Managerial Incentives for Compliance with Environmental Information Disclosure Programs
The essays in this volume will be illuminating for both researchers and practitioners, specifically in relation to questions of environmental policy and how a proposed change in incentives or benefits might affect behavior and consequently, the likely success of a policy. This book argues that the experimental evidence complements theoretic insights, field date and simulating models to improve our understanding of the underlying assumptions and incentives that drive behavioral responses to policy.
Covering topical areas of interest such as tradable permit markets, common property and public goods, regulation and compliance and valuation and preferences, the critical advantage of this volume is that each section concludes with discussion points written by economists who do not use experimental methods.
© 2017 Taylor & Francis Group
Evans, Mary F., Scott M. Gilpatric, Michael McKee, and Christian A. Vossler, Managerial Incentives for Compliance with Environmental Information Disclosure Programs, in "Experimental Methods, Environmental Economics" Routledge, UK (eds. T. Cherry, J. Shogren, and S. Kroll), 244-260, 2008.