Claremont Colleges Scholarship @ Claremont

CGU Faculty Publications and Research

CGU Faculty Scholarship

1-1-2001

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I

Robert J. Bunker Claremont Graduate University

Recommended Citation

Bunker, Robert J. "Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I." Europe Since 1945: An Encyclopedia, Ed. Bernard A. Cook. New York, NY: Garland Publishing, 2001. 1195.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the CGU Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in CGU Faculty Publications and Research by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more information, please contact scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.

minister from July 20 to December 31, Strásky simultaneously became the last prime minister of the Czech and Slovak Federated Republic. Following the division of the country on January 1, 1993, Klaus became prime minister of the Czech Republic. From 1993 to 1995 Strásky was minister of transportation. In 1995 he became minister of health. In February 1997, in an effort to stave off the bankruptcy of two prime teaching medical facilities, Strásky introduced controversial cost-cutting and consolidating measures.

Bernard Cook

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) resulted in a treaty limiting antiballistic missile (ABM) systems and an agreement limiting strategic offensive arms. These accords were signed on May 26, 1972, after two and a half years of negotiation between the United States and the USSR. A number of "agreed statements" that clarified specific provisions or parts of the negotiating history were attached.

The ABM Treaty sought to preclude the development of national missile defense systems. This treaty is of unlimited duration but allows either party the right to withdraw on six-months notice if it believes its national interests are jeopardized.

Two ABM deployment areas were allowed for each nation and were so restrictive that a nationwide ballistic missile defense system could not be developed. Each side was allowed a system to defend its capital and another to protect an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch site. These systems must be at least 1,300 kilometers away from each other, and each could have one hundred interceptor missiles and one hundred launchers. New generations of early-warning radars may be deployed, but they must be sited along the periphery of each country and directed outward so as not to facilitate an ABM defense. As agreed, the ABM Treaty is reviewed every five years.

A protocol to this treaty was signed on July 3, 1974, reducing the number of ABM deployment areas to one for each nation. The ABM Treaty was criticized by conservatives in the United States for terminating the Safeguard ABM system, which was to be deployed in twelve locations throughout the United States to protect ICBM sites, and for erasing the U.S. lead in ABM research and development. It was further criticized for encouraging the Soviet Union to create a counterforce capability that threatened U.S. land-based deterrent forces.

The agreement was to remain in force for five years, and was a stopgap measure to limit the offensive strategic

arms race while further negotiations would be carried out under SALT II. Under this agreement, strategic land-based ballistic missile launchers, including those under construction, were frozen at current levels. Further, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) could be increased to greater levels only if accompanied by the destruction of an equal number of older ICBM or SLBM launchers. Soviet strategic force ceiling levels were set at 1,618 ICBMs and 950 SLBMs (740 then existed). U.S. strategic force ceiling levels were set at 1,054 ICBMs and 710 SLBMs (656 then existed).

Although mobile ICBMs, multiple-independently-targetable-reentry-vehicle (MIRV) ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers, of which the United States enjoyed an advantage, were not covered in the Interim Agreement, it was criticized for conceding to the USSR an advantage in strategic ballistic missile launchers in return for the continuance of East-West arms control negotiations.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Labrie, Roger P., ed. SALT Handbook: Key Documents and Issues 1972–1979. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1979.

Smith, Gerard C. "The Treaty's Basic Provisions: View of the U.S. Negotiator," in Walter Stützle, Bhupendra Jasani, and Regina Cowen. *The ABM Treaty: To Defend or Not to Defend?* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of the Negotiations. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990.

Robert J. Bunker

SEE ALSO Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II

Second stage of strategic arms limitation talks (SALT II) between the USSR and the United States. The primary focus of these talks was the replacement of the SALT I Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972, with a more complete and balanced treaty.

These talks resulted in the signing on June 18, 1979, of a Treaty, Protocol, and Joint Statement of Principles that were never ratified by the U.S. Senate. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that year, President Jimmy Carter withdrew the treaty from Senate consideration, where it had come under considerable opposition. The Reagan administration, in turn, never resubmitted the treaty because of Soviet violations, such as the Krasno-