Shoemaker, Self-Blindness and Moore’s Paradox
Claremont McKenna College, Philosophy (CMC)
I show how the 'innersense' (quasiperceptual) view of introspection can be defended against Shoemaker's influential 'argument from selfblindness'. If introspection and perception are analogous, the relationship between beliefs and introspective knowledge of them is merely contingent. Shoemaker argues that this implies the possibility that agents could be selfblind, i.e., could lack any introspective awareness of their own mental states. By invoking Moore's paradox, he rejects this possibility. But because Shoemaker's discussion conflates introspective awareness and selfknowledge, he cannot establish his conclusion. There is thirdperson evidence available to the selfblind which Shoemaker ignores, and it can account for the considerations from Moore's paradox that he raises.
© 2003 The Philophical Quarterly
Kind, Amy. 2003. “Shoemaker, Self-Blindness and Moore’s Paradox,” The Philosophical Quarterly 53: 39-48