March 2012

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NATO’S ROLE IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR: IS THE ALLIANCE OBSOLETE?

Benjamin Forster

Since the outbreak of the “War on Terror” following the September 11th terrorist attacks, NATO has been struggling to rapidly adapt its political and military strategies in order to face the transformed threat of global terrorism. NATO has indeed developed innovative new ways of tackling the issue of global terrorism, though it faces a number of significant difficulties, which, if not addressed, will likely mean that NATO will be a minimally effective force in the fight against global terrorism.

In the analysis that follows, I will first examine two important outcomes of the 2002 Prague summit of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC): the Alliance’s Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism (MCDT) and the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAPT). Together these comprise NATO’s first frameworks for addressing the issue of terrorism. As we will see, though both provide much needed basic frameworks in order for NATO to address the issue of terrorism effectively, each presents unique difficulties that must be addressed if NATO is to have a significant role in the broader War on Terror. I will then examine some of the practical applications of the Prague summit’s frameworks, such as NATO counterterrorism and antiterrorism operations, as well as the Alliance’s intelligence and consequence management capabilities. Finally, I conclude by examining four separate shortcomings of NATO’s current counterterrorism and antiterrorism capabilities: NATO’s lack of a coherent counterterrorism policy, faltering intelligence capabilities, disconnect amongst member states due to separate national loyalties and the illusive nature of terrorism, and possible difficulties associated with, and the larger implications of increased international cooperation.

In this paper I will not focus on NATO’s participation in Afghanistan, but rather NATO’s role in preventing and countering the type of terrorism seen during the 2001 World Trade Center attacks, the 2004 Madrid bombing, and the 2005 London bombing. Thus, the “War on Terror” as used in this analysis will refer to the broader global fight against terrorism, and not simply the US-led War on Terror. This paper will also refer to antiterrorism, and counterterrorism. In this analysis, antiterrorism will refer to preventative, defensive measures taken to prevent attacks (such as the use of surveillance), whereas
counterterrorism will refer to the use of preemptive offensive action to prevent a possible terrorist attack.

2002 PRAGUE SUMMIT

While the NATO collective defense framework had made previous attempts at addressing the issue of international terrorism, most notably in the Alliance’s 1999 Strategic Concept, the Alliance’s first formal address of the issue was at the 2002 NATO Prague summit meeting of the EAPC (de Nevers). During that summit, the Alliance established what has become NATO’s official policy towards terrorism, namely the Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism, and the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism. While there are a number of significant shortcomings of these plans, in line with the strategies developed by the EAPC at the Prague summit, NATO has played a small but significant role in the broader War on Terror, particularly through antiterrorism operations.

Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism (MCDT)

The 2002 Prague summit meeting’s Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism (MCDT) plan stipulates that “all members [will] have the primary responsibility for the defense of their populations and infrastructures” while NATO will play a much more supportive role for individual nations’ counterterrorism and antiterrorism initiatives (“NATO’s Military Concept”). The MCDT outlined four different roles for NATO’s military operations: defense measures (antiterrorism), consequence management, counterterrorism, and military cooperation (with non-military forces as well) with further NATO assistance dictated by the North Atlantic Council (Kuzmanov). As stipulated by the MCDT, specifically, defense measures (anti-terrorism) include intelligence sharing; consequence management consists of post-attack containment and disaster relief (in the case of a nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon attack); counterterrorism consists of “offensive military action in which NATO either plays a supportive or lead role” through out-of-area operations or pre-emptive strikes; finally, military cooperation consists both of inter-member (as well as non-member) civilian law enforcement and military cooperation, as well as strictly traditional inter-member (and non-member) military cooperation (Deni) (“NATO’s Military Concept”).

Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAPT)

The summit’s Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAPT) has become the main platform for joint Partners for Peace (PfP) and NATO member cooperation in addressing the issue of terrorism, with additional efforts made to cooperate with non PfP or NATO members (Kuzmanov). The PAPT has provided a five point framework for continued international cooperation. These areas include: intensified consultations and information sharing, enhanced preparedness for combating terrorism, the need to impede support for terrorist groups, to enhance capabilities to contribute to consequence management, and assistance to partners’ efforts against terrorism (“Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism”). The PAPT has also established the need for close NATO and non NATO member cooperation, through political, logistical, economic, and technological (adapting co-compatible military technologies) means. Clearly the PAPT is an important legal step in establishing the cooperation necessary for effective antiterrorism and counterterrorism operations, though it also presents significant problems that will be discussed later in this analysis.
NATO’s Operations in the Fight Against Terrorism

The practical application of these NATO initiatives in fighting terrorism has had limited success. Perhaps NATO’s two largest roles in the more broadly defined War on Terror have been through anti-terrorism operations aimed at deterring terrorist attacks, as well as through consequence management (aiding members in the event of a terrorist attack). The MCDT, and particularly the PAPT’s plan of close cooperation amongst NATO, and PfP members has been a key component of both of these roles. I will also examine some of the recent changes in NATO’s intelligence capabilities as well as its limited role in counterterrorism.

Counterterrorism

With regards to counterterrorism operations, NATO, as stipulated in the MCDT, has taken on a very “supportive” role in the broader War on Terror, and has therefore had a minimal role in offensive operations. To date, NATO’s only major offensive Article 5 operation has been in Afghanistan where it has played a largely supportive role of the US (Kuzmanov). While this study of NATO’s role in the broader War on Terror will not examine NATO’s operations in Afghanistan in detail, it is important to note that NATO has played a prominent role in counterterrorism by training civilian and military personnel both in Iraq and Afghanistan. Such training has primarily consisted of bomb detection techniques, policing procedures, etc. Perhaps one of NATO’s largest organizational shifts in the area of counterterrorism, specifically in executing non-Article 5 pre-emptive strike missions, was its development of the NATO Response Force (NRF) during the Prague summit. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states NATO’s clear role as a collective defense organization, that an “armed attack against one or more of them [members] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all” (“The North Atlantic Treaty”). In this sense, the operating nature of the NRF is a clear departure from NATO’s more traditional reactive role. The NRF, while not without significant operational limitations that will be discussed later, is NATO’s “state of the art force” that will allow the Alliance to rapidly respond to terrorist threats. This means that the NRF would act as a tip of the spear action force comprised of the best of the Alliance’s military forces, and would act in accordance with NAC mandates. The goal of the NRF is to engage members and non members into more proactive, rather than reactive engagements of terrorist threats (“The NATO Response”).

Antiterrorism: NATO’s Intelligence Capabilities, Operation Active Endeavour, and Operation Eagle Assist

NATO’s two most prominent antiterrorism operations to date have been Operation Eagle Assist, and Operation Active Endeavour, both of which were among NATO’s first actions following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. They are key examples of NATO’s antiterrorism strategy in action (de Nevers). Eagle Assist, which lasted from October 2001 to May 2002, gave direct surveillance support to the US by deploying seven NATO AWACS aircraft over American soil. In all, 830 NATO crew members representing 13 member nations participated in the operation which flew over 360 sorties over the US. Since Operation Eagle Assist, NATO’s AWACS squadrons have participated in providing airborne surveillance for events such as the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens, Greece, the Spanish Royal Wedding in Madrid, Spain, the 2006 Olympic Games in Turin, Italy, and others (Kuzmanov). Operation Active Endeavor began primarily as a NATO naval operation in the Eastern
Mediterranean, and began in 2001 as a “deterrent and surveillance measure in support of US intervention in Afghanistan” (de Nevers). Active Endeavour was seen also as a way to prevent possible terrorist attacks from Libya, and Syria, which, as of 2003, were considered by the US to be havens for terrorist groups (Kuzmanov). By 2006, the Operation had expanded to include non NATO members such as Russia, which briefly participated in patrolling the Eastern Mediterranean in 2006 and 2007. Today Active Endeavour has expanded significantly throughout the entire Mediterranean, primarily as a symbolic gesture of NATO’s continued resolve to counter international terrorism. But the Operation is much more than simply a symbolic gesture: NATO patrols have participated in search and seizure of suspect materials, prevented drug smuggling and weapons trafficking, and the operation has been extremely successful in guarding over 65 percent of Western Europe’s oil supply, which is transported through the Mediterranean. Active Endeavour has also allowed for increased cooperation with Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Israel and other states that are actively seeking to combat terrorism in their respective countries (“Operation Active Endeavour”).

NATO has also revamped its intelligence capabilities to meet the new threats posed by terrorism, though with significant limitations. NATO itself is severely limited in the field of intelligence as it itself does not collect “raw intelligence”, but rather relies on its member countries’ own domestic intelligence services. In an effort to better pool intelligence gathered from various member nations, in 2003 NATO established a Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit along with an NATO Intelligence Fusion Center to coordinate intelligence gathered by members (Deni). This initiative, while a step in the right direction, was met with significant difficulties which will be examined in depth later. NATO’s Multinational Battlefield Information and Exploitation System (MBIES) is also a way for NATO to pool intelligence resources regarding terrorism, into a single network that is readily accessible to NATO task forces (Deni).

**Consequence Management**

NATO’s consequence management plan, in line with the Prague summit MCDT, has established a number of multinational NBC containment programs. One of these programs, NATO’s Civil Emergency Planning Action Plan (CEPAP), is the Alliance’s premier post attack containment program that has pooled efforts form a variety of members and Partners. NATO’s Chemical Biological Radioactive and Nuclear Defense (CBRN) Battalion, also established during the Prague summit, plays a similar role as well. Among the primary objectives of the CBRN Defense Battalion are the identification of nuclear, biological, and chemical threats, and decontamination operations (Kuzmanov). In line with the Prague summit’s commitment to increased cooperation between members and PfP members, 12 different nations take part in CBRN rotational deployments, with the CBRN headquarters based in and staffed in the Czech Republic (“NATO’s Multinational Chemical.”). Interestingly, NATO’s increased capabilities in NBC weapon containment, consequence management, and surveillance, have given NATO a bigger role in disaster relief. In fact, the Alliance’s Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Center assisted the US during Hurricane Katrina, and Pakistan during the 2005 earthquake (de Nevers).

**LIMITATIONS OF NATO’S CURRENT ROLE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM**

Despite all of NATO’s capabilities in waging “war” against terrorism, it nonetheless has significant limitations in its capabilities. This section analyzes these shortcomings in four
specific areas: counterterrorism, intelligence, member nation state loyalties and the nature of the broader War on Terror, and problems emanating from expanded international cooperation.

**NATO's Lack of a Legal Counterterrorism Provision**

In regards to NATO’s operational capacity, NATO’s lack of a pre-emptive counterterrorism provision in the MCDT, has not only limited NATO to largely reactive operations, but it has further enlarged the gap between US and NATO capabilities (de Nevers). While the North Atlantic Treaty’s collective defense plan assures an ‘all for one, one for all’ support of members in the event of an attack, the Prague summit did not establish a legal provision for out of area counterterrorism operations (non-Article 5), but rather stated that the decision for action must come from the NAC, which is inextricably bound by the North Atlantic Treaty (Bebler). NATO has thus established itself as a formidable reactive, not proactive force. This has frequently conflicted with US security policy which, during the Bush administration, was highly proactive, focusing on eliminating threats before they surfaced, as opposed to NATO’s policy of addressing threats once they surface. The US National Security Strategy of 2002 and 2006 for example, state: “The fight must be taken to the enemy”, and emphasize the need to prevent attacks before they occur (de Nevers). It is thus clear that despite the existence of the various antiterrorist (preventative) programs NATO has pursued following 9/11, NATO as a force in the fight against preventing and eliminating global terror is severely lacking in this respect. The fact that NATO is largely a reactionary force, and that it is often difficult to mobilize, suggests a major reason why the Bush administration did not seek NATO aid during the invasion of Afghanistan. Most counterterrorism efforts amongst NATO members today occur bilaterally as a result of these and other shortcomings (Bebler). The effectiveness of the NATO Reaction Force will also be significantly compromised due to the lack of a counterterrorism provision in the MCDT, and member nations will likely be highly reluctant to take on any type of action that may exceed the mandate of the North Atlantic Treaty. As John Deni, a US political advisor to US forces in Europe notes, despite the importance of the NRF in NATO’s counterterrorism program, NATO has “…barely proved able to muster the requisite forces – forces that the Alliance itself identified as necessary for the NRF to be functional…including counterterrorism [operations]” (Deni). It remains unclear whether this lack in requisite forces is a direct result of NATO’s lack of a legal counterterrorism provision that could potentially obligate members to provide forces for the NRF. Unless NATO can successfully address this issue, the Alliance will undoubtedly face significant political conflict with the US (unless of course US policy of pre-emption changes) in years to come.

Along similar lines, NATO’s consequence management operations, such as its NBC containment programs, can only be deployed upon consent of the member nation in which the containment operation will be deployed. While antiterrorism operations (preventative operations) such as Operation Active Endeavour are beyond the Article 5 constraints under which counterterrorism (pre-emptive operations) is conducted, it is nonetheless constrained, though only to a comparatively small degree, by differing national loyalties amongst members.

**Faltering Intelligence Capabilities**

Another area in which NATO’s strategic capabilities are lacking is in the area of intel-
intelligence. Though, as illustrated earlier, NATO has made a number of attempts at creating intelligence pools, NATO in and of itself has no intelligence gathering capabilities other than through its AWACS surveillance operations. As a result, almost all of NATO’s supplied intelligence comes from the US Intelligence Community, and other member states’ counterpart organizations. As Renee de Nevers from the Maxwell School at Syracuse University points out, not only is NATO lacking in intelligence capabilities, but its members often have differing values of intelligence. For example, as US and European military capabilities diverge, the US has become more reliant on real-time intelligence as part of its evolving specialized counterterrorism capabilities. European allies however, have comparatively less specialized programs geared toward terrorism and thus have a comparatively lower value of real time intelligence (de Nevers). It should be noted that this discrepancy is largely influenced by differing threat values placed on terrorism by both the US and the European community, a conflict that will be examined in depth later in this analysis. Furthermore, the legal implications surrounding the gathering of human intelligence have caused conflicts between European NATO members and the US, which have differing views on what constitutes legal and illegal intelligence gathering (Bebler). These conflicts within the intelligence pooling arm of NATO have significantly impeded upon NATO’s intelligence capabilities. NATO has tried to remedy this situation notably through its creation of the NATO Intelligence Fusion Center, though its creation has had very little practical effect in easing member nation tensions. Rather, NATO’s creation of numerous intelligence pools have further added to NATO’s bureaucratic thicket, and as a result have further undermined NATO’s efficiency.

**Diverging Political Interests amongst NATO Members and the Nature of Modern Terrorism**

Internal discord amongst NATO members primarily due to diverging national interests, combined with the nature of the terrorist threat itself, illustrate a potential shortcoming of NATO’s role in fighting terrorism. All too frequently, the competing and changing national agendas of member nations have made decisive action very difficult, most notably in Afghanistan, and will likely make non-Article 5 pre-emptive missions extremely difficult to execute in the future. Once again, it is important to note that US security policy is geared more toward pre-emptive measures while European security policy is geared more toward reactive security. This discrepancy is a key factor in explaining the disconnect that exists between Europeans and the US over how to best deal with the terrorist threat (Bebler). Indeed there are often “serious disagreements concerning the authorized scope of operations and [concerning] several proposed deployments of the [NRF]” (Bebler). While the US in recent years has begun to see the benefits of multinational cooperation, European NATO members, often citing the case of Iraq, are highly concerned that the US may be trying to advance its own policy agenda through NATO (de Nevers). Furthermore, there is also significant discord between the US and European NATO members over the significance of the terrorist threat. For example, unlike the September 11th terrorist attacks, the Madrid and London terrorist bombings in 2004 and 2005 respectively, were not linked to Al Qaeda, but were rather conducted by domestic terrorist groups (de Nevers). Many critics of NATO’s role in the War on Terror cite this as a reason why domestic intelligence services and civilian police forces or even an EU sponsored counterterrorism program might be better suited for dealing with such issues rather than NATO, which seems more geared towards
collective military defense (Dend).

This point ties into the larger problem that exists: the nature of terrorist threats themselves. Despite the many antiterrorism and counterterrorism programs developed by NATO following the Prague summit, NATO still maintains its highly bureaucratic structure which does not give it the speed necessary to respond to terrorist threats. Furthermore, as stated earlier, NATO’s consequence management programs such as nuclear, biological and chemical weapon attack containment must have the approval of the given country in which the program will operate prior to its use. Additionally, while NATO maintains its NRF forces, it does not maintain a small scale paramilitary task force which might be ideally suited for hostage crises, and domestic terrorism. For these reasons critics often argue that international organizations such as the EU or the G-8 have developed sufficient inter-agency cooperation for fighting terrorism, and that NATO need not risk compromising its traditional military functionality in order to fight a “war” which it is not ideally suited for (Kuzmanov). Along these lines, there has not been, and will likely not be for many years, a clear consensus as to whether NATO, the EU, bilateral or unilateral action is better suited for addressing the highly illusive terrorist threat. There are indeed many pros and cons of each of these alternatives, an analysis of which is beyond the scope of this paper alone. Given the international nature of terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda today, the role of international organizations will be essential. Hence one of the most important roles NATO will play in the broader War on Terror will most definitely be its cooperation with PfP members, and the cultivation of cooperative efforts outside of the Alliance and the PfP. In this respect, the Alliance’s Partnership Action against Terrorism will be a key launch pad from which future cooperative efforts of this nature can occur.

Difficulties with Expanding NATO Membership and Non-member Cooperation

The downside of further international cooperation is that it will likely conflict with NATO’s collective defense role. Given the transnational nature of modern terrorism, NATO is highly unique in that it is the most effective international security organization in the world. In a sense, NATO’s unique position raises questions as to whether emerging international counterterrorism programs, such as the EU’s Rapid Response Force, will be able to achieve what the Alliance has (Kuzmanov). Whatever the case may be, today’s security threats demand evermore international cooperation. While unilateral action may avoid the confines of additional bureaucratic red tape that is often the result of diverging interests amongst NATO members, the use of international cooperation provides a level of legitimacy to military interventions. In fighting modern terrorism, Wesley Clark, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe says, gaining international public approval is essential in launching any successful military incursion (Clark 36). For example, in the case of the current Iraq war, unilateral military action has ignited an “us versus them” mentality in the Middle East by denying the cooperation with allies that is necessary for establishing international legitimacy (Clark 162). Conversely, during the 1990 Gulf War, cooperation with Arab states gave the incursion the international legitimacy necessary to make it the success that it was.

While the US has backed significant NATO expansion, such as in 2004, many argue that NATO’s rapid expansion is severely compromising its military capabilities. As de Néver points out, following NATO’s 1999 expansion, it was clear to existing members that the countries admitted, namely the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, were significantly
lacking in military capabilities by NATO standards. Following NATO's 2004 expansion, in which Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, and Slovenia became members of the Alliance, it was clear that these countries were even more lacking in military capabilities, and that they were not about to meet NATO's minimum military standards any time soon (de Nevers). The point here is that the cost of expansion, which will be essential in addressing the issue of terrorism, may very well be a deterioration of NATO's military standards to include more members and foster greater non-member cooperation.

NATO expansion also poses a threat to NATO's existing membership requirements. Given that modern terrorism does not discriminate between democratic and non-democratic states, it will be increasingly difficult for NATO to foster close cooperation with non-members, or to allow for their membership if one of NATO's key requirements for membership is democratic governance (Bebler). However, there are clear benefits of expansion in regards to antiterrorism and counterterrorism. Expansion could potentially provide political and economic stability for emerging democracies in Europe, which is essential in deterring terrorism from taking root (Shea).

David Yost warns that growing membership could also have unintended consequences, such as reigniting the NATO-Russia rivalry as former Soviet powers enter or adopt increasingly close cooperation with NATO (Yost 125). This could potentially detract from the overall purpose of increasing cooperation in dealing with terrorism. Even if expanded membership seems like a stretch, close cooperation in line with the PAPT presents its own problems as well. The more PfP and NATO members interact with each other strictly on training grounds, the greater a role NATO will have in transforming non-member military forces to be co-compatible. For example, the PAPT stipulates the need for increased political and logistical cooperation with non-members, and to develop compatible military units through joint training exercises ("Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism"). Hence, this will make it increasingly more difficult for NATO members not to intervene when a non-NATO member is attacked. Further, collective security implies NATO involvement in non-Article 5 missions which could potentially cause "...an erosion of NATO’s coherence as a collective defense organization during the pursuit of a diffuse collective security agreement" (Yost 166).

The risks associated with NATO's increased cooperation with non-members, coupled with the necessity of international cooperation in fighting terrorism, begs the question: why NATO? As mentioned earlier, when considering that NATO was born out of western security fears during the Cold War, it is unlikely that any future events, given today's political complexities, that an equally cohesive collective defense organization could be created. Wesley Clark points out that given the difficulties associated with bilateral cooperation, such as differing laws, judicial procedures etc., that often times terrorists will be caught and released. According to Clark, "Altruism and fellowship are not enough to bring other nations fully into the fight against terrorism. Rather, their international actions follow domestic agendas" (Clark 128). The very nature of NATO as a political-military forum also forces allies to develop co-compatible security policies, emanating from common security issues, which are in turn translated into domestic policies by forcing governments to defend their international positions at home (Clark 128). By doing this, NATO promotes collective action and burden sharing which are essential in taking on issues as massive as transnational terrorism.
WHERE SHOULD NATO GO FROM HERE?

While there are no clear solutions to many of the apparent difficulties that NATO will inevitably face with regards to its recent antiterrorism and counterterrorism programs, there are some solutions that suggest themselves. Perhaps one of NATO’s greatest weaknesses in the broader War on Terror will be its massive bureaucratic structure. Anton Beblcr, from the University of Ljubljana, suggests that NATO improve this by creating a separate forum for counterterrorism within NATO. As Bebler suggests, each NATO member state should have its own civilian paramilitary liaison to NATO, which could better coordinate NATO aid to each member’s local security or NBC containment units as needed. Within this separate forum, Bebler suggests, antiterrorism and counterterrorism decision making should be streamlined by merging repetitive sub-programs (such as the number of NATO’s intelligence programs) (Bebler). While NATO’s Reaction Forces could be potentially well equipped to address small scale conventional conflicts (i.e. through the use of mobile infantry, mechanized divisions etc.), these forces are not appropriate in dealing with small scale operations such as hostage rescue, NBC containment, etc. For this reason, smaller scale NATO paramilitary units would be better suited for small scale counterterrorism operations. If NATO is to be a successful force in fighting terrorism, its most critical tasks ahead will be in addressing the inherent problems with its intelligence capabilities, to establish a definitive counterterrorism provision, and to address the issues of international cooperation, military structure, core doctrines, and internal disconnect amongst members. However, due to the crisscrossing nature of these problems, solving one will likely create others in its place. NATO members will have to be wary of this as they try to adapt existing military and political doctrines and structures, to meet the security demands of the 21st century.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, NATO does indeed have significant antiterrorism capabilities through AWACS operations, NBC containment, and military training programs. Today’s NATO will be most effective in the area of antiterrorism and consequence management, though it will also be particularly effective in maintaining active peacekeeping operations, and through international cooperation it will be an extremely useful tool in providing political and economic security. Despite the inherent problems with NATO’s current role in fighting terrorism, there is little chance that an equally effective international security organization will emerge any time soon. As such, NATO will be a vital forum for international cooperation in the broader War on Terror, and extending NATO cooperation to non-members will be crucial in eliminating transnational terrorism. While the 2002 Prague summit was an important first step for NATO in reshaping itself to address the issue of terrorism, in and of itself it is far from sufficient in addressing all of NATO’s potential problems with regards to its policies on terrorism. If NATO can address the problems illustrated in this analysis effectively, it could potentially play a vital and even a leading role in the broader War on Terror.

APPENDIX A: EXTRACT FROM NATO’S PARTNERSHIP ACTION PLAN AGAINST TERRORISM

Action Plan

16. The specific action items under this Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism are listed below; other items may be added later. Implementation of these activities will be subject to applicable national laws and regulations, the specific character of security and defense policies of EAPC States and the principles of inclusiveness and self-differ-
16.1. Intensify Consultations and Information Sharing

16.1.1. Political consultations. Allies and Partners will consult regularly on their shared security concerns related to terrorism. Allies will make efforts to inform Partners about, and/or seek their views on, issues related to international fight against terrorism, beginning from the early stages of Alliance discussions. Partners may seek, in accordance with agreed procedures, direct political consultations with NATO, individually or in smaller groups, on their concerns related to terrorism. The consultations and discussions will reflect key security concerns of Allies and Partners, if relevant to the fight against terrorism.

16.1.2. Information sharing. EAPC States will intensify their efforts to share information and views related to terrorism, both in EAPC meetings and in seminars and workshops held under EAPC/PfP auspices. Lead nations may be invited to organize such events. EAPC States note the establishment of an EAPC/PfP Intelligence Liaison Unit (EAPC/PfP ILU). They will promote, in accordance with their domestic laws, exchange of intelligence relevant to terrorist threats.

16.2. Enhance Preparedness for Combating Terrorism

16.2.1. Defense and security sector reform. Partners will intensify their efforts to develop efficient, democratically-controlled, properly-structured and well-equipped forces able to contribute to combat terrorism.

16.2.2. Force planning. Partners involved in the Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP) will give priority, among others, to Partnership Goals aimed at improving their capabilities to participate in activities against terrorism. Such Partnership Goals will be identified within PARP and will also be communicated to Partners not participating in the PARP process – for information and to encourage equivalent efforts by non-PARP countries.

16.2.5. Training and exercises. Partners will be invited to participate in training opportunities and exercises related to terrorism to be coordinated by SACEUR/SACLANT. To the extent possible, the Partnership Work Programme will provide more anti-terrorism related opportunities and activities in the field of training and exercises. Exercises will also be used to share experiences in the fight against terrorism.

16.2.6. Armaments co-operation. EAPC States will make use of NATO armaments co-operation mechanisms under CNAD, as appropriate, to develop common, or as a minimum interoperable equipment solutions to meet the requirements of activities against terrorism.

16.2.7. Logistics co-operation. EAPC States will make use of NATO Logistics co-operation mechanisms under the Senior NATO Logisticians’ Conference, as appropriate, to develop arrangements to provide effective and efficient support to activities against terrorism, including Host Nation Support.

16.4. Enhance Capabilities to Contribute to Consequence Management

16.4.2. Enhance co-operation in Civil-Emergency Planning

16.4.3. Military contribution to consequence management.

16.4.4. Co-operation in non-classified scientific activities for reducing the impact of terrorism.

16.4.5. Co-operation in equipment development and procurement. EAPC States will take advantage of CNAD groups to identify equipment requirements which sup-
Support consequence management, after a terrorist attack, and where appropriate, co-operate on the development and/or procurement to meet these needs. Emphasis should be on dual use technologies which support both military and civil requirements.

16.5. Assistance to Partners' efforts against terrorism

16.5.1. Use of the Political Military Steering Committee (PMSC) Clearing House mechanism.

16.5.2. Establish/contribute to PfP Trust Funds. Consistent with PfP Trust Fund Policy, EAPC States will consider the establishment of PfP Trust Funds to assist individual member states in specific efforts against terrorism, as envisaged in the Consolidated Report on the Comprehensive Review of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace. Such Trust Funds may be particularly relevant to Partners from Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Balkans. These projects will be implemented as a matter of priority.

16.5.3. Mentoring programmes. EAPC States will develop mentoring programmes for specific terrorism-related issues in order to share specific experiences in combating terrorism. Exercises in the spirit of PfP will also be actively used for sharing experiences in combating terrorism.

APPENDIX B: EXTRACT FROM NATO'S MILITARY CONCEPT FOR DEFENSE AGAINST TERRORISM

MILITARY OPERATIONS

Counter Terrorism – General

Counterterrorism is offensive military action designed to reduce terrorists' capabilities. Allied nations agree that terrorists should not be allowed to base, train, plan, stage and execute terrorist actions and that the threat may be severe enough to justify acting against these terrorists and those who harbor them, as and where required, as decided by the North Atlantic Council. Counter terrorist operations will be mainly joint operations and some units specifically trained in Counter Terrorist operations might be extremely effective. Furthermore, winning the trust of the local population through Psychological Operations and Information Operations is vital. The Concept addresses two broad roles for NATO's involvement in Counter Terrorist operations:

- NATO in the Lead
- NATO in support

Counter terrorism – NATO in the lead

The Concept states that in order to carry out successful Counter Terrorism operations, NATO must have adequate Command and Control and intelligence structures, as well as forces trained, exercised and maintained at the appropriate readiness levels. While the capabilities needed to successfully execute Counter Terrorist operations are largely a subset of those needed to carry out more traditional joint operations, the manner in which the conflict will be fought will be different. Therefore the following planning aspects need special attention:

- Procedures and capabilities that support accelerated decision cycles, in order to be
successful in detecting and attacking time-sensitive targets in the Counter Terrorist environment.

- Access to flexible and capable Joint-Fires, ranging from precision-guided stand-off weapons to direct conventional fires.
- The need for more specialized anti-terrorist forces.

**APPENDIX C: EXTRACT FROM THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY**

**Article 5**
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

**Article 6**
For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

- on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
- on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

**WORKS CITED**


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