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The 2016 "White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr": An Analysis of its Positioning, Reception, and Conditions of Implementation

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Submitted to
Profess Hans Rindisbacher

By
Hunter Lee Ashburn

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Abstract

This study examines the new German 2016 *White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*. Updated for the first time in over a decade, the document reflects Germany’s reorientation of its security policy in order to become a global player. This study analyzes the *White Paper* to determine its contextual meaning, domestic as well as international support, and obstacles in the way of its implementation. Although the German Government is concerned about waning US influence and increased Russian activity, the German people are reluctant to let go of their nation’s foreign political restraint in light of a lingering feeling of historical responsibility going back their Fascist past and to WWII. The international and European reaction to the *White Paper* is largely positive and hails Germany as a defender of Western Liberalism. Russia is less enthusiastic and has embraced information warfare as a means of displaying its displeasure. The study finds that resolving these issues will prove critical for the practical success of failure in implanting the designs of the *White Paper*. 
Genealogy of the White Paper and Initial Reaction

The 2016 White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr represents a reorientation of German Foreign Policy that calls for remilitarization and increased German influence in the international community. This Study will trace the history and background of the new German Strategic Framework offered by the White Paper, analyze signals sent by the document to other countries, determine domestic, then international reaction to the White Paper, and describe the three biggest problems facing implementation of the White Paper while proposing ways to address each.

The purpose of this thesis is not to debate particular policies included in the White Paper, or to predict whether the White Paper is the correct path for Germany to take. Since the White Paper has been published to wide support within the German political elite, it seems likely that its proposed strategies will be pursued. This thesis will instead focus on understanding the White Paper, analyzing reaction to it, and determining challenges in its future.

In tracing the gestation of the White Paper, we first have to note that is an update to a previous White Paper, the one from 2006. However, the 2016 White Paper is not merely an update of language and tactics; rather it represents a transition to a new German self-image. This change first became visible in the updated Defence Policy Guidelines, released in May of 2011. Much stayed the same, like the emphasis on “security and protection of German Citizens,” but for the first time it securitized problems like failing states and climate change, turning them into issues of national
These guidelines also called for reforms to the Bundeswehr, as the German government looked toward the end of compulsorily military service slated to begin in July of the same year.2

Especially the need to transform the Bundeswehr into an attractive employer led the Bundeswehr to publish The Reorientation of the German Army: Fight-Protect-Help-Mediate in July of 2013. This document directly acknowledges the “political framework” set forth by the 2011 guidelines, and establishes the Army’s focus as “Success on Operations,” before moving into specific reforms of the army, such as recruiting reforms and the restructuring of certain commands and specific units.3

In the same year, the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), a German Institute for International and Security Affairs, published “New Power, New Responsibility: Elements of a German foreign and security policy for a changing world.”4 The report heavily influenced the 2016 White Paper, which essentially quotes much of it. It called on Germany to use its newfound power to re-enter international politics. New Power, New responsibility contrasted sharply with the influential Economist article, Europe’s Reluctant Hegemon which emphasized the German population’s reluctance to be seen as leaders, in military endeavors and more broadly in European society. The Economist

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article cited Germany’s guilt over its past and fifty-year occupation by American and Russian forces. These two publications revealed the beginning of the split in outlook between political elites and ordinary Germans, which chapters three and five will discuss.

The most significant development in 2014 was the publication of Review 2014—A Fresh Look at Foreign Policy, a report on the yearlong effort to revamp Germany’s Foreign Policy. Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier ordered a comprehensive evaluation of the ministry broken into three parts. The Review engaged with fifty foreign policy experts around the world, its own employees, and held extensive talks with the public at large to answer the question, “What, if anything, is wrong with German foreign policy?” The Review ended with a summarized conclusion from the government. The Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in “The ‘2014 Review’: Understanding the Pillars of German Foreign Policy and the Expectations of the Rest of the World,” summarized and analyzed the findings from a more critical perspective. The author declared, “It is both inappropriate and unacceptable for policy to hide behind public hearings, surveys or consultations with experts: policy must take a position and have the courage to decide.” Germany began acting on the Review by introducing the Framework Nations Concept at the 2014 NATO summit.
simultaneously underwent the reform process in its attempts to entice attractive recruits into its service.⁹

Carnegie Europe published “The Right Kind of German Leadership for Europe,” which claimed Germany lost sight of its vision for a unified Europe, lost its usual propensity for compromise, and stopped cultivating relationships with its smaller neighbors, all of which are critical to foreign policy success.¹⁰ Carnegie also published “Germany, still the Reluctant Hegemon,” which further discussed the divide between Germany’s wish to align its de facto power and responsibility with the German population’s “Culture of Restraint” since 1945. It further pointed out Germany’s lack of hard power, emphasizing reports of maintenance problems with materiel, citing a finding that only seven of forty-three naval helicopters were operational at that time.¹¹ Finally, the Financial Times article, “Merkel Seeks to Navigate Germany’s Complex Relations with Russia,” showed the growing German doubt that sanctions against Russia were not succeeding.¹²  

In 2015, specific reforms began to take shape, and Dr. Karl-Heinz Kamp, Academic Director of the German Federal Academy for Security Policy, published an Op-Ed listing five lessons the German government might learn from other countries who

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pursued a “comprehensive” foreign policy initiative such as the *White Paper* proposes.\(^\text{13}\)

The SWP in “The White Paper on Defense Policy” emphasized that the last 20 years of military history only offered two lessons, namely that the world, as it once was, was in upheaval, and that the strategic environment and the effects of one’s actions were less predictable than ever. The point being that the *White Paper* cannot and should not offer specific policies, but rather outline a general mode of thinking and options for unknown circumstances.\(^\text{14}\) The military outlined its vision of “Leadership from the Middle” meaning to lead by example, and from not just the geographic but political center of the EU to ensure cooperation by its entirety.\(^\text{15}\) Dr. Robin Niblett, director of Chatman House and former COO of the Center for Strategic and International Studies delivered a speech in Berlin on “International Expectations from Germany” where he called on Germany to see itself not as a, “Mid-size power,” but as a, “mid-sized great power,” with significant ability to affect its security environment.\(^\text{16}\)

Meanwhile in 2015, Russian-German relations continued to gain complexity. Russia began its “War on Information” in earnest, by driving BBC and CNN off Russian airwaves in favor of government-controlled outlets.\(^\text{17}\) “Dominant Narratives in Russian Political and Media Discourse during the Ukraine Crisis” discussed common threads of


Russian propaganda and noted Russia’s attempt to maintain relations with Europe while still separating it from the US.\textsuperscript{18} Pew Global found that 58\% of Germans thought their government should not use force if Russia invaded a neighboring country that is a NATO ally.\textsuperscript{19} This sentiment was much more prevalent in the former DDR, especially as Germany attempted to maintain sanctions against Russia while leaving negotiations open for a Russian-German Gas Pipeline.\textsuperscript{20}

German Foreign Policy in 2016 was naturally defined by the \textit{White Paper} itself, which was published in July by the German Government in both German and English.\textsuperscript{21} Due to the short time it has been publically available, the \textit{White Paper} has generated few in depth reports thus far. Instead, current events and news articles have dominated discussion on Germany’s Foreign Policy. Short pieces such as the article from \textit{War on the Rocks} “Germany Embraces Realpolitik Once More” summarize the \textit{White Paper} more than analyze it.\textsuperscript{22} The \textit{Center for Strategic and International Studies} not only applauded the White Paper but also called for greater German Leadership within Europe.\textsuperscript{23} In the

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same vein, *Foreign Affairs* announced, “Germany will be a responsible, restrained, and reflective leader, guided in chief by its European instincts.”24

Domestically, most of the political elite supported the *White Paper*, although the right wing party, Alternative für Deutschland claims, “[the] White Paper leads the military in the wrong direction.”25

Another great theme of 2016 on the global stage has been the American election. Of particular note was the near universal complaint by all presidential candidates that NATO was not pulling its own weight.26 After the election of Donald Trump, just a few days ago as of the date of this writing, Angela Merkel announced her candidacy for her fourth term as Chancellor, leading many to call her, “The Liberal West’s Last Defender.”27

Russia reacted poorly to the *White Paper*. Thus the *Russian Today* article “From Partner to Rival: Germany to Designate Russia ‘a Security Challenge.’”28 Russia is continuing its information war on Germany, producing heavily biased newspaper articles, prompting Deutsche Welle to report “Merkel Warns of Russian Cyber Attacks in German

Elections.”29 However, German support for Russia did not appear to wane as claimed in “Frayed Partnership: German Public Opinion on Russia.”30

The EU has begun to seriously consider the idea of a European Army, and Votewatch, in a piece titled “What Chances for a Real European Common Security and Defense Policy?” analyzed the EU’s reactions to those proposals.31 Carnegie Europe detailed problems for a successful integration of a European Army in “Policy or Project? France, Germany, and EU Defense.”32 However, after the election of Donald Trump to the American presidency, a frantic meeting was called where broad support for increased European security was found.33

Finally, the German Government has begun to move towards its next foreign policy publication, soliciting public opinion through the Peacelab 2016 format.34

Overall, it needs to be pointed out that the build-up and subsequent reaction to the 2016 White Paper did not happen quite in the linear fashion as sketched here, as foreign

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policy initiatives are influenced by constantly changing risks, interests, and opinions of
the domestic and international community. The next chapter, therefore, will break down
the *White Paper* and analyze its meaning as reflected in the reactions of other nations and
institutions, while subsequent chapters will consider the domestic and then international
reactions to the document. The conclusion will offer advice for overcoming the three
biggest obstacles to a successful implementation of the *White Paper*: an uncooperative
yet influential Russia, a perceived lack of domestic support, and the need for quick action
within the EU.
Main Political Thrusts of the White Paper


Chancellor Merkel’s answer in the forward is that due to the, “changed security situation, the task of the Federal Government is to redefine our country’s security policy interests, priorities and objectives and to develop its toolbox responsibly.”1 The second purpose is, “to generate a debate in society on how Germany shapes its security policy in the future.” Her letter defines what the Security Paper is and why a strategy is needed, but other than the same vague claim that, “our security environment has changed considerably since [2006],”2 it does not answer, “why 2016?”

The simplest answer is that it takes a long time for a bureaucracy the size a government to gather, analyze, and synthesize data into a comprehensive document. It took 2 years after Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier began “Review 2014—A Fresh Look at Foreign Policy” to create the White Paper. The Foreign Minister reached out to fifty experts abroad, employees in the Federal Foreign Office, and the German

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2 Ibid., 15.
public to ask, “What, if anything, is wrong with German Foreign Policy? What needs to be changed?”

The responses fit overwhelmingly into two categories and drove the creation of the *White Paper*.

The first answer was that, “To the majority of those surveyed, what is wrong with German policy is not so much specific actions or omissions, but rather a perceived lack of predictability.”

Experts living across the globe wrote statements like, “Germany’s Africa policy is ambivalent,” “Gulf States don’t see a clear German foreign policy strategy,” and “Germany: An Unsure Power in Conflicts,” in South Africa, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan respectively.

This indicated a collective failure by the German government to articulate its goals, policies, and methods coherently.

The second issue was the, “growing gulf between the expectation of Germany’s allies and partners that it take on a larger role in international politics, and Germany’s self-imposed limitations on its foreign policy, which the German public largely favors.”

Other experts noted, “The Federal Government is said to have long neglected to sufficiently seek the domestic support that is indispensable to dependable foreign policy.”

The lack of a clear mandate by the German people is a barrier to German projection of power, and is addressed at length in the third chapter.

While written as a response to a, “changed security situation,” the security environment is always changing and chronically unknowable. This cannot be the sole reason for writing a new *White Paper*. Instead, it is a signaling device to other countries.

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4 Ibid., 20.
5 Ibid., 23.
6 Ibid., 21.
7 Ibid., 20.
It is not the changed security environment but the need to update German relations with other countries that convinced Germany to also update its *White Paper*. Germany’s updated foreign policy means different things to different actors, and the differences are worth examining. The *White Paper* is comprehensive, yet broad. Just as in the *White Paper*, this chapter examines selected countries or alliances alone while making general assumptions about other groups of countries, and will start with the European Union.

The preamble of the German Basic Law states Germany’s, “determination to promote world peace as an *equal partner in a united Europe* [emphasis added].”\(^8\) Germany doubles down on this commitment with the new *White Paper*. It acknowledges that, “what is important for the common security space of our continent is thus not the development of a new security architecture…but adherence to existing and proven common rules and principles.”\(^9\) Germany benefits immensely from interconnected Europe; unfortunately, it also foresees an erosion of the EU. Written before the Brexit, the *White Paper* addresses the fact that the European Project is, “under pressure.”\(^10\)

Whereas the 2011 *Defence Policy Guidelines* stated German security interest as, “strengthening transatlantic and European security and partnership,”\(^11\) the White Paper describes its security interest as, “deepening European integration.”\(^12\) This subtle change of words disguises large meaning for Germany’s future in Europe. There is a fundamental

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\(^8\) *German Basic Law*, 13.
\(^9\) *White Paper*, 32.
\(^10\) Ibid., 33.
\(^12\) *White Paper*, 25.
difference between partnership and integration. Partnership can be as small as a single unilateral agreement such as an economic, security, or political policy. Integration is the merging and pooling of resources. For example, France wants a security partnership with Germany but to retain the autonomy to intervene unilaterally, whereas Germany seeks to integrate all European hard-power into a “European Army.”

The apocryphal quote of Henry Kissinger that Germany is, “too big for Europe, too small for the world,” is taken to heart by the White Paper. The paper acknowledges that, “The economies of emerging powers in Asia and Latin America will likely overtake the German—although not the European—gross domestic product in the coming years.” Germany is signaling to its neighbors that the best way to stay relevant and carry influence in the 21st century is by sticking together in all respects—although this study focuses on EU security initiatives.

Germany believes in “Fuehrung aus der Mitte,” or, “leading from the center.” In essence, this means setting the example and being the change Germany wants to see in the world. At the 51st Munich security conference, Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen described leading from the center as, “being the best at providing resources and professional expertise among our allies and partners.” Since World War II, Germany has been averse to leading from the front, and leads more comfortably by example and consensus. Fuehrung aus der Mitte is a way to balance Germany’s interest in maintaining the European Union with Germany’s reluctance to actually direct fellow member-states.

14 White Paper, 22.
As mentioned, the ultimate goal of European security integration for Germany is to create a European army. The *White Paper* seeks to achieve this through the Framework Nations Concept (FNC). The FNC is essentially an updated version of the “Pooling and Sharing” program proposed by Germany in 2013, with the idea that Germany, France, Great Britain, and possibly Italy and Turkey will take leadership as a “cluster.” Smaller states than integrate their armies under the leadership of a cluster. In this case, the big states provide the breadth of military operations while the smaller nations inside the cluster provide the depth with personnel, equipment, and funding.\(^{16}\) The German think-tank SWP rightfully recognizes that once these clusters have been created, it will take significant political capital to withdraw troops from one. German politicians have a, “common understanding that integrated European Forces can only be achieved in a step-by-step approach,” and the FNC is the beginning of such a concept.\(^ {17}\) So far 16 countries have joined the FNC. There has not been an official British withdrawal from the FNC following the Brexit, and the Polish Defense Minister claims, “Britain’s military involvement will not only be upheld, but also increased.”\(^ {18}\) The fourth chapter addresses the success of the FNC and the future of an integrated European Army.

By re-committing themselves to the FNC, however, Germany is highlighting its commitment to financial and operational relevance. As with all German policies enacted

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with a “Leading from the Middle” approach, explicitly stating its commitment and progress with the FNC goads Germany’s neighbors into action as well.

Germany continues to establish bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements, with the end goal of building trust and cohesion. These agreements provide a common ground to leverage those countries into the FNC. Germany is thus a part of the French-German Brigade, the German-Netherlands Corps, the German-Polish-Danish Multinational Corps, the Multinational Joint Headquarters in Ulm, and rotational leadership of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force; it actively participates within the European Corps and regularly contributes troops to standing NATO operations such as the Airborne Warning and Control System. Germany also has a permanent mutual exchange of troops with both the Netherlands and Poland, and in July 2016, Germany stationed a battalion in Lithuania to serve as a deterrent to perceived Russian aggression.19

Germany also plans a European Army in a simpler way, by opening up the Bundeswehr to any citizens of the EU for military service, similar to the French Foreign Legion. The White Paper claims, “Opening up the Bundeswehr to citizens of the EU would not only offer potential wide-ranging integration and regeneration and thus strengthen the personnel base of the Bundeswehr, it would also send out a strong signal for a European approach.”20 Although international response was negative, the consideration of such a proposal shows its interest in a European army.

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19 White Paper, 77.
20 Ibid., 120.
Germany is sending a clear signal to the UN about its foreign policy goals as well. The *White Paper* details Germany’s goal of obtaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council:

Germany will continue to help the UN adapt to increasingly complex tasks, in particular by… making steady progress towards the long-term goal of reforming the Security Council… Germany remains willing to assume greater responsibility as a permanent member of a reformed Security Council.21

Germany has been seeking a permanent seat with veto power for over a decade. Germany believes its newfound status comes with a responsibility to change the international community. If they assume this responsibility, they expect to receive the legitimate power consummate with their financial and political efforts. After celebrating 25 years of reunification, a seat on the Security Council would be proof to the world and to Germans themselves of their international influence. The *White Paper* is the latest push for such a seat since 2011, when Chancellor Merkel reportedly traveled throughout Africa in an attempt to garner support for a German UN bid.22

Germany’s relationship with NATO is more complex. One reason why Germany is so interested in the creation of a European army is fiscal considerations. The US has stated that in the coming years it will only provide 50% to each of NATO’s capabilities [via funding] in the future.23 As the US currently provides over 72% of total NATO spending, this leaves a large spending gap. President-elect Trump has openly called upon NATO to contribute more and even questioned US involvement with NATO in the first

21 Ibid., 63.
place. The *White Paper* firmly and repeatedly commits itself to spending at least 2% of Germany’s GDP on Defense per year, which would nearly double its defense spending to 74 billion dollars.24

Also present is a German feeling that the US will continue to limit its influence in world security. The *White Paper* treats the subject lightly, but without the usual identifying of the US as a hegemon (benign or otherwise), the *White Paper* notes, “[p]olitically, economically and militarily, the international system is moving towards a multipolar order.”25 More bluntly, the paper continues, “In this multipolar world, the United States will continue to have a profound influence on international security policy. In past years, the United States has increasingly called on its partners, including in Europe, to take on more responsibility.”26 Traditional rhetoric around the US since the end of the Cold War has corroborated its place as the world hegemon. The fact that any doubt exists as to the absolute hegemony of the US represents a dramatic change in the nature of the international relations. In a time where Germany believes US influence is waning, Germany wants to grow and fill in the gap.

Although the *White Paper* states repeatedly that the solidification, growth, and perpetuation of NATO is its goal, the *White Paper* troublingly encourages ad-hoc, bi and multi-lateral alliances, and other new formats of international cooperation. The paper claims, “new formats...do not affect the importance of established organizations. The

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26 Ibid.
UN, NATO, the EU and the OSCE will continue to provide the primary framework for our actions.”27 However, there is a duality in calling for the strengthening of international institutions like the UN, NATO, and the EU while at the same time explicitly opening Germany to informal formats such as the G7 and G20.

For example, the G7 is a format for the seven richest countries in the world to dialogue, problem solve, and reach agreements. However, these seven countries represent over 64% of the net global wealth.28 While far from perfect, the UN has checks and balances built into its charter to protect citizens of the world regardless of wealth or country. Even if the G7 has not acted in an exploitive manner, the informal format itself takes away influence from the rules-based UN. Although an initiative may be easier to achieve in an informal format, the appearance to smaller countries is that, “might makes right”; leaders must balance the time and effort cost of making decisions inside of the UN with the political cost of doing it through informal formats.

Although perhaps not realpolitik—that is, making decisions on practical rather than ideological considerations—the White Paper does not appreciate the severity of normalizing these formats, stating, “in cases where it can protect its interests in this way, [Germany] will participate in ad hoc cooperation and initiate it with its partners.”29 It may be impossible and impractical to ignore them, but official commitment to informal formats weakens the formal institutions maintaining the same, “rules-based international order on the basis of international law,” which Germany names as a security interest.30

27 Ibid., 81
29 White Paper, 30.
30 Ibid., 25.
The *White Paper* focuses on the short term at the expense of solid, long-term stability. The paper regrets erosion of international institutions while at the same time contributing to their decline. The SWP warned in 2014 that:

> The states of the West have contributed to weakening the existing architecture of global norms and institutions, whether by acting inconsistently or using double standards, by employing trade discrimination, or even by not sufficiently legitimizing the use of military force, by resorting to informal “coalitions of the willing” and ad-hoc formats such as the G-20, or simply by their failure to appropriately adapt the international order to the new challenges until now.31

Germany appears to be hoping for the best, but planning for the worst. The *White Paper* reveals a fundamental belief that existing international institutions will become less significant in the future. However, the belief itself contributes to breakdown of the international institutions that brought relative peace to the last 70 years. If one believes these institutions are responsible for that peace, and Germany believes their influence to be in decline, the *White Paper*’s signals to potential rivals take on a new seriousness.

Although obfuscated behind political terminology, the message is clear: “stay out of our way.” Germany, “too small for the world,” from a realist perspective is strengthening European ties to gain power. It is true that the EU has problems that will need solving with German leadership and resources. However, as mentioned before when comparing German vs European GDP to other regions of the world, maintaining their current level of influence will only be possible in the future with Europe’s backing.32

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Germany is enhancing its alliance with the West to win power and influence in an anarchic world. However, Germany believes that if it takes too much of the spotlight, the plan will backfire as Europeans and Germans themselves will rebel and balance against too strong a Germany. Thus the policy of, “Fuehrung aus der Mitte.” The White Paper claims that, “[i]t is not might but right that creates lasting peace and stability,” and excepting its new commitment to informal formats, Germany has spent the last 25 years working within the rules-based international order to earn that right. Germany is now warning its challengers that any break from the status quo will not be acceptable.

Germany is beyond just worrying about Russian expansionism. With the increased use of Hybrid Warfare in Crimea and the Ukraine, “Russia is creating uncertainty about the nature of its intentions.” If viewed again from a realist paradigm, in the absence of absolute US hegemony, Germany sees Russian as a competitor for the power given up by the US.

Russia is openly calling the European peace order into question with its willingness to use force to advance its own interest and to unilaterally redraw borders...Russia is rejecting a close partnership with the West and placing emphasis on strategic rivalry. Internationally, Russia is presenting itself as an independent power center with global ambitions.

The White Paper displays some extent of German exceptionalism, as while they write about Russian global ambition with disdain, just pages earlier they claim, “Germany has a responsibility to actively participate in shaping the global order.” What is different is that Germany is attempting to assert itself globally through transparent,

33 Ibid., 52.
34 Ibid., 32.
36 Ibid., 22.
rules based accepted forums like the EU, NATO, and the UN. Even the informal formats it participates in like the G20 are somewhat normalized in the international community. The message to Moscow is clear. Waning US power is leaving a global power vacuum that Germany intends to fill.

Germany continues to give Russia the, “speak softly and carry a big stick,” treatment, by accusing Russia of creating a, “strategic rivalry.” Germany does not accept the rivalry, and instead insists it is a Russian construction. Germany thus does not commit itself to being Russia’s enemy, but is still flexing its muscles, arguing for, “the right balance between collective defence…on the one hand, and approaches to cooperative security and sectoral cooperation on the other.”37

On first approach, German concerns about China seem to be purely based on economic might. The *White Paper* only explicitly mentions China twice in the *White Paper*, once in a list of the current UN Security Council. The second is because China, “could account for one fifth of the global economic output by 2030, while India will account for approximately one sixth.”38 However, more analysis reveals that Germany is less concerned about the rising Chinese economy, and instead about its military ambitions.

Even if one analyzes the global economy as if it were a zero-sum game, Germany will continue to find itself in a strong economic position. Dr. Niblett, a British international relations expert said in a conference about the *White Paper*, “Germany is the world’s fourth largest economy…more important, it is structurally strong. In a country

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37 Ibid., 32.
38 Ibid., 30.
like China, the number two in the world economy, I would not want to be sitting in Beijing trying to work out how to get China through its middle income trap. Will it face a great depression?"³⁹ More important than arguing about the long-term stability of the Chinese market, which is beyond the scope of this paper, is the concrete structural strength of the German economy. The American Society of Mechanical Engineers points to unique strengths of the German manufacturing industry. Unlike other manufacturing countries with a small number of large companies—where the loss of one enterprise due to outsourcing is an incredible blow to the economy, Germany’s manufacturing base is mostly made of small and medium-size enterprises (SME’s), which dominate niche markets.⁴⁰ More than 1,130 SME’s are either number one or two in the world market for their products, where, “superior quality and performance enables them to command premium prices.”⁴¹

Although not explicitly, Germany’s *White Paper* reveals concern with Chinese naval presence in the South China Sea. The paper mentions the importance of free and unimpeded trade routes for German economic success ten times in its one hundred and thirty-nine-pages, an average of once every fourteen pages.⁴² When listing the 7 missions of the Bundeswehr, the picture chosen for emphasis is that of three German naval ships

⁴¹ Ibid.
with the caption, “responsibility in matters of foreign and security policy – the security of our maritime routes is of great importance.”

The US is engaged in, “Freedom of Navigation Operations,” in the South China Sea in order to prioritize free-trade routes. Germany supports these as Germany wants, “to make clear that Beijing must uphold international law as it seeks a bigger global role.” By looking at Sino-German economic relations, it is easy to see why Germany avoids directly addressing these concerns in the *White Paper*. Approximately 20% of Chinese trade is with the EU, and, “Germany remains China’s principal trading partner in the European Union.”

This bi-lateral partnership expands even beyond the economic, as in 2014, “[Sino-German] relations were upgraded to a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership.” Germany clearly feels uncomfortable berating a close partner in a comprehensive strategic document like the *White Paper*. Russia’s treatment has been harsher because Russia has officially claimed territory, whereas China has not yet attempted to exercise its “sovereignty” in the South China Sea with violence.

Although Germany’s official acceptance of informal formats, commitment to funding NATO, and stern strategic rhetoric on Russia are new, the most surprising and radical changes of German foreign policy concern “spoiler” states. Spoiler states are states that proliferate weapons of mass destruction, support or harbor terrorists, or are

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43 Ibid., 90.
47 Ibid.
fragile states in a strategic location, because, “in today’s globalized world, a local problem can quickly develop into a regional or international problem.”

Previous White Papers cursorily mentioned intervention, stating that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s, “abilities include the entire spectrum…including conflict prevention and conflict intervention,” and that regional conflicts could hurt Germany, such as the collapse of Yugoslavia, which, “could only be resolved through determined and unified intervention from the international community.” The new White Paper, however, specifies the need for future intervention. It bluntly states, “Germany must participate in the prevention and stabilization of crises and conflicts as well as in post-crisis and post-conflict management.”

As to how it will do so, the White Paper hedges its bets. It recommends, “robust military intervention,” and the maintenance of military means across, “all levels of intensity, from…humanitarian operations to robust peace enforcement [emphasis added].” The UN principles of peacekeeping operations define peace enforcement as interventions not requiring the consent of the main parties, but which may involve the use of military force at the strategic or international level. The difference between the two is both that of consent and that of extremes. This is a signal that for the first time in its history, Germany may be willing to do more than training police forces and actively deploy troops into failing states.

50 Ibid., 21.
51 White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr. 2016. 50
52 Ibid., 60.
Further supporting this claim is the earmarking of funds for the Enhance and Enable Initiative (E2I) for the first time in 2016.\textsuperscript{54} E2I is primarily a way to, “export security beyond the external borders of the European Union,” in the context of training, education, and the provision of equipment.\textsuperscript{55} Chapter 3 considers E2I in depth, but its creation is a signal to fragile states that they can expect assistance, including arms exports, from Germany, even if the EU or other organizations deny them that assistance.

The \textit{White Paper} repeatedly reiterates that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, noting the high costs of foreign unemployment of young males, and stating, “[O]ur comprehensive approach will therefore place an even stronger focus on the labor market.”\textsuperscript{56} The \textit{White Paper} also securitizes pandemics, taking them out of the medical realm and into the room of national security. Outbreaks in even small states have a possibility of growing into an pandemic which can affect the German population. The \textit{White Paper} promises Germany’s commitment to organizations like the European Medical Corps and the World Health Organization.\textsuperscript{57}

The language of the \textit{White Paper} is often left purposely obscure, for reasons that will be discussed in the subsequent chapter. Other parts, however, are addressed bluntly and directly, and almost any nation, regardless of how it categorizes its relationship with Germany—friend and ally, rising power, or weak state—has information to glean from the 2016 \textit{White Paper}. Of course, signals are only as powerful as other state’s belief in them. Without legitimacy from Germany in the shape of concrete policy, money, and

\textsuperscript{54} \textit{White Paper}, 52.
\textsuperscript{55} Germany. Bundesakademie fuer Sicherheitspolitik. \textit{Germany’s Enable & Enhance Initiative What Is It About?} By Jana Puglierin. 2016, 1.
\textsuperscript{56} \textit{White Paper}, 44.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 45.
domestic support, other countries cannot believe and act on the information Germany is sending.
Ambivalence of Domestic Support

The Results of the Foreign Policy Review 2014 revealed the, “growing gulf between the expectation of Germany’s allies and partners that it take on a larger role in international politics and Germany’s self-imposed limitations on its foreign policy, which the German public largely favors.”\(^1\) Other experts noted, “The Federal Government is said to have long neglected to sufficiently seek the domestic support that is indispensable to dependable foreign policy.”\(^2\) Just as the 2016 *White Paper* is a signal to foreign governments, it is a signal to the people of Germany. Explicitly stated:

The 2016 *White Paper* is the first of its kind to be based on an inclusive participation phase. National and international experts as well as interested citizens were given various opportunities to participate in the discussion about the future of German Security Policy...The *White Paper* is also an invitation and a request to actively continue the security policy debate following its publication, as security policy is a permanent endeavor for society as a whole in an open and healthy democracy.\(^3\)

In this sense, however, the *White Paper* is at odds with itself. The German Government produced an animation titled *Explained through video: The 2016 White Paper.*\(^4\) At four minutes, the animation is just long enough to become condescending with its non-stop cartoon sound effects, while short enough to appear simplistic. This video distills meaning to the lowest common denominator, while the *White Paper* is

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\(^2\) Ibid., 20
\(^4\) *Im Video Erklärt: Das Weissbuch 2016.* German Federal Ministry of Defence, 13 July 2016. Web. 3 Nov. 2016. <https://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/ut/p/c4/NYqxDsMgDET_ylax3YKypN2qSm26AUHUUoDlcZKlH18Ycie94d7hB2uz3SlaaZLtjG8cPV3dAS7tEY5A6-o2_8VXe048fMBGiVkocrlVgrDULjmZjbmaoAmHIJXujdLqjP515nm53-rSD-aBS0rdH-xzdpM!/>. 
actually often written in legal language with highly specific meaning behind it. Citing and conflatting three different constitutional articles, one section of the *White Paper* explains constitutional authority in deploying the Bundeswehr inside Germany.\(^5\) Chapter Two of this study explained the significance of “robust peace enforcement” which is a benign term with huge implications.

There is no perfect balance between the two. Public outreach will always either be too complicated as to be accessible, or too simplified to be meaningful. What is important to recognize, however, is that the time for public input on the *White Paper* is closed. The Government is no longer inviting debate on the topic but attempting to drive political opinion to support the *White Paper*’s policies.

The German Government has had moderate success in changing public opinion to support its foreign policy initiatives, but when it comes time to follow through on hard choices, public support dwindles. This is evident in the recruitment crisis facing the Bundeswehr and in public opinion on Russia and the Ukraine crisis. However, because the public was heavily involved in the creation of the *White Paper* and polls reflect their consent for the broad objectives, it is now the responsibility of the German Government to execute its strategy even if the public does not agree on all specific issues.

Public Opinion about increasing German influence was initially low. During Frank Steimer’s “Review 2014—A Fresh Look at Foreign Policy” a poll from the Koerber Foundation found that 60% of Germans believed, “Germany should continue to exercise [international] restraint.”\(^6\) The review broke down foreign involvement into

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\(^5\) *White Paper* 110  
\(^6\) Ibid., 26
categories and attempted to argue that Germans only disagreed with military involvement. This was partially true, but only a minority of Germans supported taking in refugees or supporting other countries’ military interventions (even without direct military participation). 82% wanted decreased engagement in military operations, the same number who wanted to decrease the amount of arms supplied to allied countries.7

Much can change in two years. An updated 2016 poll by the Pew Research Center found that today 53% of Germans believe their country should help other countries deal with their problems.8 While the exact same question was not asked, in the 2014 Koerber Foundation Polls only 37% of Germans thought Germany should be more engaged. 74% believe that the EU should play a more active role in world affairs than it does today and 62% think human rights should be one of Germany’s most important foreign policy goals. Another large success has been Germany’s approach to leadership, as 67% of Germans think that, “in foreign policy, our country should take allies’ interests into account even if it means compromising.”9 The German people strongly support “Fuehrung aus der Mitte.” In these terms, the White Paper seems to fit with popular opinion.

The German government drove this radical two-year change in German perspective. The outreach began concurrently with the Koerber polls as part of the same 2014 review. One third of the entire project focused on engaging debate with domestic Germany. Beginning in July of 2014, the Federal Foreign Office (FFO) held over 60

7 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
forums, panel debates, conferences, and simulation workshops. The FFO claims to have succeeded in institutionally learning not, “[to] simply make difficult decisions in cabinet meetings and then announce them on the news: Instead, we need to campaign for our convictions and share the content of our decision at many events.”

Even though the 2014 Review is over, the webpage has been specifically archived so that its lessons will not be forgotten. Another lesson learned was the importance of online engagement, which has led to a continuation of clear, user-friendly websites for all major German Foreign Policy Initiatives.

The 2016 White Paper website is detailed and clearly organized into 11 sections; these include a “dialogue” page with reactions from 53 everyday citizens, experts in videos breaking down “questions about the White Paper”, and a download page with links to various literature surrounding German Foreign Policy.

The conversation about the White Paper has finished, and the updated public foreign policy debate currently revolves around “Peace Lab 2016.” Peace Lab 2016 is a format that began on the 5th of July (just days after the release of the White Paper) seeking public opinion on the government’s attempt, “[to] establish new guidelines for managing crises and conflicts by the spring of 2017.” In the same fashion as the 2014 Review and the 2016 White Paper, Peace Lab 2016 summarizes debates and forums on

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11 Ibid., 30
12 http://www.aussenpolitik-weiter-denken.de/en/topics.html. The notice announcing the end of the project and pointing visitors to where they can continue to the discussion is posted upon one’s first visit to the site.
13 “Review 2014--A Fresh Look at Foreign Policy”, 46.
various topics surrounding crisis management, with a twitter account used to announce upcoming events.

In contrast to earlier attempts, however, there is not a dedicated forum for Internet discussion. Instead, Peace Lab 2016, “heartily invites you to take part in this discussion: share or comment on this discussion on Facebook, LinkedIn or Twitter! If you have your own idea for a discussion, please tell us via our email!”15 This is an attempt to reach a wider, broader, and younger audience than in previous endeavors. Without a dedicated space in which only the political engaged will talk, it must be shared on social media, and should theoretically be read and discussed by a much larger number of people. It is not possible to divine causation from correlation, and increased German support for international engagement may have come from any number of sources. However, the public outreach performed by the German Government appears to have been at least moderately successful, and was certainly not a failure.

The German Government, however, was less successful in turning broad support for its strategy into support for concrete action. The largest disconnects in which the public disagrees with the White Paper strategy relate to the Bundeswehr and the Ukrainian Crisis. Despite the White Paper’s promise to raise military funding from 1.2% to 2% of Germany’s GDP, only 34% of Germans support increasing defense spending, whereas 64% support keeping it the same or even reducing it. The German Government

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is listening, as the planned defense budget for 2020 remains the same as its 2016 levels.\textsuperscript{16} 85% of Germans believe ISIS is a “major threat” to Germany, but only 29% believe using military force is the best way to defeat terrorism.

More important than polling numbers about Germany’s political will to fight or properly fund its military is its ability to field soldiers. Regardless of public opinion on foreign policy, unless Germany has the personnel to effect change in its environment, none of its opinions matter. After the end of mandatory military service five years ago, Germany is still struggling to recruit members. Attempts by the German Government to increase recruiting have failed, mostly because of bad public perception of the Bundeswehr. The \textit{White Paper} tells us that:

\begin{quote}
The people in this country recognize the importance of our citizens in uniform. They rely on them, they are grateful, and they feel connected to them. Their interest in them is sincere. This is expressed in a multitude of respectful gestures and words. Surveys have shown that a growing majority of Germans highly regard and trust the Bundeswehr. Not least of all the positive response at public events such as the Bundeswehr Day has shown that the Bundeswehr is firmly embedded in society.\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}

Interestingly, on the same page of the \textit{White Paper}, there is a photo of a worker scraping paint off the entrance to the Bundeswehr recruiting station in Berlin. The front entrance was paint bombed in blue and red as an act of vandalism and protest in November of 2015.\textsuperscript{18} The juxtaposition of a paragraph explaining the public support of the Bundeswehr with a picture of a vandalized recruiting center does not seem to fit.


\textsuperscript{17} \textit{White Paper}, 111.

Alison Smale of the *New York Times* determined that in 2024, 17% of male Germans born in 2006 will need to volunteer to serve in the Bundeswehr.¹⁹ Less than 700,000 children will come of age in 2024, and half are girls, seven times less likely to serve than their male peers. The Defence Minister’s annual goal is 60,000 applicants. In 2012, one year after conscription ended, the Bundeswehr already missed its target of volunteers by 37.7%.²⁰

The *White Paper* acknowledges this problem and will attempt to make the military more attractive by creating modern accommodations, flexible working conditions, childcare arrangements, state of the art IT equipment, and improved pay and social security for service members.²¹ A second idea proposed by the German government was the creation of “Bundeswehr Day” (Tag der Bundeswehr). As the aviation website *Checksix* noted during their coverage of the Luftwaffe’s demonstration during Bundeswehr Day, “In the past, the primary concern of the Bundeswehr was demonstrating its equipment and capabilities, nowadays however, its main concern is attracting new recruits voluntarily into its ranks.”²² Ironically, however, Robert Kysela notes in his review of the airshow that although the day was a, “great success!”, unfortunately, “this event was definitely no airshow as the Bundeswehr generally do not

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²¹ *White Paper*, 120.

like to attract a lot of attention and as such the demonstrations were generally quite restrained."

Even in the midst of a recruitment crisis, on a day meant to make the military cool, the Bundeswehr did not feel comfortable showing off. In the view of the current public, the Bundeswehr should be seen and not heard, and is not seen as a desirable place to work.

The 2016 *White Paper* mentions one last strategy to increase recruitment of the Bundeswehr, this time without the need to increase public opinion. A Bundeswehr open to all citizens of the EU. This idea is mentioned only once throughout the whitepaper, and hidden inside of a paragraph, rather than highlighted as a bullet point. At the bottom of the seven-sentence paragraph, the *White Paper* states, “Last but not least, opening up the Bundeswehr to citizens of the EU would not only offer potential for wide-ranging integration and regeneration and thus strengthen the personnel base of the Bundeswehr, it would also send out a strong signal for a European approach.”

Limited public response to this idea has been decidedly negative. The German Newspaper *Deutsche Welle* reported on the proposal and notes that the Bundestag would have to change the German Military Act. Political opposition to this is already mounting, such as from MP Alexander Neu who complained that most recruits will come from economically weak countries, a population he does not want to give access to Germany.

Secondly, European Partners need to be consulted and in many cases special agreements...
made. Finally, the German Armed Forces Association, which represents the interest of over 200,000 current and former soldiers made it clear that they would not be quick to give their approval, as questions like loyalty to Germany first need consideration.\(^\text{26}\) There has been no policy initiative aimed at realizing this idea. It appears that at least for now, the idea is tabled as it was received with a soft but firm “no” from the public.

The German Public slowly accepted Germany’s increased role on the international playing field, but has not been as receptive in actually supporting the Bundeswehr. Another area of foreign policy citizens resist is the White Paper’s take on Russia. Although 62\% of Germans think human rights should supersede other foreign policy goals, according the Human Rights Watch, “Russian authorities have created a pervasive climate of fear and repression in Crimea in the two years since it has occupied the peninsula,” yet Germans still do not support their government’s sanctioning of Russia in reaction to the Ukrainian crisis.\(^\text{27}\)

Only 31\% of Germans see Russia as a threat to their country, and 58\% of Germans think, “having a strong economic relationship with Russia is more important than being tough on Russia with foreign policy disputes.” In a 2015 poll, 77\% of Germans opposed sending arms to Ukraine.\(^\text{28}\) While this may seem surprising to the


uninitiated, it makes sense when one considers the political, cultural, and economic ties Germany has with Russia.

Many officials “spent decades” working with Moscow during German reunification, and business leaders have much to gain and lose in gas supplies and export markets. The Pew Research Center supports these findings, as only 26% of those living in West Germany support decreasing the economic sanctions on Russia, while 42% of East Germans support decreasing the sanctions. Even among the Ukrainian Crisis, plans to expand the Nord Stream gas pipeline from Russia to northern Germany have not slowed down.

The Nord Stream 2 would bypass Ukraine, and possibly deprive them of almost 2 billion USD per year. Ukraine already needed a bailout from the International Monetary Fund in September of 2016. Germany is clearly stuck between its values of promoting human rights and international stability, and its own economic interests. Berlin, so quick to compromise on issues with its allies, needs to remember that it cannot do the same with its rivals. As implied by the title of the report, Germany should heed the advice of “New Power, New Responsibility” when it notes:

> What is true is that conflicts between German values and interest, especially in dealing with authoritarian states, are often unavoidable in the short term and that they must be balanced from case to case. In the long-

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32 Ibid.
term, however, a commitment to values is an existential interest for any Western democracy.\textsuperscript{33}

As much as domestic support is important in creating a foreign policy strategy, it is actions, which demonstrate credibility to the international world. It is time for the Chancellery, whose, “instinct is against running much ahead of German opinion,” to begin creating public opinion instead of following it.\textsuperscript{34}

Broad public support was essential in creating the 2016 \textit{White Paper}. However, the administration may have learned its lessons too well: detailed engagement with the German public as educational outreach is important; and it is also correct that one of the best ways to educate the public is by engaging in large scale Socratic seminars and guided discussions. However, it is time to stop offering debates to the public when with the explicit purpose of informing and not in contributing to writing new policy. Public support was already gathered to write the \textit{White Paper}, now it is time to implement it. There will always be critics, and the best way to silence them is not to debate them but to show them they are wrong. PeaceLab2016 has produced over 1300 tweets since April of 2016 and yet has only 343 followers.\textsuperscript{35} The public has a much lower attention span when discussing how Germany intervenes compared to discussing when or if it should intervene in the first place.

The German public consented to the \textit{White Book}, and now it is time follow through on what was written. As mentioned earlier, the German Governments believe in

\textsuperscript{34} "Merkel Seeks to Navigate Germany's Complex Relations with Russia".
\textsuperscript{35} https://twitter.com/peacelab2016
foreign policy “broadly rooted in society.” The white paper has rooted such support, and now the government needs to begin the growth process. If it fails to fund or supply the German Military with enough soldiers, or follow through on its rhetoric and strategy of remaining tough on Russia, the White Paper will have been written for nothing. Germany has gathered as much public support as it could have hoped for, now it is time to leverage that support into action. As discussed in Chapter 2, the White Paper was a signal to the international world, but actions will always speak louder than words.

36 “Review 2014--A Fresh Look at Foreign Policy”, 29.
International Reactions to the White Paper

While the German *White Paper* is less than six months old, the international community has already responded. Russia, the European Union, and the United States have had the strongest and most important of these reactions. Russia responded scathingly, denying Germany’s accusations of being a spoiler in the international system, and accused Germany of remilitarizing in order to dominate its neighbors yet again. The EU responded mildly positively, with great support from the political elite and a general non-reaction from its citizens. US support has been overwhelming, with calls for Germany to actually go further and take on more responsibility than it already has. Although the Russian response is both troubling and important, for the most part Germany has done an excellent job marketing itself and its interests to the international community and is in a good position to achieve those aims.

Russia is gaining a negative reputation for the high volume of propaganda it releases online, and pro-Russian internet activists have earned themselves the nickname “Putin’s Trolls”, “Numerous examples of highly biased and propagandist coverage of international affairs by the Russian media have often been highlighted by well-respected commentators, experts, and journalists”.¹ One of the most influential outlets is *Russia Today*, a television channel and Internet news-source. *Russia Today*, rebranded as *RT*, claims to, “create news with an edge for viewers who Question More [SIC].”² However, while becoming more informed is almost always a good idea, the *Columbia Journalism Review* notes that *RT* is, “known as an extension of former

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² https://www.rt.com/about-us/
President Vladimir Putin’s confrontational foreign policy.”³ It is highly provocative, relies upon questionable experts and sources, and presents only one side of the issues. However, sorting through RT’s bias opens an opportunity to understand what the Russian Political Elite wants people to believe, and therefore their opinion of international affairs.

RT wrote a reactionary response to the German White Paper, titled “Germany moves to run its own EU Army – leaving both Brussels & NATO in new crisis.”⁴ The article builds a narrative that a race between the EU and Germany to build a European army for purposes of political prestige is splitting NATO and making it less cohesive. The author compares the third Reich the rise of the alternative Right, then argues, “it’s a stark choice between a German chancellor running such an ambitious military operation or the rather ineffective EU diplomat Federica Mogherini, who has struggled to achieve even the most fledgling success.”⁵ Russia is disappointed that their almost belligerent behavior has been brought to light in such an important document. Their hopefulness that a stronger German military or European Army might actually weaken the European position reveals a fear that such a program will be successful.

Several Russian political figures have also made their disappointment clear. An authorless RT article cites two members, one from the upper and one from the lower chamber of the Russian Duma. Both go on the offensive, such as when Alexey Pushkov claimed the harsh language used in the White Paper is, “more a sign of Berlin’s ‘subordination’ to the US than a demonstration of ‘the real state of affairs.’”⁶ Konstantin Kosachev from the upper chamber

⁵ Ibid.
responded less aggressively, and merely insists, “Moscow has never abandoned cooperation and partnership with the West…it’s not Russia who withdrew from cooperation with NATO.” They both make the US and the West responsible, without responding the White Paper’s claims.

The most direct response has been from the spokeswoman from the Russian Foreign Ministry, Maria Zakharova, who claimed, “[r]emarks mentioned in the doctrine on the need to cooperate with Russia in the sphere of common interests do not cancel the fact that by approving the White Paper, Berlin is cementing a confrontational component of its entire policy in regard to Russia in the long term.” Again, instead of acknowledging the actions Russia is accused of, the foreign policy talking point is to shift the blame from the Russian government to the accuser. Berlin is not going to change the strategy document it spent two years writing because of a negative Russian response, so the Kremlin’s posturing is most likely for the benefit of Russian citizens. The posturing continued as the diplomat ominously ended her comments noting, "Berlin’s another [SIC] anti-Russian insinuation cannot but arouse regret and we will take it into consideration in the aspect of Russian-German relations." By doubling down on its “strategic rivalry”, Russia can put the onus on the West, and scapegoat the US to Russian citizens for the sanctions placed upon them. This is even easier given the pro-Russia leanings of former DDR citizens mentioned in Chapter 3, which gives Russia the ease of pointing out support from abroad. Further analysis of domestic Russia is beyond the scope of this paper, but noteworthy is that the nature of these decentralized accusations of the West through online propaganda sites does not necessarily reveal Russian confidence, but fear of increased Western power.

7 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Chapter 3. Page 37.
Other member states of the European Union responded generally positively to the German *White Paper*, with some exceptions. While there has not been a plethora of official responses from EU states, the response to the German *White Paper* can be benchmarked by looking at support for a European-wide Army, especially one in which Germany takes the lead. While support for such an army cannot be directly correlated with individual points of the *White Paper*, the detailed requirements for creating such a European Army are indeed all major themes of the German *White Paper*, including increased European cooperation, increased military spending, and a general wish for more European Influence in international affairs.

The UK is one of the only states that has not and does not want increased European integration – not only militarily but, as Brexit shows, in other domains too. When the German *White Paper* was first leaked in a *Financial Times* article, Brexit leaders immediately took issue with it. Mike Hookem, member of the European parliament and the United Kingdom Independence Party, claimed the EU would force the UK into joining its Army saying, “David Cameron and the traditional parties have neither the political will nor clout in Europe to defend our armed forces from becoming one part of a far-reaching European military structure.”11 With the impending Brexit, only 2% of British MEPs supported more integration in defense policy, placing them second to last in European support, ahead of only Ireland.

However, because after the UK leaves, they will no longer be able to veto or even vote against increased integration, “from the perspective of the CSDP [Common Security and Defence Policy], Brexit is actually a positive development,” according to Eva Chitul and Doru Frantescu.12 In order to, “inject new Momentum,” and, “relaunch the European project,” all 27

current EU members except for the UK met in Bratislava for a one day meeting in September, during which Italy called for a joint permanent European Multinational Force (EMF).\textsuperscript{13} This was unexpected and was an expansion of the proposal jointly made by Germany and France, which called only for the establishment of a permanent EU headquarters.\textsuperscript{14} High levels of support came from Germany, Italy, Spain, and although French MEP’s were more divided on the issue, they were one of the two countries to initiate the conversation.

The highest levels of support came from, “former Russian satellite states in Eastern Europe,” like Romania.\textsuperscript{15} This can be explained using Stephen Walt’s balance-of-power theory that argues that these states are “Balancing” against Russia, which they see as a rising power.\textsuperscript{16} Besides bad experiences with the former Soviet Union:

To ally with the dominant power means placing one’s trust in its continued benevolence. The safer strategy is to join with those who cannot readily dominate their allies, in order to avoid being dominated by those who can.\textsuperscript{17}

eastern European states like Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania support further integration with a vote of at least 70\%.\textsuperscript{18} They are watching international developments keenly, and because Russia has already shown its willingness to “dominate its allies” - as shown by its actions in Georgia and the Ukraine, these states feel that it is in their best interest to integrate into the European Union.

The least amount of support for a European Army came from traditionally neutral states: mainly the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Austria. However, because MEPs do

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\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Chitul, Eva, and Doru Frantescu. "What Chances for a Real European Common Security and Defense Policy?"
\item Ibid.
\item Ibid.
\item Chitul, Eva, and Doru Frantescu. "What Chances for a Real European Common Security and Defense Policy?"
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
not vote by nations and instead group themselves independently into coalitions, there is still some support in nations like Austria. In fact, when support for a Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), rather than the EMF is examined, only five of the twenty-eight EU members do not demonstrate majority support for increased defense policy integration (e.g. joint headquarters) within the European Parliament. While PESCO does not go as far as a standing EMF, it still demonstrates a marked increase in European security Cooperation, and therefore serves as a positive benchmark for the German *White Paper*.

Most importantly, support for a more deeply integrated Europe is trending upwards. The election of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States spurred a new wave of talks. German defense minister Ursula von der Leyen claimed that President-elect Trump’s victory has “cast doubt” on NATO’s mutual defense pact; a view echoed by Jean-Claude Juncker, president of the European Commission.19 Juncker, while not specifying the US-election, held a press conference the day after the election results were announced, saying that US-EU relations shouldn’t be reset, “out of anger,” and declaring, “We have a lot to thank the American’s for… but they won’t look after Europe’s security forever.”20 In the wake of the election, there was an impromptu session held in Brussels for the Heads of States to talk. While the UK and Hungary did not attend, and France sent only an envoy, enough members were present to sign off on a new defense plan, which allows the EU to deploy forces to stabilize a crisis before a UN resolution is passed.21 While the meeting “played down” talk of a European Army, many state

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officials offered commentary similar to the French Foreign Minister, who called it an, “essential step forward.”\(^{22}\) Being only a step forward, future projects can be expected as well.

An essential caveat to this willingness to integrate European Security is that the support for these initiatives came from the “political elite,” specifically the Members of the European Parliament. Support from citizens is generally much lower. Sputnik news, a Russian media outlet, claimed last year that 36% of Germans and 37% of French would rather have an EU army to protect Europe than have NATO fulfill that role.\(^{23}\) It is important to note that the Russian outlet (which publishes sensationalist articles with titles like “Washington Wants Bloodshed in Aleppo to Continue”) has incentive to over-report the number of EU citizens calling for a European army (the “end of NATO “) to show the “divide” between Europe and the US.\(^{24}\) However, even from a biased source, only a minority of European citizens support such a measure. As seen in the previous chapter, there is a disconnect between the politicians making foreign policy decisions and their domestic base of support. Whether or not the support gap applies to Germany’s new *White Paper* or only to a European army is much more difficult to determine; but a lack of protest against the new German *White Paper* and recent defense proposals signals, “No news is good news.” Even if it is the case that the average EU citizens merely doesn’t care about Germany’s re-militarization, the lack of concern after Germany’s instigation of two World-Wars is telling in itself.

The last major actor whose reaction should be considered is the US. Although, like in Europe, the *White Paper* has, “received limited attention in the Anglophone media,”\(^{25}\) unlike the

\(^{22}\) Ibid.


\(^{24}\) https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201611131047384616-us-aleppo-bloodshed-aid/

haltingly positive European response, US Foreign Policy experts overwhelmingly support the new German Strategy. Jeffrey Rathke, Senior Fellow for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, notes that the White Paper gives Germany a central role, “which in the uncertain times facing U.S. security… is a bright spot from an American perspective.”

Contrary to European Opinion, Rathke feels that the White Paper does not goes far enough. He points out that it self-describes Germany as a, “middle-sized power,” which he feels is, “a frustratingly false modesty… and unnecessarily self-limiting.”

Alison Smale of the New York Times also embodies the positive American reaction in an article titled “In a Reversal, Germany's Military Growth is Met With Western Relief.” Concerns about German re-militarization and strength, very real just 25 years after German Reunification, have completely disappeared. In fact, the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies hosted an almost celebratory “Roll-Out Event” for the White Paper, including panels and networking opportunities.

Americans seem to be happy with the White Paper's aims, even if they don’t know of its existence. Both President Obama and President-elect Trump have complained of other NATO members acting as “free-riders.” Whether America wants to become more isolationist or, on the contrary, strengthen ties with our partners, more activity and enthusiasm from another state with similar goals and interests is a positive event.

27 Ibid.
In general, the international reaction to the *White Paper* was almost entirely a success. No foreign state outside of Russia is concerned about increased German hard power. Germany has successfully built trust and cohesion over the last quarter century to the point where it is a valued player in the western democratic order. In fact, many of Germany’s allies are excited by the country’s remilitarization and wish it were even more involved. The two countries expressing displeasure at Germany’s updated strategy are Russia and the UK. Russia, acting as a spoiler state even before the new document was released, seems unlikely to halt its behavior, regardless of whether Germany chooses to become a lion or a sheep. The UK has fears that Germany and the EU will bypass NATO, but because it will soon no longer be able to block European integration, Germany is in an excellent position to achieve its foreign policy goals, and specifically its military integrationist plans, within the international community.
The Way Forward: Obstacles to implementation of the White Paper

Germany’s successful implementation of the White Paper faces three problems: Russia’s propaganda disrupts German discourse; unfavorable results of the upcoming federal election could seriously obstruct the White Paper’s chances of implementation; and the European Union continues to fracture. For a successful implementation of the White Paper, the German government will firstly need to decrease the Russian media’s influence on Germany’s citizens. Second, the political leaders who created the White Paper will need to remain in power, with their re-election serving as a mandate by the German people to continue down the path of increased international involvement. Finally, the European Union must remain cohesive, especially on issues such as the refugee and debt crises. Germany will have to “lead from the center” and stabilize the EU by reaching out publically, fiscally, and militarily. Because of the shift towards Euroskepticism among the German electorate, solutions to the last two problems are somewhat incompatible. Chancellor Merkel needs to work for the EU to keep the region stable, while convincing the German people she cares about Germany first.

On the face of it, the Russian propaganda network is an amazing accomplishment. The German White Paper only identifies propaganda within a framework of hybrid warfare, noting that, “[h]ybrid attacks can target all areas of society through cyber-attacks and information operations (e.g. propaganda) … to delay or completely prevent an immediate and decisive response by the state under attack.”¹ In listing ways to counter

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the information warfare aspect, the *White Paper* recommends an effective early-warning system, and calls upon politicians, the media, and society at large to expose propaganda and counter it with facts.²

For contrast, the *Russian Foreign Policy Concept of 2013* does not consider propaganda as a means within a framework, but an end in itself. The *Concept* explicitly declares, “[Russia] must ‘create instruments for influencing how it is perceived in the world’, ‘develop its own effective means of information influence on public opinion abroad’, and ‘counteract information threats to its sovereignty and security.’”³ Germany sees information warfare as a subset of hybrid warfare, but because Russia sees it as important in its own right, “[t]he ability to project narratives to foreign audiences is…considered a matter of national security.”⁴ While Germany has identified information operations in a strategic context for the first time in the *White Paper*, Russia has spent the last decade developing these capabilities. As long as Russia can project and control narratives outside of its borders, Germany needs to create effective counters, lest it and the EU be susceptible to artificial division and declining social capital. Essentially, Russian propaganda will cause confusion, polarize the German people, and disrupt nay policy consensus that may be possible.

Russia’s “war on information” is not new. In 2014, a law restricting foreign ownership and management control of media outlets ousted CNN and BBC from Russian

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² Ibid.
⁴ Ibid.
airwaves. In short, Russia successful centralized its news. Most troublesome, however, is their exportation of propaganda to other countries, briefly mentioned in Chapter Four.

Germany needs to continue supporting and promoting free Internet at home and abroad. Politicians should utilize twitter and other media to connect directly to the German people and denounce specific Russian propaganda efforts. For example, an anonymous spokeswoman from the German interior ministry told the right-wing newspaper *Welt am Sonntag* that turning back all refugee boats was, “what the minister believes.” Dozens of articles from outlets like the *Express*, *Daily Mail*, and *Independent* buried the original article within 24 hours with sensational headlines like “DON'T COME HERE! Merkel migrant U-turn as Germany orders EU to SEND BACK boats to Africa” without reaching out for comment and often citing no sources at all. The original article is almost impossible to find, both because so many other sensational outlets show up first on Google, and because it is in German. The English-language outlets do not link to it, if they mention the original article at all. The German Government should issue a direct but proportional response, perhaps via tweet or other social media, immediately both clarifying the situation and pointing out the poor journalism.

6 Refer to “Putin’s Trolls”, Page 40
According to Hans-Georg Maassen, chief of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, “We have the impression that [information manipulation] is part of a hybrid threat that seeks to influence public opinion and the decision making process.”\textsuperscript{10} Angela Merkel also recently warned the public, “We are already, even now, having to deal with [false] information out of Russia… it may be that this could also play a role during the election campaign.”\textsuperscript{11} Other members of the German government must follow suit in denouncing foreign influence in their domestic sphere.

The way to counter Russian propaganda abroad is by reporting concrete and accessible facts. In a parallel to another age, successful Western propaganda in the USSR was not propaganda at all—but regular America media. When Soviet theaters showed \textit{The Grapes of Wrath} to display the, “desperate misery of the Okies under the most advanced system of capitalism on the planet,” it backfired. The USSR pulled the film after, “Soviet audiences...could see for themselves that even the most dispossessed of America’s rural proletariat were shown driving automobiles.”\textsuperscript{12} The key is not to present an alternative opinion against which Russian media outlets can argue, but to utilize twenty-first-century technology to spread unbiased facts and let people independently form their own opinion based upon them.

Matt Armstrong, Governor of the non-governmental organization *Broadcasting Board of Governors*, recommends creating Russian-language TV programs in the successor states of the Soviet Union, and digital offerings that reach millions of Russians and Russian-speakers.\(^{13}\) Germany should focus on online platforms, with the purpose of reaching German citizens most likely to be sympathetic to Russia. The lessons it learned during its public outreach to create the 2016 *White Paper* and subsequent foreign policy initiatives like PeaceLab2016 should be applied to counter Russian disinformation. While online and cable outlets reach the entire country, dialogues and in person outreach should focus on the eastern parts of Germany, which are more likely to be sympathetic to Russia.\(^{14}\)

Kristine Berzina of the German Marshall Fund claims that regardless of promises between President-elect Trump and President Putin, we should not expect a reconciliation between Russia and the West anytime soon. But she emphasizes that even if the sanctions should continue, there is no guarantee they will succeed.

The situation is analogous to the time when OPEC created an artificial shortage of oil to keep prices high during the 1973 Oil Crisis. However, long-term efforts of countries to create fuel-efficient engines use alternative resources such as natural gas, and import from other countries defeated the short-term strategy. Berzina believes that Russia is similarly changing its economy in reaction to sanctions. She notes that in the absence of western food imports, she has seen an increase in local stores and locally made goods.

\(^{13}\) Armstrong, Matt. "Russia's War on Information".
In essence, “Russian citizens have adapted to their new circumstances.”\textsuperscript{15} The sanctions hit Russia hard, and although Russia’s citizens still suffer the consequences, they have already weathered the shock. If sanctions are the new normal, they no longer elicit a reaction. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace notes, “over-reliance on sanctions in dealing with Russia risks undercutting their effectiveness over the medium to long term as the Kremlin inexorably develops mechanisms to evade sanctions or at a minimum seeks to soften their impact.”\textsuperscript{16}

One of the only ways to combat hybrid warfare, in which countries engage in salami tactics by pushing established boundaries without overtly crossing them, is to call out the offender and draw a clear line. But doing this can be dangerous, because if the other state does not believe that the lines are firm, they will cross them and incite a war.

Even more dangerous is engaging in modern day appeasement and letting up against Russia. Just as Germany is and was willing to make economic and political sacrifices to keep the EU intact, they must make similar sacrifices to continue Russia’s isolation: starting with the cancelation of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline.

Germany must call a spade a spade as, “The Kremlin has no intention of being a reliable partner, and the West should embrace this strategic clarity.”\textsuperscript{17} Russia will continue to exploit the duality in Germany’s plan of, “credible deterrence with a


\textsuperscript{17} Berzina, Kristine. "Sorry West, Russia's Just Not That Into You: Preparing for Long-Term Estrangement."
willingness to engage in dialogue” until Germany explicitly breaks ties with Russia. Furthermore, Russia will continue to spread misinformation inside, creating artificial division inside of Germany.

The second precondition for success of the White Paper is the continued reign of like-minded political leaders who agree on the strategy. This is an obvious assumption, but Germany is in the middle of a political upset, which may have stark repercussions for its foreign policy. The new populist party, Alternative for Germany (AfD), has not published a cohesive platform related to foreign policy. However, it sums up their response to the new strategic paper as, “The new White Paper is no masterpiece; it leads the military in the wrong direction.”18 Since the AfD is primarily an opposition to the ruling German party coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD, it would probably reject any White Paper on principle, but the AfD is also known for its Euroskepticism. Even after its Euroskeptic founder Bernd Luke left to form another party, their website still claims, “The AfD is convinced of the principle of subsidiarity, and rejects the countless attempts by the EU commission to interfere in the everyday life of its citizens.”19

In Berlin’s September 2016 Landtag elections, Angela Merkel’s party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), lost 8 seats for a total of 31. The AfD, in contrast, gained its first 25 seats.20 The AfD can no longer be dismissed as it was in the Economist article “Europe’s reluctant hegemon.” Speaking about the Fiscal Reforms needed at the

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time, the article noted, “with the exception of the Alternative fuer Deutschland, the new fringe party, all the parties agree,” and later left out the AfD completely, stating, “if there are differences [between the parties]…they are about the pace [of the fiscal reforms].”21 If the AfD wins parliamentary seats in the 2017 German Federal Elections, the attainment of the Government goals set forth in the White Paper may be at risk. If the AfD wins a number of seats large enough to force itself into the winning coalition, it is not impossible that the White Paper would have to be essentially set aside.

The ramifications would be far-reaching. The world at large is looking to Germany to steward the Western tradition in what they see as an impending phase of waning US influence. If German influence not only decelerated but shrank, world confidence could be shaken. NATO states, especially in the Baltic, would likely militarize to balance against Russia. Russia may see a less cohesive NATO and act even more aggressively.

The White Paper is a product of the executive branch of the German government. Thus, the continuation of that executive branch is critical for the continuation and execution of the document’s central tenets. Chancellor Merkel has announced she will run for a fourth term, and there is a common consensus that she is running only because the CDU has no alternative candidate attractive enough to win. Even if she wins the 2017 election, unless she starts grooming a successor soon, the CDU, “may end up leaderless

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by the 2021 election,” and the *White Paper* will be in just as much jeopardy then as it is currently.22

The current German regime is stuck between a rock and hard place. The *New York Times* summarizes the situation by reporting that, “Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, under siege domestically but widely seen as a pillar of Western liberalism, announced on Sunday that she will seek a fourth term next year.”23 The siege under which she falls, representing the rock, may be broadly rooted in the AfD, but it is not limited to it. The two sister parties, the CDU and the Christian Social Union (CSU), are in, “the throes of their worst internal crisis in over 40 years.”24 The southern CSU was and is firmly against Chancellor Merkel’s decision to open the country’s borders to refugees. Chancellor Merkel’s hard place are crises like the Refugee and Debt Crisis. Agreements like the deal reached with Turkey may serve as the basis for solving these crises; however, Chancellor Merkel will need to soothe the German people and convince them that increased, not decreased integration within the EU is the only way to solve the crisis.

Simon Tilford of the Center for European Reform notes the rising populist movement in France, and after prescribing actions Merkel can take to, “prevent the worsening of the political situation in France,” he declares, “[t]o help France and prevent

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Le Pen [a right-wing presidential candidate] is to risk increased populism in Germany.”25 The very reforms that would satisfy voters in the Eurozone (i.e. France) by loosening economic regulations would anger voters of the populist AfD in Germany. Chancellor Merkel will have to walk a very thin line between the realpolitik of growing her domestic base of support and pursuing the White Book’s strategy that calls for unprecedented levels of integration in the EU and strong support for NATO.

If the CDU does not win the 2017 election, the White Paper is unlikely to be implemented. Yet attempting to implement its proposals now, before the election, will hurt the CDU’s chances in the election. However, if the current German government does not at least begin the implementation of the White Paper, the international community will dismiss Germany’s willingness, “to take on responsibility for Europe’s security,” as nothing more than lip service.26 The jury is out on whether Donald Trump’s election will shock Europeans into increased cooperation, thus easing the burden of responsibility on Merkel. Perhaps his election will divide Europe further as states rush into bi-lateral agreements with a United States that is skeptical of existing alliances.

The purpose of my study is not to argue whether implementation of the White Paper is better than its non-implementation, but to analyze speed-bumps on the way toward its success.

Of the three pillars on which its successful implementation significantly rests, increased domestic support in the time leading up to the 2017 elections is the timeliest

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26 White Paper, 6.
and therefore most important. Responses to Russian influence can be developed simultaneously – something that will actually help the CDU maintain its standing among the electorate. Germany needs to pump enough bilge water to keep the promise of the European project afloat for another year, while ensuring that the next generation of the German leadership receive a mandate in 2017 to pursue the strategy of the White Paper. Deflating the influence Russia has on the German people will go a long way towards this goal. These three obstacles stand in the way of implementing the White Paper in the first place. If the White Paper survives these hurdles, it will become a part of German Security Policy. Only time can provide the perspective to judge if it contains the right strategies to pursue or not.
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