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Natural Resources as a Source of Conflict in the Middle East

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Natural Resources as a Source of Conflict in the Middle East

A Discussion of Islamic Fundamentalism's Resistance to
the Effects of Modernization on Oil and Water

By
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Thesis submitted to the Department of Religious Studies, Pitzer
College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
of Bachelor of Arts

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Zayn Kassam and Richard Hazlett

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Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION.....	5
CHAPTER 1 Religion as a Source of Conflict?	
Introduction.....	20
Criticisms of the theory of secularization.....	22
Is religion is declining or thriving?.....	24
Secularization Theory in the Modern World.....	31
A Clash of Civilizations?.....	34
Critiques of the “Clash of Civilizations”.....	37
The Location of the Holy.....	40
Conclusion.....	41
CHAPTER 2 View from the US	
Introduction.....	43
The US’ driving forces.....	45
McWorld.....	52
Neoconservatism and Leo Strauss.....	56
Doctrines supporting the US’ hegemonic power.....	63
A image for a hidden agenda.....	68
Conclusion.....	71
CHAPTER 3 The response from the Muslim Perspective	
Introduction.....	72
Gramscian approach.....	74
Jahiliyyah.....	80
Wahhabism.....	80
Sayyid Qutb.....	88
The current Islamic mindset.....	98
Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda.....	100
Conclusion.....	114
CHAPTER 4 The response from the Muslim Perspective	
Introduction.....	115
History of Oil and its US-Arab relationship.....	116
Backlash and the “Oil Sword”.....	123
Conclusion.....	130
CHAPTER 5 Resource Wars: Water in Palestine	
Introduction.....	132
National Identity.....	133
Sources of Water in Palestine.....	139
Israel’s use of Water.....	142

Conflicts in Palestine.....	147
The history of the US alliance with Israel.....	149
Conclusion.....	154
CONCLUSION.....	155
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	160

Introduction

Thesis Proposal

1. Introduction

In the past decade, the world has seen a shift in the determining factor for power and authority. Religion and land have been influential factors deciding who or who does not have power across continents, time, and civilizations. In the 21st century, these two sources of influence have lost their supremacy in determining a nation's power or authority. Power and authority are now defined by a nation's access to and influence over resources. Resources define the position of a nation in terms of its economy, society, and political structure and influence. The Middle East exists as a perfect microcosm for studying the complex relationship of resources with the dichotomy of power, seen in the conflict over oil and water. The region's resource conflicts are often emphasized due to its extreme amount of and geopolitical status of resources. Oil is found in large quantities in the Persian Gulf, specifically in Saudi Arabia, while water is found in relatively scarce quantities in the region, specifically in Palestine.

To mask the competition for oil and water in the Middle East, civilizations and religion are often blamed for having a substantial role in the atmosphere of the conflict-ridden region. The common conception of the clash between the US and the Muslim world is portrayed as *the* source of conflicts. Through the theory of the "clash of civilizations" by Samuel Huntington, tensions arise because of differences in religious views, correlated with disagreements in practices, moral beliefs, and lifestyles. In the Middle East, Islamic fundamentalism (a Muslim minority) becomes

the face of modern resistance to the US. The Islamic response of resistance to the modernizing world should not be attributed to differing civilizations and religions, but to the opposition of structural pressures experienced in the Muslim world and encouraged by the “rationalized,” “Western” world. The grievance of Islamic fundamentalists who ask for a revival of society are reacting against the influence of Western colonialism, seen through the influence and effect of resources, like oil and water, that support the institution of structure pressures of one nation onto another.

The world’s dependence on oil has exponentially grown due to the evolution of technology that needs a constant influx of energy to sustain its activities. The world’s oil dependence began in 1859 when the United States developed the first large-scale petroleum industry, which maintained the US’ economic growth through the 20th century. The Standard Oil Company, Aramco, and Atlantic Richfield were established as the first large multinational corporations to capitalize on the discovery of the profitable resource of oil.¹ Before World War II, the United States was one of the few nations that possessed oil, which helped to build the US’ economy domestically and internationally.² Looking at the US’ success, other nations began to invest in the oil industry for the development and protection of their nation, increasing the international demand for oil dramatically. At the same time, due to the discovery and development of the oil industry, the Middle East became an important region for the US due to the emerging oil reserves that would be vital to the US’ future national security.

¹ Michael Klare. *Blood and Oil* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004), 8

² Ibid. 9

Saudi Arabia was one of the first nations in the Middle East to be drastically affected by US influence. Rich in oil reserves, the kingdom was one of the first nations in the Gulf to have the US military stationed within its borders to ensure the free flow of oil. An alliance between the US and Saudi Arabia was initiated to ensure the safety of the kingdom's oil reserves, while generating at the same time an emerging radical Islamic response to the structural pressures exerted by the US. The development of this resource and its ensuing influence in the Middle East has kept the world in a constant battle over the power, availability, and protection of oil ever since.

The conflict over water in Palestine lies at both the Israelis and Palestinians' desire for an independent nation. Water is a fundamental source of life and is essential for structuring, developing, and modernizing a state, the goal for both the Israelis and Palestinians. The harsh, desert climate of Palestine poses numerous problems concerning the conflict over water since both identities share the similar environmental obstacle. The severe climate produces difficult and complex conditions for water usage as well as the sustainability of human water supplies and ecosystems. In the Middle East, each region's ecosystem must find a way to sustain its needs for the populations, whether through terrestrial or aquatic water sources. Presently, Israel has control of the majority of water sources in Palestine, while the Palestinians are given substantially fewer rights to water sources. These sources include the Mountain Aquifer and the Jordan River, which are equally needed by both groups for their population's basic human needs. The West Bank proves to be the center region for water rights of the Jordan River that are predominantly controlled by Israel, putting

Palestine in the subservient position. The position of Israel's control over water rights and sources in Palestine is due to certain structural pressures that elevate the complexity of the conflict. Water is the determining factor of power and rests at the heart of the conflict in Palestine.

The two resources, oil and water, fuel the world as it modernizes and globalizes. The struggle over resources underscores the conflict that occurs in response to Western influence in the Middle East and the numerous individuals upset by its current economic and political order.

2. Subject of Thesis

While the introduction lays out the general idea of the struggle over resources, the deeper subtext discusses the origins for the US' drive to maintain control over resources in the Middle East and the reactions to the Western-style society from the Muslim world. The US holds the dominant force in the world for numerous reasons, which nations often attempt to imitate due to its political and economic success. Its dominant role is attributed to two reasons: first, to the need for resource security to maintain its high-consumption rate and second, the maintenance of the US dollar's position in the international oil market. A different economic strategy results from the US' international force driven by the US' neoconservative movement for "Pax Americana," or total American domination. The US' hidden agendas for resource domination are hidden by the way the Muslim world is portrayed seen similarly to the depictions of Soviets during the Cold War.

Thus when the Muslim world responds to the industrialized world of modernization and globalization, Islamic fundamentalism (or political Islam) is fatally misunderstood in its attempt to respond to the modern, rationalized world of the US interests in the Middle East. A small Muslim minority of Islamic fundamentalists became the face of Islam, obscuring and misinterpreting Islam's entire message at the price of starting a 'cosmic war.' The response calls for a reemergence of Islam in societies seen as too modern or too "Western," and Islam existing as the savior for the world's problems of corruption, materialism, and immorality. The 18th century leader of the Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia, al-Wahhab, and the 20th century Egyptian radical thinker, Sayyid Qutb, both played influential roles in Islamic fundamentalism in the 21st century. Both articulate the struggle against invading forces framed by their own experiences with foreign powers, which hinder the proselytization of Islam. However, the reality lies in the fact that conflict results from the hatred of certain radical Islamic fundamentalists towards the modernization of their world as a result of structural powers applied to societies seen with oil and water.

The conflicts over resources stress the noteworthy concern over the effect of Western structural pressures in Muslim societies. The concern of Islamic fundamentalists over the US' international influence represents a clash of human interests rather than a clash of civilizations or religions. Illuminating the US' excessive consumption and exploitation of the world's resources, the US' hidden structural pressures are demystified as a tangible force as the protection of resources.³

³ David Orr. "Millennial Hope: Climate Change and Far Horizon for Possibility." 2008 Hart Institute Lecture Series, Pomona College, Claremont, California

Organization

Chapter 1 is a discussion of the theoretical position of religion in modern society using the two hypotheses, Max Weber's "secularization theory" and Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations." The secularization theory states that the modern world in the 20th century has experienced a decline of religion in society, religious beliefs, practices, and institutions. The chapter begins with criticisms of the theory that it is a valid premise for argument, seen in the articles, "Toward Desacralizing Secularization Theory," by Jeffrey K. Hadden, and, "The Case Against Secularization Theory: A Rebuttal," by Frank J. Lechner⁴. A discussion follows of the varying opinions regarding the secularization theory and whether or not it is correct. Peter Berger and Mark Chaves support secularization theory, while David Brooks and Rodney Stark refute the argument and believe religion is thriving.

The "clash of civilizations" presents the hypothesis that our world's conflicts are over differing civilizations, cultures, and religions. Huntington's argument is explained and elaborated on, followed by a criticism and rejection of the legitimacy of the argument. Edward Said's article titled, "The Clash of Definitions,"⁵ and Roy P. Mottahedeh's article titled, "The Clash of Civilizations: An Islamicist's Critique,"⁶ are used to negate the "clash of civilizations" hypothesis. The chapter ends with a

⁴ Jeffrey K. Hadden. "Toward Desacralizing Secularization Theory," *Social Forces*, Vol. 65, No. 3 (Mar., 1987), Frank J. Lechner. "The Case against Secularization: A Rebuttal." *Social Forces*, Vol. 69, No. 4 (Jun., 1991)

⁵ Edward W. Said, "The Clash of Definitions," in *The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Entity*, ed. Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003)

⁶ Roy P. Mottahedeh, "The Clash of Civilizations: An Islamicist's Critique," in *The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Entity*, ed. Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 133.

discussion of the sacred and how it has changed during the modern age. Max L. Stackhouse's article, "The Location of the Holy,"⁷ is used to discuss this argument that the sacred and the holy are seen differently than its past uses in society.

In order to introduce Islamic fundamentalism, I used Roxanne L. Euben's book *Enemy in the Mirror* to discuss its relationship with the "rationalized" society that influences the movement's very existence, purpose, and actions, however creating a culturally constructed discourse. The "rationalism" denotes a "progress of reason" from 19th century theories of rationalization, linked first to the advance of Western culture that results in a modernized narrative.⁸ Rationalized societies create the phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalism as a functional, epiphenomenal paradox by assuming its reactions are solely politically or socio-economically motivated, which further reinforces the neglect of the fundamentalist view as being valid and justified. Likewise, the vital characteristics of the movement's religious faith and inspiration are disregarded, and become "functionalized" to the point that its true meaning is misconstrued into an "irrational," distorted meaning. The resistance of Islamic fundamentalism to the struggle against Western structural pressures uses a cultural and political context to mobilize their protest against modernization through the claim of religious reform.

The purpose of the chapter is to expose the reality of the place of religion and Islamic fundamentalism in the context of conflict. Natural resources, intertwined with political mobilization, are the tangible influences acting upon the Middle East that Islamic fundamentalism resists to in the name of religious revival. Oil and water stand

⁷ Max L. Stackhouse. "The Location of the Holy." *The Journal of Religious Ethics*. Vol. 4, No. 1 (1976)

⁸ Roxanne L. Euben. *The Enemy in the Mirror*. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 21.

as the two most important natural resources in the Middle East, and create a torrent of charged interests to the region.

Chapter 2 is a discussion of the new religion of the world from the Western perspective, the “religion of the market,” where the globalization and modernization takes the place of the holy and sacred. The obscured view of the “war on terror” occurs as a result of the US’ concern to protect and secure their economic, social, and geopolitical powers on the world scene, specifically in the Middle East. The US’ current world economic strategy, known as “McWorld”, is represented through the US’ frantic concern to control the world’s dwindling natural resources and to lock the US dollar as the primary form of currency. Neo-conservatism and its founding father, Leo Strauss, are discussed to provide a basis for where the US began its interventionalist approach to foreign policy, followed by its percolation into the White House beginning with President Ronald Reagan. The US’ current policies on foreign affairs are elaborated on, looking at universality, the promotion of democracy, and the agenda used to achieve its hidden interests.

Chapter 3 deconstructs the Islamic fundamental resistance to the world’s current political systems and wielded structural pressure, described in Chapter 2. The Wahhabi movement and Sayyid Qutb have influenced the Islamic fundamental mindset in the Middle East due to their reaction against imperial forces through the incorporation of religion and political mobilization. The Wahhabi movement began in Saudi Arabia in the 18th century as a puritanical form of Islam, which traveled to Afghanistan during the war in 1979 and remained a central facet to many of the *mujahidin* trying to bring about a global Wahhabi campaign. Sayyid Qutb was an

Egyptian Islamist fundamental thinker in the 20th century that called for a revitalization of the *jahiliyyah* society, or state of barbarous ignorance that opposes the Islamic constitution, state, and laws,⁹ which Qutb saw as the root for the world's current state of affairs. Both the Wahhabi movement and Sayyid Qutb called for a reinstatement of Islam into the Western-influenced society that has strayed from Islam's values and morals according to *shar'ia* law, and fallen into a state of *jahiliyyah*. The chapter concludes with a dialogue over these influential voices on current Islamic fundamental mindsets, seen with Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. The current movement's response to the West is framed in a similar fashion to the previous thinkers' responses to imperial influence. Conflict in the Middle East does not concern differing civilizations or religions, but calls attention to the rapidly changing world that, in some eyes, is seen as hazardous to all aspects of life.

Chapter 4 and 5 explain the tangible examples (natural resources), rather than solely differing civilizations or religions, to explain the conflicts between the US and Islamic fundamentalism. Chapter 4 details the complex relationship of the US and the Persian Gulf, specifically in Saudi Arabia, over the control and flow of oil. A historical outline of the US' dependence on foreign oil is charted, followed by the attempt of the US to create and maintain a force over oil and power in the Middle East against the "oil sword" of Saudi Arabia. Chapter 5 describes the place of water within the Israeli-Palestinian peace conflict and its force that remains at the heart of the Israeli and Palestinian claim to nationhood. Palestine's sources of water are described, followed by its allocation to Israeli and Palestinian populations. Each

⁹ Wanttoknow.info. DaanSpeak. "Power of Nightmares-The Rise of the Politics of Fear." Episode 1, "Baby It's Cold Outside." <http://www.daanspeak.com/TranscriptPowerOfNightmares1.html> (Accessed April 2, 2009)

group equally needs adequate water sources to support the possibility of a strong and prospering nation, which is one of the key factors in violence and conflict in Palestine.

Literary Review

The general methodological theories that permeate through this thesis are ones that discuss the misleading dichotomy of the “West” versus the “East” or “us” versus “them.” Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis introduce the simplistic reason of the “clash of civilizations” to explain the world’s conflicts in their articles titled “Clash of Civilizations?” and “The Roots of Muslim Rage.” Their work is used to show the subjective accusation that simplifies the conflict into a theoretical and mystified concept, which rapidly grows in the general public opinion largely unnoticed.

Edward Said’s *Orientalism*, published in 1978, is used to analyze the Western view towards the Middle East regarding the “us” versus “them” paradigm.¹⁰ The definition of “Orientalism” is important for this discussion due to this topic’s rejection of this imperialistic and oversimplified Orientalist view. Said’s work sheds light on the break down of the Orientalist view that oversimplifies the differing civilizations and cultures.

The literature in Chapter 1 is organized into the subsections of the two theories, the secularization theory and the “clash of civilization.” Even though the decline of religion has been hypothesized since the Enlightenment, and later thoroughly defined as the secularization theory by Max Weber in the first half of the

¹⁰ Edward Said. *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978)

20th century, the majority of literature discussing the theory was published after 1960. Articles from the two magazines, *Sociology of Religion* and *Social Forces*, are used to deconstruct the validity of the theory in order to give an accurate foundation for readers concerning the secularization theory. Similarly from these two articles, I looked at 20th century authors that refuted and supported the secularization theory and thematically set up the chapter accordingly. Contributing authors to *The Atlantic Monthly* supported and refuted the secularization theory, like David Brooks and Peter Berger, which proves that literature on the theory is (first), expansive and has been thoroughly analyzed, and (second), has transcended from solely academic circles to media and political ones.

The literature for the subsection of the “clash of civilizations” begins in 1990 with Bernard Lewis’ article, “The Roots of Muslim Rage.”¹¹ Samuel Huntington develops Lewis’ theory of the “clash of civilizations” in his own article published in *Foreign Affairs* in 1993 titled, “The Clash of Civilizations?” These two articles blend together opinion and historical fact to weave a seemingly logical explanation for the reasons why the “West” is in conflict with the “East.” Literature used to criticize the theory comes from the author of *Orientalism*, Edward Said, and the Islamicist, Roy P. Mottahedeh, and together are highly critical of Huntington’s generalizing methods when explaining world conflict.

In order to bridge the chapter’s discussion of religion with Islam, two books are used to introduce Islam and the Islamic fundamentalist movement. Francis Robinson’s *Max Weber and Islam* is used to discuss Islam from Weber’s point of view. Roxanne L. Euben’s *Enemy in the Mirror* is used to demonstrate Islamic

¹¹ Bernard Lewis. “The Roots of Muslim Rage.” *The Atlantic Monthly*. 1990.

fundamentalism as a social science model rather than a solely theological one. Modern rationalism influences the movement's definition as a social science model, which provides vital insight into the Islamic fundamental mindset. The rationalist viewpoint also influences structural pressures exerted on Muslim nations. This section of Chapter 1 helps lead into Chapter 2's discussion of the US' influence in international affairs, explaining the origins and tangible policies of the rationalist perspective.

The literature for Chapter 2 is comprised of quantitative and qualitative research used to bolster the US' interest for control over resources and power internationally. Benjamin R. Barber's term of "McWorld" is used to explain the US' type of interest, while Noam Chomsky, Michael Klare, and William R. Clark are used to detail the US' dependence on foreign oil and its desire to maintain the US dollar's global position. For a historical understanding of the origins of the US' foreign policies and rationalized world, literature on Leo Strauss' "natural right" is employed. The documentary, The Power of Nightmares, is used to show one perception of the US' hidden international agenda, in addition to the basis for the final section discussing the formed "hidden enemy."

Chapter 3 uses primary and secondary sources to delve into the meaning behind the grievances from the Muslim perspective concerning the modernized and rationalized world. To frame the discussion on Islamic fundamentalism, the Gramscian approach is used as a methodological tool to explain the Islamic fundamentalist response to the US' international strategy and perspective, seen in Thomas R. Bates' article titled, "Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony." Muslim

perspectives from the 18th and 20th century reacting to imperial powers frames the current Islamic fundamental mindset using the primary sources of *Kitab al-Tawhid* by Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as well as *Social Justice in Islam* and *Milestones* by Sayyid Qutb. Secondary sources provide analysis for each thinker's rationale, seen in Richard Booney's *Jihad, from Qur'an to Bin Laden* and John Esposito's *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*. Stephen Schartz's *The Two Faces of Islam* and the documentary, [The Power of Nightmares](#), are controversial sources due to their subjective perspectives, yet are carefully used for their historical explanations. The effect of these past Islamic thinkers is exposed through a discussion of Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, using Bruce Lawrence's *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden* as a primary source.

The literature of Chapter's 4 and 5 also include quantitative and qualitative data to demonstrate the influence of resources in conflicts in the Middle East. Concerning Chapter 4's discussion of oil, in 2004 and 2005 alone, twenty books were published about the emerging crisis of oil as a dwindling natural resource.¹² For this thesis, I used two of Michael Klare's books titled, *Blood and Oil*, and *Resource Wars*. *Blood and Oil* discusses the relationship between the US and its dependence on oil, mainly foreign, and the numerous consequences it will have for the US' future.¹³ *Resource Wars* discusses oil and other natural resources that are being demanded by the world's growing populations and consumption rates.¹⁴ Klare highlights the sizeable influence that resources have on conflicts in regions around the world,

¹² "The Power of Community: How Cuba Survived Peak Oil." Copyright Community Service, Inc. 53 mins. www.communitysolution.org/cuba accessed April 6, 2009

¹³ Michael Klare. *Blood and Oil*

¹⁴ Michael Klare. *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2001)

clashing over oil, water, timber, gems and minerals. Resources become a geopolitical concern for nations that depend on the resources for their nation's livelihood.

Matthew R. Simmons' book titled, *Twilight in the Desert*, and Steven Emerson's book titled, *The American House of Saud: The Secret Petrodollar Connection*, both touch on the US' alliance with the kingdom of Saudi Arabia over the control and availability of oil.¹⁵ While Emerson's book must be looked at as a subjective source due to its slanted perspective on the Saudi regime, the two works give extensive history and background on the US' influence over oil and control in Saudi Arabia at the beginning of the 20th century.

For the discussion of water, the article titled, "Religion, State, and the International System in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," provides an important groundwork for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, highlighting the nationalist and statist relations as the source of conflict rather than for religious or theological reasons.¹⁶ Water rights directly influence the goal of a nation or state, yet in Palestine are unequally distributed throughout the region's populations siding either with the plight of the Israelis or Palestinians. Herbert C. Kelman's chapter in the book, *Islam, Judaism, and the Political Role of Religion the Middle East*¹⁷, deconstructs the idea of national identity and its meaning for each group.

¹⁵ Matthew R. Simmons. *Twilight in the Desert: The Steven Emerson. The American House of Saud: The Secret Petrodollar Connection* (New York: New Republic, 1985) *Coming Saudi Oil Shock and the World Economy* (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2005),

¹⁶ Hillel Frisch, Shmuel Sandler, "Religion, State, and the International System in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict." *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 25, no. 1 (January 2004), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601623>,

¹⁷ Herbert C. Kelman. "National Identity and the Role of the 'Other' in Existential Conflicts: The Israeli-Palestinian Case," in *Islam, Judaism and the Political Role of Religion in the Middle East*, edited by John Bunzl, 61-74. Florida: University Press of Florida, 2004.

I used three articles that provide quantitative data for understanding the water sources in Palestine, and the allotted amount for Israelis and Palestinians. Hillel Shuval's article in the spring 2000 edition of *Arab Studies Quarterly* gives a general overview of the quantitative data of the region's wells and springs, amount of, sources of, and its production and consumption rates of water.¹⁸ Nadav Morag's article in the *Middle Eastern Quarterly* in 2001¹⁹ offers the discussion of water rights from the Israeli perspective, while Munther J. Haddadin's article in *The Geographical Journal* in 2002²⁰ presents the water rights from the Palestinian perspective. The three authors are crucial for their quantitative research concerning the water sources in Palestine.

By bridging together topics ranging from philosophy, politics, Islamic theory, and natural resources, my thesis proves to demonstrate the power and influence of natural resources in our current world. In the 21st century, the current conflicts are the Islamic fundamentalist response to the structural pressures from natural resources controlled by Western influences. This perceived confrontation is not due to differing religions or civilizations, but to an evolving society that deems tradition as more important than modernization.

¹⁸ Hillel I. Shuval. "A proposal for an equitable resolution to the conflicts between the Israelis and the Palestinians over the shared water resources of the mountain aquifer." *Arab Studies Quarterly*. Belmont: Spring 2000, Vol. 22, Iss. 2, pg. 33.

¹⁹ Nadav Morag. "Water, Geopolitics and State Building: The Case of Israel." *Middle Eastern Quarterly*, Vol. 37, no. 3, (July 2001).

²⁰ Munther Haddadin. "Water in the Middle East Peace Process." *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 168, No. 4, Water Wars? Geographical Perspectives. December 2002. 324-340.

Chapter 1

Religion as the Source for Conflict?

Introduction

Since the Enlightenment of the 17th century, the place of religion in society has been the subject of much debate. Thomas Woolston, an English deist of the 17th century, theorized that modernity would prevail over the Christian faith by 1900.²¹ Yet in the 20th century, a German sociologist named Max Weber pioneered the term “the secularization theory” stating that society in the 20th century is less dependent on the authority of religion as a position of authority and religion has lost its past social significance.²² According to A Dictionary of Sociology, religion is measured “by religious attendance, commitment to orthodox belief, support for organized religion in terms of payments, membership, and respect.”²³ Frank J. Lechner, a critic of the actual premise of the theory, defines secularization as “a general theory of societal change, consisting of a coherent body of empirical generalizations that rests on fundamental Weberian premise.” Lechner notes that religion in Western societies experienced a decline “in cultural and social influence of religious ideas and institutions.”²⁴ Lechner also observes the importance of the emergence of rationalization that changes certain societies transcendental worldviews, becoming deeply sacralized.²⁵

²¹ Rodney Stark. “Secularization, R.I.P.” *Sociology of Religion*, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Autumn, 1999), 249.

²² Andrew Giddings. “The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion by Peter Berger.” INDS 581: Christian Faith and Practice in a (Post) Modern World. Craig M. Gay

²³ Gordon Marshall. “secularization.” A Dictionary of Sociology, 1998.

<http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O88-secularization.html> accessed April 11, 2009

²⁴ Frank J. Lechner. “The Case against Secularization: A Rebuttal.” *Social Forces*, Vol. 69, No. 4 (Jun., 1991), 1106.

²⁵ *Ibid.* 1104.

The root of the secularization theory developed from the Weberian view of rationality within the Christian West. According to the theory, rationality increases with the “human capacity to calculate and to control all aspects of life without appeals either to traditional norms or to charismatic enthusiasm.”²⁶ As the economy, legal system, and society move towards a more rational and technological form of living, individuals rely less on religion to control their lives, known as Weber’s “disenfranchisement of the world”²⁷. “To find direction, and to win security in this world and the next, the human being no longer needs either to revere or coerce the spirits.”²⁸ Science also explains natural and cultural facets of the world, downgrading religion’s importance in public life, and creating a “fragmentation of human [understandings] of the world.”²⁹ Religion is forced out of economic, political, and social conduct, is separated from private and public life, and no longer stands as one large, cohesive entity. Disenchantment and fragmentation of human understandings of the world characterize the secularization theory as its main themes concerning the change of religion in society.

The majority of Max Weber’s work is a unique Western development centering in Western Europe, yet holds great importance for looking at secularization theory in the Islamic world. Through the Weberian lens of the modern Western vision of studying the civilizations, rationalist views, and capitalist theories, Islam is used as

²⁶ Francis Robinson. “Secularization, Weber, and Islam.” In *Max Weber and Islam*, ed. Toby E. Huff and Wolfgang Schluchter (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1999), 231.

²⁷ Frank J. Lechner. “The Case against Secularization: A Rebuttal.” 1106.

²⁸ Ibid

²⁹ Ibid.

the anomaly to explain why they did not develop in Islam.³⁰ While S.N. Eisenstadt believes that Weber's understanding and description of Islam in civilizations is wrong³¹, his concept of Islam in relation to the secularization in societies is vital for our discussion.

The next section will look at the secularization theory, including a general critique of the theory, followed by its rejection and support by numerous authors, and ending with the application of secularization to the Islamic world. Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations" will follow the Weberian perspective on secularization in the Islamic world to further understand religion's place.

Criticisms of the actual theory of secularization

In Jeffrey K. Hadden's article, "Toward Desacralizing Secularization Theory," Hadden finds numerous challenges to the secularization theory. The basis for Weber's theory rests on the 'presuppositions . . . [that] represent a taken-for-granted ideology' of social scientists 'rather than a systematic set of interrelated propositions.'³² It is "causally" used as a link between the decline of religion and modernization, yet no definitive link is given to hold the two together other than the proposition of their relation as an "orienting concept."³³ Religion is also difficult to qualitatively measure because of its subjective nature, noting Charles Glock's opinion: "It is extremely

³⁰ S.N. Eisenstadt. "Weber's Analysis of Islam and the Specific Pattern of Islamic Civilizations." In *Max Weber and Islam*, ed. Toby E. Huff and Wolfgang Schluchter (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1999), 281.

³¹ Ibid. 282.

³² William H. Jr Swatos and Kevin J. Christiano. "Secularization Theory: The Course of a Concept." *Sociology of Religion*, Fall 1999, 211.

³³ Jeffrey K. Hadden. "Toward Desacralizing Secularization Theory," *Social Forces*, Vol. 65, No. 3 (Mar., 1987) 598.

doubtful that accurate statistics can be produced through manipulating the unreliable ones.”³⁴ Religious movements of the 1960’s and 1970’s in the US and Europe, like the new Christian and Eastern religious revivals, are improperly used to support the theory, and instead are the result of a socially constructed counterculture. Finally, religion is described in privatized terms, or the religion meant for the individual, which downplays its influence in politics, seen in issues such as Catholics versus Protestants in Northern Ireland, Muslims versus Jews in Palestine, and the fanatical overthrow of the Shah of Iran.³⁵ Reasons for conflict are reduced to ethnic hostilities rather than taking into account the effect of religion.

Hadden’s four challenges to the secularization theory draw back to his conclusion that the theory is “very much a product of the social and cultural milieu from which it emerged.” Corresponding to Hadden’s critical stance against the theory, the works of a professor of sociologist at Emory University, Frank J. Lechner, is used to discern criticisms concerning the secularization theory. Frank J. Lechner provides five criticisms for the theory in his article titled, “The Case Against Secularization Theory: A Rebuttal.”³⁶ Lechner’s main argument against secularization theory states that the theory claims “to account for societal variations in secularization, relying on contingent features of social change and religious arrangements in different societies.”³⁷ Lechner supports Hadden’s criticism as valuable insights to the discussion of secularization, yet disagrees with the way in which he approaches the debate.

³⁴ Ibid. 599.

³⁵ Ibid. 606.

³⁶ Frank J. Lechner. “The Case against Secularization: A Rebuttal.” 1104

³⁷ Ibid. 1105.

Contrary to Hadden, Lechner views the secularization theory as more of a “coherent theory, Weberian in inspiration and based on a century of collective scholarly activity.”³⁸ The historical presupposition of religion having a “golden age” ignores the fact that new religions and religious behaviors have not ceased and are reoccurring. The secularization theory interprets religious decline in Western societies to degeneration rather than to religious transformation that brings about a search for new gods.

Looking generally at the secularization theory, Lechner criticizes the status and existence of the theory. He believes that religious revivals do not have an indirect relationship with secularism, and are based off of local phenomena. Religious fundamentalism exists to reverse secularization and to restore a religious order to the secularized world. It is given a purpose to desecularize in the purpose-lacking secular world. Social and cultural strengths of religious institutions account for the local phenomenon of religious fundamentalism, rather than on account of the actual secularization process.³⁹

Lechner’s final claim is that secularization theory is irrelevant, and globalism is the culprit for creating a new world order and global change. The secularization theory must be treated “as at best a partial account of a part of the overall process of global change and as a problematic component of global culture.”⁴⁰ The secularization theory cannot merely apply to individual societies, but must encompass a new ‘global theory.’ It needs to move out of the idea that everything initially came from the Middle Ages “Christendom” as Western-centered, rooted in Christian origin.

³⁸ Ibid. 1106.

³⁹ Ibid. 1114.

⁴⁰ Ibid. 1115.

Whether the secularization theory is true or false, a discussion of both sides will be necessary to supplement religion's role in world.

Is religion is declining or thriving?

There is a varied amount of scholarship concerning the support of the secularization theory, seen by authors such as Bryan Wilson, Thomas Luckman, Karel Dubbelaere, Mark Chaves, and Peter Berger. The opinions of Mark Chaves and Peter Berger in support of the secularization theory will follow that add valuable insights to this side of the theory.

Seen in Peter Berger's book titled, *The Sacred Canopy*, Berger supports secularization theory and sees religion as declining. He argues that humans require a "sacred canopy" in order to make sense of the world, because meaninglessness is a threat to our need for an orderly universe."⁴¹ Berger agrees to an extent that religion is reemerging due to the importance of religion as an "internal supporting structure," to society, known as a process of legitimating. His notion of reality and individuals creates legitimizations that "answer the 'why' questions concerning 'institutional arrangements.'"⁴² Legitimizing "reinforce the what's and the why's of society" as new people become a part of the religion as well as during a crisis, either collective or individual, where "the veil between meaning and chaos grows particularly thin." Legitimizations are supported by plausibility structures, being specific social processes that reinforce and reconstruct the legitimate world, such as religion. If a plausibility

⁴¹ Gordon Marshall. "secularization."

⁴² Andrew Giddings. "The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion by Peter Berger." INDS 581: Christian Faith and Practice in a (Post) Modern World. Craig M. Gay

structure is weak, legitimations must be strong and sophisticated, speaking of religion's influence to explain the why's and what's about life. And likewise, if the plausibility structure is strong, then a relatively simple legitimation is needed, thus possibly a relatively simple explanation of the what's and why's of the world. Berger's view of religion is one that is described by religions power to "locate human phenomena within a cosmic frame of reference."

However, theodicy, defined by Berger as the explanations given of suffering, evil, and death in terms of religious legitimations, is the greatest task when explaining religious legitimation because of anthropodicy. With the move away from Catholicism, Protestantism divided the world into secular and sacred spheres that pluralized society. Competition within the religious realm over plausibility structures broke down the order of the world that used to have an "over-arching idea of truth," while in the end religion became relativized. Theology as a whole becomes criticized, with the orthodox side trying to "[assert] the objectivity of Biblical revelation." These orthodox resurgences are "merely interruptions in the secularization process."

Interestingly, in 1997 Berger took back his support for the secularization theory, noting the improper correlation between secularization and modernity. "There is some evidence for it. But I think it's basically wrong. Most of the world today is certainly not secular. It's very religious."⁴³

Through the work of Mark Chaves, secularization theory has evolved from the decline in religion to the decline in religious authority.⁴⁴ In Chaves' article titled,

⁴³ Rodney Stark. "Secularization, R.I.P." 270.

⁴⁴ Mark Chaves. "Secularization as Declining Religious Authority." *Social Forces*, Vol. 72, 1994. 754.

“Secularization as Declining Religious Authority,”⁴⁵ he describes secularization theory as reformulated in a differing manner in his “new differentiation theory”⁴⁶ than its classical perception portrays.⁴⁷ Within religion’s new definition, societal spheres that secularization theory claims to harm religion, like the state or science, do not undermine religion. “Secularization occurs, or not, as the result of social and political conflicts between those social actors who would enhance or maintain religion’s social significance and those who would reduce it.”⁴⁸ A religious authority’s legitimation can exist from this power, while its power is called upon by a supernatural referent. “Secularization as declining religious authority, then, will refer to the declining influence of social structures whose legitimation rests on reference to the supernatural.”⁴⁹

Numerous individuals believe that humanity is experiencing a growth in religious zeal opposite the secularization theory that hypothesized the decline of religion. The first to deny secularization theory was in 1965 by David Martin, a contemporary sociologist.⁵⁰

The contemporary journalist for *The Atlantic Monthly*, David Brooks, holds the anti-secularist view in the article, “Kicking the Secularist Habit.”⁵¹ Brooks notes numerous successes in the religious world concerning an increase in religious fervor. For instance, “Orthodox Judaism grows among young people, and Israel has gotten

⁴⁵ Ibid. 752.

⁴⁶ Ibid. 751.

⁴⁷ Ibid. 750.

⁴⁸ Ibid. 752.

⁴⁹ Ibid. 756.

⁵⁰ Rodney Stark. “Secularization, R.I.P.” 254.

⁵¹ David Brooks. “Kicking the Secularist Habit,” *The Atlantic Monthly*, (2003), <http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200303/brooks>, accessed April 4, 2009

more religious as it has become more affluent,”⁵² as well as the success of Philip Jenkins’s career as a proponent for Christianity’s international growth in the 20th century. Brooks also claims that denominations that *refuse* to adapt to secularism are growing the fastest, including ecstatic forms of Christianity and “anti-modern” Islam.

Rodney Stark, a fellow *Atlantic* reporter and sociologist, also argues against the secularization theory, stating that “the vision of a religionless future is but illusions.”⁵³ Stark does not agree with the secularization theory’s reciprocal relationship between modernization and religious belief. In his article titled, “Secularization R.I.P.,” he attributes and disproves five notions against the theory: the myth of the religious decline, the myth of past piety, the failure to Christianize, subjective religiousness, and the relationship of science and religion.

First, there is a universal agreement that modernization, which includes industrialization, urbanization, and rationalization, will lead to a religious decline. This assumes that modernization is a short, quick and immediate process, when in fact it’s a “long, gradual, relatively constant process,”⁵⁴ making the secularization theory extraneous. Societies are affected by multiple reasons other than modernization that can affect religious participation. A “myth” of religious decline, as well as a decline in religious piety, is created due to false and inaccurate data “based in part on very exaggerated perceptions of past religiousness.”⁵⁵

Second, the secularization theory focuses on individual piety and belief, and does not concern institutional differentiation. Today religious institutions, like the

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ William H. Jr Swatos and Kevin J. Christiano. “Secularization Theory: The Course of a Concept.” 6.

⁵⁴ Rodney Stark. “Secularization, R.I.P.” 251.

⁵⁵ Ibid. 260.

Catholic Church, have less political power than they once had. Likewise, secularization theorists believe that as the power of religious institutions decrease, so will personal piety. However, Stark feels that this focus is historically false and insincere, and cites Karel Dobbelaere's criticism that personal piety is not a valid indicator of religiosity. "The religiousness of individuals is not a valid indicator in evaluating the process of secularization."⁵⁶ For Dobbelaere, secularization is a societal-level process, "driven by functional differentiation, to which religious organizations and individuals react."⁵⁷ Important to note is Stark's mention of the subjectivity of religiosity for every individual, which should follow a certain doctrine. The lack of stereotypical religious participation, like attending church, does not correlate with the extent of a churchgoer's faith.⁵⁸

Third, there is a presumed incompatibility between religion and science, and that science "has the most deadly implications for religion."⁵⁹ By using a questionnaire from the 1914 article in *Nature* by American psychologist James Lueba, Stark noted that scientists are not "notably irreligious."⁶⁰ The findings concluded that, "over an 82-year period, there has been no decline in a very literal belief in God among scientists."⁶¹ Thus according to Lueba and used by Stark, religion has not been on the decline in the science community, which further negates the secularization theory.

⁵⁶ Ibid. 252.

⁵⁷ Mark Chaves. "Secularization as Declining Religious Authority." 754.

⁵⁸ Rodney Stark. "Secularization, R.I.P." 264.

⁵⁹ Ibid. 253

⁶⁰ Rodney Stark. "Secularization, R.I.P." 265.

⁶¹ Ibid. 266.

Fourth, Stark notes the secularization theory's focus on Christianity.

Discussion of the secularization theory must be broader than just Christianity and must study other religions and cultures globally.⁶² With respect to Islam's religious revival, Stark claims the compatibility of the Islamic faith and modernization, and even its religious commitment, as increasing with modernization.⁶³ A study done by Joseph Tamney looking at Islam in Java, Indonesia, concluded that "religious commitment was positively correlated with education and with occupational prestige."⁶⁴ People with a college education or with a high status occupation were more likely to participate in Islamic practices than people with little education and low status occupations. Stark concludes that modernization will not be the reason for the demise of faith, and the secularization theory will remain as a "product of wishful thinking."⁶⁵

The two sides to over secularization theory represent the expansive influence that religion, or the lack of religion, has on a society. The US and Europe represent societies that have become more secular in the past 100 years, while many poor developing nations show a surge in religiosity such as nations in Africa and Asia. Phil Zuckerman, a professor of sociology at Pitzer College, asserts that secularization theory must only be thought of as a possibility since no social phenomenon is inevitable. A society is constantly moving in a circular motion regarding social phenomenon, including religion's place within a society. Religion is regarded as one possible perspective concerning secularization in the West, according to Francis

⁶² Ibid. 253.

⁶³ Ibid. 267.

⁶⁴ Ibid. 268.

⁶⁵ Ibid. 269.

Robinson in “Secularization, Weber, and Islam.”⁶⁶ Secularization theory holds many different pathways concerning ideology, nationalism, and religious change.⁶⁷

Secularization Theory in the Islamic World

In the current discussion of religion’s place in the Islamic world, the secularization theory is both supported and refuted. Ernest Gellner’s forward to *Islam, Globalization, and Postmodernity* states that the secularization theory applies to Islam and argues that the Islamic world holds religion to a different degree for its incorporation into everyday life. It varies from country to country, and occurs in socially radical countries as well as fundamental ones as a result to modernization. However, in Abubaker A. Bagader’s chapter titled, “Contemporary Islamic movements in the Arab world,”⁶⁸ he refutes the notion that secularization theory applies to Islam, stating that Islam retains control between the secular and the sacred keeping them indivisible.⁶⁹

By adopting Weber’s perspectives of disenfranchisement and fragmentation, a clearer picture is illustrated when understanding the secularization theory from the perspective from the Islamic world. As Francis Robinson noted, disenfranchisement and fragmentation occur on structural levels concerning the law, learning and power, as well as in subjective terms from the consciousness of human beings. However, these classifications are from the Christian Europe perspective in addition to the fact that secularization “was a consequence of the projection of Western capital and power

⁶⁷ Gordon Marshall. “secularization.”

⁶⁸ Ernest Gellner. *Postmodernism, reason, and religion* xiv.

⁶⁹ Abubaker A. Bagader. “Contemporary Islamic movements in the Arab world.” 114.

into the Islamic world from 1800 onward.”⁷⁰ Muslim societies learned to adapt to the Christian West’s form of secularization rather than creating their own due their entanglement with Western economic influence, power, and thought. The secularization theory develops with Islam as a different world than Weber’s Christian West.

According to Weber’s secularization theory Islam, must be looked at in terms of its society in which Islam exists. The level of religiosity in Islamic societies should be measured by the extent to which they follow *shari’a* (the body of Islamic law as a theocracy), and its secularity should be looked at according the degree that it does not follow *shari’a*.⁷¹ However, the use of the *shari’a* in the 19th and 20th centuries has changed dramatically for numerous reasons in every Muslim society, including the “[fuelling] by continuing movements of reform, by vast increases in the availability of Islamic knowledge, and by favourable economic and social changes, which have brought Muslims to live lives closer to the *shari’a*.”⁷² A process of Islamization occurs, which supports the notion of secularization in Islamic terms as well as existing as “notable a feature of recent Islamic developments, as one fo secularizations, following Weber’s theory of secularization.”⁷³

As an example of “extremist factions,” Islamic fundamentalism must be understood in terms of its definition to oppose modern rationalism.⁷⁴ According to Roxanne Euben, discourse surrounding Islamic fundamentalism “interprets and

⁷⁰ Francis Robinson. “Secularization, Weber, and Islam.” 238.

⁷¹ Francis Robinson. “Secularization, Weber, and Islam.” 239.

⁷² Ibid. 240.

⁷³ Ibid. 241.

⁷⁴ Roxanne L. Euben. *Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 26.

structures political life through the opposition of a notion of rationality to irrationality derived from distinctively Western moments in modern political and social thought.”⁷⁵ The grievances among Islamic fundamentalists are generated from the reactions against the process of modernization and from their expectations of greater opportunities for advancement.⁷⁶ Roxanne Euben also notes the emerging Islamic fundamentalists as the overeducated and underemployed class that might have led the modernization process, and are now gravitating towards “the extremes of political action, attracted toward the instruments of propaganda, agitation and violence.”⁷⁷

Through this understanding, the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism is deconstructed to reveal the power of the movement to perceive itself as solely situated in “the imperative of divine sovereignty and absolute truths of revelation.”⁷⁸ The often-misinterpreted assumption that Islamic fundamentalism is a reaction to political or socioeconomic circumstances reinforce the neglect of the movement’s system of ideas “as a substantive vision for the world.”⁷⁹ The total effects acting on Islamic fundamentalism must be looked at to determine the origins of the movement.

By examining the different views on secularization theory, one can conclude that the level of religiosity of a culture or society cannot alone explain current conflicts. While religion holds a significant place in society, the degree of a religion’s place in a culture cannot be correlated with conflict since religion and culture are subjective for every individual and nation. The following section will discuss

⁷⁵ Ibid. 21

⁷⁶ Ibid. 26

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.21

⁷⁹ Ibid. 23

alternative reasons for conflict, such as Samuel Huntington's theory of the "clash of civilizations," which theorizes that civilizations, cultures, and religions collide *because* of their differing civilizations, cultures, and religions.

A Clash of Civilizations?

In the post-Cold War era of the 20th century, Samuel Huntington was the leading American political scientist to explain the world's current state of conflict. From his well-known thesis on the new world order outlined in an article published in *Foreign Affairs* in 1993 titled, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Huntington asserts that culture, rather than ideological or economic reasons, is the fundamental source of conflict.⁸⁰ In the article, Huntington fleshed out the phrase, "the clash of civilizations," from Bernard Lewis' coinage of it in the latter article's titled, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," which appeared in the September 1990 issue of *The Atlantic Monthly*. Lewis stresses that "Muslim rage" is targeted at the US due to "[an] irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both."⁸¹ After September 11, the "clash of civilizations" theory was used to explain the motives for the attack, attributing it to "a new war between the Islamic world and the (mostly) Christian West."⁸² Seen in an October 2001 interview with bin Laden and Taysir Alluni, al-Jazeera's most celebrated reporter, bin Laden agrees that the conflict is a "clash of civilizations."⁸³ "This [Clash of Civilizations] is a very clear matter, proven

⁸⁰ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" 22.

⁸¹ Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage." 60.

⁸² Michael Klare. *Blood and Oil*. 54.

⁸³ Osama bin Laden. "Terror for Terror." 124.

in the Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet, and any true believer who claims to be faithful shouldn't doubt these truths, no matter what anybody says about them."⁸⁴ Not only is this theory accepted in Western mindset, but in Muslim perspectives as well.

Huntington defines a civilization as a cultural entity that belongs to a village, region, ethnic group, nationality and religious group, which is "the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity."⁸⁵ According to Huntington, these differences will separate civilizations from one another, resulting in world conflict. Under the subtext of culture, Huntington notes religion to be the most important difference: "[Religious differences] are far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes."⁸⁶ After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the world became divided into two religious civilizations: Western Christianity on one side, and Orthodox Christianity and Islam on the other.⁸⁷ Separation because of religion became the culprit for conflict, further instigating the idea of "us" versus "them," and idea for which Huntington was highly criticized. His hypothesis builds on this notion of difference to imply that these cultural and religious differences indicate an equal difference over policy issues, ranging from human rights, territory claims, and political systems. Groups, governments, and nations will attempt to appeal to the "common religion and civilization identity" of the battle in order to rally support for "relative military and economic power, struggle

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Samuel Huntington, "Clash of Civilizations?" 24.

⁸⁶ Ibid. 25.

⁸⁷ Ibid. 25.

over the control of international institutions and third parties, and competitively promote their particular political and religious values.”⁸⁸

Huntington does not see the “clash of civilizations” as a recent event, but one that has existed for 1,300 years. With the foundation of Islam in the seventh century, the civilization moved westward, conflicted with the Crusaders from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries, and later experienced a surge of tension between the Ottoman Empire and the colonial powers of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. “In the Arab world, in short, Western democracy strengthens anti-Western political forces . . . [complicating] relations between Islamic countries and the West.”⁸⁹

The discourse to explain Huntington’s hypothesis is inherently set up to differentiate the “West” from the “the rest,” based off of Kishore Mahbubani’s phrase.⁹⁰ A discriminating and polarized image of the US as a ‘superpower’ is created, which is problematic to the rest of the world that cannot compare in its policies of economics, politics, military, society etc. Differences in the power and struggle for military, economic, and institutional power are the sources for conflict, and are a consequence of one’s civilization.⁹¹ In conclusion, Huntington views civilization and culture as the basis for the majority of world conflict, and sees it as “a central focus of conflict for the immediate future [to be] between the West and several Islamic-Confucian states.”⁹²

⁸⁸ Samuel Huntington, “Clash of Civilizations?” 29.

⁸⁹ Ibid. 32.

⁹⁰ Ibid. 41.

⁹¹ Ibid. 40.

⁹² Ibid. 48

Critiques of the “Clash of Civilizations”

Currently, Huntington’s explanation for conflict is widely disputed and often disregarded as a credible commentary for modern political theory. The two essays, “The Clash of Definitions,” by Edward Said, literary critic and author of *Orientalism*, and, “The Clash of Civilizations: An Islamicist’s Critique.” by Roy P. Mottahedeh, provide a literary critic’s of Western and an Islamicist’s assessment, respectively, to which we can turn for the noteworthy critiques of Huntington’s article and latter, book.

The authors’ initial complaints are Huntington’s generalizing language and its attempted use ineffective evidence. According to Said, Huntington does not remain neutral in his rhetoric and oversimplifies ideas that he uses to create “easy-to-quote-and-remember ideas.”⁹³ His figurative and easily-conveyed images perpetuate the world of a polarity between “us” and “them” that are supposedly destined to clash. Even more questions are brought up and unexplained due to his evidence being found to be lacking in scholarly research. Historical evidence is asserted be to “natural” and “epistemological,” when in reality, it is “constructed” and “situational.”⁹⁴ Mottahedeh agrees with Said’s view of Huntington’s sweeping generalizations, yet emphasizes his poorly constructed use of examples. As an Islamicist, this is, one who studies Islam and Muslim studies, Mottahedeh’s initial dilemma concerns the ambiguous examples from the Islamic world.⁹⁵ Huntington’s examples do not show a proper theoretical correlation between the relationship of “culture” and political behavior. For example, Huntington claims that tense relations between the Arab world and the West will not

⁹³ Edward W. Said, “The Clash of Definitions,” 68.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Roy P. Mottahedeh, “The Clash of Civilizations: An Islamicist’s Critique,” 133.

cease due to the history of its centuries-old militaristic hostilities.⁹⁶ However, Mottahedeh casts light on the reality of this historical claim in pointing out that the most important conflicts in the past centuries were between the West and the Ottoman Turks, who can hardly be classified as “Arab.”⁹⁷

The second dispute shared by Said and Mottahedeh relates to Huntington’s neglect in acknowledging the presence of counter-culture in civilizations. Said asserts the existence of the counter-culture that must be given importance because there will always be a group contradicting to the norm.⁹⁸ The ultimate fault lies in assuming the homogeneity between culture and identity, as doing so ignores the complex relationship between them. Mottahedeh sees Islamists as Islam’s counter-culture, who “[call] for some degree of reimposition of Islamic law and tend to view the West as a more or less unified and universal ‘alien civilization’ to be treated in the spirit of the clash of civilizations.”⁹⁹ Islamists as a counter-culture also have another counter-culture within themselves concerning opinions of foreign policy, yet remain a minority within the larger Islamic *ummah*, or community.

The third complaint is Huntington’s strategy to identify and define civilizations. Huntington uses the term, “civilizational identity,” to encompass a wide range of people under an umbrella of a stereotypical type of culture. He lists them as Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and African civilizations.¹⁰⁰ The mere relationship of a culture and a civilization is already complex, Said notes, which Huntington ignores as he tries to separate and

⁹⁶ Edward W. Said, “The Clash of Definitions,” 71.

⁹⁷ Roy P. Mottahedeh, “The Clash of Civilizations: An Islamicist’s Critique,” 140.

⁹⁸ Edward W. Said, “The Clash of Definitions,” 73.

⁹⁹ Roy P. Mottahedeh, “The Clash of Civilizations: An Islamicist’s Critique,” 143.

¹⁰⁰ Samuel Huntington. “Clash of Civilizations?” 28.

define each term under one of eight civilizations. Huntington views these two terms as “a sort of ontological fact of political existence,” which is far from the truth. As François Burgat notes, the West overlooks the negative side of the clash of civilizations and “the disturbing effect of marginalization of cultural and linguistic codes within these societies [go] virtually unnoticed.”¹⁰¹

Additionally, even to define identity is difficult since it occurs as an invention and construction. Along with Mottahedeh’s opinions, Said notes Huntington’s conflation of Arabs and Muslims that results in the assertion that all Muslims behave similarly to Muslim Arabs. Mottahedeh uses numerous examples of nations in the Muslim world that did not behave according to Islamic tradition, like the election of a woman as prime minister in Turkey in 1996. Thus by assuming that every Muslim nation acts like the other is simply ignorant and generalizing. Said also refutes Huntington’s claim that the idea of a free market has little effect on Islamic cultures. Pre-Ottoman Islamic societies were free market economies, thus Huntington’s identification of the Arab civilization as not embracing this market strategy cannot be correct.

Said’s final disagreement with Huntington follows his own work concerning the Orientalist view that creates feelings of hostility against the area of the world with a strategic position for purposes of colonization, and more recently, in the oil market. The Western portrayal of Muslims as terrorists and fundamentalists creates a dividing space. Said’s work creates a discourse that refutes the claim that civilizations and cultures are the reason for conflict in our world, which aids the discussion over the polarized depiction of the Western powers versus the non-Western powers. Rather

¹⁰¹ François Burgat. *Face to Face with Political Islam* 11.

than defining the reason for conflict, Said identifies the reasons why conflict is *not* caused by culture or civilization that includes the war over resources.

The location of the holy

Both secularization theory and the clash of civilizations represent the changing place of the ‘holy’ in people’s lives. The holy, or sacred, arises from human experiences reflecting social experiences, alerting one to the changing society that can be influenced by a multitude of factors.¹⁰² According to secularization theory, religion is declining, thriving, or evolving as a result of the current world’s state of affairs.

The debates about secularization . . . seem to revolve around the question of whether we are in a state of affairs in which the holy has disappeared from our horizons, or whether the older locations of the holy have proven inadequate and instead those activities which were once deemed secular have now become the marks of the sacred.¹⁰³

According to Huntington’s argument, the holy, according to different civilizations, is instigating conflicts between groups.

Max L. Stackhouse defines the holy in his article titled, “The Location of the Holy,” which discusses the justifications for basic moral stances and what it deemed “holy” in society. “The sense of holy provides the basis for those ‘background beliefs’ that sustain or transform our standards for evaluation, analysis and action, and thereby give substance to our basic moral stances.”¹⁰⁴ The sense of the holy provides the legitimacy for societal structures and the fabric of everyday life.¹⁰⁵ The “really real”, or the reality that is structured based on one’s insights, sensibilities, traditions,

¹⁰² William H. Jr Swatos and Kevin J. Christiano, “Secularization Theory: The Course of a Concept.” 13.

¹⁰³ Max L. Stackhouse, “The Location of the Holy.” 70.

¹⁰⁴ Max L. Stackhouse. “The Location of the Holy.” 70.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

or procedures, is debatable in our time, especially what can be deemed holy. Additionally, this notion of the holy is not defined as a spiritual injection or attendance of church service, but “in a broader sense present wherever fundamental questions of what is ultimately powerful and worth in life are debated.”¹⁰⁶

Scientists, theorists, psychologists, and philosophers have posed the question of the holy’s location since its very existence, inventing and theorizing alternative locations for the basic ethical stance. This questioning exists as an expression of that individual or group’s psychological predisposition to which they belong: “What is deemed holy is ‘actually’ the social, psychological or biophysical conditions out of which stances develop as epiphenomena.”¹⁰⁷ The 20th century experienced widespread social change, which communicates the differing view of the holy in accordance with the “drive for social change from the exposure of the biases, the interests, the lusts for power, gain, and dominance that are present in widely accepted moral stances and in their supporting marks of holiness.”¹⁰⁸ Differing views of the holy lead to differing moral stances, each considering one’s view as correct and the other as incorrect, creating a moral dilemma for the group with differing views.

Conclusion

From the above arguments, the root of our world’s numerous conflicts is not attributed to the degree of religion’s place in a society, seen in the secularization theory, or its opposition to another religion, as Huntington theorizes. The search for understanding the reasons for cause of conflict must be directed towards the world’s

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. 71

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. 72

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

new type of 'religion', one that is grounded in economic and political reasons: natural resources. Natural resources support the life of a nation in every sphere, from its agricultural sustainability to its numerous forms of energy and power. The following section will look at the US' hegemonic global drive to maintain its status and power on the world scene. The protection of access to the availability and flow of resources lies at the heart of the US' influence and position in the Middle East to secure its flow of oil.

Chapter 2: The View from the US

Introduction

Natural resources are vital for every nation in order to carry out basic human needs and survive the global economic market. Developed nations that have exhausted their own resources are now relying on the resources concentrated in developing nations.¹⁰⁹ Issues of environmental stress and resource management will result because of the widening gap between the industrial, developed nations and the developing nations.¹¹⁰ Globalization will bring “deepening economic stagnation, political instability, and cultural alienation,” which will ‘foster ethnic, ideological, and religious extremism,’ with the majority of the violence directed against the US.¹¹¹ These factors have the power to “divide worldwide publics and challenge US leadership.”¹¹²

As of 2005, the United States’ GDP was the highest in the world, amounting to approximately \$10.5 trillion compared with the world’s overall GDP of \$32 trillion. “[The US] is in fact the most absolute global power ever seen for its reach, influence, and control. The US is rightly regarded as the unchallenged superpower.”¹¹³ Yet despite the US’ towering economic superiority in the world, in

¹⁰⁹ Benjamin R. Barber, “Jihad Vs. McWorld,” *The Atlantic*, March 1992, <http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/199203/barber>.

¹¹⁰ A. Rodney Dobell, “Environmental Degradation and the Religion of the Market,” in *Population, Consumption, and the Environment*, (Albany: State University of New York, 1995), 229-51.

¹¹¹ Noam Chomsky. *Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006), 128.

¹¹² *Ibid.* 129.

¹¹³ William R. Clark, “The American Century: Post-World War II Period,” in *Petrodollar Warfare* (New York: New Society Publishers, 2005), 8.

2004 its trade gap was \$665.9 billion, a 6% increase from 2003 of \$496.5 billion.¹¹⁴ The job market also experienced a drop, losing 1.1 million jobs between 2001 and 2004, representing 7.4% of the population in contrast to the previous 5.6%.¹¹⁵ The relocation of jobs and trade outside the US affected the decline, which weakens the domestic market that needs these monetary assets within the US. Structural imbalance in the US economy instilled fear in the Bush administration, prompting a possible decline in the US' economic international power and the influence in controlling the depleting hydrocarbons. Before the Cold War, the US' main doctrine was the maintenance of a global system of alliances against the communist Soviet Union, subordinating the pursuit of the US' national interests to protect the world from communism. Yet with the end of the Cold War, US security policy changed to accommodate America's security interests, including the access to overseas supplies and the production of oil.¹¹⁶

The US' desire to maintain its hegemonic power through the protection of resources is seen with the "war on terror," which places blame on differing religions and civilizations for the conflicts rather than on the control for resources.¹¹⁷ The Olduvai theory states that the life of our industrial civilization is only meant to last approximately 100 years, from 1930 until 2030.¹¹⁸ While its claims are questionable, it highlights the US' fear of the quick depletion of the world's oil supplies that could cripple the US' international power. These deceptions must be broken apart that

¹¹⁴ William R. Clark, "The American Century: Post-World War II Period," 8.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Michael Klare, *Resource Wars*, 5

¹¹⁷ Ibid. 15.

¹¹⁸ Richard C. Duncan, "The Peak of World Oil Production and the Road to the Olduvai Gorge," <http://www.hubbertypeak.com/Duncan/olduvai2000.htm>.

“flow very naturally from the ways in which power is concentrated,”¹¹⁹ must be broken apart. The following section will detail the US’ current economic state through the discussion of resources and the dollar, followed by the explanation of the US’ interventionalist approach to securing these issues.

The US’ driving forces

Resources

The first driving force to protect the US’ hegemonic status in the world is the control of the world’s major energy resources, specifically oil as a “stupendous source of strategic power” known since the 1940’s.¹²⁰ Zbigniew Brzezinski notes that US control over oil in Middle East “gives it indirect but politically critical leverage on the European and Asian economies that are also dependent on energy exports from the region.”¹²¹ US political leverage allows for a more powerful economy and military, which become vital to the US doctrine as a powerful, dominating nation. However, to ensure military and economic strengths, the insatiable hunger for oil must be satisfied and can only be accomplished by the international quest for energy. John C. Gannon, the deputy director of the CIA in 1996 remarks, “We have to recognize that our nation will not be secure if global energy supplies are not secure.”¹²²

¹¹⁹ Noam Chomsky, *The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy*, 103.

¹²⁰ Ibid. 36.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Michael Klare, *Resource Wars*, 6.

As of 2004, the US made up 5% of the world's total population that consumed 25% of the world's total supply of oil,¹²³ and consumed 30% of all raw materials by human population in 1998.¹²⁴ In 2004, the Department of Energy's Annual Energy Outlook concluded that US oil consumption will rise from 19.7 million barrels per day in 2001 to 28.3 million barrels a day in 2025, increasing by 44% in 24 years.¹²⁵ At the same time, domestic oil production will decrease from 5.7 to 4.6 million barrels a day.

The excessive American lifestyle of a large home, large and multiple cars, and a never-ending supply of material goods are the motivations for American's high consumption rate. "The single biggest factor in our ever-increasing dependency on foreign oil is our seemingly endless capacity to consume," notes former deputy secretary of the Treasury Stuart E. Eizenstat in 2002.¹²⁶ The current levels of consumption are not healthy to sustain any wealth-oriented nation, especially the United States.¹²⁷ Two-thirds of the US' petroleum usage goes to transportation, which only increases as the demand and usage of cars increases, 13.5 million barrels a day in 2001 to an estimated 20.7 million barrels a day in 2025.¹²⁸

America is dependent on foreign resources also to support its military that has the most technologically advanced defense capabilities.¹²⁹ The US military provides an unrivaled ability to venture across the world unchallenged by any other nation. Constant and innovative technology is needed to support the US' access to resources

¹²³ Michael Klare, *Blood and Oil*, 11.

¹²⁴ Michael Klare, *Resource Wars*, 15.

¹²⁵ Michael Klare, *Blood and Oil*, 16.

¹²⁶ Ibid. 18.

¹²⁷ William Clarke, "The American Century: Post-World War II Period," 12.

¹²⁸ Michael Klare, *Blood and Oil*. 17.

¹²⁹ William Clarke, "The American Century: Post-World War II Period," 12.

thus war to protect them is vital for America and its international capitalist adventurism. “Most-if not all- technological innovation is driven by the aim of the US military establishment to remain far ahead of other nations in the cutting edge of military capability.”¹³⁰

Globalization’s Effect on resource availability

In the global sense, the world is expanding at an astronomical rate with a dramatic increase in the human population that drives the demand for resources. Over the past fifty years, the human population grew from 2.6 billion in 1950 to 6 billion people in 1999. By 2010, the world’s population is expected to increase to 6.8 billion people, and in 2020 to 8 billion people.¹³¹ Increased consumption also produces to an increase in the gross world product (GWP), which only a portion of the world’s population benefits from because of globalization. With an exponential growing population, an equally increasing demand for resources will result, putting an even larger burden on the world.

However, with the US’ growing consumption rates and declining domestic production, the US will have to look to foreign suppliers, weakening the nation through foreign dependence. A deep concern resonates among American leaders regarding the US’ dependence on foreign oil, especially since imported petroleum crossed the 50% mark in 1998.¹³² Michael Klare notes, “Most policy makers anticipated a deepening dependence on imports, and with it an ever-increasing role

¹³⁰ Richard Booney, *Jihad; from Quran to Bin Laden* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 371.

¹³¹ Michael Klare, *Resource Wars*, 17.

¹³² Michael Klare, *Blood and Oil*, 13.

for American soldiers in guarding the global flow of oil.”¹³³ Klare also notes that the US foreign oil will come from unstable and unfriendly nations in dangerous areas. Most of the remaining oil reserves are located in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa, all areas that have “suffered from instability and civil unrest,” and which have “sufficient tapped reserves to satisfy our (and the world’s) rising petroleum demand in the years ahead.”¹³⁴

The Petrodollar

The petrodollar is the second driving force to protect the US’ hegemonic status in the world. Established at the end of World War II, in 1945 the Bretton Woods Monetary Conference set the US dollar as the medium of exchange in an international monetary system.¹³⁵ After the war, the US saw the need for a stabilized economy and diplomacy, a perfect vacuum for the US to fill. In addition to the international use of the dollar, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were established to aid the economies of Europe and Asia that were destroyed during the war.¹³⁶ Additionally, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) was established in 1949 to protect against possible Soviet Union dominance in Western Europe, which bolstered the US’ power on the international scene. Thus the US emerged from the post- World War II period with as a strong economic power as well as having the largest gold reserves that allowed the US to trade and export freely with Europe and Japan. The US experienced an enlightened age in foreign policy due to

¹³³ Michael Klare, *Blood and Oil*, 13.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.* 20.

¹³⁵ William Clarke, “The American Century: Post-World War II Period,” 18.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.* 19.

their strategic economic dominance, which plummeted in the late 1960's and 1970's because of the expensive Vietnam War.

During the Vietnam War, European countries using the dollar, like France and Britain, began to redeem their dollars for gold due to the fear of the floating dollar losing value.¹³⁷ Floating currencies resulted in 1971 when the US and European nations began to drain the Federal Reserve's gold stocks, transferring US dollars into gold bullion (precious metal with high economic value).¹³⁸ In response, The Nixon administration abandoned the dollar-gold link in August 1971, resulting in a system of floating currencies to ensure not the total collapse of the gold reserves of the US.

To appease the concerns of the European nations, OPEC organized a discussion with the G-10, or Group of Ten nations, to deliberate about a transition to a basket of currencies.¹³⁹ Wanting to preserve the international use of the US dollar, in 1974 President Nixon arranged an agreement with Saudi Arabia, the largest oil producing nation in the Middle East, to purchase \$2.5 billion in US Treasury bills with their oil funds, and to ensure that oil prices would be in dollars only.¹⁴⁰ By 1975 elite US, UK banking interests, and Saudi Arabia formed an oil-backed dollar known as petrodollar recycling, which favored US dollar hegemony.¹⁴¹ Petrodollar recycling forced nations to use the dollar when buying oil. Industrial developing nations were unable to use the US dollar that forced nations to "recycle" their petrodollars to other nations.

¹³⁷ Michael Klare, *Blood and Oil*, 21.

¹³⁸ William Clarke, "The American Century: Post-World War II Period," 18.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.* 20.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.* 20.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.* 34.

The inflated price of oil due the surplus of petrodollars characterized the 1970's. The surplus of petrodollars were given back to the US through (first), the secret financial arrangement with SAMA (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency) to direct the funds to the US Federal Reserve Banks and the Bank of England, and (second), the deposit of surplus dollars by Saudi Arabia and other OPEC producers into US/UK banking systems. Gold reserves were transferred into dollar reserves, which became the major reserve currency for other nations in the world.

The strength of the US dollar maintained US hegemonic power, yet introduced a new type of strife for nations that could not survive the US interest rates on their petrodollar loans.¹⁴² The expansion of developing nations was dependent on oil that could only be bought in US dollars, producing large debts for newly industrializing nations needing to export goods. The availability of oil allowed nations to exist in the international market, yet weakened nations at the same time because of their mounting debts that could never be paid off.¹⁴³ The strategic introduction of the dollar as the currency in which oil was to be bought and sold maintained the US' economic and military hegemonic power in the world.

Stated by William Clark in *Petrodollar Warfare*, "the Iraq War was about dollars, euros, oil, and geostrategic power in the 21st century."¹⁴⁴ With respect to the Iraq War, the debate between the US dollar and the Euro shows the last phase of the conflict to maintain the dollar's international standing, or an "unspoken oil-currency war between the US and the EU."¹⁴⁵ The US' military control of the remaining

¹⁴² William R. Clark, "The American Century: Post-World War II Period," 22.

¹⁴³ Ibid. 22.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid. 40.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid. 27.

hydrocarbons and enforcement of the petrodollar arrangement shows the international competition to be OPEC's main currency for oil transactions,¹⁴⁶ as well as "to preserve the faltering system of American economic hegemony."¹⁴⁷ In September 2000, Saddam Hussein announced that Iraq would use the euro currency rather than the US dollar, a detrimental situation for the US that relies on petrodollar recycling to fund its military supremacy. A snowball effect would occur to sell-off the already weak dollar by foreign banks and OPEC oil producers. Responding to Hussein's announcement, in 2003 the US military spent \$417 billion for the war in Iraq, compared to the \$120 billion spent by the EU comprised of a twelve-state union.¹⁴⁸

Thus the US sees the Iraq War as an important strategy to maintain the US dollar's hegemonic force and position as a dominant power in the global economy.¹⁴⁹ The US government's positioning on an international level gave the administration the agency to not be held accountable for its validity, domestically and internationally. Through the administration's origins as an elite culture, it was easy to ignore the possibility of a terminal catastrophe, and thus respond with violence and war that would guarantee the control over and access to Iraqi oil reserves in the Middle East.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁶ William R. Clark, "The American Century: Post-World War II Period," 27.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid. 42.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid. 41.

McWorld

The demystification of the type of markets must be addressed concerning Benjamin R. Barber's article from *The Atlantic Monthly* titled, "Jihad vs. McWorld."¹⁵¹ As his example shows, the economic strategies pursued by differing markets calls for a critique of the Orientalist view of splitting up these two entities represented by Jihad and McWorld into definite terms. In his article, "The Clash of Civilizations: An Islamicist's Critique,"¹⁵² Roy P. Mottahedeh contests Huntington's argument that "western ideas of free markets often have little resonance in Islamic (culture)."¹⁵³ Huntington's sweeping generalization forgets the notion that many Middle Eastern societies in the pre-Ottoman period were free market economies, many of which still existing today, such as Morocco, Turkey, Kuwait, and most of the other Arab Gulf states.¹⁵⁴ Huntington lacks empirical evidence and makes assumptions to support his argument. Nonetheless, generalizing assumptions are important to remember when looking at the world of Jihad and McWorld that give insight into their perceptions. Barber uses the term, "Jihad," not meaning its original, Qur'anic term of "struggle," but to invoke the notion of "[re-create] ancient subnational and ethnic borders from within", noting that their existence is pertinent to the argument of the two differing economic goals in the world.

Despite Barber's seemingly harmless notion of his term in the economic sense, "Jihad," it is important to notice the hidden, possibly purposeful, Orientalist concept of the "Islamic threat." It alludes that every single individual defined as

¹⁵¹ Benjamin R. Barber, "Jihad Vs. McWorld."

¹⁵² ¹⁵² Roy P. Mottahedeh, "The Clash of Civilizations: An Islamicist's Critique," 137.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Noam Chomsky, *Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy*, 28.

“Islamic” in a religious and cultural sense agrees with the beliefs and policies of fundamentalists and their movement. The need to identify every Muslim to determine the Islamic threat dates back to the historical events beginning with the Crusades in the 11th century resulting in a large generalization and grouping of all Muslims into few categories. Fred Halliday, author of *Islam & the Myth of Confrontation*, argues that the responses of the Islamic fundamentalist movement are not specific to the Islamic ‘world’ through its complaints concerning current social and political problems.¹⁵⁵

The use of Barber’s term, “McWorld,” is used to show the US’ current economic strategy. McWorld is defined by “the onrush of economic and ecological forces that demand integration and uniformity and that mesmerize the world . . . one McWorld tied together by technology, ecology, communications, and commerce.”¹⁵⁶ Economic globalism is a sub-definition of McWorld that results in homogeneity and uniformity in methods of management as well as in the rules of market relationships.¹⁵⁷ McWorld’s main goal is nationalism and is achieved through four imperatives that, in combination, are victorious over factiousness and particularism.¹⁵⁸

Market, resource, information-technology, and ecological imperatives constitute McWorld’s approach to the world market. Seen through market imperatives, multinational corporations gain speed in the West and attempt to homogenize the world to create a healthy market despite the lack of a common

¹⁵⁵ Fred Halliday, *Islam & the Myth of Confrontation* (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd), 107.

¹⁵⁶ Benjamin R. Barber, “Jihad Vs. McWorld.”

¹⁵⁷ David Lehmann, “Fundamentalism and Globalism,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 4, *Rethinking Geographies: North and South Development* (1998), 607-634.

¹⁵⁸ Benjamin R. Barber, “Jihad Vs. McWorld.”

national identity. Yet to unite the multinational corporations, a common resource is needed, such as a language or currency, like English and the dollar. Natural resources such as arable soil and mineral resources from less developed nations present another form of dependence, on which developed nations depend, making them more dependent than when they began. As a result, corporations attempt to solve these particular, nation-specific problems through Americanized universal solutions with the use of information-technology imperatives for generalizing the technology's needs. Globalization and universalism do not solve the ecological imperative that creates a greater inequality between nations of differing status. The US' economic position is portrayed through the image of McWorld that clashes with many other types of nations and economies characterized with the image of the world of "Jihad."

The "religion of the market," adopted by A. Rodney Dobell, is an acceptance of an individualistic religion of economics and of markets, using Nature as an everlasting supply of resources to gain admission into the dominant, global market.¹⁵⁹ Under this economic religion, individual and social incentives succeeded to the point of boosting rapid growth of per capita incomes, foreshadowing future possible increased incomes that are well received around the world.¹⁶⁰ Environmental wastefulness, destructive technologies for harvesting renewable resources, and extraction of exhaustible resources results as a nation attempts to become a part of the world of McWorld. Western nations constitute the majority of devotees to the "religion of the market."

¹⁵⁹ A. Rodney Dobell, "Environmental Degradation and the Religion of the Market," 135.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

Driven by possible economic advantages of more oil to drive production, such as cheaper gas prices, a healthier market, and an overall increase in gross domestic profit (GDP), nations ignore the ecological downfalls of their actions, and continue the cycle of consumption, dependence, and wastefulness. McWorld is driven by the force to unite all nations under the global neoliberal economic regime, which only serves the West's hunger for power leads to dwindling amounts of oil. William Clarke supports this notion concerning the US and oil, stating that evidence for the Bush administration's apprehension of losing their dominant international position is found in the actions it has taken to maintain the US's position of military superiority and to control the global economic system with the dollar. The increase in national security, whether by bolstering military action or strengthening an internal profit, is a product of vulnerability.¹⁶¹

The McWorld image portrays the American definition and location of the holy as the global power and control of natural resources. From the Western perspective, the hegemonic power, yielded across the globe, is the American definition of the holy, based on the first chapter's definition that the holy is "present wherever fundamental questions of what is ultimately powerful and worthy in life."¹⁶² America's neoconservative movement in the later half of the 20th century asks the same moral questions, disputing what is classified as "holy" and requesting social change for the correct path of American. A look at the neoconservative movement will follow, along with a discussion of Leo Strauss and his "natural right."

¹⁶¹ Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Security," *International Security*, Vol. 8, No.1 (Summer, 1983), 146.

¹⁶² Max L. Stackhouse, "The Location of the Holy," *The Journal of Religious Ethics*. Vol. 4, No. 1 (1976), 71.

Neoconservatism and Leo Strauss

Neoconservatism

Since 1930's and 1940's, neoconservatism has existed in response to the expansionist and totalitarian state of communism.¹⁶³ Irving Kristol defines a neoconservative as, "A liberal 'mugged by reality,'"¹⁶⁴ neoconservative views were present in New York intellectual circles with individuals such as Sidney Hook, Irving Kristol, and Norman Podhoretz.¹⁶⁵ The presidential era of Lyndon Johnson in the 1960's represents the beginning of the neoconservative presence in the White House with the influential roles of late Democrats Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota or Henry Jackson of Washington. The US opposed the Manichean struggle with the Soviet Union "to play an important role in improving life and protecting the cultural freedom of all citizens at home,"¹⁶⁶ and "to extend America's unrivaled global dominance and to complete the transformation of American conservatism."¹⁶⁷ In the late 1960's, neoconservatism represented a reaction to the 1960's counter-culture, known as McGovernism. The term came from the rise of George McGovern in 1972, who defeated former Vice-President Hubert Humphrey for the Democratic presidential nomination.¹⁶⁸ McGovernism saw America's international involvement

¹⁶³ Jay Winik, "The Neoconservative Reconstruction," *Foreign Policy*, No. 73 (Winter, 1988-1989), 137.

¹⁶⁴ Roger Cohen, "The New L-Word: Neocon," *New York Times*, October 4, 2007, Opinion section

¹⁶⁵ Jay Winik, "The Neoconservative Reconstruction." 141.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Gary Dorrien, "Consolidating the Empire: Neoconservatism and the Politics of American Dominion," *Political Theology*. PT 6.4 (2005) 410.

¹⁶⁸ Drew McKissick, "The New McGovernism," in *BlogCritics Magazine*, Opinion section, August 16, 2006.

as “immoral, imperialistic, and corrupting,”¹⁶⁹ standing for “appeasement and the politics of liberal guilt, while the neocons stood for a self-confident and militantly interventionist Americanism.”¹⁷⁰ A discussion of the neoconservative movement’s most influential member, Leo Strauss, will be discussed in relation to the movement’s presence in American foreign policy.

Leo Strauss and the “Natural Right”

Leo Strauss was a political philosopher in the 20th century who taught political science at the University of Chicago, published 15 books, and taught several generation of students. His term, the “natural right,” is noteworthy for the discussion of modernity and “the entailed crisis of the West that is manifest in the crisis of liberal democracy.”¹⁷¹

Strauss’s essay, “Political Philosophy and the Crisis of our Time,” explains his views about 20th century society. Other than the threat of communism, the basic threat is the “internal disability of modern liberal democracy,”¹⁷² where the West has lost its purpose and faith and needs to return to their “natural right,” as described later. The regime of the modern liberal democracy is a limited government with public and private sectors, “which in effect means the private (and secret) is above (below, or outside) the law and outside the realm of political responsibility in the

¹⁶⁹ Jay Winik. “The Neoconservative Reconstruction.” 137.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ John G. Gunnell, “Political Theory and Politics: The Case of Leo Strauss and Liberal Democracy,” in *The Crisis of Liberal Democracy*, edited by Kenneth L. Deutsch and Walter Soffer, 68-88. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 68.

¹⁷² Ibid. 75.

classical sense.”¹⁷³ These ideas are reduced to an ideology where Strauss notes the importance of its origins and interpretations as equaling as the ideology itself.¹⁷⁴

Strauss wrote *Natural Rights and History* that outlines the principles, “to argue for a return to truth, to a standard common to all and grounded in nature.”¹⁷⁵ Nature was of the unknown and not of certainty, which “might be known but wasn’t, of that which might be known but as not yet.”¹⁷⁶ It is also split into the natural and unnatural, approached by “a pure and whole questioning.”¹⁷⁷ The term, “natural right,” expresses a subtle nuance compared to “natural law” that Strauss could have used. “Natural right” gives room for interpretation and does not delineate an absolute path that “natural law” communicates. “Natural law threatens the political order by setting up a moral law that transcends the political order.”¹⁷⁸ Additionally, natural law subordinates the “prudent statesmen,” forbidding certain actions that would protect the state. “Its otherworldly nature places a great strain upon the political order because it makes absolute demands on it that are oblivious to its limitations.”¹⁷⁹

Strauss’s notion of the “natural right” is important for the discussion of modernity and democracy. Strauss explains the “natural right” as “the right of the wise to rule absolutely or in the absence of law Strauss understands tyranny (as it is commonly understood) to be the rule in the absence of law. Classic natural right is,

¹⁷³ John G. Gunnell, “Political Theory and Politics: The Case of Leo Strauss and Liberal Democracy,” 77.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid. 79.

¹⁷⁵ Anne Norton, *Leo Strauss and the Politics of American Empire*, (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2004), 75.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid. 75.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid. 87.

¹⁷⁸ S.B. Drury, “Leo Strauss’s Classic Natural Right Teaching,” *Political Theory*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Aug., 1987), 310.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

therefore, identical with the tyranny of the wise.”¹⁸⁰ Strauss bases much of his “natural right” theory from Aristotle that practical wisdom of the wise is better than a set of rules, or “provides man with principles of conduct, but with a hierarchy of ends.”¹⁸¹ These needs, such as peace, stability, and preservation are hierarchically lower than justice and takes precedence in order to ensure the livelihood of the higher institution. “Justice may have to be sacrificed for the sake of the public safety, and such sacrifices are also in accordance with the requirement of natural right . . . Without the preservation of the city, the life of the philosopher would be impossible.”¹⁸² In the name of the natural right, there are no limits, similar to the Machiavellian view that extreme situations allow for the suspension of natural justice for the preservation of the state. To conclude Strauss’ “natural right” theory, the following quote expresses the views of the neoconservatives in the Washington.

Classic natural right maintains the primacy or priority of the good over the right or just. The good is understand as the end to which all action is a means; it is a state of affairs deemed desirable, excellent, noble, or worthy of pursuit of its own sake . . . Right is therefore subordinate to good.¹⁸³

Authority in the 20th century has accepted Strauss’s political philosophy too often and without needed critical thought.¹⁸⁴ The neoconservative position accepts Strauss’s “deprecation of morality”¹⁸⁵ and overlooks justice in the name of security. The natural right becomes the fundamental question that nature authorizes

¹⁸⁰ S.B. Drury, “Leo Strauss’s Classic Natural Right Teaching,” *Political Theory*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Aug., 1987), 304.

¹⁸¹ Ibid. 307.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Ibid. 309.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid. 311.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid. 312.

totalitarianism in every aspect of life and allows for US' interventionist approach to politics and economics.¹⁸⁶

Neoconservatism in the White House

The neoconservative movement began as a reality in response to “communism-as-evil, the centrality of military force, and the indispensability of the American idea and much else.”¹⁸⁷ The election of President Ronald Reagan articulated the neoconservative stance on foreign policy with the election of thirteen neocons to high-ranking positions in the Republican administration. “Neocons provided the intellectual ballast for Reagan’s military build-up and his anticommunist foreign policy . . . They argued that a massive military build-up was necessary and the U.S. needed to ‘take the right to the Soviets.’”¹⁸⁸

The neoconservative doctrine of totalitarianism supported the US foreign policy as a faith. According to the doctrine, during the Cold War the world experienced an ideological struggle between ‘good and evil’, or the US and the Soviet Union. The Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations left continued this legacy regarding their edicts to fight communism and to aid nations that threatened the US’ role of dominance.¹⁸⁹ However, the neoconservative’s totalitarian faith was contradicted with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 and the election of President George H.W. Bush who opposed certain neoconservative viewpoints. As a result, few positions

¹⁸⁶ Rogers D. Masters, “Evolutionary Biology and Natural Right,” in *The Crisis of Liberal Democracy*, edited by Kenneth L. Deutsch and Walter Soffer, 48-66. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 44.

¹⁸⁷ Roger Cohen, “The New L-Word: Neocon.”

¹⁸⁸ Gary Dorrein, “Consolidating the Empire: Neoconservatism and the Politics of American Dominion,” 412.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

were given to neoconservatives, while keeping yet kept the idea to “create an American-dominated world order.”¹⁹⁰

“Pax Americana” became the new order for American foreign policy in 1992 in order to put down the US’ remaining rivals and enemies to ensure the US’ total control. Paul Wolfowitz, a neocon from Reagan’s administration, supported the idea of global control in the Bush I administration, and was supported by Bush’s Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, a old-style conservative, yet also an ally with many neoconservatives. The first Bush administration did not give the neoconservatives enough sustaining power, which eventually lead to their fallout with the administration.

The Clinton administration behaved similarly, clashing with the neoconservative’s ideas on foreign policy concerning the level and control of American’s hegemonic power. Interesting to note is the change in the meaning of strength for a nation that resulted in the 1990’s represented in the Clinton administration. Before and during the Cold War, a nation’s strength was based on its military power and its alliance system that proved that one’s nation could stand alone in a turbulent world society. Yet the end of the Cold war heralded in a new definition of a nation’s power, one that emphasized its economic dynamism and the cultivation of technological innovation.¹⁹¹ According to the Institute for National Security Studies, “national security depends on successful engagement in the global economy.”¹⁹² A resilient and powerful domestic economy meant that a nation could

¹⁹⁰ Gary Dorrein, “Consolidating the Empire: Neoconservatism and the Politics of American Dominion,” 414.

¹⁹¹ Michael Klare, *Resource Wars*, 7.

¹⁹² *Ibid.* 8.

compete with other nations to develop and export high-tech goods, which turned into the characterizing feature of what a powerful nation meant. In 1993, President Bill Clinton articulated the need for an “econocentric” approach to national security, which was executed initially through expansion of international trade in Latin American and Asia and investment in his foreign policy goals.¹⁹³ By linking economic interests with security interests, it was only a matter of time that the push for a protection of oil was enforced due to its importance to both interests. Thus, military enforcement to guarantee its security was implemented in order to continue the economic growth and production needed to compete on the international market.

The election of George W. Bush in 2000 represented a second chance for the neoconservatives to put unipolarists and realists in high-ranking positions. A global empire strategy was emphasized outlined in a PNAC (Project for the New American Century) position paper stating issues regarding defense systems, defense spending, defense allocation, and the reinvention of the U.S. military. In 2001, the attacks of September 11 provided the perfect excuse for the administration’s hopes. “The neocon fantasy of military expansion, preemptive warfare, and regime-changing unilateralism became American policy.”¹⁹⁴ The Bush administration was concerned with overthrowing Iraq, Iran, and Syria, and knew that an Islamist multinational extremist Sunni movement, Al-Qaeda, could be blamed as the perfect scapegoat during the turbulent period after September 11. “It didn’t matter if Iraq had nothing to do with September 11; what mattered was getting rid of Saddam and imposing a pro-

¹⁹³ Michael Klare, *Resource Wars*, 8.

¹⁹⁴ Gary Dorrean, “Consolidating the Empire: Neoconservatism and the Politics of American Dominion,” 416.

American regime in the middle of the Middle East.”¹⁹⁵ Additionally, “Bush officials wanted to change the Middle East, creating a pro-American Iraq that gave the U.S. a direct power base, ensured the oil supply, set off a chain-reaction of regime changes, gave relief to Israel, and got rid of a thuggish enemy.”¹⁹⁶ The US government uses the popular reason of conducting the “war on terror” to explain its involvement in the Middle East and downplays its true reasons for the Western cravings for global empire superiority, the supreme security of resources, and the power of the dollar. The government’s real task and aim is protection of its interests, usually represented as “noble intent and self-defense” in place of geopolitical or strategic objectives in the Middle East.¹⁹⁷

As stated by leftist commentator and blogger Matthew Yglesias, neoconservatives “‘believe that America should coercively dominate the world through military force’ and ‘believe in a dogmatic form of American exceptionalism’ and ‘favor the creation of a U.S.- dominated ‘universal empire.’”¹⁹⁸

Doctrines supporting the US’ hegemonic power

Universality

The hegemonic power of the US rejects universality, the idea that every nation is held accountable to the same standard regarding political, economic, and social rights. Beginning in 1945, the United Nations entrusted the US to end the second

¹⁹⁵ Gary Dorrean, “Consolidating the Empire: Neoconservatism and the Politics of American Dominion,” 417.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Roger Cohen, “The New L-Word: Neocon.”

world war and gave the US the title of “the supreme law of the land.”¹⁹⁹ However, according to Noam Chomsky, this principle “is flatly rejected in the elite intellectual, moral, and political culture of the most powerful states,”²⁰⁰ and is often ignored and excluded from public discourse. US’ policies on environment degradation and foreign affairs exemplify the US’ denial of universal laws that supports the US’ idea of militaristic superiority.

The Group of Eight summit of 2005 in Gleneagles, Scotland shows the Bush administration’s neglect of responsibility pertaining to the global warming crisis. The summit’s goal was to bring the rich countries together in order to discuss and implement urgent action concerning cost-effective techniques to reduce net global greenhouse gas emissions. The Bush administration did not respond properly to the growing concerns of human impact on global warming, nor did it acknowledge that the US had a part to play in the environmental issue.²⁰¹ The Bush administration doubted the validity of the summit’s argument due to the fact that we “do not know enough about this literally world-changing phenomenon,” and that global warming is “too uncertain a matter to justify anything more than voluntary measures.”²⁰²

The Bush administration acted similarly in 2005 at an annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. The meeting concluded to have found “the most compelling evidence yet” to support the need of humanity to take responsibility for their ecological footprint. The meeting received little attention in the US media despite its correlation to the Kyoto protocols, which the Bush

¹⁹⁹ Noam Chomsky. *Failed States: the abuse of Power and the assault on democracy*. 79.

²⁰⁰ Ibid. 81.

²⁰¹ Ibid. 16.

²⁰² Ibid. 17.

administration rejected even with supporting evidence from highly recognized and revered researchers. This dismissal of universality and disregard for the world's environmental stability shows the US' rejection of the world's acknowledgments concern for the security of the world. The US cannot forget that it plays a significant role in destroying the environment through its production and unstoppable consumption of oil. Ignoring its significantly harmful role in environmental pollution and consumption is unforgivable, which emphasizes their global universality.

In 2004, Bush's policies concerning the use of force show the US' rejection of universality concerning foreign policy. A report in 2004 by the UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change states that "force can be lawfully deployed only when authorized by the Security Council, or under Article 51", which gives the "right of individual or collective self-defense if armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations."²⁰³ Article 51 is interpreted as the justification for self-defense and gives no restrictions or reinterpretations. The UN World Summit in September 2005 endorsed the provisions of the Charter, neglecting to grant other individual states or regional alliances the same type of treatment. Bush's doctrine of "anticipatory self-defense" highlights the Western-centric and elite perception of "the right of the United States to attack a country that it thinks could attack it first,"²⁰⁴ stated by Condoleezza Rice. Condoleezza Rice also supported the US' unilateral right on numerous occasions, stating that the US does not need to "conform" to international behavior or international agreements, unlike the rest of the nations and allies.

²⁰³ Noam Chomsky, *Failed States: the abuse of Power and the assault on democracy*, 80.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.* 82.

Finally, the justifications for the Iraqi war symbolize the US' rejection of universality. The US did not see itself as being held to the same accountability as other nations when it declared war on Iraq. The US clasped onto its militaristic domination and saw itself in a higher position and status compared to other nations in the world regarding its military power and responsibility. Foreign policy documents and studies on the Bush administration have surfaced that demonstrate the US' aspiration for geostrategic dominance and prohibition of other nations to compete with US domination.²⁰⁵

For example, the major policy study in March 1992 by the Project for a New American Century (PNAC) titled, "Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategies, Forces and Resources for a New Century," emphasized the neoconservative view of US dominance, stating "no other nations will be allowed to 'challenge' US hegemony."²⁰⁶

Promotion of Democracy

Iraq was also justified by Bush's doctrine of "promoting democracy abroad." This doctrine "has been a primary goal of US foreign policy ever since Woodrow Wilson endowed it with a 'powerful idealist element.'"²⁰⁷ According to Raja Bahlul, the democratic West claims that democracy "is the only morally defensible political

²⁰⁵ William Clarke, "The American Century: Post-World War II Period," 25.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Noam Chomsky, *Failed States: the abuse of Power and the assault on democracy*, 102

order, the only political option for societies and states that do not want to be left behind in the rapidly evolving world in which we live.”²⁰⁸

Bush’s messianic message of bringing democracy to the Middle East expresses this hopeful tone of an idealistic war.²⁰⁹ Thomas Carothers, the director of the Democracy and Rule of Law Project, is a witness to Bush’s mission. “American exceptionalism” gives reason and meaning to the doctrine, creating misimpressions about itself and its enemies to ensure that the correct interests receive the most power. “‘Preemptive’ state terror”²¹⁰ further separates nations from each other, dividing them into “failed states” or “outlaw states”.

The US’ fear of independent nationalism goes to “impressive lengths”²¹¹ to remain the ‘masters of the hemisphere.’ Historical ties with Cuba, Iran, and Syria exemplify the US’ fear of rebelliousness and the possibility of the nation’s exponential growth without the help of the US. These doctrines of the ‘rogue’ nations would spill into other nations, “corrupting” their governments and creating a larger force against the “unquestioned power” of the US.²¹²

The strategic military response to remove of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) became the justification for the Iraqi War to mask the US’ hegemonic foreign policy.²¹³ By ensuring the removal the WMD from a country that the US feared could interrupt their influence over resources, mainly oil, the Bush administration gained support from congress to wage war in Iraq. Bush’s vision of

²⁰⁸ Raja Bahlul, “Democracy without Secularism? Reflections on the Idea of Islamic Democracy,” in *Islam, Judaism, and the Political Role of Religions in the Middle East*, edited by John Bunzl, 99-117. (Florida: University Press of Florida, 2004), 100.

²⁰⁹ Noam Chomsky, *Failed States: the abuse of power and the assault on democracy*, 130

²¹⁰ Ibid. 89.

²¹¹ Ibid. 112.

²¹² Ibid. 121.

²¹³ Ibid. 25.

democracy soon followed, tailing behind the need to remove a harmful power ruled by a dictator and replace it with a democracy. According to Richard U. Ullman's article, "Redefining Security," the US government focused energy towards the easier depiction of an ideology of military dangers for the inattentive public rather than Washington's true interests. With the war in Iraq, no WMD's were found despite the Bush administration persuasive arguments to the public. Deception by the government went so far as to distort, manipulate, and ignore actual intelligence under false pretenses in order to gain the support of the nation to invade Iraq.²¹⁴ The reasoning for the US presence in Iraq was modified to bring democracy to the Middle East and according to Augustus Richard Norton, jumped onto the "democratization bandwagon."²¹⁵ Articulated by Noam Chomsky, "So understood, 'promotion of democracy is central' to Bush strategy in a kind of postmodern interpretation, in which we restrict attention to narrative and text, recoiling from "Truth," perhaps a social construction."²¹⁶

An image for a hidden agenda

The support of the badly uninformed American public is inadvertently the most powerful tool for the US' foreign policies, allowing for "a rational planning to promote dominant domestic interests."²¹⁷ The US government is able manipulate its own power because of the public's ignorance and unawareness concerning foreign issues, allowing evidence to be misconstrued and falsified in order to support their

²¹⁴ Noam Chomsky, *Failed States: the abuse of power and the assault on democracy*, 25.

²¹⁵ Ibid. 130.

²¹⁶ Ibid. 159.

²¹⁷ Ibid. 110.

own interests of geopolitical strategic power. Demonic messianism of the ‘enemy’ is the result, a perceptions captured by the US government and supported by the influence of American popular culture.²¹⁸

The ‘veil of deceit’ originates during the Cold War beginning with the Truman Doctrine to portray the Soviet’s as a diabolic being that must be stopped by any means necessary. During the Reagan era, the Soviets were the focus of evil in the modern world in contrast to the US,²¹⁹ seen as an “evil empire.”²²⁰ Samuel Huntington expressed similar views in 1981 focusing on the need to create an image of the Soviet threat to ensure the conflict’s acceptance by the public and media. “‘You may have to sell’ intervention or other military action ‘in such a way as to create the impression that it is the Soviet Union that you are fighting.’”²²¹ At the same time, the “war on drugs” in Latin America “served to frighten the domestic population into obedience”²²² and was to ensure the public’s total submission to the huge government-media propaganda campaign.

With the fabrication of a demonic enemy, a savior or messiah was conjured to protect the US public, a vacuum that US politicians and powerful policies agreeably filled.²²³ “Demonic messianism is a natural device for leadership groups that are at the extreme of the spectrum in their dedication to the short-term interests of narrow sectors of power and wealth, and to global domination.”²²⁴ Politicians portray

²¹⁸ Noam Chomsky, *Failed States: the abuse of power and the assault on democracy*, 213

²¹⁸ Ibid. 130.

²¹⁹ Wanttoknow.info. DaanSpeak. “Power of Nightmares-The Rise of the Politics of Fear.” Episode 1, “Baby It’s Cold Outside.”

²²⁰ Noam Chomsky, *Failed States: the abuse of power and the assault on democracy*, 106

²²¹ Ibid. 103.

²²² Ibid. 107.

²²³ Ibid. 130.

²²⁴ Ibid. 211.

themselves as rescuing the public from a nightmare of international terrorism, an illusion they created themselves. Due to the public's lack of knowledge, the fashioned terror encourages the battle between good and evil, a fear that is essential to the neoconservative movement for world hegemonic dominance.²²⁵

In Bernard Lewis' article in 1991 titled, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," the Soviet threat is transformed into the Muslim threat, capitalizing equally on the obliviousness of the US public. The initial battle between good and evil was a war that was never suppose to end, its goals largely misconstrued in order to maintain the US' dominate world status, and perpetuated with the "war on terror" with Arab nations. With the fall of the Soviet Union after the war in Afghanistan, the US-allied Arab warriors, known as the "Afghan Arabs," became the new threat to US interests in the Middle East. The Afghan *jihadists*, lead and financed by Osama bin Laden, became the new targets of the US against terrorism, which will be discussed further in Chapter 3. Saddam Hussein in Iraq became equally menacing for the US due to his growing power in the Gulf that could undermine the US' oil and power interests. Images of "Great Satans" were invoked to further the menacing image.²²⁶ The US became dedicated to defending the world for an "inspiring vision" against the polar opposite of the "Great Satan".²²⁷

The US created a "phantom enemy" to mask its true interests in Gulf Region's natural resources, "a fantasy serving the interests of many."²²⁸ Providing an ideology of a tangible phenomenon, the US gained the needed support in order to engage in

²²⁵ Wanttoknow.info. DaanSpeak. "Power of Nightmares-The Rise of the Politics of Fear." Episode 1, "Baby It's Cold Outside."

²²⁶ Noam Chomsky, *Failed States: the abuse of power and the assault on democracy*, 104

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Wanttoknow.info. DaanSpeak. "Power of Nightmares-The Rise of the Politics of Fear." Episode 3

Middle Eastern conflicts that would ensure the protection and security of the flow of power and resources.

Conclusion

The US' hunger for total domination and control of resources are the most formidable of its ideological weapons.²²⁹ The US is the corporeal reality of Barker's McWorld that masks its true nature at any cost and ruled by its hunger for consumption and power guided by the "religion of the market." However, with the existence of US' worldly status, another force is developed to counter the strength of the US and its policies: Islamic fundamentalism.

The following chapter will discuss the Islamic response to the changing world instigated by the US and its consequences on the world. Conflict does not result in response to differing civilizations, as highlighted in chapter one, yet is produced from the growing tensions surrounding the security and protection of resources. Political Islam's response to the modernizing world is often correlated and mistaken for a response to differing religious beliefs, when religious justifications are used for the removal of imperial powers from their lands and its resources.

²²⁹ François Burgat. *Face to Face with Political Islam* 10.

Chapter 3: The Response to Modernization from the Muslim Perspective

Introduction

From the radical, sometimes termed fundamentalist, Muslim perspective, the world is in a state of *jahiliyyah*, or a state “characterized by ignorance of the divine truth”²³⁰ that opposes the Islamic constitution, state, and laws.²³¹ According to John Esposito explaining the Muslim perception of conditions of the world, the world is dominated by “corrupt authoritarian governments and a wealthy elite concerned more in economic prosperity rather than natural development.”²³² These effects result from the influence of Western, European colonialism beginning in the 18th century. As a result, a radicalized Muslim minority combines militancy with messianic visions to inspire “an army of God whose jihad they believe will liberate Muslims at home and abroad.”²³³

Islam is used to legitimize the complaints of the world’s current political state that resulted from the effects from Western culture and life. Islamic fundamentalism designates Islam to provide solutions to the world’s problems that Muslim societies are facing today.²³⁴ The Qur’an designates Islam’s place in the world through *da’wa* as “God’s ‘call’ to human society to find in Islam the true religion,” in Qur’an

²³⁰ William Shepard, “Age of Ignorance,” in *Encyclopedia of the Qur’an*, ed. Jane McAuliffe, Vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2001), 37.

²³¹ Wanttoknow.info. DaanSpeak. “Power of Nightmares-The Rise of the Politics of Fear.” Episode 1, “Baby It’s Cold Outside.”

²³² John Esposito. *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*. (New York: Oxford University Press), 27.

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ Fred Halliday, “The politics of Islamic fundamentalism,” In *Islam, Globalization, and Postmodernity*. (London: Routledge, 1994), 93.

(14:46).²³⁵ Islamic fundamentalists become the vanguards to ensure that the world's current pace of change will not wipe out their culture and tradition from the seventh century.²³⁶ This Islamic imperative is often misconstrued for fanaticism and intolerance due to the world's media²³⁷ that often advertises individuals that are on the "radical fringe of a broad-based Islamic *jihad*."²³⁸ The perceived images of Islamic fundamentalists and *jihad* result from Islam's power and idealistic concept that transforms into the primary idiom of Muslim politics into a created perception by "rulers and the ruled, be reformers, political opposition, and terrorists."²³⁹ The following chapter will look at two prominent thinkers that have contributed to Islamic fundamentalism, Muhammad Ibn al-Wahhab and Sayyid Qutb. The ideologies of the two individuals are framed around Western European colonialism that calls for a ridding of alien influence in the *ummah*, or the community or nation. A radicalized form of Islam uses the call to *jihad* to bolster and legitimize the rejection of Western influence. Following the discussion of the influence of Muhammad Ibn al-Wahhab and Sayyid Qutb, Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda will be looked at to discern the impact of past thinkers influenced by colonial powers.

²³⁵ Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori. *Muslim Politics*. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), 35.

²³⁶ Ankbār S. Ahmed, Donnan, Hastings. "Islam in the Age of Postmodernity." In *Islam, Globalization, and Postmodernity*. (London: Routledge, 1994), 13.

²³⁷ Ibid. 14

²³⁸ John Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*, 73.

²³⁹ Ibid.

Gramscian approach

When looking at the responses of Islamic fundamentalism, the Gramscian approach is used as a form of methodology to understand the ideas and processes that fundamentalist Islam employs. Antonio Gramsci was an Italian theorist in writing at beginning of the 20th century who contributed to the Marxist critique of hegemony. The theory states “that man is not ruled by force alone, but also by ideas,” and that it is “political leadership based on the consent of the led, a consent which is secured by the diffusion and popularization of the world view of the ruling class.”²⁴⁰ In Thomas J. Butko’s article, “Revelation or Revolution: A Gramscian Approach to the rise of Political Islam,” political Islam is framed according to the blending of Islamic ethic and Gramscian theory, outlining the countering force of political Islam as a response to the ‘passivity of the Islamic state,’²⁴¹ which responds to the Western, hegemonic powers who see the *shari’a* and Islamic way of life as problematic.

Political Islam, or Islamic fundamentalism as it is known in the West, is the counter to a hegemonic force “with the sole and ultimate objective of overthrowing the current elites and the present political, economic, and social structure.”²⁴² With the establishment of a viable revolutionary force, or a “political organization erected upon religious foundations,”²⁴³ which eradicates the old form of rule creating a political vacuum, an expected new form of society will result, “a new morality and,

²⁴⁰ Thomas R. Bates, “Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony,” *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Apr.-Jun., 1975), 351.

²⁴¹ François Burgat, *Face to Face with Political Islam*, 76.

²⁴² Thomas J. Butko, “Revelation or Revolution: A Gramscian Approach to the Rise of Political Islam,” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (May, 2004), 41.

²⁴³ *Ibid.* 42.

most fundamentally, a new type of man.”²⁴⁴ An alternative to this hegemon will allow for a new way of thinking and the success of a revolution. The forms and problems that an individual faces when attempting to bring about a change through political Islam, or his “true consciousness,” will be discussed, looking at the power and legitimacy of the elites in their sociopolitical order.

The elite’s view of “common sense” poses the problematic issue of forcing its conception of the world onto the masses, which prevents them from realizing their “true consciousness.” Human nature is open to influences by dominant forces of society and thus can be compliant to new ideas or beliefs. The elites, or the most educated members of society, “will determine the general orientation and beliefs of the masses,”²⁴⁵ which, through the breakdown of this elite power, can be transported to the revolutionary movement. The state, and thus the elite power, is made up of political society and civil society, which exists as their “armour of coercion.”²⁴⁶

However, if the support civil society is gained, the attempt to control state power can be accomplished. The support of civil society is gained through the understanding of the “collective man,” or the formation of a larger group with similar aims and goals as an ideology. “Shared perceptions of repression, exclusion, and marginalization,”²⁴⁷ as well as the “[search] for greater meaning in life, brought about by increased feelings of ‘spiritual inadequacy,’” unite the common man, rather than the Marxist’s reason due to economics. The ideology of the ruling class, or the structure, is in tern more important for the hegemon’s supremacy in a society. With

²⁴⁴ Thomas J. Butko, “Revelation or Revolution: A Gramscian Approach to the Rise of Political Islam,” 42.

²⁴⁵ Ibid. 44.

²⁴⁶ Ibid. 45.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

this understanding, instruction and education must be invoked for supporters of the counter-hegemonic force, “while exposing the ‘evilness’ of the regime and the surrounding *jahiliyyah* society.”²⁴⁸

According to Gramsci, this counter-hegemonic force is made up of three pieces: a coherent and attractive ideology, a political organization expressing that ideology, and a well-developed strategy. An ideology is an instrument for unifying the masses of divergent interests, usually through “their opposition to the current elites and desire for its overthrow.”²⁴⁹ It also must provide an alternative to the conception of the world, as well as an answer to the problems faced by a society.

An organizational structure is the “concrete expression” of the ideology’s goal, made up of three types of groups: the leadership, the vanguard, and the individual members. The type and level of leadership determines the cohesiveness and potential success of the movement, seen with leaders such as Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949), Khomeini (1902-1989), and Mawdudi (1903-1979). The vanguard, or the inner circle of individuals, is “a group of the most dedicated and active members, on whom could be placed the primary burden of serving God and the message.”²⁵⁰ Sayyid Qutb, a 20th century Egyptian Islamic revolutionary, refers to the necessity and importance of a vanguard during the march against the *jahiliyyah* in his book, *Milestones*, in which the vanguard ensures the confrontation and possible destruction of the *jahiliyyah* society. Gramsci stresses the individual members, or the mass, and believes in the “inherent value of each and every individual by declaring that since

²⁴⁸ Thomas J. Butko, “Revelation or Revolution: A Gramscian Approach to the Rise of Political Islam,” 48.

²⁴⁹ Ibid. 49.

²⁵⁰ Ibid. 53.

‘all men are philosophers’, they should be considered ‘intellectuals’ in the grander sense.”²⁵¹ Individual self-dedication and discipline, like the five daily prayers, make up Islam, while faith and firm conviction ensure the success of the aims of the movement. “Hence, if the seed (Islam) is planted and creates strong roots of leadership, the branches and its leaves (individual members) cannot avoid being nourished and, thus, spreading the word and message of Islam throughout the entire world.”²⁵²

Finally, a well-developed strategy is needed, which Gramsci names as the ‘war of position,’ as “to infiltrate civil society through the dissemination of new ideas and, in the process, to intellectually and culturally prepare the ground for the revolutionary movement’s assault on hegemonic dominance.”²⁵³ A re-education in the core principles of Islam has been the cornerstone to the 20th century Islamic movement since Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood In Egypt, and comprises the strategy of the ‘war of position.’ Qutb agrees with this type of strategy, stating, “Our aim is to first change ourselves so that we may later change the society.”²⁵⁴ Muslim societies are equally capable of committing acts similar to the *jahiliyyah* society, thus require equal energy in the reeducation.

The confrontation of opposites will ensure the movement’s success to counter the present power in the world, first to separate and then eventually to completely destroy. “Consequently, the aim of this movement must be to consciously separate itself from the current social order, while simultaneously attempting to destroy it

²⁵¹ Thomas J. Butko, “Revelation or Revolution: A Gramscian Approach to the Rise of Political Islam,” 53.

²⁵² Ibid. 56.

²⁵³ Ibid. 57.

²⁵⁴ Ibid. 58.

entirely.”²⁵⁵ This separation also includes a rejection of the hegemonic ways and power, followed by the total adoption of the counter-hegemonic forces. Values are “rewritten” within the Muslim culture, “participating in a complex process of reconciliation which actually extends the boundaries of modernization rather than causing it to stay or preventing its progress.”²⁵⁶ Through the achievement of political power in all of the movement’s methods, political Islam will bring about a fundamental change in the sociopolitical sphere.

The following section will look at two prominent thinkers who have had a substantial influence on the current Islamic fundamentalist movement, Muhammad Abd Ibn al-Wahhab and Sayyid Qutb. From these perspectives, the Muslim response was aimed at European colonialism beginning in the 18th century and the failure of modern Muslim states, which hastened the debate of the meaning of *jihad*.²⁵⁷ By delving into the Gramscian theory that explains Islamic fundamentalism, one can understand the ways in which a movement is established. To oppose the “ruling” hegemonic force that imposes their conception of the world, a counter-hegemonic force is realized as “a demand for the present and a hope for the future,”²⁵⁸ accomplished through an ideology, political organization, and strategy.

Al-Wahhab and Sayyid Qutb played crucial roles in the development of the Islamic fundamentalist mindset through their use of religion to justify their response to European colonialism. As discussed later in the chapter, Osama bin Laden contends that promotion of the education of Islam is vital for all Muslims in order to

²⁵⁵ Thomas J. Butko, “Revelation or Revolution: A Gramscian Approach to the Rise of Political Islam,” 58.

²⁵⁶ François Burgat, *Face to Face with Political Islam*, 153.

²⁵⁷ John Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*, 49.

²⁵⁸ Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones*, forward Ahmad Zaki Hammad (Indianapolis: American Trust, 1990), 119.

realize the *jihad* against the aggressive US government and its policies²⁵⁹. In the context of discussing Afghanistan, bin Laden notes:

So we advise Muslims both within and outside Afghanistan to help these students [the Taliban's subjects in Afghanistan], and we advise Muslims outside [Afghanistan] that much of the effort that is being made is doing hardly anything to promote the existence of a state of Islam . . . And we call on Muslims to help this state [Afghanistan] with all their might, their ideas, their charitable donations and funds, for which God's will it represents the banner of Islam today.²⁶⁰

According to bin Laden, a *jihad* is used in self defense, and is the only way to obtain a faithful strength to unite Islam against the enemy.²⁶¹ In an interview between Al-Jazeera and bin Laden in 1998, bin Laden stated that the call to *jihad* needs to occur now, contrary to many scholars who believe “now is not the time.”²⁶² All individuals from the Muslim world are “obliged to strive” for a *jihad* to rid the *ummah* of unfavorable powers. The example of bin Laden is used to show the evolution and progression of Islamic fundamentalism in the 21st century from the teachings of al-Wahhab and Sayyid Qutb. Both thinkers emphasized the rejection of Western influence, which interferes with the education and proselytization of Islam in a world that is supposedly in a state of *jahiliyyah*. The term will be used to refer to the world that these two thinkers wish to change, mirroring the ideal version of an Islamic world.

²⁵⁹ Osama bin Laden, *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden*, edited by Bruce Lawrence. (New York: Verso, 2005), 46.

²⁶⁰ Ibid. 85.

²⁶¹ Ibid. 49.

²⁶² Ibid. 80.

Jahiliyyah

The question of faith between the divine and the human, or *din*, characterizes Islam's *jahiliyyah*.²⁶³ The first evidence of *jahiliyyah* is in pre-Islamic, pagan Arabia and found in pagan poetry. "*Jahiliyyah* is not lack of knowledge on the part of the *jahili* poet or on the part of his *jahili* masters, but simply disobedience to God's law and order. These *jahili* poets worshipped idols and not Allah, thus not following God's order."²⁶⁴ Pagan scholars and poets are seen as committing *jahiliyyah* who do not fully submit to Allah.

With the birth of Islam and the Qur'an in the seventh century, individuals not following God's orders are seen as disbelievers, using a variation of the term *jahiliyyah*, such as *jahil* for individuals, and *jahilun* and *juhhal* for them as a group.²⁶⁵ *Jahiliyyah* took on its own meaning in the Qur'an as a result of the Qur'an's usage of the word from the pre-Islamic period. The term is to denote a contrast to Islam, seen in Qur'an 39:63-64 with, "Say [O Muhammad}: Is it some one other than Allah that you order me to worship, oh *jahilun* ones?"²⁶⁶ Thus, "the term was a religio-political concept used oppositionally to the Islamic constitution, state, and laws."²⁶⁷

Wahhabism

Origins of Wahhabism

Today, Wahhabi Islam is known because of its Saudi origins and affiliation with the bin Laden family. Initially known as the Wahhabiyya, or Wahhabism by the

²⁶³ Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones*, 19.

²⁶⁴ Ibid. 18.

²⁶⁵ Ibid. 20.

²⁶⁶ Ibid. 25.

²⁶⁷ Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones*, 32.

West, it exists as an 18th century Islamic revivalism “that [sought] to purify Islam of any innovations or practices that deviate from the seventh century teachings of Prophet Muhammad and his companions.”²⁶⁸ According to the *Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World*, Wahhabism was “the last significant reformist effort in the area before European imperialism.”²⁶⁹ It holds puritanical and iconoclastic philosophies forbidding saint veneration, the celebration of the Prophet’s birthday, some mystical teachings of Sufism, and the loathing for music.²⁷⁰ These bans often clash with many of Islam’s other non-Wahhabi sects, like Sunni Muslims, Shiite Muslims, and non-Muslim neighbors that participate in shrine veneration. According to John Esposito, Wahhabism today “continues to be a significance force in the Islamic world, informing both mainstream and extremist movements from Africa and Central Asia to Europe and America.”²⁷¹ A discussion of the Wahhabi movement’s origins will follow, first by looking at its founder’s theoretical positions for its justifications and ending with the movement’s historical context until the present day.

Wahhabism’s origins can be traced to an 18th century thinker named Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1971) from Najd in the Arabian Peninsula. Al-Wahhab held strict convictions that differed from mainstream Islam, “disillusioned by the spiritual decline and moral laxity of his society.”²⁷² He called for “a return to *tawhid*” (strict monotheism) and viewed society as moving away from the

²⁶⁸ Christopher M. Blanchard, “The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya,” in *Focus on Islamic Issues*, ed. Cofie D. Malbouisson (London: Nova Publishers, 2007), 23.

²⁶⁹ Sohail H. Hashmi, “Arab Middle East and North Africa,” in *Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World*, ed. Richard C. Martin, Vol. 2. (New York: Macmillan Reference, 2004), 575

²⁷⁰ Christopher M. Blanchard, “The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya,” 23.

²⁷¹ John Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*, 47.

²⁷² *Ibid.*

pure Islam he called for.²⁷³ He also called for a fresh interpretation of Islam that returned to its revealed sources, seen through the Qur'an and *hadith*.²⁷⁴ Muslims should read the Qur'an for their own interpretation and disregard other human insights into the interpretation of scripture. Similarly as regards the *hadith*, its content must be analyzed by the individual rather than using the interpretations of transmitters. Literature by *hadith* commentators made it difficult to see the difference between the actual story and the commentary of the authors.²⁷⁵ According to al-Wahhab, through the study of the Qur'an and *hadith*, contextualization and the search for purpose are the proper ways to understand Islam, rather than just with memorization and analysis of other interpretations.²⁷⁶ Al-Wahhab's book titled, *Kitab al-Tawhid*, or the Book of Monotheism, outlined his basic teachings and describes the themes of his work with the Qur'an and *hadith*.

In *Kitab al-Tawhid*, an entire treatise is dedicated to *tawhid*, which al-Wahhab describes as the sole characteristic of Islam "reflected in the Wahhabi's self-designation as 'unitarians.'"²⁷⁷ The treatise attributes Christianity and Judaism's false monotheism to their "ordained clergy, papacy, or binding interpretations of scripture written by rabbis or priests."²⁷⁸ *Kitab al-Tawhid* represents al-Wahhab's manifesto for action and a justification for fighting those with different beliefs.²⁷⁹ The idea of

²⁷³ Sohail H. Hashmi, "Wahhabiyya," in *Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World*, ed. Richard C. Martin, Vol. 2, (New York: Macmillan Reference, 2004), 726

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

²⁷⁵ Ibid. 46.

²⁷⁶ Ibid. 195.

²⁷⁷ John Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*, 50.

²⁷⁸ Christopher M. Blanchard, "The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya," 49.

²⁷⁹ Ibid. 57.

tawhid “makes it clear that correct belief is intended to lead to correct behavior,”²⁸⁰ since knowingly violating *tawhid* is a greater sin than unknowingly.

The Wahhabis are known for their clear definitions of faith (*Iman*) and unbelief, or *kufr*, which is “any failure to follow the teachings of the Wahhabis.” Al-Wahhab teaches that non-Muslim individuals must be educated on the Islamic way of life, and will be excused from ignorance.²⁸¹ He agrees that faith “cannot exist without proper instruction in the Qur’an and Sunna,”²⁸² To aid this practice, al-Wahhab taught that guiding individuals to Islam is the most worthy action a Muslim can do through the infusion of knowledge and education through proselytization.²⁸³ This education occurs through steps, beginning with the acceptance of *tawhid*²⁸⁴ (the monotheistic belief in Allah). The opposite of *tawhid*, *shirk*, is taught as “a violation of and departure from *tawhid*,” and assigns power and sovereignty “to someone or something other than God,” which was the greatest sin of all according to al-Wahhab.²⁸⁵ According to the *Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World*, Al-Wahhab’s teachings “provided the ideological basis for the militant conquest of the Arabian peninsula that had been undertaken by the Sa’ud family.”²⁸⁶

In addition to the impacts of al-Wahhab’s work on the current Islamic fundamentalist movement, the evolved Wahhabi appeal seen in Saudi Arabia adds to the discussion of the Islamic fundamentalist origins. The development of the Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia is notable due to its deeply intertwined status with the

²⁸⁰ Christopher M. Blanchard, “The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya,” 59.

²⁸¹ Richard Booney, *Jihad: from Qur’an to Bin Laden*, 80.

²⁸² Ibid. 82.

²⁸³ Ibid. 198.

²⁸⁴ Ibid. 200.

²⁸⁵ Christopher M. Blanchard, “The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya,” 62.

²⁸⁶ Sohail H. Hashmi, “Wahhabiyya,” 728.

politics of the kingdom, turning into a religio-political movement.²⁸⁷ The Arab clan of Al-Saud was the Wahhabi rival in the region, which eventually joined forces in 1745. Through the formation of the al-Wahhab-Saudi alliance, “Ibn Sa’ud pledged to give military support for the propagation and enforcement of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s teachings,”²⁸⁸ elevating Wahhabism to a sizeable position in the kingdom. The 18th century alliance represented the symbiotic relationship of the two powers in Saudi Arabia, which Ibn Saud employed Wahhabism “as a religious ideal to legitimate his jihad to subdue and unite the tribes of Arabia, converting them to this puritanical version of Islam.”²⁸⁹

While attempting to establish power in the region in the 18th century, Western imperial powers, like the British, capitalized on this strong alliance due to its resistance against the Ottoman Empire for the availability and protection of its resource interests in the Arabian Peninsula. In conjunction with imperial powers, the ultimate goals of the al-Wahhab and Ibn Sa’ud alliance, was to “undermine the Ottomans, subdue the Two Holy Places, and impose the Wahhabi dispensation on the entire *ummah*.”²⁹⁰ As a result, the Saudi ruling class formed a commanding, influential, and wealthy elite that “legitimated its domestic and foreign policies by claiming to govern and be governed by the Qur’an and sharia.”²⁹¹

Until Saudi Arabia’s founding in 1932, the region was constantly in conflict with foreign powers and influences, like the Ottoman Empire and Britain. First, in the early 19th century, the Ottoman sultan permitted the governor of Egypt, Muhammad

²⁸⁷ John Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*, 48.

²⁸⁸ Sohail H. Hashmi, “Wahhabiyya,” 728.

²⁸⁹ John Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*, 48.

²⁹⁰ Stephen Schartz, *The Two Faces of Islam*, 93.

²⁹¹ John Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*, 81.

‘Ali (1769-1849), to destroy the Wahhabi state by the Ottoman sultan, which was later revoked in 1822.²⁹² Second, in the 20th century during the First World War, the British curtailed the Wahhabi expansion in Arabia, which was revoked later in 1925, regardless of their previous cordial relationship.²⁹³

In response, the Wahhabi movement contributed a totalitarian system based on the *Ikhwan al-Muslimin* (Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood), which established its own form of fascism “based on a monopoly of wealth by the elite, backed by extreme repression and a taste for bloodshed.”²⁹⁴ The *Ikhwan*’s doctrine called for a rejection of non-Qur’anic or non-Wahhabi texts and music, alongside a skeptical view of modern technology. Nonetheless, with the discovery of oil in 1938, the Wahhabis and the Saud family became “the world’s richest and most powerful ruling elite,”²⁹⁵ as well as initiating the clash “between the Sa’audi family and clerical establishment and the most zealous Wahhabi loyalists.”²⁹⁶

Further foreign presence occurred in Saudi Arabia in 1945 with the Roosevelt-Ibn Sa’ud alliance on the *USS Quincy*, with the US’ promise of American military aid to Saudi Arabia in return for the kingdom’s business and security of interests. American dollars spilled into Saudi Arabia because of the oil industry, which also brought American interests and influence, angering many of the Wahhabi fundamentalists present in Saudi Arabia. “Airport Wahhabis,” characterized as Saudi aristocracy who engaged in non-Wahhabi activities, emerged from Saudi Arabia as a result of this influx of wealth that “became an unparalleled symbol of debauchery,

²⁹² Sohail H. Hashmi, “Wahhabiyya,” 729.

²⁹³ Ibid.

²⁹⁴ Stephen Schartz, *The Two Faces of Islam*, 105.

²⁹⁵ Ibid. 110.

²⁹⁶ Sohail H. Hashmi, “Wahhabiyya,” 729.

obstentation, and waste, as well as ignorance, prejudice and brutality.”²⁹⁷ This influx of money, technology, and interests angered the Wahhabi society, thus globalization “inevitably [undermined] Wahhabi domination in Arabia.”²⁹⁸

Wahhabi strength maintained its presence in Saudi Arabia through the boom in the oil industry in the mid 20th century. With the war against Soviet Union in Afghanistan in 1979, the Wahhabi campaign extended its reach. The *mujahidin*, or the ‘Afghan Arabs,’²⁹⁹ were the young and restless youth fighting in the Afghanistan *jihād* who used religious reform to instigate political mobilization. According to Stephen Schwartz, Afghanistan gave the Wahhabi-Saudi power a chance to “impose [its] own form of Islam under the pretext of defending Muslims . . . launched [its] most ambitious attempt to date at direct religious colonization of a Muslim country that was neither Arab nor a neighbor of Arabs.”³⁰⁰ The US also supported the war in Afghanistan through financial aid and military support for the *mujahidin*, training the young soldiers American tactics in warfare, such as the use of the car bomb.³⁰¹ However, after the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan, the ‘Afghan Arabs’ switched their efforts from fighting the Communists to bringing about the global Wahhabi campaign to revive Islam in Muslim communities. The Wahhabi-Saudi movement “attempted Wahhabization of these countries and the destruction of their indigenous Islamic cultures, which were and remain mainstream Sunni, Suffi, and pluralist.”³⁰² Iran, the Shi’a radical Islamic state, posed a threat to the Wahhabi-Saudi movement,

²⁹⁷ Stephen Schartz, *The Two Faces of Islam*, 116.

²⁹⁸ Ibid. 123.

²⁹⁹ Ibid. 155.

³⁰⁰ Ibid.

³⁰¹ Wanttoknow.info. DaanSpeak. “Power of Nightmares-The Rise of the Politics of Fear.” Episode 1, “Baby It’s Cold Outside.”

³⁰² Stephen Schartz, *The Two Faces of Islam*, 166.

as well as to the US because of Khomeini's aggressive rule. Iraq, ruled by Saddam Hussein, also opposed Iran, which the US quickly sent aid and arms to in support of the invasion of Iran. Consequently, the US supported Iraq and the Saudi line, however unaware of the real Wahhabi agenda against Iran.³⁰³

The world of Wahhabism separated reality into two human societies, the "house of war" and the "house of peace," similar to the Communist's divided world between capitalist and socialists.³⁰⁴ "They sought an *ummah* sufficient unto itself, with no 'external' relations except those between Wahhabi rulers and the minority in their subjects . . . all others were to be liquidated, beginning with the Shi'ia and Sufis."³⁰⁵ Arabian youth, specifically in Saudi Arabia, blamed the decline in civilization, Western colonization, and disenfranchisement of the Palestinians on the Saudi rulers who relied heavily on Western influence.³⁰⁶

The 18th century Wahhabi movement stressed the need for a strict interpretation of the Qur'an and *hadith* to mobilize a political movement against the Ottomans and the British, which is often perceived as puritanical and extreme. In addition to the conversation on al-Wahhab's ideologies, Sayyid Qutb, the most powerful Egyptian voice of radical Islam that protested against both Arab nationalism and Western hegemony in the 20th century³⁰⁷, must be looked at to

³⁰³ Stephen Scharz, *The Two Faces of Islam*, 167.

³⁰⁴ Ibid. 176.

³⁰⁵ Ibid. 178.

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ Bruce Lawrence, "Introduction," in *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden*, ed. Bruce Lawrence, (New York: Verso, 2005), xii.

Sayyid Qutb

While many great Islamists supplemented the Islamic fundamentalist movement in the 20th century, Sayyid Qutb is known as the “godfather and martyr of Islamic radicalism.”³⁰⁸ Sayyid Qutb Ibrahim Husayn Shadhili was born October 9th, 1906 in a small town in Upper Egypt called Musha. Throughout Qutb’s childhood and early adulthood, Egypt was under foreign occupation by the British until 1955 when with the British withdrew from the Suez Canal. Egypt was bombarded with modernization because of its control under a Western monarchy, which was resisted with Islamic resurgence. In his youth, he was educated the traditional Islamic form, and later in the secular form while in college in Cairo. One can see the linear progression of Qutb’s ideologies of militant *jihad* that stem from his response to the repressive Egyptian state reacting from British rule, and past French rule, in the late 1950’s and 1960’s.³⁰⁹

After completing his education, Qutb traveled to America in 1948 to study school curricula. While at first an admirer of the US, Qutb became disillusioned by the American vices in society, which were comprised of the “combination of secularism and materialism that in his opinion had resulted in moral laxity, exploitation, oppression, and racism.”³¹⁰ Religion was not a guiding factor in the American public life, where human laws and thought were given more precedence than divine revelation and law. John Esposito notes that Qutb’s experience in

³⁰⁸ John Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*, 56.

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

³¹⁰ Natana J. Delong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 257.

America “produced a cultural shock that made him more religious and convinced him of moral decadence of the West.”³¹¹

After traveling to the US, Qutb began to invoke *jahiliyyah*, to denote the condition of the world³¹² rather than the period before the rise of Islam. Seen in the introduction of an Indian Muslim thinker colleague’s book, *What Has the World Lost as a Result of the Decline of Muslims*, Qutb freely uses *jahiliyyah* to show the condition in which the world is without Islam, “humanity [being] corroded by a criminally luxurious and wasteful life on the one hand, and hopelessness and frustration and despair on the other.”³¹³ Previously, Qutb had used synonyms of *jahiliyyah* in the historical sense, like *jahalah*, *jahilin*, and *jahiliyyah*.³¹⁴

After his experiences with *jahili* society in the US, in 1951 Qutb joined the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist organization in Egypt founded by Hassan al-Banna. His membership was a result of the blending of his distaste for the Western culture, the US support for the state of Israel in 1948, Egypt’s alignment with Russia, and secular nationalism in Egypt.³¹⁵ As a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Qutb filled the vacuum left after the assassination of al-Banna and “became an editor of its journal and established himself right away as Islamism’s principal theoretician in the Arab World.”³¹⁶ After World War II, several organizations were born in response to their post-war status still under imperial authority, like the Ba’ath party as an anticolonialist

³¹¹ John Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*, 57.

³¹² Natana J. Delong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad*, 149.

³¹³ Ibid. 149.

³¹⁴ Ibid. 156.

³¹⁵ John Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*, 57.

³¹⁶ Paul Berman, “Why Radical Islam Just Won’t Die,” *New York Times*, March 23, 2008, Opinion section.

party.³¹⁷ All organizations demanded Egypt's full independence from Britain following World War II in 1952, which paralleled with other Egyptian groups' interests, such as the Free Officers led by army colonel Gamal Abd al-Nasser. However, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Free Officers clashed because of their differing ideologies. The Free Officers were secular in orientation, following Arab nationalism, with Nasser's ideas "[centering] on the unification of the Arab nation and modernization of Arab society, under Egyptian leadership, as a means of reviving their past greatness."³¹⁸ Nasser also did not believe that the fight for an Arab revival was through the religious purification of fundamentalism, but rather as a consequence of ethnic solidarity and social reform.³¹⁹ On the contrary, the Muslim Brotherhood favored Islam as the basis for the identity and construction for Arab alliance. Qutb firmly believed in the Egyptian *Ikhwan*, or totalitarian system of an ideological militia, filled with the fundamental separatism and supremacism similar to Wahhabism.³²⁰

Tensions between the Brotherhood and Nasser erupted in 1954, leading to Qutb's subsequent imprisonment because of his prominent position in the Brotherhood. Qutb was tortured extensively in prison where he wrote, "In the Shade of the Qur'an" using Qur'anic commentary. Qutb wrote extensively in prison where he became progressively more radically Islamist, including his views on *jihad* to oppress Western influences and the secular regime that grew from it. "His hostility to

³¹⁷ Stephen Schartz, *The Two Faces of Islam*, 128.

³¹⁸ Ibid. 127.

³¹⁹ Ibid. 129.

³²⁰ Ibid. 133.

the West expressed itself in an exaltation of his concepts of ‘*jihad*.’³²¹ In 1966, Nasser executed the incarcerated Qutb as an attempt to quell the emotions that Qutb had instilled in the Islamic fundamentalist movement.

A shift is seen in Qutb’s work in the 1960’s from moderate to radical in his two books, *Social Justice in Islam* and *Milestones*. Qutb’s criticizing writing style evoked a “profound anger and revulsion, which translated into a revolutionary vision.”³²² In his later years, he “disowned” most of what he had written during the era of his secularist views, which included *Social Justice in Islam*, which he then rewrote.

Sayyid Qutb wrote *Social Justice in Islam*, or *Al-‘Adalah al-Ijtimā’iyyah fi al-Islam*, in 1949, representing his initial political and theoretical position of Islamic society in the modern world.³²³ After traveling to the US, Qutb wrote, *Social Justice in Islam* that came out of his concern for the political corruption, social stress, economic inequality and the continuing European imperialism in Egypt. Each of the book’s six versions show the progression of Qutb’s changing views from his life in Egypt with the Muslim Brotherhood and during his incarceration.³²⁴ “He took the lead in attacking the social conditions and in preparing the ground for social reform.”³²⁵ Yet the real evolution of Qutb’s views came with the publication of *Milestones*.

Qutb’s *Milestones*, written in 1948, was (and still is) one of the most influential primary sources for Islamic fundamentalism. It was his first Islamic book,

³²¹ Stephen Schartz, *The Two Faces of Islam*, 134.

³²² John Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*, 20.

³²³ William E. Shepard, *Sayyid Qutb and Islamic activism: a translation and critical analysis of social justice in Islam* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996), 50.

³²⁴ *Ibid.*

³²⁵ Sayed Khatab, *The political thought of Sayyid Qutb: the theory of jahiliyyah* (London: Routledge, 2006), 156.

and continued to be published until 1964 that subsequently lead to his re-arrest for an accusation of conspiracy against Nasser.³²⁶ Qutb introduces the book by calling on Islam to revive the world from the Western system that possesses values and a way of life not warranted to be the leader of mankind.³²⁷ The documentary, God's Warriors, states that the “vanguards” of the Islamic world saw *Milestones* as “the manifesto of the *jihadi* movement.” Kamal Al-Saad Habib, an individual interviewed in the documentary, was a member of an Islamic *jihadist* group in Egypt during Qutb’s lifetime. Habib sees Qutb’s work as a call to arms: “America and the Western world have a moral problem. They look at the human being only from a materialistic point of view.”³²⁸ Fawaz Gerges, a CNN Middle East Consultant, also noted Qutb’s work, specifically *Milestones*, concerning the Muslim mission in life: “Your mission in life is to replace the secular, non-Muslim society-government that exists in this part of the world with authentic Islamic state, and you must do it. You must do it using all means at your disposal.”³²⁹

According to the Muslim minority of Islamic fundamentalists, *Milestones* was to engage the beginning of a revolution “to be carried out via *jihad* as holy war, which was declared to be the ongoing, permanent duty of Muslims as they engaged in the cosmic battle of good versus evil, played out in every life.”³³⁰ To the current Islamist community, it is a classic manifesto for action framed around Qutb’s rejection of Western influence in Egyptian life in the 1960’s.³³¹

³²⁶ Richard Booney, *Jihad: from Quran to Bin Laden*, 221.

³²⁷ Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones* 5.

³²⁸ Christiane Amanpour, God's Warriors: Islam. CNN Special reports. www.youtube.com.

³²⁹ Wanttoknow.info. DaanSpeak. “Power of Nightmares-The Rise of the Politics of Fear.” Episode 1, “Baby It’s Cold Outside.”

³³⁰ Natana J. Delong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad*, 258.

³³¹ *Ibid.* 259.

Milestones is made up of a three--part analysis: the ills of modernity (*jahiliyyah*), a cure to *jahiliyyah* in the form of Islamic law, and a method of implementing the cure.³³² Islam is vital to the *jahiliyyah* society so that the “humanity of man” can be awakened and developed, seen through the invocation of *jihad*. *Jihad* is used to eliminate the *jahili* authorities, such a political systems or material powers, which remove individuals’ freedom from forming Islamic ideas and serving Allah, known as Islamic *din*. According to Roxanne Euben, Islam “seeks to abolish all those systems and governments that are based on the rule of some men over others.”³³³ Institutions and traditions that limit the freedom of human beings and distorts human nature should be destroyed, serving as an obstacle for individuals from humanity’s freedom and choice.³³⁴ Roxanne Euben also notes that “this leaves no option for Islam but to fight against them in order to remove all obstacles from the path to universal human freedom. Only this manner can life be wholly dedicated to Allah.”³³⁵

Jahiliyyah society must follow Islam’s declaration of faith, “*La ilaha illa Allah*” (no god but Allah) to create a foundation for a true, Islamic community based on the worship of Allah alone. According to Qutb, societies that do not fully submit to Islamic *din* are *jahili* societies that do not dedicate themselves to the submission of Allah alone in ideas and beliefs are a *jahili* society.³³⁶ Qutb also declares that “all existing so-called ‘Muslim societies’ are also *jahili* societies”³³⁷ due to the lack of absolute submission to Allah. The world becomes divided into separate states of *dar-*

³³² Roxanne L. Euben. *Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationality*, 56.

³³³ Sayyid Qutb. *Milestones*, 49.

³³⁴ Ibid. 61.

³³⁵ Ibid. 62.

³³⁶ Ibid. 66.

³³⁷ Ibid. 67.

al-Islam (home of Islam) where Islamic *shar'iah* law is enforced, and *dar-al-harb* (home of hostility), where Islamic *shar'iah* law is neglected,³³⁸ neither being able to coexist with the other.³³⁹ Qutb's worlds of *darl-al-Islam* and *darl-al-harb* "recast the world into black and white,"³⁴⁰ with no shades of gray. With the success of a state of *dar-al-Islam*, Allah and the Qur'an will remove all forms of *jahiliyyah* to make that land pure.

At the end of *Milestones*, Qutb addresses the vanguards for which the book is dedicated to. The vanguard is charged with understanding the struggle on earth as a triumph of faith as well as a struggle perceived by Allah in the Thereafter that dictates humanity's purpose.³⁴¹ Vanguards are called to enact religious reform that is meant to establish political mobilization favorable to Islamic fundamentalism. Qutb warns vanguards that enemies will try to change the struggle into an economic or political issue to "deprive them of their weapons for true victory,"³⁴² which he commands believers to disregard. Islam is to take the world out of disparity, notes Qutb, and must not be "a camp follower."³⁴³ Qutb's final words are used to bolster the vanguards when empowering the *dar-al-Islam* against the *dar-al-harb*, described as the "spirit of materialism," inspiring the heart of the Islamic fundamentalist to strive against *jahili* society that has held a predominant position in world affairs.

³³⁸ Sayyid Qutb. *Milestones*, 102.

³³⁹ Ibid. 112.

³⁴⁰ John Esposito. *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*, 60.

³⁴¹ Richard Booney. *Jihad: from Quran to bin Laden*, 137.

³⁴² Ibid.

³⁴³ Ibid. 149.

Qutb's other works

In addition to *Social Justice in Islam* and *Milestones*, in 1951 Qutb wrote two books that discuss the liberation of man from controlling and dominating forces, *The Battle between Islam and Capitalism*, and *Islam and Universal Peace*.

The Battle between Islam and Capitalism shows his interest in understanding and describing the problems of the royal, Western capitalist system and its negative impact on Egyptian society.³⁴⁴ Egypt must distance itself from hegemonic forces, such as France, that do not understand the tension between the legislation and the spirit of the people. To respond to the problems of the capitalist system in Egypt, Islam must be used to disregard all the other powers in the world that are attempting to do the same thing. The only way for the *ummah* to prosper is to be ruled by *shari'ah* law,³⁴⁵ emphasizing religion to initiate political mobilization. It must go back to the great *'aqidah* (creed): "This great *'aqidah* today, in the case of Egypt, is not anything but Islam."³⁴⁶

Islam and Universal Peace notes that "Islam, unlike secular ideologies, is divinely inspired guidance and is able to establish both justice and peace in the world."³⁴⁷ The world will continue to suffer until Islam is given the leadership to "lead the perplexed (*ha'ir*) humanity to justice, order, and peace."³⁴⁸ This peace will arise from the Islamic liberation of man, which is the religious duty for every Muslim

³⁴⁴ Richard Booney. *Jihad: from Quran to bin Laden*, 151.

³⁴⁵ Ibid. 152.

³⁴⁶ Ibid. 153.

³⁴⁷ Ibid. 155.

³⁴⁸ Ibid. 156.

to liberate the world from the unjust rule, regardless of religion or predominant governance. The path to peace will be through *jihad* against the *jahili* society.³⁴⁹

The perspective of Qutb's influence on the Islamic fundamentalist mindset against *jahili* society concerning *jihad* varies in degree and purpose. According to Bin Jani, author of *Sayyid Qutb's View of Jihad*, Qutb did not believe in the armed struggle per se, yet called for an alternative method. First, a vanguard of Islam must be set up as a "catalyst for the creation of an Islamic society that is suppose to replace the existing *jahili* society," to unite all Muslims under a single Islamic organization. Its main duty is the propagation of *da'wah* through persuasion, argumentation, and education to oppose *jahiliyyah*. Only with the help of the vanguard will an authentic Islamic society be accomplished to transform their movement into a religio-political unit, separating completely from the *jahili* society. However, according to John Esposito in *Unholy War*, Qutb's *jihad* was more radical in nature. While explained as an "armed struggle in the defense of Islam against the injustice and oppression of the West and the East," it stands as an important ideology to numerous radical *jihad* extremist groups. A *jihad* is to be waged against the "Western threat as a political, economic, and religio-cultural conflict,"³⁵⁰ in addition to the elites of the Muslim world that support them.

Roxanne L. Euben sees Qutb's experience with Nasser in Egypt as a clue to understanding and discussing the world and *jahili* society. Qutb's aversion to modernity is not due in part to technology, progress, or worldliness, but to the openness to Westernization and commitment to secularization imposed by previous

³⁴⁹ Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones*, 74.

³⁵⁰ John Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*, 61.

imperial rule.³⁵¹ Man-made sources of authority become Qutb's true rival, like the Egyptian President Nasser who believed in secular nationalism. Additionally, an authentic Islamic society will only be accomplished through the active participation "in the realization of the Islamic way on Earth,"³⁵² through the enactment of a *jihad*. In this strange paradox, Islam brings freedom to the *jahili* society yet insisting that Allah's sovereignty must be accepted. This turns into an unapologetic offensive, which is necessary to bring about a more Islamic way of life to the world. Even while reading Qutb's *Milestones*, his language gradually develops an image of a winnable battle between good and evil for the vanguards, calling for a *jihad* against the *jahili* society rooted in materialism, sexual permissiveness and promiscuity, free use and abuse of alcohol, and its racism.³⁵³

The resonating theme between al-Wahhab and Sayyid Qutb is their emphasis on religious reform for freedom (to follow Islam) that is hindered by invading forces reminiscent of colonial powers. A call for a religious revival merges with the concern to change the political influences that attempt to modernize societies in the Middle East. For this reason, a *jihad* against the *jahili* society that supports these powers is perceived as just and gives a tangible purpose. Through our development of the 18th and 20th century thinkers' ideologies, a discussion of the current response of Islamic fundamentalism resulting from the previous ideologies can be examined.

³⁵¹ Roxanne L. Euben. *Enemy in the Mirror*. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990) 85.

³⁵² Ibid. 73.

³⁵³ John Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*, 57.

The current Islamist mindset

After September 11, an examination of Saudi Arabia was instigated by the fact that 15 out of the 19 hijackers were of Saudi background. With this said, the current demographics of Saudi Arabian society must be looked at in order to piece together one perspective from the Middle East. This is not making the assumption that all hijackers are Saudi, or that all Saudis are hijackers, yet brings to light certain factors of Saudi Arabia that can influence the Islamic fundamentalist perspective. According to Michael Klare, despite the US' hesitance to admit the instability of Saudi Arabia, the kingdom "[became] a scene of social, economic, political, a religious ferment."³⁵⁴ From 1950 to 2002, Saudi Arabia's population grew from 3.2 million people to 21.7 million people with 75% of the population under the age of thirty and 50% under the age of eighteen.³⁵⁵ The kingdom also experienced a drop in its per capita income, from \$28,600 in 1981 to \$6,800 in 2001, followed by an approximate 30% unemployment rate under thirty that, according to Richard Booney, "may fuel support for militancy."³⁵⁶ Well-educated and ambitious men were left often alienated and "with high expectations and few economic opportunities- perfect fodder for political or religious extremists."³⁵⁷

Saudi Arabian society in the 21st century became discontent for three reasons due to the emerging Western presence and influence in their kingdom. First, the continuing US military presence left over from Operation Desert Storm in 1990

³⁵⁴ Michael Klare, *Blood and Oil*, 86.

³⁵⁵ Ibid. 87.

³⁵⁶ Richard Booney, *Jihad: from Quran to bin Laden*, 382.

³⁵⁷ Michale Klare, *Blood and Oil*, 87.

angered some in the Saudi community, who saw the occupation as a stab to the spiritual heart of Islam with the dwelling infidels. Second, the Saudi state was angered by the US' continuing support for Israel and the war against the Palestinians, which directly refuted the Saudi-US alliance to consider Arab interests in addition to Israeli ones. Third, some in the Saudi society saw the royal family as having been corrupted due to Western petrodollar wealth, which caused it to move away from the path of Islam, losing "its mantle of legitimacy."³⁵⁸ "The result [was] the intrusion of Western values at the expense of Muslim principles, the corruption of Saudi princes and officials, and dependence on the United States."³⁵⁹

In addition to adopting Western lifestyle habits, the royal family received "commissions" from foreign companies, usually Western, to secure interests and allies. Commissions were passed on to Islamic fundamentalists to reconcile their conflicts with the Saudi regime because of their fear of losing power. Unfortunately, the reverse happened with "an explosion of anti-Americanism, a deepening anger at the royal family, and a steady stream of recruits to Al Qaeda and other extremist organizations."³⁶⁰ From the Western perspective, the only way to combat these resentments was to support the Saudi regime and royal family.

Still to this day, the Saudi royal family lives a life of contradictions. It attempts to appease the Saudi Wahhabi campaign and maintain an alliance with the US at the same time,³⁶¹ which is the exact complaint that many current Islamic fundamentalists hold as a justification for their global *jihad*.

³⁵⁸ Michael Klare, *Blood and Oil*, 88.

³⁵⁹ Bruce Lawrence, *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden*, 3.

³⁶⁰ Michael Klare, *Blood and Oil*, 89.

³⁶¹ Richard Booney, *Jihad: from Quran to Jihad*, 382.

While the teachings and theories of al-Wahhab and Sayyid Qutb have strengthened the Islamic fundamentalist movement's justifications concerning the *ummah*, *jahiliyyah*, and *jihad*, the real strength lies in their representation of contemporary Western societies as well as the "Muslim sense of historic oppression, occupation, and injustice at the hands of the West."³⁶² In 18th century Saudi Arabia, the Wahhabi movement developed from a reaction against the Ottoman Empire and the British, similarly to the 20th century Egyptian reactionary movement against British rule. Religious reform becomes alike with political mobilization. The examples of Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda will be used to demonstrate the evolved power of the movement in the 21st century responding to a "centuries-long tradition of reform in Islam, most of it aimed at the last one hundred years toward the struggle over Muslim oppression by the West."³⁶³ Through bin Laden's identification with many mainstream and extremist Muslim grievances and perceptions, he seeks to legitimate and mobilize the "'Muslim street', or general population."³⁶⁴

Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda

Osama bin Muhammaed bin Laden was born in Saudi Arabia in 1957 to a wealthy family with close ties with the ruling al-Saud family. Osama Bin Laden was educated in economics but preferred Islamic studies, and was taught by Abdallah Azzam and Muhammad Qutb (the brother of Sayyid Qutb). After briefly working in Saudi Arabia for his family's construction empire, bin Laden experienced a "turning

³⁶² John Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*, 22.

³⁶³ *Ibid.* 25.

³⁶⁴ *Ibid.* 22.

point”³⁶⁵ in his life when became involved with the *jihad* in Afghanistan and helped organize the flow of Saudi funds and equipment to the *mujahidin* in addition to US’ support in Afghanistan. After the war ended, the *mujahidin* were “left orphaned and warring amongst each other in Peshawar,”³⁶⁶ prompting bin Laden to return to Saudi Arabia. Upon return, bin Laden was initially viewed as a hero, but gradually became in conflict with the royal family when he felt bound within the confines of a regime whose policies and alliances he more and more came to despise as corrupt and un-Islamic. However, in light of the invasion of Kuwait, bin Laden offered the Saudi kingdom the protection of the ‘Afghan Arabs,’ and in place took the support offered by the US. This period in the kingdom’s history represents the defining moment for bin Laden in his anger towards the US, Saudi Arabia, and the encroaching powers of the US. With this brief summary concerning bin Laden’s disagreement with the Saud family, we can begin to understand the origins of bin Laden’s fundamentalist perspective, where he and other Islamic radicalists “[paint] their liberal rivals and opponents as traitors to Muslim civilizations.”³⁶⁷

The teachings and theories of Muhammad Ibn al-Wahhab and Sayyid Qutb represent earlier grievances against Western influence in the Middle East, which influence the perception of the current Islamic fundamentalist movement. As a current example of the Islamic fundamentalist resistance to the effects of contemporary Western society, Osama bin Laden exists as a vanguard to address the radical grievances and to bring the Muslim world back to the traditional Islamic ways. Similar to Huntington, he portrays the conflict as being between the Judeo-Christian

³⁶⁵ John Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*, 9.

³⁶⁶ Bruce Lawrence, *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden*. xiii.

³⁶⁷ Paul Berman, “Why Radical Islam Just Won’t Die.”

West and Islam: “America escalated its campaign against the Muslim world in its entirety, aiming to get rid of Islam itself. Its main focus in this was to target the scholars and the reformers who were enlightening the people to the dangers of Judeo-American alliances.”³⁶⁸ Using Islam as a justification and a unifying force, bin Laden calls for the Arab world’s rejection of Western influences that restrict an individual’s rights to accept Islam as a religion and way of life, seen in a call for *jihad*.³⁶⁹

As a result, bin Laden is portrayed in the Muslim world as an archetypical Islamic warrior fighting a ‘battle between good and evil,’ akin to the Western’s notion of Robin Hood, which supports the proliferation of Western interests that reflects Huntington’s theory. According to Natana DeLong Bas, Huntington’s clash between East versus West turns into a ‘rival exceptionalism,’ which “implies a *portrayal* of the reality, or a false consciousness on the part of militant Islamists and their militant equivalent in the United States.”³⁷⁰ The image of bin Laden as either a “freedom fighter” or “terrorist” obscures the underlying basis of conflict for the clash of interests over power and resources effected by Western influences. The elevation of bin Laden to a mystical status and position detracts from the reality of the conflict for power and resources.

Bin Laden’s primary focus was targeted at Saudi Arabia’s incorrect regime, leading to the kingdom’s erosion of Islamic morals and lifestyles as a result of these Western influences. Stated by bin Laden, the kingdom’s neglect of religion and weakness of faith has led to the fall of the *ummah*. The following is a description of the kingdom’s current state through the perception of bin Laden: “You are all aware

³⁶⁸ Osama bin Laden, *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden*, 39.

³⁶⁹ Richard Booney, *Jihad: from Quran to bin Laden*, 320.

³⁷⁰ *Ibid.* 365.

of the degree of degradation and corruption to which our Islamic *ummah* has sunk, in its government and in the feebleness and cowardice of many of its scholars in the face of its enemies, as well as its internal divisions.”³⁷¹ However, during the Afghan *jihad* in the 1980’s, the US supported Saudi Arabia who backed the ‘Afghan Arabs,’ led by bin Laden’s *jihad* against the Soviets. The symbiotic relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia (and its “freedom fighters”) lasted until after Operation Desert Shield in 1991, when bin Laden felt betrayed by Saudi Arabia, which preferred US troops over the ‘Afghan Arabs’ to protect the kingdom from invasion.

Bin Laden perceived this act as a betrayal of its Muslim brothers and demanded a total elimination of US interests and presence from the *ummah*. In this complaint he also held contempt concerning the US’ place in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. “‘To erase this blight on the Muslim world’, he thundered, it was ‘an individual duty for every Muslim’ to ‘kill the Americans’ and drive their armies ‘out of the lands of Islam.’”³⁷² In 1994, King Fuad of Saudi Arabia revoked Osama bin Laden’s citizenship after his establishment of a *mujahidin* in Sudan from where he then returned to Afghanistan. This furthered his revulsion and hate for the Saudi leadership.

Bin Laden’s secondary focus are attributed to hostility towards the US, or Western abuses, and the presence and preference of US troops in Saudi Arabia during the Kuwaiti war with Saddam Hussein. The phenomenon of US presence in the kingdom is not new due to the historical precedence of the Roosevelt-Ibn Saud meeting in 1945 that legitimizes the kingdom’s protection from invading forces.

³⁷¹ Osama bin Laden. *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden*, 15.

³⁷² Michael Klare, *Blood and Oil*, 54.

Klare acknowledges the influence of bin Laden's growing rage against (first) the economic globalization and (second) the continued US support for Israel. A more cognizant influence is attributed to the effect of resources in Middle Eastern societies, namely oil, which makes the kingdom wealthier and more indulgent in Western practices.

After Operation Desert Shield, bin Laden was tied to numerous attacks targeting the US, beginning in 1995 with the bombing of the SANG headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. 'Fourth-generation' warfare³⁷³ describes Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda's strategy as unconventional warfare to protect an imbalance of power, seen in the attacks of September 11. 'Fourth-generation' warfare is the use of small-scale devices and light weaponry concerning the struggle against the "best-armed, best-trained, and most experienced armies in the world (the USSR in Afghanistan, the US in Somalia, Russia in Chechnya, and the Zionist entity in Lebanon)."³⁷⁴ It is also characterized by its ghost-like presence, appearing and disappearing at whim. The confrontation of 'fourth generation' warfare becomes extremely difficult due to its alternative strategies for a "struggle for justice or a struggle for self-determination, or contained elements of both."³⁷⁵

By looking at two of bin Laden's speeches around the time of his campaign against the US in 1995, his future ideological motives can be foretold. While bin Laden made statements prior to 1994, Bruce Lawrence concurs that the two following speeches after 1994 were intended for a wider public audience. Following his exile from Saudi Arabia, bin Laden's public declarations addressed his view of the

³⁷³ Richard Booney, *Jihad: from Quran to Jihad*, 322.

³⁷⁴ Michael Klare, *Blood and Oil*, 54.

³⁷⁵ Richard Booney, *Jihad: from Quran to bin Laden*, 323.

transformation of the Middle East as a betrayal to the *ummah*. First, in 1994 he addressed Chief Mufti, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, or bin Baz, concerning his endorsement of the Oslo Accords in 1993 between Israel and PLO. Bin Laden saw the Saudi princes and officials as renouncing Islam, and considered them “sell-outs” of Palestinian rights to Washington. The following quote illustrates bin Laden’s anger with the Saudi government, which sided with the peace agreements with Israel.

And it seemed as if you were not satisfied with abandoning Saudi Arabia, home of the two Holy Sanctuaries, to the Crusader-Jewish forces of occupation, until you had brought another disaster upon Jerusalem, the third of the Sanctuaries, by conferring legitimacy on the contracts of surrender to the Jews that were signed by the traitorous and cowardly Arab tyrants. These contracts constitute a serious and dangerous calamity containing deceit and deception from a member of different perspectives.³⁷⁶

Accordingly, bin Laden contends that Palestine must be liberated from the ‘Jewish enemy’ in order to return the *ummah* to Islamic sovereignty, enacted by a *jihad* as the legal duty of Muslims.

In 1995, bin Laden sent a letter to bin Baz in Saudi Arabia denouncing the stationing of American and foreign troops in the kingdom using scriptural support from the Qur’an. ‘Honourable and righteous scholars’ are told to remember the covenant made with God: “God took a pledge from those who were given the Scripture-‘Make it known to your people; do not conceal it.’”³⁷⁷ Bin Laden designates unnamed Saudi rulers and scholars “apostate collaborators with Western powers”³⁷⁸ who have brought about the fall of the *ummah* due to their neglect of religion and

³⁷⁶ Osama bin Laden. *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden*, 9.

³⁷⁷ Ibid. 17.

³⁷⁸ Ibid. 15.

weakness of faith.³⁷⁹ The following quote illustrates bin Laden's accusations of the Saudi rulers' bad behaviors.

All this happened on the watch of the region's rulers, and with their active participation--in fact, these are the people actually implementing the plans for our *umma*'s enemies. This invasion was financed by these rulers using our *umma*'s wealth and savings.³⁸⁰

Bin Laden accused the Saudi family of partaking in the fall of the *ummah*, which turns the kingdom into an enemy equal to that of the US and its government.

Numerous quotes from the Qur'an are used to inspire sense of devotion to God for the call to *jihad* to "spread knowledge, enjoin good, and forbid evil."³⁸¹ Similarly to al-Wahhab and Qutb, bin Laden employs religious reform for political mobilization.

Bin Laden uses the tenets of Islam (that people are familiar with) to legitimize his efforts.³⁸² In 1997, while discussing the justifications for the aggressive *jihad* in Afghanistan, bin Laden attributed driving the Soviets out of Afghanistan and establishing the Taliban government to God. "After the collapse of the Soviet Union--in which the US has no mentionable role, but rather the credit goes to God and the *mujahidin* in Afghanistan . . ." ³⁸³ Bin Laden does not acknowledge the CIA's influence in the success of driving out the communists from Afghanistan,³⁸⁴ and sees God's instrumental force as the contributing factor to the *mujahidin* and the Taliban government. In 1998, Osama bin Laden emphasizes with the success of the Muslim impact, and ignores the America influence: "[it] is not a force influenced from the outside, as the Crusader Western media would have it, but a force that has come from

³⁷⁹ Osama bin Laden. *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden*, 15.

³⁸⁰ Ibid. 16.

³⁸¹ Ibid. 18.

³⁸² Ibid. 85.

³⁸³ Ibid. 51.

³⁸⁴ Ibid. 65.

within.”³⁸⁵ On October 7, 2001, Al-Jazeera aired a video recording of Osama bin Laden expressing his praise for the attacks on September 11 as carrying out God’s will. He avows, “God has struck America at its Achilles heel and destroyed its greatest building, praise and blessings to Him.”³⁸⁶ He also refers to the *ummah* as experiencing humiliation and contempt in the past eighty years, referring to the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the development of Western influence in the Middle East concerning power and oil.

The stylized themes of al-Wahhab and Sayyid Qutb are apparent in numerous speeches by bin Laden, which further support the legitimization of justifications for his global *jihad*. Whether or not bin Laden’s justifications for citing these two sources are valid, their presence is felt in his speeches, which are broadcasted to millions of Muslims and non-Muslims throughout the world.³⁸⁷ In his declaration of war against the US, he brought together numerous elements from Muslim history with the globalization for terrorist groups to enhance its global power, seen in “the ability to harness religion and modern technology to strike anywhere, anytime, and anyplace.”³⁸⁸

Bin Laden employs similar characteristics to al-Wahhab’s work when discussing the need for moral reform in Saudi Arabia,³⁸⁹ seen in his interview with Al-Jazeera in 2001.³⁹⁰ With al-Wahhab’s origins in Saudi Arabia, he underscores the importance of the education of *tawhid*, which if violated in an act of *shirk*

³⁸⁵ Osama bin Laden, *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden*, 84.

³⁸⁶ Ibid. 105.

³⁸⁷ Ibid.

³⁸⁸ John Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*, 72.

³⁸⁹ Richard Booney, *Jihad: from Quran to bin Laden*, 363.

³⁹⁰ Osama bin Laden, *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden*, 127.

(polytheism), is an unforgivable sin. The proselytization of Islam is the mandatory duty of all Muslims, which protects and enhances the Muslim community. In the interview, bin Laden discusses generally the leaders in the Islamic world that are being “tricked” by other leaders, alluding to the Saudi--US alliance that prevents the proper proselytization of Islam. While arguing that peace will not end until Islam prevails over the enemies of Islam, he quotes:

this situation is prevailing upon the Islamic world today, with its big leaders, and its famous rulers--it is a trick; they [the rulers] trick people and lie to them, but, with the permission of God, God's liberation and release is close, and the promised victory is close- God willing.³⁹¹

The removal of the US from its presence in the *ummah* is the solution to the “ordeal,” stated by bin Laden, emphasizing a battle between the Muslims and the global Crusaders.

With respect to the influence of Sayyid Qutb in bin Laden's mission, one must look at the correlation between the two men. First, bin Laden's most important associate and ‘righthand man’, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was an Egyptian student and follower of Sayyid Qutb since the age of 14, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, and is said to have a direct influence on bin Laden's global *jihad* strategy.³⁹² Second, while in attending university, Bin Laden also was a student of Sayyid Qutb's brother, Muhammad Qutb. According to John Esposito, Sayyid Qutb's work was a staple in Islamic education, thus bin Laden must have been well versed in Qutb's work. The timing of bin Laden's education also coincided with the time when Islamic

³⁹¹ Osama bin Laden, *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden*, 127.

³⁹² *Ibid.* 58.

movements and religious extremists, or *jihad* movements, were on the rise in the broader Muslim world and within Saudi Arabia.³⁹³

Bin Laden uses similar thematic styles as Qutb, seen in his use of *jahilliyah*, to describe the ills of modernity, and *jihad*, the strategy to rid the world of these obstructing ills to allow for freedom to form Islamic ideas. In *Milestones*, Qutb portrays the battle as a triumph of faith against the *jahiliyyah* society, and calls the vanguard of Islam to empower the *darl-al-Islam* (home of Islam) against the *darl-al-harb* (home of hostility). In an October 2001 interview with Al-Jazeera, bin Laden emphasizes the West's detrimental influence on the *ummah*: "It is that this Western civilization, which is backed by America, has lost its value and appeal,"³⁹⁴ and hinders the freedom, human rights, and equality of Muslims in the world. The Western civilization, and the US government, is blamed for taking the world into a "choking life"³⁹⁵ that the Muslim world cannot tolerate. *Jihad* becomes mandatory for all Muslims to rid the Islamic lands from the *infidels* of Western culture, which Qutb similarly calls for.

While recognizing the similarities in ideological principles between the three revolutionary thinkers, a more elusive predicament occurs from the mixture of Islamic fundamentalist thought. The public perception in the minds of Muslims and non-Muslims occurs between the Islamic fundamentalist movement of al-Wahhab, Sayyid Qutb, and bin Laden. By using similar themes to previous revolutionary thinkers from the Muslim world that use religious reform for political mobilization, bin Laden seeks to support and legitimize his radical Islam to the listening world.

³⁹³ John Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*, 8.

³⁹⁴ Osama bin Laden, *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden*, 113.

³⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

Bin Laden also further supports Huntington's "West" versus "East" paradigm by portraying the conflict as a 'heavenly battle' between the US and the Arab-Islamic world. Commenting on the American and British attacks in Iraq in 1998 called Operation Desert Fox, bin Laden notes the American excuse of "bringing Iraq to account and to justice"³⁹⁶ and ridding Iraq of Saddam Hussein, yet claims that its true motives are to strike the "growing power of the Arab and Islamic world."³⁹⁷ Bin Laden sees the US and Israel as a growing 'tyranny' with great contempt for Muslims. He asks the Muslim peoples to act upon these injustices by any means necessary, even with *jihad* where death "is predestined and decided," as a duty to "motivate our *ummah* to *jihad* for the sake of God against Americans and Israelis and their allies."³⁹⁸ Similarly in his interview in October 2001, bin Laden perceives the US as fighting against Islam under the pretext of fighting against terrorism,³⁹⁹ furthering the image of the evil US fighting against the pure, moral Muslim society of the Middle East. However, Osama bin Laden downplays the importance of oil that influences US interests in the region, and instead explains the US interests as fighting against Islam to bolster support from Muslims around the world.

In order to declare a *jihad* against the Jews and Crusaders, bin Laden issued the World Islamic Front declaration in 1998.⁴⁰⁰ With this declaration, he was able to stir the Arabs and Muslims' sentiments through religious discourse when speaking about American presence in the Gulf and Palestine. Bin Laden uses the justifications that "Muslims were under siege, their lands occupied in a world dominated by their

³⁹⁶ Osama bin Laden, *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden*, 67.

³⁹⁷ Ibid.

³⁹⁸ Ibid. 69.

³⁹⁹ Ibid. 105.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid. 58.

historic enemies, militant Christianity and Judaism.”⁴⁰¹ bin Laden’s declaration of a *fatwa* (authoritative legal opinion) was to detail obligation to wage *jihad* against “Americans, military and civilians, until they quit the lands of the *ummah*.”⁴⁰² However, the *fatwa* was signed by four other individuals to reinforce its power due to the concern over bin Laden’s lack of necessary religious qualifications to issue a *fatwa*. Al-Zawahiri was one individual who signed the *fatwa* in addition to the three leaders and representatives from Egypt and Pakistan. Despite the portrayed image of bin Laden as a vanguard for the Muslim world, many discrepancies exist with his image and the Islamic tradition that he proselytizes. The manner in which he is portrayed by the neocon interests of Western European cultures is to mask the source of conflict in the Middle East as one over resources. A phantom enemy, coined by the documentary *The Power of Nightmares*, is created.

Three factors show the inaccuracy of the image of bin Laden. First, the US created the tangible character of bin Laden to explain the attacks on the US from the Muslim world. In order to prosecute bin Laden for the 1998 bombing in East Africa that killed over 200 people, American law required evidence of a criminal organization “that would allow them to prosecute the head of the organization even if he could not be linked directly to the crime.”⁴⁰³ The testimony of a witness named Jamal al-Fadl was used to bolster the image of Al-Qaeda as bin Laden’s organization, showing enough evidence to materialize an organization. “The reality was that bin Laden and al-Zawahiri had become the focus of a loose association of disillusioned

⁴⁰¹ John Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*, 21.

⁴⁰² Osama bin Laden, *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden*, 58.

⁴⁰³ *Ibid.*

Islamist militants who were attracted by the new strategy.”⁴⁰⁴ Before the US’ use of Al-Qaeda, it acted similar to a venture capital firm “providing funding, contacts, and expert advice to many different militant groups and individuals from all over the Islamic world.”⁴⁰⁵ Interestingly, Jamal al-Fadl was an enemy of bin Laden’s, and was granted witness protection along with thousands of dollars for his testimony about Al-Qaeda. With the US’ creation of Al-Qaeda as a global organization, the US was able to prosecute individuals much more easily, turning bin Laden into an internationally identified radical Islamist. Bin Laden agrees that the West named Al-Qaeda as an international organization, when the name actually originates from a military base in Afghanistan to train men during the Cold war that translates into, “The Base.”⁴⁰⁶

Second, Osama bin Laden influences the global *jihad* movement through economic involvement rather than anything else. Khalid Sheik Mohammed, an Islamist militant, was the planner behind the attack on September 11, not bin Laden who provided funds and help in finding volunteers. Here again, due to bin Laden’s “link” to Al-Qaeda, he became the central focus.

Third, the inconclusive hunt for bin Laden and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan shows their thoroughly elaborated portrayal by the Western media and the US’ foreign policies. Bin Laden and his organization were thought to be in the mountains of Tora Bora, which was enlarged even more with depiction of a secret, underground hideout in *The Times of London*. As the mountains of Tora Bora (Afghanistan) were bombed, caves thought to be hiding Al-Qaeda network members proved inconclusive.

⁴⁰⁴ Osama bin Laden, *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden*, 58.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁵ Jason Burke, “Al Qaeda: Think Again,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 142 (May-Jun., 2004), 18.

⁴⁰⁶ Osama bin Laden, *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden*, 120.

Al-Qaeda as the global organization did not exist, and became a phantom enemy. The documentary, The Power of Nightmares, asserts that the “idea of a coherent, structured terrorist network with an organized capability simply does not exist.”

From the Muslim perspective, the perceived battle between the West/US and the Middle East is seen as a ‘cosmic’ and perennial battle,⁴⁰⁷ regardless of the Qur’anic forbiddance of the unjust killing of anyone seen in Q. 5:32:

... if any one slew a person--unless it be for murder or for spreading mischief in the land--it would be as if he slew the whole people: and if any one saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of the whole people.⁴⁰⁸

There is no moral justification for the leadership of Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda in Islam, which uses ruthlessness and cost-effectiveness to carry out its tactics rather than new technology.

The Power of Nightmares uses the label of a “phantom enemy” to express the mystical entity that the US (and the Muslim world) have fed into that reinforces the US’ hidden agenda for international influence and power over resources. The twisted image of a phantom enemy strengthened the neocons in the White House due to the dichotomy of good and evil forces. The representation of a phantom force seen during the Cold War continued with the figure of bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, corporeal forces that the US could construct in order to maintain a favorable world order and destiny. The fundamentalist response of bin Laden and Al-Qaeda to the changing world confirms the “East” versus “West” paradigm from Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” theory, which does not make a valid argument.

⁴⁰⁷ Richard Booney, *Jihad: from Quran to bin Laden*, 365.

⁴⁰⁸ EMuslim, “The Sanctity of Muslim Life.” <http://www.emuslim.com/islamagainstVoilence.asp>

Conclusion

Muhammad Ibn al-Wahhab (the Wahhabi movement) and Sayyid Qutb used methods of the Islamic revival to coerce a political mobilization against foreign powers and influence. Foreign powers included the Ottoman Empire in the 18th century and the British in the 20th century, which also framed their ideological positions concerning Islamic fundamentalism. In the 21st century, the Islamic fundamentalist movement built upon these ideologies to form a resistance to the modernization of societies resulting from Western, mainly US, influence.

Huntington's theory of religion as the source of conflict is proved false, and conflict is instead produced by structural pressures exerted on Middle Eastern societies seen through the development of the two natural resources in the region, oil and water. As a result of these two influences, a change in power occurs that transforms political, economic, and social issues.

Chapter 4:

Resource Wars: Conflict over Oil

Introduction

The Persian Gulf remains the world's largest oil producing region to supply "the burgeoning American and international [oil] demand" in the 21st century.⁴⁰⁹ Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates hold the region's, and the world's, largest proven reserves, the untapped petroleum reserves known to exist that can be extracted through existing technology. As of 2003, these six nations "jointly possess 664 billion barrels of proven reserves, or about 64% of the world's known supplies,"⁴¹⁰ while the US and European powers combined only hold 18%. Surprisingly, the Gulf's *production* capacity is lower than many other oil producers, such as the United States, Mexico and Russia because of its relatively new oil extraction technology.

In the years to come, the Gulf region will be capable of *increasing* its oil production and output, to be exported to nations, like the US, that continue to rely heavily on imported oil. As a result, as the resources of the older oil-producing nations dwindle in availability and amount, the Gulf nations will become even more important for the international oil industry. According to Michael Klare, "With each passing year, the Gulf producers will supply an ever-increasing share of the world's

⁴⁰⁹ Michael Klare, *Blood and Oil*. 74.

⁴¹⁰ *Ibid.* 18.

oil intake.”⁴¹¹ The Gulf region will be the sole majority supplier of oil to other nations, and will be able to do so because of its relatively small domestic demand compared to larger nations like the US.

Conflict will arise from the struggle over resources rather than Huntington’s problematic “West” versus “East” paradigm. The chapter will outline how the US became dependent on foreign oil and its relation with Middle Eastern nations before and after its dependence on Middle Eastern oil, specifically from Saudi Arabia.

History of Oil and its US-Arab relationship

America’s dependence

The year of 1859 marks the birth of the US’ dependence on oil for its booming economy, domestic and foreign policy, and population “drunk in consumption.”⁴¹² The domestic discovery of oil was made in Titusville Pennsylvania in 1859, leading to the first large-scale petroleum industry.⁴¹³ In 1901, the US became the world’s dominant oil producer with the discovery of oil in southeast Texas.⁴¹⁴ Various large-scale organizations developed to capitalize on the discovery, like John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Company, which was the base for Exxon Mobil, Chevron, Amoco, and Atlantic Richfield. Cheap and abundant supplies of petroleum raised America’s domestic and foreign status as the most powerful world leader allowing for its quick dominant position during World War II.

⁴¹¹ Michael Klare, *Blood and Oil*, 75.

⁴¹² Christopher Uhl, Dominiki Kulakowski, Jeffrey Gerwing, Michelle Brown and Mark Cochrane, “Sustainability: A Touchstone Concept for University Operations, Education, and Research,” *Conservation Biology*, Vol. 10, No. 5 (Oct., 1996), 1311.

⁴¹³ Michael Klare, *Blood and Oil*, 8.

⁴¹⁴ Matthew Simmons, *Twilight in the Desert: The Coming Saudi Oil Shock and the World Economy*, 43.

In 1942, the US was the leader in oil production with 20 billion barrels of oil, allegedly half of the world's total oil reserves.⁴¹⁵ In addition to oil's domestic use to support the 'American dream', allied victory was assisted by US oil, allowing for the invention and usage of exceptional warfare weapons such as tanks, airplanes, submarines, aircraft carriers, boats, and armored troops carriers in addition to the capability to support these modes from domestic reserves.⁴¹⁶ Oil turned into a national security matter as the war progressed during Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration. By 1942, the US was using four million barrels of domestic oil per day, which would be consumed in thirteen years at that rate.⁴¹⁷ Roosevelt's concern lay not only in the rapid depletion of US oil reserves, but the acceleration of US' dependence on foreign oil once domestic supplies ran out. Commodore Andrew F. Carter of the Army-Navy Petroleum Board is quoted as concurring that the known petroleum US reserves are "inadequate to meet over a period of years either the wartime needs of the United States or the needs of the civilian economy once normal conditions are established."⁴¹⁸ The Middle East's untouched land and large supplies of oil became the US' primary concern for national security.

The biblical story of the Eternal Fires during Nebuchadnezzar's rule reveal the thousands-year-old existence of oil in the Middle East.⁴¹⁹ Oil was first discovered in the Middle East in Iran in 1908, yet the first substantial oilfield was discovered in 1927 in Iraq's Kirkuk, 2,500 yards from the site of the Eternal Fires. On the western side of the Persian Gulf however, the real oil profits of the Middle East lay in Saudi

⁴¹⁵ Michael Klare, *Blood and Oil*, 28.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid.

⁴¹⁷ Ibid. 29.

⁴¹⁸ Ibid.

⁴¹⁹ Steven Emerson, *The American House of Saud: The Secret Petrodollar Connection*, 24.

Arabia, explored 30 years after the discovery in Iran. The US government did not forge any formal diplomatic relations until 1939, nor post a residential ambassador in the kingdom until 1943. The end of World War II heralded a new era of resource management that determined the US' resource interests abroad, especially towards Saudi Arabia.

Oil in Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia's oil legacy began in 1923 with the New Zealander, Major Frank Holmes, who was the first person to suggest the exploration of oil in Arabian Peninsula.⁴²⁰ Holmes established the first oil concession in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province in 1925, which was handed over to Gulf Oil, a global oil company, who proclaimed that the area did not contain adequate levels of oil for extraction. With this concession, numerous American and British officials argued with Saudi King, Abdul Aziz Al Saud, over the permission for oil exploration.

In 1933, the American group, named SOCAL (Standard Oil of California), allied with two of the best geologists in Bahrain and made a sixty-year concession with Saudi Arabia that granted them the rights to search for oil in the kingdom. Western interest in Saudi Arabia came at a perfect time for the one-year-old kingdom and King Saud. During King Saud's first year of rule, Saudi Arabia's economy weakened because of the drop in Muslim pilgrimages to Mecca, the kingdom's main form of revenue, bankrupted Saudi Arabia.⁴²¹ US groups also faced the effects of the

⁴²⁰ Steven Emerson, *The American House of Saud: The Secret Petrodollar Connection*, 27

⁴²¹ *Ibid.* 24

global depression, seen in the drop of the gold standard and the closing of U.S. banks, which surprisingly didn't stop their exploration.

SOCAL directed its exploration efforts towards al-Hasa, a promising area along the kingdom's Persian Gulf coast (first) because of its geologically similar qualities to Kuwait, Iraq, and Persia, and (second) because no European companies held any land in this area. In 1936 SOCAL struck oil at the oilfield known as Damman No. 7 in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia, which led to the establishment of the state-owned national oil company, the Arabian American Oil Company, or Aramco.⁴²² To help fund these oil campaigns, Texaco, Exxon and Mobil Oil Company became shareholders of the Aramco nation in 1946 to "provide more investment capital," they being three out of the original "Seven Sisters" (Exxon, Shell, BP, Mobil, Chevron Texaco and Gulf).⁴²³ SOCAL established the California-Arabian Standard Oil Company (CASOC) as an infrastructure to develop the field, which later struck oil in 1938 on the Persian Gulf coast opposite of Bahrain.⁴²⁴ An aggressive search for oil began in the Middle East that quickly escalated to match the increasing demand for oil from the US. Saudi Aramco quickly became one of the most sophisticated petroleum organizations in the world.⁴²⁵

In 1945, Franklin D. Roosevelt and King Saud met on the *USS Quincy* in Egypt, representing one of the few trips that King Saud made outside of his kingdom. There are no official transcripts from this meeting, but it can be deduced that the two men discussed issues pertaining to the kingdom as well as the US-Saudi relationship.

⁴²² Steven Emerson, *The American House of Saud: The Secret Petrodollar Connection*, 27.

⁴²³ Ibid. 31.

⁴²⁴ Michael Klare, *Blood and Oil*, 31.

⁴²⁵ Steven Emerson, *The American House of Saud: The Secret Petrodollar Connection*, 101.

According to Michael Klare, King Saud warned FDR of the conflict over the Jewish homeland that would escalate if Israel were established due to the Jewish culture that would differ greatly from other Arab cultures.⁴²⁶ It is debated whether or not the two men discussed the issue of oil, but is highly likely due to Saudi Arabia's large oil reserves and the US' urge to develop and "uphold the American firms' dominance of the oil fields."⁴²⁷ A strong friendship emerged after the 1945 meeting between the two men, most remarkably with FDR noting the importance of the Arab opinion concerning issues over Palestine in addition to the Jewish one.

The kingdom of Saudi Arabia allowed the US to develop its oil fields due to the wealth that Saudi Arabia would experience from the modernization. Before the influx of wealth from oil, its GDP was "50% less than that of the poorest countries of the OECD," on a per capita basis.⁴²⁸ After the surge of wealth, its GDP "now pales in comparison to some of its neighbors, such as Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar."⁴²⁹ According to Michael Klare, oil has become the backbone of Saudi Arabia, which experiences a similar reliance, like the US' dependence, on its natural resource. The Saudi backbone supports modernization of the oil industry and economy, social services, debt handling, employment, and the development of new industries.⁴³⁰

US' attempt at economic and political stability in the Middle East

To ensure the business relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia, in 1941 FDR approved the Lend-Lease Act that "gave the president the authority to sell,

⁴²⁶ Michael Klare, *Blood and Oil*, 12.

⁴²⁷ Ibid. 36.

⁴²⁸ Steven Emerson, *The American House of Saud: The Secret Petrodollar Connection*, 16.

⁴²⁹ Ibid.

⁴³⁰ Ibid. 18.

exchange, lend, lease, or otherwise transfer military equipment to ‘any country whose defense the president deems vital to the defense of the United States.’⁴³¹ Developing the case to aid to Saudi Arabia was an American national security issue, and in 1943 FDR finally declared the Lend-Lease act to the kingdom. However, the president felt that the extension of the Lend-Lease act was insufficient for the protection of Saudi oil from other interested nations, like Great Britain. Instead, the US government “chose to collaborate with rather than supplant the giant American oil companies,” through the public-private partnership. The partnership gave private interests the power to enforce US foreign policy while the US government remained involved with the security and stability of oil-producing regions in which private companies operated.⁴³² However, even with the Saudi-US alliance of 1945, the Lend-Lease Act was problematic because “U.S. officials were constantly being forced to reconsider their approach and launch new initiatives to bolster America’s position in the [Persian Gulf],”⁴³³ in order to protect the region of Soviet influence during the cold war era. Three great presidential edicts responded to this crisis: the Truman, Eisenhower, and Nixon doctrines.

In 1947, the Truman Doctrine stated that America would assist any nation threatened by Communism. The US saw the Soviet adventurism in the eastern Mediterranean and northern Gulf states as a geopolitical threat, which was very close to the Saudi Arabian oil fields. From the American perspective, oil supplies in the Gulf region were compromised by the Soviet influence in the region, which prompted US aid to the three nations most vulnerable to Soviet expansionism: Greece, Turkey,

⁴³¹ Michael Klare, *Blood and Oil*, 33.

⁴³² Ibid. 35.

⁴³³ Ibid. 38.

and Iran. Iran had the most controversial history with the Soviet Union due to its occupation after World War II, especially due to its status as the Gulf's leading oil producer at the time.⁴³⁴ The strength of these northern nations would protect the vulnerable and valuable oil-producing, Western-friendly nations in the Persian Gulf. Subsequently, Saudi Arabia began to receive more aid from the Truman Doctrine to buttress it for defensive capabilities in order to bolster its protection from Soviet expansionism. As a result, the second form of presidential edicts resulted, the Eisenhower Doctrine.

In 1957, the Eisenhower Doctrine was developed also in response to the threat of Soviet expansion but focused on strengthening military forces against the Soviet Union and Nasser's Egypt. As discussed in Chapter Two, Nasser supported Arab nationalism and despised the West, resulting in Egypt's purchase of arms directly from the Soviet Union. In response, the Eisenhower Doctrine "authorized the president to use American combat forces to defend friendly Middle Eastern countries against Soviet-backed aggressors and to provide additional arms and military assistance to pro-American regimes."⁴³⁵ The majority of this aid went to bolstering and modernizing the Saudi military and air force, including the Department of Defense's support of the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG). Yet again, another presidential edict would ensue, here as a result of the Vietnam War's effect on the American public regarding the foreign policy of American bloodshed in developing worlds.

⁴³⁴ Michael Klare, *Blood and Oil*, 39.

⁴³⁵ *Ibid.* 41.

In 1969, President Nixon knew that the nation would not support another foreign war, yet needed to secure the US' oil interests in the Persian Gulf. The Nixon Doctrine was enacted to support the Persian Gulf oil interests through the indirect economic and military backing of threatened nations, like Iran and Saudi Arabia. The US wanted these nations to be responsible for their own security and defense and "to cooperate among themselves to insure regional peace and stability."⁴³⁶ Billions of dollars of advanced weaponry were sent to Saudi Arabia and Iran in addition to thousands of American military advisers and technicians to oversee the instruction of the new weapons. In the following years, the relationships between both governments of Saudi Arabia and Iran and the US would wither due to Saudi Arabia becoming more suspicious of the US' false alliance, and in Iran, the overwhelming distaste and opposition for the American-imposed shah.

Backlash and the "Oil Sword"

The Saudi-imposed oil embargo of 1973 and the Iranian Revolution in 1979 show the effect of the fallout of the presidential edicts to protect their interests in the Middle East. The two events are symbolic of the aversion to the Nixon Doctrine that was not well received in the Middle East.

The Saudi-imposed oil embargo occurred in October 1973 at the time of the world's greatest growth in global oil demands, a 250% increase from 1960 to 1970 from 20 million barrels to 60 million barrels.⁴³⁷ (The US reached maximum domestic

⁴³⁶ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, *New Perspectives on the Persian Gulf*, hearings, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 1973, 39.

⁴³⁷ Steven Emerson, *The American House of Saud: The Secret Petrodollar Connection*, 46.

production the year before,⁴³⁸ and Saudi Arabia had to increase its oil production in order to supply the world's oil needs.) The same year, King Faisal warned President Nixon to rid Israeli occupation of the territory acquired from the Sixty-Day War in 1967, or else Saudi oil production would be curtailed. King Faisal turned Saudi oil into a weapon, or the "oil sword,"⁴³⁹ used to threaten and manipulate the US' foreign policy. In order to preserve Saudi interests and the Saudi-US relationship, American oil companies would have to "prove their loyalty" to the kingdom.⁴⁴⁰ Their strategic position as the leading oil supplier and producer allowed them to act in this manner, which gave them the rights to withhold trading with whomever they pleased.

Saudi Arabia's three most productive oil fields, Ghawar, Abqaiq, and Safaniya, produced 88% (2.973 million barrels a day) of the total 1970 oil output (3.296 million barrels a day), led by Aramco.⁴⁴¹ The West's reliance shifted from domestic to foreign oil in the 1970's, which gave Saudi Arabia a tremendous amount of power, capitalizing on the American-induced oil vacuum from its resource potential. As a result, millions of dollars amounted in Saudi Arabia due to their increase in the price of oil from \$1 in 1970 to \$12 in 1974, changing the kingdom's economy overnight.⁴⁴² However, the overproduction of the three most viable oil fields led to the dropping pressure and production of water in oil wells that added to the oil shock of 1973.

Exacerbating to the problem was King Faisal's increasingly skepticism of Saudi Arabia's American alliance for two reasons. First, the American dollar was

⁴³⁸ Michael Klare, *Blood and Oil*, 16.

⁴³⁹ Steven Emerson, *The American House of Saud: The Secret Petrodollar Connection*, 14.

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid. 28.

⁴⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴⁴² Steven Emerson, *The American House of Saud: The Secret Petrodollar Connection*, 48.

weakening due to the soaring inflation rates, which strained many Middle Eastern economies. Second, the American-Saudi alliance established by King Faisal's father and FDR was not maintained due to the US' stance on Palestine when President Truman supported the UN resolution of the creation of Israel that directly countered the Arab agreement of 1945. Nixon supported Israel in 1973 when he announced his re-arming of the state during the Yom Kippur War, greatly angering King Faisal as well as destroying the trust between Saudi Arabia and the US.⁴⁴³ The oil shock explanation changed from over-production to a Saudi-controlled reduction.

Saudi Arabia used the "oil sword" against the US when Saudi Arabia and nine other oil ministers cut back oil production by 5% every month resulting in a dire effect on the international oil market. "Though the amount of oil OPEC withheld was small, its impact on the price of oil was enormous and more violent than most Arab oil ministers had expected."⁴⁴⁴ Looking at the economic and environmental problem of the Saudi oil wells, according to certain sources, many Aramco officials were aware of the problem. According to an article written by Seymour Hersh in the *New York Times*, titled, "Saudi Oil Capacity Questioned,"⁴⁴⁵ the testimony of Aramco's owners agreed that the damage done to Saudi Arabian oil wells was due to the increase in production to meet the world oil demand from 1970-74. Whether or not these accusations are correct, the topic of the Senate hearing represents the US' fear of losing Middle Eastern interests that should be avoided at any cost. Hersh's article

⁴⁴³ Steven Emerson, *The American House of Saud: The Secret Petrodollar Connection*, 53.

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid. 54

⁴⁴⁵ Seymour M. Hersh Special to The New York Times (1979, March 5). Saudi Oil Capacity Questioned: U.S. Companies Said to Report Production Snag Saudi Oil Capacity Questioned. *New York Times* (1857-Current file), p. D1. Retrieved December 5, 2008, from ProQuest Historical Newspapers *The New York Times* (1851-2005)

was the only one to report the findings from the 1974 report, which even included quotes from James B. Knight, Aramco's vice president, stating that the oil well levels were at acceptable levels, despite the report's compromising claims.⁴⁴⁶ At the end of 1973, the price of oil had increased fourfold to \$11.65.

The Saudi-imposed oil embargo was eventually lifted. However, oil prices continued to rise throughout the 1970's. Simmons notes that the real reason for the increase in oil prices was not King Faisal's doing, but because of "the converging trends- increased demand, shrinking market liquidity created the formula for increasing prices."⁴⁴⁷ By 1975, Saudi Arabia's oil production was lowered to 6.6 million barrels a day by Aramco; however, this was changed a year later when the kingdom and Iran became the sole oil producers in the world with adequate spare capacity.⁴⁴⁸ The embargo highlights the West's dependence on foreign oil, noting the political relationship that oil held with economics.

The slow rejection of Western policies in the Middle East is also seen during the Iranian Revolution when the American-imposed shah abdicated from the throne in 1979, and was replaced by Ayatollah Khomeini. "Iran was no longer a reliable shield against Soviet incursion into the Gulf."⁴⁴⁹ The Islamic militant takeover of the American embassy in Tehran in 1979 further emphasized the loss of the delicate relationship that the US had with Iran, which could no longer be counted as a reliable source for protecting oil resource in the Persian Gulf.

⁴⁴⁶ Seymour M. Hersh Special to The New York Times (1979, March 5)

⁴⁴⁷ Steven Emerson, *The American House of Saud: The Secret Petrodollar Connection*, 55.

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid. 59

⁴⁴⁹ Michael Klare, *Blood and Oil*, 46.

Responding to the overwhelming surge of needed security in the Persian Gulf, in 1980 President Carter established the Carter Doctrine. Carter noted that access to the Persian Gulf was a vital national interest, and the US would use “any means necessary, including military force,” to protect these interests.⁴⁵⁰ The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was established, “responsible for managing the U.S. combat operations in the region.”⁴⁵¹ The US sent military defensive support to Saudi Arabia during the Iran/Iraq War to protect the Saudi oil fields close to the border with Kuwait. In a similar tone as many of the past presidential promises vowing to protect Middle Eastern nations, in 1981 President Reagan stated the importance of the US’ protection of Saudi Arabia’s oil.⁴⁵²

The Iran-Iraq War represents the US’ fear of another obstacle in between their free flow of oil from the Middle East. When Iraq invaded Iran, the US remained neutral, creating an international oil embargo on Iraq exports, including Kuwaiti exports as well. However, once Iran gained the upper hand in 1982, the US “tilted” towards Iraq, sending loans, intelligence support and arms.⁴⁵³ In light of maintaining the Saudi-US alliance, the US “made it clear that the United States would protect Saudi Arabia”⁴⁵⁴ from attacks attributed to the war. War erupted in 1990 with Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait due to reason over oil, which was perfect for American leaders who wanted Saddam to be thrown from power for various reasons. Iraq was translated into an indisputable threat to American oil interests in the Persian Gulf. To protect Saudi Arabia’s major oil fields in Eastern Province, American troops were

⁴⁵⁰ Michael Klare, *Blood and Oil*, 46.

⁴⁵¹ Ibid.

⁴⁵² Ibid. 48.

⁴⁵³ Ibid. 48.

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid.

sent to Saudi Arabia. The Bush administration, specifically Dick Cheney in 1990, justified the invasion of Kuwait based on the Roosevelt—Ibn Saud meeting regarding the deployment of American troops into the kingdom.⁴⁵⁵

Despite the Saudi King Fahd's hesitance to allow the deployment of American troops into the kingdom, Dick Cheney convinced the King to allow American forces into the kingdom, yet under the condition that troops "must be withdrawn from Saudi Arabia the minute the danger from Iraq had passed."⁴⁵⁶ At the same time, the "Afghan-Arabs," led/financed by Osama bin Laden, lent their support to the kingdom. However, King Fahd rejected the offer from the 'Afghan-Arabs', and turned to the US for protection.⁴⁵⁷

In 2004, the Florida-based Centcom, or U.S. Central Command, was established as the current implementation to protect Western security and power in the Middle East regarding oil. It is the "nerve center for all U.S. military operations in the Persian Gulf region."⁴⁵⁸ The Carter Doctrine of January 23, 1980 originally enunciated Centcom.⁴⁵⁹ Under the doctrine three years later, the Reagan administration established the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) at the MacDill Air Force Base to increase the number of forces in the Gulf region, which eventually turned into the Central Command by President Ronald Reagan in 1983. Both Reagan in 1987 and Bush in 1990 used Centcom forces to instill the American hegemonic fear in the Middle East in hopes of expressing the "U.S. commitment to

⁴⁵⁵ Michael Klare, *Blood and Oil*, 36.

⁴⁵⁶ *Ibid.* 51.

⁴⁵⁷ *Ibid.* 53.

⁴⁵⁸ *Ibid.* 1.

⁴⁵⁹ *Ibid.* 4.

the flow of oil through the Gulf.”⁴⁶⁰ During and after the Persian Gulf War in 1990, Centcom forces occupied the region, with its most memorable leader, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, playing a large role in the defeat of Iraqi forces. Operation Iraqi Freedom, begun in 2003, used Centcom forces to protect and defend “Iraq’s highly vulnerable petroleum infrastructure.”⁴⁶¹

As of 2005, Saudi Aramco had roughly 5,000 to 8,700 oil wells in Saudi Arabia. However, Saudi Aramco statistics are debatable because of the lack of credible evidence sent from the Saudi kingdom.⁴⁶² Matthew Simmons’ book, *Twilight in the Desert*, discusses the given evidence from Saudi Aramco detailing information on Saudi oil fields. Simmons used SPE technical papers authored and published by Aramco officials that detail facts and issues concerning the kingdom’s most productive oil fields, as as Gwawar, as well as its attempt to find new oil fields. Despite Aramco’s fallacious evidence and reports of oil production, Simmon notes that the underlying tone of the reports reflect the Saudi and US companies’ fears of the reduction of oil production and eventual depletion, oil on which the kingdom relies heavily to support every aspect of its economy. Oil reserves are the main indicator of an oil company’s worth, which “makes the task of estimating reserves far more a matter of probability and than certainty.”⁴⁶³ This poses a serious problem for the US due to its dependence on Saudi oil, and on which rests the Saudi-Western alliance.

⁴⁶⁰ From an official announcement delivered by Assisant Secretary of Sate Richard W. Murphy, as cited in Palmer, *Guardians of the Gulf*, 123.

⁴⁶¹ Michael Klare, *Blood and Oil*, 6

⁴⁶² Matthew R. Simmons, *Twilight in the Desert: The Coming Saudi Oil Shock and the World Economy*, 102.

⁴⁶³ *Ibid.* 266.

When looking at the relationship between the US and powers in the Middle East, the relationship is complex and becomes political rather than economic, succumbing to petrodollar pressure. “Arab financial transactions have often been accompanied by a political dimension tied to foreign policy interests.”⁴⁶⁴ According to Steven Emerson, a pro-Zionist, the power of the petrodollar influences the Arab world’s contention with the Zionist movement’s efforts to establish a Jewish state in the Middle East. He also notes that from the beginning of Saudi Arabia’s history as a kingdom, King Saud cautioned against the establishment of a Jewish homeland. King Saud’s strong opposition is seen in his interview in 1943 with *Life* magazine in Riyadh, where he “retold the history of the region and gave his reasons for rejecting all arguments used to validate the Jewish claim to a homeland in the region.”⁴⁶⁵ Regardless of validity of King Saud’s historical facts concerning the contention between the two religions, it is important to note the king’s strong opposition to a peace conflict and negotiation, which further complicates oil’s position in the kingdom and in the world.

Conclusion

The Middle East’s thriving oil industry has brought a great amount of wealth to many of its nations and positions them at the top of many industries. Nations dependent on Middle Eastern oil then become deeply connected with the politics and economics of the region. Subsequently, the social fabric of these thriving economies is changed due to the modernization and development that oil brings. In certain eyes

⁴⁶⁴ Steven Emerson, *The American House of Saud: The Secret Petrodollar Connection*, 17.

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid.

from Saudi Arabia and other parts of the Middle East, this is seen as the decline of the world that needs to be brought back to the correct path as discussed in Chapter Three. Conflict does not arise from differing cultural and religious reasons, but as a conflict over the effect of modernization and development in the oil-producing Arab states. Oil as natural resource lies at the heart of this internal debate, feeding the voracious struggle between the state as it tries to maintain a hegemonic power and Islamic fundamentalists that reject of a modern world in favor of a more Islamic society.

Chapter 5:

Resource Wars: Water in Palestine

Introduction

This chapter discusses the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in terms of a struggle over water as a dwindling resource in the arid region of the Middle East. Water rights in Palestine that influence the economic, social, and political play a crucial factor in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for a nation state. Conflict over water, not because of religious differences, becomes one of the contested issues between the Israelis and Palestinians. Hillel Shuval agrees and sees the disputes over water resources as “becoming a major roadblock in the final stages of the path of peace.”⁴⁶⁶ The “oil sword” of Saudi Arabia parallels with the Israeli power of water security due to its heightened position in the region after the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 by the United Nations (and support from the US.)

According to Samuel W. Lewis in his article, “The United States and Israel,”⁴⁶⁷ there are five elements that rest at the basis of the unofficial and unspoken US-Israeli alliance. First, the US was absent during the murder of 6 million Jews during holocaust of World War II. As a result, US foreign policy regarding the creation of and the existence of Israel instilled a sense of humanitarian effort. US’ efforts in Israel resulted to help the European Jews displaced from Hitler’s regime.

⁴⁶⁶ Hillel I. Shuval, “A proposal for an equitable resolution to the conflicts between the Israelis and the Palestinians over the shared water resources of the mountain aquifer,” 1.

⁴⁶⁷ Samuel W. Lewis, “The United States and Israel: Evolution of an Unwritten Alliance,” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 53, No. 3, Special Issue on Israel (Summer, 1999), 365.

Second, donations from wealthy American Jews played a large role in the US political scene, specifically with the Democratic Party. Third, the American sense of idealism “contributed admiration for the founding of a new democratic state which proclaimed a Declaration of Independence redolent with phrases drawn from that of the United States.”⁴⁶⁸ Fourth, American Christians identified with the Jews due to the “common Judeo-Christian Bible and heritage,”⁴⁶⁹ that supported the return of the Holy Land. Fifth, widespread ignorance of the US public regarding the Arab people and cultures intensified the support for Israel against the Palestinians.

The chapter will begin with a discussion of Israeli and Palestinian desire and right for a national identity, followed by Palestine’s available water resources, each group’s access to these resources, ending with a discussion of the US-Israeli relationship that affects the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

National Identity

For the discussion of the rights to the Holy Land, Israeli Zionism and Palestinian nationalism evolved as the justifications to modernization in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.⁴⁷⁰ In their article, “Religion, State, and the International System in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” Hillel Frisch and Shmuel Sandler support the notion that the conflict is not based on ideology with religious justification, but

⁴⁶⁸ Samuel W. Lewis, “The United States and Israel: Evolution of an Unwritten Alliance,” 365.

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁰ Newman, David, Ghazi Falah. “Bridging the Gap: Palestinian and Israeli Discourses on Autonomy and Statehood.” *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series*, Vol. 22, (November 1, 1997), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/623054>, 115.

rather, is focused on the statist relations between Zionism and Palestinian nationalism.⁴⁷¹

Nationalist and statist relations result from the struggle over national identity. National identity cannot be negotiated, and individuals will not easily give up their core identities, such as their sense of peoplehood, attachment and historical authenticity to the land, and commitment to national culture.⁴⁷² Each identity “[claims] the same territory, and each seeks ownership of that territory and control over its resources as the basis of an independent state that gives political expression to its national identity.”⁴⁷³ A national identity is also legitimized by the mere existence of another national identity that challenges their claim to ownership of the land and its resources. The act of an identity’s negation of another shows the power of even acknowledging the existence of a contrasting identity. The existence of each identity becomes an existential threat to the meaning and collective purpose of the other. “All issues tend to become existential-matters of life and death for each side.”⁴⁷⁴ An exclusive and monolithic nature results as a defining characteristic of each identity making conflict resolution difficult. As a result, a group’s identity is defined by several dimensions, “such as ethnicity, religion, and language,”⁴⁷⁵ all of which are highly correlated.

⁴⁷¹ Frisch, Hillel, Shmuel Sandler. “Religion, State, and the International System in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.” *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 25, no. 1 (January 2004), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601623>, 78.

⁴⁷² Herbert C. Kelman, “National Identity and the Role of the ‘Other’ in Existential Conflicts: The Israeli-Palestinian Case,” in *Islam, Judaism and the Political Role of Religion in the Middle East*, edited by John Bunzl, 61-74. Florida: University Press of Florida, 2004, 67.

⁴⁷³ *Ibid.* 62.

⁴⁷⁴ Herbert C. Kelman. “National Identity and the Role of the ‘Other’ in Existential Conflicts: The Israeli-Palestinian Case,” 64.

⁴⁷⁵ *Ibid.* 64.

When claiming the land, each identity also has its own historical narrative regarding the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, with both sides negating the other “to bolster the justice of their own cause.”⁴⁷⁶ From the Israeli point of view, the establishment of the State was the rightful return of the Jews, a chosen people, to their ancestral homeland, holding the “incompetent” Palestinian leaders responsibility for the Palestinian refugee. The United Nations cited the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine as “unassailable”: ‘it is the natural right of the Jewish people to lead, as do all other nations, an independent existence in its sovereign state.’⁴⁷⁷ From the Palestinian point of view, Western European colonialism displaced the Palestinian population for the immigrating Jewish population who were only a religious group and not a nation entitled to its own state. The Zionist movement, established by the First Zionist Conference in 1897 by Theodor Herzl, began the movement’s “vision of national revival.”⁴⁷⁸

The justifications for Palestine according to the Israelis and Palestinians are equally just and reasonable, yet ripe with problems. From the Israeli perspective, the Zionist movement justifies the creation of the State of Israel, one that “[identifies] the Jews as a political, not solely a religious group, and maintained that the Jews’ problem was a political one.”⁴⁷⁹ According to Alexander Flores, its principle goal is building a Jewish state in Palestine, which is a political and secular problem.

⁴⁷⁶ Herbert C. Kelman, “National Identity and the Role of the ‘Other’ in Existential Conflicts: The Israeli-Palestinian Case,” 63.

⁴⁷⁷ Richard Booney, *Jihad: from Quran to bin Laden*, 277.

⁴⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁹ Wade Clark Roof. *Contemporary American religion*, ed. Wade Clark Roof. Vol. 2. (New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 1999) 799.

The Zionist movement remained secular and rejected religious discourse and reasoning to ensure its international presence. Zionists only used Judaism to rally the support of other European Jews in addition to separating themselves with a religious divide from everyone else.⁴⁸⁰ In 1919, Chaim Weitzmann, the president of the World Zionist Organization and the first president of the State of Israel⁴⁸¹ wrote to the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George regarding the requirements for a Jewish State.⁴⁸² Such requirements included territories in the valley of Litani and the western slopes of the Hermon range, which are “imperatively demanded by the requirements of modern economic life,”⁴⁸³ and represent a “return to the soil.”⁴⁸⁴

Weitzmann emphasized the territories’ importance to establish a on modern Jewish, economic life that must be met in order to gain a Jewish state. To achieve this goal, it was necessary to development of an agricultural sector, which, clearly would require an adequate amount and source of water to support the agricultural industry. Adequate and fair water rights are crucial for the Zionist movement’s goal for a Jewish state in Palestine to protect the state’s existence.

However, similar to the Israeli concern is the Palestinian right to a state. Palestinians use a form of Arab nationalism to justify the Palestinian claim to the land “based on majoritarian rule that [reflects] the culture and proclivities of the vast

⁴⁸⁰ Alexander Flores, “Islamic Themes in Palestinian Thought,” in *Islam, Judaism, and the political role of religions in the Middle East*, ed. John Bunzl (Gainseville: University Press of Florida, 2004), 156.

⁴⁸¹ Encyclopaedia Judaica. Eds. Michael Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik. Vol. 20. 2nd ed. Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2007. 746.

⁴⁸² Nadav Morag, “Water, Geopolitics and State Building: The Case of Israel.” 190.

⁴⁸³ Ibid. 191.

⁴⁸⁴ Hillel Shuval, “A proposal for an equitable resolution to the conflicts between the Israelis and the Palestinians over the shared water resources of the mountain aquifer.” 50.

majority of its inhabitants.”⁴⁸⁵ Arab nationalism is driven by the urge for autonomy that initially remains as a political tool to ensure rights and needs, but still focused on receiving independence.⁴⁸⁶ Originating in Egypt, Arab nationalism was invoked by nations in the Middle East as a uniting tool to claim rights over the Holy Land that contended with the Zionist movement. According to the *Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World*, Arab nationalism shaped the political ideologies of postcolonial nations in the Middle East through the rejection of Western influences to instill the values of Muslim unity that would restore the region morally and politically.⁴⁸⁷ Initially used by Arab nations to reject the rule of the Ottoman Empire, Arab nationalism evolved through World War I to eventually become an anti-imperial opposition movement against British rule during the British Mandate period.

Seen during the rebellion of 1946-49, Arab states in the Middle East extended their influence to the affairs in Palestine through their initial negotiations and then military force against the newly declared State of Israel⁴⁸⁸ that was established by brute force by the British, both for inherently secular reasons.⁴⁸⁹ “The reaction of Palestinians to the realization of the Zionist project in turn was nationalist and hence secular.”⁴⁹⁰ Finally, in 1964 the establishment of PLO, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, represents the Arab’s view of a unified Palestinian-centered territorial

⁴⁸⁵ Hillel Frisch, Shmuel Sandler. “Religion, State, and the International System in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.” 84.

⁴⁸⁶ David Newman, Ghazi Falah, “Bridging the Gap: Palestinian and Israeli Discourses on Autonomy and Statehood,” *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series*, vol. 22, no. 1 (1997) 112.

⁴⁸⁷ *Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World*. Ed. Richard C. Martin. Vol. 2. New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2004. 502.

⁴⁸⁸ Hillel Frisch, Shmuel Sandler, “Religion, State, and the International System in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.” 85.

⁴⁸⁹ Richard Booney. *Jihad: from Quran to bin Laden*. 277.

⁴⁹⁰ Alexander Flores, “Islamic Themes in Palestinian Thought,” 156.

nationalism and gave a voice to Palestinian refugees in neighboring nations who were silenced and/or displaced by the creation of Israel.

The Palestinian Arabs refer to the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 as *al-Nakbah*, or the ‘disaster’. The indigenous population was uprooted from their home of 1,300 years, while 55 percent of Palestine was given to the Jews who had previously owned less than ten percent of the land, representing only one third of the population.⁴⁹¹ As a result, between 1948 and 1950, 930,000 Palestinian Arabs became refugees in addition to Israel’s doctrine of defense of the “iron curtain”⁴⁹² to curtail the number of refugees allowed to return. Other Arab states did little to aid the Palestinian Arabs after 1950, seen Egypt’s rejection of nationality to Palestinians.

According to Asem Khalil, Egypt’s hesitates to grant Palestinians citizenship is due to the unwanted blending of Egyptian and Palestinian cultures, languages and ethnicities. If a Palestinian were to be given Egyptian citizenship, they would not “necessarily coincide with the totality of the citizens of [the Egyptian] state.”⁴⁹³ Additionally, with the emergence of a large Palestinian population, this constituent power could exercise sovereign power over a territory and create a Palestinian state. “Once the Palestinian state is created, the relationship between the Palestinian nationals and Palestinian citizens will need to be defined.”

⁴⁹¹ Richard Booney. *Jihad: from Quran to bin Laden*. 277.

⁴⁹² Ibid. 278.

⁴⁹³ Asem Khalil, “Palestinian Nationality and Citizenship, Current Challenges and Future Perspectives,” CARIM Research Reports (July 2007), http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/e-texts/CARIM-RR_2007_07.pdf

Sources of water in Palestine

The indeterminate boundary lines in Palestine of the Jordan River and the Mountain Aquifer complicate the issue of water rights, and represent Palestine's two main water resources. Water sources are not confined to one authority or state, which further complicates negotiations for the distribution of water.

The Jordan River creates severe problems because of its geopolitical status. Before the Six Day War in 1967, proper borders were delineated by water sources and used by all surrounding nations, such as Lebanon, Syria, Israel, and Jordan. Each possessed rights over streams/tributaries that lead into the Jordan River, which crosses the four state boundaries.⁴⁹⁴ Lebanon's tributary, Hasbani, originates on the Hermon mountain range with a flow of 157 million cubic meters per year (mcm/yr). Syria's tributary, the Baniyas, originates on the Golan side of the Hermon range with a flow of 157 mcm/yr. Israel holds the Dan tributary with an annual flow of 258 mcm/yr, and originates deep within the Hermon mountain range. The largest tributary, the Yarmouk, with a flow of 400-500 mcm/yr, flows through Syria then along the Syrian-Jordanian border, then into Israeli territory before joining the Jordan River. The river flows from 2,200 meters above sea level to 400 meters below sea level, creating a natural flow of water downstream.

The system of the Mountain Aquifer is made up of natural springs and drilled wells that extend to both sides of the central territory of the Judaeen and Samaritan Mountain range in Israel, from the Jezreal Valley to the Beersheba Valley, and from

⁴⁹⁴ Hillel Shuval, "A proposal for an equitable resolution to the conflicts between the Israelis and the Palestinians over the shared water resources of the mountain aquifer." 52.

the foothills of the Judean Mountains to the Jordan River.⁴⁹⁵ The aquifer is divided into three general zones, the Western Aquifer Basin (Yarkon-Tanninim), the Northeastern Aquifer Basin (Schem/Nablus-Gilboa), and the Eastern Aquifer Basin.

The Western aquifer has an average of 350-360 mcm/yr and resides in Israel. Before the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, the aquifer was used by Jewish farmers, which evolved after statehood to become a major supplier of water through the Yarkon-Negev Pipeline in 1954. Within the Israeli border, 300 wells are used to tap the aquifer's resources, yet some wells were dug by Israel for Israeli settlements *outside* the Israeli border.⁴⁹⁶ The Northeastern aquifer is used within Israel and has about 130 mcm/yr, 100 mcm/yr sourced to Israeli forces and 30 mcm/yr to Palestinians. The Eastern aquifer is made up of two strata, the Upper Cenomanian and the Lower Cenomanian, both under Palestinian control. The Upper Cenomanian is made up of springs, yet is highly affected by inter-seasonal fluctuations, especially during droughts seen in 1988-91. The Lower Cenomanian is a much better source of water, being a deep fresh water aquifer. The two strata add up to the Eastern aquifer's total yield of 150-200 mcm/yr, which remains in Palestinian control.

Wells and springs of the Mountain Aquifer are used for additional water resources. Yet this channeling of resources is not equal between the Israelis and Palestinians due to the amount of production, regardless of the number of mechanisms. With respect to wells, Palestinians are in control of 519 wells, while Israelis hold 42 wells. Of the 519 Palestinian wells, only 353 are water producing wells with a total yield of 72.3 mcm/yr, with only 70% meeting World Health

⁴⁹⁵ Hillel Shuval, "A proposal for an equitable resolution to the conflicts between the Israelis and the Palestinians over the shared water resources of the mountain aquifer," 35.

⁴⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

Organization (WHO) standards for drinking water. Of the 42 Israeli wells, 38 are production wells with a total yield of 50 mcm/yr, while 94% of them meet WHO standard for drinking water. From water allocation through springs, Palestinians are in control of 146 springs with a total yield of 65.9 mcm/yr, while Israelis control 11 springs yet with a total yield of 88.3 mcm/yr.⁴⁹⁷ On the surface, it appears that Israel and Palestine have equal rights to the water resources, when in fact each region's total yields are starkly different. These disparities in water allocation heighten the dispute over water security and stabilization.

According to speculative information on Israel's water usage, an average of 45-60 mcm/yr is diverted by Israeli forces for Israeli settlements in the West Bank "diverted by Israeli wells".⁴⁹⁸ According to Hillel Shuval, since 1967 Israel has tapped even more sweet water sources through new deep wells that supply water to Israeli settlements.⁴⁹⁹ Error! Bookmark not defined. Israel's development of deep wells has reduced the Palestinian flow from traditional springs and wells.⁵⁰⁰ Currently, there is a total of 630 mcm/yr of known potential yields of the Mountain Aquifer, while Israel uses 410 mcm/yr and Palestine uses 110 mcm/yr, with the remaining 50-100 mcm/yr left for Palestinian deep well drilling. Both Israel and Palestine allocate water from other aquifers drilled after 1967, yet the major portion of the recharge area of the aquifer lies in Israeli hands, with an estimate of 672 mcm/yr, giving them more control over the water flow.

⁴⁹⁷ Hillel Shuval, "A proposal for an equitable resolution to the conflicts between the Israelis and the Palestinians over the shared water resources of the mountain aquifer," 42.

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁹ Ibid. 44.

⁵⁰⁰ Ibid.

The Jordan River and the Mountain Aquifer both provide a substantial amount of water to Israeli and Palestinian regions, yet the rights to each water resource are widely debatable. Regardless of who has the rights to Palestine, from the previous conclusive evidence, Israel has the upper hand over water rights in Palestine. A general summary of the argument between the Israelis and Palestinians in the 20th century will be outlined in the following section that complicates the authority of these two sources of water.

Israel's use of water

The immigration of the Diaspora Jews to Palestine in the 19th and 20th century was focused in urban locales, such as Jerusalem and Hebron. These locales became the center of Jewish society in pre-Zionist Palestine, and were called the Old Yishuv. After World War I, in 1929 Palestine allowed the Old Yishuv to organize an autonomous body with a national assembly and executive council, the only Jewish community allowed to do so.⁵⁰¹ The Old Yishuv became the heart of the region that helped to influence the initial Zionist ideology of nation building through social and territorial causes. Using the ideas of the pre-Zionist movement, the Old Yishuv made the move from the urban core to the peripheral core due to the abundance of land and the emerging allure of the developing societies. The now "New" Yishuv's population increased astronomically from 1929 to 1939, with the population beginning at 160,000 and jumping to 500,000.⁵⁰² One fourth of this Jewish population lived in cooperative farming communities in 1939, beginning the development of a Jewish

⁵⁰¹ Robert Seltzer, *Jewish People, Jewish Thought* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1980), 665.

⁵⁰² Ibid.

society in the State of Israel. The New Yishuv's goal was to establish a society of agricultural workers and to demonstrate that the new generation of Jews was a strong, confident, and Hebrew-speaking people.⁵⁰² To attract more of the European Jews to these societies, Jewish settlers needed a minimal standard of living, housing availability, and job opportunity for further incentives other than just to join the Jewish state.

The access and availability of water became an important factor the establishment of the State of Israel to assure the successful absorption of the Jewish population. Nadav Morag concedes that a strong settlement is crucial for the Jewish nation. "Without settlement, the Jews would have no hope of changing the demographic balance in Palestine in their favour and hence laying the basis for a claim to sovereignty over Palestine."⁵⁰³ Irrigation answered the problem of how to establish a vibrant Jewish society in the Jordan Valley. Stable and efficient water availability would allow for a stable agricultural segment to provide job opportunities and food resources bringing more people to the regions and increasing the land's population.

In order to fulfill the creation of a Jewish nation and ensure its sustainability, two issues resonate within the nation to ensure nationhood existence: the ability to provide security from external threats and to build a society through economic and social policies. Agriculture directly affects both the economic stabilizing of a Jewish state that help to remove Israel from a dependent relationship with neighboring nations.

Israel's agricultural sector relies on Palestine's water availability. Israel uses over 95% of its available water, about 1,650 mcm, which does not provide enough extra water supplies in case of a sudden change in availability. 1,650 mcm is about one third of Israel's total rainfall due to the 60% evaporation rate of its semi-arid conditions. This portion of available water is partitioned through the state's needs: 75-80% for agriculture, 15-18% for domestic use, and 4-7% for industrial use.

The stability of Israel's agricultural sector is vital for its right to statehood and security sector. The development of Israel's economy is supported by its agricultural sector due to the state's goal of self-sufficiency that is crucial to its protection of food supplies from a possible partial Arab blockade.⁵⁰³ In the 1950's, Israel was unable to produce enough food for its growing population, and had to institute food rationing from 1949-1952. However, with the cultivation of land through irrigation and the establishment of water channels, Israel's food production increased.⁵⁰⁴ Water availability inevitably determines the production rate, growth, and prosperity of the agricultural sector vital to Israel's livelihood.

To further help the state of Israel, a stable society must be built through the development of agriculture and settlement. The ability to create a physical basis for an independent state and to establish a society of agricultural workers are primary factors for developing a land for the Jewish population. These two factors would allow the settlement of larger Jewish populations in Palestine, as well as the extension of the Jewish population into scattered areas of the country.

⁵⁰³ Nadav Morag, "Water, Geopolitics and State Building: The Case of Israel," 182.

⁵⁰⁴ Ibid. 190.

The Palestinian state's use of water

Similar to the Zionist movement that depends on water resources for the development of a Jewish homeland, adequate water resources for the Palestinian movement support a strong economy and population, which is vital for an independent nation in the Middle East. The history of the Palestinian request for autonomy begins with the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 by the United Nations who demoted the Palestinians to a second tier status. Therefore, Palestinian justifications for water rights often focus on rights that balance out the power given to Israel from the events of 1948 through 1974. "During this period, the source of power became firmly embedded within Israel . . . the 1967 war increased the asymmetrical nature of power relations in Israel's favour, such that the latter was able to impose unilateral solutions."⁵⁰⁵

Palestine's economy in the later 20th and early 21st century represents the effects of an imbalanced power as a result of the influence of foreign powers, i.e. the state of Israel established by the UN. Water rights are crucial in a peace agreement because of agriculture's place in the Palestinian economy. However, the Palestinian agricultural industry is unable to move past its small-scale status due to the requirement of Israel's approval in most activity.⁵⁰⁶ Irrigation is a vital component to the agricultural industry, mainly situated in Gaza, the Jordan Valley, and the northern districts of the West Bank, over which Israel ultimately has control. As of 2002, Palestine's GDP was estimated at \$1.8 billion in contrast to Israel's around \$18

⁵⁰⁵ Simone Klawitter, "Water as a Human Right: The Understanding of Water Rights in Palestine," *Water Resources Development*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (June 2007)

⁵⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

billion⁵⁰⁷, with a contribution of 28% by the industrial economy, 63% by services, and 8% by agriculture.⁵⁰⁸ Any change in the water availability would not only affect the agricultural sector that provides needed securities for the population, such as a secure food source, but would also affect other industries that support the GDP that are crucial for a thriving society. Important to note is the 2.8% contribution of Israel's agricultural economy to the total GDP, despite its use of 50% of total water supply for irrigation purposes (Palestine uses 11% of total water supply for agricultural industry). Agriculture also produces vital job opportunities that raised Palestinian employment from 12.7% in 1995 to 16% in 2004.

To counteract the imbalance of power, international contributions have helped the plight of the Palestinians, seen in the PLO's efforts as well as the current influence of the United Nations. With the establishment of PLO in 1964, Palestinian rights were given international recognition through PLO's position as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people."⁵⁰⁹ Israel's position within the international community was undermined by the Palestinian cry with its part of the international agenda.⁵¹⁰ In 1974 with the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3236, the UN identified the Palestinian right to return as an "inalienable right," which leads to the Palestinian justification for water rights as an international necessity.

⁵⁰⁷ Globalis- Israel. Global Virtual University.

http://globalis.gvu.unu.edu/indicator_detail.cfm?IndicatorID=19&Country=IL

⁵⁰⁸ Hillel Shuval, "A Proposal for an Equitable Resolution to the Conflicts between the Israelis and the Palestinians over the Shared Water Resources of the Mountain Aquifer." 1.

⁵⁰⁹ David Newman, Ghazi Falah, "Bridging the Gap: Palestinian and Israeli Discourses on Autonomy and Statehood," 118.

⁵¹⁰ Ibid. 120.

Palestinian rights to water

The right of every human being to have water to sustain life is the Palestinians' first justification for secure access. The Palestinian question over water uses several international human rights treaties that put peoples needs for water first.⁵¹¹ International human rights groups, such as like the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural rights, defines the human right to water thus: "The human right to water entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic uses."⁵¹²

The second right to water relates to international water law regarding territorial disputes. According to Hillel I. Shuval, four out of the eight Palestinian claims to water rights involve territorial disagreements.⁵¹³ The claims focus on Israel's improper and unfair extraction of water from Palestinian territory that, if extracted completely, could harm the Palestinian economy severely.⁵¹⁴ To help appease these water disagreements, the International Law Association in 1966 established the Helsinki Rules that were a peaceful approach that determined the concept of "equitable apportionment," meaning that, "Each basin state is entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters on an international drainage basin."⁵¹⁵ Although the Helsinki Rules only applied to ground water usage, other policies were later made to include surface water

⁵¹¹ Simone Klawitter, "Water as a Human Right: The Understanding of Water Rights in Palestine," 303.

⁵¹² Ibid. 304.

⁵¹³ Ibid.

⁵¹⁴ Hillel Shuval, "A Proposal for an Equitable Resolution to the Conflicts between the Israelis and the Palestinians over the Shared Water Resources of the Mountain Aquifer." 41.

⁵¹⁵ Ibid.

that, for the purpose of this paper, would include the Jordan River in addition to the Mountain Aquifer.⁵¹⁶

Conflicts in Palestine

The first Palestinian *intifadah* took place in 1987 and recognized the PLO as “the sole, legitimate representative of ‘our people, all our people wherever they congregate in our homeland or outside it,’”⁵¹⁷ giving PLO more recognition. To help the Palestinian plight, slightly similar in its goals for an Arab Palestine, Hamas was established a year earlier as an outgrowth of the Muslim Brotherhood who did not favor a US-PLO dialogue. “The fear was that the peace process would merely serve to legitimize the ‘Zionist entity’- Hamas refused to call Israel by its name; in its view, there could be a truce (*hudnah*) with it, but never a settlement.”⁵¹⁸

The second Palestinian *intifadah*, or al-Aqsa intifadah, commenced in September 2000 prompted by Ariel Sharon’s electioneering visit to the al-Aqsa Mosque, affirmed by Imad Al-Faluhi, the Palestinian Authority’s Communications Minister.⁵¹⁹ Yassar Arafat was unhappy with the peace process of the Camp David negotiations that year due to the relatively little importance given to the rights of Palestinians. In 1993 with the Oslo Accords, Palestinians were awarded the West Bank and Gaza, representing 22 percent of Palestine, and then in 2000 at the Camp David negotiations, Palestinians were given 80 percent of the 22 percent of the 100

⁵¹⁶ Hillel Shuval, “A Proposal for an Equitable Resolution to the Conflicts between the Israelis and the Palestinians over the Shared Water Resources of the Mountain Aquifer.” 45.

⁵¹⁷ Richard Booney, *Jihad: from Quran to bin Laden*, 307.

⁵¹⁸ Ibid. 309

⁵¹⁹ Ibid. 313

percent of their original homeland.⁵²⁰ ‘Martyrdom operations’ were instituted by Hamas in March 2001 to “strike within Israel’s heartland” in order to protest the Jewish nation. According to Ritchie Ovendale, from the Muslim perspective, *Jihad* was a viable response to the infidels in control of Muslim land furthered by the ‘martyrdom operations.’ The suicide bombing carried out by Palestinians in Israel became the conflict’s distinctive characteristic and was a form of resistance against the infidels included the strategies utilized for *Jihad* .⁵²¹

From the statistics above, it is clear that Israeli forces are in control of water allocation in Palestine due to their dominant political presence and power in the region because of foreign involvement. The following is the history of the US-Israeli relationship that strengthens the state of Israel to hold an authority over water rights in Palestine. The US has given economic and military aid to Israel over the latter half of the 20th century first, to stop the expansion of communism (and thought to be allied Arab nationalism) seen during the Cold War, and second, to establish a Western ally in the Middle East.

The history of the US alliance with Israel

While referring back to Samuel W. Lewis’ five elements that rest at the basis of the unofficial US-Israel alliance, a discussion of the region’s historical ties with the US must be elaborated on.

The US-Israeli alliance began in February 1957 during the Eisenhower administration. Until the Carter administration, much of the historical narrative

⁵²⁰ Ritchie Ovendale, *The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Wars*. (London: Longman, 1999), 322.

⁵²¹ Ibid. 335..

concerning the Arab-Israeli conflicts revolves around US-Soviet global rivalry.⁵²² The US would only support the United Nations sanctions regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict if Israel withdrew from Gaza and other Egyptian territory from the seizure in 1956 during the Suez Crisis. Israel agreed under the condition that Egypt would allow Israeli vessels free passage through the Straits of Tiran in addition to an UN-supported force to protect the Israeli-Egyptian border. Israel's economics and military-strategic circumstances were allied with those of the US,⁵²³ which led to the subsequent withdrawal of Israel that set a diplomatic tone⁵²⁴ as a "deepening US commitment to Israeli security."⁵²⁵

The US saw Israel's strength during the Suez Crisis as a vital addition to the US' desire to contain radical Arab nationalism thought to be allied with communism. Congress supported the US involvement in the Middle Eastern nations threatened to fall under the influence of communism through military and economic aid, as seen with the Eisenhower doctrine of 1957.⁵²⁶ In 1959, the US gave into Israel's request of financial and military support against Soviet aggression with \$100 million in technical and financial assistance, and in 1960 with \$10 million worth of radar equipment. Fearing the backlash from certain Arab nations against the US for their generous contribution, Eisenhower rejected Israel's last request of HAWK missiles to maintain a neutral yet tilted status in the Middle East. The interests of protecting US oil flow and maintaining political support from wealthy Jewish Americas lay at the

⁵²² Ritchie Owendale, *The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Wars.*, 367.

⁵²³ Zack Levey, "Israel's Quest for a Security Guarantee from the United States, 1954-1956," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 22, No. ½ (1995), 43.

⁵²⁴ Douglas Little, "The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and Israel, 1957-1968," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Nov., 1993), 563.

⁵²⁵ Ibid. 564.

⁵²⁶ Douglas Little, "The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and Israel, 1957-1968," 564.

base of the US' stance on the Israeli-Palestinian problem seen in its partial support for both sides. Broadly speaking, US involvement in the Middle East was to ensure the protection of its interests from communist Soviet Union.

During the Eisenhower administration of the 1950's, the President viewed the Israelis as "potential allies in his struggle to contain Soviet-backed revolutionary Arab nationalism."⁵²⁷ During the Kennedy administration of the 1960's, Israel began to develop weapons, igniting the US to continue its pledged assistance in the event of Arab aggression to protect Israel and the US interests. Egypt also received MIG's from the Soviet Union that worried Washington, causing debate over the amount of security and protection that Israel should receive from US without compromising US relations with Arab nations in the Middle East. Kennedy facilitated the situation in 1961 by using a comprehensive regional settlement to handle the disputes rather than providing more military support to Israel to use against Egypt.

However, after the Arab-Israeli War in 1973, the US held a peace-seeker status and tried to negotiate with Israel to withdraw from certain territories in order to bring peace to the conflict. In exchange for the surrender of Israeli territory, the US would support Israel to create a strong tie in the Middle East to ensure the protection of US interests in the region. This Western alliance was discussed frequently, yet in an informal and implicit way.⁵²⁸

The era of President Jimmy Carter represents a move away from support of Israel for anti-Soviet reasons into one focused on bringing peace to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the past administrations, the Palestinians were ignored, thus

⁵²⁷ Douglas Little, "The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and Israel, 1957-1968," 563.

⁵²⁸ Ibid. 565.

Carter incorporated them into American interests through the meeting at Camp David in 1978 to make the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel. Yet Carter still kept in mind US interests in Israel, sending more economic and military aid and cooperation to Israel.

Israel's position in US foreign policy changed with the Reagan administration, which reverted to viewing the alliance with Israel through a Cold War lens. Israel was a friendly and democratic ally with the US, amidst some hostile Arab nations allied with the Soviet Union. However, the US could maintain a simultaneous relationship with both the Arabs and the Israelis through the Reagan era's "strategic cooperation." During the 1980's the US maintained a "military-to-military" relationship with Israel, while also strengthening ties with Gulf nations like Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Yet with the commencement of the Palestinian *intifada* in 1987, American public support for Israel dwindled due to the image of the Israeli army as a "brutal occupier" supported by with US financial and military aid.

The US outlook on the Arab-Israeli problem reverted to protecting Israeli and US interests during the Bush I administration from 1989-1993. A peace negotiation was not "only in Israel's interest and that of the long-suffering Palestinians, but also very much in the American interests."⁵²⁹ The Madrid Peace Conference in late 1991 represents the culmination of the US' newfound power and interests in forging peace in the region, with the commencement of face-to-face meetings of Arab and Israeli leaders. At the same time, the position of the Israeli prime minister was changing,

⁵²⁹ Samuel W. Lewis, "The United States and Israel: Evolution of an Unwritten Alliance," 369.

from Minister Yitzhak Shamir to Yitzak Rabin, who held a much more supportive stance on the relations between Israel and the US.

With the election of President Clinton in 1993, the US-Israel relationship changed dramatically. President Clinton and Minister Rabin extensively discussed plans and strategies for peace, establishing a deep diplomatic relationship that had not been seen before. The US also fervently supported the Israeli-Palestinian agreement signed in Oslo in 1993, leading to the large US donation of two billion dollars to the West Bank and Gaza in order to help establish the new Palestinian authority described in the Oslo Agreement.

Continuing through the Clinton, Bush and into President Obama's administration, peace to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict ceases to be fully realized. In April 2003, the Quartet, made up of about 40 nations including the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations, released a 'Roadmap' that "outlines a three-stage program leading to an independent Palestinian state and a 'final and comprehensive settlement for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict' by 2005."⁵³⁰ The roadmap was titled, "Performance-based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Crisis." Their obligations under the Roadmap were enacted on November 27, 2008 when leaders of the United States, Israel, and the Palestinians agreed to establish a peace treaty by the end of 2008 through the creation

⁵³⁰ Global Policy Forum, "Roadmap," <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/israel-palestine/peace/roadindex.htm>.

of a Palestinian state.⁵³¹ Yet to this day, a peace treaty has not been made between the Israelis and Palestinians despite numerous efforts to institute a two-state solution.⁵³²

Conclusion

Water rights in Palestine hold a substantial position concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Religious and cultural differences are not the sole reason for conflict, which are often the perceived visage. The creation of the state of Israel in 1948 augmented the power structure in Palestine, giving Israeli forces more power, influence, and control over the region's resources. As a result, a struggle continues to exist between the Israelis and Palestinians for equal rights to a nation that can only be accomplished through adequate natural sources to support the economic, social and political growth of a nation. Noam Chomsky notes the US' persistence to maintain an influential role in the region, "and to a search for a 'hidden agenda, for example to help Israel control the Palestinians, to control Iraqi oilfields, or generally to extend American hegemony.'"⁵³³

⁵³¹ Adam Entous, Sue Plemming, "Israel and Palestinians commit to 2008 peace treaty," Reuters, November 27, 2007, <http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSN2636654420071127>.

⁵³² Isabel Kershner, "Palestinians Ask U.S. Envoy to Pres Israel on 'Two-State Solution,'" April 17, 2009, Global Edition: Middle East, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/18/world/middleeast/18mideast.html?fta=y>.

⁵³³ Noam Chomsky, *Failed States: the abuse of power and assault on democracy*, 159.

Conclusion to Thesis

The purpose of my thesis was to counter Samuel Huntington's argument that the world's conflict is over differing civilizations, religions, or cultures. Whether or not religion is declining or growing, it cannot be used to portray the world in a 'cosmic war,' or a battle between 'good and evil'. Natural resources, not religions, rest at the basis for the Islamic fundamentalist and militant movement due to its response to the Western structural pressures that are modernizing Muslim societies. Oil and water become vital tools for exercising power and authority of one nation over another, and are identified as the true culprits for a conflict that is often furtively concealed.

Chapter One discusses the true nature of religion's place in a society, whether the amount of religiosity or a differing religion had a true effect on conflict. World order was to be determined by the access and power to natural resources rather than opposing civilizations or religions. Chapter Two developed the US' structural pressure in the Middle East as a result over the access to natural resources and the challenge to maintain itself as a hegemonic force over resources in the modernizing Middle East. Chapter Three presents a parallel discussion of concerns that delves into the predominant Muslim thinkers and movements that have influenced the modern-day Islamist Muslim response to globalization and modernization because of US influence. Chapters Four and Five explain the resources of oil and water as tangible forces that are used to exert certain influences a structural powers for a one-sided agenda of total wealth, power, and knowledge.

According to the article by Fareed Zakaria titled, “Learning to Live with Radical Islam,” a different kind of strategy to combat radical Islam needs to be adequately developed in order to deal with and understand the world’s conflicts. In 2009, President Obama emphasized his concern for foreign policy in the Middle East seen in his inaugural address that “reached out to the Muslim world calling for a relationship based on mutual respect.”⁵³⁴ According to President Obama, a “differentiated approach”⁵³⁵ towards Muslim nations needs to be made before a substantial and enduring change can be considered. Even words or phrases that sound similar to Samuel Huntington’s sweeping generalizations, like “ ‘war on terror,’ ‘global insurgency,’ even ‘the Muslim world,’ ”⁵³⁶ must be avoided to ensure a change. The quest for oil and water are portrayed as a clash of differing civilizations and religions rather than the true nature of a clash of interests. With an accurate consideration for the motives behind radical Islam and Islamic fundamentalism, the true nature of the conflict can be attempted to be resolved.

The most powerful tool that the Islamic fundamentalism movement holds is its position as a *phenomenon*. The obscure and theoretical view of Islamic fundamentalism makes generalized connections to individuals and movements that largely have little connections to each other, such as the created correlations of Osama bin Laden and the Taliban in Afghanistan⁵³⁷ or between bin Laden and Saddam Hussein. The distortion of radical Islam has become so great that Muslim and “Western” imaginations have been altered far from the truth of reality, creating the

⁵³⁴ Rob Reynolds, “Obama moves swiftly on Middle East,” Al Jazeera.net, January 29, 2009, Americas section.

⁵³⁵ Fareed Zakaria. “Learning to Live with Radical Islam,” *Newsweek*. March 9, 2009. 26.

⁵³⁶ Ibid.

⁵³⁷ Ibid. 26.

theory of “Bin Ladenism.”⁵³⁸ Much like the highly skeptical “clash of civilizations,” the “West” has been placed in “armed opposition” to Muslim fundamentalists that further perpetuates the view of the struggle from Muslim and “Western” viewpoints.⁵³⁹ As stated by Roxanne L. Euben, a scientific study of Islamic fundamentalism needs to occur to distinguish the correlations among urbanization, expanding education, commercialization, industrialization, and alienation that “‘produce’ Islamic revival.”⁵⁴⁰

Equally alarming is the assumption similar to Huntington’s regarding the support of radical Islam in the Middle East. According to the article by Fareed Zakaria titled, “Learning to Live with Radical Islam,” a clear distinction needs to be made and understood regarding the involvement of local militants and global *jihadists*. Out of all the people “we” call a member of the Taliban, “less than 10 percent are ideologically aligned with Quetta Shura or Al Qaeda,” while 90 percent are tribal fighters or Pashtun nationalists.⁵⁴¹ Islamicists and *jihadists* have become the two common “interchangeable”⁵⁴² buzzwords, and need to be properly clarified to understand their divergent goals. Islamicists ask for the plausible goal of their own nation while *jihadists* demand an inconceivable and infeasible goal of destroying all ‘evil’ forms of power. *Jihadists* and radical Islam do not provide the answers to modern-day problems, the exact antithesis to what radical Islam dictates as its purpose in the world. “They do not have a world view that can satisfy the aspirations

⁵³⁸ Fareed Zakaria, “Learning to Live with Radical Islam,” 29.

⁵³⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁰ Roxanne L. Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism* 23.

⁵⁴¹ Fareed Zakaria, “Learning to Live with Radical Islam,” 29.

⁵⁴² Reza Aslan, Pomona College, Claremont, April 14, 2009

of modern men and women. We do. That's the most powerful weapon of all,"⁵⁴³ notes Resa Aslan, Iranian-American Muslim author of No god but God and Cosmic War.

Oil and water stand as two of the most important resources that a nation or civilization depends on in the modern world. Both resources nourish the modern world in ways that are inextricably linked together to ensure the stabilization and growth of a civilization. Oil's versatile use in the world allows it to play a role in almost every aspect of a modern society, ranging from the agricultural, industrial, energy, social and political sectors. On the other hand, water is the fundamental component to life that ensures the growth and development at the biological level of every single human being and living creature on earth. The two resources are influential and attentive to every single aspect of humanity's progression thus are able to shape the changing society and world. The power over change rests at the basis for conflict's motives, arising over the undeniable power over resources and therefore ability to transform the world.

The rise of the Islamic fundamentalist movement cannot be looked at from the critical point of view, seeing the Middle East as entity composed of violence, hatred, and unjust. From the Western, academic point of view, the Islamic fundamentalist viewpoint must be looked at in its own terms in order to understand its evolving state of mind. As President Barack Obama stated in a speech given before the Turkish parliament on April 6, 2009, "America's relationship with the Muslim community, the Muslim world, cannot and will not just be based upon opposition to terrorism. We seek broader engagement based upon mutual interests and mutual

⁵⁴³ Fareed Zakaria, "Learning to Live with Radical Islam," 28.

respect.”⁵⁴⁴ Its complaints about modern civilization are valid due to the speed at which the world appears to be diminishing. While many of the movements’ actions and ideologies are violent and unjustifiable, attention must be given to the origin of concern derived from the modernization and globalization of the world. Speaking broader than losing the Islamic culture in the Middle East, local and indigenous traditions are being neglected for more globalized and homogenous tradition. Hopefully in the years to come, the world’s leaders will hear and respond to the cries of the Muslim world that are attempting to open our eyes to the damaged world in need of great change. President Barack Obama has begun this transformation with his concern and attention towards relations with the Middle East, overcoming the stigmatized image of the conflict in the region over differing civilizations and culture. President Obama is quoted as, “The United States ‘is not and will never be at war with Islam.’”⁵⁴⁵

⁵⁴⁴ Helen Cooper, “In Turkey, Obama Presses for Mideast Accord.” *New York Times*, April 7, 2009, Europe, Global edition.

⁵⁴⁵ Helen Cooper, “America Seeks Bonds to Islam, Obama Insists.” *New York Times*, April 6, 2009, Europe, Global edition.

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