Title

Stochastically Equivalent Sequential Auctions with Multi-Unit Demands

Graduation Year

2015

Date of Submission

4-2015

Document Type

Open Access Senior Thesis

Degree Name

Bachelor of Arts

Department

Economics

Reader 1

Yaron Raviv

Terms of Use & License Information

Terms of Use for work posted in Scholarship@Claremont.

Rights Information

© 2015 Tongjia Shi

Abstract

Past empirical analysis show that in contrast to the theory predictions; prices tend to decline in some sequential auctions, a puzzle known as the declining price anomaly. Several theoretical explanations were proposed demonstrating the possibility of a declining price pattern under certain assumptions. In this paper, we demonstrate that when bidders have private values and multi-unit demand, expected selling price can be increasing, constant, decreasing or even non-monotonic. In our model, price pattern depends on the distributions from which bidder valuations are drawn (including the size of the bidders demand reduction), and the number of bidders.

Share

COinS