Egypt at a Crossroads: an Analysis of Morsi's Strategies of Military Control in the Post-Revolutionary State

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EGYPT AT A CROSSROADS: AN ANALYSIS OF MORSI’S STRATEGIES OF MILITARY CONTROL IN THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY STATE

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AND
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BY
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I: Introduction

Following Tunisia, Egypt was the second Arab nation to engage in the Arab Spring, as massive civil uprisings in protest of its former repressive dictator Hosni Mubarak succeeded in toppling his regime after thirty years of rule. While this revolution had set and achieved its primary goal – to overthrow Mubarak – it did not, however, include a plan for the restructuring of the Egyptian political system after the fall of its leader in February of 2011. Consequently, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the leaders of the Egyptian military, assumed power following Mubarak’s exit, promising to “maintain the homeland”\(^1\) in the process of preparing to hold free elections in the near future. The SCAF ‘maintained the homeland’ for 17 months after the fall of their former leader, until elections were finally held in June of 2012. On June 24\(^{th}\), Mohamed Morsi, a member of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, was declared the fifth president of Egypt.

Morsi is Egypt’s first civilian president. Ever since the Free Officers Revolution of 1952, Egypt has been ruled by a succession of military leaders, including Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak. Consequently, political and economic authority has since rested in the hands of the military. In order to establish and maintain a functional and representational democracy in this period of post-revolution transition, this hierarchy of power must be reversed: civilian leadership must be able to control the intentions and actions of the military. This change is significant and will be difficult to

accomplish given the degree to which the military has enjoyed its dominant role in Egyptian society over the past sixty years.

The underlying challenge at the heart of the civil-military question is how to “reconcile a military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask them to with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize them to do.”2 This is a rather interesting paradox: “because we fear others we create an institution of violence to protect us, but then we fear the very institution we created for protection.”3 What is most perplexing of all, I believe, is that no one knows the right answer to the question. As the newly elected civilian president of Egypt, Morsi must navigate his way and prove his legitimacy in a society where the line between too much military authority and too little military authority is ambiguous. If Morsi goes too far in suppressing military authority in the coming months, he runs the risk of catalyzing a military coup against his government. On the other hand, if he gives the armed forces too much leeway, the military has the capacity to undermine his civilian leadership, and make him more of a symbolic figurehead than an actual source of governing power.

The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to evaluate the strategic approaches undertaken by Egypt’s former leaders in an overall attempt to provide a comprehensive answer to this central question: what are President Morsi’s strategies for controlling the military in post-revolutionary Egypt? I will argue that, while Morsi has demonstrated his desire to control the armed forces through various institutional changes, his efforts have fallen short of attacking the heart of the problem, which is the deeply-rooted militaristic

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3 Ibid, 150.
culture that has come to be valued and accepted by Egyptian society throughout the course of the last sixty years.
II. Civil-Military Theory

In the following section, I provide an analysis of civil-military theory from a variety of standpoints, both historical and contemporary. The purpose of this section is to offer a basic understanding of the ways in which civilian and military institutions are inclined to balance power in society.

*Huntington & Janowitz*

Civil-military relations refers to the relationship between civil and military authority in a given society. The study of civil-military relations is extensive, as it pertains to a variety of subject matters and academic areas, including political science, philosophy, sociology, anthropology, law, and the like. Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz serve as the founders of the contemporary study of civil-military relations in the age of liberal democracy, bringing with them the generally accepted normative belief that civilian authority is preferable to military control of the state. In order to maintain the liberal values intrinsic to democracy, the civilian authority must be able to control its military. But how can this be done?

Huntington, “arguably the greatest American political scientist of our time,” introduced his theory of civil-military relations in his book *The Soldier and the State*. He sees civilian control as a function of either “objective control” or “subjective control”. Objective control is the process by which the military maximizes its professionalism, removing it from any sort of political involvement. More specifically, it is the “distribution of political power between military and civilian groups which is most

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conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior among the members of
the officer corps.”6 It isolates the military from politics, renders it politically neutral, but
gives it “as free a hand as possible in military matters.”7 Subjective control is, instead,
the maximization of civilian power in relation to the military – a process that is
complicated by “the large number, varied character, and conflicting interests” of civilian
groups within a society.8 Objective control, therefore, is the healthier and more effective9
approach to civilian control of the military organization in any given state, according to
Eliot Cohen. It is often referred to as a liberal theory primarily concerned that the
structure of civil-military relations is such that it enables the military to “protect
democratic values by defeating external threats.”10

Conversely, Morris Janowitz proposes what is commonly referred to as a civic-
republic theory of democratic civil-military relations, which is concerned more that civil-
military relations are able to sustain democratic values – “especially the value of civic
virtue – by bolstering civic participation through the citizen-soldier’s role.”11 In other
words, civilian control comes from greater civic participation by both soldiers and
civilians alongside one another. While Janowitz’ theory is also concerned with
professionalism as is Huntington’s, he sees the military’s politicization as somewhat
unavoidable.12

6 Ibid, 83.
7 Cohen, 4.
8 Huntington, 80.
9 Cohen, 4.
12.
11 Ibid, 12.
12 Ibid, 12.
Contemporary Theories of Civil-Military Relations

Both of these theories, while they have served as a general basis for subsequent civil-military theory, are somewhat outdated. They were conceived in the historical context of the Cold War when the Soviet threat required the U.S. military to maintain a large standing army for the first time, which was controversial because no one knew if its permanence within the state would threaten civilian authority, and therefore undermine America’s ability to sustain a liberal democracy.¹³ Many of the theories that have emerged since are concerned primarily with newly formed democracies, often highlighting the changes in civil-military relations that occur when a state transitions from authoritarianism to democracy. These are the theories that are the most relevant to this paper’s discussion of Egyptian civil-military relations.

Deborah Norden, for instance, uses Huntington’s theory as a springboard in her discussion of civil-military relations in Latin America. She argues that the case of Venezuela discredits the necessity for complete civilian oversight of the armed forces, and that it was actually the “government’s ability to fit the armed forces into its broader policy goals” that allowed “for relatively more political authority over the military than [what] might [have been] expected.”¹⁴ The way she rationalizes her theory is by breaking down the three elements of control: domination, who commands the armed force; management, who directs the armed forces; and authority, what militaries believe.¹⁵ A government need not possess all three dimensions of control; the more facets achieved,

¹³ Feaver, 159.
however, the more control the civilian authority has over the military. In the Venezuelan case, therefore, civilian control stemmed from a shared political ideology.

Rebecca Schiff offers an alternative model, the theory of concordance, which interprets effective civil-military relations as a function of coordinated institutional efforts. Schiff proposes that this cooperation should occur between “three partners – the military, the political elites, and the citizenry” in determining “the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, recruitment method, and military style.” She argues that the main issue with the current theory of civil-military relations is that it requires militaries to remain “physically and ideologically separated from political institutions.” This theory of separation derives from the American civil-military experience, which “assumes that American institutional separation should be applied to all nations to prevent domestic military intervention.” The American case, however, is in many ways specific to its historical and cultural legacies, which renders it inadequate as a standard basis of civil-military theory for other nations. The concordance theory does not base its rationale on the American case; instead, it “considers the unique historical and cultural experiences of nations and the various other possibilities for civil-military relations.”

The theories of both Norden and Schiff prove that developing societies involve a wide range of complex variables that affect civil-military relations. Consequently, the challenge of controlling the armed forces differs depending on these variables. A state’s

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16 Ibid, 3.
18 Ibid, 7.
19 Ibid, 8.
20 Ibid, 8.
21 Ibid, 8.
national ethos, the military’s sense of purpose and role, the prevalence of stable or unstable institutions within the state, the type of government in place, and the state’s historical legacy are all among the elements that influence the balance between civilian and military authority within a developing nation.

In his subsequent piece *Reforming Civil-Military Relations*, Huntington provides a discussion pertaining to the question of civil-military relations in developing countries. He argues that new democracies – especially those emerging from authoritarian regimes – face four primary challenges: 1) the definition of the military’s specific roles; 2) military political intervention; 3) “pre-existing military privileges”; 4) and “the development and diffusion of new military technology.”\(^22\) While all four of these challenges apply to the Egyptian case, the first three are particularly central to this paper.

*Important Themes*

For the purposes of this paper, several themes will be important to the discussion of civil-military relations in Egypt. First of all, professionalism will be mentioned quite frequently throughout my analysis. According to Roderic Camp, professionalism has five distinct characteristics:

1. It must be based upon a body of systematic theory (for example, theories of warfare);
2. Its members must possess differentiating expertise (for example, knowledge of military strategy and weaponry);
3. It must incorporate certain powers and privileges granted by society (for example, the military exercises autonomous control over its admission, training, and standards);
4. It must subscribe to a code of ethics (the most critical variable for the military because a code governs intra- and inter-group relationships); and
5. Its culture, including values, norms, and symbols, must convey its mystique and

More generally, a professional military is one that is aware of its specific roles, is well-trained and organized, and functions with the same degree of expertise as any other professional within society, whether that be a doctor, banker, or academic professor.

Secondly, military disengagement – or rather, de-politicization – is another key theme for this paper. A military is depoliticized when it abstains from playing a direct political role in the government. It can be defined as “the substitution of praetorian policies and personnel with those advocated by the recognized civilian authorities,” and occurs when the armed forces “return to the barracks and make room for some kind of civilian rule.” This means, for instance, that governmental ministries and cabinets are filled by civilians rather than military officers.

Conversely, the politicization of the armed forces enables military officers to participate directly in governmental affairs. According to normative standards of democratic civil-military theory, allowing the politicization of the military is dangerous because it enables the armed forces to act as another interest group within society. In order to secure its interests, a politicized military may opt to use force in the place of diplomatic decision-making processes. As you will see, Egyptian leaders either attempted to politicize or depoliticize the military in their efforts to control it.

Cooptation is also significant to this paper, especially in its application to the military institution during the Mubarak era. The civilian authority typically coopts a military by ‘winning it over’, which can be done through the provision of certain valuable

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incentives. Incentives can be monetary, in which a form of financial security is given to military personnel in exchange for their commitment to the civilian authority. They can also be political, in which military officers are promised prominent positions within the government in return for their political loyalty to civilian rule. In essence, it is a form of mutual accommodation that provides privileges in exchange for political obedience.

Finally, civilian control is yet another central topic. It can be defined as the set of institutions and mechanisms – i.e., control over the budget, policy, and endowments – that are used to make sure that the civilian government remains fully in control of the instruments that have the ability to influence military power. In a democratic setting, it often involves the establishment of a constitution that creates a framework in which the tasks of legislative, executive, and judicial powers are designated to civilian control.25 Further, military transparency is an important mechanism of democratic civilian control, as it pertains to “the military’s openness and its accountability toward civil society.”26

26 Ibid, 23.
III: The Officers’ Republic

Between the Free Officers Revolution of 1952 and the toppling of Hosni Mubarak in February of 2011, Egypt was ruled by four presidents, all originating from the military: Muhammad Naguib, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar al-Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak.27 Throughout this period of nearly sixty years, the “military has dominated the country’s politics”, prompting the “long-standing subordination of civilian leadership to the influence of the military establishment.”28 This has led to the emergence of what Yezid Sayigh refers to as the “officers’ republic”, or the “self-perpetuating military networks that permeate virtually all branches and levels of state administration and of the state-owned sectors of the economy.”29 The officers’ republic not only exercises control of the defense budget, U.S. military assistance, and much of the Egyptian economy, it also enjoys “a deep sense of institutional and personal entitlement”30 – an elevated social status that unquestionably stems from this legacy of military dominance.

The centralization of power in the executive branch of the republic, not coincidentally “the strongest branch within”31 the Egyptian political system, is a fundamental characteristic of the political apparatus that enables the persistence of the officers’ republic. Despite, for instance, the existence of an independent judiciary branch, the degree of power invested in the executive is such that it negates the functionality of proper checks and balances. The Administrative Monitoring Agency, one of several oversight agencies in Egypt, serves as a pertinent example of this lopsided political

28 Ibid, 82.
30 Ibid, 3.
31 Miller et al., 82.
system. It was established in 1958 “to investigate administrative and financial violations” with a mandate “to combat corruption throughout the country and in the entire state apparatus.”\(^{32}\) The only component of the state over which the Administrative Monitoring Agency cannot exert its jurisdiction is the armed forces, because the military is not subject to “any civilian oversight beyond that of the president, who until Morsi’s election had always been an ex-military man.”\(^{33}\) This exemplifies an instance of reciprocity, in which the regime looks out for the corporate interests of the military in exchange for unfaltering military loyalty and support for the regime. The notion of reciprocity is one that extends throughout the entirety of the Egyptian republic, supporting the argument that “the military remains central to Egyptian politics because it provides the power base for the president and protection for the regime.”\(^{34}\) This reciprocal relationship is a threat to the future of Egyptian democracy, in that it allows the military to become a prominent political actor in the democratic state.

International factors have also contributed significantly to the entrenchment of the officers’ republic within Egyptian society. The military disaster of the 1967 Six-Day War with Israel prompted Nasser to initiate policies that would improve the effectiveness of the Egyptian Armed Forces as a military entity of force and national security. Further, Egypt’s alignment with the Soviet Union and the United States greatly influenced its ability to maintain a professional military.

In this post-revolution transitional period, Egypt’s only chance of securing a true democracy – one in which a non-corrupt, non-military, representative, and transparent

\(^{32}\) Sayigh, 12.

\(^{33}\) Ibid, 12.

\(^{34}\) Imad Harb, “The Egyptian Military in Politics: Disengagement or Accommodation?”, \textit{Middle East Journal} \textbf{57} (2003): 287.
government is put in place to genuinely serve and protect the interests of the Egyptian people – is through the disassembling of the officers’ republic. If President Morsi’s administration fails to do so, then the officers’ republic “will use its extensive political reach and its control over key bureaucratic and economic enclaves to subvert any future government of which it disapproves.”

A complete unraveling of the officers’ republic, however, requires knowledge of precisely how it was wound up in the first place: what measures did Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak take individually to establish and enhance the robustness of the military institution throughout the last sixty years?

This paper finds that Egypt’s past leaders have used different variations of four main strategies in their respective efforts to control the armed forces: politicization, de-politicization, professionalization, and cooptation.

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35 Sayigh, 4.
IV: Nasser, 1956-1970

Nasser’s Ascendance to Power

On July 23 of 1952, a group of Egyptian army officers called the Free Officers Movement took power of the Egyptian state through the execution of a bloodless coup d’etat.\(^{36}\) Led in part by the young officer Gamal Abdel Nasser, the military uprising was provoked by widespread discontent with Egypt’s lack of independence: under King Farouk’s monarchical rule, Egypt was nothing more than Britain’s colonial puppet. The dismantling of the king and the Muhammad Ali Dynasty, and therefore of Egypt’s connection to its imperial counterpart, would introduce a new chapter in the progression of Egypt’s political history.

After the establishment of the new republic, Muhammad Naguib became the first President of Egypt in 1953. His time in office, however, was rather short-lived, as contention rooted in power politics between Gamal Abdel Nasser and he ultimately led to his forced removal from office.\(^{37}\) In June of 1956, 99.9% of five million Egyptians voted in favor of Nasser, the only running candidate, for president under a newly formed constitution that made Egypt a socialist Arab state with a one-party political system.\(^{38}\) Nasser’s regime, which reigned from 1956 until 1970, directed Egypt down a pathway of almost complete military political dominance, a legacy that persisted up until the fall of the Mubarak regime in 2011.

Nasser’s Strategies

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38 St. John.
In order to control the armed forces, therefore, Nasser’s main strategy involved extensive military politicization: he intentionally staffed “the cabinet, ministries, and state machinery with military personnel.” This was Nasser’s way of gaining control over a bureaucracy that had been traditionally independent. This policy backfired in 1967, when Israel launched a surprise attack on Egypt. In response, Nasser sought to reverse his tactic of politicization, and with the help of the Soviet Union, he began to professionalize the ranks of the military as well.

Nasser transformed Egypt into what Anouar Abdel-Malek refers to as “une société militaire,” a military society, wherein the armed forces became the primary agents of societal transformation. Under Nasser, the military not only served to protect the regime, but it also participated significantly in governing alongside the president. Military officers were given prominent positions in the cabinet, ministries, and state machinery to an almost overwhelming degree: “of 18 cabinets between 1952 and 1970, only the first (lasted for less than two months) was headed by a civilian.” In addition, out of 100 top positions in the Foreign Ministry in 1962, 72 of them were occupied by military officers, “and all ambassadors to Europe except for three were officers.” The three successive political organizations created by the regime (the Liberation rally (LR), the National Union (NU), and the Arab Socialist Union (ASU)) were also largely controlled by military men.

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40 Miller, 72.
41 Sayigh, 10.
42 Harb, 278.
43 Ibid, 279.
44 Ibid, 279.
Eliezer Beeri describes the Egyptian power structure under Nasser at the time of his death in 1970 as a three-tiered pyramid. Nasser occupied the pinnacle of the pyramid, representing his exceptional position as ruler of the state. The second tier of power included nine individuals who were “vice-presidents, prime ministers, and Speakers of the People’s Assembly,” and all of whom were either former or active military officers.\(^{45}\) The third tier “consisted of the different deputy premiers between 1962 and 1967, 42 in all, 13 of whom were from the military.”\(^{46}\) Within all three of these tiers, therefore, 42% of the ruling elite were officers.\(^{47}\)

Nasser’s economic policies further entrenched military dominance in Egyptian society. In an effort to make Egypt economically independent, Nasser imposed radical economic strategies that effectively transformed the Egyptian economy from a private dominated sector economy to a public dominated sector economy. The nationalization of the Suez Canal, the confiscation and redistribution of land, and the seizure of all privately owned financial institutions helped to fortify this economic transformation. By 1965, “the public sector contributed 95% of all investment and controlled 83% of all means of production.”\(^{48}\) Consequently, the Egyptian bureaucracy “increased by 161% between 1961-1962 and 1970-1971”, and the number of ministries increased from 15 to 28 between 1952 and 1970.\(^{49}\) Military officers, with their close connection to the revolutionary regime and to the sentiments of the president, were suddenly presented with a large bureaucracy and many positions to be filled.

\(^{45}\) Ibid, 279.
\(^{46}\) Ibid, 279.
\(^{47}\) Ibid, 279.
\(^{48}\) Ibid, 278.
\(^{49}\) Ibid, 278.
During the Nasser era, retired military officers also received key posts in the state that lay completely beyond the sphere of government. In fact, Abdel-Malek estimates that approximately “1,500 officers had been appointed to the upper ranks of the non-military establishment,” occupying high-profile positions in “culture, the press, radio and television,” as well as senior administrative positions of the boards of public corporations, etc.\(^50\) Nasser effectively transformed the military into a multi-functional political body, managing to mold the Egyptian society into one that valued the military as such. In this way, the president was able to maintain control of his military by ensuring his officers’ economic wellbeing and political prominence in exchange for their support and undying loyalty to the regime.

*The 1967 Six-Day War*

Nasser’s strategy of control, however, proved to be defective when Egypt was faced with a real external threat from Israel on June 5\(^{th}\) of 1967. In a surprise attack, Israeli jets succeeded in completely demolishing a large portion of Egypt’s air force, and in the following days the Israeli ground forces were able to defeat the Egyptian army and seize the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula.\(^51\) Imad Harb argues that the defeat was “precipitated by a combination of factors including command and control problems and the politicization of the military command.”\(^52\) The factionalism, lack of qualification and military training, and disorganized nature of the military that resulted from its politicization essentially rendered the military useless in its capacity to function as the defender and protector of the Egyptian state.

\(^{50}\) Sayigh, 10-11.  
\(^{51}\) Harb, 281.  
\(^{52}\) Ibid, 281.
The politicization of the armed forces, however, was not the only factor contributing to its inadequacy in the 1967 Six-Day War. Egypt’s international and regional standing in the years leading up to the 1967 war significantly influenced its lack of military readiness. Nasser’s foreign policy throughout the early 1960’s greatly focused on the plans of a unified Arab state system\(^{53}\), of which he would be the leader. This vision “created tremendous intra-Arab conflict,” and consequently “left little time for concerns about Israel” during the period leading up to the June attack of 1967.\(^{54}\) Egypt was not inclined, therefore, to “secure a greater commitment from foreign actors”\(^{55}\) because it was largely preoccupied with regional engagements.

Not surprisingly, Egypt did not seek a great deal of military assistance from the Soviet Union in the years leading up to 1967, its closest great power ally at the time. As early as 1955, the Soviet Union served as Egypt’s principal arms supplier; yet the relationship was tainted by a mutual suspicion of “each other’s motivations and the potential costs of any close association or level of commitment.”\(^{56}\) In comparison to the years after the 1967 war, in which increased Israeli security threats and domestic instability prompted greater reliance on the Soviet Union and on regional actors, the years before the war demonstrated Egypt’s lack of international support.\(^{57}\) Egypt’s limited external financial assistance contributed, alongside its politicization, to the military’s failure in the 1967 Six-Day War.

\(^{54}\) Ibid, 380.
\(^{55}\) Ibid, 379.
\(^{56}\) Ibid, 380.
\(^{57}\) Ibid, 381.
With increased military support from the Soviet Union, Nasser professionalized the military ranks by providing improved training, equipment, and instruction. Between 1967 and 1972, for instance, “the number of Soviet troops and advisers stationed in Egypt increased from” 500 to nearly 15,000.\(^{58}\) In fact, by 1970 the Soviet Union had infiltrated “all levels of Egyptian defense planning”: it had retrained the Egyptian army, funded practically all of its weaponry, and provided additional financial support for Egypt’s war effort.\(^{59}\)

In addition to using Soviet aid to professionalize the military, Nasser also sought to depoliticize the Egyptian armed forces. While both Nasser and Field Marshal ‘Abd al-Hakim ‘Amr “tended their resignations”\(^{60}\) in the days that followed the 1967 fiasco, it was ‘Amr’s suicide that changed the way the military as a political entity would be conceptualized in the future. Harb believes that ‘Amr’s death Signaled a new approach to the military that centered on a lessened political role in the regime (although military presence in the cabinet immediately following the defeat spiked) and devotion to the duty of regaining the Sinai, preparedness for a long war, and professionalism.\(^{61}\)

On June 11\(^{th}\), Nasser expunged the ranks of the military leadership that were opposed to him, and filled the new officer corps with a second generation of officers: those who were not directly affiliated with the 1952 Free Officers Movement. Separated from this movement, the new generation of officers was thought to be depoliticized in the sense that it had no connection to the “revolutionary ethos and history”\(^{62}\) that contributed to the

\(^{58}\) Ibid, 385.
\(^{59}\) Ibid, 386.
\(^{60}\) Sayigh, 281.
\(^{61}\) Ibid, 281.
\(^{62}\) Ibid, 281.
failure of the 1967 Six-Day War with Israel. Despite this transformation, however, the
Free Officers organization was able to maintain its influence within the top elite as
ministers and advisors, and would later serve as a sizeable obstacle to Sadat’s ascension
to power.

Howard J. Dooley, author of “Nasser and DeGaulle: Heroes in Search of a Role”, makes an interesting and reflective comparison between Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser
and France’s Charles DeGaulle in January of 1971, only a few months after the deaths of
both of these “giants of world politics.”63 Dooley argues that what Nasser and DeGaulle
shared in common was their raw ambition, political brilliance, and ability to alter the
course of history: “both were not merely politicians, but phenomena that often defied
logical analysis.”64 Nasser, the “Afro-Asian nationalist”, managed to take a small and
underdeveloped nation and turn it into a “world force for the first time in more than 2000
years.”65 He proved to his people that Egypt could overcome its social and economic
depravity, and that it was a country worthy of international prestige and respect. He
contributed significantly to the beginning of Egyptian modernization, and effectively
turned the country into the Arab leader of political and military power by the time of his
death in 1970.66

When Nasser’s strategy of military politicization proved defective in the 1967
war, he instituted a two-pronged strategy of professionalization and political
disengagement. Upon Sadat’s ascendance to power in 1970, he continued to implement

64 Ibid, 48.
65 Ibid, 53.
66 Ibid, 52.
Nasser’s strategy of professionalization and de-politicization, but to a much greater extent.

Sadat’s Strategies

Anwar al-Sadat, technically the third president of the Egyptian Republic, came into office after Nasser’s death on September 28, 1970, bringing with him an entirely new set of ideological and political changes that would serve to significantly alter the role of the Egyptian military. Much like his predecessor, Sadat used the military as the foundation upon which he grew his legitimacy and power; yet, the tactics he used to control the armed forces differed greatly. He was able to completely subordinate the military under his civilian command through strategies of professionalization and de-politicization. Sadat also used ‘divide and rule’ tactics to enhance military obedience. Further, his dominance over the military stemmed from his unwillingness to tolerate dissent of any form or degree throughout the entire state apparatus.

Sadat’s Corrective Revolution

Initially, it was difficult for Sadat to foster a legitimate political base with a strong support system because unlike Nasser, he did not ascend to power in a revolution. Instead of starting from scratch, as Nasser had done, Sadat was forced to begin his presidency within the Nasserist framework, an internal system that had definitively reached an impasse by the mid-1960s.® Further, Nasser’s enormous popularity worked against Sadat in his accession to the presidency: he had “no political base of his own, no charisma similar to Nasir’s, and [was] hated by his predecessor’s lieutenants for

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inheriting their hero’s legacy.” What was Sadat’s solution to this resistance? A comprehensive purge of all those who were opposed to him and his regime.

This purge, coined the “Corrective Revolution”, occurred in May of 1971. It eliminated specific Nasserist enemies within the military and the Arab Socialist Union who Sadat saw as threatening to his position, including the band of Free Officers that remained in office from Nasser’s government. He replaced this inner core of power with several personal advisors and chief ministers who enjoyed “extremely close personal relations with Sadat,” forming a sort of “royal family”. The Corrective Revolution would be the first purge of many, as Sadat was not willing to tolerate virtually any degree of opposition within his regime, despite his talk of ‘democracy’. Instead, he preferred to build his regime almost purely on trust, appointing “to high office people whom he trust[ed] … and whose reactions to any given set of circumstances [were] broadly similar to his own.” Otherwise, those who disagreed with Sadat to an extent that he deemed inappropriate were thoughtlessly dismissed from their positions. For instance, Sadat “jailed Fawzi, arrested Sadiq, exiled Shazli, and retired Gamassi,” because he saw these individuals as directly threatening to his supreme command.

Within historical literature, Sadat is often described as a particularly dynamic, determined, and dominant leader; but one that was perpetually suspicious of his fellow

68 Harb, 282.
69 Aulas, 18.
71 Philip Adams, “Sadat’s Egypt,” (paper presented as the opening address at the Third Annual Conference of the Society, Collingwood College, University of Durham, 5-7 July 1976): 73.
72 Ibid, 73.
elites.\textsuperscript{74} It was this wariness that contributed significantly to the ways in which Sadat consolidated his power, both within his inner circle of elites and within the Egyptian armed forces. Unlike Nasser, who was constrained by his Free Officer comrades – “men who made the revolution with him, and who, far from being his creatures, were relatively permanent members of a team not easily disregarded and who on occasion could defy him” – Sadat was controlled by no one.\textsuperscript{75} The elite under Sadat were better described as “‘his’ men” than as his equals or colleagues, as they were frequently ambiguous persons appointed to power, to whom Sadat had no obligation.\textsuperscript{76} In fact, Sadat made it a point to periodically refresh the ranks of the elite in order to prevent any individual from feeling a sense of permanency, which would challenge the supremacy of the president. He maintained few advisors and seldom consulted with them, often making major decisions single-handedly with little instruction.\textsuperscript{77} As a result, Sadat emerged as the absolute pinnacle of power during his reign; no other power centers apart from the president were able to form – not even the military.

As a result of Sadat’s thorough consolidation of power, he was able to finally and completely subordinate the Egyptian military to his civilianized presidential leadership. To be able to control the military, Sadat not only dismissed officers who disagreed with him, but he also used ‘divide and rule’ tactics to manipulate the officer corps, pitting individual officers against each other to thwart their attention away from the president.\textsuperscript{78} Sadat replaced, for instance, the Minister of War General Muhammad Sadiq with the

\textsuperscript{74} Hinnebusch, 444.  
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid, 445.  
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid, 445.  
\textsuperscript{77} Adams, 73.  
\textsuperscript{78} Harb, 282.
apolitical General Ahmad Hasan ‘Ali because Sadiq had objected to Sadat’s war plans against Israel.\textsuperscript{79} He managed the military in the same way that he managed his inner core of elites: through a combination of sidelining, dismissals, and divide and rule strategies. What resulted was an exceptionally loyal and obedient military.

\textit{Professionalization}

Sadat also sought to professionalize the armed forces. The 1967 defeat under Nasser’s command proved to Sadat that the Egyptian military needed to reorient its focus toward accepting more of a professionalized and depoliticized role within the state. The most evident example of professionalism during Sadat’s presidency is the amount of attention paid to improving recruitment, equipment, and training.\textsuperscript{80} In preparation for the 1973 surprise attack on Israel, therefore, Sadat pressured the Soviet Union – Egypt’s strongest great power ally at the time – to supply the Egyptian military with the most up-to-date arms technology to match that of Israel.\textsuperscript{81} A greater effort was made to recruit university graduates to fill the ranks of junior officers and tank commanders, and the implementation of a more rigid training program reestablished confidence and legitimacy in the military.\textsuperscript{82} Although the Egyptians technically lost the 1973 October war in the sense of pure military combat, the “professionalization of the officer corps has implied unquestioning acceptance of the commands of legitimate authority – that is, of the president.”\textsuperscript{83}

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid, 282.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid, 282.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid, 282.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid, 282.
\textsuperscript{83} Hinnebusch, 454.
From the Soviet Union to the United States

An important outcome of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War was the shift in partnership from the Soviet Union to the United States. Henry Kissinger’s “shuttle diplomacy” during the war, in which he negotiated a deal with Sadat that “eventually culminated in President Anwar Sadat’s willingness to make peace with Israel,” had huge implications for Egypt’s military. These negotiations led to the Camp David Accords in 1978 between U.S. President Jimmy Carter, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and Anwar Sadat, setting the stage the following year for the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. Both the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty and the Egypt-U.S. strategic partnership represent alliances resulting from the 1973 Yom Kippur war that have persisted to this day.

Making peace with Israel, although condemned by many Arab states, was essentially Sadat’s way of getting closer to the United States. What Egypt lost in financial assistance from his Arab neighbors and the Soviet Union was supplanted by the enormous benefits received from its new partnership with the U.S. Starting in 1979, “Egypt has been the second-largest recipient, after Israel, of U.S. bilateral foreign assistance,” and has received approximately $35 billion in military assistance since then. While Egypt values its relationship with the U.S. for basic economic reasons, its primary incentive to sustain a close relationship has been the “U.S. support for Egypt’s military, and thus for its governing regime.” This relationship significantly enhanced

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85 Ibid, 78.
86 Ibid, 78.
88 Sullivan and Jones, 84.
89 Sullivan and Jones, 79.
the professionalization of the military, as Sadat could use U.S. military funds to provide exceptional training and up-to-date weaponry.

_De-politicization_

Depoliticizing the armed forces was yet another strategy that Sadat took to control the military. Whereas in 1967 the military occupied between 41% to 66% of key government positions, that figure was reduced significantly to only 22% in 1972. Under Nasser, approximately one-third of the elite was comprised of military officers; in Sadat’s later years, only one in ten elites had originated from the officer corps. Sadat’s political reorientation essentially made it so that a military career no longer presented a direct pathway into the political elite.

Sadat’s economic policies also helped to disengage the military from the political sphere. In an effort to open the Egyptian economy for development, Sadat imposed a range of liberalization policies as part of his Open Door Economic Policy (ODEP). These policies implied decreased spending on the military. Despite the smaller defense budget, as Miller suggests, “the military-industrial complex was growing and becoming more self-sufficient.”

_Bread Riots of 1977_

A testament to the military’s subordination under Sadat – a product of its professionalization and de-politicization – was the military’s reaction to the bread riots of 1977. Egypt was one of several Arab states involved in a “Mediterranean debt crescent”

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90 Harb, 283.
91 Hinnebusch, 450.
92 Miller, 74.
93 Miller, 74.
94 Miller, 74.
in the 1970s.\textsuperscript{95} Often upon the request of the International Monetary Fund, authoritarian elites throughout the Arab world responded to massive debt by subscribing to the neoliberal ideology, a Western economic theory that promotes open markets and a limited economic role for the state.\textsuperscript{96} This meant, however, significant cuts to subsidies that were previously provided by the state as a part of what James Gelvin refers to as the ‘ruling bargain’, or the “accommodation reached between the states and the citizens they govern.”\textsuperscript{97} Citizens were essentially stripped of their access to certain ordinary commodities that they depended on, prompting many to take to the streets in protest of this new economic practice. This is precisely what instigated the bread riots of 1977 in Egypt. In order to quell the protests throughout the state, Sadat called upon the military to restore order. The armed forces complied, and obediently returned to their barracks shortly after the uprising.\textsuperscript{98}

We can compare this instance of mass protest to that of the 2011 revolution. Like the bread riots of 1977, part of the Egyptian resentment for the Mubarak regime resulted from a deteriorating economy. In March of 2008, for instance, Egypt experienced widespread bread shortages, which eliminated affordable access to a staple food product of the Egyptian diet. Egypt spends roughly US$2.75 billion annually to subsidize the cost of bread to Egyptians, an example of the social contract – the ruling bargain – that continues to exist between the state and its people.\textsuperscript{99} Among other

\textsuperscript{96} Gelvin, 17.
\textsuperscript{97} Gelvin, 12.
\textsuperscript{98} Harb, 283.
\textsuperscript{99} Miller et al., 88.
instances of economic insufficiencies, including price hikes and banking scandals\textsuperscript{100}, Egypt’s economic conditions leading up to both the 1977 bread riots and the 2011 revolution were a major source of public dissatisfaction with the government.

Shortly after the police force collapsed within the first week of the 2011 uprising, Mubarak called upon the army to open fire on the demonstrators in order to silence their protests.\textsuperscript{101} The armed forces refused the president’s request, a decision that I believe determined the outcome of the revolution. Whereas Sadat had basically issued the same order in 1977 that Mubarak had to his military in 2011, Sadat’s military acquiesced without hesitation, while Mubarak’s military refused. A fundamental difference, therefore, exists between the armed forces under Sadat and the armed forces under Mubarak: the independence with which Mubarak’s military behaved during the Egyptian revolution of 2011 is something that lacked in the era of Sadat. The independence that Mubarak bestowed upon the military was originally intended as a tactic of control; yet, it was the military’s autonomy that ultimately led to Mubarak’s demise.

\textit{Sadat’s Military}

Through the processes of depoliticizing and professionalizing the military, Sadat was able to exclude military elite from political decision-making, yet simultaneously hold the military establishment completely under his control. As a result, the military society that flourished under the rule of Nasser declined, transforming its role from protector of the revolution against imperialism and Zionism into a functional security apparatus that guarded the order of the Egyptian state. By the time Sadat was assassinated in 1981\textsuperscript{i}, he had come close to reconciling what Peter Feaver refers to as the “civil-military

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid, 88.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid, 94.
problematique”: the establishment of a military that is “strong enough to do anything the civilians ask them to with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize them to do.”

His successor, Hosni Mubarak, would introduce yet again an entirely new age for the Egyptian military, one that drew components from both Nasser’s Egypt and Sadat’s to create a new era of civil-military relations.

Sadat, therefore, amplified the policies of professionalism and de-politicization first introduced by Nasser at the end of his rule. Sadat’s control also stemmed from the way in which he sought unquestioned power for himself: through policies of dismissals and divide and rule tactics.

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102 Feaver, 149.
VI: Hosni Mubarak, 1981-2011

Mubarak’s Strategies

The Egyptian officers’ republic, as coined by Yezid Sayigh, reached its most entrenched state during the rule of Hosni Mubarak. While Mubarak continued to implement Sadat’s policies of de-politicization and professionalization, he also sought to draw the entire officer corps into his own system of crony patronage and privileged access at the same time through a strategy of cooptation, which gave the military economic, institutional, and judicial autonomy in the state. Like the militaries of Nasser and Sadat, what resulted from Mubarak’s policies was an extremely loyal and obedient military. Unlike the militaries of Nasser and Sadat, however, Mubarak’s military transformed into one that “became invisible by virtue of its very ubiquity.”

The officers’ republic existed in nearly every sector of the civilian sphere of Egyptian society, to the point where its pervasiveness became normal, and thus accepted. Moreover, the military under Mubarak finally solidified into a stable institution, whose professionalism warranted the president’s policy of “ceding certain independent functions to it.” By granting the Egyptian Armed Forces significant economic, institutional, and judicial autonomy through the implementation of certain advantageous policies, Mubarak gained in return a loyal military that, like the militaries of Nasser and Sadat, served as his base of power and legitimacy.

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103 Sayigh, 4.
104 Ibid, 4.
105 Harb, 285.
Why Cooptation?

Mubarak’s extensive use of cooptation under his crony patronage system was his main strategy of coercing political loyalty for his regime. The need to augment Sadat’s strategies of professionalization and de-politicization with cooptation was perhaps a consequence of conditions relating to the post-Cold War environment. These conditions include the expansion and increased professionalization of the armed forces due to Egypt’s military partnership with the United States, as well as the liberalization policies that ensued in the post-Cold War era.

After the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Sadat’s diplomatic negotiations in the Camp David Accords and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty effectively replaced the Soviet Union with the U.S. as the patron of Egypt. However, while the military under Soviet influence represented merely an “unwieldy Soviet-based fighting force,” the military under U.S. influence – and especially during the rule of Mubarak – was transformed into “a modernized, well-equipped, Western-style military.”

Without the military aid of the United States during the reign of Mubarak, the Egyptian military would in no way be as professional as it is today. Under Mubarak’s regime, the military partnership with the United States grew immensely, even further than it had under Sadat’s rule. At the time of the revolution in January of 2011, Egypt stood as the 10th largest military in the world, with more than 468,000 members, and approximately “625 U.S. military personnel stationed in Egypt.”

Egypt receives the majority of its foreign aid funds from the U.S. in the form of “three primary accounts:

Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Economic Support Funds (ESF), and International Military Education and Training (IMET). Since 1987, Egypt has received $1.3 billion annually from the United States in military aid. This has had an extraordinary impact on Egypt’s defense policies and purchasing power: “the $1.3 billion received in fiscal year 2005 comprised more than 80 percent of Egypt’s total military procurement budget.”

The military support from the United States during the Mubarak era was particularly influential in terms of training and technology. IMET assistance was significant because it enabled Egyptian military personnel to be trained by American standards of military education. Egypt and the United States started coproducing M1A1 Abrams Battle tanks in 1988, an enterprise that serves as “one of the cornerstones of U.S. military assistance to Egypt” today. Additionally, the FMF program enabled the transfer of actual military technology: “specific examples of purchases since 1979 include 220 F-16 aircraft, three dozen Apache helicopters, and 880 M1A1 (Abrams) tanks.” In contrast to Soviet and U.S. military aid during the Sadat era, the U.S. military assistance during the Mubarak era was much more significant, in both monetary and technical terms.

Further, Mubarak implemented enhanced liberalization policies which enabled political parties to become “freer to operate publicly” in the post-Cold War era. Even “those adhering to a mild form of Islamic radicalism” were permitted to engage in

108 Sharp, 8.
109 Ibid, 8.
110 Sullivan and Jones, 84.
111 Sharp, 9.
112 Ibid, 8.
113 Sullivan and Jones, 85.
114 Harb, 284.
politics to a certain extent.\textsuperscript{115} This meant that Mubarak’s regime was surrounded by various organizations of opposition, which directly threatened his position as the supreme leader of Egypt. In order to negate the prevalence of opposition within society, I believe that Mubarak used the strategy of military cooptation in order to broaden his basis of support. According to Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, the reason why autocrats survive for decades is directly related to their “overwhelming monopoly of force.”\textsuperscript{116} When they are faced with opposition either from within the ruling elite or from outsiders within society, these rulers tend to rely on the support of certain institutions to maintain their position.\textsuperscript{117} Mubarak needed the military institution to protect his regime because it acted as a deterrent to dissenting political parties.

In part, this could explain why Mubarak sought to strengthen his military in the post-Cold War era through the U.S.-Egyptian military partnership previously discussed. While this military buildup was certainly a preemptive measure intended to defend Egypt against any threat to its national security, it is possible that it was also a product of Mubarak’s paranoia. The cooptation of a robust military institution was Mubarak’s means of prolonging his presidential tenure. As part of the bargain involved in cooptation, Mubarak granted the military significant economic, institutional, and judicial autonomy in exchange for political obedience and loyalty to his regime. Mubarak’s need for cooptation, therefore, explains why his military functioned much more independently than Sadat’s military. The following section will address the cooptation policies Mubarak implemented that helped to render the military autonomous.

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid, 284.
\textsuperscript{117} Gandhi and Przeworski, 1280.
**Mubarak’s Policies of Cooptation**

In order to coopt the armed forces, Mubarak invented what was called “a loyalty allowance”. Senior officers were promised this loyalty allowance upon retirement, which normally granted them guaranteed careers in the state sector, implying a second income alongside military pensions.\textsuperscript{118} The most well-connected officers often received more preferable settlements as retirees, including leadings positions in government ministries as well as “in civilian bureaucracy that offer[ed] particularly lucrative opportunities for extra income generation or asset accumulation.”\textsuperscript{119} In exchange for Mubarak’s loyalty allowance, officers were to refrain from political involvement and had no choice but to accept poor wages during their military careers.\textsuperscript{120} In this way, the loyalty allowance policy incentivized compliance with the system during the years that these officers were forced to basically “wait their turn.”\textsuperscript{121}

Not only did the crony patronage system guarantee certain privileges, as in the case of the loyalty allowance, it also determined military promotion. Junior officers that were perceived to be disloyal or political by their superiors were incapable of moving beyond the rank of major.\textsuperscript{122} In fact, the only officers that were promoted to middle rank positions – positions above the rank of major - were those who had been cleared for advancement based on their commitment and loyalty to the Mubarak regime.\textsuperscript{123} It was political loyalty – not military merit – that ensured an officer’s well-being within the

\textsuperscript{118} Sayigh, 4.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid, 4.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid, 4.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid, 5.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid, 5.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid, 5.
system.\textsuperscript{124} As his crony patronage system became the backdrop of civil-military relations, therefore, Mubarak’s reliance on cooptation to maintain control over the armed forces was unparalleled by either regime that preceded his.

Secondly, Mubarak sought to coopt the armed forces by providing them access to a large portion of the Egyptian economy. As a result, the military became a major producer and exporter of military equipment, household appliances, agriculture, and infrastructure,\textsuperscript{125} and held such private enterprises as tourist hotels and travel companies.\textsuperscript{126} In 1979, Law 32 gave the military “financial and institutional independence from the government’s budget and allowed it to open special accounts in commercial banks.”\textsuperscript{127} In this way, the military could truly function as an independent economic institution, providing the officer corps with attractive benefits such as improved medical care, higher personal income, and access to scarce resources.\textsuperscript{128} In addition, Mubarak’s shift toward the privatization of the public sector in 1991 required the implementation of neoliberal policies that opened the door to increased officer involvement in the economy.\textsuperscript{129} The military’s economic independence enabled the officer corps to reap important financial benefits that, in turn, solidified their commitment to Mubarak’s regime.

Finally, Mubarak ensured the institutional stability and independence of the military through legislative and judicial means. Not only did the military control its military-owned businesses and U.S. military aid, it also enjoyed “exclusive control over

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid, 9.
\textsuperscript{125} Harb, 285.
\textsuperscript{126} Sullivan and Jones, 29.
\textsuperscript{127} Harb, 286.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid, 286.
\textsuperscript{129} Sayigh, 7.
the defense budget.”\cite{Ibid, 3} This last point – the control over the defense budget – requires particular attention, for it has important implications in the discussion of civil-military relations. The fact that the defense budget rested entirely in the hands of the military implies that civilian oversight was nonexistent in that particular area of defense policy under the Mubarak regime. Within much of the literature pertaining to democratic civil-military relations, civilian legislative oversight of the various components of defense policy and the armed forces is necessary in order to hold the military accountable, and thus under control.\cite{Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster, “The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces and Society 29 (2002): 44.} The fact that the military, and not the civilian authority, maintained control over the budget speaks to the degree to which the military institution was permitted to operate independently within the state.

Counter to standard civil-military theory, however, the lack of adequate civilian oversight in this case did not pose a serious threat to Mubarak’s ability to maintain power – at least, not until the fall of his regime in 2011. In fact, enabling the military to exert itself so freely and independently throughout the state was exactly how Mubarak succeeded in coopting them: he protected the interests of the military in exchange for its undying loyalty to the regime. After all, Mubarak was a former military man himself; ensuring the supremacy of the military institution was in his best interest too.

The military’s institutional stability also stems from the structure of Egypt’s judicial system, which, according to Sullivan and Jones, is a broken system.\cite{Sullivan and Jones, 35.} The Administrative Monitoring Authority, as mentioned previously, is a judicial oversight body established to fight corruption throughout the state by investigating administrative

\begin{enumerate}
\item[Ibid, 3.]
\item[\cite{Sullivan and Jones, 35.}] Sullivan and Jones, 35.
\end{enumerate}
and financial crimes. The military is the only actor that is exempt from its jurisdiction, as the armed forces do not incur any civilian oversight other than that of the president. This is a deliberate policy designed not only to grant the president exceptional judicial power, but also to serve as one of many gateways for the military to infiltrate the civilian bureaucracy.

Additionally, the existence of military courts within the complex Egyptian legal and judicial system further accentuated the institutional autonomy of the military under the Mubarak regime. The military courts claim jurisdiction only over military cases. Under the emergency law, however, the president has the power to refer any case to the military courts, including cases involving civilians. Mubarak, despite repeated promises to lift it, kept in place the emergency law since 1981, “which [gave] the state broad power to detain suspects without charge for lengthy periods, try civilians in military courts, prevent public gatherings, and monitor private communications.” This is clearly a very controversial and deeply illiberal system that favors the executive power and the armed forces.

Since the fall of Mubarak, the SCAF has abused its judicial powers enormously, most likely in attempts to demonstrate and maintain its favorable position in Egyptian society. In early May of 2011, the military court in Cairo sentenced a 17-year-old civilian boy to death, despite the fact that the death penalty is illegal for minors under standard

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133 Sayigh, 12.
134 Ibid, 12.
135 Ibid, 12.
Egyptian law. This is part of a trend that has been going on since late January, “when the Army took on an expanded role in securing and governing Egypt.” The extrajudicial powers of the military, enabled by the Mubarak regime, directly threaten Morsi’s current leadership and the likelihood that he will be able to effectively control the activities of the military in the future – a necessary stipulation of legitimate democracy.

Enabling the economic, institutional, and judicial independence of the military under his crony patronage system in exchange for an unaltering loyalty to his regime is the process through which Hosni Mubarak controlled his armed forces. A particularly dangerous consequence of the military society that Mubarak created was the change in the Egyptian concept of social order. Under Mubarak, the pervasiveness of the military throughout the entirety of the state generated an elevated social status that separated the military from the civilians. The military was not only the national protector, it was also the charitable peace-keeper, the law-maker, and the decision-maker. In other words, civilians became the dependents of the paternalistic military under Mubarak’s rule. This was not the case in Nasser’s era. Only a few days before his regime fell, for instance, Mubarak addressed the Egyptian public as ‘his children’, standing proof of the fact that Mubarak and his military considered themselves to be more competent than their civilian counterparts, and therefore more deserving of higher status. This legacy, entrenched within Egyptian culture for the past 30 years, is not going to be easy to break.

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139 Ibid.
140 Sayigh, 22.
141 Ibid, 22.
142 Ibid, 22.
If Morsi is to attempt to subordinate the military under civilian leadership, however, the paternalistic culture must be eradicated altogether.

*The Fall of Mubarak*

If Mubarak’s strategies of cooptation, professionalization, and de-politicization effectively established this tight crony-based system, then why did he fall from power in 2011 basically at the hands of the military?

Crony-based authoritarian regimes are inherently unstable. In my opinion, the process of gaining political loyalty through the distribution of certain privileges can only function for so long. The issue is that this kind of loyalty is not necessarily rooted in an individual’s fundamental beliefs, which provide purpose beyond the materialistic privileges offered by crony patronage. In other words, a military officer will remain loyal to a regime under a crony-based system for as long as its promises satisfy his immediate material needs. Consequently, these regimes and their co-opted military counterparts do not always share fundamental ideologies and morals, because their relationship never required this kind of deep-rooted convergence.

In its decision to refuse the orders of Mubarak to fire upon civilians during the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, the Egyptian military verified the instability of its former leader’s crony patronage system. The military’s decision to side with the Egyptian citizenry outweighed the decision to abide by Mubarak’s request because the material privileges provided by the system were comparatively insignificant to the prospects of a democratic movement.

The military’s autonomy, which was a principle outcome of Mubarak’s strategy of cooptation, also contributed to the leader’s fall. If the military had not been as
economically, institutionally, and judicially autonomous as it was under Mubarak’s rule, I would argue that it would have had a harder time making the definitive decision to refuse Mubarak’s orders. As we saw throughout the nearly year and a half rule of the SCAF following Mubarak’s exit, the military’s independence as a self-sufficient societal institution proved that it had the capacity to function without the ruler.

Its decision to side with the Egyptian people also demonstrated that the military was deeply politicized, despite Mubarak’s shallow strategy of de-politicization. Although Mubarak’s military did “not hold political positions as it did during its heyday under Nasir,” “the military cannot be seen as fully disengaged from politics.” From Naguib to Mubarak, all of Egypt’s presidents since 1952 have originated from the military. Consequently, the military has never fully disengaged from politics in the sense that Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak ensured the military’s institutional dominance and protected the military’s interests. The autonomy and politicization of the military, therefore, significantly contributed to the fall of the Mubarak regime.

Finally, it is possible that the United States indirectly played a role in the fall of the Mubarak regime due to the strong military partnership between the two states. In fact, Robert Hunter of CNN argues that “one reason Egypt’s military responded to the demonstrations so positively has been its long-standing ties to the U.S. military, stretching back three decades.” During the initials days of the uprising, the Egyptian chief of staff and a group of high-ranking officers engaged in talks with “American

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143 Harb, 287.
hosts” in the Pentagon. These talks addressed the issue of military action in the Egyptian uprising, and encouraged the military to exercise restraint. The Egyptian military’s compliance with American requests suggests the degree of influence that the United States has in directing the revolution.

145 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
VII: Mohamed Morsi, 2012 - Present

By January 25th of 2011, which marked the start of the revolution, the Egyptian military had transformed into a force to be reckoned with, a result of six decades under the rule of four successive military leaders. Right now, Egypt is suspended in a transitional state as the newly elected civilian president, Mohamed Morsi, struggles to solidify his position as the leader of the people’s revolution, while simultaneously deal with the exceptional power and prestige of the military.

Will the officers’ republic remain above the law? Or will Morsi be able to bring the military under civilian control? Is this a zero-sum game? While the answers to these questions are not yet clear given the current state of the ongoing transition, a closer look at the changes that Morsi has implemented since he assumed office on June 30, 2012 will provide an indication of the direction that he has taken in regard to Egypt’s civil-military relations.

On June 17, just days before Morsi was declared president under Egypt’s first democratic election, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces issued a constitutional declaration intended to hinder the powers of the president if, in fact, Morsi were to be the victor. The addendum effectively dissolved parliament on the grounds that one-third of its members had been illegally elected.147 The real issue for the SCAF, though, was the fact that the parliament was Islamist-dominated, which posed a threat to the military’s ability to maintain its legislative powers. By dissolving parliament, therefore, the military assumed all legislative powers, which “stripped Morsi of much of his presidential

authority."\textsuperscript{148} The constitutional declaration also positioned the military beyond civilian control, and gave the SCAF permission to “appoint a new assembly if the current one is unable to complete the job” of drafting a new constitution.\textsuperscript{149}

In defiance of the military’s decree, Morsi recalled the formerly dissolved parliament on July 8\textsuperscript{th}.\textsuperscript{150} It was a surprise decision, and some have even reported that the military had not been consulted before the ruling was made official.\textsuperscript{151} By reinstating parliament, Morsi abstracted legislative authority from the hands of the military and returned it back to parliament. In addition, he declared that within 60 days of the official formulation of a new constitution, parliamentary elections will be held.\textsuperscript{152} In this way, Morsi could strike somewhat of a compromise as to appease the parties involved in the construction of a new Egypt: in the short term, at least, “the military gets part of what it wanted – a new parliament in coming months – and Islamists can avoid a situation where the military dominates a legislative authority.”\textsuperscript{153} More importantly, this move demonstrates Morsi’s desire to limit the supra-powers of the military through reconciliatory – as opposed to aggressive – measures.

On August 12, President Morsi issued another set of surprising alterations. He forced the retirement of two of the military’s top chiefs: Field Marshal and Defense Minister Mohammed Hussein Tantawi and his deputy, Chief of Staff Sami Anan.\textsuperscript{154} He

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{149} Brown.
\textsuperscript{150} “Egypt: President Morsi orders dissolved parliament back.”
\textsuperscript{152} “Egypt: President Morsi orders dissolved parliament back.”
\textsuperscript{153} “Morsi recalls parliament in Cairo.”
appointed as his vice president top judge Mahmud Makki, and he “issued an addendum to Egypt’s governing March 2011 interim constitution.” The addendum annulled the SCAF’s June constitutional declaration which “placed the military beyond civilian control, gave the SCAF a legislative role,” and allowed the military to have control of the process of writing a new constitution. In other words, Morsi has already attempted to subordinate the military through a strategy of civilian control: he has taken away certain key legislative powers from the military, and put them into the hands of the civilian authority. However, while it appears that Morsi’s bold initiatives have turned the tables, so to speak, one question still lingers: is this enough?

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155 Brown.
156 Ibid.
VIII: Recent Developments

Despite Morsi’s strategy of civilian control, the legacies of Mubarak’s strategies persist. Incontestably, the dramatic steps that Morsi has taken have spurred the symbolic shift in authority from the military to the presidency. Whether or not this shift will actually occur is another question altogether. I see the biggest impediment to the successful transfer of power from the military to the presidency as being the persistence of a distinct Egyptian military culture that accepts the military as a superior institution. Throughout the past sixty years of military dominance, this militaristic culture has fully developed and ingrained itself into Egyptian society. Under Nasser, the military began its ascendance to prominence, as it enjoyed extensive political influence. Sadat, although he depoliticized the institution, perpetuated military dominance by transforming it into a professionalized force. It was under Sadat that the military gained substantial popular support, as it proved its valor to the Egyptian people through its military conquests, namely the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Mubarak’s patronage system provided the military extraordinary benefits, which, in turn, worked to further elevate its status within society. At the start of the 2011 revolution, Egypt’s military was truly, as Yezid Sayigh says, above the state.\footnote{Sayigh.}

This is a culture accepted both by the soldiers themselves, and by the Egyptian people. On the one hand, the military sees itself as one of the most important – if not the most important – institutions in Egypt, due almost entirely to its historical legacy as such. On the other hand, citizens have come to conceptualize the military as the national unifier, the almighty protector, and the leader of the people’s revolution. In other words,
this militaristic culture runs deep into Egyptian society. What Morsi has attempted to do thus far in his quest to subordinate the military falls short of addressing the dangers associated with this culture, because his initiatives have barely brushed the surface of the issue. He has implemented only institutional changes (i.e., recalling parliament, dismissing top military leaders, etc.) intended to transfer tangible powers into his civilian hands, and thus professionalize the military under his command. In the short run, this gives the illusion of progressive change towards a democratic society. In the long run, however, who will claim ownership of the intangible powers currently enabling the persistence of Egypt’s military society?

The problem is that we, as observers, are often quick to assume that a professional military is one that will remain neutral and subordinate to civilian leadership, as first proposed by Samuel Huntington.\(^\text{158}\) The Egyptian case disproves this theory: the military was considered to be highly professional under the rule of Hosni Mubarak, for instance. However, its professionalism did not necessarily imply its neutrality; the Egyptian military functioned as more of an interest group than as a neutral body. In fact, one could argue that its professionalism led to its autonomy, which is what ultimately led to not only its capacity, but also its desire to influence politics. After all, it was the military’s refusal to fire upon protestors that entirely changed the course of the revolution. If the military had complied with Mubarak’s order, it is likely that the dictator would still be in power today. This is not to discredit the incredible efforts of the leagues of Egyptian civilians that risked their lives in the beginning of 2011 to see an end to Mubarak’s rule.

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\(^\text{158}\) Huntington, 83.
Without them, nothing would have changed in Egypt. I firmly believe, however, that the tipping point of the revolution occurred as a direct result of the military’s noncompliance.

To a certain extent, the Egyptian case fits Samuel Fitch’s theory of political professionalism. The idea that professionalism prevents militaries from politically intervening, he says, is a representation of Western ethnocentric thought.\textsuperscript{159} His studies of Latin American civil-military relations have actually proved just the opposite – that “higher levels of military professionalization have in fact generally resulted in more institutionalized forms of military intervention in politics and rejection of civilian control.”\textsuperscript{160} Fitch further dissects his theory, proposing two outcomes of political professionalism: tutelary regimes or conditional democracies.\textsuperscript{161} It is the latter of the two outcomes, conditional democracies, that applies most directly to the Egyptian case. In a conditional democracy, the military “remains in the background politically, yet it indirectly influences policy and remains prepared to intervene if it judges that national security is threatened by the actions of the civilian regime.”\textsuperscript{162} We saw the Egyptian military do just this: it remained in the background until the conditions of the revolution prompted it to intervene on the side of the populace.

Further, the SCAF’s erratic behavior throughout the transition period has demonstrated its desire to maintain this conditional democracy. After the fall of Mubarak and the subsequent power transfer to the SCAF, its “zigzag approach to politics” has

\textsuperscript{160} Ibid, 3.
\textsuperscript{161} Ibid, 2.
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid, 2.
made the process of deciphering its interests very challenging.\textsuperscript{163} It has, for instance, “oscillated from an apparently heartfelt desire to transfer power in a timely manner … to taking steps extending the process seemingly in order to safeguard its interests.”\textsuperscript{164} The inconsistency is due in part to a conflict of interest, in which the military wants to maintain all of its privileges – “such as a secret budget sheltered from civilian oversight; de facto immunity from prosecution;” and its control over large portions of the economy – but at the same time has no intention of actually governing.\textsuperscript{165} In other words, the SCAF wants all the power but does not want to be blamed for the social and economy instability that will likely ensue as the result of this transition. What I propose is that this conditional democracy will persist and continue to undermine the legitimacy of Morsi’s leadership unless he attempts to unravel the officers’ republic.

\textsuperscript{164} Ibid, 16.
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid, i.
IX: Conclusion

Since the election in June of 2012, President Mohamed Morsi’s strategies of controlling the Egyptian military have fallen short of confronting the powerful military legacy that persists as a result of sixty years of military dominance throughout Egyptian culture and society. While his initiatives have been symbolically bold, his tactics of civilian control have only established institutional changes that limit the legal functions of the military in the matters of legislative and executive authority. These measures are no match against the militaristic culture that characterizes Egyptian society— a culture that is valued by both the armed forces and the populace.

Both Nasser and Sadat implemented policies that contributed greatly to the persistence of military dominance. Nasser initially politicized the armed forces, giving them significant access to political participation and decision-making. Sadat’s strategies of de-politicization and professionalization transformed the military into an effective fighting force. As a result, the military became a widely popular and highly respected institution of the state.

Mubarak’s strategies of control, however, were the most significant of the three. The officers’ republic reached its most pervasive state under Mubarak’s rule, as he complemented Sadat’s former strategies of de-politicization and professionalization with cooptation. The privileges that the military gained from this plan of mutual accommodation granted it access to nearly all sectors of Egyptian society, which effectively turned it into an autonomous institution.

I argue that the most dangerous consequence of Mubarak’s military society was the transformation of the Egyptian concept of social order. As a result of its
pervasiveness, the military gained a higher social status than it ever had before, which reinforced the notion of militaristic paternalism within Egyptian culture.

Looking forward, what lies ahead in the Egyptian transition is the development of a new constitution. I predict that the writing of a new constitution will have huge consequences for the balance of power in the state. At this time, the legacy of Mubarak’s strategies provides the military with the necessary power, autonomy, and legitimacy to react in any way that it chooses. If the constitution caters too heavily to the Muslim Brotherhood, for instance, it is possible that the military could stage a coup in opposition. If Morsi goes too far in the coming months in attempting to further rein in military authority, that too could cause a dramatic reaction from the armed forces.

The military wants to maintain the prerogatives and privileges it enjoyed throughout its past. If the constitution significantly limits those privileges, I believe that we can expect a strong military reaction to follow. However, if Morsi does not want to emerge from the writing of this constitution as the civilian puppet of the military, he must make some significant changes that will instigate the process of unraveling the officers’ republic. In this way, it is clear that Morsi is straddling a very fine line.

The Egyptian military, as it has become the most powerful institution of the state over the past sixty years, is an essential component of this transition. While the future of Egypt and the prospect of a transition to genuine democracy is momentarily unclear, it is certain that the military will undoubtedly influence its direction.
X. Bibliography


Harb, Imad. “The Egyptian Military in Politics: Disengagement or Accommodation?”


