Graduation Year
Spring 2014
Document Type
Campus Only Senior Thesis
Degree Name
Bachelor of Arts
Department
Economics-Accounting
Reader 1
Matthew Magilke
Terms of Use & License Information
Rights Information
© 2014 Marisa Orozco
Abstract
This paper examines the effects of disclosures on information asymmetry by studying bid-ask spreads around independent management forecasts and earnings announcements released with forecasts. The findings suggest the disclosure of independent management forecasts increase information asymmetry in the market rather than resolving it. Regulation FD has reduced the overall level of information asymmetry in the market with respect to both earnings announcements and management forecasts although it has a greater effect on management forecasts, post-forecast spreads. Closer analysis reveals that when “good news” forecasts and separated from “bad news” independent management forecasts, good news management forecasts decrease information asymmetry. Since initial tests demonstrated that management forecasts increase information asymmetry, these findings suggests that the magnitude of the effect of bad news management forecasts is greater than that of good news forecasts.
Recommended Citation
Orozco, Marisa, "An Examination of Bid-Ask Spreads: How Do Management Forecasts Affect Information Asymmetry?" (2014). CMC Senior Theses. 945.
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/945
This thesis is restricted to the Claremont Colleges current faculty, students, and staff.
