U.S. Foreign Policy in Pakistan: Bringing Pakistan Into Line with American Counterterrorism Interests

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U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN PAKISTAN: BRINGING PAKISTAN INTO LINE
WITH AMERICAN COUNTERTERRORISM INTERESTS

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................. 5  

Abstract ............................................................................................................................. 6  

1 – Introduction ................................................................................................................... 7  
  Organization .................................................................................................................... 8  

2 – Realism, The Filter Effect and the U.S. Foreign Policy in Pakistan .......................... 12  
  Realism and U.S. Foreign Policy in Pakistan .................................................................. 12  
  Multilevel Realism ......................................................................................................... 16  
  The Filter Effect ............................................................................................................. 19  

3 – The History of the Pakistani State and Military ....................................................... 21  
  The Pakistani Military at Partition .................................................................................. 21  
  Pakistan’s Military - Early Years ...................................................................................... 23  
  Periods of Military Rule .................................................................................................. 25  
  Territorial Disputes ........................................................................................................ 28  
    Kashmir ......................................................................................................................... 28  
    The Durand Line .......................................................................................................... 31  
  Islamization ...................................................................................................................... 34  
  Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence ........................................................................ 37  
  Nuclear Weapons Program .............................................................................................. 43  

Covert Anti-Soviet Cooperation in Afghanistan, 1979-1989..........................46
Efforts to Recast Pakistan’s Strategic Posture After 9/11............................49
U.S. Drone Program in Pakistan, 2004-2015...........................................52

5 – Counterterrorism Filters in the U.S.-Pakistani Relationship..................59

Counterterrorism Filters Related to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan........59
Counterterrorism Filters Related Pakistan’s Strategic Posture....................63
Counterterrorism Filters Related to the U.S. Drone Program in Pakistan........72
Counterterrorism Filters Related To Pakistan’s Possession of Nuclear Weapons.................................................................75

6 – Policy Prescriptions: Resolving Filters on U.S. Counterterrorism Policy in Pakistan..........................................................81

Resolving Filters Related to Pakistan’s Strategic Posture..........................84
Resolving Filters Related to the U.S. Drone Program in Pakistan...............89
Resolving Filters Related to Pakistan’s Possession of Nuclear Weapons......90

7 – Conclusion...................................................................................................93

Bibliography.....................................................................................................98
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Abstract

This thesis is a review of U.S. foreign policy in Pakistan through a realist lens. It critiques the current state of U.S. policy and recommends that the United States prioritize national security interests, particularly with regards to counterterrorism, over building Pakistani democracy and running civilian aid programs. It then further recommends ways for the United States government to account for ground level dynamics in Pakistani politics in crafting foreign policy aimed at bringing Pakistan into line with U.S. counterterrorism priorities.
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

The iconic cover of Pink Floyd’s 1973 album Dark Side of the Moon shows light passing through a prism and emerging as a rainbow. This thesis is built around the idea that foreign policy can be thought of, in an abstract sense, as being analogous to the image of a light-distorting prism. This idea borrows heavily from concepts and terms coined by Jennifer Taw in her article “Domestic Distributive Response,” published in the Review of International Studies. In that article, Taw argues that ground level dynamics in countries targeted by U.S. foreign policy have important but poorly understood causal effects on the outcomes of American foreign policy initiatives. To continue the Pink Floyd analogy, foreign policy is formulated in Congress, the White House, Foggy Bottom, or Langley as simple white light before passing through the prism of domestic politics and competition in the target country. What emerges from the prism is almost never same light that goes in – domestic “filters” cause unintended consequences that can either run parallel to the intended effects of the foreign policy or work against them.

This thesis will apply the idea of domestic filter effects to U.S. counterterrorism policy in Pakistan from a realist perspective. Pakistan provides a rich set of potent ground level dynamics that regularly filter U.S. foreign policy objectives, often in ways that result in foreign policies failing completely or even backfiring. By describing in detail Pakistan’s domestic politics, its intergovernmental dynamics, the ways that Pakistani actors compete for influence, and the effects that these forces have had on past and present U.S. policy, I will make a series of recommendations to current U.S.
policymakers, diplomats, and intelligence officials. The general tenor of these recommendations will be to properly account for ground level dynamics and their resultant filters, so that U.S. policy may pass through the figurative prism in a straighter line.

Organization

Chapter II provides the theoretical background that underpins this paper’s analysis of Pakistan’s history, past U.S. foreign policy in Pakistan, and the barriers currently standing in the way of effective counterterrorism policy in Pakistan. Chapter II describes the realist paradigm and its relevant assumptions, providing a contrast to the often-idealistic foreign policy initiatives currently under way in Pakistan. It provides an overview of the principles currently guiding U.S. policy in Pakistan and explains how they depart from a realist perspective. Its discussion of realism includes discourse on “multilevel realism,” which provides an important theoretical framework through which American policymakers and diplomats can understand the root of some major filters on U.S. policy. It also goes deeper into a discussion of Jennifer Taw’s argument about filter effects in “Domestic Distributive Response.” Ultimately, my use of Taw’s concept of filters contributes to a multilevel realist analysis of past and present U.S.-Pakistani relations, describing the ways in which American foreign policy in Pakistan will be filtered through Pakistani domestic politics and institutions.

Chapter III discusses major events and dynamics in the history of the Pakistani state. It describes the origin of Pakistan in the 1947 partition of British India, the
formation of its armed forces, and the roots of the Pakistani military’s immense domestic power. It then discusses and attempts to explain the frequent military control over the Pakistani state, and the corresponding historical malaise in Pakistani civil-military relations. Next, Chapter III maps out the history of the two major territorial disputes that Pakistan has engaged in since its formation as a nation state. It examines the consequences of those disputes on Pakistan’s national psychology and its modern strategic posture. It then describes the influence of Islam on Pakistani society and, more importantly, its military. It provides an overview of the history of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, and then finally discusses the history and modern role of the Pakistani military’s main intelligence service, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

Chapter IV continues Chapter III’s historical discussion, but with an emphasis on U.S.-Pakistani relations since 1979. It contains three sections, the first of which covers the joint CIA-ISI covert action program during the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. The second section of Chapter IV describes the American and Pakistani responses to 9/11, largely focusing on Pakistan’s enlistment as a reluctant partner in the United States’ Global War on Terror. Chapter IV’s third and final section chronicles the history of the covert American drone program inside Pakistan’s tribal regions between 2004 and 2015.

Chapter V then discusses those three sections, attempting to map out how ground level dynamics inside Pakistan have filtered the intended effect of U.S. foreign policies. In addition to the three areas of U.S.-Pakistani relations covered in Chapter IV, Chapter V includes discussion of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, and the ways in which it
filters U.S. counterterrorism policy today. The first section of Chapter IV covers American cooperation with Pakistan’s military dictatorship under General Zia ul-Haq and Inter-Services Intelligence after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. It discusses Pakistan’s strategic preference for directing American aid towards more radical Islamist resistance elements and how that preference ultimately became a major filter on U.S. counterterrorism policy, resulting in severe blowback with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda, and the attacks of September 11, 2001. Chapter V’s second section covers U.S.-Pakistani cooperation in the Global War on Terror following 9/11, and the filters presented by Pakistan’s perception of its strategic interests and the divided, contradictory approaches taken by different elements within ISI. The third section discusses the American drone program in Pakistan’s tribal regions, and the ways in which current drone policy fails to take into account filters in Pakistan’s military and society that ultimately dilute the effectiveness of the program. The fourth section discusses the role played by Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and argues that Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons filters U.S. counterterrorism policy by making Pakistan’s military “too big and too important” to fail, stripping U.S. policymakers of needed leverage.

Chapter VI concludes with a systematic examination of current filters on U.S. counterterrorism policy in Pakistan, discusses ways to refocus U.S. policy from Pakistan’s civilian government towards its military in order to properly account for those filters. It then examines other potential tools available to the U.S. government to address filters and better advance U.S. counterterrorism initiatives in Pakistan. Finally, Chapter VI questions what the American intergovernmental dynamics should be in a refocused,
reimagined U.S. counterterrorism policy in Pakistan. Taken together, Chapter VI represents a comprehensive policy prescription for future U.S. counterterrorism policy in Pakistan.
CHAPTER II: REALISM, THE FILTER EFFECT, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN PAKISTAN

This chapter will argue that U.S. foreign policy in Pakistan suffers from two central problems. First is a lack of adherence to the realist school of thought, which results in the United States wasting money on unaccountable and usually unsuccessful aid programs that fail to enhance American national security or interests. The second problem is a lack of attention to the ways in which ground level dynamics can dilute or prevent the success of American foreign policy targeted on Pakistan. The first section of this chapter will argue that the United States’ diplomatic and intelligence efforts should be targeted towards enhancing American national security and advancing the national interests of the United States, not towards contradictory and self-defeating goals like promoting Pakistani democracy or building prosperity for the Pakistani people. The second section will describe multilevel realism and explain its relevance to my analysis of Pakistan’s domestic institutions and politics. The third section will provide a theoretical primer on filter effects as described by Jennifer Taw in “Distributive Domestic Response.”

I. Realism and U.S. Foreign Policy in Pakistan

The recommendations found in this paper are guided by a set of assumptions from the realist school of thought in international relations. Chief among those assumptions are that nations act according to their rationally perceived self-interest under the assumption
that the survival of the state is the state’s ultimate end, that any measure required for survival is ultimately justified, and that pure altruism is not a characteristic of the realist state.¹ This paper assumes that the protection of national security and sovereignty should be the primary end of statecraft on the international stage.

These assumptions fly in the face of current U.S. foreign policy in Pakistan. The “mission statement” or ideal outcome driving the United States’ relationship with Pakistan today is “a stable, prosperous, democratic Pakistan at peace with its neighbors.”² One premise of that mission statement is that its four clauses are compatible with one another. Another premise is that Pakistani prosperity and democracy are necessarily in the American national interest. This paper will argue that that both premises are false.

With regards to the first premise – that the four clauses are compatible – stability and democracy do not always go along with each other in Pakistan, nor do democracy and regional peace. Pakistani politics suffer from a number of centrifugal forces that, without a strong and unified presence from the military, might tear the country apart. National civilian government is characterized by patronage and ethnic identity politics, and the profoundly weak institutions at its disposal ensure that Pakistan under democratic civilian governance is chaotic, divided, and unstable. The military, on the other hand, is the one true meritocracy in Pakistan, and is widely viewed as the most competent and least corrupt organization in the country.

² Ambassador Cameron P. Munter, interview by author, Claremont, California, April 10, 2015.
Consequently, American efforts to promote democracy in Pakistan necessarily compromise Pakistani stability, and vice versa. Furthermore, efforts to ensure regional peace in South Asia are less likely to succeed under democratic civilian government. The Pakistani populace is virulently anti-India, and a representative democratic government would naturally reflect that. While the military shares the general public’s fear of India, it also possesses a rational sense of Pakistani national interest lacking on the civilian side that is likely to limit the likelihood of a Pakistani confrontation with its easterly neighbor. Empowering representative civilian government in Pakistan would increase the drive and incentive for aggression towards India. Democracy and regional peace, like democracy and stability, are thus at odds in Pakistan.

With regards to the second premise – that Pakistani democracy and prosperity are in the American national interest – the realist school of thought dictates that promoting Pakistani prosperity and democracy should only be American concerns insofar that they advance American interests on balance. Efforts to promote democracy and prosperity in Pakistan are both ineffective and often run counter to American national security interests. Realism indicates that U.S. policy should prioritize stability over democracy and prosperity in Pakistan – a nuclear-armed state that is unstable or failing is a far greater threat to American national security than a generally stable but undemocratic one. Promotion of democracy has been a popular ideal for U.S. policymakers and diplomats since Woodrow Wilson’s presidency, but in practice democratic states have not always served the American national interest – in certain states, Pakistan included, American
national security priorities and interests have always been best served by undemocratic regimes.

With regards to promoting prosperity in Pakistan, as the second clause of the American mission statement would indicate, providing massive amounts of aid to shore up hopelessly corrupt and opaque civil institutions has proved to be ineffective and in many cases counterproductive to American national interests. Investing billions of dollars in Pakistan’s weak civilian government is akin to continuously pouring water into a leaky bucket even after noticing your shoes are wet. There is little to no accountability after the money is spent, and diversion to corrupt individuals is rampant. Despite the questionable benefits to American interests, the United States currently spends billions of dollars in civilian aid every year to promote democracy, education, infrastructure, energy, and employment in Pakistan. Running parallel to this civilian aid is a military aid program that boosts the domestic fortunes of the Pakistani armed forces, working at cross purposes to the supposedly democratizing civilian aid program. Providing billions of dollars to the Pakistani military solidifies its ability to meddle in Pakistan’s civilian politics, undermining the United States’ supposed goal of democratizing Pakistan. Wasting money in this manner advances American interests in no discernible way.

Having established that current U.S. foreign policy in Pakistan suffers from these compromising contradictions, this paper will argue that American foreign policy and aid initiatives in Pakistan should largely be focused on and limited to areas that present obvious, achievable opportunities to advance American national interests. Chief among those glaring American priorities in Pakistan is ensuring that Islamic radicals in
Pakistan’s largely autonomous tribal regions cannot launch attacks against the American homeland or obtain and use nuclear weapons from Pakistan’s military. I will argue that prioritizing this set of interests, grouped together under U.S. counterterrorism policy, is the proper course for the United States government, and that by addressing and anticipating filters on current U.S. counterterrorism policy in Pakistan, the United States can better advance its national security interests.

II. Multilevel Realism

A realist model that depends on an analogy between state behavior and rational, purposeful, intelligent, individual human behavior fails to account for many of the dynamics that are present in Pakistan. An example central to this thesis is Inter-Services Intelligence’s simultaneous support for both U.S. counterterrorism efforts and the extremist targets of those efforts; a unified, rational actor predicted by realism would choose one of those conflicting courses of action, but in the Pakistani case, different empowered elements of the Pakistani state pursue both courses without any attempt to reconcile them, distorting and subverting U.S. foreign policy.

As such, it is necessary to create a multi-tiered model through which to view Pakistani behavior. Though a multilevel realist model departs from realism’s traditional focus on rational nation states as the primary unit of analysis on the international stage, it retains realism’s emphasis on selfish human nature as the main driver of state behavior. This approach is not original in and of itself – Kenneth Waltz’s seminal “levels of analysis” theory in Man, the State, and War, deserves credit here – but most realist theory
restricts analysis to one level at a time – individual, domestic, or international. By understanding all three levels simultaneously, American policymakers can best craft policy that takes into account local filter effects.

In the Pakistani case, the individual level presents the most significant departure from traditional realist thought. Whereas traditional realism envisions international actors as dispassionate, coldblooded bodies that rationally pursue national interests, individuals in the Pakistani government, particularly its military and security services, often act according to individual religious and financial incentives. Widespread religious piety in Pakistan creates sympathies between individual military and intelligence officers and extremist proxies – individuals who, by their title or position, are assumed to act on behalf of the state, often instead act to further perceived religious imperatives. Individual attitudes towards corruption in Pakistan are generally tolerant, leading to weak collective will for action on behalf of the state.

While these individual factors are present in many states, in Pakistan individuals are especially empowered in their ability conflate individual goals with the actions of the state due to rampant institutionalized corruption and weak, divided apparatuses at the domestic level of analysis. Different Pakistani organizations wield power in complex ways that defy the traditional realist understanding of a unified state actor. The three most important examples in the Pakistani case are the country’s military, the military’s main intelligence organization, Inter-Services Intelligence, and Pakistan’s weak civilian government. By studying the power dynamics between the various competing groups in Pakistan (the three listed above but also civil society and religious organizations) in combination with the individual and international levels of analysis, policymakers can
better understand the likely filters for potential policies aimed at bringing Pakistan into line with U.S. national security interests.

The international level typically concerns a country’s unified concern in the maintenance of the state through foreign policies meant to ensure national security. Accordingly, the particulars of Pakistan’s regional environment and its historical presence in it deeply affect its behavior on the international stage. However, if analysis of Pakistan’s behavior on the international stage is limited to the international level of analysis and assumes unified security concerns (as the international level of analysis typically does), any resultant paradigm will fail to explain Pakistan’s disjointed and contradictory foreign policy actions.

In order to understand Pakistan’s response to (and the potential success of) U.S. foreign policy, it is necessary to understand Pakistani behavior as the sum of action at all three levels of analysis. Analyzing Pakistani behavior in isolation at the individual level fails to explain why individual incentives (which exist everywhere) filter foreign policy in Pakistan more than they might in India or China. Analyzing Pakistani behavior in isolation at the domestic level fails to explain why weak institutions (which are also common) lead to rampant transnational Islamic militancy in Pakistan while similarly weak institutions in Turkmenistan do not. Analyzing Pakistani behavior in isolation at the international level fails to explain why different groups inside Pakistan use state apparatuses to behave in contradictory ways on the international stage – for example,

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ISI’s simultaneous support for Islamic militants and cooperation with/assent for the CIA drone program meant to target those same militants.

III. The Filter Effect

Foreign policy, for this paper’s purposes, can be thought of as having two components. The first component is in the formulation of foreign policy by the acting country: for example, the United States Congress crafts a package of humanitarian aid for Guinea, with provisions to help provide targeted financing for women to start small, independent businesses. The second component is the “filter effect.” This refers to the effect of local conditions in the country that is the target of the foreign policy. Continuing the example from above, the ultimate success of the Guinean aid package will be in large part dependent on the domestic actors who control the flow of the American aid money. Is the government corrupt in ways that will result in aid money being diverted to purposes other than financing small businesses for Guinean women? If so, who will be diverting the money and to where will it be diverted? Could diverted money cause more problems than women-owned small businesses prevent? All of these questions, and more, need to be answered in order to accurately forecast the effects of U.S. foreign policy in a target country. Resting on a simple input/output model that assumes that foreign policies will always have their intended, formulated effect neglects half of the picture: local conditions play an important causal role in determining the outcome of foreign policy.  

In Pakistan, filter effects have resulted in American foreign policy towards Pakistan and South Asia at large falling far short of its intended goals, in some cases actually backfiring and damaging U.S. national security. This has especially been the case in American dealings with Inter-Services Intelligence, a divided body that simultaneously cooperates with the United States on shared interests and competes with it on divergent ones. Taken together, ISI’s duplicitous actions dilute and occasionally pervert the effect of U.S. foreign policy in Pakistan.
CHAPTER III: THE HISTORY OF THE PAKISTANI STATE AND MILITARY

This chapter will provide the historical context necessary to understand why the Pakistani military is so enduringly powerful, and why it continues to play such an entrenched role in Pakistani politics. It also attempts to explain how two territorial disputes lead to Pakistan’s modern strategic security posture – a posture that ultimately works against American counterterrorism priorities, as will be argued later in this paper.

I. The Pakistani Military at Partition

Like Pakistan itself, the Pakistani Armed Forces were a product of the partition of British India. The Indian Independence Act of 1947 resulted in a bitter partition of British India’s land, financial, and military assets. The particulars of Pakistan’s birth resulted in an outsize reliance on the country’s military that has pervaded its domestic and foreign policy since 1947.

At the time of the partition, the international community was largely against the division of Pakistan and India into separate states. Time magazine referred to Pakistan as the result of a “slick political trick” by the new state’s preeminent champion, Muhammad Ali Jinnah (known to Pakistanis as Quaid-e-Azam, or “great leader”). This international skepticism caused a deep insecurity among the Pakistani people about the fragility and

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long-term viability of an independent Pakistan, resulting in a desire for a strong military to legitimize the new state.

Indian leaders viewed partition as an unfortunate necessity, only agreed upon in order to smooth their own path towards independence. The nationalist historiography of India still views the 1947 partition as “a tragic accompaniment to the exhilaration and promise of a freedom fought for with courage and valor.” Furthermore, many Indian politicians and intellectuals viewed partition as temporary – Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister, attested to this many times, saying in 1946 that “it may be that some division of India is enforced,” but “even if this happens, I am convinced that the basic feeling of unity and world developments will later bring the divided parts nearer to each other and result in a real unity.” In 1960, Nehru admitted that during the independence period, “we expected that a partition would be temporary, that Pakistan was bound to come back to us.” India’s claims of the “inevitability of reunification” contributed to national suspicion of India’s intentions towards the newly independent Pakistan – Pakistan’s relations with India were therefore, from the beginning, conducted under the assumption that India’s ultimate goal was the collapse of the Pakistani state and the reunion of the two countries. This paranoia about India’s intentions persists to this day – a military strong enough to defend Pakistan from an Indian invasion is thus a national

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8 Ibid 71
security imperative. Furthermore, strategic decisions related to the militarily superior India are made under the assumption that the sovereignty and statehood of Pakistan are at risk.

The partition of British India was not restricted to land – the colony’s military assets were also a source of contention during partition. Under the terms of the partition Pakistan received about a third of the undivided British Indian army, while the other two thirds remained with India.\(^\text{10}\) India’s new leaders dragged their feet in transferring to Pakistan its share of military assets, contributing to the latter’s severe suspicion of India’s intentions. Furthermore, Pakistan’s share of British India’s revenue was only 17 percent, which raised questions about Pakistan’s ability to maintain the assets it did ultimately receive.\(^\text{11}\) This chaotic and uncertain inception, paired with a military confrontation with India that occurred within months of the partition agreement resulted in severe insecurity and a compulsive need for a strong, protective military force.

II. Pakistan’s Military – Early Years

At the time of partition, a large percentage of the military assets to which Pakistan was entitled were located in India. This included fixed assets like bases, schools, and production facilities that, for obvious reasons could not be moved to Pakistan’s


\(^\text{11}\) Haqqani, *Between Mosque and Military*, 26
For example, of the 46 training establishments in British India, 39 ultimately landed in what would become India’s territory. As a result, Pakistan in 1947 was at a severe disadvantage in setting up its armed forces. In the months leading up to independence, Pakistan rushed to create a capital in Karachi and a military headquarters in Rawalpindi. Immediately following independence in August 1947, the Pakistani military was under the control of British officers who remained in Pakistan after the British exit; most of the highest ranking officials in the Pakistani military were British, including the chief of general staff, the master general ordnance, the quartermaster general, and the heads of most of the key directorates.\(^\text{13}\)

A key moment in the early years of Pakistan’s army occurred in September 1947 at the inaugural meeting of the Pakistan Defence Council. It was at this meeting that the original chiefs of the three branches of Pakistan’s armed forces decided upon the army’s internal and external functions. The army was given an expansive role not only in protecting Pakistan from foreign invasion, but also in maintaining domestic law and order, supporting the civilian government, and supporting political authorities in the semi-autonomous tribal regions in the north and west.\(^\text{14}\) This initial emphasis on a domestic political and police role for the Pakistani military grew over time to the point where it has tilted civil-military relations decisively towards the military in Pakistan, and


\(^{13}\) Ibid., 30-33

\(^{14}\) Ibid., 33-34
is therefore a root cause of the army’s outsize influence on Pakistan’s domestic and foreign policy.

In the earliest days of Pakistan’s army, post-independence British control was perpetuated by the simple lack of trained Pakistani officer candidates. As more Muslim officers migrated from India and more Pakistani officers earned promotion over Pakistan’s first three years, the Pakistani officer corps became more representative. The symbolic completion of the transition to Pakistani control of their own armed forces occurred in January of 1951 with the promotion of Ayub Khan to commander-in-chief of the Pakistan Army.

III. Periods of Military Rule

The Pakistani Armed Forces have never been far from power in Pakistan. The record for the longest uninterrupted period of civilian control over Pakistan’s 67-year history is eleven years, which has occurred twice. The first military coup, by the aforementioned General Ayub Khan, occurred in 1958 after eleven years of civilian control under Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s Muslim League party. Following Khan’s overthrow of President Iskander Mirza, the military ruled until early 1971. After six years of civilian rule with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto serving as Prime Minister, the military once again took control in 1977 under General Zia ul-Haq. After General Zia’s death in a mysterious 1988 plane crash, civilians once again ruled for eleven years under Prime
Ministers Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto before General Pervez Musharraf arrested the former and exiled the latter.¹⁵

This back-and-forth between periods of civilian and military rule is indicative of a deeply unhealthy civil-military relationship in Pakistan. The specter and precedent of military control renders the civilian government toothless – civilian leaders know that decisions that conflict with the military’s perceived interests and opinions could result in a coup, and therefore avoid making such decisions. Periods of domestic unrest threaten civilian control – Pakistan’s police are underfunded, deeply incompetent and thoroughly corrupt, so the military is therefore relied upon to quell domestic disturbances.¹⁶ Political unrest of any kind or extent automatically raises the prospect of military intervention in the civilian government – in August of 2014, protests led by Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf opposition party raised concerns that the military would force the resignation of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, further undermining democracy in the country.¹⁷ We will see later that this malaise in Pakistani civil-military relations is a major domestic filter for U.S. foreign policy in Pakistan.

A more positive quirk of frequent military control of the Pakistani government is that Pakistan-U.S. relations have typically thrived most under military rule. For example, General Zia’s military dictatorship coincided with the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan,

¹⁶ C. Christine Fair, Keith Crane, Christopher S. Chivvis, Samir Puri, and Michael Spirtas, Pakistan: Can the United States Secure an Insecure State? (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2010): 87, 102-3
which brought with it an alliance of convenience between the U.S. (which sought to covertly thwart the Soviet Union) and Pakistan (which sought to covertly project influence in Afghanistan). In the early years of Ayub Khan’s regime, U.S.-Pakistani relations thrived as the former regarded the latter as a valuable strategic partner in balancing communist China and the Soviet Union. After 9/11, General Pervez Musharraf transformed Pakistan into a “necessary but uncertain” partner in the American “Global War on Terrorism,” resulting in a largely successful U.S. campaign against the Afghan Taliban and the capture of numerous high value terror targets as they crossed into Pakistan.18 Former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Cameron P. Munter explains this phenomenon as a natural result of the Pakistani military’s status as the least corrupt and most meritocratic institution in Pakistan – he describes a natural affinity between American leaders and their counterparts in the Pakistani military. Furthermore, Munter describes the Pakistani military as having a sense of Pakistani national interest that is, “in a terrifying way,” often lacking on the civilian side.19 Many civilian politicians are primarily concerned with the interests of a particular domestic ethnic group or political party and lack the pan-Pakistani identity needed to cooperate with the United States on matters related to either state’s foreign policies.

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18 Shaun Gregory, “The ISI and the War on Terrorism,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30, No. 12 (October 26, 2007): 1020
19 Ambassador Cameron P. Munter, interview by author, Claremont, California, April 10, 2015.
IV. Territorial Disputes

Perhaps the greatest and most durable sources of Pakistani insecurity are the territorial disputes that have characterized its relationship with India and its westerly neighbor, Afghanistan, since 1947. The existential nature of these disputes, and the perpetual threat of open conflict they present, results in an influential, well-funded, and nuclear-armed Pakistani military that is largely responsible for the nation’s foreign policy. Furthermore, the Pakistani military’s strategy in managing these territorial disputes throughout the past six decades has placed the army in bed with tribal elements that create the conflicting institutional demands at the root of this thesis.

A. Kashmir

The territorial partition of British India was conducted by two commissions, one for the eastern border which would ultimately demarcate East Pakistan and the other for the western border which drew West Pakistan. Both commissions were led by the outgoing British Viceroy, Sir Cyril Radcliffe, and consisted of him alongside two representatives from Jinnah’s Muslim League and two representatives of the Hindi Congress Party.\(^2^0\) The boundary commission was only able to draw borders for what had been British India, however. This did not include the hundreds of “princely states” that were not under the direct rule of the British Viceroy – the rulers of these states were instructed to choose between remaining independent or, preferably, joining India or

Pakistan, “taking into consideration geographical contiguity and the wishes of their subjects.”

The conflict over Jammu and Kashmir is the most prominent territorial dispute in the Indian/Pakistani relationship, and was one of the first to result from the process of folding the princely states into the two new nations. The ruler (also called the Maharaja) of Jammu and Kashmir, who was a Hindu governing a 77% Muslim territory, initially elected to avoid his dilemma by remaining independent of both India and Pakistan. Threatened with a pro-Pakistan accession rebellion, the Maharaja asked for armed intervention from India and ultimately granted accession to the Indian state. While this accession was originally regarded by both parties as temporary and dependent on a popular referendum, a referendum has never taken place and India’s claim to the territory is based entirely on the original accession by the Maharaja.

Pakistan’s still weak and transitioning military had few options in responding to India’s post-accession occupation of Kashmir in late October and early November of 1947. Pakistan’s military leadership quickly came up with a plan: capitalize on the piety of tribesmen in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) to induce Muslims in northwestern Pakistan and northeastern Afghanistan to come to the defense of their coreligionists in Kashmir. These state-sponsored guerillas were supposed to cut off routes to Kashmir and prevent the Indian Army from occupying Kashmir, but failed to

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21 Haqqani, Between Mosque and Military, 27
23 Nawaz, Crossed Swords, 48
arrive at the passes in time. With Pakistan’s tribal proxies failing to hold territory in Kashmir against the much stronger and better-equipped Indian Army, the Pakistani Army became “formally” involved in the conflict in the summer of 1948, fighting side by side with (and often disguised as) tribal militants.\textsuperscript{24} The conflict ended with a ceasefire on the first day of 1949 which dictated a “line of control” separating Pakistani and Indian-controlled territories of the former princely state. This de facto border, separating the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir from the Pakistani territories of Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir, remains in place today.

The Kashmir War of 1947-8, and the Kashmir conflict in general, was the first Pakistani national security issue that resulted in an alliance between the Pakistani military and Islamic militants in the tribal areas between northern Pakistan and Afghanistan. Furthermore, the particular religious factor of the Kashmir conflict – a primarily Muslim area occupied by non-Muslims – led to the conflation of state geopolitical ends and Islamic \textit{jihad} goals. Pakistan has continued to fund, protect, and cooperate with Islamic militants that attack Indian military forces in Kashmir and, on occasion, conduct terrorist attacks against Indian civilians.

The ambiguous conclusion of the 1947-8 war also had consequences for civil-military relations in early Pakistan. The Pakistani military came away from the ceasefire with the feeling that military victory had been possible, and that the incompetent and scared political meddling of the civilian government had prevented Pakistan from taking complete control of Kashmir. This tension “fuelled the eventual expansion of military

\textsuperscript{24} Nawaz, \textit{Crossed Swords}, 67
influence in Pakistan and created a serious imbalance between military and political decision-making in the fledgling nation.”

The perceived stakes involved in the Kashmir dispute, and the massive amount of state resources devoted to managing it, gave the military a reason to prevent civilian authorities from establishing true and permanent democracy.

B. The Durand Line

The Kashmir conflict is only one of two existential border disputes that Pakistan has faced since its earliest days. Like the Kashmir conflict, Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan is perceived to pose an existential threat to Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty and national security, and is at the root of the perverse relationships between Pakistan’s intelligence service and Islamic tribal elements on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

Pakistan’s border to the west with Afghanistan predates the partition of British India, having been drawn in 1893 by Sir Mortimer Durand, a British diplomat. The line divided the Pashtun tribes in the region, splitting “Pashtunistan” into two in order to diminish the Afghan amir’s sovereignty over the tribal region. Having been conceived with regard for British India’s strategic protection rather than national identity, the Durand Line has been a target of Pashtun nationalist sentiment since it was drawn. The

\[\text{Nawaz, Crossed Swords, 73}\]
\[\text{Ibid., 73}\]
Pashtun people were (and still are) Afghanistan’s dominant ethnic group, but the Durand Line placed the majority of Pashtuns on the Pakistani side of the border.\(^{28}\)

After the creation of Pakistan, Afghanistan’s political leadership, led by Sardar Muhammad Daoud (who would later become Afghanistan’s first president), demanded the creation of an independent Pashtunistan to link Pashtun tribes in Afghanistan with those living in Pakistan’s NWFP and Baluchistan.\(^{29}\) Though these demands were framed in terms of ethnonationalist self-determination on behalf of the Pashtuns, they were in reality irredentist.\(^{30}\) Daoud’s goal was to fold this “Pashtunistan” into Afghanistan proper and was, at its root, strategic in nature. The seemingly contradictory inclusion of Baluchistan (where there is a Baluch, not Pashtun, majority) in Afghanistan’s demands for a Pashtunistan plebiscite proves the strategic nature of Afghan irredentism – controlling Baluchistan, which touches the Indian Ocean, would free Afghanistan from its strategically crippling land-locked state.\(^{31}\)

Afghanistan’s demands, if met, would have amounted to independence (or Afghan reclamation) of nearly half of what was then West Pakistan’s territory.\(^{32}\) Pakistan therefore had no interest in allowing a vote on Pashtun independence, and every interest in preventing one. Hoping to fan the flames of a Pashtun independence movement, Afghanistan in the 1950s and 60s mounted several attacks inside Pakistan using a


\(^{29}\) Haqqani, *Between Mosque and Military*, 161

\(^{30}\) Gartenstein-Ross and Vassefi, 40


\(^{32}\) Gartenstein-Ross and Vassefi, 40
combination of irregular forces and Pashtun tribesmen. In response to Afghanistan’s interference on the Pashtunistan issue, Pakistan began funding Islamist militants inside Afghanistan in the 1970s.  

Pakistan’s government saw a few key benefits in funding Islamist attacks against their neighbor’s government. First, by supporting Pakistan’s Islamists and pointing them towards Afghanistan, Pakistan’s government hoped to direct their wrath away from Islamabad. Second, leveraging non-state actors in Pakistan and the tribal regions of Afghanistan was seen as a way to exert government influence in the semi-autonomous regions. This leverage included both exerting control over domestic tribal groups, whose independence could be seen as a threat to Pakistan’s sovereignty and security, and using those same tribal groups in proxy warfare against the Afghans. Third, a foothold in Afghanistan was thought to provide “strategic depth” in the event of a conventional war against India.

This third benefit remains a major emphasis of the Pakistan Army’s strategic doctrine to this day. Ever fearful of the prospect of a major ground war with militarily superior India, Pakistan has throughout its history sought to minimize the chances of being forced to fight a war on two fronts. A friendly (or at least cooperative) Afghan government was and is therefore a national security goal of the Pakistani military. A strong and hostile Afghanistan was an existential threat to Pakistan, while a weak or friendly Afghanistan was a strategic boon.

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33 Gartenstein-Ross and Vassefi, 43
34 Schetter, 56-60
35 Ibid., 56
To achieve influence and strategic depth in what had been an extremely hostile eastern neighbor, Pakistan turned to the same Pashtun population that it felt threatened by. The Taliban, which has been the main Pakistani pawn in its struggle for power in Afghanistan, is mostly composed of Pashtuns – by turning the ethnonationalist tendencies of the Pashtun population into an Islamic insurgency within Afghanistan, Pakistan believed it could avoid a domestic separatist insurgency while projecting power inside Afghanistan. 36 De facto control over the tribal border regions ultimately gave Pakistan’s government the power to effectively overthrow Afghanistan’s government, and gave Islamabad a great deal of control over the Taliban regime from 1996 until late 2001. 37 The U.S. invasion after 9/11 changed the regional landscape and divided the Pakistani military’s loyalty between the U.S. and the tribal Islamist elements in its northern and western regions that it had previously supported at Afghanistan’s expense. 38

V. Islamization

While the Pakistani military’s (particularly Inter-Services Intelligence’s) relationship with Islamic tribal elements predated the Islamic reforms instituted by Zia ul-Haq in the 1970s and 80s, the institutionalization of pious Islamic values in the Pakistan Army conflated a strategic aim (projecting influence across the Durand Line into

37 Nasreen Ghufran, “Pushtun Ethnonationalism and the Taliban Insurgency in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan” Asian Survey 49, No. 6 (December 2009): 1102-1103
38 Ibid., 1095
Afghanistan) with a religious imperative (promoting an austere, state-approved form of Islam in a neighboring country). To this day, Pakistan’s conflation of religious and strategic concerns poses a major obstacle to U.S. efforts to reorient Pakistan’s strategic posture. The strategic benefits of Pakistan’s alliance with Islamist militants in the tribal regions on its border with Afghanistan are therefore only one part of the equation; it is possible that the religious kinship between the militants and their handlers inside the Pakistani military plays an equally important role in Pakistan’s seemingly contradictory policies.

Muhammad Zia ul-Haq was a career military officer who joined the British Indian army before partition and rose through the ranks after independence.\(^39\) He became the Chief of Army Staff in March of 1976, appointed by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.\(^40\) Bhutto thought of General Zia as a “potentially quiet and pliable army chief…[who] had no ostensible tribal support or another base in the army,” a grave miscalculation that would ultimately cost Bhutto his power and then his life.\(^41\) During a period of intense domestic unrest in 1977, Zia declared martial law, disingenuously promising to call new parliamentary elections within 90 days (he ultimately ruled for the rest of his life, over 11 years).\(^42\)

General Zia, in his first speech after his coup, declared that “Pakistan, which was created in the name of Islam, will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. That is

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39 Haqqani, *Between Mosque and Military*, 132
40 Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, 338
41 Ibid., 337
why I consider the introduction of [an] Islamic system as an essential prerequisite for the country.”

One of Zia’s most important Islamic initiatives, with perhaps the most lasting effect, was to establish hundreds of madrassas along Pakistan’s tribal border with Afghanistan. At the time, these schools were meant to serve as a barrier between communist Afghanistan and Pakistan’s Islamic republic, but today they are a source of radicalization in the restive tribal regions. Zia’s Islamizing reforms were aimed more broadly at Pakistani society as a whole, but particularly set the stage for a set of Islamizing reforms inside the military. Zia made Islamic teachings part of the army’s training program, and changed the army’s motto from “Unity, Faith, and Discipline” to “Iman, Taqwa, Jihad fi sabeelillah,” or “Faith, Obedience of God, and Struggle in the path of Allah.” Piousness became a precondition for promotion – only observant Muslims were eligible for advancement in the military under General Zia. The military under General Zia also shifted its recruitment strategies to target lower-middle class Pakistanis, who were typically more religious and had fewer family attachments to the pre-Islamization military. Jamaat-i-Islami, Pakistan’s conservative Islamist party, encouraged its members to enlist in the officer corps. These shifts resulted in a new breed of officer in the Pakistani military, one far more pious and fundamentalist than previous generations of the officer corps.

43 Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005): 92
45 Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, 384
47 Ibid., 385
This demographic- and values-driven piety in the Pakistani military results in a natural affinity towards Islamist proxies in the tribal regions that extends the relationship beyond strategic ends and into spiritual ones. The conflict over Kashmir is no longer just a territorial struggle, it is also an Islamic mandate to free a Muslim territory from an apostate occupier. The covert effort to install the Taliban in Afghanistan is no longer just a pursuit of strategic depth, it is also an attempt to bring about a true Islamic Emirate under sharia theocracy. This conflation of the strategic and the religious is a major barrier to U.S. policy aimed at bringing Pakistan’s military into line with American strategic interests.

VI. Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence

At the time of partition, Pakistan’s main intelligence arm was known as the Intelligence Bureau (IB). The IB descended from the pre-partition intelligence service of British India and consisted of the intelligence assets granted to Pakistan under the terms of the partition agreement. The IB in 1947 was primarily a police organization with an internal focus, and therefore performed poorly when asked to provide external intelligence services during the First Kashmir War in 1947-8. Pakistan’s leadership, realizing the need for a more externally oriented intelligence service to counter India,

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49 Bidanda M. Chengappa, “The ISI Role in Pakistan’s Politics” *Strategic Analysis* 23, No. 11 (February 2000)
responded by creating the Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) in 1948 under Major General R. Cawthorne.\textsuperscript{50}

For the first decade of ISI’s existence, the focus of its intelligence collection and analysis was mostly limited to India, with a particular emphasis on Kashmir. After General Ayub Khan seized power in 1958, the ISI became the favored organization not only for external intelligence efforts but for internal initiatives as well – with the military in power, Pakistan’s new leadership preferred to turn to a military body (ISI) over the more police-oriented IB.\textsuperscript{51} ISI’s ascendance coincided with a period of increased discontent in East Pakistan, where Bengali nationalists felt marginalized by the geographically remote capital in Islamabad. The ISI, in the 1960s and early 1970s, became Pakistan’s main tool for suppressing dissent and manipulating elections in East Pakistan.\textsuperscript{52} ISI officers attempted to prevent the Awami League (which was led by a Bengali and was sympathetic to East Pakistani calls for greater autonomy) from gaining power, and assassinated prominent East Pakistani politicians.\textsuperscript{53}

After Pakistan’s crushing defeat in the resultant Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, the ISI did not return to its original posture as an externally oriented intelligence organization. Post-war Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto immediately increased the ISI’s budget and used the service to spy on his domestic political opponents.\textsuperscript{54} Bhutto also established ISI political cells in Balochistan and the North-West Frontier Province to

\textsuperscript{50} Winchell, “The Invisible Government,” 374
\textsuperscript{51} Chengappa, “The ISI Role in Pakistan’s Politics”
\textsuperscript{52} Haqqani Between Mosque and Military, 58-9
\textsuperscript{53} Winchell, “The Invisible Government,” 376-77
\textsuperscript{54} Peter Lyon, Conflict Between India and Pakistan: An Encyclopedia (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2008): 84-5
monitor and quell unrest in those areas.\textsuperscript{55} Bhutto built up the ISI’s political wing, beginning a tradition of ISI interference in Pakistani parliamentary elections that may persist to this day – Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi announced in 2008 that the ISI’s political wing had been dissolved, but it is likely that the agency has maintained its ability to affect politics in a less formal sense.\textsuperscript{56} There exists a sense in the Pakistani military leadership that interference in civilian politics is necessary to maintain security in a state faced with ethnonationalist political parties in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Sindh that would break up the country if given the chance.\textsuperscript{57} This natural sense of fragility, rooted in a diversity of ethnic groups that periodically gives rise to nationalist separatism, gives rise to another filter that blocks effective U.S. engagement with the Pakistani state.

Ironically, given Bhutto’s support for the expansive use of Inter-Services Intelligence, it was the ISI that set in motion the chain of events ending with the Prime Minister’s ouster and death. ISI chief General Ghulam Jilani Khan encouraged the Prime Minister to promote Zia ul-Haq to Chief of Army Staff in 1976, one year before the latter took power in Operation Fair Play, a military coup d’état.\textsuperscript{58} Zia continued the diversification of ISI initiatives, many of which had begun under his predecessor. ISI

\textsuperscript{55} Chengappa, “The ISI Role in Pakistan’s Politics”  
\textsuperscript{58} Haqqani, \textit{Between Mosque and Military}, 91
continued its covert procurement of nuclear technology and stepped up its support for insurgent groups inside India.\textsuperscript{59}

In 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan turned the ISI into an international player in the context of the Cold War – CIA money and arms intended for the Afghan mujahideen were funneled through the ISI. This allowed the ISI to amass large amounts of material resources by skimming off the U.S. mujahideen aid program throughout the 1980s, further cementing itself as Pakistan’s premier intelligence service at the expense of the Intelligence Bureau.\textsuperscript{60} The ISI’s cooperation during the 1980s, both with the CIA and with Islamist insurgents across the western border, created a number of conflicting and duplicitous relationships within the ISI that persist today.

Hamid Gul is perhaps the figure who best personifies the persistent ties between ISI and Islamic extremists in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. Gul, head of the ISI from 1987 until 1989, was instrumental in funnelling CIA money and arms to mujahideen militants inside Afghanistan in the latter years of the Soviet occupation.\textsuperscript{61} Two decades later, in 2008, the United States would ask the United Nations Security Council to designate Gul an international terrorist for his links the Haqqani network (a Taliban-aligned organization responsible for hundreds of attacks against NATO troops and

\textsuperscript{59} Winchell, “The Invisible Government,” 378
Afghan civilians). Gul is mentioned so many times in the “Afghan War Diary” released in 2010 by WikiLeaks that it “seems unlikely that Pakistan’s current military and intelligence officials could not know of at least some of his wide-ranging activities.” Taken together, Gul’s actions indicate that elements of Pakistan’s military and intelligence services continue to maintain a secret understanding with the Taliban and its associated militants in which Pakistan turns a “blind eye” to their presence in Pakistan’s northwestern tribal regions in exchange for the militants focusing their operations inside Afghanistan.

With the death of Zia ul-Haq in 1988 and the resumption of civilian control over Pakistan’s government, the ISI’s interference in domestic politics rose to new heights. ISI has long had an antagonistic relationship with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and attempted to prevent his daughter, Benazir Bhutto, from returning to power by murdering two of her brothers and intimidating her with overt surveillance during her exile in London. The government of Benazir Bhutto frequently challenged the ISI and the military at large, leading the ISI to pressure then-president Ghulam Ishaq Khan to dissolve Bhutto’s parliament in 1990. The fall of Bhutto’s government brought to power Nawaz Sharif’s Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) party, which had been organized

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64 Chengappa; Bahukutumbi 38
65 Samina Yasmeen, “Democracy in Pakistan: The Third Dismissal,” Asian Survey 34, No. 6 (June 1994): 573-4
by the ISI in 1988 – Sharif’s party was effectively an ISI creation, formed to serve as a right-wing counterweight to Bhutto’s more progressive PPP.\textsuperscript{66} Former ISI Director General Asad Durrani admitted in 2012 that the ISI manipulated Pakistan’s 1990 elections by distributing millions of dollars to Pakistani politicians and political parties to ensure that Sharif’s IJI would defeat Bhutto and the PPP.\textsuperscript{67}

During this period of increased domestic influence, ISI was also flexing its muscles across Pakistan’s eastern and western borders. To the west, Afghanistan had devolved into civil war following the withdrawal of Soviet forces and the fall of the Najibullah regime in April 1992. In 1994, ISI, with the approval of Benazir Bhutto (who had regained power from Sharif in 1993) began funneling money and arms to the nascent Taliban, which began as a student militia movement in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s goal was to “engineer the rise to power in Afghanistan of a Pashtun-dominated pro-Islamabad client regime.”\textsuperscript{68} The Taliban found quick success in this endeavor: after four years of civil war following the Soviet withdrawal and the fall of Najibullah’s communist government, Taliban forces led by the mullahs Mohammed Omar and Mohammad Rabbani captured Kabul.\textsuperscript{69}

In addition to funding and guiding the Taliban to power in Afghanistan, the ISI collaborated with Islamic militant groups (including Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda) to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{66} Rizvi, “Civil-Military Relations in Contemporary Pakistan,” 101
\item \textsuperscript{68} Gregory, “The ISI and the War on Terrorism,” 1018-9
\item \textsuperscript{69} Ralph H. Magnus, “Afghanistan in 1996: Year of the Taliban,” \textit{Asian Survey} 37, No. 2 (February 1997): 113
\end{itemize}
establish training camps in order to “host, indoctrinate, and train foreign fighters who could reinforce Kashmiri separatist/terrorist groups like Lashkar-e Taiba… and promote a pro-Pakistan Islamist agenda” throughout the region.\textsuperscript{70} ISI’s alliance with the Taliban and the transnational Islamist militants the Taliban hosted served Pakistan’s security interests on both of its borders. Throughout the 1990s, these militants (led by the ISI’s crown jewel, Lashkar-e Taiba) mounted a sustained, ISI-funded insurgency in Kashmir that killed thousands of Indian troops.\textsuperscript{71}

VII. Nuclear Weapons Program

Pakistan maintained a peaceful nuclear energy program from 1956 until the early 1970s. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and in the wake of a crushing defeat in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, Pakistan initiated “Project 706” with the goal of obtaining a nuclear deterrent.\textsuperscript{72} The Pakistani equivalent of the Manhattan Project, Project 706 gained new impetus after India’s 1974 “Smiling Buddha” nuclear test.\textsuperscript{73} At the time, Pakistan’s blossoming atomic program was mired in a schism between advocates of a plutonium-based enrichment program and advocates of uranium-based enrichment. Pakistan ultimately developed two parallel programs, one using plutonium

\textsuperscript{70} Gregory, “The ISI and the War on Terrorism,” 1020
\textsuperscript{73} Andrew Bast, "Pakistan's Nuclear Calculus." The Washington Quarterly 34, No. 4 (2011): 76
and the other uranium. Nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan was tapped to lead the uranium program, and established a network to covertly proliferate enrichment technology from URENCO (an enrichment company based in Europe) to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{74} Project 706 culminated in Pakistan’s first full-scale nuclear test, codenamed Chagai-I, in 1998.\textsuperscript{75}

Pakistan’s National Command Authority (NCA) is responsible for the state’s nuclear weapons command and control policy, while the military has complete custodial control over the weapons themselves. The NCA consists of a combination of civilian and military authorities, including the Prime Minister on the civilian side (along with other top ministers) and the heads of the four branches of the Pakistani military on the other.\textsuperscript{76} While the exact number and location of the weapons is a tightly guarded state secret, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program is currently believed to consist of around 120 strategically placed warheads.\textsuperscript{77} The program is a source of great national pride in Pakistan, and the government is extremely protective of its primary deterrent against Indian encroachment or belligerence.\textsuperscript{78} Pakistan’s nuclear scientists are revered and celebrated by the Pakistani public. There exists a sense in Pakistani society that Western

\textsuperscript{77} “Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance,” \textit{Arms Control Association}, February 2015
\textsuperscript{78} Bast, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Calculus,” 80
powers and India are conspiring to take away Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, and Pakistan therefore takes great pains to conceal the location of its stocks.\footnote{Jeff Goldberg and Mark Ambinder, “The Ally from Hell,” The Atlantic, November 5, 2011, \url{http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/12/the-ally-from-hell/308730/}}
CHAPTER IV. U.S.-PAKISTANI SECURITY COOPERATION, 1979-2015

This chapter provides an overview of U.S.-Pakistani security cooperation from 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, until today. It will provide the necessary historical context needed to understand where and why filters exist in the U.S.-Pakistani relationship with regards to modern American counterterrorism initiatives. Its focus is on three areas of U.S.-Pakistani security cooperation – the joint anti-Soviet covert action program between 1979 and 1989, combined efforts to change Pakistan’s strategic posture with regards to Islamic militants and address the terror threat in Afghanistan after 9/11, and the Pakistan-approved American drone program in Pakistan’s tribal regions between 2004 and 2015. These three areas, along with Pakistan’s nuclear program, will also be the focus of Chapter V, which attempts to account for filters on related U.S. policy.

I. Covert Anti-Soviet Cooperation in Afghanistan, 1979-1989

The singular event that precipitated years of cooperation between the Central Intelligence Agency and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. A year and a half earlier, the Afghan government had fallen to a communist coup d’état in the Saur Revolution of April 1978. The new communist government faced fierce resistance from Pashtun and Islamist insurgents through 1978 and early 1979, resulting in a power struggle between Hafizullah Amin and Nur Muhammad Turaki, the leaders of the ruling People’s Democratic Party of
Afghanistan (PDPA). With Moscow seeking a more dedicated and stable client state, Soviet involvement increased throughout 1979, culminating in a formal invasion of Afghanistan by nearly 100,000 Soviet troops in December 1979. As direct Soviet involvement in Afghanistan grew throughout 1979, American policymakers, led by National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, saw an opportunity to “giv[e] to the USSR its Vietnam War.” To that end, President Jimmy Carter signed a covert presidential directive to provide aid to Afghans resisting the pro-Moscow regime on July 3, 1979, five months before troops from the Soviet 360th, 201st, 357th, and 66th Motorized Rifle Divisions poured across the Amu Darya River separating Afghanistan from Soviet Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

The Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan brought with it a myriad of problems for Pakistan. A million Afghan refugees crossed the Durand Line, and the Soviet-Afghan state began fomenting an irredentist insurgency in Pakistani Baluchistan, hoping to extend the territory of Afghanistan “to the shores of the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean” through a terror campaign inside Pakistan. Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq sensed an opportunity to address these problems while also insinuating himself into Afghanistan’s affairs, bringing down the hostile communist regime and boosting pro-

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83 Seth G. Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, April 12, 2010): 19
84 Mitrokhin, “The KGB in Afghanistan,” 111, 139-41
Islamabad Pashtuns and Islamists across the border. Zia positioned Pakistan, which was conveniently one of three significant routes into Afghanistan (along with the Soviet Union and Iran) to serve as the implementer of the United States’ covert Afghan policy during the Soviet occupation.\(^85\)

Crucially, Zia insisted that Pakistan take political control over the distribution of CIA-supplied weapons and money. Zia wanted to be in control of who in Afghanistan benefitted from the program. A CIA-selected regime in Afghanistan was hardly an improvement over the status quo; Zia wanted to handpick the recipients of American aid in order to boost Pakistan’s selected strategic proxies inside Afghanistan. He won this right without much argument from Langley.\(^86\) Zia entrusted ISI director-general Akhtar Abdur Rahman to manage the CIA-ISI-mujahideen nexus. General Akhtar established strict rules to ensure that ISI retained absolute control over aid flowing into Afghanistan from the American Treasury Department and military. Even if it had objected, the CIA had little recourse – it was the ISI that possessed the necessary relationships with militants in the Afghan mujahideen, which allowed Akhtar to more or less dictate his terms.\(^87\) CIA officers were forbidden from direct contact with the Afghan mujahideen, and from crossing the Durand Line into Afghanistan.\(^88\)

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\(^{88}\) Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 63-4
Throughout the 1980s, American taxpayers poured a total of nearly $3 billion through the ISI and into the hands of Afghan mujahideen fighters, many of them extreme in their jihadist interpretation of Islam.\textsuperscript{89} 35,000 Muslims from 40 countries traveled to Afghanistan to join the jihad against the occupying Soviet forces. By the time the Soviet Union began withdrawing from Afghanistan after a decade of war in 1987, 13,500 Soviet troops had been killed and over 35,000 wounded by mujahideen forces funded and armed by the CIA and the ISI.\textsuperscript{90} The United States’ short-term goals (forcing a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, bringing down the communist government in Kabul, and imposing a high human and economic cost on the Soviet Union for its expansionism) had all been met.

II. Efforts to Recast Pakistan’s Strategic Posture After 9/11

At the time of General Pervez Musharraf’s 1999 overthrow of Nawaz Sharif’s civilian government, Pakistan’s foreign policy was thoroughly intertwined with the Afghan Taliban and its associated militant movements. International security scholar Shaun Gregory refers to Pakistan in the late 1990s as “the hub of a radiating network of Islamist groups and organizations that by 2000 were asserting a pro-Pakistan agenda across the region taking in Afghanistan, the Southern Caucus, the west of China,


Kashmir, and across the Indian subcontinent.” Given its position at the heart of transnational Islamic terrorism, the ISI/Taliban/Islamist militant nexus (and thus Pakistan’s foreign policy itself) suffered an existential shock as a result of al-Qaeda’s September 11 attack on the United States. The destruction of al-Qaeda and their hosts in Afghanistan’s Taliban government had suddenly become a central foreign policy goal for the world’s preeminent superpower.

Forced by the administration of U.S. president George W. Bush to decide quickly where Pakistan’s loyalties lay in the wake of 9/11, Musharraf elected to reevaluate Pakistan’s strategic stance and side with the United States in the “Global War on Terror” (GWOT) – at least in terms of Pakistan’s “official” posture. In return for his decision, which was a “considerable political risk” according to a memo by Secretary of State Colin Powell, Musharraf received a generous package of loan write-offs, international financial assistance, and American military and civilian aid. In exchange for assistance that totaled $4 billion by 2004, Musharraf agreed to a program of action that, if adhered to, would have “essentially cast Pakistan’s regional security interests to the wind, threatened the country’s internal stability, and put his own presidency at risk.”

This package of assistance (coupled with an implicit “carrot or stick” threat) was supposed to purchase three main services: Pakistani assent for a U.S. military presence at bases inside Pakistan, supply routes going through Pakistan and into Afghanistan, and

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92 Daniel S. Markey, *No Exit from Pakistan: America’s Tortured Relationship with Islamabad* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, October 7, 2013): 110-113
Pakistani military cooperation and coordination with the U.S. military’s effort in Operation Enduring Freedom.\(^{94}\) As American Special Forces, air power, and paramilitary personnel drove al-Qaeda elements and Taliban leadership out of Afghanistan and towards Pakistan, Musharraf summoned around 80,000 troops to secure the border, succeeding in detaining many al-Qaeda militants (though key leadership figures, including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, managed to elude capture).\(^{95}\)

Since militant refugees from Afghanistan poured into Pakistan’s tribal regions in the wake of Operation Enduring Freedom (the United States’ invasion of Afghanistan after 9/11), Pakistan’s military has launched a series of offensives against militants in the Federally Administered Tribal Area and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. These offensives – Operation Al Mizan from 2002-06, Operation Zalzala in 2008, Operations Sher Dil, Rah-e-Haq, and Rah-e-Rast from 2007-09, Operation Rah-e-Nijat from 2009-10, Operation Koh-e Sufaid from 2008-11, and Operation Zarb-e-Azb in 2014 – have come at a great human and economic cost to Pakistan.\(^{96}\) The indiscriminate tactics used in Pakistan’s offensives created not only a vast population of internally displaced people but also a domestic offshoot of the Taliban, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which has targeted

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\(^{95}\) Shanthie D’Souza, “US-Pakistan Counter-Terrorism Cooperation: Dynamics and Challenges,” *Strategic Analysis* 30, No. 3 (September 2006): 527-8

the Pakistani state and people with a bloody insurgency against the government in Islamabad. Musharraf’s willingness to execute the costly military offensives against militants in Pakistan’s tribal regions at the United States’ behest cost him his political popularity. Musharraf was ultimately blamed for turning the Islamic militants against the Pakistani state, taking a problem that had (according to the prevailing view in Pakistan) only existed in Afghanistan and importing it to Pakistan – the “Global War on Terror” came to be seen as synonymous with “America’s War,” and therefore with Musharraf himself. According to some sources, well over 25,000 Pakistani civilians and security personnel have lost their lives in terrorist violence since 2003. The domestic terrorism that has accompanied Pakistan’s participation in the GWOT shows no signs of abating – Pakistan recently suffered one of the deadliest terror attacks in its history, with TTP’s December 2014 massacre of 145 students and teachers at the Army Public School and Degree College in Peshawar.

III. The U.S. Drone Program in Pakistan, 2004-2015

Members of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center (CTC), led by its chief, Cofer Black, conceived of the American drone program in 2000 in response to the growing

http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm
threat from transnational Islamic extremists. Previously used for surveillance, the idea to arm Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) came in the wake of a number of frustrating failures to strike Osama bin Laden with cruise missiles fired from submarines in the Indian Ocean in the late 1990s and early 2000.\textsuperscript{101} The CIA’s secretive Special Activities Division equipped the Predator drones with Hellfire AGM-114 laser-guided missiles and began developing the legal, tactical, and chain-of-command framework for their use.

After 9/11, the armed Predator drones saw early action in Afghanistan targeting Taliban and al-Qaeda encampments. Hellfire missiles struck a number of high-ranking Taliban and al-Qaeda commanders, demonstrating the value of the program. After the swift defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan, however, a large number of high-value al-Qaeda targets resettled across Afghanistan’s eastern border in Pakistan’s tribal regions, namely South Waziristan (part of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, or FATA) and the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA, now known as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). U.S. intelligence services soon realized that Pakistan’s tribal areas had become a safe haven of sorts for al-Qaeda and Taliban elements to regroup and plan a new wave of attacks after their swift defeat inside Afghanistan.

The framework for drone strikes inside a country with which the United States was not formally at war was formalized in a November 2002 strike against Abu Ali al Harithi, a plotter in the USS Cole bombing and right-hand man to Osama bin Laden. The

strike was carried out with the knowledge, approval, and collaboration of the friendly Yemeni regime under Ali Abdullah Saleh. The success of the strike on Harithi sparked interest within the U.S. government in using the armed Predator drones inside Pakistan’s tribal regions to target high value al-Qaeda and Taliban targets.

A Taliban commander by the name of Nek Mohammad Wazir planted the seeds for such a program inside Pakistan’s tribal regions. Nek Mohammad was the leader of an early “rogue Taliban” element (later known as TTP) that refused ISI supervision and conducted attacks against Pakistani military and civilian targets. On several occasions, he humiliated the Pakistani military by signing one-sided truces that consolidated his power in the tribal regions and then immediately broaching them by resuming attacks against the Pakistani military. Sensing an opportunity to extend its nascent drone program into Pakistani territory, the United States offered to “resolve” Pakistan’s Nek Mohammad problem in exchange for Pakistani assent for regular drone strikes in the tribal regions. Musharraf agreed, with several conditions. Pakistani intelligence officials would have to approve each drone strike in advance, and the CIA would be forced to restrict strikes to approved “flight boxes.” Furthermore, the strikes would need to be carried out under the CIA’s Title 50 authority rather than the U.S. military’s Title 10 authority, so that the strikes would remain classified and deniable.

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103 Williams, “History of an Assassination Campaign,” 874
104 C. Christine Fair, Seth G. Jones, “Pakistan’s War Within,” *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* 51, No. 6 (December 2, 2011): 171
June 18, 2004, Nek Mohammad Wazir was struck and killed by a Hellfire missile fired by an American drone, the inaugural kill in the United States’ drone program in tribal Pakistan.\(^{106}\)

The drone program continued under the initial agreed-upon terms, with Pakistan collaborating on targeting and providing approval for each strike, for about four years. In 2008, the CIA detected a number of instances in which Pakistani officials warned targets or tribal elders of impending drone strikes after receiving advance notice from the United States.\(^{107}\) That July, President George W. Bush approved an increase in drone strikes on Pakistani soil and also gave the go-ahead to stop providing Pakistani generals and intelligence officials with advance notice before strikes.\(^{108}\) Instead, notification would be given either concurrently with the strike or a few minutes after.\(^{109}\) This was the first step in a gradual degeneration of the Pakistani military’s collaboration with American drone strikes.

The extent of Pakistani military collaboration with the U.S. drone program began as full-blown cooperation – in many cases, the ISI’s public relation wing, Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) claimed credit for strikes that had in fact been carried out by the


CIA. ISI is also suspected of intimidating and in some cases murdering Pakistani journalists that attempted to uncover the truth behind the drone program.\(^{110}\) After the American night raid that killed Osama bin Laden on May 2, 2011, Pakistan responded angrily by reducing the number of Special Operations counterterrorism trainers allowed in the country from 120 to 39, barring CIA contractors from Pakistani soil, and expelling a number of suspected CIA officers.\(^{111}\) Furthermore, ISI stopped acknowledging receipt of faxes providing concurrent or post-strike notice on American drone actions in the tribal regions – these acknowledgments had previously represented Pakistan’s tacit consent for the strikes.\(^{112}\) After the Abbottabad raid, what had at one time been collaborative program between the United States and Pakistan was rapidly becoming a unilateral American air campaign.

U.S.-Pakistan cooperation on drone strikes had not yet reached its nadir, however. After U.S. forces mistakenly killed 24 Pakistani soldiers in what became known as the Salala incident on November 26, 2011, Pakistan began obstructing the drone program, closing the Shamsi base from which the drones were launched inside Pakistan.\(^{113}\)


began putting out statements not only acknowledging American strikes on Pakistani soil but loudly objecting to them, stirring up outrage among Pakistani citizens. In June 2011, ISPR claimed in a statement that “as far as drone attacks are concerned, [the] Army has repeatedly conveyed to all concerned that these are not acceptable under any circumstances. There is no room for ambiguity in this regard.”

Since the nadir of late 2011 and early 2012, U.S.-Pakistani relations have become comparatively normalized. The Obama administration, perhaps in response to the dwindling numbers of U.S. troops across the border in Afghanistan, claimed to have ended so-called “signature strikes” which targeted unidentified individuals presumed to be extremists. It became clear in April 2015, however, that signature strikes have continued – two Western hostages held by al-Qaeda were killed in what is reported to have been a signature strike on January 15, 2015. A database compiled by the Long War Journal recorded a spike in strikes from 2007 to 2008 (from five to 35), then a peak

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of 117 strikes in 2010 followed by a precipitous drop to 24 strikes by 2014.\textsuperscript{117} There have only been seven strikes through the first four months of 2015.\textsuperscript{118} Though the pace of drone strikes has abated, the American drone program is still regarded as a crucial tool of American counterterrorism policy in Pakistan.


CHAPTER V: COUNTERTERRORISM FILTERS IN THE U.S.-PAKISTANI RELATIONSHIP

This chapter will examine filters in counterterrorism cooperation between the American and Pakistani national security apparatuses. It is divided into five different historical events or U.S. foreign policy initiatives wherein ground level dynamics in Pakistan have filtered U.S. policy to the detriment of American national interests. By summarizing and mapping out different factors at play when American and Pakistani national security initiatives have been either in line or at odds, I aim to ultimately present American policymakers and diplomats with the historical context necessary to understand filters that remain in play today. The four sets of filters I will examine are as follows: filters during and in after the Soviet war in Afghanistan, filters related to counterterrorism cooperation in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom, filters related to the American drone program in Pakistan’s tribal region, and filters related to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.

I. Counterterrorism Filters Related to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

One of the most harmful filters on any U.S. foreign policy in the past half century has been the second-order effects of the U.S.-backed Afghan muhajideen that defeated the Soviet Union and brought down its communist client state. In terms of its short-term goals, U.S.-Pakistani cooperation during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan must be regarded as a resounding success. Long-term, however, domestic filters in Afghanistan
and Pakistan resulted in American anti-Soviet policy backfiring and ultimately compromising U.S. national security.

The massive amount of aid that poured into Inter-Services Intelligence’s coffers during the 1980s had a profound, lasting effect on the structure and internal power dynamics of the Pakistani military. Pakistan’s secretive intelligence service became one of the most powerful, well-financed organizations in the entire country, allowing Pakistan’s military to assert itself in Pakistan’s internal politics and across the country’s eastern and western borders. The persistent malaise in Pakistani civil-military relations is therefore due in part to diverted American anti-Soviet aid, and results in weak civilian institutions that are unable to keep Pakistan stable on their own. These power dynamics within Pakistan continue to filter U.S. counterterrorism policy today by making two of the United States’ most popular foreign policy tools – democracy promotion and civilian aid – incompatible with stability and therefore counterproductive to American national security.

The Islamic piety of the ISI under General Zia, and the radical character of its chosen aid recipients, served as two major filters on U.S. policy with regard to financing the Afghan mujahideen. Pakistan had a wide variety of anti-Soviet militant elements to choose from when selecting the recipients of the United States’ and Saudi Arabia’s aid (Riyadh had agreed to match CIA funds to the mujahideen dollar for dollar). Had the United States been able to choose the beneficiaries of its money and armaments, it is

likely that the more moderate forces led by Ahmed Shah Massoud would have been the main recipients of covert foreign aid.\textsuperscript{120} As it was, however, Pakistan favored the more extreme elements of the Afghan resistance – the two largest recipients of aid funneled through ISI were the militant groups Hezb-e Islami, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan, led by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf.\textsuperscript{121} Hekmatyar would later be designated a global terrorist by the U.S. Treasury Department and would become an early target of the CIA’s drone program.\textsuperscript{122} Sayyaf is described by the 9/11 Commission Report as a mentor to 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), and is said to have extended an invitation to Osama bin Laden to return to Afghanistan after his expulsion from Sudan in 1996.\textsuperscript{123}

The empowerment and financing of the most radical Islamists in Afghanistan’s anti-Soviet resistance movement was a lasting negative result of policy filters in Pakistan’s military and intelligence service. Flush with cash even after the Soviet withdrawal, radical groups had a major advantage over more pro-Western movements.

\textsuperscript{121} Peter Dale Scott, \textit{The Road to 9/11: Wealth, Empire, and the Future of America} (Oakland, University of California Press, 2007): 126-7
like Ahmed Shah Massoud’s Northern Alliance. Many of Pakistan’s chosen proxies in the anti-Soviet resistance would later be coopted or absorbed by the Taliban, strengthening the Taliban government between 1996 and 2001 and allowing al-Qaeda to grow its capabilities. The filter on U.S. policy was severe: aid meant to ensure American national security by undermining the Soviet Union’s power passed through the prism of Pakistan’s domestic politics and strategic considerations, then empowered hostile, anti-American elements throughout Afghanistan which would ultimately endanger and compromise American national security far more than a communist government in Afghanistan ever could have.

A final filter stemming from the United States’ covert effort to cast the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan in the 1980s was the creation of a generation of ISI officers with deep ties to the most “radical, anti-Western, transnational Islamists fighting in the jihad.”\textsuperscript{124} The importance of these personal connections cannot be understated – Fredrick Grare, a South Asia expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, points to the fact that many ISI officers “have ethnic and cultural ties to Afghan insurgents, and naturally sympathize with them.”\textsuperscript{125} This indicates that the ISI’s continued support for Islamic extremists is rooted not only in a rational measurement of Pakistan’s national interest, but also to some extent in a personal affinity for and agreement with the aims of Islamic radicals.

\textsuperscript{124} Scott, \textit{The Road to 9/11}, 127

The Islamic piety of the Pakistani military under General Zia, Pakistan’s calculation of its national interest with regard to the radical character of its chosen proxies in Afghanistan, and the lack of accountability in the U.S. aid program for the mujahideen resulted in Afghanistan becoming a hub for well-financed, well-armed Islamic extremist elements. The empowerment of these individuals and groups, as well as the ideology they espoused, would later become major threats to U.S. national security. Both remain central national security priorities today, and are complicated by filters in Pakistan’s intergovernmental power dynamics and within ISI caused indirectly by the United States’ aid program.

II. Counterterrorism Filters Related to Pakistan’s Strategic Posture

After the United States’ quick defeat of the Taliban during Operation Enduring Freedom in late 2001 and early 2002, the United States’ mission in Afghanistan quickly shifted from defeating the Taliban to targeting high value terror suspects and building a stable Afghan state where terrorists would be unable to find safe haven. Pakistan has necessarily had a significant role to play in this mission – many al-Qaeda and transnational Islamist elements that escaped the American invasion resettled in Pakistan’s tribal region, opening a new front in the United States’ effort to deny terrorists safe havens from which they could launch attacks.\textsuperscript{126} Furthermore, the Taliban elements that found themselves in Pakistan’s tribal regions after fleeing Afghanistan in late 2001 posed

\textsuperscript{126} Tom Lansford, 9/11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq: A Chronology and Reference Guide (Santa Barbara, ABC-CLIO, November 4, 2011): 257
a persistent threat to the new Afghan state, and Pakistan was uniquely positioned to either mitigate or intensify the threat the Taliban posed. Ultimately, different elements of Pakistan’s government did both – parts of ISI continued to support and protect from American drone strikes Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders who were conducting attacks on coalition forces and Afghan government targets inside Afghanistan, while other groups inside Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership cooperated with the United States in trying to neutralize those same militants.

Musharraf’s acceptance of the U.S. aid program and the conditions it imposed after 9/11 did not change Pakistan’s strategic reality – that an Afghanistan without a Taliban client state is one where India can project and has projected influence, threatening Pakistan’s strategic depth.127 As a result, from the beginning of post-9/11 cooperation between Pakistan and the United States, the Pakistanis have hedged their bets. The post-9/11 offensives by the Pakistani military mainly targeted organizations that were involved in sectarian, domestically targeted jihadi violence within Pakistan while to a large extent sparing groups like the Haqqani network (one of the preeminent Taliban-aligned groups fighting coalition and Afghan forces in Afghanistan).128 By only targeting groups that were “out of sync with the military’s perception of the national interest,” Pakistan in the early and mid-2000s supported American efforts in the GWOT just enough to continue benefitting from U.S. economic and military assistance without truly

reconfiguring its strategic posture with regard to a stable, non-Taliban-governed
Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{129}

There exists a sense in Pakistani government and society that Pakistan has
suffered greatly for agreeing to come to the aid of the United States in the GWOT.
Despite massive amounts of aid paid to the Pakistani military and civilian government in
exchange for its cooperation, Pakistani diplomats and commentators frequently argue that
the American aid program doesn’t come close to recouping the economic and human
costs incurred by the Pakistani state in its fight against terror.\textsuperscript{130} Many in Pakistan also
perceive psychological, reputational costs – that Pakistan’s international reputation has
been besmirched as an unstable society, home to terrorists, constantly on the brink of
collapse. Cameron Munter, former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, agrees – in an
interview, he referred to this sense as a sticking point in U.S.-Pakistani relations. At one
point during Ambassador Munter’s tenure, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari presented
Ambassador Munter with “what could only be described as a bill,” totaling the combined
reputational, economic, opportunity and human costs into a massive number that would
essentially require a “new Marshall Plan” to be properly reimbursed.\textsuperscript{131} The perceived
difference between the costs incurred by Pakistan and the amount reimbursed through
American aid is a major filter on U.S. policy in Pakistan. So long as the Pakistanis view
the balance of costs and benefits as being in favor of making good with extremist

\textsuperscript{129} Ashley J. Tellis, “Pakistan and the War on Terror: Conflicted Goals, Compromised
\textsuperscript{130} Alexander Evans, “Pakistan and the Shadow of 9/11,” \textit{The RUSI Journal} 156, No. 4,
(September 2011): 69
\textsuperscript{131} Ambassador Cameron P. Munter, interview by author, Claremont, California, April
10, 2015.
elements to stave off attacks on Pakistan, current amounts of American aid will not be sufficient to permanently change Pakistan’s geostrategic calculus.

For several years, Pakistan’s approach of tepid, “just good enough” support for coalition efforts to stabilize Afghanistan’s new government was successful in making the United States’ government believe that it was getting full cooperation from Pakistan – President George W. Bush declared on June 24, 2003, that Pakistan was providing “effective border security measures and law enforcement cooperation,” resulting in the capture of hundreds of al-Qaeda and Taliban suspects.¹³² Just four years later, however, in the July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, the American Director of National Intelligence declared unambiguously that al-Qaeda was benefitting from “a safe haven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas,” and other senior U.S. foreign policy officials and representatives began “to wonder whether Pakistan is in fact doing its part” to ensure that the Taliban did not reemerge in Afghanistan to create a new safe haven for al-Qaeda militants.¹³³ Again, we can see a filter wherein elements of the Pakistani military and government feel the need to hedge their bets, exacting generous amounts of aid but remaining unwilling to completely recast Pakistan’s strategic posture with regards to extremism in the tribal regions. Part of the problem, according to Ambassador Munter, is a fundamental difference in American and Pakistani outlooks – the United States “naïvely” views the relationship as a partnership that shares goals, while many in

¹³³ Tellis, “Pakistan and the War on Terror,” 1
Pakistan view it as an extractive, transactional relationship that unsuccessfully attempts to paper over divergent interests. Succinctly put by Ambassador Munter, “the United States wanted love. The Pakistanis wanted money.” Until these outlooks align in a real partnership, it will be difficult for American policy to obtain the complete cooperation necessary to address United States’ national security concerns in Pakistan.

On the question of post-9/11 support for the Taliban and militant elements in the border region, there has been dissonance between Pakistan’s official foreign policy and the actions of its military, particularly ISI. The “official” divorce between the Pakistani state and its Taliban client occurred in a matter of weeks in late 2001 – a period of time far too short to allow for the annulment of the close religious, ethnic, and institutional ties built over the previous decade. Pakistan’s continued unofficial support for the Afghan Taliban and its associated militants reflects a belief in some corners of the Pakistani government that post-9/11 cooperation with the United States is a temporary pragmatic necessity, whereas the assertion of influence in Afghanistan through the Taliban and in Kashmir through Islamic militants has more lasting strategic value.

Complicating post-9/11 efforts to extricate Pakistan’s military from its proxies in the tribal regions is Pakistan’s desire to maintain ties with the Punjabi militants that target Indian forces in Kashmir and conduct high profile attacks inside India, namely Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Directly after 9/11, General Musharraf made sure to distinguish LeT from

134 Ambassador Cameron P. Munter, interview by author, Claremont, California, April 10, 2015.
groups like al-Qaeda and the Taliban (which were the main targets of the early GWOT) and sectarian groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) (which the Pakistani military was already targeting). Musharraf effectively drew a line between “good jihadis” and “bad jihadis,” referring to Kashmir-targeted extremists like LeT as “freedom fighters.” As the Taliban and al Qaeda members and sympathizers streamed into tribal Pakistan and solidified their hold over their new safe haven, however, it became more difficult to differentiate the “bad jihadis” being jointly targeted by the United States and Pakistan from the “freedom fighters” Pakistan wished to continue supporting. Punjabi LeT fighters began developing links with the Afghan Taliban diaspora and TTP while providing covert financial and logistical support for al Qaeda. The conflation of these groups, some acting in Pakistan’s perceived interest and some acting against it, results in continued Pakistani efforts to project influence in Kashmir (by funding LeT and its associates) indirectly filtering joint U.S.-Pakistani efforts to target “bad jihadis” in tribal Pakistan.

It is difficult to establish with certainty the degree to which Pakistan’s military and civilian leadership (the “official” channels) are complicit in continued support for extremist Islamic militants in Pakistan’s border region. That being said, there are a number of indications that dissonance exists between the unofficial actions of cells within ISI and the “official” actions of the Pakistani military and state. After 9/11, Pervez

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Musharraf gave strong indications that he was serious about reconsidering Pakistan’s support for the Taliban and its associated jihadist militants. He fired top generals and intelligence officials that were considered pro-Taliban or Islamist, including Lieutenant General Mahmood Ahmed (head of the ISI) and corps commander Lieutenant General Mohammed Aziz Khan. Furthermore, he disbanded ISI units that had previously been tasked with handling Pakistan’s militant proxies.

And yet, evidence that groups within the ISI have continued to support and protect Taliban leaders is overwhelming. A 2012 NATO report reviewed transcripts of 27,000 interrogations of over 4,000 Taliban and al-Qaeda detainees, finding that “ISI is thoroughly aware of Taliban activities and the whereabouts of all senior Taliban personnel,” that “senior Taliban representatives, such as Nasiruddin Haqqani, maintain residences in the immediate vicinity of ISI headquarters in Islamabad, Pakistan,” and that “ISI provided safe havens to the Taliban, monitored their movements, manipulated their fighters, and arrested those thought uncooperative.” Muhammad Hanif, a Taliban spokesman captured in 2007, claimed that Mullah Omar, the leader of the Afghan Taliban, had been under ISI protection since his flight from the coalition forces that

converged on Kabul in November 2001. The filter here is severe: the United States Congress and intelligence community allocates aid to the Pakistani military and intelligence services, only to see groups within ISI using its money to finance groups like LeT and the Haqqani network, directly working against U.S. counterterrorism priorities.

Dr. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, a counterterrorism scholar and analyst, suggests a three-tiered paradigm to understand the different levels of continued support for the Taliban in Pakistan’s government. At the official level within ISI, most likely sanctioned by military and civilian leadership, there exists an institutional policy of political support for strategic proxies like the Taliban. This does not necessarily extend to jihadist attacks against American forces inside Afghanistan or abroad, but reflects a simple preference for Taliban leadership in Afghanistan. In the second tier, “beyond the ISI’s explicit policies,” rogue or unofficially sanctioned elements of ISI provide operational support for terrorist attacks like the one in Mumbai in 2008 or the bombing of the Indian embassy in Afghanistan that same year. At the third level, retired ISI officers maintain links with both their former colleagues and the militant groups they sympathize with – Carlotta Gall claims that the entire S-Wing is made up of such deniable, ostensibly retired officers.

These tiers clearly overlap to a great extent – as an outsider, it is impossible to say with any degree of certainty which decisions are made at which tier, or whether the “rogue” or “unofficial” tiers are merely covers for official policies. Dr. Gartenstein-

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142 Gartenstein-Ross, “Religious Militancy in Pakistan’s Military,” 38
Ross’s three-tiered paradigm remains an important analytical tool, however, because it illustrates the divided and deniable nature of Pakistan’s foreign policy and covert action apparatus, which makes it difficult for American foreign policy to properly map out who or what group has influence on a given issue and target policy accordingly.

Another major filter affecting the United States’ efforts to induce Pakistan’s military to address the extremist threat in its border region is Pakistan’s entrenched orientation towards a conventional and irregular war strategy targeted at India. The United States has tried to shift Pakistan’s focus towards a counterinsurgency footing through targeted, dedicated aid programs like the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF), which provided hundreds of millions of dollars between 2009 and 2013 to enhance the Pakistani military’s counterinsurgency capabilities. The Pakistani military has resisted these reorientation efforts because of an entrenched doctrine that paints India as the central threat to Pakistani national security. Until Pakistan recognizes the threat that its own domestic insurgency poses, its national security policy will remain out of sync with American priorities. Further attacks by the TTP like its massacre at the Army Public School and Degree College are likely to boost the viability of a counterinsurgency posture within the Pakistani government and military.

The difficulty of affecting Pakistan’s strategic calculus in the face of its deep paranoia about India and Pakistan’s military and intelligence service’s close personal, religious and institutional ties with terrorist proxies are major challenges facing the

United States. Furthermore, the opacity with which different groups operate within Pakistan’s military, particularly within ISI, is a major barrier preventing U.S. intelligence services and diplomats from accurately targeting foreign policy in Pakistan meant to ensure U.S. interests with respect to counterterrorism and nuclear nonproliferation. These challenges must be overcome in order to execute effective foreign policy in Pakistan and South Asia at large.

III. Counterterrorism Filters Related to the U.S. Drone Program in Pakistan

The American drone program in the tribal regions of Pakistan has been referred to by many American commentators and officials as a crucial component of the United States’ counterterrorism policy. The idea behind the program is simple and logical: by identifying extremists that pose a threat to the American homeland or its interests abroad and targeting them with drones, the United States can disrupt terrorist planning and kill leadership with few civilian casualties and no risk to American personnel. In practice, however, the Pakistani military’s incentives diverge from American ones and local populations respond to drone strikes in ways that complicate and filter the straightforward formulated logic of the drone program.

The fact that Pakistan in 2004 agreed to allow American drones to operate in its tribal regions should not be interpreted as evidence that Pakistani and American interests align perfectly on the question of targeting militants with drones inside Pakistan. As argued above, even 9/11 did not induce the Pakistani military as a whole to completely reconfigure its strategic posture with regard to al-Qaeda-aligned groups like the Afghan Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba. Pakistan remained largely concerned with groups that target Pakistan, like TTP and internally-focused sectarian groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.\footnote{Animesh Roul, “Lashkar-e-Jhangvi: Sectarian Violence in Pakistan and Ties to International Terrorism,” \textit{Terrorism Monitor} 3, No. 11, (June 3, 2005): 177} Between 2008 and 2011, there were a number of recorded incidents in which Pakistan’s favored militants came under the scope of U.S. drones, only to be warned by ISI officers that had been read in by the CIA. In 2011, a camera mounted on an American drone recorded militants scrambling to move explosive material from a bomb-making facility in advance of a missile strike after being warned by ISI officers.\footnote{Bob Woodward, Greg Miller, “Secret memos reveal explicit nature of U.S., Pakistan agreement on drones,” \textit{The Washington Post}, October 26, 2013, final edition, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/top-pakistani-leaders-secretly-backed-cia-drone-campaign-secret-documents-show/2013/10/23/15e6b0d8-3beb-11e3-b6a9-da62c264f40e_story.html} Two filters lead to events like these, which dilute the effect of American counterterrorism drone policy: the enduring close personal relationships between ISI officers and Islamic militants, and the continued estimation by some in Pakistan’s military that certain militant groups can still advance Pakistani strategic interests in Afghanistan and India.

Beyond obstructing American drones and preventing them from hitting targets that threaten the United States, Pakistan’s military also shrewdly coopts the strikes for its
own purposes, which largely run counter to American interests. As a result of the United States’ unwillingness to declassify certain aspects of the drone program or acknowledge it publicly, Pakistan’s military has free hand to use the United States as a “punching bag,” blaming the United States for Pakistan’s woes and claiming that drone strikes mostly kill innocent civilians rather than dangerous terrorists.\textsuperscript{148} The resulting anti-American sentiment among the Pakistani populace serves as a major filter on U.S. counterterrorism efforts: with a steady supply of Pakistanis that despise the United States available to take the place of extremists killed by American drones, U.S. drone policy is less able to achieve its designed objective of effective decapitation of militant groups in Pakistan’s tribal areas.

Drone strikes are also coopted by locals to further their own political goals. After successful strikes, militants in the tribal regions have been known to “cordon off the area, remove their dead, and admit only local reporters sympathetic to their cause or decide on a body count themselves.” As a result, inflated civilian death counts permeate Pakistani media reporting on drone strikes. Muhammad Ahmed, a reporter at the popular Buzz Pakistan website (essentially the Pakistani version of Buzzfeed), wrote in 2011 that “USA did more than 100 drone strikes in Pakistan in the past 3 years, if you read news about these drone attack you will see that in these drone attack only 1% terrorists were killed and other 99% people who died in these attack was innocent civilians of Pakistan.”

75% of them were 10 to 15 year old teenagers.”
Civilian politicians also exploit misconceptions about the prevalence of civilian deaths to drum up political support – Imran Khan, leader of Pakistan’s far-right Tehrik-i-Insaaf party, gathered 100,000 Pakistanis to march against U.S. drone policy. These sorts of mass anti-American movements work against the United States’ goals of preventing further radicalization and increasing political stability inside Pakistan.

IV. Counterterrorism Filters Related to Pakistan’s Possession of Nuclear Weapons

Pakistan’s status as a nuclear-armed state raises another set of issues and dynamics that are important to understanding the U.S.-Pakistan security relationship. Persistent insecurity with respect to its militarily superior neighbor to the east led Pakistan to take a path that diverged from American security and nonproliferation interests. Today, Pakistan's weak governmental institutions and the presence of empowered individuals with religious and financial incentives to spread nuclear weaponry and technology combine to serve as a major filter on American counterterrorism policies.

Preventing nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists, a major national security priority of the United States, remains a sticking point in U.S.-Pakistani

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relations. Forward proliferation of nuclear weapons technology from Pakistan to aspiring nuclear powers Libya, North Korea, and Iran is known to have occurred from the late 1980s until as late as 2003.\(^{151}\) Beyond simple state-to-state proliferation, the United States remains highly concerned about the ability of Pakistan’s military institutions to prevent Pakistan’s myriad of extreme Islamist militant groups from obtaining one of the military’s estimated 120 nuclear weapons.\(^{152}\) Though to this point they are not known to have come close to obtaining a nuclear weapon, Pakistani militants are known to have targeted Pakistani nuclear facilities on at least six different occasions in the past.\(^{153}\) Pakistan continues to pose a major nuclear terrorism risk for a number of reasons, which weighs heavily on U.S. efforts to manage its counterterrorism relationship with Pakistan.

First and foremost, Pakistan’s perception of the main threat to its nuclear arsenal is at odds with the United States evaluation of the main threats, causing the Pakistani military to take an approach on nuclear security that runs counter to U.S. interests. Whereas the United States is concerned about the potential of an insider threat to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, Pakistan is mainly concerned with a preemptive Indian strike against its nuclear facilities or decapitation strikes against its nuclear chain of command. As a result, Pakistan has a diversity of authority in its nuclear hierarchy, and is constantly moving its weapons from place to place in low security, unmarked vans to obscure their


location and hide their credible minimum deterrent from feared Indian airstrikes. The United States would prefer to see less movement (which would provide fewer opportunities for a weapon to go missing) and fewer people with authority over the weapons (which increases the risk of an unwanted nuclear use and would give extremists more people to potentially target in order to obtain a weapon). Pakistan’s focus on India as the main threat to its nuclear arsenal prevents U.S. nuclear security policy from having its intended effect – with Pakistan’s military leadership unwilling to compromise on the strategic aspect of its nuclear security, Pakistan’s nuclear posture filters U.S. nuclear security priorities.

Pakistan’s troubled and unstable economy raises its proliferation risk relative to other nuclear powers. The internationally-restricted nature of nuclear technology results in governments willing to pay great sums to obtain it – in 1978 Libya is said to have offered India around $15 billion (over $50 billion in 2013 dollars) for nuclear weapons. Though the offer was rejected, the Libyan proposition demonstrates the huge economic potential in nuclear exports. Individuals in nations with lower legitimate economic potential, like Pakistan, are more incentivized to sell nuclear technology to the highest bidder.


Pakistan’s military demonstrated its willingness to exchange nuclear technology for economic relief in 1991, when Army Chief of Staff Asif Nawaz reportedly reached an agreement to trade nuclear weapons technology to Iran in exchange for oil. A skittish President Ghulam Ishaq Khan ultimately scuttled the deal, but massive incentives for rogue individual exporters remain – A.Q. Khan made tens of millions of dollars marketing banned technology, including a $3 million payment from North Korea split between him and several senior Army officials. The presence of individuals in Pakistan’s weak governmental institutions (like the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission or the Ministry of Science Technology) who are willing and able to enrich themselves by selling nuclear weapons and technology to dangerous people and groups is a filter that must be taken into account in U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan.

Religious extremism among empowered individuals in Pakistan’s government poses a major barrier to U.S. efforts to ensure nonproliferation. A grave example is that of Pakistani nuclear scientist Bashiruddin Mahmood, who formed a “humanitarian NGO” called Umma Tameer e Nau (UTN) in January 2001. UTN has been implicated in offering to share nuclear technology with al-Qaeda and the Taliban; Mahmood has been quoted as saying that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons should be “the property of a whole

Ummah (the global Muslim community).” The Islamic piety of Pakistan’s armed forces, nuclear infrastructure, and government as a whole can here be seen as having a major filter effect on U.S. nonproliferation policy in Pakistan. U.S. policy that fails to take into account the religious and financial incentives of empowered Pakistanis will fail to satisfactorily address nuclear nonproliferation security priorities of the United States.

Perhaps the greatest filter arising from Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons is the reduction in leverage available to U.S. policymakers, military officials and diplomats that can be used to influence Pakistan’s national security policies. The unspoken understanding beneath the billions of dollars in aid provided annually to the Pakistani military is that the nuclear-armed army is “too big – and too important – to fail.” The leadership of the Pakistani military understands that its nuclear weapons program is a major bargaining tool that prevents the United States from revoking assistance. The United States cannot allow the Pakistani military to fail or fall into dire financial straits, because preventing Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal or nuclear technology from falling into the wrong hands is a critical U.S. national security priority that outweighs all other concerns.

The Pakistani military has used the threat of forward proliferation in response to threats of reduced or eliminated security assistance. In a meeting with Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Henry S. Rowen, General Mirza Aslam Beg, head of the Pakistani Army from 1988 to 1991, threatened to share nuclear technology

with Iran should the United States cut off or reduce arms sales to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{159} With the United States’ perception that it is compelled by these implicit and explicit threats to maintain the status quo and continue funding the Pakistani military, it is very difficult for the United States to attach effective strings or threaten to revoke aid in order to bring Pakistan’s strategic posture into line with American counterterrorism policies.

CHAPTER VI: POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS: RESOLVING FILTERS ON
AMERICAN COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY IN PAKISTAN

In this chapter, I aim to provide a number of policy prescriptions to American policymakers, diplomats, and intelligence officials with the intent of resolving filters on American counterterrorism policy in Pakistan. It is divided into the three modern areas of counterterrorism cooperation between the United States and Pakistan that are discussed in Chapter V: continued efforts to recast Pakistan’s strategic posture with regards to support for Islamic militants, the pursuit of high-value Islamic terror suspects through the United States’ drone program in Pakistan’s tribal regions, and efforts to prevent nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of Islamic terrorists. Each of the three sections will recap the dynamics in Pakistan that serve as filters on U.S. counterterrorism policy and suggest policies to account for and resolve those filters. Each policy prescription will describe the tools the United States’ disposal to address filters and describe the political considerations at stake in using them. Each section will also contain suggestions regarding which organization or agency should take the lead in executing revised American counterterrorism policies and how they should be approached.

The general tenor of these recommendations precludes working with Pakistan’s civilian government. Whereas many analysts suggest that the malaise in Pakistani civil-military relations harms American national security and that the United States should do everything in its power to empower the civilian leadership of Pakistan, I will argue that enhanced civilian control over the Pakistani state would likely work against U.S.
counterterrorism priorities in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{160} Therefore, I will argue, the United States should prioritize finding and empowering partners in the Pakistani military over partnering with Pakistan’s civilian government.

This paper assumes that the Pakistani military is a better partner for U.S. counterterrorism efforts for a number of reasons. First, the Pakistani military exerts complete control over Pakistan’s foreign policy, especially with regard to Pakistan’s political, financial, and operational support for Islamic militancy. Whether or not the United States agrees with the course currently being taken by Pakistan’s foreign policy leadership in the military, attempts to circumvent the Pakistani military’s control over the country’s stance on terrorism is unrealistic and would likely be counterproductive. As argued in the historical background section of this thesis, the internal relevance and power of Pakistan’s military is a phenomenon that dates back to Pakistan’s inception and results from Pakistan’s precarious position in its regional environment. Its strength and influence stem from deep-seated cultural factors related to widespread hatred of India and fear of its intentions. The thought that the United States would be able change the dynamics that result in military primacy in Pakistan’s foreign policy, given the nation’s regional environment and its historical, political, and cultural background, is hubristic at best.

Second, the hierarchy of Pakistan’s military leadership is more consistent than its
civilian counterparts. Civilian governments come and go with the elections that bring
them to power or cast them out of it, but military officials follow a generally predictable
career path. Picking partners and building lasting relationships with them over time is
crucial to the success of U.S. counterterrorism and nuclear security/nonproliferation
policy in Pakistan.

Third, the structure of Pakistan’s military results in power being concentrated at
the top, which provides a convenient focal point for targeted U.S. policy. In the civilian
and civil society spheres, power and influence is distributed among hundreds of members
of parliament and thousands of social or religious leaders. It is simply easier to map out
influence and target U.S. foreign policy efforts at those empowered individuals when
there are fewer empowered individuals to focus on.

Fourth, top Pakistani military officials are, by their nature, more inclined and
incentivized to support American counterterrorism efforts. Members of the Pakistani
parliament are beholden to a populace that is bitterly anti-American (14% percent of
Pakistanis polled in a Pew Global Attitudes survey held a positive view of the United
States) and frequently drum up anti-American sentiment in response to drone strikes
approved by Pakistan itself.¹⁶¹ Many officers at the top of Pakistan’s military leadership
have experience training or studying in the United States’ military institutions and are

¹⁶¹ Bruce Stokes, “Which Countries Don’t Like America and Which Do,” *Pew Research
Center*, July 15, 2014, [http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/07/15/which-
often more pro-American than the military corps or the Pakistani public at large – General Ashfaq Kayani, Pakistan’s Army Chief of Staff from 2007 until 2013 and former ISI chief, trained at Fort Benning and graduated from the General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth and was widely regarded as having a cozy relationship with the United States. Diplomatic cooperation and negotiation with these types of military officials are more likely to bring about security-enhancing behavior from the Pakistani state than similar talks with Pakistani politicians or religious leaders.

With these factors in mind, I will now attempt to summarize filters on U.S. policy and suggest potential resolutions focused on Pakistan’s military and intelligence service.

I. Resolving Filters Related to Pakistan’s Strategic Posture

The first filter discussed in Chapter V related to Pakistan’s unwillingness or inability to completely reconsider its strategic posture after 9/11 is the divided nature of Pakistan’s military and intelligence services. The lack of unified command results in different groups within the military and ISI working at cross purposes, some working in support of U.S. counterterrorism initiatives and policies and some working against them. As a result, some of the American military and intelligence aid provided to Pakistan inadvertently works against U.S. priorities.

In order to resolve this filter, the United States must step up human intelligence (HUMINT) efforts targeted at the Pakistani military. While it is impossible as an outsider to establish the extent to which the CIA already targets ISI and the Pakistani military leadership, more covert money and manpower would undoubtedly allow the CIA to buy more influence and compromise more ISI officers, so that the CIA might at least know which elements of ISI are working against American counterterrorism priorities. The advantage of covert aid over overt, Congressionally appropriated financing is that the CIA’s money can go to trusted individuals in the Pakistani military and intelligence services for specific purposes, whereas general American military aid goes to the Pakistani institutions as a whole and is therefore more prone to diversion to the ISI’s pro-Islamic militancy elements. That being said, the U.S. military should also redouble its efforts to identify partners within the Pakistani military through its International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding – these programs give Pakistani military officials experience and education in American military schools and training programs, and ultimately create more pro-American officers in the Pakistani military corps.

The second filter on this topic is the Pakistani military’s hesitation to fully embrace American security priorities in light of its own perception of Pakistan’s strategic interests. Due to Pakistan’s sense that it needs to hedge its bets in order to address the perceived threats posed by India and Afghanistan, Pakistan’s military views its partnership with the United States in zero-sum terms of costs and benefits rather than mutual benefit – closer counterterrorism cooperation with the United States means compromising on its strategic security interests. Part of this filter arises from Pakistan’s
ability to continue reaping aid from the United States without a complete revision of its strategic posture. As a result, Pakistan’s entrenched conventional posture towards India is resistant to even billions of dollars of American military aid meant to shift Pakistan towards a counterinsurgency/counterterrorism footing.

One initiative that would help to address this filter would be to tie military aid to direct Pakistani assistance in capturing and killing targets selected by the United States. The model for such a program is alleged by Pervez Musharraf to have existed in the early 2000s – the CIA at that time paid millions of dollars in “bounties” or “prize money” for captured al-Qaeda members.163 Providing aid solely based on the capture or killing of specific targets would at least force the Pakistani military leadership to choose between protecting militants and continuing to receive military aid.

Another way to help bring Pakistan’s strategic posture into line with American interests is to offer to help it quell the domestic insurgencies it faces in the NWFP, Khyber Pahktunkhwa, and Balochistan. Pakistan’s perception of its precarious position in its international environment is in part caused by the threat posed to the sanctity of the Pakistani state by separatist insurgencies – by stepping in with increased intelligence sharing and diplomatic efforts to sway India (which is suspected of supporting and fomenting at least some of the insurgencies) to take a different course, the United States

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could help resolve a major reason why Pakistan views continued links with Islamic militants as being in its national interest.\textsuperscript{164}

The third filter related to Pakistan’s strategic posture is the connection between Pakistan’s chosen “good jihadis” (like Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Haqqani network) and “bad jihadis” (like al-Qaeda). Due to the links between the wide array of militant groups in Pakistan, it is nearly impossible for Pakistan to support one without at least indirectly supporting the others, thus filtering American efforts to target groups like al-Qaeda and supportive Taliban elements.

Resolving this filter would require the United States to dramatically raise the cost of continued support for “good jihadis” for Pakistan. Currently, evidence of Pakistani complicity in terror financing and logistical support through ISI is often swept under the rug, dealt with quietly, or blamed on rogue elements (even if the latter may be accurate). The U.S. Department of State and Treasury Department should respond to evidence of ISI complicity in LeT or Haqqani Network actions with credible threats of revocation of aid and financial sanctions. As the United States’ war in Afghanistan winds down and the United States relies less and less on Pakistan for supply routes and drone bases, American policymakers and diplomats will be more able to credibly threaten to revoke aid and impose sanctions. Raising the cost of allowing ISI officers, whether officially sanctioned or not, to finance and support Islamic militants, would incentivize the Pakistani military to enhance its command and control structures and bring its various factions into line.

The fourth and fifth filters related to Pakistan’s strategic posture are the opacity of the Pakistani military and ISI and the existence of close personal and cultural ties between ISI officers and their militant proxies. The inability of the American intelligence apparatus to accurately map out the various factions inside the Pakistani military and ISI inhibits American efforts to determine to what extent continued support for Islamic militants is official Pakistani policy. The close personal, cultural, and religious ties between parts of the ISI officer corps and Islamic militants have proved resistant to efforts from above to annul those ties – even when an ostensibly pro-American military leader like Pervez Musharraf attempted to extricate Pakistan’s foreign policy from Islamic militancy, sects inside ISI maintained those ties. This filters U.S. counterterrorism efforts by diluting the ability of the United States’ chosen partners in Pakistan’s military to bring Pakistan’s security policy into line with U.S. counterterrorism interests.

The previously suggested changes to U.S. policy would all help to resolve these filters. Enhanced CIA human intelligence efforts would go a long way towards providing American intelligence officials and diplomats with an understanding of who in the Pakistani military is working with the United States and who is working against it, resolving filters caused by the Pakistani military and intelligence service’s opacity. This would allow the United States to choose its partners better and perhaps provide covert assistance to help empower them. Stepped-up IMET assistance would also help to address the issue of Pakistani military and ISI officers with personal, religious, and cultural ties to Islamic militants over the long term by gradually replacing the “old guard”
that maintains ties from the Afghan-Soviet war era with a younger generation of American-trained officers.

II. Resolving Filters Related to the U.S. Drone Program in Tribal Pakistan

The first filter discussed in Chapter V related to the U.S. drone program in Pakistan’s tribal regions is caused by the close personal, ethnic, and religious ties between ISI officers and militants targeted by American drones. These ties filter U.S. drone policy by protecting Pakistan’s favored militants from the scope of the U.S. drone program. As argued above, filters caused by the close ties between ISI officers and Islamic militants can be mitigated by a combination of enhanced HUMINT, a restructured and differently-targeted military aid program, and efforts to raise the cost of Pakistani complicity for actions by Islamic militants through revocation of American aid and installation of a sanctions regime.

The second filter related to the U.S. drone program in Pakistan is caused by the ability of individuals in Pakistan’s military, civilian government, and society to coopt drone strikes for their own ends, resulting in the United States being vilified throughout Pakistani society and used as a “punching bag” by the Pakistani military for its own failures. This filter is especially damaging, because it further destabilizes Pakistan and creates a stream of potential recruits for anti-American militant groups and causes the U.S. drone program to often work against American counterterrorism priorities.

One simple revision to U.S. policy would help resolve this filter. By declassifying the existence of the drone program and publicly acknowledging it rather than restricting
“official” discussion of it to off-the-record briefings, the United States would take a big step towards reclaiming the popular narrative surrounding drones in Pakistan. Releasing official, unadulterated death counts and explaining who the target was, who was killed, and the reason they were targeted would prevent self-interested Pakistani politicians and reporters from misrepresenting and inflating the civilian cost of drone attacks. In the event of civilian deaths, acknowledging them and paying a modest sum of *diyat* (blood money) to Pakistani families would help to head off anger about the purpose and effects of the American drone program.

III. Resolving Filters Related to Pakistan’s Possession of Nuclear Weapons

The first counterterrorism filter related to Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons is caused by Pakistan’s perception of the risk to its nuclear weapons posed by India, which results in a diversity of authority and a constantly moving arsenal that both work against U.S. nuclear security priorities. In order to induce Pakistan to take a different approach with regards to the security of its nuclear weapons, the United States should offer to help harden Pakistan’s existing nuclear facilities, which would obviate the need to constantly move the weapons. The United States should also expand intelligence sharing with Pakistan about India’s intentions, which may help to assuage Pakistani fears. To reduce the diversity in authority over Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, the United States should tie future military aid to an altered, more secure nuclear command hierarchy.

The second counterterrorism filter related to Pakistan’s nuclear program is the ability of individuals in Pakistan’s weak institutions to proliferate nuclear technology,
and massive financial incentives available for them to do so. While little can be done about the willingness of individuals and states to pay great sums for nuclear weapons and technology, continuing to assist Pakistan’s military with efforts to shore up its nuclear command and control will reduce the likelihood of someone in Pakistan’s government or military being able to sell to them.

The third nuclear weapons-related filter is the prevalence of religious extremism among Pakistan’s armed forces, intelligence establishment, and governmental science institutions. Enhanced HUMINT capabilities and an increased CIA focus on Pakistani individuals with access to nuclear technology will allow the United States to better mitigate the insider threat to Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile. By identifying religious extremists among Pakistan’s nuclear personnel and inducing Pakistani institutions to move or fire them, the United States can decrease the possibility that someone inside the Pakistani government shares nuclear weaponry or technology with a like-minded militant group.

The fourth and final filter related to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program is the “too big – and too important – to fail” dynamic. With the ever-present threat of Pakistan becoming a failed state weighing on the minds of American policymakers, diplomats, and intelligence officials, the United States has become unwilling to face the threat of a nuclear-armed failed state and is therefore unable to pressure Pakistan’s government on its security policy by threatening to revoke aid.

Resolving this filter requires only an understanding of Pakistani history. For the 50 years before 9/11, Pakistan’s military survived several extended periods without
American military aid to shore up Pakistani domestic stability. Pakistan’s military even survived a sanctions regime meant to punish Pakistan for its continued efforts to build a nuclear weapon. U.S. arms control sanctions against Pakistan after its Chagai-I nuclear test in 1998 barred the United States from providing a single dollar of civilian or military aid to Pakistan, yet the Pakistani military and its nuclear program were still standing when President George W. Bush waived the sanctions eleven days after 9/11.¹⁶⁵

The Pakistani military remains more than capable of maintaining command and control of its nuclear weaponry without U.S. assistance, or, if necessary, in the face of sanctions meant to bring Pakistan’s strategic posture vis-à-vis Islamic militants into line with American counterterrorism interests. The United States can therefore threaten to reduce or revoke aid or impose sanctions to alter Pakistan’s strategic calculus without fearing the collapse of the Pakistani state or military and the resultant spread of nuclear technology to terrorist groups. While the threat of state-to-state proliferation would remain, the international arms control infrastructure built up over the past half-century has been largely effective in preventing or at least detecting onward proliferation.

¹⁶⁵ Alex Wagner, “Bush Waives Nuclear-Related Sanctions on India, Pakistan,” Arms Control Today, October 1, 2001
Instituting Realism in U.S. Foreign Policy in Pakistan

This thesis has argued at various points that the Pakistani military has hedged its bets in its dealings with the United States, unwilling to reject cooperation with American objectives but also unwilling to fully embrace it. The fact is that the United States has behaved similarly – American policymakers and diplomats acknowledge that the United States needs Pakistan’s military as a partner, but have remained unwilling to move away from idealist policy initiatives (like promotion of Pakistani democracy and prosperity) that work at cross purposes to security cooperation with Pakistani military and intelligence units. On one hand, the United States rightfully refuses to disregard its own national security interests, but on the other, it remains unwilling to dispose of the false narrative that only a democratic and prosperous Pakistan can best assure those interests.

The United States’ preoccupation with Western-style democracy and civilian aid programs in Pakistan is the foremost example of a phenomenon that has plagued U.S. foreign policy across the globe for decades. Many U.S. policymakers and diplomats seem to think about foreign policy in a technocratic, input/output model – that is, that a given foreign policy has inherent properties that will result in it having its designed effect, wherever it is instituted. This style of thinking disregards ground-level dynamics in foreign countries that, more often than not, result in foreign policies having unintended side effects in addition to their designed effect, having unintended side effects and failing
to achieve their designed effect, failing altogether to achieve any sort of effect, or even having negative effects for U.S. interests.

Understanding Filter Effects in Pakistan

In order to resolve this phenomenon, the United States must attempt to better understand the targets of its foreign policy at each level of analysis. By mapping a theoretical foreign policy on to each distinct level of analysis and projecting the combined results, U.S. policymakers and diplomats can craft better policies and avoid counterproductive ones. This would not be a simple undertaking – even the most advanced theoretical multilevel model, taking filter effects into account, would be unable to exactly predict the effect of a proposed foreign policy. With that being said, accounting for filters and predicting the combined response at each level of analysis would likely help to avoid some of the more destructive policy failures.

Pakistan is an ideal test case for this sort of policy process. Pakistan’s domestic institutions are so weak and divided, and power there so decentralized, that it is impossible to predict Pakistan’s response to a given foreign policy at any single level of analysis. This thesis has attempted to map out some of the filters that exist at all three levels of analysis in Pakistan.

At the individual level, widespread hatred of India, anti-Americanism, Islamic extremism, poverty, tolerance for corruption, and diffuse empowerment filter U.S. counterterrorism priorities. At the domestic level, profoundly weak institutions, lack of collective will for action on behalf of the state, perceptions of Pakistan’s strategic...
interests, and a sense of humiliation and un-recouped costs prevent keep Pakistan out of line with U.S. counterterrorism policy. At the international level, Pakistan’s precarious position in its international environment ensure that Pakistan continues to execute policies that dilute the effectiveness of U.S. policy or cause it to fail altogether. Only by understanding dynamics like these at all three levels can the United States craft policy that has a chance at changing Pakistan’s behavior and bringing it into line with U.S. national security interests.

Moving Forward

As U.S.-Pakistani relations move into a new era with the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, now is the time to examine these dynamics and institute policies that take into account incentives and likely responses at all three levels inside Pakistan. This thesis has argued that the logical outcome of such a reading would be to reduce or eliminate idealist policies that seek to democratize Pakistan or bring its people out of poverty. Both sets of initiatives have been tried, and both have largely failed at great cost to the American taxpayer. U.S. policymakers must take a new approach, guided by a clearly-defined and prioritized set of goals. This thesis argues that the United States’ first priority in its relationship with Pakistan should be the advancement and protection of its national security interests, particularly counterterrorism.

Partnering with the Pakistani military to ensure the United States national security interests, particularly with regards to counterterrorism, also faces a set of filters that must be resolved. This thesis has described the filters on U.S. counterterrorism policy that have
existed and currently exist in the Pakistani military and intelligence services, and recommended a number of policies to address them. These recommendations include:

- Increasing and refocusing the CIA’s human intelligence efforts to target the Pakistani military, particularly Inter-Services Intelligence.
- Stepping up International Military Education and Training (IMET) partnerships with Pakistani military officers.
- Assisting Pakistan in its continuing fight against separatist insurgents in Balochistan
- Declassifying more aspects of the U.S. drone program, providing information to the Pakistani public about each strike and modestly compensating the families of innocent victims.
- Tying military aid to Pakistan to the capture or killing of individual terror suspects in a “bounty” program.
- Raising the costs on Pakistan for continuing to support Islamic militants in Punjab, India, and Afghanistan.
- Helping Pakistan harden its nuclear installations, which would encourage Pakistan to take a safer approach to nuclear security.
- Inducing Pakistan to reduce the number of individuals with authority over its nuclear arsenal.

These recommendations, if implemented, would serve as the basis of a reimagined U.S. foreign policy in Pakistan. Alone, no single proposal would be sufficient to adequately address filters in current U.S. policy. Taken together, however, the
recommendations listed above would be a positive first step towards bringing Pakistan into line with U.S. counterterrorism interests.
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