicians, police, employers, chosen as a ‘target’ of social policy and the terrain of police ‘raids.’” 35 According to Balibar, these cités, grands ensembles, and banlieues, predominately inhabited by minority groups,

33 Balibar, 63.
34 Ibid, 64.
35 Balibar, Etienne, and James Ingram.
have felt ostracized and stigmatized by French society, causing a ‘revolt of the excluded’.  

36 Subjecting where the rioting took place clarifies the strong separation of groups in the departments within the Île-de-France, which had a major impact on the identity rioters took upon themselves, as the present “other” outside of central Paris, and an “other” outside of its social context.

French Intégration: *Le Pari Difficile*

Manuel Boucher makes many observations about social integration and assimilation in modern day France and the effects that ethnicity, class, regionality, and social norms play for immigrants coming to France. In his book, *Les Théories de l’intégration Entre Universalisme et Differentialisme*, he examines the debates in contemporary France over the widely accepted, universalism, versus approaching the rupture through a multi-culturalist approach. For immigrants coming into France, Boucher explains the dominating vein of sociological discourse is for the acceptance of French societal values. He describes,

“L’appréciation de l’assimilation d’un étranger se fonde sur un ensemble d’éléments, au premier rang desquels se situent l’usage et la connaissance du français, ainsi que la participation à la vie sociale.”

There is an assumption for all immigrants an immediate recognition of and acquiescence to the distinct valorized factors of being French. As Boucher comments however, with growing concerns over a French national identity, there is a growing concern for the problematic issues the French model of integration poses. For one, acceptance of and adjustment to a French identity with the abandonment of old cultural values has proven impossible. National identity and cultural values and norms are intrinsically linked. To drop one’s previous culture and adopt another cannot be achieved through state governance and issue to assimilation.

36 Ibid, 49.

37 Boucher, 26.
In its efforts to prevent a fragmented society, France emphasizes the common thread of citizenship and adhesion to the Republic so that its citizens will not heed to ruptures and social cleavages. A fragmented society is one of the greater fears of French society. From national rhetoric,

“La tradition républicaine française ne connaît qu’un ennemi de la nation et de la République: la guerre civile…Dans ce cadre, un ‘bon citoyen’ intégré est celui qui préserve la paix civile en respectant les lois et les droits de tous et en oubliant ses particularismes, que ceux-ci soient d’ordre religieux, ethnique ou même de classe”\(^ {38} \)

Yet it is precisely from the national rhetoric of a unified, secure nation state that a highly cleavaged France has emerged. Oppositionally, there is resistance from immigrants integrating into the society and resistance from those already living in France. For immigrants moving to France, assimilation and integration into the social sphere is more than a matter of assimilation but also acceptance. It is acceptance from both sides, the outsider immigrants in their new and unfamiliar environment, and those espousing French cultural and societal norms that are necessary.

According to Boucher, France has reached a moment where it can no longer sustain its method of intégration. As globalization and mass immigration continue, France is at a crossroads and turning point, structurally changing their policies, but struggling to change their cultural attitudes. Emphasized in the department of Seine-Saint-Denis, these residents are assumed outside members of the cultural context of France and are appropriated and dealt with through classifications of race, religion, class, and age.

---

**A Social Control of the City?**

---

\(^ {38} \) Ibid, 32.
Another examination of the *banlieues* of Paris is a case study conducted by Gendrot, whose book, *The Social Controls of Cities?: A Comparative Perspective*, examines the possible correlations between the impact of globalization on the city, the growth of inequalities and of power conflicts, and the violence and crime evident in what are often spatially segregated areas.\(^{39}\) In her analysis she draws comparisons between French and American cities and their relative levels of urban violence and struggle.

In her findings related to Seine-St-Denis, Gendrot observes the effects of spatial polarization in Paris and specifically the degree to which Seine-St-Denis’s neighborhoods are struck by unemployment, poverty, crime, and a concentration of new immigrants. She attributes these qualities to its roots as an “old working-class suburb” where “upward social mobility was seen as an electoral threat by communist mayors.”\(^{40}\) Historicizing the political context of Seine-Saint-Denis places those living there with limited social mobility in their efforts to move forward. What she poses as the most current problem for Seine-St-Denis, however, are its public schools and public buses.\(^{41}\) Lacking the resources for good transportation and schools, residents are further displaced from access to social capital. In addressing these problems, Gendrot observes the participatory action of local actors to give agency to the community. However, in her conclusions on the power of social mobility and agency for marginalized actors, she states, “local governance and empowerment remain, nevertheless, ambiguous notions.”\(^{42}\) The unpredictability of the roles local actors play could not be made clearer after the rioting that took place in Seine-St.-Denis in 2005. Gendrot’s study of Seine-St-Denis contributes to the discourse of political mobilization of smaller group actors, but the level of mobilization and degree to which it can affect policy was not taken into account.

In her subsequent case study of social segregation Gendrot makes a contradictory observation about the pluralistic center of Marseilles. She observes that its center is, in

\(^{39}\) Gendrot, x.
\(^{40}\) Ibid, 189.
\(^{41}\) Ibid, 189.
\(^{42}\) Ibid, 222.
fact, very diverse where, “Everywhere, French nationality prevails alongside a multicultural mix…the city having been molded by multiple migratory flux.” This marked contrast to Paris, which, like Marseilles, has a statistically high population of immigrants, does not confirm a sound form of fragmented localities existent in French cities.

Furthermore, in her comparative case studies on “world status” cities, she categorizes New York and Chicago with Paris, Lyon, and Marseilles, creating an over-generalized, broad platform for observing the evolutions of city violence. Drawing upon differences from national cities, as exemplified in her case study of Marseilles, presents the problematic “globalized economic” approach she uses in explaining the dynamics of social control in cities. Each of her analyses contains elements of truth in addressing how marginalized communities act in terms of their spatial construction. But for a cohesive, concrete understanding of the governing and spatial roles at stake in these different cities, her argument is abstracted to a large degree of discord and incongruence in her findings.

**Constructing Spatial Inequality**

In terms of its historical construction, the Île-de-France and social integration of the classes at the time in Paris were given consideration and planning to transform the city from its position as a monarch center to a cohesive city. In the planning conducted by Haussmann and the second empire, Paris was planned out and idealized as a city with promenades, parks, and schools available to all classes. Yet in his research on Paris’s renowned urban planner, Howard Saalman critiques that in Haussman’s revisioning of the country’s capitol, the Second Empire was reinstilling spatially unequal norms between the classes. Because the vision of the new Paris was comprised through an elite

---

43 Ibid, 199.
44 Ibid, xxix.
class, the class divides were only reproduced in newly designed schemes. He explains, “The lower middle and working classes of France did not have the organized political power required, and the Second Empire found it possible to neglect their demands if not to ignore them altogether”\textsuperscript{45} Thus, even in its 19\textsuperscript{th} century revisionist approach, lines of social and economic status were not addressed and implemented for integration, but rather redrawn out and reconstructed into the 20\textsuperscript{th} and now present day. Salmaan concludes,

> “Parks, large and small, monuments, churches, public buildings, sewers, water mains, and boulevards were distributed more or less equally throughout all parts of the city. Political pressure from the upper as well as the working classes saw to that. But the unpromising policy of using urban reconstruction as an instrument of social revolution was decidedly not part of Haussman’s or Napolean III’s thinking”\textsuperscript{46}

Yet even disregarding the foresight to social revolutions infers that there is a tendency to fear the idea of recreating space and the urban landscape, the recreation of Paris was set forth from a centralized, private, and cohesive group of political and economic elite. Involvement from the working class was only present in terms of their political participation, which during the second empire was by no means strong. To argue that there was no social foresight in the urban planning of Paris is to disregard entirely the fact that a city is comprised of socially different classes. The makers of the game are those who have the economic and political power.

Moving forward into the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, it soon became clear that Paris itself was the central and idealized place to live. This concentration of production and wealth in the city center contrasts with the living conditions and work available to those living on the outside of the city, visible by the 1950’s in examining the living conditions. In his analysis of the construction of the French new towns, James M. Rubenstein critiques that from the forefront, Paris had an unequal distribution of wealth centered around the capitol that did not reach out to the peripheries. He writes,

\textsuperscript{45} Saalman, 23.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid, 116.
“The intense competition for space in central Paris has priced the poor out of the market. They must live in peripheral projects that have all of the negative features of suburban living and none of the positive…Jobs are far away, requiring long-distance commuting on frequently inadequate public transportation systems. Most of the social problems are found in these suburban areas.”

From his analysis in the late 70’s, the problems of spatial inequalities were already made clear. The centralization of wealth, jobs, and classes was concentrated in the center of Paris and not equally distributed out to mixed housing as many politicians and urban policy rhetoric envisioned. Furthermore, the planning policies that did go underway, called the *grands ensembles*, were organized in a complex administrative structure made up of the national government, local authorities, and public and private developers. This creation of a multilayered administration split up private and public funding, housing development, and created an ineffective transportation for citizens to come into central Paris. As evidenced today, the level of integrated public and private planning for the Grand Paris Express is just as thoroughly demarcated and mixed in various realms of planning and development. In a sense, the multi-fractioned development of planning is both a repercussion of and improvement upon previous city planning for the greater region of Paris. Because it is so fragmented and because there is a more cohesive social discourse that stemmed from a direct need for more feasible and efficient means of access in and around the city, the vision for the Grand Paris Express is one that will sufficiently bring more public transportation to all of the areas of the Île-de-France.

In his comparative analysis of the French new towns with American suburb towns, Rubenstein argues that these towns, developed after the *grands ensembles*, were effectively socially integrated because they were, “planned to promote social balance.” However, the visionaries of these new towns and the *grands ensembles*, were effectively from the same administration. The focus on increasing jobs, providing more shopping facilities, and movement was only isolating these new towns away from the employment needs of the central city.

---

47 Rubenstein, 29.
48 Rubenstein describes at length the extent to which France tried to compartmentalize each department for efficiency and well-planned social housing.
49 Ibid, 89.
locations in central Paris. Thus, instead of creating more integration into central Paris and its peripheral cités and grands ensembles, the planning underway only made more isolationist communes. His prediction of the isolated community resulted in unequal conditions to such a degree that rioting took root throughout all of France, suggesting that the deprivation in the cités was about more than just poor living conditions alone.

**Who now constructs the Île-de-France?**

Moving forward to current examinations of the planning underway for urbanizing Paris, recent scholarship argues that there are detrimental consequences for residents in the outlying neighborhoods in light of the increasing urbanization of Paris. In her dissertation, *Building a Grand Paris: French Neoliberalism and the Politics of Urban Spatial Production*, Theresa Enright examines the objectives in the planning for Grand Paris, and the problematic recursive claims it poses in bringing about social cohesion for socio-economically disadvantaged groups. Thus, while Grand Paris aims to eradicate economic disparities between marginalized groups living on its outskirts, ultimately the project is perpetuating the very problems it sets out to address. In a similar vein, Sophie Gonick discusses the implications for President Sarkozy’s initial planning for Grand Paris in her piece, *Disciplining the Metropolis: Grand Paris, Immigration, and the Banlieues* and how, in contingency with his state policies, the goal for social mixité is not achieved. What results from the, “confluence of policy and planning ultimately heightens differentiation and inequality.” In essence then, this heightened inequality stems from the government policies originally created to address the socio-economic divide for those living in the department of Seine-St-Denis. She concludes that for the utopian ideal of the

---

50 Enright, 4.

51 Gonick (2011) predicts the Grand Paris as further dividing the economic and social passages in the Île-de-France. 27.
social *mixité* that France aims for, in light of current national rhetoric, “many, it would seem, do not want a system that enfolds their immigrant brethren into French polity.” Now France is left in a paradoxical physical urbanizing and expansion, with furthering societal constraints and protectionist objectives.

Interestingly though, while planning for *Grand Paris* and the *Grand Paris Express* were primarily executed and organized by national governing bodies, elite architects and a coalescence of private sector and public urban planning groups, I contend by the mere fact that the call *began* from local, marginalized actors, their political power and sway remains an integral component of planning and organizing for the *Grand Paris Express*. Furthermore, in the altering socio-political discourse, these local actors are actually strong determiners of changing policy in the Île-de-France Region and the French state.

Looking at the scholarship surrounding the Grand Paris Express and the rioting that occurred in 2005 is the tendency to overwrite the prolific power that these riots had in making a significant change in regional and transit planning for the Île-de-France. It is here that I bring in the work of James C. Scott, who spent two years in a small community in Malaysia examining peasant resistance. In his work, he examines the multiple ways in which peasants resist ideological domination through small, hidden, daily acts of resistance. He contends that their individual acts of foot dragging and evasion, reinforced by the venerable act of resistance has a multiplier effect. Continued a thousand-folds over, these individual acts may, in the end, make an utter shambles of the policies dreamed up by their would-be superiors in the capital.53 Therein, by mere resistance to hegemonic ideologies, repressed actors hold political and even sociological power.

---

52 Ibid, 39.
53 For more on peasant resistance, Scott (1985) presents insightful observance on seemingly unpolitical acts in rural Malaysia. While drawn up in a different context, his work sheds valuable light to political acts occurring in isolated incidences worldwide.
Of key concern to Scott are the effects that peasant resistance can have on the hegemonic state and its capitalist system. Rather than succumbing to their appropriated class and social status, local actors hold sway in their actions against their system of oppression. For peasants in Malaysia, these acts are hidden, compulsive and in some ways indulgent. They operate through these “hidden transcripts” and not other open forms of protest because it is in their self-interests to do so. Heavily embedded within the capitalist system of oppression, organized, political acts are unattainable and near impossible.\textsuperscript{54} However their individual acts, collectively in and of themselves provide a narrative of political protest. Scott concludes, “At different times and places they have defended themselves against the corvée…against the inroads of capitalism…against the modern capitalist state, and, it must be added, against many purportedly socialist states as well” (302). In their continuity, hidden protest amasses itself in addressing the larger issues at stake.

At first glance, the societal issues affecting the Île-de-France seem a far cry from peasant resistance in Malaysia. Yet similar to a peasant’s hidden transcript, the continuity of dissatisfaction within the French state from residents in Seine-St.-Denis amassed itself to riots. What’s more, the degree of an open, collective revolt against the French state lead to direct revisions in policy measures for a more integrated and urbanized Île-de-France region. It is my argument that contrary to current claims about the true nature of the Grand Paris Express, the riots created a fundamental change for the political and urban landscape in the Île-de-France region, resulting in an adjusted French ideology regarding urban policy.

The riots that began in Clichy-Sous-Bois and later expanded to other areas of France were a means of political mobilization that created policy changes at the national level. Beginning as a form of constructive control from the national government, the

\textsuperscript{54} Scott discusses how these peasants perform these acts through a series of hidden transcripts, foot dragging, stealing, loitering, and slaughtering livestock as a means of defying a totalitarian class order.
coalescence of local and state actors has changed the direction of integration within France.

Methodology and Limitations

For my methodology, I have a wide berth of gathered findings from multiple mediums. Interviews, economic determiners, and social urban transit theories are all a part of my areas of study. For this reason, my data gathering is not conducive to one specific approach. My historical analyses are close examinations of past and current discourses on societal issues rooted to economic, social, and housing problems. I have decided that these are three core components directly tied to the rioting of 2005. I will assess the impact of these issues be examining the policy measures undertaken by the Société du Grand Paris for extension of the Île-de-France’s orbital corridors. Additionally I have conducted informational interviews centered on urban and social affairs with representatives of NGO organizations in the region. Finally, I will examine the political narrative in France, and how it has altered in regards to more societal welfare for normally marginalized groups in France. I argue that the changes in planning are both a reflection of state and local actors striving to find a balance of economic expansion through a state endeavored project.

I plan to use this methodology in order to provide the corollary ties between citizenship and participative involvement through civic communities and organizing as they are related to the rioting of 2005.

Limitations

Foremost, is my variety of channels and avenues of social involvement in presenting my argument. The department of Seine-Saint-Denis in particular remains difficult to address for their economic and societal needs. Residents there have objectives
that are as multifaceted as the rioting that began in 2005. Thus, to ascertain that their needs are concerned with the specific constraints of unmet mobility could prove to be an overarching assumption. Another problem posed by my analysis is the subjectivity present in the planning for the Grand Paris Express. While enacted into French legislation, state funding is still a contentious issue for the public and regional officials. Towards whom the Grand Paris Express serves is categorically a claim that cannot be met yet.55

For example, ridership and utilization of other mass transport as well as commuting distances to other areas of Île-de-France could provide demonstrative insight in determining if ring corridors are better than additional rail lines and tramways. This thesis digresses away from quantifiable data sets normally seen in political science and transit planning. Rather, I take an ethnographical and theory based approach. Finally, to justify my contention that effective mobilization is transgressing from a politically void voice to one that is active and effective in current political discourse is difficult to argue in demographic terms. For one, French census polling is purely based on economic income.56 Thus in my efforts to prove discrimination in regards to race in French society is limited. The Société du Grand Paris is invariably a bureaucratic organization, however, there is large votership in France all around, rather than just specifically marginalized groups, leading me to believe that lobbies set forth by other organizations are working effectively in the region.

While most scholarship and studies suggest that policy prescriptions set forth by the Grand Paris Express will only further economic segregation (Gonick, 2011 Enright, 2012), I argue that from the national trend of state and local governance acting in partnership, the multiple actors provides a narrative that moves away from the Sarkozian approach, towards one that will incorporate and provide more of the social mixité that the French Republic aims towards. The planning of the new metro line leads to an altering of

55 See the law and its articles: LOI n°2010-597 du 3 juin 2010 relative au Grand Paris
56 For explorations on the “color-blind” aspect in France, see Oppenheimer (2007) and his comparisons of equal opportunities in the US and France.
the physical landscape with social mobilization at the local level.
Chapter Two: Through the Eyes of Paris’s Architects

Building Different Identities through Expansion

The positioning of Paris, in its varied dimensions and forms, tells as much of a history about its inhabitants as those who created it. In the Île-de-France region especially, there is a heightened awareness of the separation and distinctions of space in how spliced and organized the quarters into communes and finally to departments have been constructed over time. In its early beginnings, the growth of central Paris was seen as a historically momentous and pivotal moment of progression into the 20th century. The Haussmanizing of Paris, as it is commonly called, transformed the medieval empire into a world renowned and revered masterpiece. Following this meticulously planned city was poor attention to the complexity of growth soon presented beyond Paris. In addition to the age of industrialization, the inevitable growth to follow was population in the city.

In looking at current planning for the Île-de-France region, one naturally must look at its positioning in relation to the roots of Paris, Baron Haussman’s renovation, followed by extensive years of quick and decisive outer housing projects leading from the early 30’s well into the 70’s. From this scope, one can more comprehensively appreciate the ambition and vast renovation to occur with the Grand Paris Express. In order to fully appreciate the scale and transformative history that is urban planning for Paris and its outer regions, its birth in the mid-nineteenth century must first be examined.

Creating its Nucleas: Haussman’s Streets of Paris and Beyond
Evaluating the renovation of Paris under the Baron Haussman can be comprised into five primary components. Its streets, buildings and their aesthetic, parks and promenades, services, and money were all integral to the composition and dynamics of the modern city. One of the largest changes in its construction were the extension and relocation of Paris’ streets. Already in stages of planning and production before Haussman’s administration, the new streets of Paris were to be determined in location and direction with respect to their existence already as, “places to live and shop according to new standards of upper middle class affluence, as a kind of stage for elegant living.”

With this in mind, these streets also, “linked the central organs of administration and business…with the focal points of the city’s various quarters.” Under considerable foresight already, these streets proved themselves as the interconnectivity of all of Paris’ various quarters. With this as their mode apparatus, the streets of Paris brought to attention all of the dynamics of city life. However, with its need for growth, these streets also demarcated what had been old Paris.

“The realization of these new streets cutting through old quarters involved extensive expropriation and demolition of private buildings. This crucial aspect could not be carried out without a plan of Paris drawn to the most exact scale. A Paris which had grown by gradual addition did not need and had not supplied such a plan.”

The new streets of Paris proved themselves as both symbols of a larger networked city, while also serving as reminders of a tinier intimate past. For their seemingly transit orientated purpose, streets are integral components of and identities to a city. One of France’s well known urban theorists and planners, Le Corbusier argues the new purposes of streets, “should be a masterpiece of civil engineering” and that the, “corridor-street’ should be tolerated no longer, for it poisons the houses that border it.” A forerunner of the Machine Age and progression of society into the 20th century, Le Corbusier’s view of

---

58 Ibid, 14.
59 Ibid, 14.
60 Ibid, 15.
61 Legates, Stout.
the street arguably presents one of the deep problems Paris continually struggles with. In its growth, the streets were a catalyst for the expansion of not only central Paris but its outlying areas.

Evident nowadays, the streets and highways of modern day France sequester and cut the Île-de-France into sections. Nowhere is this more evident than in the Peériphérique ring road highway finished in 1978, a ring that essentially encloses the proper city of Paris from its outlying banlieues.62 Traditionally, when one thinks of highways in particular, they shield more than they reveal. American historian and urban theorist Eric Avila argues in his book, Popular Culture in the Age of White Flight: Fear and Fantasy in Suburban Los Angeles, that the freeway is representative of an insular, sheltered existence for those who can afford mobility and movement with cars and a counterdefinition, an “emblem of destruction” for those who cannot afford such means of movement.63 This holds true not only for a city as decentralized and car-centric as Los Angeles but for the newly aggrandized city of Paris.

Enright agrees, arguing that while, “the ‘island of Paris’ consisting of its historic quarters is well imaged and known world-wide…there is a notable gap in thought and deficit of representations of Paris on an urban scale beyond its official city limits”64, resulting in a sheltered, obsolete view from the true representation of the Île-de-France region. Thinking concretely about the physicality of a ringed highway marking Paris from its banlieues accentuates the calculated efforts to maintain and safeguard the identity of Paris. The movement into the city of Paris created a need for improved mobility itself in the city, as exemplified by Haussman’s extension and expansion of streets. Yet streets have also proved themselves to be mobile blockades in for different users. In considering the importance of Haussman’s calculated scaling of Paris, a telling factor is the streets and what they signified for Parisiens. No longer able to create the

---

62 Hall, 79.
63 Avila, 206.
64 Enright, 73.
protected Gallic walls of the 15th and 16th century, the city has enclosed itself with its mobile “red-belt” ring on its outskirts.

Returning back to Haussman aesthetics, the buildings, parks and promenades, and services implemented during Paris’s mid-nineteenth century were a combined rectifying of small-scale complexity into monumental simplicity. Tantamount to their implementation was the thought and consideration into having something of aesthetic value remaining to the old city.

![Image](http://www.intellego.fr/soutien-scolaire-terminale-professionnelle/aide-scolaire-arts-appliques/urbanisme-2-haussmann-paris-1860-1870/26896)

**Figure 1: The newly expanded streets of Haussman's Paris, 1900**

While Haussman was not influenced by the idea of the “positive effects” of park development, he did believe that fresh air, illumination, and green areas served a healthy purpose for the well being of the cities residents. Conversely, Haussman elevated the health and sanitation levels of Paris in his attention and demands for adequate sanitation and fresh water. Under his standardization, Paris received more than double its freshwater

---

65 Saalman, 17.
67 Saalman, 19.
and a network of drainage and sewage systems were implemented. Making Paris not only aesthetically appealing but also functional and sanitary vastly amplified not only its appeal but also its sustainability. In this transition shifting Paris from a densely packed neomedieval city into a prosperous and beautiful metropolis, Paris had established itself as the city of the 20th century, a city of grandeur and beauty that would be forever recognized as the prosperous, balanced city of modernity and timeless appeal. Ceding to change, as is difficult in many of the embedded ideologies of the French state, would prove to be difficult as Paris realized that its growth was not stagnating, but escalating.

Crowding in: Expanding Outwards to Let People In

A key facet of urban planning underway for France at the end of the nineteenth century was both its decentralization and attention to multiple organized administrative powers in its urban planning. The division of power for these administrations created an aggrandized Île-de-France region, split up into fractioned areas of regions, departments, and municipalities. Struggling for more representation, the decentralization of Paris to regions has been acknowledged by scholars as a form of democratic success for its citizens. Division of power is important for more fair and equal representation. However, in the history of urban planning following Baron Haussman’s renovation, the process of development was laden with difficult obstacles for Paris’s urban planners. As evidenced in all newly industrialized cities, overcrowding, and inadequate housing were primary problems for all most all industrialized cities. The creation of “new towns” as coined by scholar James M. Rubenstein are the direct result of the growth-inducing industries provided by cities such as Paris. However, for all of their deliberate planning

69 Newsome, 185.
70 Rubenstein, 5.
the new towns were disproportionately inadequate. Scholar Sophie Gonick argues that prior to the establishment of the new towns, the urban poor lived in impoverished, informal housing outside the city center. Known as bidonvilles, translating roughly to shantytowns, the postwar development did not correctly estimate the number of incomers.\textsuperscript{71} Furthermore, in their disorganized and simplistic planning immigrants living in these housing structures them were already segregated from the process of administrative, regional, urban planning.

Important to note also is the association of Paris’s expanded housing with immigrants. With the construction of the “new towns” came the placement of immigrants within them. Between 1946 and 1975, according to Newsome, the number of immigrants in France increased from 1,700,000 to 3,400,000.\textsuperscript{72} This drastic increase in immigrant population simultaneously separated and categorized those living in the outlying sectors of Paris as an “other”. Following this separation, actual placements for housing developed in a highly segregated manner. Many new young North-African men were isolated in dormitory-style buildings constructed and managed by the Société nationale de construction de logements pour les travailleurs (SONACOTRA).\textsuperscript{73} By placing them in unmixed housing, an unfortunate combination of economic disadvantage and marginalization soon followed. As a counterbalance to the poor planning following postwar France, the state put forth a plan to create public housing estates, known as Habitation a Loyer Modéré (HLMS). By the early 1970’s, 195 planned housing estates were constructed around Paris.\textsuperscript{74} Here their famed and notorious name, les banlieues created a societal connotation riff with poverty, immigration and foremost a disassociation with the central metropole of Paris. In their continued administrative and changing taxation policies, segregation and inequality immersed within the banlieues themselves. Evidence of gentrification occurred in the late 1970’s when the French

\textsuperscript{71} See Gonick, (2011).
\textsuperscript{72} Newsome, 185.
\textsuperscript{73} Newsome, 186.
\textsuperscript{74} Gonick, 30.
government created policies that incited home ownership among lower middle classes.\textsuperscript{75} As discrimination is a substantive experience for many of \textit{les banlieues} inhabitants, this encouragement for ownership pushed out those able to afford other housing over to those who had no other choice. The policies then created a cyclical problem of disadvantaged people occupying \textit{les banlieues}, and as was often the case, they were immigrants. Ultimately, the policies incited by regional officials did little in helping to improve the livelihoods of those living the \textit{banlieues}. Their policies encouraged those who could to leave and those who could not to stay.

In a seemingly proletariat struggle, instances of protest did occur for those living in the \textit{banlieues}. Newsome reports that immigrants periodically speak against the debilitating policies put in place in their housing units. He writes,

\begin{quote}
“In January 1975, for example, Algerian, Malian, and Senegalese residents of a SONACOTRA foyer in the Paris suburb of Saint-Denis initiated a rent strike to protest a 30 percent rent hike and the discriminatory conditions.”\textsuperscript{76}
\end{quote}

Their protesting demonstrates a battle for the ability to shape the communities in which they live. In multiple respects, planning for the housing units outside of Paris left many gaping holes for the immigrants entering into the units. Foresight and planning was not conducted in a Haussmann manner, but rather an extrapolated and hurried plan executed without the thoughts of the dynamics of what an extension of Paris should be.

Contextualizing two different eras of urban planning –Haussmann’s Paris and later government extended housing for the masses requires some extra depth and exploration. Moving into the ideas and policies invested into urban planning in the late 50’s up to the 70’s, three central figures were at hand for the new folds of Paris’s suburbs, Le Corbusier, Paul Delouvrier and Georges Pompidou. From their strategic planning, the

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid, 30.

\textsuperscript{76} Newsome, Brian. 187. Note: The SONACOTRA housing plan between 1965 and 1976 was administered by the interior prime minister in relation to the Algerian civil war occurring at the time. For a more in-depth and historical analysis see, Bernardot (1997) who discusses in detail the political aspects of the housing decisions during this period. For my purposes, I am sharing this to allude to the occurrence of segregated housing. However in my broader analysis, I want to separate this plan out from other French urban planning.
future of Parisian space was tightly gridlocked out to create massive housing for the high numbers of people moving into the region.

Le Corbusier, one of the world’s most influential and prominent architects and urban planners of the 20th century, revolutionized how urban planning organized and constructed cities. He, alongside other famous architects Ebenezer Howard and Frank Lloyd Wright were a new generation of urban thinkers, envisioning cities that were demographically diverse and that brought people together. In his designs and mapping of the city, Le Corbusier sought to prove that urban design was rational and promoted social welfare for the city’s residents. Intent on complimenting his buildings as lively spaces for inhabitants, Le Corbusier considered the needs and planning required for urban life. To many Parisian city planners and architects, Le Corbusier’s concepts of a city were vastly unorthodox and disjointed to the classic ideals of apartments and buildings in Paris. In 1925 at the Exposition International des Arts Décoratifs et Industriels Modernes, he received mixed reception after the unveiling of his Pavillon de l’Esprit Nouveau. Called a “beacon of radicalism,” his contemporary building presented one of the model housing cells for construction of his blocks of apartments. Perhaps most shocking and uncanny about this building, was its stark contrast to the grandeur and elaborate Haussman buildings tucked into Paris’s beautiful primary arrondissements. Reflecting on his Pavillon’s reception, Le Corbursier wryly noted,

“The pavillon was ready in 1922, but the outside was shocking and naturally everybody screamed at the outside without bothering to see what was inside” (Le Corbursier from Le Corbursier Le Grand 153).

His use of straight lines, flat concrete surfaces and blocked, gridded and taller housing was an illustrious metaphor to the post-industrial machine age, where height and symmetry were hailed as the future of buildings.

---

77 Fishman, 6.

78 Benton, Cohen, 121.
Farther down in his career, Le Corbursier founded a collective of architects and engineers, the Assemblée de Constructeurs pour une Rénovation Architecturale, (ASCORAL), in the postwar period for reconstructing France’s cities. Combining his urban and domestic theories, Le Corbursier envisioned apartment blocks centered around a community with public and individual space: shops, schools, gymnasiums in each block, with the private homes overseeing the apartment blocks. For these apartments, Le Corbursier strongly took into consideration the importance of them remaining spaces for living. His imagined, Ville Radieuse, or Radiant City, incorporated the natural openness of areas in nature combining habitation with, “space, sun, and greenery”. Called “free-form ribbon developments” housing blocks opened up to create breathing room and separation from industry and work with home life. While initially designed to release the constrictive environment of the city, these blocks of apartments became constrictive by their own accord. The distance from the city, difference in architecture, and their overall appearance created an environment that was both alien and unlike the commonly perceived city.

Figure 1: Housing Unit from Le Corbursier, 1945

---

79 Ibid, 223.
80 Ibid, 223.
81 Image taken from http://obleo.net/tag/grasshopper/.
In this juxtaposed presentation, Parisians were adverse to the idea of living there and newcomers were left with no other choice. Describing one of his units in Marseille, he states:

“The park has an imperial splendor. And the humans live in it as in a mirage. The silence is total. Yesterday the elevators took 500 guests 56 meters up in 13 minutes. The indoor streets are an invitation to the life of the future. The kids have already got the message of this future life given over to gaiety and warm-heartedness” (Le Corbursier, from *Le Corbursier* 424.)

The importance of space, places for recreation, and a thriving community were at the forefront of Le Corbursier’s ideas. Spaces created for an engaged community was integral to his planning, yet there was something starkly disconnected about Le Corbursier’s blocked housing to the rest of the established city. Inlaid in the planned framework were unassailable differences to what was established in the past.

A forward thinker, his planning undertook a grounding realization that the world’s cities had to separate from past conceptions. With mass migration to cities, its construction could not evolve organically, but in a technical, outlaid manner. This measure of accountability and formulation to urban planning emphasized an applied *scientific* approach. Unlike Haussman’s approach, Le Corbursier’s ideals took on Fordist overtones in his processed, supply and demand theory. Yet despite all of his appreciation for order and harmony, accommodating the movements inward to the city, the question then arises, how did planning from his *Grands Projets* unravel to such a state of disparity and isolation for residents living in the outer *banlieues* of Paris?

New, individualized, and unlike the tight-webbed city of Paris, Le Corbursier’s architectural plans spanned beyond just a difference in space and construction but an ingrained *ideology* of the city. With the movement into the 20th century, he stated, “These studies rest on an inalienable, unquestionable truth that is fundamental to all plans for

---

82 See Fishman.
social organization: individual liberty.”83 The long debated question of the individual and his place in society has always been at the forefront of philosophical, political, and social debate for the French Republic. The government’s role -- in the mentality of the French state, is that of the protector. Deciders of what is best for the individual, the government is centralized as the law and policy maker for the societal welfare of everyone. In this aspect, Le Corbursier’s planning for an environment enabling individual freedom, contrasts to the French notion of a centralized, protective, city, embodied in the state’s capitol, Paris, and its ideologies.

**Theories for Creating Space: The Sociology of Space and Identity in the Region**

Another leading man who expanded and debated the ideas around the structuring of a city was Henri Lefebvre. A Marxist philosopher and sociologist, his arguments brought in not only the infrastructure needed to create a dynamic city, but also its sociological dynamics, who lives where, and how there is an intrinsic tie of politics and social life that cannot be separated from the methodical, technical approach to city planning.84 Contesting what he deemed a “scientific” and “empirical” approach to town planning, Lefebvre sought to weave together the technical process with the societal realities that make up a city. “Space is political” Lefebvre asserts and to separate the two ideologies is detrimental to an adequate planning process.85

As a member of the French Communist Party, Lefebvre’s ideas were radically different from those of the centralized, authoritarian French state. In his *Reflections on the Politics of Space*, he argues that urban planning has three dimensions: production, financial, and spatio-temporal. For the purposes of exploring the relationship between the suburbs of Paris and Paris central, his third dimension, the spatio-temporal, is critical to developing a sound and fair understanding of the suburbs and their obvious disconnect to

---

83 Fishman (Quote from Le Corbursier).
84 Lefebvre, Tr. Michael J. Enders 30.
the city. For the former two, production and financial planning of the new towns and suburbs were well-connected, stemming from the work of architects and city planners of Paris. Yet, for the third component, Lefebvre argues that it has yet to be integrally connected to production and financial planning because it holds a specific relationship to the specific space itself and its innate networks of communication and transactions, for our case, the outlying new housing units of greater Paris. In this sense, there exists a well-structured, formulated infrastructural planning to these new developments. But to this point no clear social or spatial networks of management had existed as of yet. Following this thread, the development of Paris’s new departments was not well coordinated between those who were going to live there, and those who were planning who was going to live there.

What Lefebvre observed, which other city planners and architects missed, is perhaps the core problem of the outer suburbs, both at their construction and during periods of civil unrest and rioting. Lefebvre picked up on the vital and major utilization of networks in the spatio-temporal facet of a city. If construction, financing, and production beget the actual space, subsequently the people who follow to live in it have not yet created sound and clear forms of networks, be they through communication, commerce, or transportation. Consequently, for the Île-de-France, Paris was already tightly webbed and packed as a network, but the developing areas, due to their newness and flux of inhabitants from all over France and countries abroad, developed a web of networks that were tenuous at best.

Lefebvre succinctly summarizes, “Urban space becomes the place of encountering new things, people – an exchange.” Predicting well in advance the current concepts of social capitol and the high importance of networks, Lefebvre developed theories that can be applied to Paris’s current problem of urbanization and sociological disconnect of its

---

86 Ibid, 32.
87 Ibid, 32.
88 Lefebvre, 19. (Translation is my own)
residents. These housing unites and their newness to the already established city of Paris created a dynamic that was difficult to discern at first as just developing or disjointed. Yet in ignoring the growing inequalities developing socially for these residents, planners of French urban policy were not aware of the need for networks and a social connection.

**Keys to the City: To Contract or Create**

Herein it is apparent that the Île-de-France – and all of France’s cities, were caught in the crossroads of an inevitable progression into city expansion and development while holding onto the ideals of the well-established beauty and protection of a traditional city. This desire for living within the city and not in its outlying quarters and *banlieues* intensified the separation of borders in and around the Île-de-France region. It was in 1960 when Paul Delourvier was appointed by then President Charles de Gaulle to further develop the areas into livable and functioning departments. Heralded as the father of the French new towns, Paul Delourvier was ambitious in his efforts to move away from the isolation of apartment blocks and *grands ensembles* towards a more holistic community.

In an interview, Delouvrier describes how city expansion was based decidedly upon two factors: continuous development and isolated points of growth.\(^{89}\) Continuous development was unfavorable because in French opinion it would create, “tache d’huile” or, in other terms, sprawl. Isolating growth also proved to be difficult because it would require, according to Delourvier, “a sharper discipline or control than the French people would accept.”\(^{90}\) Thus, continuous growth along direct axes and lines with the new towns as focal points would provide the services and a livelihood for urban life otherwise found in the center of Paris.\(^{91}\) Also a matter at hand was the implications of naming these areas as ‘new towns.’ For Delouvrier it was a struggle:

---

\(^{89}\) Rubenstien, 34.  
\(^{90}\) Rubenstien, (From an interview with Paul Delouvrier) 34.  
\(^{91}\) Ibid. 34.
“If it were said that new suburbs were being built in the Paris region no one would have said a thing; but the term ‘new towns’ is a pretension, a method of organizing true growth. Everyone in the provinces and even in the government was going to take this as a desire to the Paris region grow”  

Thematically throughout Paris’s rapid expansion in the 20th century is an overarching tone of resistance to real and open settlement in the Paris region. Despite his concerns for creating lively and functioning towns, Delouvrier was engaged in a deeper campaign with those already living in the Paris region.

Before the new towns finalized plans in 1965, planning for the Île-de-France region was primarily run by the national agency, Délégation à l’Aménagement du Territoire et à l’Action Régionale (DATAR). Under their assessment, urbanization in Paris was discouraged because of the dearth of land on which to build. The extreme pressure to inhabit Paris was a phenomenon that is still evident today. Its role as the nation’s capitol and large hub of economic wealth creates an interesting juxtaposition to the undesirability of locating business, homes, and commerce to its outlying departments. For Delouvrier, assessing the nature of this problem was to expand urbanization hubs elsewhere so that the Parisian agglomeration could breathe. The dynamic interplay of urbanizing in new space would then give Delouvrier’s towns every opportunity for successful development both at the economic level and that of environmental protection. Centered around the principle of urbanizing poles, growth could occur and structure the outskirts of the Île-de-France. After meticulous planning, this is how five new towns were born: Cergy-Pontoise, Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, Evry, Melun-Sénart, and Marne-la-Vallée. After his legacy, the visions of Paul Delouvrier encapsulated crucial aspects of urban planning that acknowledged the inevitable blockage of movement into Paris directly, while encouraging outside growth for independent economies and residences.

---

92 Rubenstien, (Interview with Paul Delouvrier)112.
93 Ibid. 25.
95 Ibid, 150.
Perhaps what was most distinct about moving into the Île-de-France region was the sense of permanence felt in constructing these social housing neighborhoods and new towns. Prior to the age of what French scholars Jobert and Théret have dubbed, “neoliberalism à la Française”\(^96\), Paris was regarded as a singular vision of beauty and unique arrangement. It was a city foreigners and tourists could admire and visit from all over. Yet leading up to WW II it was just that: a place to visit. Following the postwar construction of social housing neighborhoods and new towns was not just a physical change to its urban landscape but also a change to its overall identity as a city. By the 1980’s France altered many of its laws and policies on immigration under socialist President François Mitterand. Mustafa Dikeç, a scholar and professor of urban planning and human geography, observes this shift in policy coinciding with a paramount moment of civil unrest and disruption in the *banlieues* of Paris and other French cities. Brought to attention by media, the looting and unrest pre-dawned the violence and chaos that occurred in 2005.

Suddenly brought to the forefront of political attention, the *banlieues* came to the forefront of political and social attention. For Dikeç, French urban policy in the 1980’s and 1990’s centered itself around the problems specifically associated with the *banlieues*, their economic disparity and the large numbers of immigrants living there.\(^97\) Yet at a loss for how to adjust their urban policy in adaptive *social* terms, French Urban Policy took on a renewed vigor in creating policies centered around ideas of “financial solidarity”\(^98\) namely, fostering economic activity and to increase employment through tax concessions in specific areas of Paris’s neighborhoods. As solving most housing and inequality problems, concessions made out through social welfare from the state has occurred since the Île-de-France had housing. However, what has elapsed is not always successful. The idea of “mixed housing” has undergone various forms of implementation since Paris

\(^96\) Jobert, Théret, 80.
\(^97\) See Dikeç, *Two Decades of French Urban Policy*.
\(^98\) Dikeç, 70.
began expanding. Coined under the term, *Habitation Loyer Modérée* or HLMs were developed both in and outside the greater Paris area to provide low-income housing. However, the HLM buildings in central Paris were much more expensive than those on the outlying periphery because of differences in land costs. Incidentally, HLM developments constituted as requiring higher financial support are more concentrated in the suburbs of Paris.\(^99\) Additionally, there is an even lesser degree of HLM developments in the peripheral new town areas of the Île-de-France region.\(^100\) Thus, a process of economic gentrification has backfired in a sense, where the HLM developments, aimed to help those who were economically disadvantaged, have only further isolated contained suburbs of lower social classes. Dikeç argues further that in responding to the civil unrest that occurred in these concentrated areas, the French state has taken on “authoritarian role,” utilizing its powers as protector of the state to justify its policies against the “menaces to the republic.”\(^101\) Politically, the agenda set forth by French politicians of the 1980’s and 90’s has reformatted the problems of the *banlieues* to be in and of themselves the problem. Marked as “neighborhoods in difficulty”\(^102\) little has been done to help them socially. Under penalizing urban policy, the *banlieues* have undergone a long duration of embedded social stigmatization, and polarization.

To some degree, one can imagine and hope that the new towns would have helped absolve and satisfy many of the problems presented by the apparent isolation and void of viable economies for people on the outer districts of the Île-de-France. Yet in current assessment by scholars, planning for the greater Paris area and its *banlieues* was only destined to degrees *de mal en pis*. For surveyors of the current state of the *banlieues*, Sophie Gonick writes, “encouraged by a discourse that draws upon the Republicanism of the French state, these areas have become synonymous with a kind of dangerous urban

\(^99\) Rubenstein. *French New Towns*. 131. (Table 5-3).
\(^100\) Ibid. 131 (Table 5-3).
\(^101\) Dikeç, 77.
Caught in the balance between restrained growth and massive development, the French state faced difficult decisions in imposing effective policies. By mere association with the number of people moving into the Île-de-France region, construction of housing developments and new towns took on negative connotations. Tainted by the marked separation from Paris, it is now near impossible to identify the banlieues as a part of Paris. They are represented distinctly distant, one apart from the other.

What is important to ask now is how the problems within the banlieues are being addressed. What are the political, social, and cultural narratives at hand? Is the French state adopting policy measures that are only continuations of repressive, penal policies? Or is there a new agenda being laid out? And more importantly, who exactly is laying out the agenda?

In the following chapter I will examine in detail the exact connotations of the banlieues leading up to the rioting of 2005, what preceded afterwards, and how the banlieues are currently being presented. From this I hope to investigate their real differences, not only in economic terms but also in social and cultural terms. For it cannot be denied that despite the values upheld by the French Republic of liberté, égalité, and fraternité, there exists a tangible sense of the other, as spatially presented through Paris, and its outlying suburbs.

---

103 Gonick, 31.
Chapter Three: Vying Voices for Change

For the residents in the banlieues, it is often just their portrayal and a characterization of their plight as described by French press and media. Hearing their actual accounts gives the realities of their situation. Recent testimony from banlieue residents makes it hard to believe housing renovations have actually been implemented.

“It’s difficult to live here, the buildings are badly built, the situation with housing is a total mess. The main problems are housing, finding work, and then making it to the end of the month. Once we’ve paid the electricity and water bills, we find we don’t have much money left” explained high-school student Danaé in an interview. Clichy-Sous-Bois, where she lives, is notoriously known as a bad neighborhood and was where the rioting of 2005 began. According to Danaé and other residents, the living conditions of Parisian banlieues have remained unfavorable places to live. Debated and discussed over in the most recent elections, the issue is called, Le Problèmes Banlieues. Socialist candidate, Françoise Hollande spoke out against the stark inequalities present and the need for direct, immediate change. Nicolas Sarkozy, who was president and member of moderate right party the UMP, defended his past housing policies to create change and spoke of an advancement occurring for many areas in and around the Île-de-France region.

Supporters of the far right party, Le Front National, favored Marine Le Pen’s staunch position against the problems of the banlieues. The party’s platform heavily situated and connected banlieue strife to statewide concerns about economic insecurity, immigrants, and unemployment. As polling results showed, despite socialist president Françoise Hollande’s win for the presidency, polling for support of the National Front found an all time high --17.9% of the vote, for Marine Le Pen in the 2012 election than in

104 See Lantier’s in his article on the political climate in Clichy-sous-Bois.
105 See Vignal’s article summarizing the multiple political discourses around the banlieues.
106 See Hester.
previous years. Puzzled by the numbers, analysts categorized this voting behavior as the “normalizing” of far right politics. Put in other words, anti-immigrant discourse is becoming more and more acceptable in France. According to Nilufer Gole, professor of sociology at Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Science Sociales in Paris, increased voting for National Front candidate Marine Le Pen presents that, “there is no shame in voting for a person who represents the feelings and anxieties of the people, and who is, ‘one of us.’” In a way, voters found consolation in Marine Le Pen’s animosity towards the banlieues. She made it easy to argue that these neighborhoods themselves created their problems, and that the rest of France should not be responsible.

Succeeding the Sarkozian years where sociopolitical discourse further ostracized the outer communes of France, there is a continued tendency to impress France’s statewide concerns on the banlieues. The past elections have made it clear how problematically all these issues are placed one on top of the other. France’s economic decline, high unemployment, housing strains, and anti-immigration measures are synonymously placed alongside the problems of the banlieues.

Yet these higher voting percentages of the far right and shared “feelings and anxieties of the people” does not present just one dynamic of the political climate in the Île-de-France region. The mounting support for political parties such as the National Front brings to focus two important facets of the 2012 French presidential campaign: a growing characterization of the banlieues as places occupied by immigrants and the unemployed but also a growing political voice from residents in the banlieues themselves. It can be argued that the heightened radicalization of the far right party suggests an amplification of not one, but two minority groups.

For these banlieuesards, as they are called by the press, it is difficult to determine where they place themselves in the political process. For, as one youth from Clichy-Sous-

---

107 See Morris’ analysis. (blogs.lse.ac.uk).
108 See Gole’s position (OpenDemocracy).
109 See Gole.
Bois reported, “I voted in the elections. But whether I voted or not, it does not make much difference.” His désespoir in the French political system is a despair shared by many from low-income communes in the Île-de-France. The recent elections have presented additional complexities to an already muddled social issue. Struck now by demonizing characterizations from far right political figures but also with a political voice of their own, residents of the banlieues are in a political warfare of sorts. Their demands are equal job opportunities, voting rights, and better housing accommodations. Yet they are also working to de-politicize their stigmatization as France’s grand ensemble.

For this chapter, in moving away from the actual construction of and policies for the banlieues, I plan to examine the ways in which the banlieues and cités of the Île-de-France have been socially drawn, both by central political figures, and by those living in them. First I will draw upon various discourses around the rioting preceding, during, and following the events of 2005. The variety of problems presented as the root of the rioting suggests that there is no singular dimension for a solution. Rather, a continued progression towards more effective policies, social mobilization and transferred ideas creates an oscillation of new ideologies. These ideologies however, are not merely reproduced gestations of past behavior in the banlieues. I argue there is a new order and sense of direction. Where there was once only désespoir, I plan to show from a variety of past and current discourses, hope is now impressed on the minds of les banlieuesards.

A strong facet that continually comes up their presentation of the banlieues. As depicted in the film, La Haine, by Mathieu Kassovitz, young men roam their destitute neighborhoods and the streets of Paris, hoping to find some semblance of belonging, yet always seeming to find contentious quarrels and struggles in both places. In his commentary on the creation of the film, director Mathieu Kassovitz writes about the reality of people’s living situations in the banlieues. There is an attirance of sorts towards delinquency, violence, and drug trading that occurs within these neighborhoods,

110 See Lantier.
which gives them such a bad rap. At the head of this derogatory escapade was President
Nicolas Sarkozy. Kassovitz argues that through men like Sarkozy, their words and
descriptions, incurs “hate upon hate,” which then develops and devolves into stereotypes
and an entrenched imprisonment of people’s existence in these areas. Like many zoned
districts in large metropolises, there are certain ones with highly devolved stories, which
stick and remain to their foundations.

Le Mal Nommé: Cité, Banlieue, Zone Urbaine, et Les Grands Ensembles

Before continuing into the events that have circulated around and embedded
themselves into the framework of the suburbs outside of Paris, it is important to note
exactly what the terms banlieues and cités actually denote. As categorizations of areas,
banlieue translates as the suburbs in the English language, but it carries a negative
connotation in its French meaning. In French, banlieue translates to ‘banned location.’ In
the Middle Ages, these banned locations were localities under control by officials of the
main town. Inhabitants of the banned locations did not have the same rights and freedoms
as the authorities in the area. Today the French use multiple terms to describe the
neighborhoods outside of France, yet there are associations and subtle differences for
each word used. For example, another term for banlieue is cité, which specifically
signifies the housing estates developed by Delouvrier and other city planners in the 1950s,
1960s and 1970s. After eventual stalemates of growth in the late 1970s, specific cités in
the Île-de-France began to develop stronger negative associations than others. La
Courneuve, the 93rd commune in the Île-de-France, is distinctly a space of social
inequality with high levels of youth unemployment. It has historically been this way
for some time, creating an impression of permanence to its socio-economic class. The

---

111 See Kassovitz’s positioning on the banlieues in “La France d’en Bas”
112 See Waddington, King, Jobard.
113 INSEE. La Courneuve (93027 – Commune) Emploi – Population active. See Figures in
Appendix D.
French have many different iterations and ways to describe the space they inhabit. The name *La Courneuve* alone stands isolated from the rest of the regions departments.

Despite their low-income portrayal, not all communes within the Île-de-France are economically worse off than the central part of the city. In fact, many departments in the western region are valued as booming centers of commerce and industry for the French state. They are well off economically and attract many nodes of industry such as engineering, green energy, and biotechnology.\(^{114}\) Yet the wealth does not evenly circulate around the Île-de-France. Concentrated in its western half, the departments have been split into the haves and the have-nots. In French city planning terms, the name *Zones* cropped up as a way to differentiate between the various communes and their relative prosperity. The three classifications, *Zone d'Education Prioritaire* (ZEPs), *Zone franches urbaines* (ZFU) and *Zone Urbaines Sensibles* (ZUS) are all designations of communes and their relative need for ‘urban policy recovery’. They are all given a form of social welfare allocations from the state. Zones for education (ZEPs), tax and duty free areas (ZFU), and economic statistics (ZUS), are all titles for subsidies from the state. Yet by doing so, the communes have been polarized as spaces social and economic needs. They are then endowed with a dependency to the state, who regulates and oversees provisional and policy aid for these communes. Moreover, aside from policy terms, they also hold the negative connotations associated with the *banlieue*.\(^{115}\) For a variety of reasons these have become the associations of the various *cités*. Evolving from a confluence of social and policy ideations is an inextricable tie to the terms given to the *cités* and *banlieues*. Handicapped by social deprecation while also aided through taxation cuts and economic resources, the meanings behind the words *banlieue*, and *cité*, carry the weight of a difficult and severe place to live.

\(^{114}\) Cadenel, Nicole and Christian Calzada. In their findings, the de-industrialization of the Île-de-France has resulted in considerable growth for technology and research in some areas, such as la Dèfense, Saclay and Palaiseau. 28.

\(^{115}\) Waddington, King, Jobard, Xx.
Recognition and Denial: Two Addresses from the State

Studying the actual movements within specific hard-hit banlieue localities reveals the extent of their proletariat identity and also their immigrant identity. As discussed earlier, outlying areas of France experienced moments of civil unrest and disruption before the rioting of 2005. Terms such as L’Été Chaud, to describe the summer events that occurred in the Minguettes housing in Lyon during 1981, indicate that residents were experiencing a sense of embottled emotions. Coinciding with these events was the policy framework, politique de la ville, ambitiously seeking to help deprived urban areas. Yet in already deprived states, the politique de la ville, despite its intentions for revitalization did not successfully help the residents of the Zones Urbaines Sensibles (ZUS). In the 1980s two threads arose under congruent observance in the banlieues: a generation of sons from immigrant blue-collar families without jobs or a good education and an increase of demand in the heroin market. To follow were immediate allegations centered around youth delinquency, crime involvement and high dropout rates in school. All of this rhetoric was connected to the prevailing drug environment. Intensifying this culture were the paramilitary police unites deployed in the cités beginning in the 1990s. Thereby, advancing towards an idea of extreme surveillance and policing, the neighborhoods turned from economically disadvantaged to socially hostile, volatile to crime and corruption. As Waddington and Jodard summarize, the timelining of social and economic policies to help the residents has, in many respects, been, “extremely counterproductive.” It has also been extremely detrimental to the image of these cities. They are branded with an image of crime and unrest, making it difficult to avoid their negative associations.

117 Ibid, 33.
118 Ibid, 37.
Coming as no surprise, the case study findings from Waddington, Jodard and King, as well as other scholars, show a direct correlation where the rioting of 2005 occurred were designated ZUS. However, contrary to the depictions presented by the media and press immediately following the riots, Waddington, Jodard and King noted that where rioting occurred was, “much more precisely correlated with the level of segregation of these people” in these neighborhoods designated as ZUS.\(^{119}\) We can deduce that more concentrated segregation within the *banlieues* heightens and delineates the communes themselves. From this observation, there is not only differentiation from central Paris and wealthier communes in the Île-de-France but also each neighborhood in the departments themselves. The extent to these degrees of separation, made so finite, suggest that residents, specifically the unemployed youth, feel a complete and utter sense of *abandonment*. They have no sense of community or belonging in where they live. It is understandable then in what transpired during the rioting. The riots were a multitude of things, but above all there was an exceptional feeling of embottled despair and plight.

As I discussed in my opening chapter, the many interpretations and analyses that ensued after the riots were multifarious and at times contradictory. Debated through many lenses such as economic volatility, a policing problem, youth delinquency, and the threat of Islam, they have become compressed into an amalgamation of dilemmas that the French state is now treading delicately around. Yet it seems the state is unable—and moreover, unwilling to fully cede and fix the housing crisis and identifiable education gaps in the ZUS. Alain Morice, a scholar of French sociology, observed that many of the institutionalizing laws and policies laid out following the riots, eradicated the possibility for protesters to present their feelings in an open democratic dialogue. Furthermore, politicians presented two acted in two ways: severe punishment of the acts as vandalism and finding solutions for the problems in the *quartiers difficiles*.\(^{120}\) Yet dealing with the

\(^{119}\) Ibid, 113.
\(^{120}\) See Morice, 5.
banlieues has posed many problems. France acts a social-welfare state, but struggles to recognize the unequal benefits they enact. They give out social benefits, while also pointedly failing in their social welfare policies. The French state was stuck grappling with their solutions in a way that would decidedly deal with the problem.

The Banlieue Debate at Large

Also important to articulate is that for the first time in France, the problems of the banlieues was brought to the forefront of international attention. It moved beyond merely the French press. International media coverage displayed the burning cars, schools and public buildings for all to see. It was as if France’s heavily guarded and policed cités were suddenly unleashed out for the world to witness. No longer an underlying, peripheral issue kept dissimulé by the French, residents of the banlieues made themselves visible beyond the surveillance of the French Republic. This is integral to understand for multiple reasons. First, in having not just national but international coverage of the riots, the French news dealt with not only addressing the manifestations of the rioting but also acknowledging the ways in which other media coverage was interpreting and covering the high levels of unrest and chaos. In one article from Le Monde titled, “Comment la droite américaine exploitait les émeutes” author Serge Halimi deplores the ways in which American media from the right, specifically Fox news, associates social agitation with sentiments against ‘enemies of the exterieur’. He argued American discourse and media dissemination is ingrained in the voice of the right, and badly posed to answer the problems. It is notable that the rioting was debated through these two lenses. The American media presented it in many ways from their own interpretations of riots. However, the United State’s history of rioting holds different historical significance then that of the banlieue.

---

121 See, Halimi, “Comment la Droite Américaine Exploitait les Émeutes”
Spun one way versus another, French journalists found themselves facing a story beyond their own framing. In another article, Alec G. Hargreaves interviewed youth in the communes of Seine-St-Denis. He noted an 18 year olds frustration with discrimination. The youth of the departments wish for insertion into French society, he discovered after hearing their complaints, were by means of employment.\textsuperscript{122} Construed and interpreted in various ways, news and media sought answers and justifications for reasons behind the riots. However, as many remark in their concluding sentences, the French state was too late in addressing the inequalities present in the \textit{banlieues}. Beyond the state’s failure to understand what was boiling, there was also a failure to fully comprehend what was at stake for the youth engaged in the riots.

Weighing in on opinions from abroad, French headlines engaged with an international dialogue. \textit{Le Courrier International} featured journalists from Europe and the United States, who compared and debated the ways in which the French state and other countries dealt with discrimination and rioting. Josep Playà Masset, writer for \textit{La Vanguardia} expressed the dissimilarities between France and Spain in dealing with the two issues. He observed there is also a similar influx of recent immigration into Spain but that they run little risks of rioting.\textsuperscript{123} Washington Post journalist David Ignatius openly addressed France’s failure to adhere to a system of positive discrimination, stating, “the pretended egalitarian system does nothing but guarantee unequal results.”\textsuperscript{124} Dagens Nyheter, writing from Stockholm, pointedly noted that the French state has an embedded history of colonization, and that their political elite strictly enforce the ‘\textit{valueurs de la République}’. By contrast, Sweden does not have a history of colonization, alleviating many potential racial tensions.\textsuperscript{125} Contextualized historically, socially, and through French law, opinions from everywhere assessed the rioting. France was forced to also analyze them under new auspices it had been denying previously.

\textsuperscript{123} See Maset, \textit{Le Courrier International}.
\textsuperscript{124} See Ignatius.
\textsuperscript{125} See Dagens \textit{Courrier International}
While news coverage of the events of the banlieues was debated and discussed, another topic came to the forefront of the French Press. Politicians and the news covered stories around a growing concept of Islamophobia in France. Presented as a fundamental inconsistency to French Society and Europe, articles ranged from opinion pieces by François Bayrou, a French centrist politician, to student led activism in newly “Islam infiltrated” neighborhoods. In an article published in France’s L’Express, writers Eric Conan and Christian Makarian report on the growth of an Islamic presence in France and Europe. Citing historical events and periods of Muslim and Judeo-Christian conflicts and battles, they argue that Islam is incompatible in Europe. They go on to extrapolate over Western stereotyped notions of Islam, such as the “renfermement endogamique des jeunes filles” (confinment and endogamous control of girls) or an , “evolution of Islam.” What’s more, they stress the strong aversion to multi-culturalism, which they claim is not always a richness to the region. He argues, “This awareness is due to immigrant activists who want to emancipate from a growing Muslim male chauvinism in Europe”¹²⁶

I bring up this article to highlight how journalists from a French perspective perpetuate and clearly make apparent a deep-seated cultural difference in France. That is, the unwillingness to accept a multi-culturalist ideology. The way Conan and Makarian interprete and portray the Islam Europe debate through their article is itself an acute measure of French ideology. By framing Islam as incompatible to France, they are only further propagating the resistance to it. Perhaps made clearer, is the narrowing of Islamophobic feelings to specific campaigns in neighborhoods within Île-de-France. In an article from France’s Libération titled, “Traquenard au pinard contre l’Islam,” author Julia Pascual reports one young woman’s efforts to denounce and retaliate against the “islamisation” occurring in the Goutte-d’Or, her neighborhood in the 18th arrondissement of Paris. Self-described as

“ultralaïques” to emphasis a strong adherence to the French laïcité law, Sylvie François, the leader behind the event, explains a need to prove the unease she feels living in her quarter and how those living there, “no longer feel at home in their neighborhood”. In her efforts to campaign against this ‘islamisation’ she hosted a gathering for pork appetizers, in an outright effort to “re-conquer their territory and identity.” This counterattack against Islamic practices over actual spatial territories denotes a peculiar French cultural dominance. Made apparent from this campaign is the threat French citizens feel in their neighborhood from Islamic religious observance. Pinned to a simple choice of food, this campaign gets at an even more deeply seated cultural difference. François’ decision to campaign a French social, and –as made evident, cultural practice, against a religious practice demonstrates the obtuse incomprehensible threat she feels. The debate pits cultural values against religious values and wants to prove the two are incompatible. There is a hot conteraction against differences in France, yet many are blinded to their own culturalist assumptions.

By this point in time, most of the heat from the rioting had ceded. However, the politicizing of the riots as acts of fundamental Islam pervaded into the political discourse at large. The delinquent youth rebellion story had morphed and attached itself to debates about immigrant occupation and moreover, Islamic occupation in France. In comparison to other European countries, France holds a high immigrant percentage. Yet there was still a strong emergence of resistant ideology to Islam in France after the rioting of 2005.

There was little France could do to prevent the swift media reception immediately following the riots. Media engagement from both sides, audiences from all over chimed in their opinions. Left wing, Right wing, and from minorities, citizens in the Île-de-France concurrently began to use their political voices. After the rapid ascension of the Internet and social media in the new digital age, forums blossomed on blogs, groups

128 Conan, Eric and Christian Makarian.
formed under collective, social engagement, and opinions began to spread at unprecedented scale. Whereas in previous years where Paris’s center could quell and ignore the civil unrest after several weeks passed, the emergence of networking and global social discourse set off a continuous pulse. Those in the center now heard periphery voices that had previously been silenced.

Chapter Four: Engaging in the Dialogue

Avenues for Political and Social Change in the Île-de-France

To open up this chapter, I move away from discussions and narration on the riots of 2005, towards the current discourse in the Île-de-France. I decided to reach out and speak with various organizations on issues addressing sociopolitical and socio-spatial injustices in France. As an American reaching out to multiple groups, I prefaced my requests for interviews based on my interest in both the social and the spatial dynamics of the Île-de-France.

Before elaborating on the interviews conducted, I want to highlight first the ones I was not successful with. I received more reception from non-government affiliated organizations than actual French administrative offices. A variety of factors I think are connected to this illuminating facet. Primarily, being government branches, I found it was difficult to navigate and speak to an associate who would pass on information related to their operations. Whether it was because they did not have the time or if they could not disclose information, I continually came to blockades and forwarded dropped calls. Additionally, I observed a resistant tone to the administrative representatives I spoke with. The majority of them advised me to acquire the information through their website, and others would just hang up. One such organization was the Société du Grand Paris. In my efforts to speak to their press relations, I was redirected and given e-mail addresses to contact.
However, I want to emphasize here that my position as an American social-science academic plays as much a part of my efforts to gather information, as it does to these organizations sharing it. This can be attributed to my accent, but also a certain French institutional opposition to disclosing information. As a governing body, their processes should not be questioned. I make this distinction from my comparable experience and classes on French society while abroad. As a foreigner to France, my curiosity raised speculation before compliance. But for the organizations I did speak with I discovered illustrative and signifying reports.

My first interview was with Marwan Abu Dijibril Muhammed, a representative for the organization, Collection Contre l’Islamophobie en France. Beginning in 2003, the collective was founded to help and support the victims of discrimination and hate crimes based on Islamophobic prejudice. Growing in France at that time was the idea of Islamophobia. Marwan explained to me that many French political figures were making very bold declarative statements against Islam. Furthermore, they were not ashamed of their Islamophobic sentiments. In addition to the oppressive speech, the collective formed in a parallel moment to France’s law forbidding the wearing of the foulard. What followed was an increase in incidents of Islamophobic hate crimes and prejudices in the streets of France. Providing psychological and legal support, CCIF helps victims of Islamic prejudice cope with the derogatory and hurtful speech and acts directed towards them. In addition, their legal counsel empowers people to be aware of unlawful prejudice and bias they may experience in administrative, public, and private spaces.

Marwan explained to me that the CCIF is not a religious organization but a civil organization, engaging with people from a variety of diverse backgrounds. A part of his role helps, “take part in the anti-roma prejudice and the anti-semitism” however, their

---

129 The foulard is French for scarf or neckerchief. I use it colloquially here to present how it is discussed in modern French conversation. However, other words exist to describe the adornment restricted in the 2004 law.

130 Marwan Muhammed. Appendix A. Personal Interview.
campaign, is “specifically on Islamophobia individually.” While discussing with Marwan the numerous incidences of discrimination occurring in the Île-de-France region and France at large, Marwan repeatedly spoke about many of the conceptions centered around Islamophobia. In their case findings, the reports were almost always conceptions of appearance and physical determiners. Those who allegedly look Muslim, men from Seik religions, having beards, and darker skin color are all markers of an identity that is supposedly Islamic. Frequently women are targeted because they wear the hijab, or headscarf. Quantifying the number of incidences, Marwan cited that a shocking 87% of the hate crimes reported are targeted at women. Additionally, after the 2004 law passed, discriminators will misinterpret it and band women from many public establishments in the region. Restaurants, administrative buildings, gyms, bakeries, cafés, and places of employment are all utilized as places of discrimination and subjugation. This suggests that there is a reoccurrence of discrimination occurring in novel “hot-spots” around the Île-de-France.

Singular isolated incidents acts are not sufficient enough to explain a rise of Islamophobia in France. Yet correspondingly, as anti-Islam ideology is disseminated, the CCIF has recorded an amplified number of reported cases. Citing their numbers, Marwan said 2012 was the highest year on record, with 369 incidents reported. However, he notes this report is most likely inaccurate because victims interiorize and do not realize that these acts of discrimination are, in fact, illegal. Marwan describes it as a rising phenomenon in France. It is visible that Islamophobia is no longer an isolated event, but rather an identifiable form of racism that pervades around French society. Recalling the far right rhetoric from earlier, the CCIF’s high reported numbers correlate well to the rising political allegiance of France’s far right party members. Islamophobia is not just a creation from everyday citizens, but dispelled down from minority political elites.

---

131 Muhammed. Appendix A.
132 Cesari, 1.
133 Muhammed. Appendix A.
134 Muhammed. Appendix A.
To fully understand the areas centered around Islamophobia in the Île-de-France region, I asked Marwan about localities and if distinctly segregated places still existed. As noted before by many scholars such as Waddington (2009), Cesari (2005), and Ossman (2006), the neighborhoods in the Île-de-France are not measured in terms of ethnicity or race but on income levels. However, Cesari’s discussions on the “subculture” in the banlieues of France is centered on conflated issues around poverty, ethnicity, and Islam. Discussing this concept Marwan noted,

“Different from the U.S – here the idea of community, or a Muslim community, is relatively taboo. We don’t say that this is a Black neighborhood, or this is an Arab neighborhood or this is a White – or predominately White neighborhood. We don’t usually use this categorization in France. What we see, is that the religious belonging, or that the ethnic or cultural belonging of an individual has no statistical explanatory power."^{136}

Certainly there is no absolute explanatory power from one’s race or religious affiliation and economic income. However, important to note in these departments specifically located in the Île-de-France is Cesari’s continued “subculture” – a continued taboo, that the French state has embedded into its social ideology. There is a strict state ordinance to look at these neighborhoods in economic levels. However, apparent is a cultural permanence to associate Muslims, Arabs, and people of Islamic origin as coming from these departments and neighborhoods in France. Thus there is an existence of real barriers, both physical and conceptual, between people in the Île-de-France region.

Accordingly, Marwan mentioned that there still is an over representation of North-Africans and Arabs in deprived areas around Paris, namely the “91st, the 93rd, and the 94th arrondisements."^{137} These are the same places where the riots began seven years ago.

**Insiders and Outsiders: Where they Collide**

---

135 See Cesari’s “sub-culture” lense of the banlieues for a better understanding of resistance in outer regions of the Île-de-France.
136 Muhammed. Appendix A.
137 Muhammed. Appendix A.
It would appear then, to answer questions asked earlier about the two ways of addressing the riots with penalization or communication\(^{138}\) it was the former rather than the later. As observed by the CCIF, the propaganda from political discourse, media, and – unfortunately, the French administration itself, has led to specific places of exclusion: the inner arrondisements of Paris, schools, libraries, museums, administrative offices, and – of particular interest, the Paris metro.

Talking about these cases in the region, Marwan revealed telling information. Youth from banlieues who go into Paris proper are often subjected to higher levels of surveillance by security officials. In its closely knitted center, teenagers are unduly patrolled by security in public shopping centers, museums, and libraries. Accusations range from loitering to theft and are based upon appearance and attire. For Muslim women, if they choose to wear the hijab, they are not allowed to attend school events because of the hijab’s religious affiliation.\(^{139}\) Additionally, in places such as the 6\(^{th}\) arrondissement, a “fancy neighborhood of Paris“\(^{140}\) Muslim women are often subjected to extreme levels of discrimination in cafés, bakeries, restaurants, and public administrative offices. Employers will even fire their employees who they know are Muslim. They find reasons through unlawful accusations such as using lunch to pray in spaces designated for lunch breaks.\(^{141}\)

From Marwan’s explanations, it appears places of discrimination and separate identities display themselves most prominently when one group breaches into a space they are not normally associated with. This creates perceptions of an, “apartheid type of ideology. These are the Muslims, these are the non-Muslims, and we’re going to base our judgment – our inclusion based on their religious visibility“\(^{142}\). Similarly, for the youth in the banlieues, the prejudice based upon their appearance creates, “these forms of

\(^{138}\) Here I am referring to Alain Morice and his article on French responses to the riots (2008). See chapter 3 for my analysis.

\(^{139}\) Muhammed. Appendix A. Here he refers to refused service based on a religious tie.

\(^{140}\) As described by Marwan.

\(^{141}\) Muhammed. Appendix A.

\(^{142}\) Muhammed. Appendix A.
animosity between some of the youth living in the suburbs and some of the more posh areas as we have, which are completely segregated in terms of social life and inclusion.”

Obvious still, is the impress of places serving as defining points of segregation and at the same time areas of belonging. For those living in the Île-de-France, as is the case in most all cities world-wide, the association of good and bad neighborhoods remains contrasted with central Paris and the banlieues. There is blindness on both sides, for those who fear going into the banlieues and those who feel forbidden to leave them. In turn, it creates a difficult cycle of reiterated discriminatory remarks, inopportunistic views, and disheartened outlooks for residents in the banlieues. Well aware that the separation ideology is established in Paris, the Collection Contre L’Islamophobie is working hard to break it down.

**Campaigning and Mobilization: Using Metro Space as a Political Sphere**

Before speaking with Marwan, I came across their national campaign, *Nous Aussi Sommes La Nation*, on the homepage of their website. Described as the first national campaign against Islamophobia, it acted to create awareness around the sentiments, questions, and meanings of racism and Islamophobia in France. Beginning in November 2012, posters, bulletins, press conferences, and radio talks all helped dispel the message of *Nous Aussi Sommes La Nation*. Talking with Marwan about the campaign’s promotion and development process, he explained its main, integral message was that as citizens and members of the French republic, immigrants, Arabs, Muslims are all a part of France without having to change their identity. For them, their daily contributions, their participation in and belonging to the state does not ostracize and isolate them. They are free to practice their traditions, values, and religions as they are. As citizens, they do not have to “get rid of anything that constitutes their identities.”

---

143 Muhammed. Appendix A.
144 Muhammed. Appendix A.
constructed stereotypes by politicians, the message was precisely constructed to, “not fall into the trap of replaying and reproducing the clichés that most Muslims are accused of.” Upon its launch, CCIF released the campaign through radio discussions, viral videos and spatially around the ring *peripherique* road of the Île-de-France region.

Through a platform generating discussion with politicians and radio announcers as well as the visual campaigns, the various mediums created a forum that the collective used to usher in new and developed ideas for fighting Islamophobia. Important also were their deliberate decisions to create a discourse that was balanced and rational. They did not want to subject it to ideas of a protest, but rather, a space of discussion. Using humor and conversation, they wanted to give *Nous Sommes Aussi la Nation* a feeling of openness and approachability. It was purposed to create conversations as well as invoke humor.

In terms of *where* the images and bulletins were made visible, billboards around the road *peripherique* (the road that divides Paris’s inner 20 arrondisments from the outlying departments and neighborhoods) displayed the large images. The signs showed diverse groups of people holding France’s flag, united under the Republic. Additionally throughout other areas of France such as Lyon, images displaying people’s portraits were mounted on display at bus stops and other places of transit. Publicized in open spaces, the message proliferated out to the people of France.

Yet in other popular spots to campaign, the collective encountered some difficulties. Marwan stated there was a desire to mount the campaign in the Parisian metro but that it created a backlash of resistant responses from the publicity agencies in charge of metro ad spaces. A popular spot to campaign, it was here that the collective encountered the most difficulty. A public space without their message, presented a paradox in terms of what was public space and what was private. With respect to Paris,

145 Muhammed. Appendix A.
146 Muhammed. Appendix A.
147 See the Collective’s ad space in: La Campagne S’Affiche À Lyon.
an area of paramount mixing and interaction between people is its underground metro. Arguably the metro holds as much cultural significance to the city as it does for its massive transit operation. For the commuters, tourists, students and other passengers, the metro serves as a place for observance and consideration of events, news and advertisements on display in its enclosed tunnels. A valued area for disseminating a campaign, Marwan, explained that the metro was, in fact, one of the only places where they were not allowed to exhibit their campaign. He stated,

“Initially we wanted to have the campaign in the metros. But the agency in charge of allocating the advertisement space in the metros said, ‘fighting Islamophobia is a religious thing and we should not see any women wearing the hijab, -- headscarf in the metro for the sake of what we call in France laïcité.. So basically, they were trying to forbid the campaign from going on in the metro, which is basically equating to discriminating an organization, fighting discrimination.”

Hearing this report, one must take into consideration several factors. First, ad space in the metro is highly desirable; it promotes and circulates its content by the very nature of the metro itself. It also generates vast numbers of views per day to a wide array of people. Whichever ad agency the Collective contacted, they were aware of the marketable value and – in this sense, ideological value that their ad spaces hold. Second, in monitoring what images are displayed, in this case a woman and her headscarf, private agencies hold formidable control of one’s vision of public space. What is presented, who views it, and how it is portrayed are all considered of essential importance to the private eye for public viewership. Third, in arguing that laïcité applies to the metro specifically under French jurisdiction shrinks and disregards what is actually considered public and private space in the French context. Under the French law of laïcité, it states the wearing of signs or clothing, which elicits the religious affiliation of the student is forbidden in public elementary, middle, and high schools. Nowhere does the law state that areas such as the metro forbid the appropriation and wearing of religious symbols. Herein, it is clear that French administrative and private powers not only exert a bias in their powers, but

---

148 Muhammed. Appendix A.  
149 For more on the French law of laïcité see Weil (2008).
they also exploit and abuse the authority guaranteed by French law. The mere existence of France’s law of laïcité shows the extent to which institutionally, privately and even territorially, areas in the Île-de-France are prone to subjective and dissimulated presentations of civic space. Thus, there is a tension of struggle between those who hold authoritative power and those who contest it in the Île-de-France’s collective spaces, in this incident, the Parisian metro.

For what followed in the aftermath of the metro ad space illustrates how the collective’s campaign fighting discrimination was grounded in problematic rooted problems tied to identity. Marwan explained in order to present the challenging stance the ad agency posed in forbidding the posters’ display, the collective decided to utilize their discrimination as part of the discourse and debates around the issues. He states,

“We published some of the information to the press. It was massively positive for us because we had the debate, why is it so taboo to say that there is Islamophobia in France? Why is it so taboo that an agency like the metro advertising agency would take an ideological stance about these posters and why is it so taboo to admit that the French society today is diverse?" 

Marwan’s questions get at the core of the French issue. Diversity is not a new phenomenon in France. Yet why is it so highly censored? Made evident from the ad space affair, the metro advertising agency gives weight to what the collective seeks to overthrow. There is a discrimination existent in French society. Yet it has become convoluted within spatial, ideological and actual boundaries in the Île-de-France. Why does there continue to be a lingering creation of separation of space? And why does it seem that it is often the case that these places of separation occur in seemingly open, autonomous establishments such as the metro, the cafes and restaurants in and around Paris?

150 Muhammed. Appendix A.
**Providing Spaces to Live: The Necessities of a Home**

In my efforts to further make clear the separation of space and identity for the respective banlieues of Paris, I looked at associations in the Île-de-France recognized for their involvement in providing aid to both public and private housing. One group I came across was Solidarités Nouvelles pour le Logement (Resources to provide Solidarity in Housing, SNL). A volunteer based network, low-income individuals and families are given temporary lodging until they are able to find permanent and sustainable residences in their proper cités. Normally, these people are connected to what SNL calls, the vie du Groupe Local. Acting as a support system, volunteer residents act as counselors to the family’s needs. The mission is to help beneficiaries from beginning to end for a successful reinsertion back into society. Corresponding with Marie-Camille Raffin, their head of press, I discovered that the organization is well established in five departments in the Île-de-France: Paris, Yvelines, Essonne, Hauts-de-Seine et Val-de-Marne.

I was directed to a map of where exact localities and lodgings are offered in the Île-de-France. Located on the following page (Figure 1) the red-housed symbols indicate where at risk and low-income people have been lodged by volunteers involved in SNL.
From the map presented above, the five departments mentioned in SNL’s press documentations are visibly marked with their concentrations of housing establishments.

Curious as to why the Seine-St-Denis department was not equally represented, I asked Marie about SNL’s singular five department placement behind the notable lapse of representations. In her explanation, Seine-St-Denis does hold some lodging. However, the SNL does not hold a departmental association with the Seine-St-Denis region. An additional part of her explanation was that because it is a volunteer based network, they are not present elsewhere in the other parts of the Île-de-France region. Housing accommodations remain organized around the epicenter of Paris and other more wealthy departments. True to the Île’s separated economic spheres, the SNL’s mission appeared to be reaching out only insofar to those who were aware of its existence. Arranged in this manner, I was struck by how off kilter the hosted housing was. Pitched to one side, the map clearly shows how strikingly polarized the North-Eastern region is. The existence of resources provided by the SNL in the Île has made many leaps and bounds for those who

---

151 **Figure 1.** Map provided by Press Documentation of SNL’s work and mission. P 3.
benefit. Yet those who remain perenniually on the outskirts face larger borders to cross.

In social terms though, there is a civic traversal across lines spatially in the Île-de-France. For those who face housing constraints, they are supported by private homeowners. To this end, the SNL unites two very different groups of people who would otherwise most likely never interact. While not mixed housing, the relationships established help erode away the social stigmas and misconceptions of people living in deprived areas around Paris. Marie acknowledges the long-term relation between the landlords and boarders creates real relationships, exchanging stories and giving aid and advice. In their relationship, Marie describes that both volunteers and social workers act, showing renters how to take charge of their accounts and make and follow records. It is, as Marie states, a real relationship, with regular visits and check ups. Housing management and labor cost savings are all comprised and taken into account.

With the creation of the Besson law in 1990, SNL receives grants and subsidaries from the state to help them in their efforts. Since its passing, 65% of all grants fund the housing. The duration of their stay on average lasts between three to four years. During this time they get adjusted and back on their feet. In this way, they are given the time to stabilize and find social housing. Once capable to make a move, lodgers normally find their new homes in social HLM housing. In a paradoxical sense, their move from private to public housing resituates them into the outer periphery context. However, for its social and hopeful endeavors, inhabitants in the Île-de-France are given a sense of connection and help. By its numbers alone, the SNL organization has helped 7,000 lodgers find and acquire housing.

A groundbreaking stance away from the bureaucratic approach of France’s social

154 Raffin Appendix C.
155 Number provided by SNL’s annual report. See “Solidarités Nouvelles pour le Logement: Dossier de presse”
housing policies is the wholesome approach organizations such as SNL and CCIF carry out. Present in their missions is an essential element: a human resources and contact. The availability of someone to talk to, seek advice and consultation from, strives to bridge and create stronger ties and mutual lines between people in the Île-de-France. Aside from a government run suprastucture, these organizations are helpful because of their ties as focal points of people interacting. Minority citizens feel less helpless in the face of large administrations because they have these places to go to.

Another representative I spoke with was Martin Dassieu, who helps run the PACT organization in the Île-de-France. Different from the Solidarité des Nouvelles Logements, the PACT is for private housing. Public and private housing in France are operated in different fashions. For their objectives, the PACT operates to help homeowners more easily renovate and rework their homes. They act through three objectives: finding financial assets to help orchestrate the housing project, amassing the resources and experts necessary and finally completion of the project. It is an effort that remains connected to the PACT for both economical and housing specialized reasons. According to Dassieu, because they operate democratically and do not pass expenses federally through the state, they are economically less expensive. They give a quality to their housing renovations without necessarily being overpriced and expensive.\(^\text{156}\)

PACT operates to help those who can afford to pay for the costs of renovations. From Dassieu’s explanations, passing through state regulations, the organization effectively helps home-owners. However, it is not state-subsidized, setting them apart from normal social housing that the state oversees. In this sense, PACT has a liberal reformative measure, empowering and helping individuals with their home goals. The PACT is an acroynym for: Propaganda Action Contre (against) the Taudis (slums). Used only in its acroynym form today, The PACT was created in 1930 before World War II. Following World War I, many cities in France had been horribly destroyed. The PACT

\(^{156}\) Martin Dassieu, Appendix B. Personal Interview
was created to help reinforce and reconstruct many of the homes and buildings after the first World War.

It was not until the 1950s and 1960s, returning back to the work done by Le Corbusier, that Paris’s Grands Ensembles were created. The PACT was involved in their construction, however it was not until truly afterwards in the 80’s and 90’s that the noticeable decline appeared in the *grands ensembles*. It was at this moment a new intervention took place to help them. Dassieu explained that it was precisely after WWII that, in what he termed, “les populations sinistrées” were placed specifically in the Seine-St-Denis department. Now, many of the operations and urban renewal projects are organized out from the state into this department. The most young, the most poor, Dassieu concludes it is here that that there is the highest concentration of *grands ensembles*. Existent still today, as Marwan had concluded, is an axe of economic polarity. On one side there are the rich, and on the other, the poor. It is, as always, the east versus the west.

It is a conclusion that repeatedly comes up. The Île-de-France is dividedly economically. Classes are separate. The state works insofar as providing housing, yet it still does not provide the livelihood that is needed.

**The Here and Now: Movement Towards Better Development?**

From presenting the societal ideology around the history, recent discourse and current debates on the many identities within the Île-de-France – and France at large, I hope to have established within the spatial frameworking of the Île-de-France region, a long-lasting impression of connections to identity and place within the French mindset. From multiple perspectives, academic, historical, sociological, and political, it is apparent that there has long been a debilitating conformed idea around those who live in the banlieues and those who live in Paris. Speaking directly with representatives of
associations such as Collectif Contre L’Islamophobie, citizens are empowering themselves to speak out against institutional, political, and civic biases and prejudices they experience.

Yet the histories of areas, while distinctly parts and places of an identity, can and do change. The difficulties in assessing these periods of change is by which means and who exactly implements the change. For the Île-de-France, the surveillance and heavy policing of the regions was a component of their identity. Yet in what ensued from the rioting, while at times dualistically penalizing and aiding, there was an outcome. The need for direct change and expansion was iterated by Sarkozy, when he heralded in his plans for a Grand Paris. Moving forward now to the progression and development of the Grand Paris Express, one must also note the tonality of the project and what is at stake for those involved. As Marwan had noted, moments of discrimination and stereotyping occur when politicians and media present people and their affiliation – be it to a religion, neighborhood or appearance, in a negative light. For progressing into its new chapters of development and the desires of these neighborhoods, the Grand Paris Express is envisioned as an all-encompassing project of economic growth and urban development. It hopes to provide efficiency and mass transit out to the departments outside of the Île-de-France. In their discursive claims about the importance of residents’ voice and participation in the development of the Grand Paris Express, it would seem that their directors are intent on a participatory, active voice and dialogue from their residents.

When I spoke to Marwan specifically about the Grand Paris Express, for their part, his association is not affiliated with any part of the planning. Interestingly, he observed that not many people were involved in the Grand Paris Express. But for what is at stake with the public transit system outside of the greater Paris area he emphasized, is an infrastructural participation of exclusion that these lines bring to the Paris suburbs. The question he has, and I have as well is, “How can we tackle these issues, how can we build
a network of transport that’s going to bring these people into the society? It is an important question to pose, one that pulls in strong consideration for the region’s people. I found it to be a discernable and interesting point. For his cautionary questioning, it is true that the region must be aiming to move forward and change their habits. For, as they move forward into their planning, the changes they make today will greatly alter and affect the decisions they make tomorrow. To justify and fully appreciate their stance, I think it is noteworthy to see how the CCIF’s work is humanely based. For them, they see how fully unintegrated these citizens are. Thus, to justify a transit oriented developmental growth may be possible, but at the core of the matter are people’s real livelihoods.

Curious to see what other opinions were around the development of the Grand Paris Express, I also spoke with Martin Dassieu about his views. From what he understood, the Grand Paris Express is a revisionist view of the Île-de-France’s potential. Returning back to the problem where jobs are concentrated in the region, Martin Dassieu stated that the majority of jobs are situated in Paris, yet this is not where the majority of people live. Paris right now is in a state of centrality, thanks to its metro and the multiple jobs available there. Dassieu is in favor for the Grand Paris Express. He reasons that from its creation, the Île-de-France will be able to create two centralities. Its objective is to create other central points in the region and this can be achieved through the new outlined routes.

Dassieu explained that after the 1970s and 1980s, France discontinued the production of its auto-routes, the equivalent of freeways that we have in the United States. The auto-routes had been created in large part due to the popularity of the automobile, yet interestingly after the 1980s, France returned back to its emphasis on mass public transportation. His testimony aligns well with past studies of transit planning for Paris. Past analyses conducted for planning in the Parisian region assess that there have been

---

157 Muhammed. Appendix A.
158 Dassieu. Appendix B.
certain adjustments to wanting more accessible transit for the masses. Interestingly, regional transit developer for the RATP, Michel Barbier reported that the primary roadwork had been developed in a modified “radiocentric form” to serve Paris’s proposed new towns. Car ownership had also increased in the 50s and 60s for France. The highways created such as the road périmétrique made sense to meet the demands. Yet they did not prevail as the new hegemonic transport system. A study forecasting future transportation needs for the Île-de-France concluded that despite the addition of roadways a completely new rapid transit system was needed, in order to link the new towns with Paris. What I found particularly eerie about Barbier’s work looking at transportation needs over the years, was how similar the assessments were to today’s planning of the Grand Paris Express. For example, possible ideas for improved transportation included, connecting regional railway lines across Paris, extending existing metro lines to the suburbs, creating busways into the suburbs, and constructing new orbital lines in the inner suburban ring. From Barbier’s study dating all the way back to 1972, we have now come to the same conclusions for the Île-de-France.

Comparing cars to rail and the metro, Dassieu explained that use of the car in Paris is actually very different and complicated. Gas is expensive and citizens have difficulty parking and finding places. He asserts that there is an additional ecological aspect. With the region’s preoccupation and concern for the environment, there is heavy taxation on cars. Aside from pollution taxes, Dassieu said that to place a high tax on cars, as he explained exists in other cities such as London or Berlin, is unimaginable in France. There is a common tendency and unpopularity to have cars in France. Parking is hard to find, the arrangement of the city makes circulation difficult and traffic is copious and time consuming. In complimenting the transit that already exists in there, the transit map in common functions beautifully. Privileging and placing valor on French

\[159\] See Barbier.
\[160\] Ibid. 207.
transportation back into importance, the Île-de-France is returning back to the armature it was constructed upon.

Recurring since the ideas of Lefebvre, is the importance of an integrated, socially connected city. The planning for the Grand Paris Express seems to expressly have a desire, or at least a presentation of, this integrated and connected city. However, from merely a network of mass transit, is it feasible to both ideologically and spatially transform and help the residents from these disadvantaged neighborhoods? As I have thus far examined, the Île-de-France is historically a place of growth, yet also a place of embedded preconceptions and labeled prejudices in its neighborhoods.

**Systems of Change and Movement Forward**

For concluding this chapter and moving forward to current processes and revitalizations of Paris’s mass transit to outer districts of France, a presidential campaign video from the past 2012 elections supporting François Hollande, well encapsulates precisely what is hopeful and unfortunately also problematic for the planning of the Grand Paris Express. The video opens with the caption, “L’changement c’est maintenant” (the change is now) and proceeds to list five neighborhoods, Creil, Les Ulis, Aubervilles, Clichy-Sous-Bois and Aulnay-Sous-Bois all outer departments of greater Paris. Shots of diverse residents an array of blacks, arabs, and whites hold their electoral voting cards, smiling at the camera, and speaking out presidential candidate François Hollande’s name. Other images show Hollande traveling by the rail RER line to the various communes, shaking hands with his supporters. One woman is filmed excitedly sharing the news that, “Yes! François Hollande – he is on the train!”[161] It all symbolically ties together the main essence of the political call to revitalize and empower the outer communes of Paris.

---

[161] Translation is my own, from the campaign video: “http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BOXhp0BuaiM”
Moreover, it presents a heterogeneous crowd of supporters for Hollande, playing on the thematic, and realness of a diverse body politic in the Île-de-France. Yet there is an edge of the same state-protectionist, disconnected, government led-centrality, that is especially heightened from its placement and portrayal of space. How though, can the two be reconciled? Space begets identites and stereotypes. Coming to terms with the two, one must acknowledge places as means of identity but also as means of change and alteration.

As we can see from the recent elections, the civil unrest of the past, and the current fight against discrimination in France, there are many facets to the social-spatial dynamics in the Île-de-France. It is in a period of conceptual revival. Given all of the now established associations, debates and minorities effectively place themselves at the precipice of the region’s transformation. It must be made clear that in my explorations to follow, the series of new lines planned for the greater Paris area have yet to be installed. It remains to be seen how, and if, these new networks of Paris will, as Marwan questions, “bring these people into the city?” The complexities of an integrated society will not be resolved by a transit network alone. However, I seek to demonstrate, that this grid of mobility serves as a precursor to a more highly networked Île-de-France, both spatially and socially.

A discretionary note: In an article published by the lab, the director of François Hollande’s campaign, Vincent Faltesse assures that the official campaign did not solicit the release of Kanye West’s and Jay-Z’s song to accompany the campaign video. http://lelab.europe1.fr/t/clip-pro-hollande-si-jay-z-kanye-west-ont-un-probleme-on-changera-la-bande-son-1819
Chapter Five: What to Expect from the Grand Paris Express

At this moment, the Île-de-France is taking sweeping measures to catch up to a no longer homogenous society. City planners, politicians, and residents openly recognize the dissimilarities between central Paris and its outlying cités and suburbs. The unraveling of policies and political debates over the banlieues and an elevated awareness of discrimination since the urban riots of 2005 all measure the directives being taken towards a renewed and re-imagined city.

In a different fashion from their normally state-led, welfare driven economic policies, regional actors, both private and public, are working in conjunction with the central government to viably solve the problèmes des banlieues. In their various roles, the state, non-governmental organizations, and regional planners are working to change the landscape of the Île-de-France. Solving the varying degrees of social and economic problems in a land marred by a deeply authoritarian history presents a high wall that will be difficult to overcome.

Conceptually, in this chapter I will introduce many ideas that touch on what effectively makes a city function. From many disciplines and schools of thought, urban planning systematically operates in many ways. Furthermore, I plan on discussing the differentiation between urban planning and urban renewal in order to clarify and perhaps elucidate upon the ideas behind the Grand Paris Express. Using theorists and case studies of urban projects from scholars and theorists such as Patrick Simon, Andrew Newman and Steinhardt, I seek to demonstrate that a city and what helps it function harmoniously is its movement, as well as a sense of belonging and identity to specific areas.

For discussing the process of the Grand Paris Express, the implementation of its lines remains centrally connected to the concepts of a larger Paris, its outlying cités, and in this case a re-imagined Paris. I will show the beginnings of the planning, as drawn out by Nicolas Sarkozy, the law enacted later, and what is now currently happening in social
discourse and official rhetoric of the Société du Grand Paris, the agency behind the operations.

In concluding my fifth chapter, I want to combine the ideas I have about transit and social mobility. Additionally, I want to elaborate on the connections individuals make within their environments and the possible extensions of social capital they can create with more mobility. Spanning out and planning for Paris’s new transit is something that one can only hope will improve the social capital of and accessibility to other resources for the residents of these areas. Yet it is a difficult and still somewhat ambiguous concept to apply.

**How People Effectively Alter a Space**

Before looking specifically at the Grand Paris Express, I want to include a specific case study of spatial-political activism in a northeastern neighborhood of Paris. Scholar Andrew Newman conducted an ethnographic study of efforts led by residents of West-African and Maghribi descent to put a park in their neighborhood. In his dissertation he argues that from the collaborative efforts of policy makers, urban planners, and the residents themselves, the process of urbanization formulates spaces of political change while also creating a sense of cultural belonging. By their association with the group, the residents were involved with the restructuring urban space at the material and symbolic level. Organized as the Association Jardin d’École (AJE) the mobilization efforts helped put in a field green park in what would have been a diesel truck depot. A point of observation to note is the singular distinction of this movement. Newman chose to focus only on one neighborhood in Paris. On the outlying periphery of the neighborhood is specifically multi-ethnic, in a post-industrial area that, contrary to the banlieues, is still Paris proper. In this light, Newman asserts that the AJE,

---

“echoes the class structure of the global city itself, with acute divisions between middle class European descended French, second and third generation Maghrebi residents who were also middle or working class, and an extremely poor generation of first generation immigrants, particularly from West Africa.”

In both their ethnic and economic differences, these residences uniquely occupied and organized through a channel that, in its diverse organizing, remained connected to the specificity of the proper neighborhood as the centralizing root of their community efforts. The events that transpired demonstrate the singularity and power of organizations to push forward their specific goals, in this case, a social and green environment designed to give a shared space to the community. Critical to highlight also was the sway AJE held in contesting what was planned by other, much more powerful national industries in order to uphold their goals of a green space.

In including Newman’s observations, this chapter seeks to demonstrate that there are areas that do contain elements of social and economic mixing in the Île-de-France. These districts all contain their proper history, distinct groups of people, and formation in an increasingly global city that is Paris. What marks this story’s singularity perhaps is its definitive beginning and ending. Seeing the problems marked by years of urban decay, increased violence, and poor living conditions, an organization materialized within a community, demanded a park and—in the end, they now have a “vibrant green space” that is heavily used. What's more, the neighborhoods assembling under the AJE, helped advance and push forward the goals of an area, that otherwise would have been diversely stratified and afflicted by urban decline.

What Newman highlights is not so much the collective shared identity of these people in this organization but rather their shared idealism of a space and what it can give to a community. With this as the case, the AJE and its positioning in the North Eastern area of Paris poses a fluidity to the group, its demographic, and their territorial belonging.

164 Newman, 34.
165 Newman notes that due to a combination of good political timing, leadership, and the strength in remaining united helped overturn rival efforts to transform the abandoned freight train station into privatized space.
Their one objective, which remained centralized and fixed, was the area itself.\footnote{In his observations, Newman articulates that from the collective efforts by these residents to address the social degradation of their area, there was this desirable need to transform an otherwise unused space into an actual place centered around, “a better life for the neighborhood”. 140.} In the emerging stages of the lands development, high stakeholders were already invested. Called the Cour du Maroc (translated as the Moroccan court) the property was owned by French’s National railroad, the SNCF.\footnote{While an abandoned site, the SNCF still owned the property. However, Newman observes that from its lack of purpose (at this point the site was a refuse deposit from tunnel digging a new commuter line, the RER E) there were competing uses and creations of the space. 135.} But after a lapsed period of involvement from both the SNCF and city council, little was being done towards the direct planning for the Cour du Maroc. Newman speculates that from this disjointed effort at the national level, and the unionized efforts at the local level, there was successive progression with residents under the AJE in mobilizing their campaign for a park.\footnote{After 1998, the SNCF announced that the Cour du Maroc would be split between the Tafanel company (50%), its own freight operations (40%), and potentially, “a small neighborhood garden” (10%), 141.} Indeed, the wants and desires of a community often emphasize the needs of a green space. Returning back to Lefebvre and his forewarnings of the industrialization of space, he argues that the proximity of nature is of crucial importance for people and their place.\footnote{See Lefebvre, \textit{La Revolution Urbaine}.} Of primary concern is often the need for a space of greenery. For this place in particular, the area was both green and socio-politically oriented.

At a coinciding moment globally, apparent also was the push towards “green space.” Defined under umbrellas of “sustainability” and “green urbanism” Newman asserts the AJE’s aim was, “itself a product of de-industrialization and burgeoning urban environmentalism in North America and Europe.”\footnote{By this measure, their urbanizing efforts were inasmuch a global awareness for the necessity of a green environment within space and the neighborhood’s specific desire. To this end, the Cour du Maroc was being reappropriated and reclaimed, moving away from disadvantageous construction of}
buildings, as directed by national companies, and moving towards a space for life, community, and a focal point of recreation.

For considering Newman’s ethnographic study in comparison to the Grand Paris Express project currently occurring in the Île-de-France, one could claim that these two movements—one organized from a localized, grassroots organization, and the other delegated and legislated from the national level, invariably leads to an oppositional and contradictory movement for effectual socio-spatial justice. Even within the context of a four hectacre park, Newman himself poses the questionability of alternate results occurring from the improved desirability of the space. Known in urban planning as gentrification, many definitions have arisen in the past few decades. The phenomenon is difficult to measure and define because for each urbanizing area, the end results are repeatedly different. In large part because globally, cities respond differently to lowered rent and vacancy and their respective districts all have their own unique urban history. For studies of gentrification in Paris, there is little literature on its existence, yet as compared with American cities, much of its evolution and process occurs in a similar manner. Writing about gentrification reshaping the inner arrondisements in Paris, author ____ notes its only recent emergence in French literature and the various ways it occurs in Paris’s inner districts. Describing the precise process as where,

“The middle class and upper middle class settle in older and working-class areas in the center of great cities and that leads to the restoring of housing. It creates a new frontier within cities that deeply reshapes the social division of urban space. In the city of Paris, gentrification is part of a wider process of long-term ‘embourgeoisement’ that concerns even the upper class areas”.

While connected to notions of trends currently seen in the United States, the case of Paris stays unique for several reasons. Foremost is the established residency of the upper class in Paris. The market value of real estate in central Paris is exceptionally high, in large part because of the already established wealth in the west bank. Thus, the historically

---

172 See, Clerval’s “Gentrification, a frontier reshaping social division of urban space in the Inner Paris” 1.
poor working class neighborhoods, such as the Latin Quarter undergo a long-term process of gentrification, what Clerval defines as *embourgeoisement*.\textsuperscript{173} What results, due in large part to both a state preservation of social housing combined with new renovations by upper middle class, are luxury apartments adjacent to rundown ones. This “micro-scale segregation” creates shared spaces in inner Paris.\textsuperscript{174} Yet according to Clerval, “even when gentrifiers and working-class people are neighbors, they don’t meet each other very much.”\textsuperscript{175} Difficult to determine whether this lack of interaction can be specifically applied to Parisians alone, it is nonetheless pertinent to a communicative breach between members of a different class. Additionally, citing the working class as primarily poor immigrants of Africa or Asia, as well as old French working-class people implies that there is not a lack of proximity to different and diverse groups of people living in central Paris, but rather, a distinct lack of social mixing. For their part, however, despite living in economically disadvantageous circumstances, there are seldom reports of high levels of racism or discrimination in these neighborhoods in France.

For the case of the neighborhoods in the 18\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} arrondisements where Newman observed, historically, they have remained markedly multi-cultural, immigrant neighborhoods. Indeed, as early as the 1990’s scholars such as Patrick Simon gathered examinations of the dynamic relationship between inter-class, cross-cultural living situations in the outer arrondisements, specifically Belleville.\textsuperscript{176} Additionally, to bring the whole rhetoric of a “green movement” distinguishes the resulting park, named *Jardins d’Éole*, as a mobilization that centers itself around what scholars Checker and Dooling

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{173} Ibid. 2.
\item \textsuperscript{174} Clerval (2006).
\item \textsuperscript{175} Ibid, 8.
\item \textsuperscript{176} Simon wrote about specifically the 20\textsuperscript{th} arrondissement, known as the “melting-pot” of Paris and officially as Belleville. Given its relative proximity to the 19\textsuperscript{th} and 18\textsuperscript{th} arrondissements, much of the outer neighborhoods of Paris’s 20 inner districts retain a reputation as immigrant, multifactional places to live. See, Simon (1995).
\end{itemize}
call, “green gentrification”\(^\text{177}\) that will only further capitalist urbanization. However, Newman parleys with these assertions, concluding,

“To be sure, aspects of the mobilization were ‘classically environmentalist’ in the sense that it pursued anti-pollution politics and advocated for green space in a post-industrial area largely benefit of parks. These ends, however, were seen as an extension of ongoing struggles that were ‘classically urban’: questions of overcrowded housing, a deteriorated built environment, public spaces increasingly dominated by the illegal drug economy, and a general lack of shared, community facilities”

Here the circuitous question of space and the socio-economic problems posed to the urban environment comes into question. Undeniably, the urban environment is subject to change, both in social and economic lights. Accordingly, there are unintended consequences for all involved, the planners, investors, those who live there, and those who move. Yet in the case of the *Jardins d’Éole*, from its original intention to *better* the community, demonstrates that those involved sought what Newman writes was, “unimaginable a decade ago.”\(^\text{178}\) As is proving to be the case, urban revival and renewal in Paris takes on new meanings and evolutions that reproduce existent problems but which also produce solvable and positive outcomes. At an increasing speed, spatial justice is being demanded –and met, in the Île-de-France.

**Drawing Connections: Grassroots versus State Led**

Where though, in the context of the Grand Paris Express, is there a demand for movement? The explorations of current urban renewal such as Newman’s ethnographic study help devolve away from the methodical, capitalist underpinnings in much of the literature on urban planning, yet – as this chapter presents, much of the idealism around the Grand Paris Express, is *in* its neo-capitalist venture. Present throughout its publications, demands for competition and improved economic efficiency surface for the

\(^{177}\) Newman discusses the possibility of a gentrification where profit accumulation from green space and increased desirability disposes and displaces the poor who originally lived in the area. These results are the outcome of an institutionalization of environmental politics all pinned to capital accumulation (Smith 2002) 179.

\(^{178}\) Newman, 202.
plans of the region. Additionally it would appear that there is notably no specific organization, besides the Société du Grand Paris and other national groups, focusing on the orchestration of improved transit. This suggests a misalignment of societal and infrastructural development for the Île-de-France.

Furthermore, in terms of scale, one must be wary to abstract and draw the same conclusions for what will occur with the Grand Paris Express from what resulted for residents and their park in the northeastern neighborhood of Paris. Indeed, a 26 million dollar park\textsuperscript{179} is not on the same level of a now estimated 29.5 billion euro mass transit network\textsuperscript{180}. It is not a singular department, neighborhood, or commune affected, but the Île-de-France at large. Yet it is this process of urbanization that is perhaps the most illustrious, showing a convergence of changed social attitudes, spatial dimensions, and access into the city. Now following the Grand Paris Express, its evolution, and the people involved, the objectives may be expressing exactly what the Île-de-France requires to evolve into a truly global city.

At its outset, visions for the Grand Paris as laid out by Nicolas Sarkozy’s team of ten architects included all of the facets of a beautiful, larger and modernized Paris. One of these facets, drawn up by French architect and political activist Roland Castro, was a park, positioned on the ring highway road. Called the “Parc Courneuve” Castro had long been involved in thinking of urban changes that could be applied to help improve the conditions of the \textit{banlieues}\textsuperscript{181}. For forward thinking urban planners like Castro, putting in places of cultural and spatial significance was an applied component in the primary plans for Sarkozy’s Grand Paris. On April 29\textsuperscript{th}, 2009, Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the French Republic, delivered an eloquent and commandeering speech for his novel and ambitious city planning project: a Grand Paris. For those in attendance, he opened up asserting the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{179}] Newman, 27.
\item[\textsuperscript{180}] Gouvernement fr. “Le Nouveau Grand Paris: pour une region competitive et solidaire”
\item[\textsuperscript{181}] Sarkozy, "Le Grand Paris, 4 ans après, les Grands Projets en Cours." Transcript of Nicolas Sarkozy’s speech.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
need for an “adjusted habit of thought and behavior” to implement an actual change of urban management. Continuing on to list the behaviors of planners, engineers, architects, and of Paris itself, Sarkozy demanded that the molds of urban planning be broken to, “break the order of the city that has caused so much damage, separating the city where, in fact, the city must be brought together and reunited”. A president known for his blunt and un-professional demeanor, Sarkozy’s speech celebrated the grandeur that was Paris, yet it also had a condemning tone, pointing to the faults of routinely celebrating the dream of Paris while ignoring its defaults.

Citing the need for truth, beauty, and the grandness of Paris to compete with the other global cities in the modern world, Sarkozy also observed a fourth component essential to the new Grand Paris: a just and fair city. In a turn of commiseration, he echoed many of the feelings of helplessness expressed by the rioters from 2005, and argued that the city should not exclude the needy and helpless, but rather uplift and support them. It was a complete turnabout from the tacitly racist and discriminatory remarks he had made several years earlier, when addressing how to deal with the heavy policing and youth delinquency observed by the French Republic. It was a speech calling for the residents of Paris to acknowledge and affirm the values of the Republic, and the need for Paris to progress into the future. It was a moving speech, enveloping all of the problems the Île-de-France was experiencing with demands for improved transit, housing, and a monumental park. In the weeks following, questions about its cost, who would orchestrate the project, and its overall feasibility were posed. To shave off costs, the likeness of the 2009 Grand Paris to today’s current groundwork lacks the beauty and cultural aesthetic of the Parc Courneuve. Instead, it subsidizes planning for the transit and renovation of already existing RER lines in the area. In a turn towards austerity, the

---

182 Ibid, Translation is my own.
183 Ibid, Translation is my own.
184 Ibid, Translation is my own.
185 Social-Discourse. “They are rabble and scum” See Calvet, Véronis (2008) for more explorations of Sarkozy’s word choice and right-wing rhetoric.
Société du Grand Paris and planners have narrowed their focus to a transit-oriented infrastructure as opposed to the civic and communal value of a park. Because of that, there is a definite contrast with the Grand Paris Express project to a project such as the *Jardins d’Éole*.

However, despite its obvious shift away from creating community spaces, the plans for the Grand Paris Express place an emphasis on the Ile-de-France as a whole, aiming for a more connected and linked region. In the project’s stages of progression, it is interesting to see what is given merit and what is ruled out. Strategically, urban planners appear to be at a crossroads for deciding what is best for communities in growing cities. Gauging what installation is more valuable – for example a park versus a rail line, points out the varying degree of changes planners have in choosing what is best for the urban landscape. The rail lines are designed to provide accessible transit and englobe the Ile-de-France into a connected web. However, *where* the residents live reinforces perceptions about the area and the people living there. Thus, it may be a question of altering the spaces themselves and not only the rail lines.

In an interview with Roger Karoutchi, then regional counselor of the Île-de-France, as well as the UMP political party secreraty of state, several questions about the direction and future of departmental organization within the Île-de-France were discussed. In terms of its overall division, Karoutchi emphasized that prior to the inauguration of the Grand Paris, the central government had been disengaged and that regionally in France, the Île-de-France had leveraged the centrality of power, resulting in ignored communes. For its large and diversified size, the central government had an obligation to intervene and oversee the planning and implementation for the state. He elucidates upon this point, stating, “This is to say that among the interests of local legitimate actors, one has to define that arguably there is a sole public power the state has in governing the Île-de-
France\textsuperscript{186}. The interventionary power of France’s central government raises an interesting aspect to the dynamics of the Grand Paris Express. For one, it demonstrates there was disorganization to the governing powers of the region.

**Size and Scope**

Comprised of over 55 communes, the Île-de-France politically and socio-economically has a diverse array of people and needs. Therein, in terms of its scale and affect on the region as a whole, the central and state power pushed to advance and forward the message of Grand Paris: A region that was disparate and stratified, to a region connected with mass transit. In all of its discussion of a cohesive and better functioning region, the interventionary role the executive government held speaks to an additional, and perhaps more hidden meaning behind their motives. The city of Paris is a reflection of all that France represents: a rich culture, an imbued relationship to aesthetics and open space, with a harmonious functionality overseen by the government. For the riots of 2005 proving that this, in fact, wasn’t the case, marks how significantly there was a separation of these French elements to the Île-de-France. Thus, seeking a need for solidarity and cohesion refers also to the government’s need to regain control of the region. Despite its prevailing themes of efficiency, renewal, and expansion, the Grand Paris Express can easily be constructed and viewed in the opposite light. By their desire to holistically integrate all of the members of the Île-de-France into its rings and infrastructure, the state holds authoritarian motives as well.

Critical to evaluate is the nature and ulterior motives of the French state and their co-partnered private public management from the Société du Grand Paris. After the mixed reactions to his Grand Paris inaugural address, the Sarkozy administration worked

\textsuperscript{186}Le Monde Fr. “Quel Grand Paris prepare Nicolas Sarkozy?” Debate with Roger Karoutchi” p. 2 Translation is my own.
adamantly on a bill proposal for the project\textsuperscript{187} and a little over a year later, the Grand Paris was enacted into law as, an “urban project, socially and economically of national interest to strategically unit the territories of the Île-de-France\textsuperscript{188} Established into law, Sarkozy’s urban project was indivisible to state and region, territories and departments. Written in its literature, the law incorporated various platforms for discussion, incorporating into its writing language stressing an open forum for public debate.

Extensive and full of reformed urban policies, the law contains 36 articles and covers a substantial amount of notices including the development of a scientific hub in Saclay, the Societe du Grand Paris serving as moderator of the project, new housing, and the specifications for implementing the new transit lines.\textsuperscript{189} For assessing how closely the law has followed and held onto the principles of the project, announcements and the management by the Société du Grand Paris aims to be transparent and communicative. Their engagement with the various communes concerned with the transit lines gives weight to their aura of fair and democratic discourse. However, to accurately know what takes precedence in their planning is as of yet indistinguishable.

Since its passing, the law of 2010 has led to an ongoing series of reformulated and rethought issues integral to the outer departments in the region, as well as the entirety of the French republic. As recently as March 2013, Jean-Marc Ayrault, France’s Prime Minister, confirmed continued planning for, and reformations to the Grand Paris project. Situated between two poles, competition and solidarity, Ayrault condoned the necessity of the two for a prospering Île-de-France region. Framing solidarity through sound objectives such as passing housing construction from 40,000 to 70,000 each year, it also integrated the need for an acknowledgement to have social mixing in the region and a campaign against all forms of segregation.\textsuperscript{190} Acknowledging the polarization between

\textsuperscript{188} LOI n°2010-597 du 3 juin 2010 relative au Grand Paris (1).
\textsuperscript{189} LOI n°2010-597 du 3 juin 2010 relative au Grand Paris.
\textsuperscript{190} Ayrault, “Le Nouveau Grand Paris: pour une Region Competitive et Solidaire” Translation is my own.
people in the region and a distinct spatial segregation contributes to a movement towards and reformatted French model.

Held to a high standard, solidarity plays a central thematic role for the Grand Paris Express. However, the role of competition conflictingly presents an incongruence to the former theme of intercommunal solidarity. Calling forth a pact for jobs to fight urban sprawl, Ayrault claimed with the new Grand Paris, 250,000 jobs would be created.\(^{191}\)

Whilst encouraging competition, the urgency for renovation of the French Republican model seemed to pose itself as a grounding characteristic overall. Working to guarantee bettered lives, Ayrault claimed, “The new French model needs to be incorporated to a higher level particularly in this region [Ile-de-France], the most rich of France, the most populated but also the most contrasted.”\(^{192}\) With this resolution, the governing bodies of France seem to want to ameliorate the economic disparity not only for decreasing unemployment but also to improve the current image of the French model. Long critiqued as needing a change, the Republican model is metamorphosizing to an extent.

**A New French Model for Solidarity**

Resulting from similar prose of solidarity and competition, the French government has placed youth as the cornerstone of a new French model. The state claims it will take measures for providing them with tools and more means to succeed, the state is taking measures to improve administrative policy so that all youth have equal opportunity.\(^{193}\) The discourse presents the connectivity of youth to employment and the need to reformat their solidarity and aid. It appears to be mainly ineffectual political speech. However, it also holds a responsive address to the explicit inequalities between employment opportunities for youth in the region. In their power, the state is fine-tuning

---

\(^{191}\) Ayrault, “Le Nouveau Grand Paris: pour une Region Competitive et Solidaire” Translation is my own.

\(^{192}\) Ayrault, “Le Nouveau Grand Paris: pour une Region Competitive et Solidaire” Translation is my own.

\(^{193}\) Gouvernement.fr “La jeunesse au cœur du nouveau modèle français” Translation is my own.
their impression as a state while also espousing merely discursive and circuitous elaborations to those who are disadvantaged. Looking at the directive from high state authorities, there is something lacking in terms of their general understanding of the nature of relationship for residents in the Île-de-France. Nonetheless, while arguably presented as “talk” and long-winded speeches, their divisive political and legislative power helps moderate collective discrimination and prejudice.

The Grand Paris Express appears sustainable and unifying in its logic, yet only when abstracted from the spatial practices of domination from the state-led association. However, by maintaining the need for an open democratic discourse, the Société du Grand Paris is attempting to impose both social and economic profit to the project. For example, as written in a declaration extrapolating on article 2 of the law from June 2010, it states:

« Chacun a enfin pu exprimer son assentiment ou son opposition, mais également ses interrogations, ou ses propositions durant les quatre mois du débat présenté ci-dessus, permettant ainsi au président de la CNDP, de souligner que ‘différents débats publics ou concertations recommandées on déjà été organisés en région Île-de-France. Ils ont concerné aussi bien des projets de transport en commun, d’infrastructures routières que d’équipements de nature industrielle»

The declaration takes on an appeasing tone, encouraging each party and citizen affected to express their concerns and visions for the Grand Paris Express. Unlike the mandated housing laws and social policies of the late 90’s and early 2000’s, for the communes in the Ile-de-France, a further opened discourse takes on an almost pacifiable air to the concerned and distressed public. To further place emphasis on the need for progressive discussion, the state acknowledges the “different public debates and consultations” taking place. This leaves much to be said for an impression of openness concerning the Grand Paris Express. As current reports distributed by the Société du Grand Paris publicize, monthly and annual commune meetings are available for residents.

---

194 Déclaration by Article 2 de la loi du 3 juin 2010 relative to Grand Paris. Societedugrandparis.fr
195 See, for example, Dikeç’s piece, “Two Decades of French Urban Policy: From Social Development of Neighbourhoods to the Republican Penal State” where he argues late policy has intensified regulation through both social and penal policy-making (60).
and their respective lines of transit affected. It would appear that representatives for the Grand Paris facilitate public engagement. As far as the agenda that is being advanced, it is hard to say how effectively every group’s issues can be met. For example, recent concerns over the enormous costshave created growing dissension from multiple mayors and regional directors. Additionally, departments demanding funding and appropriate gridding of lines, namely Seine-St-Denis, have encountered numerous obstacles coming to agreements with directors of other departments. The inability to equally cover financial costs by each department reflects the outstanding level of inequality within each department. Yet by the nature of the project, all of the departments have a co-dependence on the other by connecting regionally through rail lines.

Seducing Outsiders in: The Process of Integration for Paris’s Grands Ensembles

Observing the evolution of the Grand Paris Express is my desire to hear the opinions for its expected outcome. Is a massive transit system an apparatus for change? Does entering a public, mobile structure immediately benefit and foster the means of integration and access? Measuring a transit system’s potency for social diversity and a more plural society is debatable. However, scholarship has looked at it in the past. More meaningful though, is looking at the cultural significance of these orbital corridors. In France, as I discussed previously with Martin Dassieu, the concept of rail lines is economical, efficient, and sustainable. The French respect and admire their rail modes of transport. In American studies, rail lines pose an economic deficit to the state. Due in

---

196 In a recent press release, the Societe du Grand Paris reported, “Grand Paris goes back to inhabitants for the new stages of consultation” 21 meetings were scheduled for debate on the red line.
197 See, Vincendon, “Nouveau Grand Paris: et maintenant les Calculs”
199 See De Palma, Marchal (2002). In their literature they discuss the applicable methods of large scale transport in the Parisian area. In comparative analysis they critically examine possible simulations and the benefits of mass transit for equilibrium.
200 See “Why American transport projects cost so much” and Nate Silver’s “On the Economics of Mass Transit and the Value of Common Sense” where findings from the Brookings Institute as
part to differing state infrastructures and fuel resources, I argue there is an additional cultural appeal of circular movement and connectivity in France. Dating back to Haussmann’s *carrefours*, which moved traffic efficiently in Paris, the Grand Paris Express takes part in circular routing as well. This is not, as Enright (2012) deems exclusionary but inclusionary. Communities are formed in many ways. Their spatial inequalities come up through economic and ethnic divides. This is clearly apparent in the Île-de-France region. Relocating mobility outwards via the Grand Paris Express leaves these communities asking: Is the Grand Paris Express something to be wary of? Or is it something to be excited for?

I will end this chapter by looking at the sociology around social capital, developed by Robert Putnam’s piece, *Bowling Along: America’s Declining Social Capital.* Scholars have since looked at the value behind social capital, defined as the use of networks between individuals and communities to garner social participation, mutual assistance, and trust. In its broad terminology, the theory has since been examined through several other lenses. Scholars Graham Currie and Janet Stanley present findings of possible ties between social capital and public transportation systems. Their thesis argues that public transport can provide mobility and, by doing so, provide a greater opportunity to create social networks, trust, and reciprocity. Defined, social capital remains an abstract concept to measure. Currie and Stanley write that because it is abstract, it is only considered to exist where all three elements, (networks, trust and

---

201 Enright 34.
202 See in particular chapter 2, where she discusses at length the idea of economic crowding out from the neo-liberal positioning of the corridors.
203 Currie, Graham and Stanley discuss Putnam’s concept of social capitol in their piece,
reciprocity) are found.\(^{204}\) In grounding their argument, they assert two qualifiers to connect the ties between social capital and transit:

“1. Public transport provides mobility which can enhance social interaction and hence act to build SC.
2. Transit is often targeted to transport disadvantaged groups, for example, the young, low-income, aged unemployed who by definition tend to lack SC” (538)

Plainly stated, these two constituents for an interconnected community encompass many interpretations and analyses. Under these two assertions, the Grand Paris Express project serves as an interesting lense to examine.

Their second claim addresses an important economic factor in the fractured Île-de-France region. As I looked at earlier, the costs of putting in the lines is expensive for the Île-de-France region. However, the lines connect many economically diverse areas in the Île-de-France, potentially leading to a decline of its East and West split. A hopeful objective, for the unemployed youth, mobility could give them avenues of entry.

I just addressed Currie and Stanley’s second claim for the targets of mass-transit and their capacities. Yet this is not the claim that I am most worried about. From my findings and observations, there is an underlying crux to French civil society which sharply divides them from the American ideology of social capitol. That is, that social capitol does not exist in France. I will say more on this in my conclusions.

\(^{204}\) Currie, Graham and Janet Stanley, 530.
Concluding Thoughts: Questions and Hopes for The Grand Paris Express

A sense of belonging and pride is crucial for a neighborhood’s residents. People hold dependence between themselves and their community. The impression of wellness enlivens the spirit of community. But in the Île-de-France, the grands ensembles and social housing establishments have remained in dire conditions. Change occurs, though in small increments and through grass roots moments. It is still at a pace of social progression that is difficult to quantify. In the end of my explorations I am left asking myself: Will railway lines bring life to these communities in the North-Eastern part of the Île-de-France?

I like to view things optimistically. I see this project as a distended gathering of ideas. At its base, the Grand Paris Express is founded on the uncontrollable rioting and civil unrest of 2005. In the years following, the narrative has been warped out of its history. People are eager to leave the riots in a remote and distanced past. However, questions continue to come up over the “Probleme des Banlieues” and how they will be fixed. State actors are at a point where they can no longer ignore the problems that rest on the city’s borders. The propositions and executions of the Grand Paris Express hold vital influence. It is an instrument of wealth, power and industry. Thus, it is undeniable that a political elite has a dominating force in its planning. However, I argue that what will come from these lines is a social and collective good. It is a thought that comes from two ideas I’ve noticed repeatedly in French debate.

France has two auras. On one side, it presents the ideology that France is a commonwealth or in French terminology, La république française. Citizens rest in its
cradle of welfare-driven entitlements and ordained laws representing the state’s égalité. Its physical landscape also defines the state’s welfare. The buildings, streets, parks and transit networks are all symbols of a French idealism. They stand for equal and open public spaces. In spite of their representations, these spaces are not equal. The differences are present everywhere. In an architectural sense, France creates and breaks equality. At its height, its role as protector and bearer of benefits functions well. There is a semblance of structure to the prescriptions and policies laid out. The political elite put on the airs of a well-oiled machine that is impervious to urgent grates and jars. It is only when the state’s design bends and diverges that France’s contours and shadows of inequality show.

There is an adamant sense of presentation to France. To this end, France appears untouched by the 2005 rioting because of a staunch belief that their social goods are equally accessed by all. But the roles have now been contested and the environments have changed, as exemplified in the rioting. A dialogue is forming between political actors.

In a fortuitous encounter, I was able to speak with a member of France’s political elite. Through the guest speakers on the European Union, I spoke briefly with former prime-minister Lionel Jospin. An open and kind man, he relayed to me that he was not up to date with the exact expected outcomes for the Grand Paris Express. But he did acknowledge that there were levels of differences and disagreements with a “ville au cœur” against an unequal polity and that it was a complicated issue. Noted even by high-level politicians, the split of political opinions is placed alongside a split of power.

In his lecture however, Jospin touched on larger issues affecting France and the European Union at large. His speech held echoes of France’s socio-political problems but in the larger scope of the European Union. Addressing its new structure, Jospin asserted

---

205 Jospin described the disagreements using the statement, “ville au cœur” meaning heart of the city, and what I took to mean central Paris. Jospin, Lionel. Q&A following European Union lecture. 03/15/2013. See Appendix D.
that “Europeans must accept that sovereignty is mixing” (See Appendix A). Mixing and all that it connotes is being projected by a wide array of people on a wide array of levels.

The power of mixing brings forth the power of an engaged discussion.

Throughout all of my interviews, I found similar streams of thoughts coming from everyone despite their different backgrounds. In my talk with Marwan, he repeatedly brought up the value of debate with political figures and mainstream commentators. He reasoned that with rational discourse there is a positive impact with a changed behavior from those involved. Indeed, on the same plane as Jospin, Marwan spoke at length about the European Union and how it holds a constitutive power to addressing the social problems facing individual states. Seeing a fundamental dilemma to all countries Marwan noted that, “any government is the least capable of seeing and analyzing the prejudice that is created by itself” (See Appendix A). What both Jospin and Marwan iterate is a blending of ideas without having to take away individual identities.

These shared ideas are far larger and abstracted than the initial goals of the Grand Paris Express. Tying it all back to spatial connectivity is my idea of public transport serving as a space for conversation. Inspired by Marc Augé, an ethnographer who applies his theories to political science, I attribute human proximity and the shared space of a train as adding to the togetherness of Paris and the Île-de-France. In his argument, Augé explains,

“Transgressed or not, the law of the metro inscribes the individual itinerary into the comfort of collective morality, and in that way it is exemplary of what might be called the ritual paradox: it is always lived individually and subjectively; only individual itineraries give it a reality, and yet it is eminently social, the same for everyone, conferring on each person this minimum of collective identity through which a community is defined.”

To recall the image of what these lines resemble in nature, they are multi-ringed, interweaving throughout the region. Unlike the 1978 peéripherique highway, which is experienced individually by car, the train aspect, like Augé’s law of the metro, invokes a

---

206 Augé, 30.
collective morality that all citizens are able to share. For the *banlieues* and their hurried construction, the rail lines bring to the neighborhoods something that is nostalgically French, while also prominently new.

Unfortunately however, it is here that I raise my previous worries from Currie and Stanley’s (2008) transit social capitol argument. In France’s social context, beginning these conversations will be difficult. For while there exists a collective morality, there is a tenacious insularity within French society. It was an observation I saw while on the buses and trains in France. They were relatively silent. People observed one another but there were rarely animated conversations between strangers. Chance encounters and unexpected talks do not appear to happen in most public places. Thus, the “social interaction” that Currie and Stanley bring up occurs, but in an invariably different manner in France’s public areas. Hopes for enlivened discussions and exchanges on rail transit remains an additional facet to observe.

Remembering Soja (1980) in my introduction illustrates how a project like the Grand Paris Express can change and adapt the urban landscape. There is a connected social impact coming from these new lines that will alter the *space* of these communities. Worldwide, France is renowned for its mass-transit plans. Other cities look to Paris metro as the epitome of streamlined transit. Held in high esteem, its functioning has a distinguishable cultural significance to the French. They have a pride and ownership of it. By involuntary force, a positive cultural belief exists for its operation. While there are doubts that remain, the urban planning elite have deliberated out the benefits and costs. In deciding to go through, the French elite are endowing a sense of *trust* and cultural empowerment to those all around the Île-de-France region. It is a negotiation of sorts, where there are tactical and calculate ends. But there is an enduring level of commitment and reaching out, physically and metaphorically to give pride and belonging to those in the *cités* and *banlieues*. 
While some scholars (Enright 2012, Gonick, 2011) see this extension as a pseudo societal endeavor that will only further polarize the separate poles, I predict an organic establishment of trust. Ultimately, I think that is what this project is all about: creating trust. Here I am not speaking in economical terms, nor am I projecting levels of ridership. Cost of fares, speed, and efficiency are data that have yet to be analyzed. That line of inquiry cannot be accurately measured at this point in time. For my purposes, what I want to convey is the appreciable shared potential these lines will provide once created.

As it plays out, I see the Grand Paris Express fulfilling a schema of togetherness. Where I learned the most from this project and where I suggest urban planning and mass transit planning needs are, is in connecting people through conversations. From the mere conversation alone, bonds of trust are established in talking about the same problems they seek to address.


Dassieu, Martin. Personal Interview. 15 Apr. 2013


De, Chenay C. "Jean-Paul Huchon Se Donne Trois Ans Pour Améliorer Les Transports En Ile -De-France; Mercredi 24 Octobre, Cinq Élus Régionaux Doivent Faire Leur Entrée Au Conseil d'Administration Du Syndicat Des Transports De La Région. Le Président (PS) Du


Raffin, Marie-Camille. E-mail Interview. “Re: Questions autour le SNL.” 13, 14, 16 Apr. 2013.


Image Bibliography


“Le Corbusier Housing Complex” Image accessed: http://obleo.net/tag/grasshopper/.


“Réseau du SNL” Dossier de Presse. *Solidarités des Nouvelles Logements en Île-de-France*. 
APPENDIX A

Transcript of Recorded Interview with Marwan Muhammad: Correspondant for Collectif Contre l’Islamophobie en France (CCIF)

This appendix contains an interview I held with head organizer Marwan Muhammad. It presents the history of the organization and the work they do. In addition he discussed CCIF’s recent campaigning conducted in the Île-de-France region, how they were received. Marwan presents cases of sociological discriminatory acts occurring in the Île region, as well as his opinions on the reception of Islamophobia in France. The questions and answers are designated from my initials (CL) and Marwan’s (MM). The interview was conducted in English through a skype call.

CL  What is the purpose of your organization?

MM  The collective against Islamophobia in France is a, is an organization, ah created to help and to support the victims of discriminations and of hate crimes based on uh uh, Islamophobic prejudice. Uh what do we define as Islamophobia? Well uh it’s uh any act of violence whether it be verbal or physic (physical), or discrimination targeting an institution, or an individual based on his or her uh alleged belonging to Islam. What does it mean? It means that some victims of Islamophobia can be non-muslims, uh people of uh, Seik religion for example, are often targeted because they are – they look like muslims, and for this reason the would be targeted for the same reason. Uh and also in this we do not include in this the questioning, the bringing into the question of religion by and large. So it means that uh, uh, people can question Islam as they question any other sort of religion, well it becomes a direct or an indirect attack on the, on, --the muslim citizens, then it becomes Islamophobia. [7:39]. So that is what we qualify as Islamophobia.

CL  What year were you founded?

MM  The organization has been founded in 2003 and it was a context where the 2004 law banning the hijab and the kibab in school was being discussed uh, in that time, but uh some, uh some intellectuals were uh, or some political figures were made, they made like uh, they made very bold statements that --and some of them coming out on tv and explaining uh how islamophobic they were and uh, how proud they were of that. So uh, we were, we saw many incidences of that, uh happening in the, in the streets of France, and uh victims, not having anyone to turn to, to get support, so that’s how the, that’s how the collective against islamophobia has been created. [8:36]

CL  What resources and services do you offer those you serve?

MM  The resources and services we offer to the victims is basically –first psychological and legal support. So uh we advice them in what they should do. We help them obtain their, have their rights respected. So for example we will discuss with perpetrators or discriminators, people who discriminate them to try to to, --to see if there is a solution to the, to the problem. For example, there is a –if there is a restaurant, banning women wearing the hijab, uh. At the entrance of the restaurant, we need to call these guys and say “hey, maybe what you wanna know what you’re doing is plainly illegal, are you sure you want to do this?” And so most of the time they will change their illegal, are you sure you want to do this?” And so most of the time they will change their behavior. Sometimes they will stay in their, you know in their, in the same attitude, they –in which case we encourage the victim
to filing a formal complaint to the police. So number one provide uh, psychological support. Number two provide, uh [interjection “legal counsel”] uh legal support, uh and number three gather data because uh, the one thing we need is to be able to quantify the phenomenon of, like if we’re talking about one, two, incidences, these are just stories. But if we are talking about hundreds of cases throughout the country than this becomes a phenomenon. And we’re able to substantiate it, to explain the dynamics of it, the trends of it, uh, the proportion of women being targeted, uh and this has an explanatory power and this allows us to, to, bring the cases forward at the national level. And the last uh, the last two points on the, on our services is that one of our key missions, you know is to raise awareness, cause uh you know the same way anti-Semitism is not the problem of the Jews, it’s the problem of the white community, the community at large. Well the same goes for Islamophobia. It doesn’t affect just the muslims, it affects the society as a whole because it uh, it damages the relationships between fellow citizens. And it turns people, one against the other. And so raising awareness you know in the general population on these issues, is a, is a key task. Why? Because uh, because we will not succeed at all, we will not have political – we will not be able to convince the governments and the political figures of the country to change their behavior in a context where uh, the uh, political scene, is so entrenched in, into right wing, and sometimes —most of the time, extreme right wing ideological backgrounds. And so what we see uh is that we need to make this message clear and this message loud to the population. [11:37]

CL What is the message of Nous Sommes La Nation?

MM And that’s why, number four, we builted, the the, national communication campaign that we launched in, in November, that was called Nous Sommes La Nation. And the message behind it if you —if you look at the slogans of it, was nous sommes aussi la nation. We too are a part of this nation, uhh as we are. Without changing our identity. Without having to change our beliefs. Without having to blend in or to get rid of anything that constitute our identity. We are part of this nation, and we are —we contribute to this nation on an everyday basis. We are doctors, we are architects, we are social workers, we are plumbers, uh we are electricians, we are ladies and men participating in the larger white society as we are. And we do not uh, need to forsake our religion, uh abandon our religion or our identity or our history to be a part of this nation. And so the message is..respect is something that comes unconditionally —it doesn’t come with condition, it has to --respect is to respect the other as he is and not as I would like him to be. And so muslim citizens in france do not have, they do not have [coughs] sorry, they do not have to negotiate or they do not have to convince that they are a part of this society. They are a part of this society. And so this key message was a core part of the message of the campaign. Now the way that we did it. Is that we started first it, by analyzing, how is Islamic prejudice built, how is it built. And we discovered, part of it is ideological. So we have thinkers, politicians, activists building a speech, uh an ideology, that constitutes islamophobia, uh but they are an extreme minority. Uh the vast majority of perpetrators they are uh citizens, uh but you will find is that they are citizens, they have beliefs, and they uh, they indulge too much in the clichés in the—about the muslim population, these are clearly uh are, unfounded beliefs so, for example uh, muslim men are inherently violent, uh muslim women are submissive to their husbands, to their father, to their brothers, and they are forced to do this and that by their, uh by their male family. Uh Muslims have no sense of humor, uh muslims do not speak french and that’s normal because muslims do not belong here. Uh they are an alien part of this society, and they uh, they need to stay like
that, and our identity is white—white judeo-christian. And that this is fixed and it can never be changed. And so they are the typical clichés that we are—that we observe in the, in the typical perpetrator profile. And what we’ve tried to do, what we’ve done is try to build this campaign around the clichés with a sense of humor, uh with an artistic tone. Uh and that’s how we came with the idea of the uh, the idea of building these posters uh and these videos, uh where we just go against the grain, uh and do not fall into the trap of like, replaying uh and reproducing the clichés that most muslims are accused of. And so uh do—oh by the way the collectif against islamophobia is not a religious organization we are uh, we are kind of a civil organization of muslims, of jewish people, all together in the same NGO, but we campaign specifically on islamophobia individually. But we take part in other causes—for example I take part in the anti-roma prejudice and the anti-semitism generally speaking and uh but the organization as a whole does not uh, is not uh, a religious one, or a religiously affiliated one. [15:51]

CL  How was your campaign, Nous Sommes La Nation received by the news and media?

MM  Was your campaign received well by the news and the media? It had a massively positive impact and positive feedback from this campaign. Uh because uh the tone was balanced, because we were able at the same time to have, to—to have rational discourse, a sense of humour then it was a complete success with the press. Of course, pointing problems at the campaign, saying things like “you’re not a part of the nation. Porting a beard or wearing the hijab, where you are typically excluded from the uh, from the typical french identity. But they were, uh they were clearly appearing as uh, as indulging into an ideology, and not uh, not a, not being rational with the discourse. So uh in all of the interviews I gave, in all the debates I had with political figures or, or with mainstream commentators, this all came out really really positively, and the visuals of the campaign were all over, they were all well-received. [interjection, “they seemed to be everywhere, all over billboards, down in the metro…] no they were, no, actually what happened is that, the—the—campaign. We had the campaign, I mean the broadcast, the advertising campaign it went all around the peeripherique, which is the ring, the ring road around the—around Paris, and uh initially we wanted to have uh, we wanted to have the campaign in the metros. But the agency in charge of allocating the advertisement space in the metros said, uh ‘fighting Islamophobia is a religious thing and uh we s—should uh, we should not see any women wearing the hijab, uh—headscarf in the metro for the sake of what we call in France laïcité. And so clearly the director of the agency was uh, was doing exactly, was discriminating us based on the fact that we are an Islamic organization. So basically, they were trying to, to uh, to uh forbid the campaign from going on in the metro, which is basically equating to discriminating an organization, fighting discrimination. So uh, so what we did is we uh kept this silence for two weeks of the…of the beginning of the campaign because we had advertisement space all across Paris and around. Plus we uh had the national radios and the and the, and some tvs. And, in the middle of the campaign, we get the information uh, leak that the, so we basically uh we published, we gave away some of the, some of the information to the press. It was massively positive for us because we are, because we had the debate, why is it so taboo to say that there is islamophobia in France? Why is it so taboo that even the, that an agency like the metro would uh, would, an advertising agency would take an ideological stance about these uh, these posters and what is, why is it so taboo to, to admit that the french society today is diverse, and that you will have among them, uhh, people of Indian background,
people of Egyptian background, uh people of different religions some of them manifest this religion through uh, through different choices like dress codes, and we need to live with that. That is called diversity. And France, which is supposed to be the country of human rights, has to, has to respect that at some point. And so it was really uh, really a good thing to use uh during the campaign. But I mean overall the, the the reaction of the media was overly positive and one of the reasons for that is that now the word ‘islamophobia’ is widely spread in the media and each one of them now is having a, a debate on how, on how –what is islamophobia, how does it manifest itself in, in France. It is uh, inviting people to, to engage in the discussion which never happened in the past because the mainstream ideology was this islamophobic ideology, was the fact that, uh for a women to uh, just to, to decide to wear a headscarf is already past the red line. Uh for you guys in the U.S. or for you guys [20:49] in the UK, or any country in the world, it is normal for someone to to respect his neighbors or his colleagues religious choice whether he wears a turban or a kipa, or she wears a headscarf. But in France it is the complete opposite of that. So uhhh

CL How did you send out the message of Nous Sommes La Nation?

MM Well as I said, number one the, the advertisement spaces around Paris. Number two, national radios, number three tv interviews and debates and number four, which was the key thing, is the social networks and website, having the website got a lot of interaction which in short, viral videos, and the national tour and conference where I set up appointments all across the country, uh at universities, local organizations, local town halls and I debated with local authorities and citizens all coming together, to discuss this. [21:56]

CL Where do you see high levels of Islamophobic acts occurring in the Île-de-France?

MM Well basically, at the national level there is a concentration of anti-muslim hate crimes, uh in major cities. Of course statistically there is uh, there is a clear bias in that in, the more people there are, the higher the chances are to see an act. Also the fact that wherever you see a muslim population is over-represented, then you see that that there is an over representation of uh, of hate crimes because there are more visible and because they are just there. So uh, in the, in the Île-de-France, uh what we see is that there is, uh that the areas where we see there are more, have uh uh, have very low diversity, there will be an environment where people are encouraged to act against Muslims. So for example if you have a residential area in Paris, 6th which is very fancy, and you see a muslim woman wearing a headscarf and she’s all alone in there. And people will be tempted to treat her there, like, as if she wasn’t welcome there. So if she enters a bakery or if she goes to the city hall to ask for some papers we will find that there is a, some some prejudice sometime. So looking at the, looking at the stats, first we need to know that 87% of the hate crimes are targeting, are targeting women, and then, a proportion between forty and forty-five with the perpetrator being a civil servant. So that being a school or in a university or in the city hall, and most of the time it will become a minor discrimination because people are just not aware of the law, but it shows that even in the, within the public administration, there is prejudice, and there is institutionalized prejudice by the fact that employees and professionals are not trained in human rights, and religious freedom, in freedom in religion. [24:16]

CL What types of acts occur?
A typical one is a woman being banned from a public space, uh a restaurant, a gym, a professional training center where someone would think, that, just based on his opinion, he can, that muslim women or a jewish person based on his dress code. That it is completely legal, and that it is completely misunderstanding the 2004 law. Uh the 2004 law uh bans, and religious, uh any visibly religious sign, from public schools, uh all the way from primary school up between the baccalaureat. Uh, but this is not, it doesn’t apply, outside this environment, so people are not allowed to, to implement a veil ban or kibab ban in any public space without any specific law to that, so for one case you will have uh muslim women, assaulted in the streets, uh someone taking off their headscarf, spitting at them, insulting them, you will find uh men being fired, from their job, if their manager knows that they are muslim, and finds that they, I don’t know are using their lunch break to pray. So they think its okay to go take a coffee, its okay to go smoke a cigarette but its not okay to pray. And people will be fired on that basis. You will find that some companies they apply a specific kind of treatment, to their employees when they know that these employees are muslim. Um whether it be like, holidays, policies, or dress code [uncomprensible] it will be like very specific to these uh, to these employees. Another typical case will be a, a mosque uh being damaged. Someone hanging a broke head on the door and tagging like, tagging nazi, uh signs on the walls of the mosques or urinating in the, in the moques. Profanating cemetaries. So these are, these are more and more frequent, in the country. [26:45]

What are the highest number of complaints the CCIF receieves?

Well, actually there are, from 2012 we have 369 cases and that’s the highest, uh the highest number of complaints we have received in a year. Uh so far, and this is also completely underestimated for many reasons. First off, when they are humiliated they are, uh they underreport, uh they take hate crimes are the, arduous soul that they have been enduring, and uh its most visible generally speaking, outside of islamophobia, its most visible with any type of crimes, which uh, which has uh uh a humiliating impact. Rapes, insults, degredation, harcon. Uh these uh, these crimes, go underreported, why? Uh because uh because the victims they have interiorized, some of the some of the violence, and the prejudice. Second, everyone knows that this is illegal, so a lot of the victims they think that they just need to live with it. Uh that they just need to accept uh, that they just need to, uh accept it, that, that is a part of the prejudice too.

Where do those involved in CCIF experience the most segregation or hate speech?

Uh we see that the, the hot spots of Islamophobia, number one, media. Number two, political discourse, uh especially on the right wing. And number three unfortunately, uh uh uh, civil, uh sorry, administration.

Are there areas in the Île-de-France where the CCIF sees high levels of segregation or hateful acts? If so, where?

No, not uh, not a specific area, not a specific area. But there is a specific time, which is usually any period, any point in the media where there is a political discourse, of hate speech, in the media. So we see a direct uh, correlation, between a public debate targeting, or stigmatizing a muslim, and a rise in the anti-muslim anti-bigotry acts in the next few days. Uh we don’t draw a causal link
between the two, but there is a clear, uh statistical correlation between the, between the two.

CL  Are there parts of the Île-de-France generalized as places of Islamic or Arab residences? If so, where?

MM  Okay so uh there is something very, uh very specific about the uh, about France that you need to, that you need to understand and that is very different from uh, from the U.S. It’s that here the idea of uh, of community, or a Muslim community is relatively taboo. Uh so uh, so we don’t say that uh, this is a black neighborhood or this is uh an arab neighborhood or this is a, a white or predominately white neighborhood, we don’t usually use this categorization uh in France. But what we see, is that the the religious belonging, or that the ethnic or cultural belonging of an individual has no statistical explanatory power to draw a map and say like this is uh an arab place or an Islamic place, but what we can do, what we can say is that the social economic status of the population has this explanatory power so because muslims and arabs are overrepresented in the lower part of the social and economic game, then they will tend to live in places where they can afford it. And so because the, the we’re still first, second, third generation, uh immigrants, uh we have an overrepresentation of muslims in deprived areas. So if we, if we look at the…can you hear me? So uh there will be an overrepresentation of muslims and arabs in these neighborhoods. Such as third generation immigrants in these low-income areas. This is changing rapidly, so uh in the, we are seeing, a change of distribution in the, in how the wealth is, what is typical for young muslim men and women, will have this, so this is rapidly changing over time. And there is still at the moment, and over representation of Muslims in deprived areas around Paris so uh this is maybe the arrondisements 91, 93, uh 94 for example.

CL  Does the CCIF stage protests in Paris or the Île-de-France? If so, where?

MM  Uh the answer is, generally, no. Uh because the protests will be uh manipulated in the media. Uh if we organize a demonstration in the in the, in central Paris, Just the the, multitude of hijabs, of bearded men, or being brown, uh will be perceived as a security threat. And uh it would be shown, in the media as like the typical cliché of the angry arab, so uh we don’t want to to uh play that game, so uh so we decide to mobilize people and protest, we’ll be, we’ll target, we’ll be doing it in a very precise manner. Uh so for example the mayor is uh discriminating Muslims or we not that he is stigmatizing muslims, we’ll do a sitting, just in front of his city hall. Uh we’ll have a kinda of funny event, a sense of humour if you will, or we’ll organize a breakfast for workers just in the, in front of his, the city hall but we will not organize classical, typical protests in the street.

CL  Are people ever refused service based on an Islamic tie?

MM  Definitely. Definitely. We’ll have some working agencies, uh asking people to explain their religious practices and that offered them jobs based on that. We will have uh women, participating in the school life of their children to a certain extent. So for example we will say, “it’s okay , it’s okay if you bring cakes to school, it’s okay if you give money to fund, uh I don’t know the renewal of the library of the school but we don’t want you to take any visible part in the school life. Uh we don’t want to see your headscarves uh in the, anywhere near the school or in the school” So we have women, Muslim mothers, being banned from school events when they decide to wear the headscarf and this is basically like apartheid type of ideology. These are the muslims, these are the non-muslims, and we’re going to
base our judgement our inclusion based on their religious visibility. So there are services refused to some Muslims, participation refused to some Muslims just because of their belonging to, to this religion.

CL Are there places in the Île-de-France where people do not feel comfortable going? Muslim wise you mean?

MM Or… [CL: Yes I guess from both sides] basically, although they completely refuse the idea of ghetto, the idea of a predominately black or white area, still it works, so you will find that people living in Paris, within central Paris or a fancy residential area. They are scared to go in any suburb because they perceive uh these areas as uh like they are a zoo. And they are so scared to find themselves in a suburb, in a *cité* because they perceive black youth or Arab youth as inherently uh dangerous dangerous to them. As a threat, and uh they behave with them like they were a threat, so in return, these kids to them say you are not in a zoo, we are human beings and as much as you hate us, well we hate you back. So we have like these forms of animosity between some of the youth living in the suburbs and some of the more posh areas uh as we have, which are completely segregated in terms of social life and inclusion. And so, a lot of, a lot of people feel uncomfortable going into these places. And the same way in return you will find that a lot of the youth uh living in the suburbs don’t go to the center, to the Paris museums or uh to exhibitions, uh or a great historical libraries which are located in central Paris, even though some of them are free. Why? Because they think that they are not welcome there. Uh that they don’t belong that. That someone is going to come in and tell them, you were wearing these sneakers or that sport suit, you don’t belong here. And so that uh and sometimes that happens. So uh just for, for a kid to go to a museum or a very nice library or a fancy shopping center in Paris, if he’s black or Arab, or if he looks Muslim, or he looks like he might come from the suburb, he will be followed all around the shop to make sure that he is not shoplifting. He will be asked for an ID at the entrance of the museum and he will be asked by the security guards. And so clearly there is this, uh this self-fulfilling hatred and distance between fellow citizens based on this prejudice.

CL Has the CCIF witnessed any successful changes in their efforts against hateful statements and acts?

MM Yes. From the moment where we started participating in the, in the media, um debating on tv and the radio, uh some of the people I’ve been debating, they’ve changed their behavior and now its more taboo to make like bold anti-Muslim statements on tv. And because more of us are now able to speak more publicly on tv, in French, and in a rational manner, its much more difficult for the right wing and for the left wing to some extent to build a false idea of these Muslims living in France. They can’t be like oh look these people can’t speak French, and oh these people are violent, because we show the exact opposite. And so this uh, this changes the mentalities and this changes –this has an effect on these sort of statements.

CL Is the CCIF involved in planning for the *Grand Paris Express*?

MM Charlotte I need to say that not many people are involved in that. The key issue here, and we’re not, we’re not involved in that for that matter but the key issue with the *Grand Paris Express* is that the transport network in the Paris suburbs also participates in the exclusion of some minorities in the exclusion of some areas from the participation to the wider wider, Île-de-France social and economic
life, so the plan here is how do you do make sure, how can we tackle these issues, how can we build a network of transport that’s gonna bring these people into the society. But there is no discussion as far as I’m aware, based on how we are going to fight this exclusion of minority including, through the religious minority through the Grand Paris Express Project.

CL  What are your future plans for further eliminating Islamophobia in France?

MM  We are working hard now to convince the government to take a significant action in uh against Islamophobia. So far, they have, up to the last few years been denying the phenomenon, and now they are starting to take it into account, and acting on it. But what we want to do first for 2013 is build a European network, an organization against Islamophobia to gather data, hate crimes and discrimination, uh in order for us to be able to come up with coordinated action at the European Union level, within the European commission, because we know that this is very efficient when it comes down to convincing uh national governments on racism in France. Whether it be the EU or the UN. We have this international organization, and we don’t make the most of it from an NGO perspective, and then there is the bias. The general bias is that any government is the least capable of seeing and analyzing the prejudice that is created by itself. So, for example, uh the U.S. are very reluctant to have kind of a clear, cold vision of the prejudice that they cause first to their fellow citizens and to the population abroad. So the UN is the right framework to frame this. And the same goes for France, and for a country like Japan. For example I was interviewing with a Japanese journalist, and he was excellent in pointing out the anti-Semitism and Islamophobia in France. Still he was completely unable to identity and form the kind of racism that the Japanese are encountering against Chinese minorities, against Korean minorities. And so that’s the, that’s the bias. The same goes with France on Islamophobia. It is much more efficient for a, for the U.S. to speak out against Islamophobia in France, for you kids to speak out against it in France, European Commision speak out against us, and say, you guys claim all across the globe that you guys are the country of freedom, of rights and equal respect but at the same time you are not even respecting this elementary freedom on your own soil. So come to some sense of reality and realize that in your country, they are part of your society and you need to live with that.
APPENDIX B

Transcript of Interview with Martin Dassieu: Correspondant for PACT of Île-de-France

This appendix contains my informative interview with Martin Dassieu, a correspondant for the PACT housing renewal and lodging organization based in the Île-de-France région. It was conducted over a skype call and he provided clarifying information regarding the histories of housing in France, as well as the histories of France’s transit systems and expected outcomes for the Grand Paris. The questions and answers are designated from my initials (CL) and Martin’s (MD). Our communication was conducted in French.

CL  Pour le PACT, est-ce que ça c’est une acronym?  


CL  Est-ce que ça est lié avec les grands ensembles qui a été crée par l’État ?  

MD  Alors, c’était avant, avant les grands ensembles. C’est vrai que, que au début de XXsiècle après la première guerre mondiale, en France, la première guerre mondiale a uh, destabilise forcément le pays, et a détruire beaucoup des villes. Les ville qui ont été à côté de l’Allemagne, qui sont touché par la guerre, a eu beaucoup beaucoup des logements qui étaient détruits. Dans un première temps, Les associations, les avocations avait aidé, les propriataires, a reconstruisait leur logement. Donc on n’est pas encore à la problématique des grands ensembles, mais à partir des années 50s, 60s, uh après la deuxième guerre mondiale, il a fallut un nouveau construire la France et uh, ça à posent les questions des grands ensembles. Le PACT dans un premier temps, uh, donc accompagnie la construction des grands ensembles, et il faut savoir qu’à partir des années 80s, 90s, les grands ensembles où il était très problématique, puisque on a, il est les personnes le plus pauvre dedans, et là on a commencé une nouveau intervenir pour réhabiliter les grands ensembles, pour retravailler sur les grands ensembles.

CL  Est-ce qu’il y a un lieu spécifique un department spécifique que vous, que le PACT travaillé dedans ?  

MD  Alors, on travaille sur les 7 departments dans l’Île-de-France, mais il faut savoir que les problématiques sont différents. Les problèmes sont différent par les departments. On a des departments qui sont assez connu en France qui s’appellent les seine-st-denise, uh, seine comme la riviere, et St-Denis, comme la ville St-Denis. C’est là qu’on a construit la plus des grands ensembles. C’est là que après la deuxième guerre mondiale, on a relogé, très forcement, les populations sinistrées, et aujourd’hui beaucoup de nos opérations de requalification urbain, de habitation loyer par l’état, sont réalisé par les scènes des ces departments. Donc, St-Denis, c’est le département, la plus pauvre, ou le département le plutôt plus jeune, et c’est le département où on a le plus construire pendant les années 50, 60, les grands ensembles.
Par contre, c’est différent aux États-Unis en ce qui concerne les banlieues. À cause de la délocalisation des villes, c’est au centre où on a le plus pauvres logements au contraire aux banlieues.

Oui, oui. C’est vraie qu’on a étudié que aux États-Unis, la ville américaine, à l’époque où les centres villes des États-Unis sont retrouvés populise à priori, puisque les gens voulaient vivre au banlieue, dans les résidences, qui n’étaient pas au centre ville. Uh en Île-de-France, pour les environ Paris, c’est qu’on appelle le banlieue « the suburbs » uh ça, a été, en fait construit, pendant un peu après, 20 ans, des années 50 à 70s, et ça a été très différent, sur le territoire, sur l’est de Paris, on a y a massivement les personnes pauvres, et à l’ouest de Paris, on y a massivement les personnes riches et aujourd’hui on se trouve en Île-de-France avec un context territorial, qui est très différent en fonctionne uh la localisation et généralment, on se rends compte que la même, types des constructions on a fait à l’ouest et à l’est, dont on n’a pas la même type de population. Et qu’on se retrouve pour un même type de construction, avec des populations très très, populise, donc très pauvre et c’est vrai que sur une cote il y a des riches et sur les autres cotes il y a des pauvres. Voilà l’est, le nord-est, on peut faire un petit fracture entre le nord-est, uh le seine-st-denis et uh le sud-ouest, (si vous preverez je peux vous transmettre des documents qui montrent le context qui s’opére et je peux également vous transmettre des documents sur nos actions depuis, les années 50, jusqu’à années 2000s).

En Posant des questions autour de la nouveau sujet du Grand Paris Express, avez-vous quelques petits commentaires autour ce sujet ici ? Est-ce que vous pensez le Grand Paris Express est une bonne idée ?

Alors, oui parce-que aujourd’hui en Île-de-France on se retrouve uh confronte à un gros problème c’est que l’ensemble, l’ensemble des emplois sont situé à Paris, et l’ensemble de uh des personnes qui vivre en Île-de-France sont uh, situé [oh pardon mon téléphone sonne] oui, comme je disais, c’est très important Grand Paris Express, parce-que ça permet de créer, uh de permettre, uh deux centralité, uh parce-que maintenant il y a seulement qu’un centralité, c’est la ville de Paris, et là vous avez tous les emplois. L’objectif est de créer des autres centralité pour pouvoir, mettre les emplois, ailleurs, qu’à Paris. Et uh, de coup il faut absolument développer les réseaux transports. L’automobile, uh depuis les années 70s, et 80s, on a arreté des construir une, les auto-routes pour le voiture, et on a privilégié les autres transports en commun, en Île-de-France on a vraiement un beau réseau transport en commun, et il va continuer a l’augemente parce-que avec le cout d’énergie l’essence cout de plus en plus, plus cher, et uh, devienne très problématique de déplacer en voiture. Il n’y a pas de taxes pour le voiture, qui a mon avis, ça a été imaginable en France, uh mettre un tax pour le personne qui utilise leur voiture, mais il y a un différent point, lorsque il y a trop de pollution, on interdit, certaines qui circulé, les voitures le plus polluant, les camions, les gros voitures, uh mais on n’a pas mis de taxe, pour le voiture, et notamment je sais qui-ce-passe, à Londre, ou à Berlin, où il y a des taxes pour rentrer dans la ville, uh pour utiliser les voitures, à Paris, on a fait quel-que chose différent. Ce quand on a rendu, en fait uh, le transport pour le voiture c’est très différent, très difficile, très compliqué, ce qui fait le personne n’utilise plus forcement, leur voiture parce-que c’est trop difficile de trouver une place de se-garerer, très difficile de circuler, donc plutôt on a essayé de décourager, pas taxer mais décourager, et on a explique, que le transport en commun, le train, le métro, uh le différent types de transport, uh sont moins cher, que la voiture, et c’est vraiment, moins cher que la voiture, et de l’autre part, c’est uh, c’est, pas forcement, si confortable. C’est
plutôt, le préoccupation écologique, il y a un vallée courant à ce moment, parce-que l’énergie coûte de plus en plus cher, et il faut absolument économiser l’argent et pour économiser l’argent, les gens doivent prendre le métro. Voilà.

CL Avec les organisations comme le PACT, à votre avis, est-ils sont efficaces pour les gens d’acquérir, et de louer les logements en Île-de-France ?

MD Alors, pour nous, on intervienne, sur les, qu’on apelle, le PACT privé. C’est qui uh, on viens, réhabiliter, retravailler le logement, uh privé, pas de logement publique. Parce-que en France il y a deux types des logements, les logements publiques, qui sont construits par l’état, et sont menés à la disposition pour les personnes et les logements privée une systéme avec un propriétaire, qui loue son logement à un autre personne qui alors, ou le propriétaire occupe son logement. Nous on intervienne seulement avec les PACTS privées, et on, trois actions, le premier action, est trouver l’argent, parce-que aujourd’hui en France il y a des aides, il y a des subdivisions, par ailleurs on réalise l’assistance, militie le projet, on a des architectes on a des engineers, on a des techniciens, qui vont réaliser, les bons travaux, finir les travaux, à réaliser le logement, et donc voilà. C’est passer par nous, déjà l’argent, et par l’état, le pouvoir de faire le projet, uh très technique, sans forcément recourir, a des entreprises spécialisées, on est une association démocratique, fédéral général, passer par nous, on est, ça veut dire, le qualité sans forcement, payer très chère. C’est économique en deux sens.
APPENDIX C

Notes from Correspondence with Marie-Camille Raffin, Head of Press for Solidarités Nouvelles pour le Logement

This appendix contains my correspondence with Marie-Camille Raffin, the head of press and communications for the French NGO group, Solidarités Nouvelles pour le Logement. Our correspondence was through e-mail because of technical problems connecting through international calling. The questions and answers are designated from my initials (CL) and Marie’s (MR). Our communication was conducted in French.

CL  J’ai vu le reseau qui montre où sont les logements en Île-de-France. Dans le dossier, il dit qu’il a cinq associations départementales à Paris, Yvelines, Essonne, Hauts-de-Seine et Val-de-Marne. Mais, il y a des autres logements partout la region, comme dans le reseau? Comment est-ce que SNL décider où de placer les logements?

MR  SNL est bien présente dans 5 départements. Elle a quelques logements également en Seine-Saint-Denis, mais nous n’y avons pas d’association départementale. Nous ne sommes pas présents ailleurs. Ce sont quelques bénévoles qui se réunissent pour créer un logement, elles cherchent un logement, ensuite elle réunissent l’argent (dons, subventions et prêts) pour l’acheter puis font les travaux nécessaires avant d’y installer quelqu’un. Les bénévoles se réunissent par quartier, pour être proches des personnes qu’ils logent.

CL  Dans l'historique, la loi Besson qui permet aux associations de bénéficier de subventions publiques, pour le logement social. À quelle année a-elle été créée? Une subvention, est-elle la même à une subsidaire?

MR  La loi Besson a été créée en 1990. Par contre, nous n'avons pas compris la deuxième partie de la question. Pouvez-vous me la repréciser, s'il vous plait ?

CL  En ce qui concerne la loi de Besson. Avec cette loi, à peu près elle a été créée, votre organisation, a-elle reçu des fonds pour aider avec ses logements provisionnels? Et aussi, est-ce que vous pensez il y avait une certaine ligne entre la SNL à l'année quand elle a été créée et le moment quand la loi de Besson a été établi?

MR  Grâce à cette loi, depuis 1990 SNL a reçu de nombreuses subventions pour financer la création de logements pour les plus démunis. aujourd'hui, ces subventions finance en moyenne ~65% du montant des logements (~10% de prêt long terme, ~25% de fonds propres). Avant 1990, SNL a financé quelques logement en fonds propres (dons de particuliers, amis, voisins...).

CL  Environ combien de temps est le moyen durée d'une locataire à leur logement temporaire?

MR  En moyenne, un locataire reste dans le logement temporaire 3 à 4 ans.

CL  Après ils sont reinstallé dans la société où est-ce qu'ils habitent?

MR  Les bénévoles de SNL qui accompagnent les locataires les aident à trouver un logement social ensuite (type HLM par exemple).
CL Ces logements temporaires, sont-ils publiques ou privés?

MR Ces logements temporaires appartiennent à SNL et sont donc privés.

CL Avec l'engagement civic, spécifiquement l'accompagnement des personnes logées, est-ce que les personnes sont donné une relation de SNL? Quelles types de conseil sont offert?

MR Les bénévoles et les travailleurs sociaux de SNL accompagnent les locataires. Les travailleurs sociaux les guident dans les démarches à effectuer et suivent leurs dossiers. Les bénévoles partagent une vraie relation avec le locataire. Ils les visitent régulièrement, prennent des nouvelles, ils leurs donnent des conseils sur la manière de faire des économies de charges, comment gérer leur logement...
APPENDIX D

Notes from France’s former Prime Minister Lionel Jospin’s Lecture: “Europe: a Continent in Decline or a Model for the Future?”

This appendix contains notes from Lionel Jospin’s lecture in addition to my conversation with him about the current affairs of the Grand Paris Express. I do not include his entire lecture. In sum, he spoke at length about the economic crisis affecting Europe and the adjustments individual countries were taking to meet social and fiscal conditions in the European Union. Lionel Jospin’s initials: LJ indicates his speech. My initials CL indicate my correspondence with him.

LJ We have received realistic indicators that the European markets are connected. It would now be wise to plan this European turnaround over several years. Rating agencies and markets would force us to link as markets the gross perspectives of our debts and realistic indicators, to get around the markets, shorten progressions and divorce radical methods would cease. [For the EU] to promote again to lend to their states but here we have fallen at our attempt, claiming that the European central bank could buy more of the European Union’s states sovereign debt on the secondary market and the Fed, the bank of England or the bank of Japan. It would also be wise to modulate economic policies in a now heterogenous European states according to national objectives. A common policy is not a single policy. Countries that have strong indicators of a weak budget deficit like Germany could follow less restrictive economic policy around other unsteady countries. The EU has estimated budgetary control mechanisms. It is now setting up a banking union in Europe, a gross policy to leave the prices behind more quickly. I know that some people believe that the reasons for Europe’s economic problems go deeper. For them, Europe’s social and economic model are at fault, with labor costs that are too high, and social welfare systems that are too heavy to control the new conditions of competitive global competition. I’m not convinced. First of all this model has already been partially altered over the last years in the name of economic neo-liberalism without weighing out competitivy…What’s more, a reversal would be nonsensical perspective…We are entering a period in which production costs are ebbing out, it would thus be paradoxical to not having forced such a change Europe would backtrack [pause to find place] Europe can adapt its model but it must not renounce it…the economy must serve all human beings. It would be absurd to forget…Europeans must accept that sovereignty is mixing. It can no longer accept itself as one sole nation and it cannot be embodied in one single Europe. To my mind, Europe must perfect its institution from the notion of shared sovereignty…from our model, I would call the democratic paradox. The European people who live in democracies at home fear a lack of democracy on the European union level. The European Parliament is elected by universal suffrage, by all the citizens of Europe but it does not have the force of a real Parliament. For example, it cannot levy taxes…European leaders should propose clearer functioning plans to their people, in which democratic groups would be respected on all levels. A connection with national parliament would most likely be the solution to this. The EU must choose about how it decides on its European organization. It cannot be an à la carte European Union because then it would unravel. It cannot be a two speed Europe that is distinguished between first class and second class countries. Because that would be against its very principle. It cannot close itself either into a search and consensus against others initiatives. The Union could, only at the same and level speeds. Each state would have its equal rights and responsibilities...[Speaking about Turkey] It is a question of how and when…such problems cannot be brought into the European Union. Turkey needs to solve its problems before it could join Europe if it still wishes to...In this uncertain 21st century that is unveiling out in front of us, if Europe will be alongside the US it should note also its multiplicity and connections to all of the areas of the world. So listening to Europe might
be useful for the United States…For Europe, I would not be worried about its loss of strengths, only about its loss of meaning.

CL  Bonjour M. Jospin. Est-ce que vous avez une minute pour de poser une question parce-que maintenant je suis en train de rechercher le projet en Île-de-France le Grand Paris Express. Mais il semble qu’il y a beaucoup des conflits et débats autour de ce projet.

LJ  Il faut que vous adresses, soit la marie de Paris, soit la région pour proposer des questions. Parce-que moi, je ne suis pas expert, ou spécialiste de Grand Paris Express. Mais regardez aussi la presse française parce-que elle surveille le projet.

CL  Oui, bien sur, parce-que il semble qu’il y a deux côtes de ce projet.

LJ  Oui, surtout, il y a une supposition de pouvoir une opposition, Il y a la ville du cœur et puis les autres qui ne sont pas équilibrés politiquement. Donc c’est une question complique.