The Regional Roots of Development Politics in India: A Divided Leviathan

Title

The Regional Roots of Development Politics in India: A Divided Leviathan

Files

Description

India is widely regarded as the most celebrated case of a “failed” developmental state, seemingly the exception that belies the prediction of a triumphant Asian century. Its central political and economic institutions have been variously characterized as both “soft” and “strong”—at once weak, predatory, and interventionist. Aseema Sinha presents an innovative model that questions conventional views of economic development by showing that the Indian state is a divided leviathan: its developmental failure is the combined product of central-local interactions and political choices by regional elites. To develop this disaggregated model, she examines three regional states with sharply divergent development trajectories: Gujarat, West Bengal, and Tamil Nadu. Drawing on recent work in comparative political economy, the theory of nested games, incentive theory, and an ethnographic analysis of business actors, this study directs analytical attention at the creation of micro-institutions at the subnational level, explores the role of provinces in shaping investment flows, and considers the role of federalism as a mediating institution shaping the vertical strategies of provinces. A comparative chapter applies the model to data from China, Brazil, Russia, and the former Soviet Union.

ISBN

978-0-253-21681-6

Publication Date

3-22-2005

Publisher

Indiana University Press

City

Indianapolis

Keywords

central-local interactions, regional elites, incentive theory, federalism

Disciplines

Economics | Growth and Development | Models and Methods | Political Science

Comments

*The book manuscript received an award titled “Joseph Elder Book Manuscript Prize for Indian Social Sciences” by the American Institute of Indian Studies in 2005.