Graduation Year

2015

Date of Submission

12-2014

Document Type

Open Access Senior Thesis

Degree Name

Bachelor of Arts

Department

Economics-Accounting

Rights Information

© 2014 Max Winsberg

Abstract

The National Football League’s salary cap constrains the available resources each franchise is allotted to spend on player personnel. I examine the effects of executive management’s compensation allocation strategies on team performance from 2006 to 2013. The findings suggest that spending more than the league-average on offensive lineman hurts overall team performance. Spending above the league average on both the offensive line and quarterback positions negatively affects offensive performance as well. This supports previous research stating that taking a superstar-approach to cap distribution negatively affects team performance. Furthermore, I find evidence of increased compensation inequality among players under the Collective Bargaining Agreement of 2011 compared to that of 1993.

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