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BETWEEN TWO FIRES:
THE ORIGINS OF SETTLER COLONIALISM IN THE UNITED STATES AND FRENCH
ALGERIA

By

Ashley Sanders

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
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ABSTRACT

BETWEEN TWO FIRES: THE ORIGINS OF SETTLER COLONIALISM IN THE UNITED STATES AND FRENCH ALGERIA

By

Ashley Sanders

This dissertation is a comparative study of the establishment of settler colonies in the American Midwest (1778-1795) and French colonial Algeria (1830-1848). It examines how interactions between the Indigenous populations, colonists, colonial administrators, the military, and the métropole shaped their development and advances the theory of settler colonialism. This study centers on the first fifteen to twenty years of conquest/occupation in the American Midwest, focusing specifically on southern Illinois and Indiana, and the province of Constantine, Algeria. Despite differences in geography, relative size of the military presence and Indigenous demographics, the process of establishing settler colonies in both locations followed similar trajectories. The study analyzes the founding moment of initial military occupation in Indiana/Illinois in 1778 and Constantine in 1836-1837 as well as subsequent land policies, settlement, and Indigenous resistance movements.

I argue that settler colonies in the American Midwest and Algeria resulted from a bottom-up process in which settler desires for land and greater economic opportunities compelled them to migrate (or emigrate) and stake their claim to these territories. This movement then served as a catalyst for initially makeshift colonial policies that only became systematized over time. The relationship between settlers and the Indigenous populations in both locations, as well as administrators' responses to prevailing circumstances on the ground shaped the establishment of stable settler governments.

This research broadens our conceptions of American history and deepens our understanding of the processes by which settler colonies formed and “worked.” Settler colonialism’s legacy continues to influence geopolitics, national policy decisions, and people’s daily lives. Hence, the formation and eventual structures of settler colonies help researchers explain the founding of many contemporary societies and, taken together, recast empire, settler roles, and Indigenous actions within colonial contexts.

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willingness to talk through challenging research quandaries. An additional fellowship from NCAIS enabled me to complete essential research at the Ohio Valley-Great Lakes Ethnohistory Archive in Bloomington, Indiana. Dr. Bill Monaghan, Dr. April Sievert, Wayne Huxtable, and the staff at the Glenn Black Laboratory were incredibly helpful and provided me access to the archive even when it was sparsely staffed due to winter and summer absences. I am also indebted to Jill Larson for her generosity with her time and resources at the University of Vincennes' Lewis Historical Library. Additionally, this project would have been incomplete without the treasure trove of sources in the French colonial archives at the Centre des Archives d'Outre-Mer in Aix-en-Provence, the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, and Chateau de Vincennes.

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KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS

<i>AHR</i>	<i>American Historical Review</i>
CAOM	Centre des Archives d'outre-mer, Aix-en-Provence
GPO	Government Printing Office
<i>IHC</i>	<i>Illinois Historical Collections</i>
<i>JCC</i>	<i>Journals of Continental Congress</i>
<i>MPHC</i>	<i>Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections</i>
OVLGEA	Ohio Valley-Great Lakes Ethnohistory Archives, Bloomington, IN
<i>SCP</i>	<i>St. Clair Papers</i>
SHD	Service Historique de la Défense, Vincennes
<i>TEFA</i>	<i>Tableau de la situation des établissements français dans l'Algérie</i>
<i>WHC</i>	<i>Wisconsin Historical Collections</i>

Introduction: Striking Comparisons

On arrival in America, the Europeans found a territory of immense expanse, inhabited by a population, which by comparison, was insignificant. Understanding the advantages of colonization, of civilization, they were able, without great injustice, to repel the hunters who were before them in the vast forests that covered a part of the country, forests in which these people were able to continue to live by hunting as they had in the past.

It is not the same in Algeria, where the Europeans found a limited territory, inhabited by a population of 2,500,000 inhabitants of a proud, energetic, [and] militant race, who in every case had the enjoyment of all of the country's land, and who, moreover were supported more or less directly by the Muslim country which neighbored it. ...

I regret that M. Michel Chevalier, who reported to us very interesting documents from the United States, has not I believe been obliged to visit our colony. I think that if he had traveled not only the cities in the Littoral, but the agricultural centers of the interior, he would have had better impressions of the state of the country. I believe it to be true to say that these centers, with the exception of a very small number, which were established principally in less-viable and unfavorable conditions, are in a satisfactory state. The occasional hardships through three years of drought and from diverse scourges are today in

*great part repaired and the villages are in a state of prosperity equal at least to that of the villages of France.*¹

Patrice de MacMahon – royalist, Commander of the Foreign Legion, proud Governor-General of the French Algeria he had helped to conquer, future Prime Minister and President of the French Third Republic – could hardly leave unanswered the unfavorable comparisons between America and Algeria published in the parliamentary journals by the well-known statesman, engineer, and traveler, Michel Chevalier. Using immigration, Indigenous policy, and industrialization as evaluative criteria, Chevalier found Algeria sadly lacking.² MacMahon's rebuttal, which he sent from Algeria to be read before the French Senate in 1870, maintained that, given the immense and hostile Indigenous population the French faced in Algeria, their colonization project was proceeding well by 1870.

Governor-General MacMahon presents prevailing nineteenth-century European conceptualizations of the colonization and development of North America and the United States. His address exemplifies common perceptions of North America as a “virgin territory,” Native Americans as hunter-gatherers who simply melted into the woods before the American advancement west.³ Most importantly, it reveals the belief that the obstacles Americans faced

¹ Patrice de MacMahon, duc de Magenta, “Discours au Sénat du duc de Magenta sur une pétition relative à la constitution de l'Algérie” (Paris, 1870), pp. 4-5. Centre des Archives d'outre-mer, Aix-en-Provence, France. File: F/ 80/ 1681. Author's translation.

² Moncure Robinson, “Obituary Notice of Michel Chevalier,” *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 19, no. 107 (1880): 28-37.

³ For more on the origins of European representations of Native Americans and the colonization of North America, see: D. K. Fieldhouse, *The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson Universal History 29 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966); James P. Ronda, “The European Indian: Jesuit Civilization Planning in New France,” *Church History* 41, no. 3 (September 1972): 385–95, doi:10.2307/3164223; Robert F. Berkhofer, *The White Man's Indian: Images of the American Indian, from Columbus to the Present*, 1st Vintage Books ed (New York: Vintage Books, 1979); James Axtell, *The Invasion*

and those the French confronted in Algeria were grossly different in nature. MacMahon's address was the fruit of a specific historically selective discourse regarding colonization. Consequently, the Governor-General paints the toil of two hundred years with simple brush strokes that obscure the complicated negotiations, treaties, mutual assistance, and violence that ensued between Native peoples and Euro-Americans. Portraying the retreat of Native Americans as a peaceful migration into the woods where they could “live by hunting as they had in the past” belies the numerous treaties and bloody conflicts that often preceded Native communities’ withdrawal from territory Euro-Americans sought to acquire.⁴

Within: The Contest of Cultures in Colonial North America, The Cultural Origins of North America 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Gordon M. Sayre, *Les Sauvages Américains: Representations of Native Americans in French and English Colonial Literature* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Christian F. Feest, ed., *Indians and Europe: An Interdisciplinary Collection of Essays* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999); Alan Taylor, *American Colonies*, The Penguin History of the United States (New York: Viking, 2001); Harry Liebersohn, *Aristocratic Encounters* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); John Smolenski and Thomas J. Humphrey, eds., *New World Orders: Violence, Sanction, and Authority in the Colonial Americas*, Early American Studies (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005); Peter C Mancall and James Hart Merrell, eds., *American Encounters: Natives and Newcomers from European Contact to Indian Removal, 1500-1850*, 2nd ed (New York: Routledge, 2007); Michael Gaudio, *Engraving the Savage the New World and Techniques of Civilization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008).

⁴ Note on Word Choice: While recognizing that the following term did not come into use until the twentieth century, to simplify semantics, I will use “Algerian” to refer to the totality of people who inhabited the region at the time of conquest, which included Jews, Arabs, Berbers (especially Kabyles), “Moors,” (or Andalusian descendents), Turks, and Koulouglis (children of Ottoman fathers and local mothers), as well as a few Europeans. Facing a similar problem of complexity in North America, I will refer to the Indigenous peoples as “American Indian,” “Native American,” by tribal affiliation when known, or by their language group. The Wabash and Ohio Valleys were predominately populated with Algonquian speakers, so when referring to collective groups, I will occasionally use this identifier (see Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815* (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1991 for an example of this convention). I recognize how fraught the terms “Native” and “Indian” are in African studies and Native American studies, respectively. In this dissertation, I looked to the existing and recent historiography as well as Indigenous self-identification to guide my word choice as much as possible. “Native” does not carry the same weight in Native American studies, where it is a term of respect, as it does in African studies, where the term carries heavier colonial baggage. I use “Native” and

My study proposes another reading of the American and French-Algerian colonial events. By adopting a diachronic comparison, I expose the complex relations between settlers, Native communities, and metropolitan officials by using the Wabash River Valley between 1776 and 1795 and Algeria between 1830 and 1848 as case studies.⁵ This comparison not only debunks MacMahon's specious depictions of American colonization, but it examines how Indigenous, settler, metropolitan, and military leaders shaped the formation of settler colonies in the American Northwest Territory and French Algeria.

This dissertation will examine the factors that motivated the establishment of settler colonies, as well as the structures built to sustain both colonies in the American Wabash Valley and Algeria. It seeks to understand the processes by which these two settler colonies developed through an analysis of the relationships between the *métropole*, settlers, colonial administrators/military, and indigenous populations in order to deepen our understanding of why and how these types of colonies came into existence and how relationships among diverse populations and interests shaped the formation of settler governments. It seeks to answer the following questions: What forces, people, and decisions drove settler colonialism in these two locations? How did the relationships between the *métropole*, settlers, colonial administrators, and the Indigenous populations shape settler colonial government?⁶ What factors in these relationships had the greatest effect on the formation of the colonies?

"Indigenous" interchangeably to distinguish between the people already residing in Algeria and the Wabash and Ohio Valleys prior to conquest and the arrival of colonizing forces. The capitalization of "Indigenous" and "Native" follows conventions in Native American studies.

⁵ The Wabash River Valley comprises territory in present-day southern Illinois and Indiana.

⁶ I use the term *métropole* to refer to the seat of colonial administration in the "mother country." In the United States, the location of the capital changed 14 times between 1776 and 1795. Regardless of its specific physical location, the *métropole* was always distant from the colonies, creating a lengthy communication delay in the early stages of settler colonial development in both the American and French-Algerian contexts. This distance allowed military commanders,

Literature Review

Nineteenth-century French statesmen, such as Gouverneur Général Patrice de MacMahon and Monsieur Michel Chevalier, used the United States as a benchmark in their analysis of Indigenous relations and the rate of colonization in Algeria. However, scholars have not yet followed in their footsteps. This study follows the logic of French statesmen and argues that the United States became an important model for modern settler colonialism and Indigenous policy. Likewise, Algeria has long been considered a model of European settler colonialism, but the

colonial officials, and settlers on the ground to make decisions based on local knowledge and exigencies that would ultimately shape the form of colonial governance and relations with the Indigenous population at least as much as, if not more, than those of the metropolitan administrators. My definition of the *métropole* in the context of settler colonies is grounded in historical and theoretical colonial and settler colonial studies, including Jack P. Greene, *Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Politics of the British Empire and the United States, 1607-1788*, Richard B. Russell Lectures, no. 2 (New York: Norton, 1990); Christine Daniels and Michael V. Kennedy, eds., *Negotiated Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the Americas, 1500-1820* (New York: Routledge, 2002); Eric Hinderaker and Peter C. Mancall, *At the Edge of Empire: The Backcountry in British North America*, Regional Perspectives on Early America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); David Prochaska, *Making Algeria French: Colonialism in Bône, 1870-1920* (Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Daniel R. Headrick, *The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century*, 3rd Printing (Oxford University Press, USA, 1981); Ann Laura Stoler, "Rethinking Colonial Categories: European Communities and the Boundaries of Rule," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 31, no. 1 (January 1, 1989): 134–61; Gwendolyn Wright, *The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Jürgen Osterhammel, *Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview* (Princeton: M. Wiener, 1997); Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, eds., *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Anne McClintock, Aamir Mufti, and Ella Shohat, eds., *Dangerous Liaisons: Gender, Nation, and Postcolonial Perspectives* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); Julia Ann Clancy-Smith and Frances Gouda, eds., *Domesticating the Empire: Race, Gender, and Family Life in French and Dutch Colonialism* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1998); Ann Laura Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Catherine Hall, *Civilising Subjects: Colony and Metropole in the English Imagination, 1830-1867* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Lorenzo Veracini, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Lisa Ford, *Settler Sovereignty: Jurisdiction and Indigenous People in America and Australia, 1788-1836*, Harvard Historical Studies 166 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

process of its formation has left important questions unanswered. Furthermore, previous studies of settler colonial governance have focused almost exclusively on the actions of administrators, whereas my study reveals the ways in which military commanders, settler and Indigenous populations also shaped the colony and its governance. My research, then, contributes to settler colonial theory by exposing the processes by which settler colonies were formed and “worked,” and it does so from the perspective of an Indigenous Studies historian.

As a field, colonial studies has shifted away from political histories and studies that focus on process in favor of cultural- and linguistic-studies approaches, however, we need more nuanced studies of the former that take into account the voices and actors revealed by the latter.⁷ In other words, we need political histories of colonization and colonialism that considers a broader range of actors who experienced and shaped policy creation and implementation, including local administrators, Indigenous peoples, and settlers, in addition to governmental officials. Several recent works have demonstrated that this is possible and that there is growing interest in the marriage of these two approaches.

Over the past three decades of scholarship, the characterization of modern European colonial project has been strongly influenced by larger historiographical trends, particularly perspectives emerging from postcolonial and gender studies. Some have described the essence of colonization as exploitation – of land, labor, and the extraction of commodities – while others

⁷ “The ‘new’ imperial history pits itself as a revision of the ‘old imperial history, and focuses on culture, gender, and race rather than high politics, the economy, or military expansion.” Durba Ghosh, “Another Set of Imperial Turns?” *American Historical Review* 117, no. 3 (June 2012), 772. Frederick Cooper, in *Colonialism in Question* also points to the shift in focus from processes of colonization to “stance” or positionality. Cooper also observes, “To a significant extent, the former focus on the political structure of the colonial state and the economics of empires has more recently taken a backseat to an emphasis on cultural conceptions of politics.” (Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005], 50.)

have focused on the perception of colonies as exotic lands in which European sexual norms may be transgressed and in which business practices that became untenable in the nineteenth century could be employed for maximum profit.⁸ Still other scholars have characterized the colonies as “laboratories of modernity,” or as Europe’s Other by which it refined its own self-definition.⁹ However, as Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper note, these views and representations of European colonial projects obscure the messy and complex realities of relations on the ground.¹⁰ In an effort to unpack some of those dense social systems, historians and anthropologists have focused on the impact of conquest and colonization on Indigenous communities, as well as their responses to both.¹¹ The work of Frantz Fanon, Albert Memmi, and the Southeast Asian scholars

⁸ Headrick, *The Tools of Empire*; Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt* (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Prochaska, *Making Algeria French*; Allan Christelow, *Muslim Law Courts and the French Colonial State in Algeria* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985); Malek Alloula, *The Colonial Harem* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986); Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power*.

⁹ Wright, *The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism*; Edward W Said, *Orientalism*, Reprinted with a new Afterword (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1995); Sara Mills, *Discourses of Difference: An Analysis of Women’s Travel Writing and Colonialism* (London: Routledge, 1991); Lisa Lowe, *Critical Terrains: French and British Orientalisms* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (London: Routledge, 1992); Clare Midgley, ed., *Gender and Imperialism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998).

¹⁰ Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, “Between Métropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda,” in Cooper and Stoler, *Tensions of Empire*, 4–5.

¹¹ Ranajit Guha, ed., *A Subaltern Studies Reader, 1986-1995* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); *Can the Subaltern Speak?: Reflections on the History of an Idea* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); Jodi Byrd and Michael Rothberg, “Between Subalternity and Indigeneity,” *Interventions* 13, no. 1 (March 2011): 1–12, doi:10.1080/1369801X.2011.545574; Jodi A Byrd, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism*, First Peoples : New Directions Indigenous (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011); Julia Ann Clancy-Smith, *Rebel and Saint Muslim Notables, Populist Protest, Colonial Encounters (Algeria and Tunisia, 1800-1904)*, Comparative Studies on Muslim Societies 18 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Cheikh Anta Mbacké Babou, *Fighting the Greater Jihad: Amadu Bamba and the Founding of the Muridiyya of Senegal, 1853-1913*, New African Histories Series (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007); Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815*, Cambridge Studies in North American Indian History (New York: Cambridge University Press,

who launched Subaltern Studies initiated “postcolonial” critiques that seek to de-center Europe in the narrative, focusing instead on the experiences, voices, actions, and agency of Indigenous populations.¹² In a similar way, since the inauguration of “New Indian History” in the 1970s, scholars of Native American history have sought to topple the previous narrative of American history that portrayed their removal and their perceived disappearance as inevitable and necessary to make way for American “progress.” More recent Native American Studies scholarship undermines early American myths and representations of diverse Native communities as undifferentiated, violent populations in need of civilizing and contests the assumption that only Euro-Americans made American history.¹³

1991); Susan Sleeper-Smith, *Indian Women and French Men: Rethinking Cultural Encounter in the Western Great Lakes*, Native Americans of the Northeast (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001); John W. Hall, *Uncommon Defense: Indian Allies in the Black Hawk War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); Adam Joseph Jortner, *The Gods of Prophetstown: The Battle of Tippecanoe and the Holy War for the American Frontier* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

¹² Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, Princeton Studies in Culture/power/history (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*, Princeton Studies in Culture/power/history (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1963); Albert Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized*, Expanded ed (Boston: Beacon Press, 1991); Guha, *A Subaltern Studies Reader, 1986-1995*.

¹³ The second wave of New Indian History began with James Merrell’s *The Indians’ New World: Catawbas and their Neighbors From European Contact Through the Era of Removal* (1989), which recognized the “new world” that Indians faced after European arrival and examined encounter from the “bottom-up,” as historians recognized the significance of local relations and the actions of people other than chiefs and colonial officials. This study, together with Richard White’s 1991 *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815* and Daniel Usner’s 1992 *Indians, Settlers, and Slaves in a Frontier Exchange Economy: The Lower Mississippi Valley Before 1783* also pioneered regional analyses that complicated and challenged the dominant narrative of British colonial history and acknowledged and examined Indians’ essential role in shaping the history of these regions. Additionally, White and Usner’s studies refocused historians’ attention west of the Appalachian Mountains to the Great Lakes, Louisiana, and the Western borderlands. More recently, Kathleen DuVal’s *The Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent* (2006), Brian Delay’s *War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian raids and the U.S.-Mexican War* (2008), David J. Silverman’s

Only within the past decade have scholars begun the difficult task of understanding the diversity of populations once viewed as cohesive and analyzing their distinct positions, ideologies, and actions. Some historians, such as James Searing, interrogate how the various Indigenous communities residing in colonized territories related to one another as well as to the colonial government.¹⁴ Still, more work needs to be done on this front, as one people group or another – settlers, Natives, metropolitan administrators, or colonial/military officials – is generally portrayed as monolithic and undifferentiated.

In studies of the modern French Empire, scholars have examined Indigenous political, social, and cultural histories in relation to French actions and actors in the colonies. Several historians have also begun to compare different colonies within the French Empire and examine phenomena in both France and its colonies.¹⁵ Decolonization and memory have increasingly become the focus of recent studies such that nearly one of every two studies on French Algeria

Red Brethren: The Brothertown and Stockbridge Indians and the Problem of Race in Early America (2010), and Michael Witgen's *An Infinity of Nations* (2011) analyze Native American history to challenge the misapplication of models and have developed new frameworks with which to understand Euroamerican-Indian encounter. In so doing, they are rewriting important aspects of the American historical narrative. For more on this historiography, see: Robert F. Berkhofer, "The Political Context of a New Indian History," *Pacific Historical Review* 40, no. 3 (1971): 357–82; Colin G. Calloway and Gregory Evans Dowd, "American Indians: Resistance or Accommodation?," in *Interpretations of American History: Patterns and Perspectives*, ed. Francis G. Couvares et al., 7th ed, vol. 1, 2 vols. (New York: Free Press, 2000), 61–99; Ned Blackhawk, "American Indians and the Study of U.S. History," in *American History Now*, ed. Eric Foner and Lisa McGirr, Critical Perspectives on the Past (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2011), 376–99.

¹⁴ James F. Searing, *"God Alone Is King": Islam and Emancipation in Senegal :the Wolof Kingdoms of Kajour and Bawol, 1859-1914*, Social History of Africa (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2002).

¹⁵ Eric Thomas Jennings, *Vichy in the Tropics: Pétain's National Revolution in Madagascar, Guadeloupe, and Indochina, 1940-1944* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001); J. P. Daughton, *An Empire Divided Religion, Republicanism, and the Making of French Colonialism, 1880-1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

examines some aspect of Algerian War for Independence (1954-1962).¹⁶ A few scholars, like Benjamin Brower in his recent study *A Desert Named Peace*, continue to confront the violence of conquest that France would sooner forget.¹⁷ Nabila Oulebsir's *Les usages du Patrimoine en Algérie* also includes the period before 1871 in her study of buildings, monuments, and art, as part of the national project to construct a French Algerian past, identity, and heritage. However, their studies are unusual in considering the period prior to 1871 in Algerian history. Less than eight percent of recent studies do so, and of those, most examine the history of French medicine in Algeria.¹⁸

In a similar way, a number of Americanists are pushing the United States to come to terms with its own history of violence and the colonization of Native Americans by recognizing it in the national narrative.¹⁹ In some ways, however, it is easier to discuss such issues in the

¹⁶ Alice Conklin made this observation in her review essay, "Histories of Colonialism: Recent Studies of Modern French Empire," *French Historical Studies* 30, no. 2 (Spring 2007), and the statistics come from my own examination of books, articles, and theses written on studies of French colonial Algeria over the past decade.

¹⁷ Benjamin Claude Brower, *A Desert Named Peace: The Violence of France's Empire in the Algerian Sahara, 1844-1902*, History and Society of the Modern Middle East (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). See also [French Loi 2005-158, 23 February 2005](http://www.admi.net/jo/20050224/DEFX0300218L.html) that mandated that the history of French colonialism be portrayed in a positive light in lycées (Available: <http://www.admi.net/jo/20050224/DEFX0300218L.html>) Some of the most offensive parts of it were later repealed by Jacques Chirac in 2006, but it illustrates France's inability to come to terms with its colonial past.

¹⁸ These figures are based on a review of "Recent Books and Dissertations on French History" in the journal *French Historical Studies* between 2000 and 2013.

¹⁹ Richard Slotkin, *Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600-1860*, 1st ed. (Middletown, Conn: Wesleyan University Press, 1973); Andrea Smith, *Conquest: Sexual Violence and American Indian Genocide* (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2005); Ned Blackhawk, *Violence Over the Land: Indians and Empires in the Early American West* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Robert M. Owens, *Mr. Jefferson's Hammer: William Henry Harrison and the Origins of American Indian Policy* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007); Barbara Alice Mann, *George Washington's War on Native America* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008); Margaret D. Jacobs, *White Mother to a Dark Race: Settler Colonialism, Maternalism, and the Removal of Indigenous Children in the American West and Australia, 1880-1940* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009);

United States because of the perceived distance between its violence against American Indians and because it never faced a war that brought about Native American decolonization. On the other hand, this last fact makes it imperative to confront this past and observe the ways in which it is also American and American Indians' present. Thus, decolonizing methodologies are essential to studies of United States history.²⁰

The field of comparative colonial studies has followed a similar historiographical course as the broader history of colonization. However, several significant themes have emerged in the last decade, following more traditional works of comparative political history, such as D. K. Fieldhouse's foundational work, *The Colonial Empires; A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century* (1966), comparative compilations of essays, such as Daniel Headrick's *The Tools of Empire*, as well as edited volumes that consider more recent approaches to colonial studies, such as Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler's *Tensions of Empire*.²¹ Fruitful comparative colonial studies have used gender and race as analytical lenses, often linking the two to demonstrate how issues of gender, sexuality, child rearing, and race were central to imperial policies of exclusion and the maintenance of social hierarchies necessary for the preservation of colonies.²² These studies also examine the ways in which imperial power was

Stephen J Rockwell, *Indian Affairs and the Administrative State in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

²⁰ Byrd, *The Transit of Empire*; Linda Tuhiwai Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples* (Dunedin, N.Z.: University of Otago Press, 1999); Devon A. Mihesuah, *Indigenous American Women: Decolonization, Empowerment, Activism*, Contemporary Indigenous Issues (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003).

²¹ Fieldhouse, *The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century*; Headrick, *The Tools of Empire*; Phillip Darby, *Three Faces of Imperialism: British and American Approaches to Asia and Africa, 1870-1970* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987); Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments*; Cooper and Stoler, *Tensions of Empire*; Robert Gregg, *Inside Out, Outside in: Essays in Comparative History* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000).

²² The categories of race and gender are often linked in studies of colonialism. For several examples in a large and growing body of literature, see: Lowe, *Critical Terrains*; Nupur

inscribed on bodies through regulations of sexuality, family life, and the enforcement of laws and punishment.²³

More recently two additional significant trends may be observed. First, increasing numbers of scholars have become interested once again in “big” history but now seek to address the marginalization of actors previously overlooked in top-down analyses of imperial regimes.²⁴

Other studies have examined crime, law, and issues of sovereignty and jurisdiction to interrogate structures of inequality, the creation of institutions through which colonial powers attempted to legitimize their rule, and, most recently, to examine the ways in which Indigenous populations

Chaudhuri and Margaret Strobel, eds., *Western Women and Imperialism: Complicity and Resistance* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992); Robert Young, *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture, and Race* (New York: Routledge, 1995); McClintock, Mufti, and Shohat, *Dangerous Liaisons*; Clancy-Smith and Gouda, *Domesticating the Empire*; Midgley, *Gender and Imperialism*; Antoinette Burton, “Thinking beyond the Boundaries: Empire, Feminism and the Domains of History,” *Social History* 26 (January 2001): 60–71, doi:10.1080/03071020010004417; Philippa Levine, *Prostitution, Race, and Politics: Policing Venereal Disease in the British Empire* (New York: Routledge, 2003); Sue Peabody and Tyler Edward Stovall, eds., *The Color of Liberty: Histories of Race in France* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2003); Tony Ballantyne, *Orientalism and Race: Aryanism in the British Empire*, Cambridge Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies Series (New York: Palgrave, 2002); Ann Laura Stoler, ed., *Haunted by Empire: Geographies of Intimacy in North American History*, American Encounters/Global Interactions (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); Radhika Mohanram, *Imperial White: Race, Diaspora, and the British Empire* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007).

²³ Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette M Burton, eds., *Bodies in Contact: Rethinking Colonial Encounters in World History* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); *Discipline and the Other Body: Correction, Corporeality, Colonialism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006).

²⁴ Anthony Pagden, *Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France C. 1500-C. 1800* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); Bouda Etemad, *Possessing the World: Taking the Measurements of Colonisation from the Eighteenth to the Twentieth Century*, European Expansion and Global Interaction, v. 6 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007); Jane Burbank, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); John Darwin, *After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire since 1405* (London ; New York: Allen Lane, 2007); John H. Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).

shaped the policies that could be enacted.²⁵ While these studies have added greatly to our knowledge of the formation and practice of colonial law and the establishment of both sovereignty and jurisdiction, none of them have examined the political structures of colonial administration through the lenses provided by postcolonial critiques. The utility of this approach is best demonstrated in Lisa Ford's analysis of how Native people in both New South Wales and the American state of Georgia were able to establish the boundaries and terms on which colonial legislation could be formed and executed in the colonies through the early decades of the nineteenth century.

Some scholars resist considering the United States in an imperial framework. They argue that the label of empire "obfuscates more than it explains," because it "asserts a core American similarity with historical empires that overrides too many fundamental differences." However, comparative studies of United States' colonialism, such as Lisa Ford's *Settler Sovereignty*, are appearing with increasing frequency, greater analytical depth, and have begun to provide meaningful and substantive critiques of exceptionalist portrayals of American history and imperialism.²⁶ Two forms of revisionist history have attempted this before with regard to American imperialism but have not been able to fully escape allusions to American exceptionalism. The first revisionist histories proclaimed that American imperialism was different from the modalities of modern European empires because of its "liberal and benign

²⁵ Christelow, *Muslim Law Courts and the French Colonial State in Algeria*; Barry S. Godfrey and Graeme Dunstall, eds., *Crime and Empire, 1840-1940: Criminal Justice in Local and Global Context* (Cullompton: Willan Pub, 2005); Lauren A. Benton, *Law and Colonial Cultures Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-1900*, Studies in Comparative World History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Stuart Banner, *How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005); Ford, *Settler Sovereignty*.

²⁶ Quote from Jeremi Suri, "The Limits of American Empire," in *Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State*, ed. Alfred W. McCoy and Francisco A. Scarano (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 524; Ford, *Settler Sovereignty*.

character.” Unlike European powers that ruled their colonies with an iron fist, scholars maintained that the objective of American imperialism was the altruistic promotion of freedom and democracy.²⁷ The second form of revisionist history considered American imperialism to be just as harmful to Native populations as European imperialism, but argued that American imperialism was less focused on territoriality than other empires and more informal in its use of power.²⁸ Scholars in this second stream of revisionist history ground their work in Tocqueville’s perceptions of the United States and its “unique” social system, which was not, according to Tocqueville, founded on a caste system with a special ruling class.²⁹ They, then, extend this perspective to explain the forms and objectives of American power in the world. Despite placing the United States in a comparative perspective, both of these trends perpetuate the idea that the nature and aims of American imperialism were and are unique. Native historians and anthropologists’ work, most of which is not comparative, seeks to address these problematic depictions.³⁰ Others, like Lisa Ford and Margaret Jacobs use settler colonialism as a framework

²⁷ Julian Go, *Patterns of Empire: The British and American Empires, 1688 to the Present* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 16; Lila Abu-Lughod, “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its Others,” *American Anthropologist* 104, no. 3 (September 2002): 783–90.

²⁸ Go, *Patterns of Empire*, 17; Anthony Pagden, “Imperialism, Liberalism, & the Quest for Perpetual Peace,” *Daedalus* 134, no. 2 (2005): 46–57. See also, Bernard Porter, *Empire and Superempire: Britain, America and the World* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006).

²⁹ Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, ed. Henry Reeve (Union, NJ: Lawbook Exchange, 2003).

³⁰ This is an enormous body of literature. For a sample, see Jean M O’Brien, *Dispossession by Degrees: Indian Land and Identity in Natick, Massachusetts, 1650-1790*, Cambridge Studies in North American Indian History (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Blackhawk, *Violence Over the Land*; Pekka Hämäläinen and William P. Clements Center for Southwest Studies, *The Comanche Empire*, The Lamar Series in Western History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); Audra Simpson, “Captivating Eunice: Membership, Colonialism, and Gendered Citizenships of Grief,” *Wicazo Sa Review* 24, no. 2 (2009): 105–29, doi:10.1353/wic.0.0031; Scott Lauria Morgensen, *Spaces Between Us: Queer Settler Colonialism and Indigenous Decolonization*, First Peoples : New Directions in Indigenous Studies (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011).

for comparative studies of the United States in an effort to demonstrate which local factors contributed to the different forms of American imperialism. Just as importantly, examinations of the United States as a settler colony reveal how similar American imperial power structures and institutions were to others.³¹

Despite the growth of this field of inquiry, however, most studies spend little, if any, time analyzing the initial formation of the United States' empire in a comparative perspective, instead choosing to focus on the mid-to late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries.³² Studies of early United States' imperial land and Native policies have been examined in isolation, without reference to the formation of other empires. The lack of transnational and trans-imperial context makes it difficult to determine what was truly unique about the United States case and what it held in common with the experiences of other imperial powers in the establishment of colonial policies and structures.³³ Paul Kramer explains that using a framework, such as settler colonialism, makes comparison both possible and fruitful:

³¹ Ford, *Settler Sovereignty*; Jacobs, *White Mother to a Dark Race*; Aziz Rana, *The Two Faces of American Freedom* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

³² Tony Smith, *The Pattern of Imperialism: The United States, Great Britain, and the Late-Industrializing World since 1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Darby, *Three Faces of Imperialism*; Go, *Patterns of Empire*; Porter, *Empire and Superempire*; Patrick Karl O'Brien and Armand Cleese, eds., *Two Hegemonies: Britain 1846-1914 and the United States 1941-2001* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002); Paul A. Kramer, "Power and Connection: Imperial Histories of the United States in the World," *AHR* 116, no. 5 (December 2011): 1348–91, doi:10.1086/ahr.116.5.1348.

³³ Israel Ward Andrews, "The Beginnings of the Colonial System of the United States," in *Ohio Archæological and Historical Quarterly*, vol. 1 (Columbus: Lutheran Book Concern for The Ohio State Archæological and Historical Society, 1893), 1–9; Jay Gitlin, Barbara Berglund, and Adam Arenson, eds., *Frontier Cities: Encounters at the Crossroads of Empire* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012); Craig Yirush, *Settlers, Liberty, and Empire: The Roots of Early American Political Theory, 1675-1775* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Tim Alan Garrison, *The Legal Ideology of Removal: The Southern Judiciary and the Sovereignty of Native American Nations* (Athens, Ga: University of Georgia Press, 2009); Frederick Hoxie, "Retrieving the Red Continent: Settler Colonialism and the History of American Indians in the

Understanding the U. S. West as the setting for a particular (that is, a unique but unexceptional) instance of settler colonialism raises comparative questions that were not easy to ask about Turner's frontier ... Placed in this context, the U. S. West appears as a variation on a global theme, alongside Australia, Argentina, and Algeria.³⁴

Such an approach allows us to understand the nature of the early United States government, the ability or inability to exercise its power, and to question the national narrative at an intellectual distance that is difficult to obtain without engaging in a comparative study.

Like the United States, Algeria has also received some attention in comparative studies; however, sustained comparisons between French Algeria and other colonies have not been undertaken. Existing comparative studies have not yet examined French Algeria within the framework of settler colonialism.³⁵ However, the number of references to it in larger studies, such as Lorenzo Veracini's *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview*, Aziz Rana's *The Two Faces of American Freedom*, and contributions to edited studies of colonialism, such as Lynette Russell's *Colonial Frontiers: Indigenous-European Encounters in Settler Societies*, suggest that

US," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 31, no. 6 (2008): 1153–67; Banner, *How the Indians Lost Their Land*.

³⁴ Kramer, "Power and Connection," 1361.

³⁵ John Damis, "The Free-School Phenomenon: The Cases of Tunisia and Algeria," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 5, no. 4 (1974): 434–49; Allan Christelow, "The Muslim Judge and Municipal Politics in Colonial Algeria and Senegal," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 24, no. 1 (January 1, 1982): 3–24; Steven A. Cook, *Ruling but Not Governing the Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007); Mohanalakshmi. Rajakumar, *Haram in the Harem: Domestic Narratives in India and Algeria*, vol. 8, Postcolonial Studies (New York: Peter Lang, 2009); Sharon Meilahn. Bartlett, *Foundering Men, Thriving Women: Gender, Politics, and the Crisis of Masculinity in Haiti and Algeria*, 2009; Patricia M. E. Lorcin, *Historicizing Colonial Nostalgia: European Women's Narratives of Algeria and Kenya 1900-Present* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

a sustained comparison would be useful in an analysis of the formation of settler colonial structures.³⁶

Scholars have formed a working definition of what settler colonialism was and is and its effects on Native populations through studies of various forms of dispossession. Certain policies and characteristics of settler colonies have been examined in detail – land policies, issues of sovereignty, jurisdiction, the role that myths played in legitimizing settler colonialism and creating a settler identity, and how metropolitan administrators sought to control both settler and indigenous populations, even in the most intimate aspects of their lives – sexual partnerships and rearing children. Nevertheless, scholars still have not explained the early phases of development: the motivating forces and actors that initiated settlement and how the power that was exerted in relationships between all four of the invested parties - officials in the ‘home’ country, civil and military administrators on the ground, Indigenous peoples and settlers – determined the form of settler government and its achievement.³⁷ Scholars of settler colonialism assert that land was the

³⁶ Daiva K. Stasiulis and Nira Yuval-Davis, eds., *Unsettling Settler Societies: Articulations of Gender, Race, Ethnicity and Class*, Sage Series on Race and Ethnic Relations, v. 11 (London: Sage, 1995), 6; Dolores Janiewski, “Gendering, Racializing & Classifying: Settler Colonialism in the United States, 1590-1990,” in *Unsettling Settler Societies: Articulations of Gender, Race, Ethnicity and Class*, ed. Daiva K. Stasiulis and Nira Yuval-Davis (London: Sage, 1995), 132–60; *Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century: Projects, Practices, Legacies* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 1–2, 44; Veracini, *Settler Colonialism*, 2010, 10, 18, 36, 56, 63, 65–69, 72, 74, 79, 87; Rana, *The Two Faces of American Freedom*, 10–11.

³⁷ Donald Denoon, *Settler Capitalism: The Dynamics of Dependent Development in the Southern Hemisphere* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983); Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis, *Unsettling Settler Societies*; Patrick Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: The Politics and Poetics of an Ethnographic Event*, Writing Past Colonialism Series (New York: Cassell, 1999); Lynette Russell, ed., *Colonial Frontiers: Indigenous-European Encounters in Settler Societies*, Studies in Imperialism (New York: Manchester University Press, 2001); *Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century*; Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 8, no. 4 (2006): 387–409; Annie E. Coombes, ed., *Rethinking Settler Colonialism: History and Memory in Australia, Canada, Aotearoa New Zealand and South Africa*, Studies in Imperialism (Manchester ; New York : New York: Manchester University Press ; Distributed exclusively in the USA by Palgrave, 2006); Veracini,

single most important factor that drew settlers and that policies focused on dispossessing the Native population, but what drove the planting of such colonies? If it was the movement of settlers to regions, was land, indeed, the motivating factor or are there other explanations?

In an examination of colonial and state founding moments, the processes and the motivations are inseparable, as Patrick Wolfe has argued for settler colonialism as a whole.³⁸ Through an analysis of the political debates in congress/parliament and settler councils, this study intends to shed light on the nature of metropolitan and settler political motivations and their effects on legislation. Was settler colonialism merely a political and/or economic expedient? The reasons for the establishment and development of the settler colony affected the types of relationships between the métropole, settlers, colonial officials and Native peoples; the types of policies formed; the role of the military; whether or not and how the métropole supported settlement; and the goals of each interested party.

Early social science studies of Algeria often consciously or unconsciously bolstered French notions of European superiority and ideas about the “scientific” differences of the “races,” thereby justifying French colonial rule. Imperial/colonial histories often ignored the presence and role of Algerians of all ethnicities in the shaping of events and focused on the exploits of elite European men during the conquest, colonization, and settlement processes.³⁹ In reaction, particularly in post-colonial Algeria, many histories have been written from an Algerian

Settler Colonialism, 2010; Kramer, “Power and Connection”; Fiona Bateman and Lionel Pilkington, eds., *Studies in Settler Colonialism: Politics, Identity and Culture* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Joshua Simon, “Review Essay: The United States as Settler Empire,” *Settler Colonial Studies* 2, no. 1 (March 19, 2012): 253–67; Ford, *Settler Sovereignty*; Jacobs, *White Mother to a Dark Race*.

³⁸ Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology*, 3.

³⁹ Julia Clancy-Smith, “Exoticism, Erasures, and Absence: The Peopling of Algiers, 1830-1900,” in *Walls of Algiers: Narratives of the City Through Text and Image*, ed. Julia Clancy-Smith, Zeynep Çelik, and Frances Terpak (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2009), 19–61.

Nationalist perspective, which also skews the narrative by dismissing the European colonial population from the nation's history.⁴⁰

The most prominent issue to be addressed, however, is the lack of an Algerian voice in the secondary literature. Sources do exist, but many are in Arabic or are not yet available to the public.⁴¹ It appears that the field is slowly moving towards such analyses, as James McDougall and Julia Clancy-Smith's works demonstrate, but there is much more work to do and many more questions to explore, especially in the period prior to 1871, to which almost no attention has been given.⁴² Similarly, little attention has been paid to the French conquest and construction of imperial institutions between 1830 and 1871 since the foundational works of Charles Ageron, Jacques Berque, and John Ruedy's recent synthesis that covers this period in a scant few chapters.⁴³ The interactions between Indigenous populations, settlers, and colonial administrators

⁴⁰ For more on past historiographical trends, see Edmund Burke III, "Theorizing the Histories of Colonialism and Nationalism in the Arab Maghrib," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 20 no. 2 (Spring 1998): 5-19 and Julia Clancy-Smith, "Twentieth Century Historians and Historiography of the Middle East: Women, Gender, and Empire," in *Middle East Historiographies: Narrating the Twentieth Century*, ed. Israel Gershoni, Amy Singer, and Y. Hakan Erdem (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2006), 72-100; and David Prochaska, *Making Algeria French: Colonialism in Bône, 1870-1920* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chapter 1.

⁴¹ Cf. Joshua Cole and Stéphane Bouquet, "À chacun son public: Politique et culture dans l'Algérie des années 1930," *Sociétés & Représentations* 38, no. 2 (2014): 21, doi:10.3917/sr.038.0021 Many of the plays that Cole and Bouquet rely upon for this study are still held in a family's private collection.

⁴² Clancy-Smith, *Rebel and Saint Muslim Notables, Populist Protest, Colonial Encounters (Algeria and Tunisia, 1800-1904)*; James McDougall, *History and the Culture of Nationalism in Algeria*, Cambridge Middle East Studies 24 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

⁴³ Jacques Berque, *French North Africa: The Maghrib between Two World Wars* (London: Faber, 1967); Jacques Berque, *Maghreb, Histoire et Sociétés*, Sociologie Nouvelle (Gembloux: Duculot, 1974); Jacques Berque, *L'intérieur Du Maghreb: XVe-XIXe Siècle*, Bibliothèque Des Histoires (Paris: Gallimard, 1978); Charles-Robert Ageron, *Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present* (London: Hurst, 1991); John Ruedy, *Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992).

on multiple levels, including military personnel have not been examined in this crucial founding era.

Studies of the American Midwest are flourishing right now, but most concentrate on the Ohio Valley and regions of Western New York and Pennsylvania. My study will shift this focus farther west to the frontier regions of Illinois and Indiana and yet not so far as Bethel Saler's recent exploration of settler colonialism in the present-day Wisconsin.⁴⁴ I chose this particular region because of the crucial role it played in the American Revolution in the western backcountry. Thus, this selection highlights the significance of this territory in the formation of the United States as an independent nation and the development of American settler colonial structures that became the pattern for future territorial acquisitions. While historians of the Early National Era of the United States have examined the role of the military, Indian agents, statesmen, legislation, and have begun to detail the roles of Native Americans, there has been little analysis of the interplay amongst all of the stakeholders.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Bethel Saler, *The Settlers' Empire: Colonialism and State Formation in America's Old Northwest*, 1st ed, Early American Studies (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015).

⁴⁵ This is a quickly growing body of literature. For some of the most significant studies in the historiography, see: Reginald Horsman, *Expansion and American Indian Policy, 1783-1812* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1967); Reginald Horsman, *The Origins of Indian Removal, 1815-1824*, Clarence M. Burton Memorial Lecture 1969 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press for the Historical Society of Michigan, 1970); Francis Paul Prucha, *The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984); White, *The Middle Ground*; Colin G. Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native American Communities*, Cambridge Studies in North American Indian History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Colin G. Calloway, *New Worlds for All: Indians, Europeans, and the Remaking of Early America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Frederick E. Hoxie, Ronald Hoffman, and Peter J. Albert, eds., *Native Americans and the Early Republic*, Perspectives on the American Revolution (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1999); Anthony F. C. Wallace, *Jefferson and the Indians: The Tragic Fate of the First Americans* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999); Stephen Warren, *The Shawnees and Their Neighbors, 1795-1870* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2005); Kathleen DuVal, *The Native*

On the other hand, more American historians are beginning to use insights from postcolonial studies to re-examine the formation of American political ideas and institutions in the Early Republican era, as well as the relationship between these developments and frontier/Indian policies.⁴⁶ However, these studies have been conducted in isolation with little reference to other colonies, settler or otherwise, and those that have analyzed Native American policy, particularly in the Jacksonian era have focused almost exclusively on the removal policies associated with the Cherokee, Creek, and Choctaw nations.⁴⁷ One notable exception to the lack of comparison is Aziz Rana's study *The Two Faces of American Freedom*, an exception that proves the rule. Rana argues that "most of the American experience is best understood as a

Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent, Early American Studies (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006); Matthew Dennis, *Seneca Possessed: Indians, Witchcraft, and Power in the Early American Republic*, Early American Studies (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010); Michael Witgen, *An Infinity of Nations: How the Native New World Shaped Early North America*, Early American Studies (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011).

⁴⁶ Andrews, "The Beginnings of the Colonial System of the United States"; Patrick Wolfe, "Corpus Nullius: The Exception of Indians and Other Aliens in US Constitutional Discourse," *Postcolonial Studies* 10, no. 2 (2007): 127–51, doi:10.1080/13688790701348540; Deborah A Rosen, *American Indians and State Law: Sovereignty, Race, and Citizenship, 1790-1880* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007); Craig Yirush, *Settlers, Liberty, and Empire*; Alfred Fabian Young, Gary B. Nash, and Ray Raphael, eds., *Revolutionary Founders: Rebels, Radicals, and Reformers in the Making of the Nation*, 1st ed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2011); Daniel P. Barr, ed., *The Boundaries Between Us: Natives and Newcomers Along the Frontiers of the Old Northwest Territory, 1750-1850* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2006).

⁴⁷ See for example, Amanda Paige, *Chickasaw Removal* (Ada: Chickasaw Press, 2010); Tim Alan Garrison, *The Legal Ideology of Removal: The Southern Judiciary and the Sovereignty of Native American Nations* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2009); Ronald Satz, *American Indian Policy in the Jacksonian Era* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2002); Anthony Wallace, *The Long, Bitter Trail: Andrew Jackson and the Indians* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993); Reginald Horsman, *The Origins of Indian Removal, 1815-1824* (East Lansing, Michigan State University Press for the Historical Society of Michigan, 1970); Francis P. Prucha, "Andrew Jackson's Indian Policy: A Reassessment," *Journal of American History* 56, no. 3 (Dec. 1969): 527-539.

constitutional and political experiment in ... settler empire.”⁴⁸ He embeds comparisons in his examination of the formation of American ideas about freedom, identity, and politics, but does not sustain the comparative framework throughout. Thus, my study will build on this insight, his use of comparative methodology, and his examination of the United States as a settler empire but will take it further through an in-depth comparative history of the formation of French Algeria and the United States settler colonial empire.

In the American academy, few scholars have examined United States history within the framework of settler colonialism. This approach has received more attention in recent years with the publication of Margaret Jacobs’ *White Mother to a Dark Race* (2009), Lisa Ford’s *Settler Sovereignty* (2010), and Aziz Rana’s *The Two Faces of American Freedom* (2010).⁴⁹ These scholars explore the policies that grew out of settler colonization in areas that had already achieved statehood. Jacobs shows that settler colonialism was about more than taking land and that in the post-borderlands stage of colonization, the settler state had a vested interest in the structural reordering of Indigenous societies. Both the United States and Australia attempted imposed social changes among Indigenous peoples through policies that focused on women and children and made room for white women in the colonizing project in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Ford, on the other hand, focuses on how the United States and Australian governments redefined sovereignty from the late eighteenth through mid-nineteenth centuries. She argues that the Anglophone world sought to define sovereignty as “the ordering of indigenous people in space.”⁵⁰ Through the courts, Ford contends, Anglo states aligned sovereignty, territory, and jurisdiction together in a new way that allowed settlers to govern

⁴⁸ Rana, *The Two Faces of American Freedom*, 11.

⁴⁹ Ford, *Settler Sovereignty*; Jacobs, *White Mother to a Dark Race*; Rana, *The Two Faces of American Freedom*.

⁵⁰ Ford, *Settler Sovereignty*, 2.

indigenous people and land. Rana opposes Gordon Wood's portrayal of American exceptionalism and contends that the United States, like many other states, has succeeded because its imperial policies favor the elite, dispossess Indigenous inhabitants, profit from the expropriated land, and benefit from the labor of marginalized people, including slaves.⁵¹ However, settler colonialism also produced an ideology of freedom, self-government, and meaningful labor.⁵²

By studying the processes of settler colonial formation, I intend to uncover the nature and limits of power on multiple levels. This analysis interrogates the role that the métropole played in founding and governing settler colonies and will reveal the ways in which various actors previously ignored by political history shaped policy formation and implementation. Additionally, this study will open up new avenues for research by establishing a base on which to build. Once the stimuli and means of settlement are understood, the role of ideology and which ideologies carried the most weight should become evident. With the establishment of this foundation, the interplay between race, class, and gender can be examined in context.

⁵¹ Rana, *The Two Faces of American Freedom*, 11; For Wood's argument, see Gordon S Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969); Gordon S. Wood, "The Significance of the Early Republic," *Journal of the Early Republic* 8, no. 1 (April 1, 1988): 1–20, doi:10.2307/3123662; Gordon S. Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution*, 1st ed (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1992); for another critique of Wood's analysis, see Gary B Nash, "Also There at the Creation: Going beyond Gordon S. Wood," *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Third Series, 44, no. 3 (July 1, 1987): 602–11, doi:10.2307/1939779; Woody Holton, *Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves, and the Making of the American Revolution in Virginia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999).

⁵² For a parallel argument about slavery and its paradoxical inverse relationship with freedom, see Edmund Sears Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia*, 1st ed (New York: Norton, 1975).

Defining Settler Colonialism

The mid-nineteenth century debate between the French eyewitnesses to conquest stands as an invitation to research and study. The differences between the two men are bridged by fundamental and shared assumptions about the nature of colonial expansion in the tumultuous era through which they lived. French Algeria (1830-1848) and the American Midwest (1778-1795) were *settler colonies* where, despite significant and deep differences in method, environment, and outcome, the planting and subsequent development of colonies was shaped by the demands, experiences, and culture of the settlers themselves. Empires proudly documented their conquests; the voluminous surviving records of Indigenous populations, colonists, colonial administrators, the military, and the métropole reveal the similar paths both colonies took from conquest through the establishment of stable settler governments.⁵³ Settler colonies in the American Midwest and Algeria resulted from a bottom-up process in which settler desires for land and greater economic opportunities compelled them to migrate and stake their claim to these territories by dispossessing Indigenous communities. This movement then served as a catalyst for makeshift metropolitan policies that only became systematized and institutionalized at the end of the first decade of colonization.

In both the past and present, colonies have been loci of exploitation and experimentation that colonizers have used as points of reference in their own self-definition. Exploited for their land, labor, resources, and commodities, colonized populations also faced more personal forms of colonial imposition, particularly sexual conquest as well as the regulation of social

⁵³ My research compares the establishment of settler colonies in the territory that became Indian and Illinois (1776-1795) and French Algeria, specifically the easternmost province of Constantine (1830-1848). It is grounded in archival research conducted primarily at the Newberry Library, the Ohio Valley-Great Lakes Ethnohistory Archive, Centre des Archives d'outre-mer (CAOM), Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris, and the Château de Vincennes, France. See the Methodology section for a discussion of sources.

interactions and family formation. Issues of gender, sexuality, child-rearing, and race have been central to imperial policies of exclusion and the maintenance of social hierarchies necessary for the preservation of colonies.⁵⁴

In contrast to the exploitative nature of colonialism, metropolitan administrators have repeatedly pointed to its productive capacity in the form of “civilizing missions” or “laboratories of modernity.”⁵⁵ Through education initiatives, particularly boarding schools, colonial administrators sought to “kill the [Native] in [each student] and save the man.”⁵⁶ While colonial school administrators sought to civilize and assimilate the Indigenous population, colonial architects and urban planners experimented with novel designs to dominate and regulate the land to make it productive, progressive, and easier to govern and control.⁵⁷ In the same way,

⁵⁴ The categories of race and gender are often linked in studies of colonialism. For several examples in a large and growing body of literature, see: Lowe, *Critical Terrains*; Chaudhuri and Strobel, *Western Women and Imperialism*; Young, *Colonial Desire*; McClintock, Mufti, and Shohat, *Dangerous Liaisons*; Clancy-Smith and Gouda, *Domesticating the Empire*; Midgley, *Gender and Imperialism*; Burton, “Thinking beyond the Boundaries”; Levine, *Prostitution, Race, and Politics*; Peabody and Stovall, *The Color of Liberty*; Ballantyne, *Orientalism and Race*; Stoler, *Haunted by Empire*; Mohanram, *Imperial White: Race, Diaspora, and the British Empire*.

⁵⁵ For “civilizing missions,” see Alice L. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997); Sarah Ann Curtis, *Civilizing Habits: Women Missionaries and the Revival of French Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Joshua Schreier, *Arabs of the Jewish Faith: The Civilizing Mission in Colonial Algeria*, Jewish Cultures of the World (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2010); For “laboratories of modernity,” see Wright, *The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism*; Osama Abi-Mershed, *Apostles of Modernity: Saint-Simonians and the Civilizing Mission in Algeria* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010).

⁵⁶ Captain Richard Pratt, “The Indian Policy: The Advantages of Mingling Indians with Whites,” *Official Report of the Nineteenth Annual Conference of Charities and Correction* (1892), 46. Available: <http://quod.lib.umich.edu/n/ncosw/ACH8650.1892.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext> (1 March 2015).

⁵⁷ Cf. Wright, *The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism*; John Ruedy, *Land Policy in Colonial Algeria: The Origins of the Rural Public Domain*, vol. 10, University of California Publications. Near Eastern Studies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); Liora Bigon and Yossi Katz, eds., *Garden Cities and Colonial Planning: Transnationality and Urban Ideas in Africa and Palestine*, Studies in Imperialism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014).

metropolitan administrators tested new bureaucratic structures and forms of social, economic, and political control.⁵⁸ Notwithstanding colonial publicists' spin, colonies were formed to augment the mother country's wealth and prestige.

In addition to extending their political and commercial reach, settler colonies offered nations another advantage. They were spaces in which to offload their surplus or troublesome populations. Settler colonialism was (and is) a process in which settlers emigrate(d) with the express purposes of territorial occupation and the formation of a new community rather than the extraction of labor or resources, although these may have been or become secondary objectives.⁵⁹ Settlers believed that it was necessary to remove the Indigenous population from the land they claimed. Indeed, the elimination of Indigenous peoples itself became the organizing principle of settler colonial society and territoriality became its "irreducible element."⁶⁰

Land acquisition, as well as the wealth and opportunities it brought, were among the principal factors that motivated settlement and necessitated the interminable process of eliminating the Indigenous population and the legitimation of settler sovereignty over land and people. Both dispossession and attempts to establish legitimacy were motives and means to gain access to Native land, resources, homes, and other physical structures in order to profit from the built and rebuilt environment. Thus, capitalist impulses, in part, motivated métropoles to

⁵⁸ For more on how this process worked in various colonies, including Egypt and Algeria, see: Headrick, *The Tools of Empire*; Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*; Prochaska, *Making Algeria French*; Christelow, *Muslim Law Courts and the French Colonial State in Algeria*.

⁵⁹ Russell, *Colonial Frontiers*, 2. For examples in which extractive colonialism through mining operations was combined with settler colonization in each location, see: Lucy Murphy, *A Gathering of Rivers: Indians, Métis, and Mining in the Western Great Lakes, 1737-1832* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000); David Prochaska, *Making Algeria French*, 77-85, 98-108.

⁶⁰ Patrick Wolfe terms this compulsion to dispossess Indigènes the "logic of elimination." (Patrick Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native," *Journal of Genocide Research* 8, no. 4 [December 2006]: 388).

establish institutions to maintain, govern, defend, and exert control in settler colonies. While colonial administrators sought to secure settler political, cultural, and economic hegemony, many individual settlers simply sought a “competency” for themselves and their families.⁶¹ Many impoverished settlers arrived in the colonies, looking for a better life – either on their own farm with enough land to pass on to their children or, in Algeria, in the cities as artisans or small business owners. Unlike the dyadic relationship formed between métropole and colony in extractive colonialism, settler colonialism generated a web of relations between four key sets of actors: metropolitan officials, colonial administrators (both military and civil), Indigenous peoples, and the settlers.⁶²

Despite geographic, demographic, political, and cultural variations, settler societies share a number of characteristics. Their common objective is to establish themselves on lands appropriated from Indigenous inhabitants and create a stable, semi-autonomous government with metropolitan support. To maintain control of the colony and generate a sense of belonging, settlers also seek to establish their legitimacy and in doing so, often develop a more egalitarian society amongst themselves than is found in the métropole. This, in turn, creates the perception of a dichotomous society (“us” versus “them”), and settlers feel increasingly threatened by the Indigenous population. Finally, the struggle to set up civil settler governments requires the “pacification” and/or “removal” of the original inhabitants, thereby eliminating the justification for military governance.

⁶¹ Daniel Vickers, “Competency and Competition: Economic Culture in Early America,” *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Third Series, 47, no. 1 (January 1, 1990): 3–29, doi:10.2307/2938039.

⁶² This concept is based on Veracini’s similar argument for a “triangular” system, which included *métropole*, settlers, and Native peoples (Veracini, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview*, 6). However, I argue that the military and colonial administrators on the ground (often the same people) constituted an important fourth key set of actors in settler colonial systems.

In settler societies, colonists commonly articulate two contradictory desires – one for autonomous settler government in which they handle their own affairs as they see fit and the other for metropolitan resources and military support, especially for the purpose of managing settler-Indigenous relations and as a means of dispossessing Native people.⁶³ The United States and France developed similar solutions to the dilemma colonists posed – solutions that were unique among other mother countries with settler colonies. The American federal system incorporated colonized territories into the union as states, and France annexed Algeria to satisfy settler desires and enrich the métropole. Each granted settlers representation both locally and in metropolitan government, provided for their military defense, and revenues raised through taxation and land sales went into metropolitan coffers.

Settlers occupy the tenuous position of exogenous others who claim rights to land and sovereignty over the Indigenous populations in the colonies. They therefore need to establish their legitimacy in the eyes of those they seek to rule, in their own, and in those of the metropolitan administrators.⁶⁴ As immigrants and as colonists attempting to assert their right to autonomous government, they need to craft a new identity that (1) sets them apart from indigènes and the metropolitan population and (2) bridges differences amongst themselves based on class, ethnicity, and nationality. Consequently, settlers often attach their identity to the land itself, to the mythologized common experience of settlement, and often to the idealized shared goal of self-government.⁶⁵ In settler societies, metropolitan society and politics have often been perceived as decadent and corrupt, so settlers generally seek to distance themselves from

⁶³ Veracini, *Settler Colonialism*, 2010; Coombes, *Rethinking Settler Colonialism*, 3; Rana, *The Two Faces of American Freedom*, 8.

⁶⁴ Coombes, *Rethinking Settler Colonialism*, 8.

⁶⁵ Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis, *Unsettling Settler Societies*, 1–38; Veracini, *Settler Colonialism*, 2010, 17–22, 62, 76–83; L. Veracini, “Isopolitics, Deep Colonizing, Settler Colonialism,” *Interventions* 13, no. 2 (2011): 171–89; Rana, *The Two Faces of American Freedom*, 9–12.

metropolitan customs while at the same time using their relationship to the mother country to establish their authority.⁶⁶ In their quest for legitimacy, settlers also appropriate Indigenous symbols, a process that frequently occurs simultaneously with the promulgation of one or several myths about “vanishing” *indigènes*, *terra nullius* (barren lands), and/or assertions of manifest destiny.⁶⁷ These myths allow settlers to rationalize the appropriation of Indigenous land and symbols and to declare the legitimacy of their sovereignty. All of these discursive moves unify settlers, a necessary step toward self-government.

In most historic settler colonies, greater equality among the *colons*, or settlers, emerged than was experienced among metropolitan inhabitants.⁶⁸ Immigrants to the United States who moved west to take advantage of inexpensive frontier lands were quickly granted American citizenship rights and considered equals among their peers, especially in matters of local government. Transforming European settlers into French citizens was imperative in Algeria because the French were actually a minority of the settler population in some locations, such as colonial Bône (Annaba) in the province of Constantine.⁶⁹ Many settlers believed that their civil rights and the security of their own democratic institutions rested on the subordination of Indigenous people and required their dispossession.⁷⁰ The American settler empire, “for all its brutality ... was the servant of a unique and robust view of self-rule seen by many as crucial to

⁶⁶ Veracini, *Settler Colonialism*, 2010, 54–65.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 82; Rana, *The Two Faces of American Freedom*, 8–10; Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis, *Unsettling Settler Societies*, 11; Margaret Wetherell and Jonathan Potter, *Mapping the Language of Racism: Discourse and the Legitimation of Exploitation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 124–125; White, *The Middle Ground*, 469–517. In both locations I have chosen, these claims could not be supported but (at least in the United States) were made anyway. The Indigenous population was clearly not dying out in Algeria, and Richard White suggests that population in the American Midwest had recovered from the shocks of the late 17th and early 18th c. and was actually increasing.

⁶⁸ Rana, *The Two Faces of American Freedom*, 11.

⁶⁹ Prochaska, *Making Algeria French*, 85–92, 135–179.

⁷⁰ Rana, 3.

the fulfillment of emancipatory ambitions.”⁷¹ Republican governments and democratic principles in the métropole often went hand-in-hand with repressive settler colonial policies that targeted and excluded the Indigenous population. Settler colonialism, then, was a productive engine that promoted an ideology of freedom, self-government, and meaningful labor while at the same time suppressing the rights and liberty of the Indigenous population it sought to supersede and replace.

In settler colonial systems, métropoles and settlers also tend to share concerns about perceived and actual Indigenous threats to colonists’ safety and therefore exhibit a preoccupation with militarism. This took different forms in the American territories and French Algeria. In the American Midwest, militias were initially largely responsible for securing settlers’ safety, and the military was only sent when the militias were incapable of suppressing Native attacks. However, the United States always made it clear to settlers and Indigenous populations alike that military power backed legislation, as well as the agents responsible for carrying it out in territories over which the United States claimed jurisdiction, which came to include “Indian Country.”⁷² In Algeria, the military was responsible for the administration of the colony, ensuring settler safety, and opening up additional lands to settlement. Whether conducted by militias, organized armies, or individual settlers, colonizers in both regions often resorted to coercion, force, and violence in response to Indigenous resistance.

After the period of conquest, occupation, and initial settlement, when the region was considered “pacified,” settlers were able to elect their own representatives and leaders to govern local affairs and thereby establish relatively stable settler governments. Settler leadership was

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Prucha, *The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians*, 13-47. “Indian Country” referred to unceded land west of the United States’ boundaries – land that was still under the control of Native American communities.

not appointed by the métropole at this stage, nor did active military personnel working in a military capacity fill the positions. These governments were civil, self-governing, integrated with the civil metropolitan administration, meaning that settlers had voting rights and representation in Parliament/Congress, and they had subdued, or “pacified,” the region under their administration by subjugating, silencing, removing, killing, and/or assimilating (in a limited way) the Indigenous population. While this is an important aspect in the history of these two settler colonies, this study focuses on the first two decades of occupation and settlement, leaving the story of the establishment of civil settler governments for a subsequent study.

Methodology

This study charts a new course for histories of the American occupation of the Wabash Valley, the colonization of Algeria, and settler colonial studies by putting American and French colonization efforts in conversation with each other. This comparison uncovers the strikingly similar motives and means of establishing settler colonies in Indiana/Illinois and Constantine, Algeria. Instead of focusing exclusively on colonial officials and metropolitan legislation, it also highlights Indigenous and settler agency in shaping settler colonial social and political structures. Instead of taking for granted that land was the single most important factor that drew settlers and compelled officials to dispossess the Native population, it asks what drove the establishment of these two colonies. It explores how the interactions between, and among, the métropole, settlers, colonial and military administrators, and the Indigenous populations shaped settler colonial governments in the American Wabash Valley and Constantine, Algeria.

The purpose in juxtaposing the United States and Algeria is to uncover similarities, as well as differences, that teach us about the nature of settler colonialism. The comparison between these two contexts reveals the contingent nature of imperial policies (context-dependent), their

implementation, and implications. This methodology also uncovers “points of congruence and similarities ... in seemingly disparate [geographic and temporal] sites.”⁷³ According to William Sewell, in his analysis of Marc Bloch’s use of comparison, there are three primary uses for comparative history: (1) to test theories of causation, (2) to determine the distinctiveness of societies, and (3) to “formulate problems for historical research.”⁷⁴ Underlying these three purposes is a common logic: the “logic of hypothesis testing.”⁷⁵ This approach is indispensable in the analysis of causal questions and will clarify the most significant agents, relationships, events, and ideas that led to the creation of settler colonies.⁷⁶ I will conduct this comparison using two methods of analysis: “parallel demonstration” and a “contrast of contexts.”⁷⁷ Through parallel demonstration, the most significant factors in the development of the colonies will emerge as similar events, and stages of development in each location are analyzed side by side.

However, this does not tell the whole story. Therefore, I will also use a “contrast of contexts” approach to highlight the ways in which various actors, including Indigenous men and women, settlers, and colonial officials, responded to and influenced colonial policies. In this way, the commonalities between the two settler societies and the phenomena that are particular to each become distinguishable, breaking down preconceived notions of exceptionalism, and contributing to the development of settler colonial theory.⁷⁸ The comparison between the United

⁷³ Ann Laura Stoler, “Tense and Tender Ties: The Politics of Comparison in North American History and (Post) Colonial Studies,” in Stoler, *Haunted by Empire*, 40.

⁷⁴ William H. Sewell, “Marc Bloch and the Logic of Comparative History,” *History and Theory* 6, no. 2 (1967), 209.

⁷⁵ Sewell, 208; See also Jürgen Kocka, “Comparison and Beyond,” *History and Theory* 42, no. 1 (February 2003): 39-44.

⁷⁶ Jürgen Kocka, “Comparison and Beyond,” *History and Theory* 42, no. 1 (February 2003), 40.

⁷⁷ Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, “The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 22, no. 2 (April 1980): 174–97.

⁷⁸ Sewell, 211; Chris Lorenz, “Comparative Historiography: Problems and Perspectives,” *History and Theory* 38, no. 1 (February 1999), 30; Kocka, 41.

States and French colonial development is conducted by pairing phases of development rather than following an exact chronology. The period of initial conquest, occupation and “pacification” in the American Midwest (1778-1795) is paired with the same phase in Algeria (1830-1848). By comparing the stages of development, it becomes possible to examine the variables present in each and determine which factors were most influential in determining the course of events. In both cases each state was in the process of developing methods to deal with Indigenous and settler populations and establishing means of governance that shaped later events. Additionally, the offset in time allows us to see how America’s example may have influenced French colonialism and perceptions of its “progress.”

For all that it reveals, the comparative method can also obscure. It can easily lead one to overlook significant details that do not fit neatly into the comparative framework. Without careful attention to the contingent events and voices of the actors, as well as contemporary witnesses, a researcher can easily fall into the trap of painting both case studies as more similar than they actually were. While the present study highlights similarities between the Wabash Valley and Algeria to understand what the two contexts teach us about settler colonialism more generally, the local specificities become more, not less, important. The distinctions are as revealing as the commonalities.

Sources

A variety of source materials provide insight into the actors’ attitudes, objectives, and perceptions of events. To begin with, I examined American and French military reports and correspondence, American Congressional and French Parliamentary records, newspaper accounts, and laws to trace the goals, interests and decisions of political officials and military officers. Additionally, to understand settlers’ motivations, interests, and experiences, I consulted

settler journals, correspondence, and petitions. For outside perspectives to balance against those of colonial officials, settlers, and Indigenous leaders, I examined the records of British military officers, Indian agents and translators for the American study, and British and American travel narratives, correspondence, and accounts of events in Algeria to counterbalance French sources. I also translated Ahmed Bey's memoir and reviewed both American and Algerian treaty negotiations, as well as British correspondence in America to get a sense of Indigenous leaders' viewpoints, concerns, and decisions. These sources also shed light on how decisions were reached and how the power balance shifted within Native and settler communities during the time period under examination.⁷⁹

One of the greatest research challenges of this study was the dearth of direct Indigenous voices in the source materials. Researching Native Americans in the eighteenth century is particularly difficult because few left any written records.⁸⁰ The most comprehensive archive of materials related to Native Americans in this region is the Ohio Valley-Great Lakes Ethnohistory Archive at the University of Indiana, Bloomington. During my tenure there, I systematically read through the records for the Delaware, Kickapoo, Miami, Mascouten, and Illinois communities between 1776 and 1795. I drilled down into British-French-American-Indigenous interactions in southern Indiana and Illinois between 1776 and 1795 to understand how and why the Americans formed settler colonies in these areas and how these various actors shaped the process. My basic

⁷⁹ Between Native and settler communities, Native Americans and Algerians remained the dominant powers in the two regions during the first two decades of colonial occupation, but power dynamics *within* their communities changed over time in ways directly related to the American and French military assaults and settler encroachment.

⁸⁰ Scholars of some of the most notable works on Native Americans in the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes regions, including Richard White, Gregory Dowd, Susan Sleeper-Smith, and Michael Witgen, offer examples of the extent to which Native voices may be recovered from these sources. I followed their example and investigated the same materials for what they reveal about the Indigenous experience of settler colonialism, as well as the role of Indigenous leaders in placing limits on the establishment of settler colonies in the first two decades of development.

workflow was to study the events and relations among these communities each year from 1776 through 1795. I worked through the records in chronological order and from east to west in geographical focus. Beginning with the copious records on the Delaware, who lived on the eastern edge of the territory in which I was most interested, I established a context in which to understand American-Indigenous, as well as intertribal, relations. Once I had a sense of the socio-political landscape through these records, I moved on to examine the Miami, Kaskaskia, Mascouten, and Illinois records, in turn. In this way, I developed a nuanced understanding of the interests and motivations of the British, French, American, and Native communities that shaped events in the Wabash and Ohio Valleys. These materials also revealed the complex and extensive communication networks between these villages, as well as Native communities throughout North America east of the Mississippi River. While they are imperfect representations of Native voices, they are the only written records historians have to work with.

Similarly, uncovering Algerian voices is equally difficult in the French colonial archives. For this reason, Ahmed Bey's memoir of the events between the conquest of 1830 and his capitulation in 1848 proved invaluable, as French military reports and secondary sources corroborated his account. As an Ottoman governor and one of the two most important resistance leaders in Algeria during the first two decades of conquest, Ahmed Bey's memoir provides the historian with an inside view of Algerian politics and resistance during colonization, the various options Algerian leaders faced, as well as the relationship between Algeria and the Ottoman Empire. Future research will take me into the Algerian National Archive to examine his correspondence between 1830 and his final surrender in 1848. I also plan to look for other Algerian narratives of events between 1830 and 1848, in addition to Tunisian and Ottoman correspondence with Ahmed Bey and commentary on the French conquest of Algeria to enhance

our understanding of the process of colonization from the perspective of the colonized, as well as the former imperial power and neighboring territories.

Since the American Northwest Territory and French Algeria became exemplars for other nations that sought to create similar colonies, their formation is especially important to understand. North America was one of the first early-modern settler colonies. Its evolution from a European settler colony into a modern American settler empire became an important model for modern settler colonialism and Indigenous policy.⁸¹ Likewise, Algeria has long been considered a settler colonial model, so the comparison of these two archetypes yields powerful insights into the motivations and processes that led to the establishment and development of settler colonies across time and space.⁸²

Even though France and the United States underwent different political transformations during this time, both were in transitory states and the process of making or remaking themselves. The colonies in the Midwest and in Algeria were an important part of these changes. Additionally, these two regions possessed similar geographic characteristics and were strategically significant in the colonization process. Finally, the process of colonization proceeded through similar stages in both regions and similar colonial structures emerged, despite the differences in demographics and metropolitan governments.

Both France and the United States underwent substantial political transformations through the period of conquest, occupation, and initial settlement in the colonies. The United States metamorphosed from a colony into an independent nation whose political character changed appreciably between the Revolution and the 1830s. France, a monarchy in 1830 under the Restoration government of King Charles X, was soon overthrown by the July Monarchy of

⁸¹ Ford, *Settler Sovereignty*, 20–21; Rana, *The Two Faces of American Freedom*, 8–12.

⁸² Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 51.

Louis Philippe d'Orleans (1830-1848). The transformations that took place in both the métropoles and the colonies affected each other to varying degrees and in different ways in each location, but the relationship proved important in the development of the settler colonies, the establishment of settler governments, and the shape each assumed.

Chapter Outline

Chapter one delves into each metropole's political life and describes the geo-political context of the Ohio and Wabash River Valleys in what is now the United States and Algeria on the precipice of colonization to provide a framework with which to understand and interpret subsequent events.⁸³ The Algerian province of Constantine and Illinois/Indiana in the United States provide an interesting and useful comparison because of their importance to each colonial endeavor. Geographically, both were fertile inland regions that, at the time of occupation and colonization, bordered other imperial territories and were important sites of agriculture and trade. They were strategically significant for military purposes and to gain access to lucrative commercial networks. The Indigenous populations in both areas practiced extensive agriculture, were already diverse culturally, linguistically, and religiously, and had long-established relations with the colonizers through trade. Through an examination of each region's geography, demography, and pre-existing socio-political context, this chapter sets the stage for the competition that ensued between the colonizing settlers and the Indigenous populations during the founding moments this dissertation explores.

⁸³ The region northwest of the Ohio River – what is now known as the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin – was known as the “Northwest Territory” during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in North America/the United States. Frequently, the region under examination in this dissertation extends beyond the Wabash Valley to the Ohio Valley and incorporates the stories of Indigenous peoples throughout the wider region. While it is problematic to refer to the land by its colonial name, it offers the advantage of consistency with the documents cited, and avoids the alternative problem of the plurality of Indigenous names that refer to various and overlapping sections within the larger territory.

Chapters two through four examine “moments,” or stages, in the process of establishing settler colonies and compare what these moments looked like in two different contexts. Rather than fitting events to theories, this work is grounded in the historical context of each setting. I examine the similar processes and structures of settler colonization in comparison across time, space, and cultures for what they reveal about settler colonialism more generally. The differences that emerge reveal how individual geographic locations, peoples, and historical contexts shaped the ways in which settler colonies were created and developed. As a work of historical inquiry, it reminds us that it is important to remain sensitive to chronology, the contingent nature of events, and the variety of actors who shaped those events.

Chapter two compares the initial military incursions into the lands Americans desired in the Northwest Territory in 1778-9 and the French conquest of Algiers in 1830. It uncovers the primary colonizing and Indigenous actors, what was at stake for each, and the methods used to achieve their objectives. Both the French conquest of Algeria and the expansion of the United States into the Northwest Territory, the present-day Midwest, marked the beginning of new colonial eras for both métropoles. For France, the conquest and subsequent settlement of Algiers inaugurated its “second colonial empire.” As the United States fought for its own independence from England, Americans began an assault on Native American tribes, their land, and the British who claimed the territory. As in Algeria, settlers moved in on the heels of the military, and the young United States government became the head of a nation but also a nascent settler empire. Thus, the conquests of these regions marked the commencement of two settler colonies, as well as significant periods of metropolitan change. In recognition of the importance of founding moments, this study compares the origins of these settler colonies with the understanding that

they were also highly significant for the métropoles, even if recognized as such only in retrospect.

Chapter three examines the extension of the conquest beyond the initial villages/cities occupied and the simultaneous processes of land surveying, dispossession, and settlement. Throughout the first two decades of colonization, both Constantine and the American Northwest Territory became important sites of Indigenous resistance as well. A number of powerful competing Native groups resided in both places, some of which saw advantages in siding with the colonizers against neighboring Indigenous communities. The colonizers sought to capitalize on these divisions to achieve their objectives, which were also similar in both locations, as were some of their methods. The American and French métropoles, for instance, both sought to populate the territory with small freeholders as quickly as possible by legal (treaties) or extra-legal means (forceful appropriation). However, France never achieved a colony of freeholders like the United States did, which provides an interesting point of contrast between the two.

The nature of initial settlement, the settlers themselves, and the circumstances surrounding conquest and occupation suggest that the founding moments were important to the development of each settler colony. Colonists migrated to the American Northwest Territory to farm, but many settlers in Algeria took advantage of the extensive trade networks and established themselves in urban communities. Both sought to abolish Native communities' communal land rights by instituting various measures to force the division of land into individual holdings and developed reservation systems for Indigenous societies (in Algeria, called *cantonement*).⁸⁴ One

⁸⁴ Stuart Banner, *How the Indians Lost their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 2005). The American treaties of the 1780s began to limit Native Americans to particular territories rather than bounding American lands, thus changing the conceptualization of Native lands to that which was reserved to them on ever smaller and smaller parcels.

important contrast between the two colonies was the significance of land to individual settlers. While a small number of Europeans bought large tracts of Algerian land, a majority of individuals and families settled in towns, as opposed to the American territories in the Wabash and Ohio Valleys, where the majority of the settlers bought land to farm.⁸⁵ The obvious reason for this difference was the availability of houses in extant cities in Algeria, which did not exist in America in the same way.⁸⁶ Only sections of a relatively narrow band of land about 200 miles wide along the coast of Algeria was available for farming. Once the military launched total war on the land and its people in the 1840s, hundreds of acres of trees and crops were destroyed, making it less appealing for those who sought quick returns on their investment. There were also fewer barriers to European entry into Algerian commercial networks than those Americans faced in “Indian Country.” Europeans flocked to Algerian cities to establish their shops and provide services and commodities other settlers desired in their new homeland. This calls into question scholars’ assumption that land was the primary motivating factor in settler colonialism.

Colonization began in both regions before the métropole gave its official assent and was therefore left to acknowledge the colonies and craft legislation *ex post facto*, which suggests that these settler colonies began from bottom-up impulses and processes, making the actions of the settlers, Indigenous people, and the military even more significant. Chapter four looks at the final moment of the initial phase of settler colonization when metropolitan policies began to catch up

⁸⁵ More than 60 percent of settlers in Algeria lived in urban areas. (David Prochaska, *Making Algeria French*, 11). For this reason, Constantine is especially important because it was one of the largest cities in Algeria, and as Prochaska notes, “whoever controlled the urban centers, especially the major cities of the littoral, controlled to a large extent what went on in the colony itself” (Ibid).

⁸⁶ Although some American frontier homes resembled Indigenous structures, settlers would not have lived in Indian homes, even if they had had the opportunity. However, there were few occasions in which they would have been able to make the choice, as many Indigenous structures were portable and thus migrated with the Indian communities or were destroyed during frontier warfare.

to the reality on the ground and when the military and métropole began to work in greater harmony. In America, it traces Indigenous resistance movements and American counterattacks through the Native Confederacy's defeat at the Battle of Fallen Timbers against American General Anthony Wayne's forces in 1794. It places particular emphasis on the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which established a template for integrating colonized lands into the United States as territories under the administration of the US government and, eventually, as states. It then uncovers similar French land policies in Algeria, the role of Indigenous leaders in fighting, fleeing, or accommodating the French, as well as the discursive moves the French government made to justify their acquisition of Indigenous lands. Finally, chapter five summarizes the stages, or moments, in the development of these two settler colonies and limns the significant interventions this comparative study makes in settler colonial theory and analytical frameworks.

Significance

I am not the first to make the remarkable comparison between the colonization of French Algeria and that of United States' territories. Rather, mid-nineteenth century French statesmen conscientiously used the United States as a benchmark of progress in their Algerian endeavor. This may account for at least some of the similarities in the colonies' trajectories. However, it does not explain all of them, particularly those in the initial phases of conquest. The congruency between the stages of settler colonial development in the Northwest Territory and French Algeria indicates the existence of commonalities in the formation of settler colonies more broadly.

MacMahon's characterization of the colonization of North American and Algeria sets up a stark contrast between the two locales that is not representative of actual historical events. The colonization of the two regions shared far more in common than MacMahon's description would

lead one to believe. They must have to have warranted a useful comparison for French officials to employ the United States as a point of reference.

Virginia Governor and future United States President Thomas Jefferson, among other Americans, did not view the Native American population as “insignificant.” Quite the opposite was true. In the American Declaration of Independence, Jefferson cited as one of the grievances against the King of England, “[King George III] has excited domestic insurrections amongst us, and has endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions.”⁸⁷ This sentiment was echoed in the Kentucky settlers’ plea to Virginia for aid in defending their homes from Indian raids in 1776.⁸⁸ Similarly, the Algerian resistance presented no small challenge to the French military, which topped 100,000 troops before the first stage of conquest ended in 1848.

Native American leaders’ own testimony also belies the notion that they melted peaceably into the forests and “continue[d] to live by hunting as they had in the past.” Rather, they fought for their land and agricultural/semi-nomadic life ways, of which hunting was only a part.

We have no objections to carry on Trade with your Traders, provided they do not attempt to settle in our Country, but it is too clear to us your design is to take our Country from us -- we remind you that you will find all the people of our Colour in this Island strong, unanimous, and determined to act as one man in Defence of it, therefore be strong and

⁸⁷ Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, Robert Livingston, and Roger Sherman, *Declaration of Independence*, 1776.

⁸⁸ “Petition from the Inhabitants of Kentucky, 15 June 1776,” in James Alton James, ed., *George Rogers Clark Papers, 1771-1781*, vol. 8, Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library, Virginia Series (Springfield, IL: Trustees of the Illinois State Historical Library, 1912), 11–12.

keep your people within Bounds, or we shall take up a Rod and whip them back to your side of the Ohio.⁸⁹

Native communities in both regions adopted similar approaches to resist, accommodate, negotiate, or avoid the colonizers. Recognizing the variety of options available and Indigenous leaders' choices in their interactions with Europeans and Americans moves us beyond the resistance/accommodation dichotomy scholars have drawn in the past.⁹⁰ Through their leadership, Indigenous actors also shaped the form the settler colonies took. Their armed resistance forced the métropoles to govern through the military and required vast expenditures in money, men, and arms to hold the conquered territory. Cultural and religious norms pushed colonial administrators into accommodations, such as treaty negotiations, gifts, acknowledging and respecting Indigenous juridical practices – for their own people at the very least. In many cases, military leaders were forced to work with Indigenous leaders to achieve their aims through active support, alliances, negotiating neutrality, or relying on their services as translators, guides, and scouts in unknown territory. Neither the French nor the Americans were ever able to fully eradicate Indigenous inhabitants from their desired lands, either in the period under consideration here or in subsequent years.

⁸⁹ Captain Wolf, of the Mingo, speaking at an Indian Council Held at Wakitunikee, 18 May 1785, in *Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections*, 25: 692. See also: Major (5th Reg) John Smith to Capt. Le Maistre, 20 October 1790, in *Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections* (Lansing, MI: Robert Smith & Co., State Printers and Binding, 1895) 24: 107-8. -- The Miami burned their own town to prevent settlers from doing so or benefitting from their crops.

⁹⁰ For a small sample of this literature, see: Peter von Sivers, "Insurrection and Accommodation: Indigenous Leadership in Eastern Algeria, 1840-1900," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 6, no. 3 (July 1, 1975): 259–75; Chaudhuri and Strobel, *Western Women and Imperialism*; Edmund Jefferson Danziger, *Great Lakes Indian Accommodation and Resistance during the Early Reservation Years, 1850-1900* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009).

Settlers and the military in both locations took the conquest and occupation farther than most metropolitan leaders originally intended, leaving the administration to recognize the fact of colonization after it had already begun on the ground. Officials were then left with the choice of accepting the colonies, such as they were, and continuing the work of the military and settlers or face international embarrassment by pulling out and risk the perception of weakness. Internal political pressures also compelled metropolitan politicians to send armed forces to these regions to maintain and eventually extend the occupation, but finding a way to pay for their services was a vexing problem for both métropoles.

Lack of adequate financial resources motivated metropolitan officials to promote and publicize settlement in the colonies. In both France and the United States, colonial administrators saw settlers as roots that could be planted and grow in the colonial soil to prevent its erosion from metropolitan control. Land in the colonies also served as payment for services rendered in securing it (for the soldiers and militiamen), circumventing the need to pay them in specie. This also supplied more settlers as bastions of colonial sovereignty and defenses against Indigenous land claims and armed reprisals.

In summary, settler colonies in the American Wabash Valley and Algeria resulted from a bottom-up process in which settler desires for land and greater economic opportunities compelled them to migrate (or emigrate) and stake their claim to these territories. This movement then served as a catalyst for initially makeshift colonial policies that only became systematized over time. The relationship between settlers and the Indigenous populations in both locations, as well as administrators' responses to prevailing circumstances on the ground shaped the establishment of settler governments.

Settler colonialism's legacy continues to influence geopolitics, national policy decisions,

and people's daily lives. Hence, the formation and structures of settler colonialism are germane to understanding not only a widespread phenomenon foundational to many contemporary societies, but also to uncover a holistic knowledge of empire, settler roles, and Indigenous actions within colonial contexts. This knowledge is especially important in modern settler societies where settler colonialism is no longer visible but perceived as "normal." To deconstruct settler epistemologies, this study exposes the processes and institutions of settler colonialism in the American Wabash Valley and Constantine, Algeria, as well as Indigenous and settler influences on their forms and limits.

Chapter 1: Context

On arrival in America, the Europeans found a territory of immense expanse, inhabited by a population, which by comparison, was insignificant. ... It is not the same in Algeria, where the Europeans found a limited territory, inhabited by a population of 2,500,000 inhabitants of a proud, energetic, [and] militant race, who in every case had the enjoyment of all of the country's land...¹

Thus we behold Kentucke, lately an howling wilderness, the habitation of savages and wild beasts, become a fruitful field; this region, so favorably distinguished by nature, now become the habitation of civilization, at a period unparalleled in history, in the midst of a raging war, and under all the disadvantages of emigration to a country so remote from the inhabited parts of the continent. Here, where the hand of violence shed the blood of the innocent; where the horrid yells of savages, and the groans of the distressed, sounded in our ears, we now hear the praises and adorations of our Creator; where wretched wigwams stood, the miserable abodes of savages, we behold the foundations of cities laid, that, in all probability, will rival the glory of the greatest upon earth. And we view Kentucke situated on the fertile banks of the great Ohio, rising from obscurity to shine with splendor, equal to any other of the stars of the American hemisphere. The settling of this region well deserves a place in history.²

¹ Patrice de Mac Mahon, duc de Magenta, "Discours au Sénat du duc de Magenta sur une pétition relative à la constitution de l'Algérie" (Paris, 1870), 4-5. Centre des Archives d'outre-mer (CAOM), Aix-en-Provence, France. File: F/ 80/ 1681. Author Translation.

² Daniel Boone, "The Adventures of Col. Daniel Boon; Containing a Narrative of the Wars of Kentucke," in John Filson, *The Discovery, Settlement and Present State of Kentucke*, 1st ed. (Wilmington: John Adams, 1784), 40, <http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/etas/3>.

For the historian, Daniel Boone and General Patrice de MacMahon's remarks about the comparative colonization of North America and Algeria raise important questions about the context into which the colonizers entered both regions. In the foundational myth-making narrative of explorer and settler Daniel Boone, Kentucky, a "howling wilderness, the habitation of savages and wild beasts" was transformed into "a fruitful field" through the efforts of brave settlers in the midst of a "raging war." Despite dangerous "savages," these adventurers replaced "wretched wigwams, ... the miserable abodes of savages" with "the foundations of cities ... that... will rival the glory of the greatest upon earth." How different this characterization of Boone's lived experience is from MacMahon's retrospective portrayal! And yet both accounts elide the complexity of the world into which the settlers entered and the violence employed to replace the "wigwams" with settler cities.

In both descriptions, Boone and MacMahon portrayed the settlers as facing nearly insurmountable odds against inveterate foes from whom they sought to wrest valuable lands. At the high cost of many human lives on both sides of the conflict, both the American and French colonizers were eventually successful in establishing dominance in their respective territories due to their determination and grit, at least according to the stories they told themselves. These myths were largely successful; their legacy is still observable in recent, even present, perceptions of the American territories and French Algeria.³

³ Cf. James Joseph Buss, *Winning the West with Words: Language and Conquest in the Lower Great Lakes* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011); Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2006); Mihesuah, *Indigenous American Women*; Thomas Peace, "Decolonization and Resilience in North American Indigenous History," *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 14, no. 3 (2013), doi:10.1353/cch.2013.0043; Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies*; James D. Le Sueur, "Decolonising 'French Universalism': Reconsidering the Impact of the Algerian War on French Intellectuals," *The Journal of North African Studies* 6, no. 1 (2001): 167, doi:10.1080/13629380108718427.

The process of “othering” the Indigenous inhabitants greatly contributed to the colonizers’ perceptions of themselves and portrayals of conquest and colonization. Edward Said termed this practice “Orientalism.” This phenomenon describes how Western Europe defined itself in contrast to stereotypes of its eastern neighbors as politically, socially, culturally, and intellectually “backward” and stuck in a previous stage of civilization.⁴ Similar comparisons also took place in North America when Euro-Americans limned distinctions between the Indigenous peoples and themselves to craft their own identity as “Americans” – separate from both Europeans in the mother countries and from the Indigenous peoples.⁵ Orientalism and its American equivalent were built on structures of knowledge, material investment, and the power that came along with, and supported, each.⁶ However, Orientalism only developed when capitalism and the industrial revolution placed European states in more powerful positions vis-à-vis states and empires to the east, and the Enlightenment elevated the pursuit of self-awareness, as well as definitions of both self and “others.” Economic power then made it possible to use racial and ethnic stereotypes and Europeans’ perceived elevated position within a hierarchy of “civilization” as justifications to rule over the “others.”⁷

⁴ Said, *Orientalism*. According to Lorenzo Veracini, settlers often embody European culture as well as indigenous traits in their lives in the borderlands. He observes that the tensions between the two cultures can exist within a single representative person, such as Daniel Boone. Smith writes that Boone’s character signified both ‘the harbinger of civilization and refinement’ and the escape from it. (Veracini, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview*, 24)

⁵ Veracini, *Settler Colonialism*, 2010, 20–24.

⁶ Cf. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979).

⁷ Alexander Lyon Macfie, *Orientalism* (Routledge, 2014), 94; Denoon, *Settler Capitalism*; For motivations and justifications of the European colonization of the Americas, see Pagden, *Lords of All the World*; Robert A Williams, *The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourses of Conquest* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Brian Tierney, *The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law, and Church Law, 1150-1625* (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1997), 255–288; Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World*.

Economic power, theories of enlightenment, and social progressivism became essential foundations for the rationalization of colonization, particularly in the nineteenth century. At the same time, imperialism came to characterize European understandings of modernity, progress, and upward mobility in the hierarchy of nascent nation-states in Western Europe. While historians have taken either one stance or the other: either capitalism or orientalist ideology as the defining feature that motivated European nations to colonize others, the two went hand-in-hand.⁸ Both capitalism and orientalism developed concomitantly, and the combination of the two propelled European ships across the Mediterranean to the Levant and Maghrib. However, in the cases of North America and Algeria, the physical movement of people - settlers - as well as the desire for property and upward socio-economic mobility were the determinant factors in the creation of colonies in these locations. Nevertheless, the broader social and economic structures and ideologies in America and Europe set the stage for the migration of settlers and provided the discursive framework necessary to justify their actions.⁹ Contingent events then shaped the specific circumstances and processes by which settler colonies were established and governed.

⁸ Phillip Chiviges Naylor, *North Africa: A History from Antiquity to the Present*, 1st ed (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2009), 137–139; Charles André Julien, *Histoire De l'Algérie Contemporaine*, 1.éd. ed. (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1964), 320–321; Abdallah Laroui, *The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay*, Princeton Studies on the Near East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 262–287; Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 1–44; Mahfoud Bennoune, *The Making of Contemporary Algeria, 1830-1987: Colonial Upheavals and Post-Independence Development*, Cambridge Middle East Library (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 1–31; Ageron, *Modern Algeria*, 1–8; Lucette Valensi, *On the Eve of Colonialism: North Africa Before the French Conquest* (New York: Africana Pub. Co, 1977); Juan Cole, “Mad Sufis and Civic Courtesans: The French Republic Construction and Eighteenth-Century Egypt,” in Irene A. Bierman, ed., *Napoleon in Egypt*, 1st ed (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 2003), 47–62; Jennifer E. Sessions, *By Sword and Plow: France and the Conquest of Algeria* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).

⁹ For “structuring structures,” see Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Cambridge Studies in Social Anthropology, no. 16 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

This chapter outlines both the larger structures extant in the societies that produced settlers, as well as the sociopolitical contexts they entered in the lands they colonized.

In the years prior to the American Revolution, the Ohio and Wabash Valleys, along with the Illinois Country, was a world of interconnected villages characterized by face-to-face interactions. In the eighteenth century, this territory was home to semi-nomadic and agricultural Native communities, including (from east to west) Delaware, Shawnee, Wyandot, Kickapoo, Wea, Piankeshaw, Potawatomi, and Illinois, as well as French-Indigenous families, British soldiers, and a small Spanish garrison in St. Louis. Each of these communities lived in similar ways and in close proximity to each other.¹⁰ Rather than being a land filled with Indigenous “nations,” it was a “world of bands, clans, villages, and peoples.” In this world, the Indigenous peoples understood land as a shared resource and “use rights were claimed, negotiated, and exercised as part of the lived relationships that people forged with one another.”¹¹

¹⁰ White, *The Middle Ground*; Sleeper-Smith, *Indian Women and French Men*; Daniel K Richter, *Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 168–9; Heidi Bohaker, “‘Nindoodemag’: The Significance of Algonquian Kinship Networks in the Eastern Great Lakes Region, 1600-1701,” *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Third Series, 63, no. 1 (January 1, 2006): 23–52, doi:10.2307/3491724; Witgen, *An Infinity of Nations*.

¹¹ Witgen, 19.

North America: The Wabash and Ohio Valleys



Figure 1: Map of Wabash Valley¹²

In 1778 the first civil geographer of the United States, Thomas Hutchins, detailed the Wabash Valley region and recounted his exploration of the lands west of the settled British colonies. Hutchins' account signifies his belief that this land would eventually become subject to American settlement, and his book, *A Topographical Description of Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and North Carolina*, played no small part in advertising this promised land to an eager population of colonial adventurers and families seeking greater opportunities in the west. He began his narrative by placing the reader next to him, observing the easily navigable rivers that were so numerous and interconnected that they acted like highways throughout the area: “The Wabash is a beautiful River, with high and upright banks, less subject to overflow, than any other River (the Ohio excepted) in this part of America. It discharges itself into the Ohio, one

¹² Kmusser, “Map of the Wabash River Watershed” (Wikimedia Commons, June 3, 2008), Based on USGS data, <http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Wabashrivermap.png>.

thousand and twenty-two miles below Fort Pitt in to Ouiatanon.”¹³ Hutchins then outlined the advantages of the land - its “remarkable fertility,” the wealth to be found in the recently discovered silver mine, and the promise of “others [that] may be found hereafter.”¹⁴ Hutchins extolled the beauty and abundant resources in this territory, even though it still lay in “Indian Country.” Cataloging its advantages, he described numerous salt springs along the river, the wealth of coal found in nearby hills, along with lime, free stone, and blue, yellow, and white clay for glass works and pottery. The region also received enough rain to swell the rivers and grow an abundant supply of crops, including corn, wheat, tobacco, hemp, grapes, hops, apples, peaches, pears, cherries, currants, gooseberries, melons, and even rice.¹⁵

In addition to describing the prosperity of the country, Hutchins also provided details about the extant communities. He outlined the distances between the two French settlements, common means of transportation and the navigation routes that were already established. He briefly mentioned the Native communities who lived in the region: the Kickapoo, Mascouten, Piankeshaw, and Wea but offered few observations about their culture or ways of life other than to note that many of the French inhabitants at Vincennes and Ouiatanon traded with them for furs and deer skins and that this economy was worth about 8000£ annually at Ouiatenon.¹⁶ What was

¹³ Thomas Hutchins, *A Topographical Description of Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and North Carolina* (Cleveland: The Burrows Brothers Company, [reprinted from original 1778 edition], 1904), 98.

¹⁴ Hutchins, 98.

¹⁵ Hutchins, 98-100.

¹⁶ To contextualize this economy, the average American colonial family’s income was about \$345 or 77.53£ per annum in 1774. (Peter H. Lindert and Jeffrey G. Williamson, “American Incomes before and After the Revolution.” *The Journal of Economic History* 73, no. 3 (September 2013), 757. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022050713000594>.) On 12 February 1778 the Council of Safety New Haven conventions in Connecticut capped the price of “good merchantable wheat, peas, and beans” at 9 shillings and 9 pence per bushel and oats at 3 shillings per bushel. (Forrest Morgan, *Journal of the Council of Safety* [Connecticut conventions])

more important, apparently, than the settlers' soon-to-be neighbors was the wealth that their economy generated.¹⁷

Prior to the escalation of violence in the years following Hutchin's description, this was a world of permeable cultural boundaries and fluid identities where a person could grow up in one society and be transformed completely upon acceptance into another.¹⁸ A Chickasaw from the southeast could become a Kickapoo; a Euro-American could become a Wea; but it is worth noting that rarely did Indigenous peoples assimilate willingly or completely into Euro-American communities. They did not have to. Throughout the eighteenth century, Native communities were still the dominant powers in the region. Furthermore, few Euro-Americans had established customs of acculturating captives or anyone unlike themselves into their families, customs many Indigenous communities held previously or adopted in the wake of devastating small pox plagues and wartime losses over the previous two centuries. Among Euro-Americans, however, there seems to have been an unwillingness to even consider the possibility of adopting anyone outside of their western European-American cultures.¹⁹

[Originally published New Haven, 12 February 1778, Press of the Case, Lockwood & Brainard Company, 1894].

¹⁷ Hutchins, 101. Following Michael Witgin's reading of the subtext of such "discovery" narratives, we can see Hutchins' account as a discursive possession of the territory he mapped and described.

¹⁸ Witgen, 116-165; White, *The Middle Ground*; Sleeper-Smith, *Indian Women and French Men*.

¹⁹ White, *The Middle Ground*; Gregory Evans Dowd, *War Under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations & the British Empire* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002); Eric Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires: Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673-1800* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Hinderaker and Mancall, *At the Edge of Empire*; Michael N. McConnell, *A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and Its Peoples, 1724-1774* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992); Colin G. Calloway, *One Vast Winter Count the Native American West Before Lewis and Clark*, *History of the American West* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003); W. J. Eccles, *The Canadian Frontier, 1534-1760*, Rev. ed., *Histories of the American Frontier* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1983); Witgen, *An Infinity of Nations*.

Euro-American colonists in the mid-eighteenth century did not have a single, cohesive identity, but neither did the Indigenous inhabitants. The colonists made distinctions between themselves based on religion, ethnic heritage, language, and point of origin. Similarly, Native communities held different spiritual/religious beliefs, wore different dress, and spoke different languages from each other. However, the backcountry settlers formed communities in ways similar to their Native neighbors. They moved with co-religionists, family members, and co-ethnics (primarily Scots-Irish in the beginning) but lived near other groups who had done the same. Similarly, due to the dislocations caused by constant warfare and European settlement along the eastern seaboard, tribes and smaller clan groups began moving west, often establishing villages very close to communities from other larger nations.²⁰

This land and the interactions between different people groups, including Indigenous communities, the French, British, and backcountry settlers has variously been described as a “middle ground,” as an “infinity of villages,” and as “native ground.”²¹ Contemporaries wrote about Kentucky, just to the south of the region this study examines, as the “dark and bloody ground.” Which is correct? One? All – perhaps at different times? None? The time we select for the characterization is immensely important. Prior to the commencement of the American Revolution, Richard White’s depiction of the “middle ground” and the more recent nuanced modifications of it seem to come closest to describing the nature of relationships scholars have

²⁰ Hinderaker and Mancall, *At the Edge of Empire*; McConnell, *A Country Between*; Witgen, *An Infinity of Nations*; White, *The Middle Ground*; Alan Taylor, *The Divided Ground Indians, Settlers and the Northern Borderland of the American Revolution*, 1st ed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006); Taylor, *American Colonies*; Calloway, *New Worlds for All*.

²¹ Farther to the east, in New York, Alan Taylor has written about the “Divided Ground.” (Alan Taylor, *The Divided Ground: Indians, Settlers and the Northern Borderland of the American Revolution* [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006].)

thus far teased out of the extant sources. What happened later will be the focus of subsequent chapters.

From the seventeenth through the eighteenth centuries French inhabitants and Natives formed a literal and metaphorical “middle ground,” in which each society adopted some of the customs of the other and established a set of principles for interaction that were neither wholly French nor Indian. This middle ground was the product of everyday life, as well as formal diplomatic relations.²² It was the “realm of constant invention,” in which each community explained its own self-interested actions or objectives in terms they believed the other would understand in order to legitimate their conduct or achieve their goal.

Distinct villages dotted the landscape and formed a complex web of trade and kinship connections. However, when the Americans launched a series of raids against their Indigenous neighbors in the early 1780s to achieve a modicum of relief from Native raids on their own backcountry settlements, they transformed a contest of villages into a “contest of empires.”²³ Until that time, boundaries remained at least relatively permeable, especially from an Indigenous perspective. Indigenous peoples’ belief in the possibility, as well as the reality, of an individual’s transformation from one identity to another profoundly shaped their relations with one another and with the newcomers.

The communities that peopled this region were both agricultural and mobile, but their mobility was “seasonally expected [and] politically negotiated” and not merely a response to inter-tribal conflict and wars.²⁴ Spiritual progenitors who took the form of animals were the basis

²² White, 53.

²³ White, 368.

²⁴ Bohaker, “Nindoodemag,” 39. Bohaker’s argument here directly contradicts White’s assertion in *The Middle Ground* that it formed a cohesive unity in the region out of refugee populations who settled there after fleeing from Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) violence in eastern regions.

for clans and kinship networks that mediated and influenced both movements and relationships within the community and between villages. In this region, spiritual connections were just as important as blood relationships in the formation of binding ties.²⁵ Indigenous political history here cannot be understood without knowing which peoples had access to “which land and to which resources and who could pass freely through a given space, and who was subject to taxes or tolls.” Those answers were found in the “complex nexus of kinship connections and alliances.”²⁶ Collective identities were not organized around land possession but rather the spiritual progenitors of each group - the *nindoodemag*.²⁷ The middle ground was not defined by “a unity of Algonquian-speaking peoples,” but rather an amalgamation of *nindoodemag* held loosely together through intermarriage ties but each with its own leaders. While villages and smaller groups often established alliances, even with other culturally and linguistically distinct peoples, confrontation, warfare, and slavery determined the limits of such cooperative relationships.²⁸

As French power declined in their North American Empire in the mid-eighteenth century, the power of the Anishinaabe peoples, in contrast, grew.²⁹ The transfer of European claims to power in the region from France to Great Britain following the French and Indian War (or the

²⁵ Bohaker, 38.

²⁶ Bohaker, 42.

²⁷ Bohaker, 43. Bohaker argues that while the middle ground may still be “a suitable metaphor for explicating the narratives of intercultural accommodation, it does not sufficiently explain Anishinaabe cultural continuity and adaptation. To understand that process, scholars must turn to the Anishinaabe category of *nindoodemag* and Anishinaabe expressions of their own collective identity. When faced with crisis and change, Anishinaabe peoples used glue from their own institutions, not French mediators to regroup in the wake of crisis.” (Bohaker, 51)

²⁸ Brett Rushforth, “Slavery, the Fox Wars, and the Limits of Alliance,” *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Third Series, 63, no. 1 (January 1, 2006): 53–80, doi:10.2307/3491725 quote from Rushforth, 80; Bohaker, “Nindoodemag,” 23–52.

²⁹ Witgen, 217. For population growth, see Jeanne Kay, “The Fur Trade and Native American Population Growth,” *Ethnohistory* 31, no. 4 (October 1, 1984): 265–87, doi:10.2307/482713.

Seven Years' War, as it was known in Europe) in 1763 changed very little about power structures on the ground in the Great Lakes region. Moreover, the end of the eighteenth century was not the "twilight" of Anishinaabe history. On the contrary,

the Anishinaabeg and Dakota had survived over a century of encounter with European empires without being colonized. They had absorbed the people, material goods, and cultural and political influence of the Atlantic World and either rejected these things or made them a part of their own autonomous, post-contact, Native social world.³⁰

Some scholars contend that the middle ground never existed in the Ohio Valley, and while that may be true, the region that is the primary focus of this study – the Wabash Valley and Illinois Country – saw the creation and later, the fall, of a diplomatic middle ground.³¹ In the late eighteenth century, the push of Anglo-American settlers into the Wabash Valley broke down what remained of the middle ground. The contest for the Ohio Valley, and by extension, the Wabash Valley, was not only fought between Euro-Americans and Native inhabitants, but also

³⁰ Witgen, 217. Witgen contends that Adelman, Aron, White, Taylor, Havard, Brandao and Starna "struggle to understand how the relationship between Native peoples and the European empires of the Atlantic World shaped North American history" (Witgen, 216). The problem with their perspective, he argues, is that it places too great a weight on imperial etymologies and perception of this region, which is problematic "given the demographic dominance of Native peoples" there (Witgen, 216). The present study attempts to balance the perspectives Witgen has set at opposition to one another by examining the development of settler colonies through both imperial administrators' and Indigenous eyes and seeks to complicate this dichotomy by also exploring the roles of settlers and the military as stakeholders with sometimes complementary, sometimes competing, objectives. Cf. Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, "From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in Between in North American History," *The American Historical Review* 104, no. 3 (June 1999): 814-841; White, *The Middle Ground*; Taylor, *The Divided Ground*; Gilles Havard, *The Great Peace of Montreal of 1701: French-Native Diplomacy in the Seventeenth Century* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001); José Brandão and William Starna, "The Treaties of 1701: A Triumph of Iroquois Diplomacy," *Ethnohistory* 43, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 209-244.

³¹ It is important to note that the composition of communities and the character of their relations in Wabash Valley and Illinois Country differed from that which existed in the Ohio Valley. The variations in each region's political history had important implications for the ways in which their power structures intersected, interacted, and influenced one another.

between Indigenous accommodationists and “Nativists,” who formed the first ‘pan-tribal’ military resistance movement to both the negotiations of the middle ground and American settler colonization.³²

The Nativists’ military resistance ultimately failed to end American settler colonialism in the backcountry, but

the upper Great Lakes and the upper Mississippi valley, remained demographically, culturally, and politically Indigenous long after the ink had dried on the Treaty of Greenville [1795]. ... The United States would have to work hard to colonize this space. It would have to work at being a colonial power if it wanted to truly end the autonomy and self-determination of Native peoples in this part of North America. American authorities quickly realized that any hope they had of colonizing the country they thought of as the Northwest Territory depended on their ability to co-opt the peoples of the middle ground.³³

While the middle ground framework is specific to this region, historians have grappled with other conceptual paradigms to understand contested territories, such as “frontiers,” “borderlands,” and “backcountry,” to name a few. Throughout much of the eighteenth century, Native Americans governed processes of intercultural interaction in most of the land that the British government claimed. In these “backcountry” regions, or the spaces between colonial cores and areas beyond the reach of the relatively weak colonial government, few Englishmen

³² Gregory Evans Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance*. In his first book, Dowd, one of the few Native American scholars to engage with postcolonial studies, draws on this literature to frame the Ohio River Valley as part of a larger imperial context with its center in London and views Indians as “subalterns” who attempted to shape and challenge imperial policies and the outcomes of imperial struggles. In his 2002 study, *War Under Heaven*, he argues that “Pontiac’s War” marks the moment in which Americans began to develop a vision of the West without Indians and the point at which whiteness defined subjecthood in the British Empire.

³³ Wittgen, 220.

traveled and even fewer settled, and those who did were often traders who wanted and needed to establish good relations with the Native population.³⁴ Backcountry regions in which imperial and Indigenous peoples intersected, cooperated, and competed for lands have been characterized as “frontiers,” “borders,” “borderlands,” and “zones of contact” of European-Indigenous interaction in a variety of colonial settings in North America and abroad.³⁵ Historians have critiqued the frontiers and borderlands frameworks as areas contested by two or more imperial powers

³⁴ Eric Hinderaker and Peter Mancall, *At the Edge of Empire: The Backcountry in British North America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003). The definition of “backcountry” seems to stem from the “core and periphery” model, which historian Jack Greene, among others, have applied to studies of American colonies. (Jack P. Greene, *Peripheries and Center Constitutional Development in the Extended Politics of the British Empire and the United States, 1607-1788* [New York: Norton, 1990].) Hinderaker and Mancall’s work builds on the growing body of literature that employs “frontiers,” “borders,” “borderlands,” and “zones of contact” as frameworks to understand European-Indigenous interaction in North America. Cf. Adelman and Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders”; for “zones of contact,” see Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (London: Routledge, 1992).

³⁵ This differs from earlier constructions of the concept of “frontier,” which Frederick Jackson Turner characterized as the point at which “civilization” overcame “savagery.” At the World’s Fair (Columbian Exposition) in Chicago, 1893, historian Frederick Jackson Turner delivered one of the most important American Historical Association presidential speeches (it is still cited in almost every major work on the colonial era or Western history) in which he argued that America’s “frontier” was the defining element in shaping a unique American character. He saw the frontier as the line at which “civilization” defeated “savagery” in a continual march from the eastern seaboard to the West, and in 1893, he declared the frontier to be closed since the western states had been settled and incorporated into the United States. Historians have since contested most of these ideas, noting that there were multiple “frontiers” in which Europeans and Indians competed for control over geographical territory (Spanish frontiers in New Mexico, Texas, and California; French frontiers in the Great Lakes, Canada, and over a wide territory along the length of the Mississippi River Valley). One aspect of these frontier regions is that they were “borderless” - it was not clear where Indians dominance ended and European began - and even portraying it in such a black and white way does disservice to the concept. To subsequent historians, “frontiers” became areas of European territorial conflict and ignored the presence of Indians. Since Turner’s “Frontiers Thesis,” historians have moved away from this highly fraught term and defined “borderlands” as regions in which land was contested by imperial rivals as much as between Europeans and Indians. A more recent generation of scholars, Hinderaker and Mancall included, have begun to highlight borders/borderlands as regions of contestation and accommodation between European imperial interests and Indigenous inhabitants. However, scholars like Hinderaker and Mancall are often guilty of simplifying the complex nature of interactions in these areas.

because they overlook the agency of Native Americans who were often the demographic, political, and military powers with which to be reckoned.³⁶ Pretensions to imperial power in North America through the eighteenth century were often just that – only an illusion, regardless of whose flag flew over the forts there, a point that Indigenous leaders made repeatedly throughout the eighteenth century. Thus, these contested regions may more accurately be denoted as “zones of contact.”

The precedents that Anglo-Americans, British administrators and Indigenous leaders set in the interwar years (roughly between 1763 and 1775) are essential to understanding the course of events in the Wabash Valley in the subsequent two decades. They lay the groundwork for the formation of settler colonies in the “Northwest Territory,” whose very name implied American conceptions of the region as their own even when it was firmly held by its Indigenous inhabitants. From their participation in the Seven Years’ War on, a number of prominent American colonists viewed the western lands as theirs for the taking. Even when British colonial officials tried to create boundaries between their colonists and the Native communities following the conclusion of the Seven Years’ War and Pontiac’s Rebellion in 1763, Anglo-Americans continued to trek over the Appalachian Mountains into Native territory in hopes of creating a better life for themselves and their children.

The British Proclamation of 1763 marked the first attempt to create an imperial boundary between the colonists along the eastern seaboard and Indigenous communities. In 1768, the Treaty of Fort Stanwix fixed the location of this boundary, one that Native leaders abided by and to which they held the colonists accountable. As increasing numbers of colonists moved into the western regions of Pennsylvania, New York, Virginia, and North Carolina, they encroached on

³⁶ Adelman and Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders.”

Indigenous territories. Lord Dunmore's War in 1774 then served as the opening salvo to a heated battle for lands in the Ohio and Wabash River Valleys. Simultaneously, surveyors moved into the Kentucky borderlands and began demarcating properties that could be sold to the incoming settlers, regardless of the fact that they had little, if any, justifiable claim to these lands.




Figure 2: The British Colonies in North America, 1763-1775³⁷

The year 1763 marked the end of the costly French and Indian War (or the Seven Years' War). It was also the year of what has become known as Pontiac's Rebellion. This war marked the first time that Anglo-American colonists began to use racial markers to define subjecthood in the British Empire and envisage a trans-Appalachian west without Native Americans.³⁸

³⁷ Map of the British colonies in North America, 1763 to 1775. This was first published in: *Shepherd, William Robert (1911) "The British Colonies in North America, 1763-1765" in Historical Atlas, New York, United States: Henry Holt and Company, p. 194* Retrieved on 27 October 2010. Wikimedia Commons. Public Domain. http://web.archive.org/web/20150318150913/http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:British_colonies_1763-76_shepherd1923.PNG (18 March 2015).

³⁸ Dowd, *War Under Heaven*, 174-275, see also endnotes 1-3 on pages 325-326. Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires*, 156-162.

The seeds for Pontiac's Rebellion were planted in the soil of Montreal with the French governor's capitulation to the British there on September 8, 1760. In the wake of the capitulation, British officers began taking possession of previously French occupied forts. In an attempt to recover from wartime financial losses, the Crown pressured British commanders to keep expenses down by reducing diplomatic gifts to Native leaders in America, increasing tensions between them. Compounding the problem, British traders were no longer allowed to travel out to Native communities. Rather, Native families were expected to journey to the forts to trade and meet with British officials. Some of the British commanders then added insult to injury and verbally abused many of the esteemed Indigenous leaders who traveled great distances to conduct political, economic, and social business with them.³⁹

Native Chiefs complained frequently about the lack of British respect and the very real consequences that the new British policies had on Native communities between 1760 and 1763. Following the famine of 1758 and 1759 toward the end of the Seven Years War in North America, many Native communities were forced to over-hunt or face starvation. Then followed a significant decline in the number of deer available for hunting and the fur trade. When that was combined with British reluctance to supply guns, ammunition and blacksmiths to Native communities, many men worried about how to feed their families and about their greatly diminished ability to hunt and distribute gifts – both necessary to maintain status in their villages. Women's status suffered as well because the British required the return of captives, whose fate had previously rested on the decisions of the village women. Similarly, women shouldered great responsibility in the care and cultivation of crops and created significant trade linkages through intermarriage and god-parenting networks – all of which suffered under the new British policies

³⁹ Dowd, *War Under Heaven*, 54–113; White, *The Middle Ground*, 269–314; Dowd, *War Under Heaven*, 86–89.

to keep traders in the forts rather than living with Native peoples and requiring both Native men and women to leave their villages to negotiate with the British.⁴⁰

What was more, the Native communities west of the Appalachian and Allegheny Mountains sensed the threat against their lands. Anglo-Americans continued to push eastern Native groups to cede more property and move ever closer to the Wabash Valley, often through violent means.⁴¹ Many Native warriors from multiple tribes and villages chose to follow Ottawa chief Pontiac in armed resistance to address the loss or potential loss of hunting grounds due to settler encroachment and the necessity of overhunting during certain seasons. They also sought to improve their status after a significant decline in relation to the imperial power with which they had to negotiate. Between May and August 1763, the allied Native warriors attacked British forts, communication and supply lines, as well as the settlements that supported them, not only to push both the British troops and colonists out of their territory and back across the Allegheny Mountains, but also to garner the attention of the French king and win his support once again.

⁴⁰ Dowd, *War Under Heaven*, 55–89; Sleeper-Smith, *Indian Women and French Men*, 54–64; Gregory Evans Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745-1815*, The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, 109th ser., 4 (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 32–45; White, *The Middle Ground*, 256–314.

⁴¹ Some of these bands include the Delaware, Shawnee, and Mingo.




Figure 3: Pontiac's War, 1763⁴²

At the end of the war with Pontiac in 1764, the British finally took formal possession of the Illinois Country, to which they had previously only pretended. After their victory, the British also received the captives who had been living among the Native communities – some for many years — and returned them to their settlements. However, the British had also been forced to treat with Native Americans, not as subjects of the Crown, but as separate “nations,” as associates, as equals. Despite their military loss, the Indigenous leaders under Pontiac succeeded in preserving most of their lands, reduced the British occupancy in the west, and upheld their dignity as peoples whom the British government could neither dismiss nor dominate.⁴³

Great Britain expended enormous sums of money to remove the French influence in North America and received Canada, all of the territory east of the Mississippi River, and

⁴² Kevin Myers, "Pontiac's war region," English Wikipedia - Transferred from en.wikipedia to Commons. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 via Wikimedia Commons - http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pontiac%27s_war_region.png#mediaviewer/File:Pontiac%27s_war_region.png (9 September 2014).

⁴³ Dowd, *War Under Heaven*, 174–212, 274–275; Banner, *How the Indians Lost Their Land*, 91.

Spanish Florida for its trouble. However, the Crown then had to pay for the expensive defense of its colonies and sought measures to ameliorate future costs, which included the need for troops in North America. By the end of the war in 1763, continued skirmishes between Native Americans and colonists were the primary threat to reducing the Crown's expenditures. Pontiac's Rebellion demonstrated to the British government that the Indigenous population would not tolerate continued illegal incursions into their lands and that an inviolable boundary line must be created between them. Such a boundary also held the promise of diminishing military expenditures.⁴⁴

Thus, the Crown established the Proclamation Line of 1763, marking an important turning point in English land policy on the frontiers. No longer could an individual colonist purchase land from Indigenous peoples. Rather, the colonial government, alone, in the name of the English Crown, had the right to purchase Native property.⁴⁵ Consequently, the process underwent a transformation from contract formation between individuals to treaty negotiations and agreements between *sovereigns*.⁴⁶ The English government, therefore, expressly acknowledged not only that the Native Americans had ownership rights to their lands, but also that they maintained legal authority over said lands, or sovereignty. The proclamation expressly forbade colonists from settling on or surveying Indigenous lands and from attempting to take any form of possession of Native territory. The lands that had not been ceded or purchased by the

⁴⁴ Patrick Griffin, *American Leviathan: Empire, Nation, and Revolutionary Frontier*, 1st pbk. ed (New York: Hill and Wang, 2008), 19–94; Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War the Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766*, 1st ed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), 557–734; Colin G. Calloway, *The Scratch of a Pen 1763 and the Transformation of North America*, Pivotal Moments in American History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Banner, *How the Indians Lost Their Land*, 90–99.

⁴⁵ “The principle of inviolate Indian country, which could not be reduced by private purchase but only by formal treaty between Indian nation and white nation and which could be entered only by persons licensed to do so, became the foundation on which the United States built its own relations with the tribes.” (Francis Paul Prucha, *Sword of the Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier, 1788-1846* [London: The Macmillan Co., 1969], 2).

⁴⁶ Banner, *How the Indians Lost their Land*, 84.

British government were “reserved to the said Indians. . . . For the present, and until Our further Pleasure be known.”⁴⁷ Moreover, anyone who had settled on lands declared still to be Native property were to remove themselves immediately. Yet, the wording of the proclamation signaled to settlers that transactions of Native lands then viewed as illegal, might be looked upon more favorably in the future. The perception of the prohibition’s temporality fed land speculation and further settlement.⁴⁸

The royal proclamation set several significant precedents and attempted to address the difficulty of governing the enormous amount of North American territory that Great Britain had acquired from France. It created governments for these new territories, “authorized colonial governors to grant free land to all the soldiers who had fought in the [Seven Years’] war,” and it “set up a uniform system of licensing for the Indian trade.”⁴⁹ Finally, because the Proclamation promulgated the imperial government’s preemptive rights – it was the only legal purchaser of Native lands – it not only limited what individual colonists could do, but it also restricted what Indigenous leaders could do as well. It “marked the first time the imperial government treated Indian and English landowners in such a systematically disparate fashion.”⁵⁰

While the Proclamation of 1763 created an abstract boundary, the 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix sought to fix an actual line on which both Native communities and colonists could agree. Participants in this treaty viewed the negotiations, agreements reached, and promises made as momentous, as did the generation of Indigenous leaders who followed in their footsteps.

⁴⁷ “The Royal Proclamation of 7 October 1763.” Available: http://web.archive.org/web/20150302013445/http://www.solon.org/Constitutions/Canada/English/PreConfederation/rp_1763.html (Accessed 9 September 2014)

⁴⁸ Banner, 92

⁴⁹ “The Royal Proclamation of 7 October 1763.” It should be noted that the British trade licensing system was never truly effective in the region under study here.

⁵⁰ Banner, 94.

In the years leading up to and including the American Revolution, Native American ambassadors and chiefs were divided in their response to the treaty, but only because they respected and honored agreements made in this manner. Signatories to the treaty, primarily of the Six Nations upheld its terms. Representatives from the Cherokee, Delaware, and Shawnee protested the cession of their lands, lands to which the Six Nations had no claim, and compelled Anglo-American colonists to survey and reassess the boundary drawn up in the treaty. They trusted that once an agreeable border had been achieved that it would protect their land, provide for the colonists' needs, and therefore prevent further encroachments and violence. This also assumed that the colonists would abide by the decision reached. Throughout the following decade, Native leaders acted on this belief in good faith.

In his opening remarks to the 1768 treaty council with the Six Nations, Shawnee, and Delaware at Fort Stanwix (New York), Sir William Johnson, British Superintendent for Northern Indian Affairs, acknowledged the greatest concern of the gathered Indigenous leaders - colonists' incursion into their lands and the violence that resulted therefrom:

The encroachments upon your Lands have been always one of your principal subjects of complaint, and that so far as it could be done endeavors have not been wanting for your obtaining Redress. But it was a difficult Task, and generally unsuccessfull — for altho' the Provinces have bounds between each other, there are no certain Bounds between them & you, And thereby not only several of our people ignorant in Indian Affairs have advanced too far into your country, but also many of your own people through the want

of such a Line have been deceived in the Sales they have made or in the limits they have set to our respective claims⁵¹

He argued that to prevent further invasions and conflict, a boundary line between the colonists and Native communities must be fixed. However, the tribal leaders reminded Sir William of the white settlers' poor track record in upholding treaty agreements and respecting the borders of Indigenous lands:

We have been for some time deliberating on what you said concerning a Line between the English and us, & we are sensible it would be for our mutual advantage if it were not transgressed, but dayly [sic] experience teaches us that we cannot have any great dependance on the white People, and that they will forget their agreements for the sake of our Lands — However you have said so much to us upon it that we are willing to beleive [sic] more favorably in this case⁵²

Repeatedly, Native leaders mentioned the intrusion of Euro-Americans and their English administrators on their lands and in their business.⁵³ Nevertheless, they were optimistic and willing to be persuaded as long as their “reasonable demands” were met. These included three specific provisions:

- 1) that “none of the Provinces or their People shall attempt to invade it under color of any old Deeds, or other pretences [sic] what soever;”⁵⁴
- 2) that “all our Warriors shall have the liberty of hunting throughout the Country as they have no other means of subsistance [sic] and as your people have not the same occasions

⁵¹ “Proceedings of the Treaty of Fort Stanwix 1768,” *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, ed. E. B. O'Callaghan (Albany, NY: Weed, Parsons, and Co., 1857), 118.

⁵² Proceedings of the Treaty of Fort Stanwix 1768, in E. B. O'Callaghan (Ed.), 120.

⁵³ Ibid. See esp. 123, 127, 128.

⁵⁴ Ibid, 127.

or inclinations — That the White people be restricted from hunting on our side of the Line to prevent contensions [sic] between us;”⁵⁵ and

- 3) that “His Majesty will give [Sir William] help & strength to do us justice and to manage our affairs in a proper manner.”⁵⁶

The last, they noted was considerably important to them because they had found it very difficult to “get justice or make [their] complaints known.”⁵⁷

Through appeals to past grievances, present concerns, and their love and respect for the King of England, Johnson cajoled and inveigled tribal leaders to cede a large portion of their lands to the Crown to be distributed to the colonists. He argued that the line would be so well “defended” by laws that settlers would not be tempted to cross it and that if the Natives agreed quickly and readily to the line, it “would tend to the better observance of the Line hereafter.”⁵⁸ After giving them a map of the proposed land cession, Sir William assured them that “they should be particularly rewarded for their services [and] endeavours [sic]” in order “to shew [sic] the Indians the reasonableness of the requisition.”⁵⁹ Finally, he suggested “That they should not stop at what was but a Trifle to them, tho' so advantageous & necessary to the English and that he wished they would so act as to shew their love and respect for the King & friendship for his Subjects.”⁶⁰ In so saying, he trivialized the enormous cession he requested and asserted that the land was “necessary” for the English and to keep the peace between them. His statement also recalled the metaphorical covenant chain that linked the Six Nations and English through mutual respect - a chain that required constant attention and polishing to maintain its luster.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 127.

⁵⁶ Ibid, 128.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid, 124.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid, 125.

In the end, tribal leaders agreed to the land cession, stating that they hoped the English (Euro-Americans) would view the boundary as inviolable as they did. They expected that “no further attempts shall be made on our Lands but that this Line, be considered as final.”⁶¹ In his closing statement at the treaty council, Sir William attempted to bolster Native faith in the treaty they had just signed:

Brothers,

I am glad the Boundary is at length agreed upon, & as I have great reason to think it will be duly observed by the English. I recommend it to you to preserve it carefully in remembrance to explain it fully to those that are absent and to teach it to your children.

This Boundary is intended to be lasting but should it be found necessary by His Majesty or yourselves to make any future additions or alterations he will treat with you by those who have the management of your affairs. And never permit any private application this I have received in command to tell you.⁶²

The tribes’ firm belief in the sanctity of the border established at Fort Stanwix in 1768 resurfaced later in debates over the validity of a series of three treaties in the mid-1780s.

While the Treaty of Fort Stanwix sought to settle disputes between northern tribes with northern colonies over the Proclamation of 1763 line, it created new tensions and conflicts. Most significantly, Johnson purposely did not invite the Cherokee, who had legitimate claims to the land the Six Nations purportedly sold to the English government.⁶³ According to British General Thomas Gage, this tribe was “‘exasperated to a great Degree’ when they heard the news.”⁶⁴

Following the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768, the Cherokee protested the illegality of the Six

⁶¹ Ibid, 127.

⁶² Ibid, 130.

⁶³ Banner, 97.

⁶⁴ Banner, 97.

Nations' supposed sale of their lands. Their response indicates the heterogeneity of Native American tribes in contrast to contemporary Americans' habit of homogenizing all Indigenous peoples under the misnomer, "Indian."

Over the subsequent six years, Native leaders remained powerful enough to compel the colonists to revisit and redraw the line in accordance with their preexisting property claims to the disputed land, claims that superseded those of the Six Nations'. The dissension also reveals the divisive and competitive nature of land cessions among Native communities as each jostled for greater protections for their own homelands at the expense of others' through the early 1770s. As we shall see, when the threat became more widespread and it became apparent that none was safe from avaricious American speculators and militant settlers, Indigenous leaders began to seek a united Native front during and after the American Revolution.

Heedless of the significance of Indigenous protestations, Anglo-American colonists continued to move into Native lands between 1768 and 1774 using the Treaty of Fort Stanwix as a legal justification for their claims. Believing the treaty affirmed their sovereignty over the region south of the Ohio River and backed by Lord Dunmore, American militias formed to protect their claims against Native efforts to defend and re-possess their own lands. Over the course of these six years, Euro-American colonists became *settlers* through the process of dispossessing the Native communities of Kentucky and the Ohio River Valley territory.⁶⁵ Through this transformation, they acquired a distinct identity that scholars today can retrospectively define as "settlers," but also one they, themselves, defined at the time.

⁶⁵ "Settlers are not born. They are made in the dispossessing, a ceaseless obligation that has to be maintained across the generations if the Natives are not to come back." (Patrick Wolfe, "The Settler Complex: An Introduction," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 37, no. 2 (2013): 1.)

The American exploration of Kentucky (which contemporaries also referred to as *Kentucke*) began in 1767 when John Finley, a trader from North Carolina, and others traveled through the territory. Two decades later, contemporary historian John Filson, described Kentucky as the "Dark and Bloody Ground" due to the violence that erupted over its possession.⁶⁶ After conflict arose between the Anglo-American traders and their Native trading partners, the American colonists were forced to return home. Upon arriving at his homestead in North Carolina, Finley relayed his discovery of the Kentucky territory to Daniel Boone, a veteran of the French and Indian War (1754-1763), militiaman, frontiersman, and explorer. Boone later set out with other adventurers to explore the Kentucky territory in 1769. Despite the deaths of his companions due to illness and Native American attacks, Boone remained in the region until 1771. Filson observed that at about the same time:

Kentucke had drawn the attention of several gentlemen. Doctor Walker of Virginia, with a number more, made a tour westward for discoveries, endeavoring to find the Ohio river; and afterwards he and General Lewis, at Fort Stanwix, purchased from the Five Nations of Indians, the lands lying on the north side of [the] Kentucke [River]. Col. Donaldson, of Virginia, being employed by the State to run a line from six miles above the Long Island, on Holstein, to the mouth of the great Kenhawa [River], and finding thereby that an extensive tract of excellent country would be cut off to the Indians, was solicited, by the inhabitants of Clench and Holstein, to purchase the lands lying on the north side of the Kentucke river from the Five Nations.

While the language of "purchasing" lands from the Native inhabitants seems to imply a recognition of Indigenous land rights and sovereignty, the purchases were no more than a gloss

⁶⁶ Filson, *The Discovery, Settlement and Present State of Kentucke*, 7.

of legitimacy to cover the questionable means used to secure Native land for American settlement. Often, Americans treated with Native leaders who had no claim to the lands they sold to speculators. In the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, for example, the Six Nations and unsanctioned representatives from the Shawnee and Delaware sold their lands along with Cherokee territory to the Anglo-Americans without the consent of these tribes. Consequently, these communities were outraged when Americans began settling on their hunting grounds, claiming they had a right to be there. The appearance of a legitimate sale was enough justification for the settlers who moved onto Shawnee and Delaware lands. Not only did the sale validate their claim to land rights, but it also affirmed (in settlers' eyes, at least) their sovereignty. Settlers encroaching on Indigenous lands viewed their reprisals as grounds for attacks on Native communities. Settler counter-attacks were often unsanctioned by the government but conveniently presented opportunities to compel greater land cessions, as happened in Lord Dunmore's War in 1774 and the subsequent expropriation of Shawnee territories.

In January 1773, Virginia surveyor George Rogers Clark wrote to his brother to inform him of the land he had claimed in the region southwest of Fort Pitt and its prospects. The country “setels very fast” and people had already claimed lands down to the Scioto River 366 miles below Fort Pitt, Clark reported. As his survey partner, Roy observed, the land was valuable, and Clark had already received “an offer of a very considerable sum” for his place. Even his surveying endeavors in the region were lucrative.⁶⁷ Americans could not wait to get their hands on the fertile bottomlands along the Ohio River and its valley.

⁶⁷ George Rogers Clark to Jonathan Clark, Ohio River Grave Creek Township, 9 January 1773, *Illinois Historical Collections*, ed. James Alton James (Springfield, IL: Trustees of the Illinois State Historical Library, 1912), 8: 2.

Increasing settlement in the western regions of Pennsylvania and Virginia colonies brought more Americans into contact with Native inhabitants. Tensions grew as settlers continued encroaching on Native lands, initiating violence out of fear and growing racialized hostility.⁶⁸ When Virginia surveyors began moving into Kentucky in 1773 and 1774, the Shawnee chiefs admonished the British that they could not be held responsible for what their young men might do when they met the white surveyors on their hunting grounds. Despite the warnings, the surveyors continued their exploration and their plans for settlement, even as settlers and their unwilling Native neighbors conducted raids against each other. One such incident claimed the lives of Mingo Chief Logan's family members and provoked a counterattack.⁶⁹ The subsequent machinations of John Connolly escalated the conflict to a full-blown pitched battle that the English won only by forfeit. When the Indigenous warriors chose not to continue armed hostilities and left the battlefield in the middle of the night, the Anglo-Americans declared victory.⁷⁰

Within a week of the battle at the inaptly named Point Pleasant, Virginia's colonial governor, Lord Dunmore reported that he had concluded a treaty with the Shawnee chief Cornstalk. With the combined might of his own and Captain Lewis' forces, Dunmore marched to

⁶⁸ For more on the development of race-based sentiments and violence, see Peter Rhoads Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America*, 1st ed (New York: W.W. Norton, 2008).

⁶⁹ Reminiscences of Judge Henry Jolly sent to Dr. Draper in 1849 by S. P. in Reuben Gold Thwaites and Louise Phelps Kellogg, *Documentary History of Dunmore's War, 1774* (Madison: Wisconsin Historical Society, 1905), 9–14.

⁷⁰ Colonel William Fleming to William Bowyer. nd., in *ibid.*, 254–257; Captain William Ingles to Colonel William Preston. 14 October 1774. Point Pleasant [at the Mouth of the Great Kanawha River], in *ibid.*, 257–259; Colonel William Christian to Colonel William Preston, 15 October 1774, in *ibid.*, 261–266.

the Shawnee villages on the Scioto.⁷¹ Through the clever maneuvering of British Superintendent, Sir William Johnson, the Native confederacy that the Shawnee had orchestrated broke apart, leaving them isolated and outnumbered. Faced with few alternatives, the Shawnee agreed to Dunmore's peace terms and ceded their territory southeast of the Ohio River.⁷²

According to messages exchanged between Indigenous leaders in the Wabash Valley just four years later, in 1778, it is clear that they recognized that many Americans perceived the region as future American territory. At the outset of the American Revolution, contemporary Americans viewed the land west of the Appalachian Mountains as temporarily in the possession of Native Americans. A number of prominent statesmen, including George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, believed that it would eventually be incorporated into the United States, even though the outcome of the Revolutionary War remained uncertain at the time. The Americans' objective to acquire it from its Indigenous inhabitants signaled to Native leaders that the United States had embarked on a path toward becoming a settler empire, even as the confederated states fought to free themselves from their own colonial status within the British Empire.

Settler colonial ideology grew and co-evolved with the nascent "American" identity. From the beginning the two were deeply interrelated and will be examined as coeval processes of definition. American colonists became settlers by invoking their perceived sovereignty to dispossess the Indigenous population and claim rights to land in Kentucky and the Ohio River Valley. In the North American British colonies, colonists moving west across the Proclamation

⁷¹ Colonel William Fleming's journal based on data from his orderly book, in Thwaites and Kellogg, *Documentary History of Dunmore's War, 1774*, 281–291; "Treaty of Camp Charlotte," 14 October 1774, in *American Archives. Fourth Series: Containing a Documentary History of the English Colonies in North America from the King's Message to Parliament of March 7, 1774 to the Declaration of Independence by the United States.*, vol. 1, American Archives Series 4 (Washington, D.C.: M. St. Clair Clarke and Peter Force, 1837), 872–876.

⁷² Griffin, *American Leviathan*, 114–124; White, *The Middle Ground*, 362–365; McConnell, *A Country Between*, 3–4, 268–281; Wallace, *Jefferson and the Indians*, 1–20.

Line of 1763 onto Native American lands necessitated the Treaty of Fort Stanwix of 1768 (as well as subsequent treaties) and increased tensions between Euro-American settlers, Indigenous communities, and the British imperial administration. Anglo-American desires for land both prompted rebellion from their own sovereign and motivated the newly forming United States to become a settler colonial state in its own right.⁷³

American colonists understood that crossing the Cumberland Gap and making homes in the backcountry distinguished them from their peers who remained on the eastern side of the Appalachian Mountains. They were “frontiersmen” (and women) and “adventurers” who embraced a simpler life and established democratic forms of local government, policing, and justice as an expression of political ideals and as models for their eastern cousins. They were willing to risk everything, even their lives, and confront any obstacle, including competing Indigenous claims for the material wealth and security that the western lands promised. Daniel Boone, one of Kentucky’s first explorers and settlers, described Americans’ fortitude and persistent defense of these lands in the face of Native American resistance:

[The Indians] evidently saw the approaching hour when the Long Knife would dispossess them of their desirable habitations; and anxiously concerned for futurity, determined to utterly extirpate the whites out of Kentucke. We were not intimidated by their movements, but frequently gave them proofs of our courage. ...

...The Indian army arrived, being four hundred forty-four in number, commanded by Capt. Duquesne, eleven other Frenchmen, and some of their own chiefs, and marched up within view of our fort, with British and French colors flying ... It was now a critical period for us. —We were a small number in the garrison:—A powerful army before our

⁷³ Griffin, *American Leviathan*, 124–134.

walls, whose appearance proclaimed inevitable death, fearfully painted, and marking their footsteps with desolation. Death was preferable to captivity; and if taken by storm we must inevitably be devoted to destruction. In this situation we concluded to maintain our garrison⁷⁴

In spite of the odds, the settlers held the fort at Boonesborough in August 1778 and continued to persevere through numerous hardships, being, according to Boone, “a hardy race of people, and accustomed to difficulties and necessities.”⁷⁵

Settlers believed that their labor to build homes, break ground, cultivate fields, and defend their homesteads against Indian counter-attacks entitled them to the lands they claimed. The land they acquired was already carefully managed and therefore value-added.⁷⁶ Ignoring the evidence of Native land management, settlers maintained that their improvements to the “wilderness” lands validated their sovereignty.⁷⁷ Their armed confrontations with Indigenous inhabitants proved their mettle, their worthiness to “settle” the land, from which grew the myths about the hardy, independent backwoodsmen whose interactions with the Native population transformed them into Americans, according to nineteenth-century historian Frederick Jackson

⁷⁴ Daniel Boone, in John Filson, *The Discovery, Settlement and Present State of Kentucke* (Wilmington: Printed by James Adams, 1784), 51, 52.

⁷⁵ Boone, in Filson, 56.

⁷⁶ For a description of the extent of Indigenous farming in the Wabash Valley, see Pierre-Charles De Liette, “Degannes Memoir,” in *The French Foundations, 1680-1693*, ed. Theodore Calvin Pease and Raymond C Werner, vol. 23, Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library, French Series, Volume 1 (Springfield, Ill: Trustees of the Illinois State Historical Library, 1934), 302–95. For an analysis of Native land management practices in northeastern North America, see William Cronon, *Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England*, 1st ed (New York: Hill and Wang, 1983). For American discourses about Native land management, see Banner, *How the Indians Lost Their Land*, 150–159.

⁷⁷ Patrick Wolfe, “The Settler Complex: An Introduction,” *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 37, no. 2 (January 1, 2013): 1–22.

Turner.⁷⁸ However much or little these colonists resembled their Native neighbors, as Turner contended, it was the act of continual dispossession that resulted in the transformation from British colonists to American settlers.⁷⁹

Settlers used the Treaty of Fort Stanwix as a legal pretext to support their right to expropriate lands from Indigenous communities. With little else to base their decision on apart from desire and the belief that the treaty gave them the right, adventurers, land speculators, and families in search of economic advancement set out for the western territories to stake and defend their land claims. The Battle of Point Pleasant did not end the contest for the Ohio and, later, the Wabash River Valleys; it was the opening salvo. The Shawnee land cessions in 1774 allowed more settlers into Kentucky, enriched Virginia land speculators, and provided the British with an excuse to encourage their Native allies to attack the American frontiers during the Revolution.⁸⁰

Thus, the “Indian” agents of the British Empire and Indigenous leaders, with the best of intentions, established what became the legal foundation for later settlement. The Treaty of Fort Stanwix provided the discursive groundwork for the settlers. At the same time, it paradoxically became the reference point for Native leaders to preserve their lands because it clearly delineated

⁷⁸ Cf. Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” address to the American Historical Association (Chicago, 1894).

<http://web.archive.org/web/20150302174558/http://historians.org/about-aha-and-membership/aha-history-and-archives/archives/the-significance-of-the-frontier-in-american-history>. Subsequently published as an extended essay in Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Frontier in American History* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1921), 1-38. Available: <http://web.archive.org/web/20150302174650/http://www.gutenberg.org/files/22994/22994-h/22994-h.htm>

⁷⁹ Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” 1.

⁸⁰ Boone concludes: “I can now say that I have verified the saying of an old Indian who signed Col. Henderson’s deed. Taking me by the hand, at the delivery thereof, Brother, says he, we have given you a one land, but I believe you will have much trouble in settling it. — My footsteps have often been marked with blood, and therefore I can truly subscribe to its original name” — the Dark and Bloody Ground. (Boone, in Filson, 61).

a boundary between the American and Native communities. Between the signing of this treaty in 1768 and the attacks the Americans launched on the British outposts in Wabash River Valley in 1778, Americans established both the ideological framework and the economic system that propelled people west near or into Native lands, setting the stage for the development of settler colonies. The particular events that led to the French conquest of Algeria were notably different from those that produced the American settler colonies. However, the intellectual ferment of the Enlightenment, coupled with the political and economic destabilization French citizens experienced yielded a similar impetus to migrate and establish a new colony. On the eve of conquest, Algeria, like the Wabash Valley, had been repeatedly struck by plagues and faced political upheavals that created power vacuums the colonizers sought to exploit.

Algeria: An Ottoman Regency

Like the American Wabash Valley, Algeria's economy and culture faced significant challenges from the collision of empires, the effects of disease, and changing market relations that transformed local societies. On the eve of colonization, Algeria's thriving cosmopolitan cities seem to provide a significant contrast to the overwhelmingly rural, parochial, and apparently scattered conditions of North American Indigenous communities. And yet, a web of trade and kinship ties connected disparate Indigenous cities, villages, and political units in both regions. These routes also linked local Wabash and Algerian towns with much wider, and more lucrative, trade networks. Access to these networks inspired outside American and European interest in these regions.

The industrial revolution and growth of capitalism, as well as the subsequent centralization of political power in Europe, “stirred an incipient and subtle imperialism that also aimed to incorporate peripheral economies into the growing world (European-dominated)

economy.”⁸¹ Western Europe’s greater economic power then led to a shift in European perceptions of non-Europeans, which is traceable through the transition from (relatively) more objective, academic descriptions of North Africa and her peoples in the eighteenth century and the growing judgmental and demeaning portrayals of the early nineteenth century.⁸²

Over the course of the eighteenth century, European economic interventions in the Maghrib and the decline of Maghribian piracy weakened local North African economies and made them more dependent on foreign interests.⁸³ Algeria’s necessary reliance on foreign economic interventions and increasingly heavier taxes levied against their own farmers in the interior further destabilized power relations. Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798 then radically altered the power dynamics throughout the Mediterranean and the Maghrib vis-à-vis Europe. The French invasion, and the inability of the Ottoman and Egyptian forces to repel it, demonstrated the weakness of the once powerful and feared Ottoman Empire.

At the same time, the Napoleonic Wars in Europe caused economic disruptions in both Europe and North Africa, wreaking havoc on Algerian international markets. When the continental blockade and the British counter-blockade in the first decade of the nineteenth century cut off Algerian interactions with its Italian, French, and Spanish trading partners, Europe found other suppliers, particularly from Russia, who could provide the desired grains. Algeria’s inability to profit from grain exports further upset its delicate political system.⁸⁴ While Algeria was unable to export grain to Europe, Napoleon still needed to feed his troops and took out loans from two Livorno Jewish families living in Algeria – Bakri and Bushnaq, whose

⁸¹ Naylor, 139.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Laroui, 266-269, 295

⁸⁴ Laroui, 266-269; Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 40; Abdeljelil Temimi, *Le Beylik de Constantine et Hadj Ahmed Bey, 1830-1837* (Tunis: Revue d'histoire maghrébine, 1978), chapter 1.

interests were later represented by the dey (Ottoman governor of Algeria).⁸⁵ By then, the Algerian government had already lent France 1.25 million francs at no interest, in addition to shipments of horses and grain prior to the Napoleonic Wars. Following Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo in 1815, the French Restoration Monarchy refused to honor the debts he incurred.⁸⁶

Napoleon's exploits in Egypt held greater long-term significance for the relationship between France and Algeria than even the fiscal situation outlined above suggests. Napoleon's recognition of the Ottoman Empire's declining power, the correlation he saw between the Roman Empire and France as its seeming inheritor, and the allure of North Africa germinated and grew into the idea that a conquest of Algiers might be advisable in the near future.⁸⁷

Since the year 1808 Emperor Napoleon had the conquest in mind and already in his ardent imagination the new African expedition recalled the glorious memories of the Egyptian campaign. After the peace of Tilsitt, the [military] engineer Boutin went to the Barbary coast on [Napoleon's] order to conduct reconnaissance there in case of a future war with the dey, who for that matter had not observed/respected the rigorous prohibitions of the continental system with enough deference.⁸⁸

⁸⁵ Joshua Schreier, "From Mediterranean Merchant to French Civilizer: Jacob Lasry and the Economy of Conquest in Early Colonial Algeria," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 44, no. 4 (November 1, 2012): 635.

⁸⁶ Bennoune, 31. The "Restoration Monarchy" under Louis XVIII replaced Napoleon's imperial government with a constitutional monarchy in 1814.

⁸⁷ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 47.

⁸⁸ Aristide Matthieu Guilbert, *De la colonisation du nord de l'Afrique; nécessité d'une association nationale pour l'exploitation agricole et industrielle de l'Algérie* (Paris, Paulin, 1839), 5, <http://archive.org/details/delacolonisation00guiluoft> "Dès l'année 1808, [L'empereur Napoléon] en méditait la conquête et déjà dans son ardente imagination la nouvelle expédition africaine se rattachait aux glorieux souvenirs de la campagne d'Égypte. Après la paix de Tilsitt, le colonel du génie Boutin se rendit par son ordre sur les côtes de la Barbarie, pour y faire des travaux de reconnaissance, dans la prévision d'une guerre prochaine avec le dey, qui d'ailleurs n'observait pas avec assez de déférence les rigoureuses prohibitions du système continental." The continental system was Napoleon I's foreign policy meant to paralyze Great Britain. Philip

These plans were largely forgotten until the diplomatic breakdown between Algiers and France in 1827 presented an opportunity to resurrect them and the French political situation made such an action appear advantageous.

Napoleon's influence reverberated through North Africa throughout the first three decades of the nineteenth century. The disruptions of the Napoleonic Wars and the end of privateering in 1816 created enormous upheaval in Algerian power structures. Even after the Napoleonic Wars ended and the 1815 Congress of Vienna reopened trading opportunities for Algeria, Europe continued to buy its grain from its newfound suppliers rather than from across the Mediterranean. Profits acquired through privateering and international trade provided the financial backing that bolstered and stabilized the Algerian political system.⁸⁹ In the years leading up to the French invasion in 1830, European interventions in Algerian piracy, which the northern Mediterranean countries had helped to create centuries before, and the turmoil into

G. Dwyer and Alan I. Forrest, eds., *Napoleon and His Empire: Europe, 1804-1814* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

⁸⁹ The piracy for which the Algerians were infamous began in the fourteenth century in reaction to the European powers successfully shutting them out of the Mediterranean trade. Laroui writes, "*While the Maghrib was destroying itself in futile struggles, Aragon, Castile, and Portugal, aided by the Italian city-states, gained in economic and military strength. The crusades in the east had ended in failure, but on the whole had been economically profitable, and above all they had struck a fatal blow at the Mediterranean trade of the Moslem countries.*" (Laroui, 232). Attacking North African seaports in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the Italo-Iberian fleets sought to dominate Mediterranean trade. Their efforts were ultimately successful, and the Maghribis lost the ability to ship goods around the sea, and their port cities shriveled like prunes during this period of stagnation (Laroui, 234). "*Unable to defend their own commerce,*" Laroui observes, they "*resorted to piracy, just as the English did two centuries later in combating the Spaniards. This piracy, centering chiefly at Bougie was a form of warfare, the response of the Maghribis to the Christian monopolization of the Mediterranean trade.*" (Laroui, 234). Piracy and trade from then on became the foundation of Algiers' economy and contributed substantial sums to the dey's private coffers through tribute money, prisoner ransoms, and a fifth of the pirates' profits, but these revenue streams slowly dried up in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, as European navies focused more attention on shutting down Mediterranean piracy. (Laroui, 268).

which international business fell during the Napoleonic Wars eroded the revenue streams on which Algerian political stability relied.

Historians debate whether or not Algeria was in the process of developing a distinct and unified national identity on the eve of French invasion.⁹⁰ While Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria did not identify themselves as nation-states, each began to develop discrete and recognizable characteristics and systems of government over the course of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.⁹¹ By creating more defined geographic boundaries and through their unique socio-political milieus, each acquired greater self-awareness of its separate identity.⁹² However, Algeria was not yet a fully formed, self-defined nation-state at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Then again, a number of European countries were still in the process of nation-state formation themselves.⁹³

Prior to that fateful day when a flyswatter set in motion events that would eventually lead to the French conquest of Algiers, Algeria existed as an Ottoman Regency with a highly structured society, government, fiscal, judicial, and police institutions. Thus, arguments for Algeria as a nascent state, albeit a provincial one, begin to make greater sense. Established as an Ottoman province in the early sixteenth century, an Ottoman ruler (*dey*) governed Algeria. The Sultan in Constantinople initially chose the man to fill this position, but within a century, the *divan*, a council comprised of leading members of the *Ojaq*, or the *janissary* military corps, took

⁹⁰ Mahfoud Bennone; John Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*; Laroui.

⁹¹ Even earlier, in the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Sultan-appointed Beylerbeys began to create distinct borders between Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia where only ambiguous frontiers had previously existed. However, the names “Algeria” and “Tunisia” date only back to the French July Monarchy (1830-1848) and arose out of the French conquest and colonization of Algeria. (See Julien, 293).

⁹² Laroui, 287.

⁹³ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

over this function.⁹⁴ The *janissaries* were recruited from the impoverished Anatolia province to become elite soldiers for the Ottoman Empire. Their democratically elected leaders governed according to the egalitarian set of rules the *janissaries*, themselves, drafted. Their council, or *divan*, was “responsible for defending its corporate interests [and] soon ceased to distinguish between these and those of the state.”⁹⁵ The *divan* was also responsible for debating and advising on matters of governance and the administration of justice. The *dey* selected his own officers to fill the following positions that comprised his inner circle or high officers within the *divan*: the treasury officer (*khaznaji*), the commander-in-chief of the army, the minister of the marine, his majordomo, the trustee of vacant successions, and the receiver of tribute, known as the ‘secretary of the horse’. His personal treasurer, secretaries, and bailiffs assisted the *divan* with daily administrative tasks.⁹⁶ The *dey* administered justice and directly governed the province of Algiers (*dar al-sultan*) through the *aghas* (military commanders) and cavalries. Within the city,

Each ethnic group, except that of the Kabyles, and each trade guild was answerable to a headman (*amin*) with police powers and legal jurisdiction but under the control of a major (*shaikh al-balad*). Special officials looked after fountains, markets, streets, baths and brothels. The town was extremely well policed.⁹⁷

The rest of Algeria was divided into three provinces, known as *beyliks*: Oran in the west, whose capital city was Mazouna until 1710, then Mascara until the Spanish finally vacated Oran in 1792; Titteri in the center, with its seat at Médéa; and Constantine, with its capital city of the

⁹⁴ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 1–44; Naylor, *North Africa*, 89–152; Laroui, *The History of the Maghrib*, 234–305; Charles André Julien, *History of North Africa: Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, from the Arab Conquest to 1830* (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1970), 273–335; Ageron, *Modern Algeria*, 1–8; Valensi, *On the Eve of Colonialism*.

⁹⁵ Julien, 285.

⁹⁶ Julien, 321–322.

⁹⁷ Julien, 324.

same name, in the east. The head of each *beylik*, the *bey*, was an Ottoman Turk appointed by the *dey*, who generally made his decision based on which of the candidates was most generous. Each *bey* was largely autonomous, and the *dey* in Algiers often viewed the power the *beys* wielded with suspicion. Every three years, as a reminder of the *dey*'s allegiance, he compelled the *beys* to bring taxes and customs duties to Algiers in person. These were dangerous and expensive trips, costing them wealth, perhaps their posts, and sometimes their very lives.⁹⁸

The three *beyliks* were comprised of many *watans*, or districts, that generally encompassed several tribes. *Bey*-appointed commissioners (*qaid*s) were granted civil, military, and judicial powers to administer each *watan* and oversee the tribal chiefs (*shaikh*s), their assistants, and local headmen.⁹⁹ The *qaid*s' primary responsibility was the supervision of land divisions and ensuring that upon distribution, the land was cultivated. Both tasks were essential to accurately and appropriately assess, and then collect, taxes with the *shaikh*s' assistance. The *bey* also relied on *mahkzan* tribes, who were designated to assist with tax collection as well as policing the province and were themselves exempt from non-canonical taxes in return for their services.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ Julien, 324.

⁹⁹ The *shaikh*s were often chosen from the most important tribe in the *watan*, while the *qaid*s were Turkish officers who were nominated by military commanders (*aghas*) or other high officials for the *bey*'s consideration and approval. Upon appointment, they received a seal and a red burnous to mark their position. (Julien, 325)

¹⁰⁰ Julien, 325.




Figure 4: “Afrique française – Algérie”¹⁰¹

While Algeria may have had a “pre-capitalist” economy prior to 1830, the Regency was not as backward as the French painted it. When profits from exports and privateering declined at the end of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the organization of the *makhzen* tribes to collect taxes, the creation of local military forces, and foreign investments became increasingly important to the stability of the Regency.¹⁰² Not only did they provide a firm foundation for the

¹⁰¹ Alexandre Vuillemin, “Afrique française – Algérie,” 1877. Public Domain.

http://web.archive.org/web/20150302184137/http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Alg%C3%A9rie_fr.jpg (6 April 2013).

¹⁰² “In the eighteenth century Algiers lost its former prosperity. The treaties with the [European] powers, the enemy expeditions and the growing scarcity of good corsair crews impaired the effectiveness of privateering attacks. In nine years out of a quarter of a century, between 1765

regency, but they also contributed to a slow revival of Algeria's urban centers, reconstituting "organic ties between the state and society."¹⁰³

Nevertheless, the disparity between the French and Algerian economies can hardly be disputed. Between the French Revolution and the French conquest of Algiers, the economies of the two governments experienced dramatically divergent trends:

In 1822, the United States General Consul in Algiers, William Shaler, evaluated Algerian external commerce at only 8 million francs, while at the same time, the total volume of French trade reached 950 million francs. During the period 1818 to 1828, French production of cast iron doubled; that of processed cotton tripled between 1812 and 1827; in less than fifteen years the silk industry of Lyon grew by 400 percent. Between 1825 and 1830, the quantity of money minted by France increased by 82 percent and that of gold by 156 percent. The Algerian state remained basically a military-theocratic pre-capitalist state whose organizational and institutional features were characterized by certain 'archaic' traits, which appear to have prevented the further development of the productive forces of the civil society.¹⁰⁴

Even though international trade and profits from privateering declined in the first three decades of the nineteenth century, internal trade remained constant. "Algiers had active local industries which distributed their products in the provinces and were still in operation in 1830. Commerce and industry diminished as the population declined in numbers and wealth

and 1792, the value of booty was less than 100,000 francs. The fleet, which in 1724 comprised twenty-four vessels, declined in the course of sixty years to eight barques and two galliots in 1788. The raïs Hamidu, who held the sea until 1815, restored the fleet again to thirty ships, owing to the European wars that followed the French Revolution. ... In total the Algiers trade came to about 5,000,000 francs in 1830 – a rather undistinguished figure." (Julien, 320, 321).

¹⁰³ Laroui, 284.

¹⁰⁴ Bennoune, 16-17.

[though].”¹⁰⁵ Hard hit by plagues, pestilence, and the paucity of food, particularly wheat, the population of Algeria declined sharply between 1780 and 1830.

Plagues, droughts, poor harvests, and famines wrought havoc on the population, prosperity, and political economy of Algeria. In 1787, for example, nearly 17,000 people died of the plague in Algiers. Twenty years later, in 1805, the grain harvest was insufficient to feed the population, and inhabitants of Constantine staged a massive revolt.¹⁰⁶ Ten years later, when Algeria might have begun exporting wheat to Europe following the end of the Napoleonic Wars, locusts devastated the harvest. Wheat was in such short supply that in an attempt to prevent a repeat of the grain revolts of 1805, the *dey* prohibited Oran and Constantine from exporting it. The *dey* was then forced to import wheat into the capital and opened state storehouses to the populace to prevent social unrest as famine spread and shortages continued through 1816.¹⁰⁷ A series of poor harvests throughout the Maghrib caused widespread suffering due to malnutrition in these years. The following year, in 1817, the death toll rose to 500 people per day. By 1830, the population of Algiers was reduced to a mere 30,000 inhabitants, from a height of upwards of 100,000 people prior to 1780.¹⁰⁸

Political upheaval and near anarchy ensued. Notables began competing with each other over the meager resources rather than cooperating to find a mutually beneficial solution to their financial problems. At the same time, the *beys* in the eastern and western provinces grew more powerful and controlled greater wealth relative to the *dey* than they ever had before. Growing jealous of both the financial and political capital of the *beys*, the *dey* threw eight out of office and executed sixteen between 1790 and 1825. However, the position of the *dey* was equally unsafe,

¹⁰⁵ Julien, *History of North Africa*, 321; Valensi, *On the Eve of Colonialism*, 2.

¹⁰⁶ Valensi, 5.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Julien, 320

resulting in numerous coups between 1790 and 1816. From Mustafa Dey's violent death in 1805, Algeria had six *deys* before Ali Khodja became *dey* in 1816.¹⁰⁹

Given the influence peddling, subversion, and bloody overthrows of the previous two decades, the new *dey*, Ali Khodja Dey, sought to remove himself from the *divan's* influence and potential overthrow. Upon his nomination to the position in 1816, he secretly moved his entire treasury and personal entourage away from the Janina Palace to the safety of the Casbah. Unfortunately, his reign was also a short one, as the plague carried him away just two years later. Before his death, he appointed his treasurer, Hussein Dey, to be his successor. Before the French conquest, Hussein Dey was able to reestablish much of the authority of the central government and made great strides toward stabilizing Algeria's flagging economy in his twelve years of leadership.¹¹⁰

At the same time, European intervention also repeatedly challenged the stability of Algerian society, finally launching a successful assault on Algiers led by Lord Exmouth (Edward Pellew) of Great Britain in August 1816. Under a flag of truce, a 50-ship fleet comprised of both Dutch and English vessels sailed into the harbor and proceeded to launch a brutal bombardment on the ramparts.¹¹¹ American consul to Algiers, William Shaler described Lord Exmouth's bombardment of Algiers:¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 40.

¹¹⁰ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 40–44.

¹¹¹ The rivalry between Great Britain and France was particularly significant to the decision-making processes of each government. Consequently, France refused to participate in Lord Exmouth's campaign because the French preferred that Algerian privateering continued to check British naval power in the Mediterranean.

¹¹² William Shaler was the American Consul-General and chief commissioner to Algiers in 1815 after the Treaty of Ghent ended the War of 1812. At that time, the United States was able to finally turn its attention to negotiating an end to the predations on American shipping and sailors on the Mediterranean and the high tribute payments the Algerian *dey*. Shaler and the American squadron arrived June 28, 1815 and concluded a treaty 30 days later. Shaler's notes,

The loss on the part of the Algerines is very great, certainly not less than 2000. Much has been done to suppress Algiers as a piratical power; all their ships are destroyed except the brig formerly an American prize, and a schooner, which was in the late war, the *James Madison* privateer. The ruin of the batteries is very extensive. They cannot yet know the greatness of their misfortune, but time will discover it to them. At present they are very anxious to appear undismayed, and they are actually fitting their two remaining vessels for sea with great activity.¹¹³

On August 28 after 2 days of intense shelling, the *dey* at last agreed to free all 1,642 currently enslaved Europeans and Americans, signing a truce, conceding,

in the event of future wars with any European power none of the prisoners should be consigned to slavery, but treated with all humanity as prisoners of war, until regularly exchanged, according to European practice in like cases, and that at the termination of hostilities they should be restored to their respective countries without ransom¹¹⁴

The agreement also terminated all Algerian privateering activities on the Mediterranean once and for all, striking a keenly felt blow to economic stability in the Maghribian territory.¹¹⁵

observations, and letters did not go unnoticed by French colonial officials, and in his 1839 publication, *De la Colonisation du nord de l'Afrique, nécessité d'une association nationale pour l'exploitation agricole et industrielle*, Aristide Guilbert opens his work with a lengthy discussion of Shaler's travels both in America and Europe and his complimentary observations about Algeria's geography and potential.

¹¹³ William Shaler to James Monroe, 13 September 1816, *The Scourge of Christendom; annals of British relations with Algiers prior to the French conquest*, ed. Sir R. Lambert Playfair (London: Smith, Elder & Co, 1884), 272.

¹¹⁴ Shaler to Monroe, 13 September 1816 in Playfair, 274.

¹¹⁵ It is easy to take European statements about their Maghribian policies at face value and believe that this (and previous) assault(s) were outraged reactions to Barbary piracy. However, as noted historian of North Africa, Charles-André Julien has observed, commercial interest and power politics carried far more weight in the decision-making of European governments. It should be noted, however, that the United States could legitimately claim to have acted in response to Algerian piracy, which cost the government and American merchants small fortunes

Meanwhile, the Ottoman Empire was experiencing its own problems as several significant fissures in the Sublime Porte's authority began to appear throughout the empire. In 1821, a nationalist uprising in Greece threatened to break off portions of the Balkans from the Ottoman Empire. Sultan Mahmud II's troops were sent in but neither they nor the Greeks were able to win a convincing victory to settle the conflict.¹¹⁶ Desperate and with few options, the sultan called on the fractious, rebellious, and increasingly powerful governor of Egypt, Muhammad Ali, to send in his recently restructured military. The reconstituted Egyptian military had been drilled and disciplined in a style more closely resembling European, rather than Ottoman, armies, making it a highly effective fighting force. While the sultan offered Muhammad Ali governorship of the island of Crete in return for his military aid in Greece, Ali only agreed when the sultan granted Ali's son and commander of the Egyptian forces, Ibrahim Ali, governorship over the Balkans.¹¹⁷

Ibrahim's efforts in Greece were successful and helped the Ottoman forces recapture Athens in 1827, but his victory brought unwanted European attention and intervention. Despite their squabbles over influence in the Ottoman Empire, Britain, France, and Russia came together and negotiated with Sultan Mahmud II for two years. The sultan's refusal of their proposed armistice led to a united Western European and Russian blockade of the Balkans and a naval

in the Mediterranean, where the privateers preyed on American vessels in particular, so as not to offend European trading partners.

¹¹⁶ Sending troops to deal with the Qajar invasions from Iran into the Ottomans' eastern provinces inhibited their ability to respond to the Greek uprising. With fewer troops available, it was necessary to call in auxiliaries, in this case, from Egypt. (Caroline Finkel, *Osman's Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1923* [New York: Basic Books, 2006], 432.)

¹¹⁷ Finkel, *Osman's Dream*, 432; William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 4th Edition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2009), 71-73.

battle at Pylos that destroyed the Ottoman-Egyptian fleet in 1827, drastically reducing their ability to defend Algeria in 1830.¹¹⁸

In 1831, Ibrahim Ali launched a land and naval attack on Syria to acquire raw materials essential to Egyptian industry, development, and shipbuilding. After successfully taking Lebanon and Syria, Ibrahim marched his army across the Taurus Mountains and into Anatolia, defeating the Ottoman forces there and pushed on to Konya. There he met the Ottoman army, led by Grand Vezir Resid Pasha, defeated them and pressed on, reaching Kuhtaya by January 1833. With the Egyptian army just 150 miles from Istanbul and within striking distance of Bursa, Sultan Mahmud II sought assistance from Britain and France, neither of which offered definite assurance of aid. He then turned to Russian Tsar Nicholas, whose forces “established a bridgehead up the Bosphorus from Istanbul” and prevented Ibrahim’s forces from conquering the Ottoman capital. The military assistance Russia offered provided more leverage to extract concessions and further weakened the Ottoman Empire at the very moment its strength was needed to defend its North African possessions.¹¹⁹

While the Sublime Porte was preoccupied with both interior and exterior threats, France inaugurated first a naval blockade and then a military campaign on Algiers between 1827 and 1830.¹²⁰ At that Algeria represented the farthest reaches of the Ottoman Empire. Maps of its topography reveal a land of extremes – with a brow lined with mountain ranges leading into the *Sahel*, or high plains, sandwiched between two seas – the Mediterranean to the north and a sea of

¹¹⁸ Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922*, 2nd ed, New Approaches to European History (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 56–58; Caroline Finkel, *Osman’s Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1923* (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 443–444; Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny and David H. Pinkney, *History of France*, Rev. and enl. ed (Arlington Heights, Ill: Forum Press, 1983), 263.

¹¹⁹ Gordon Wright, *France in Modern Times: From the Enlightenment to the Present*, 5th ed. (New York: Norton, 1995), 186.

¹²⁰ Finkel, 444.

sand, the Sahara desert, to the south. The region that parallels the Mediterranean for 100-200 miles inland is known as the Tell and is the most inhabitable part of Algeria. However, oases dot the forbidding desert and provide a home for date-growers and a shelter for the nomadic tribes that crisscross the dunes.

Sailing toward the shore, the city of Algiers rises gracefully from the port and coastline up a mountainside. One newcomer's description is representative of many others' first impressions: "The houses rise gradually from the sea-shore up the ascent, in the form of an amphitheatre. The town appears beautiful at a distance when approaching from the water. The mosques, castles, and other public buildings have a striking effect."¹²¹ Crowned with the Casbah, a densely populated citadel, constructed during the first century of Ottoman rule, the buildings are almost all white.¹²² Thus, the city has variously been described as resembling the head of a white-veiled woman or even as a "ship's topsail, spread out upon a green field."¹²³ American consul-general William Shaler observed in 1816, "with its surrounding hilly and well cultivated

¹²¹ Mathew Carey, *A Short Account of Algiers, and of Its Several Wars against Spain, France, England, Holland, Venice, and Other Powers of Europe, from the Usurpation of Barbarossa and the Invasion of the Emperor Charles V. to the Present Time : With a Concise View of the Origin of the Rupture between Algiers and the United States : [Four Lines from Buchanan] : To Which Is Added, a Copious Appendix, Containing Letters from Captains Penrose, M'Shane, and Sundry Other American Captives, with a Description of the Treatment Those Prisoners Experience.* (Philadelphia: no. 118 Market Street, 1794), 8.

¹²² Ottoman governance began in 1516. Historically, this was where the local military force was garrisoned to protect the city, maintain order in its hinterland, and in the city itself, if need be. (Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 22).

¹²³ William Shaler, *Sketches of Algiers, Political, Historical, and Civil : Containing an Account of the Geography, Population, Government, Revenues, Commerce, Agriculture, Arts, Civil Institutions, Tribes, Manners, Languages, and Recent Political History of That Country* (Boston : Cummings, Hilliard and company, 1826), 47–48, <http://archive.org/details/sketchesofalgier00shal>.

territory, thickly studded with white buildings, several of which are magnificent edifices, develops, on approach, one of the most agreeable views on the shores of the Mediterranean.”¹²⁴

The city’s massive defenses struck nineteenth-century visitors approaching from the sea. The port received greater attention in the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries, and construction projects were undertaken to ensure a (mostly) safe harbor, particularly for the privateers who called it home.¹²⁵ As a target of many bombardments, especially during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, dozens of cannons bristle from the fortifications. Shaler observed, “All the approaches by sea to Algiers are defended by such formidable works, mounted with heavy cannon, as to render any direct attack by ships a desperate undertaking, if they were defended with ordinary skill and spirit.”¹²⁶

Algiers was a busy port city prior to colonization. Dozens of ships docked in the harbor daily, and a flurry of activity enveloped disembarking travelers. Laborers – Arab and sub-Saharan Africans – hauled wheat and cotton for export to Italy and France. Dockworkers, mostly Biskris from oases in the eastern province of Constantine, joined their songs to the nearly deafening tumult. “Along the quays of the port of Algiers,” another traveler commented, “the beehive of the Biskris buzzes with activity. You should see these Auvergants of Algeria, an energetic and hard-working race, carrying the heaviest of loads... running from port to city.”¹²⁷

¹²⁴ Shaler, 47-48.

¹²⁵ The harbor provided protection from all but the northerly winter winds.

¹²⁶ Shaler, 46.

¹²⁷ Antoine Rozet, *Algérie* (Paris: Firmin Didot, 1850), 38 in Julia Clancy-Smith, “Exoticism, Erasures, and Absence: The Peopling of Algiers, 1830-1900,” in Zeynep Çelik, Julia Ann Clancy-Smith, and Frances Terpak, eds., *Walls of Algiers: Narratives of the City Through Text and Image* (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2009), 42 Auvergants refers to inhabitants of French Auvergne. Rozet’s use of this parallel would have resonated with French readers in his day, who understood Auvergne as “a region of limited agricultural resources [that] exported its surplus workers to cities like Paris where they monopolized certain trades and professions” (Clancy-Smith, “Exoticism, Erasures, and Absence,” 42).

To organize and monitor the activity of the port, the Ottomans established “customs houses, a state port authority, and European consular offices to verify ship manifests, as well as passports and merchandise.”¹²⁸

The city is merely a mile and half in circumference at this time, but navigating the streets was a challenging enterprise.

The streets are very narrow, the tops of the houses closing so near together as to entirely shade them from the rays of the sun, so that, by means of its flat-terraced roofs, there might probably be established a communication throughout its different quarters. [The city] is surrounded by high walls, with bastions and a dry ditch, has no suburbs, and is entered by four gates. . . . its narrow summit is crowned by the Casaubas, or citadel, which effectually commands the city, and the marine batteries.¹²⁹

In the hierarchical structure of Algerian society, most of the city’s inhabitants were identifiable by their clothing, trade and/or living quarters.

I have never seen anything like it. A prodigious mix of races, costumes, Arab, Kabyle, Moor, Negro, Mahonais... Each of these races, tossed together in a space much too tight to contain them, speaks its language, wears its attire, display different mores. The whole world moves about with an activity that seems feverish.¹³⁰

¹²⁸ Clancy-Smith, *Walls of Algiers*, 28.

¹²⁹ Shaler, 47.

¹³⁰ Alexis de Tocqueville, “Notes on the Voyage to Algeria,” 1841, 36. The much discussed (and later photographed) Moors were descendants of the Andalusians who fled Granada and what is now southern Spain after the Spanish under Ferdinand and Isabella defeated the Muslims there in 1492. Ferdinand and Isabella extended the Inquisitor’s reach into those lands when they fell into their hands. Fearing persecution, torture, and death, the Moors gathered their families and traveled across the straits of Gibraltar into Morocco, and many continued moving along the coast to Algiers. (Cf. Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, Volume 2 [Los Angeles: University of California Press, (1949 in French) 1995], 785-797.)

In Ottoman territories, Jews were not allowed to wear particular colors or specific garments, so as to set them apart from their Arab and Moorish neighbors.¹³¹ A Jewish man might wear a piece of cloth fashioned into a turban around his head, the tail of which extends down his neck and under the short collar of his embroidered jacket. Under his coat, a loose fitting shirt can be seen, which he tucked into voluminous pants that end in a gather at the knee above his slipper-covered toes.¹³² A distinguished-looking man, a well-heeled Koulougli, the son of a Turkish administrator and Algerian woman, might wear a multi-colored turban with a deep blue habit; blue stockings cover over his calves and sharply contrasting red slippers, and an off-white bournous slung over his shoulder.¹³³

More than any other Mediterranean port, Algiers surprised and astonished. It was crowded with all manner of people and with social and ethnic groups distinguishable from each other through dress, language, physical characteristics, and even hairstyle. ... The population was often swamped and enlarged by waves of new arrivals. ... Authors

¹³¹ Julien, *History of North Africa*, 291.

¹³² “In Laugier de Tassy’s *Histoire du royaume d’Alger*, first published in 1725, he noted the number of Italian, Spanish, and French Jews trading and residing in Algiers, most of whom enjoyed the protection of foreign consuls. Moreover, these Jews could live anywhere in the city, although they preferred to reside in quarters where other European merchants did. However, Algerian Arab Jews were subject to residential restrictions and rarely, if ever, intermarried with those from Europe. In accordance with Islamic law and local custom, their inferior sociolegal status vis-à-vis the Muslims was manifest in sumptuary laws governing clothing and in special taxes. Under the Turks, dress had served as one of the principal indicators of difference; clothing laws remained in force until 1834, when they were abolished by French decree. Nevertheless, since clothing was a fundamental element in collective identity, the Jews and many other groups persisted in their older practices for years after the decree.” Clancy-Smith, *The Walls of Algiers*, 39.

¹³³ Robert Junmann, “Kulughli in Winter Dress,” colored lithograph, *Costumes, Moeurs et Usages des Algériens* [Strasbourg: J. Bernard, 1837], pl. 7) in Julia Clancy-Smith, “Exoticism, Erasures, and Absence,” in Çelik, Clancy-Smith, and Terpak, *Walls of Algiers*, 35.

and witnesses couldn't help being dazzled and confused by the diversity which pervaded every street, alley or stairway; they emerged charmed but a little breathless.¹³⁴

Between this description of seventeenth-century Algiers and the end of the eighteenth century, the city grew in population and diversity until plagues took a toll on the citizens and natural disasters struck Algerian crops and the human population that depended on them.

The dramatic decline in the city's population was in evidence by 1827, however. Not long before, it boasted more than 100,000 inhabitants.¹³⁵ The Bubonic Plague ravaged the population for more than four decades, taking a frightening toll. Despite advances in medicine, there was a great deal of mistrust of the European methods in Algeria, and many people struggled to alter what they saw as the will of God. As a result, thousands suffered and died. The scourge hit Algeria particularly hard. In 1784, travelers brought it from Alexandria. The outbreak lasted for seven long years before it ran its course. By then, one out of every six people had died. There was only a two-year respite before it returned again, this time lasting six years – more in the west. Then again, it appeared in 1817, when famine had already weakened people and a strange disease struck the cattle. Annaba [Bône] saw two out of every three houses boarded up, and in 1822, the plague visited yet again.¹³⁶

¹³⁴ Jacques Heers, *The Barbary Corsairs: Warfare in the Mediterranean, 1480-1580* (London: Greenhill, 2003), 146.

¹³⁵ By 1830, the population of Algiers had shrunk to about 30,000 due to disease, the disruptions the Napoleonic wars brought to European trade, and to the increasing European domination of the Mediterranean that virtually brought an end to privateering. At the time of French occupation, Oran's population had declined to 9,000; Bône, particularly hard-hit by the plague, only counted 5,000 inhabitants; Tlemcen, "traditional commercial hub and cultural center of western Algeria had contracted to around 10,000." Only Constantine with its connections to both Saharan and Tunisian trade and its fertile agricultural lands seemed to withstand the years of urban population decline and maintained about 30,000 residents. (Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 23).

¹³⁶ Valensi, *On the Eve of Colonialism*; Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 1–44; Ageron, *Modern Algeria*, 1–8; Julien, *History of North Africa*, 324–328; Bennoune, *The Making of Contemporary Algeria, 1830-1987*, 1988, 15–31.

In the decades leading up to the French invasion of Algiers, the Ottoman Regency experienced great social, economic, and political upheaval. Dating back to the sixteenth century, the Ottoman governance of Algeria organized political, as well as social, structures and hierarchies. Apart from the imposition of Ottoman governors – provincial *beys* and the *dey* who oversaw them from Algiers – and Janissaries to maintain order, Ottoman imperial governance placed few burdens on the Algerian people. The taxes were not onerous, and unlike Egypt, Algerians were never conscripted through the *corvée* system of forced labor.¹³⁷ However, as European nations were more easily able to exert power in the Mediterranean, Algerians endured greater economic hardship and political instability through the erosion of their revenue streams. At the same time that European navies successfully undermined Barbary privateering operations that stabilized Algerian politics, the Napoleonic Wars disrupted international trade. Moreover, the Bubonic Plague swept across North Africa every few years, decimating the population, even as it faced poor harvests and famine. By the time the French invaded in 1827, Algeria had lost much of its citizenry to disease and starvation.

Comparing North America and Algeria on the Eve of Conquest

Even before colonization began, significant similarities existed between the Wabash Valley and Constantine, Algeria. Algerian Governor General Patrice de MacMahon portrayed a heavily populated North Africa, particularly Algeria, in contrast to his perception of a lightly settled Indigenous North America that Europeans entered. However, accounts of the vast expanse of Algeria described it as containing no more than 3 million people in 1830.¹³⁸ Like the Indigenous population of North America, the Algerian population suffered great losses due to

¹³⁷ Nathan J. Brown, “Who Abolished *Corvée* Labour in Egypt and Why?,” *Past & Present*, no. 144 (August 1994): 116.

¹³⁸ Valensi, *On the Eve of Colonialism*, 1–12.

disease, especially the cyclical bombardment of epidemics of fatal illness.¹³⁹ However, unlike Algeria, the Native communities in the Wabash Valley were experiencing a resurgence in their numbers as they developed immunity to the smallpox virus in the last quarter of the eighteenth century.¹⁴⁰ Indigenous Americans were therefore a formidable force with which the Euro-American settlers had to contend.

The fertile easternmost province of Algeria, Constantine, was as demographically diverse as the rest of Algeria. It contained one of the largest Berber populations – the Kabyles – who lived (and continue to live) in Grand Kabylia in the Aurès Mountains. There, they maintained individually owned plots of land as sedentary farmers and arboriculturists. Close to homes, women planted enclosed gardens with a variety of fruits and vegetables. Farther away families maintained olive groves, fig orchards, and grew wheat, barley and vegetables on the carefully terraced, irrigated, and fertilized slopes of the mountains. Households often maintained a few animals for their own consumption, which were allowed to graze on the steep rocky slopes that were unfit for agriculture. The lifestyle in the mountainous region of Kabylia differed from that of Arab settlements on the plains.¹⁴¹ Many of the Arabs in this province held vast open lands on the plains and were either sheep or camel herders. Rather than individual ownership, as in Kabylia, tribes held the lands communally, while individual families maintained usufruct (usage)

¹³⁹ Valensi, *On the Eve of Colonialism*, chapter 1.

¹⁴⁰ Kay, “The Fur Trade and Native American Population Growth.”

¹⁴¹ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 24–27, 30–32; Valensi, *On the Eve of Colonialism*, 26–27; Julien, *History of North Africa*, 324–326; Abdeljelil Temimi, *Le Beylik De Constantine Et Hadj `Ahmed Bey (1830-1837)*, vol. 1, Publications de La Revue D’histoire Maghrébine (Tunis: Revue d’histoire maghrébine, 1978), 1–40, 50–59.

rights.¹⁴² The areas each tribe held were large enough to allow the rotation of crops and maintain the soil's fertility through this careful husbandry.¹⁴³

The Algerian landscape contrasted sharply with that of America's Northwest Territory. The American lands, particularly southern Indiana and Illinois were and are lush, green places with huge rolling hills approaching the foothills of the mountains, traversed by deep, fast rivers, and gentler streams, most of which were easily navigable, albeit dangerously so during the rainy season. In the late seventeenth century, the French, the first European travelers to that territory, wrote of traveling, sometimes more than twenty miles in a day on horseback, and not reaching the end of the cornfields that women of the Kickapoo, Piankeshaw, Wea, and others had planted.¹⁴⁴

Algeria, particularly Constantine, on the other hand was a veritable sea of golden wheat and barley in the fertile areas of the plains. Farther south, flocks of sheep and herds of goats take over the landscape. The terraced mountainsides of greater Kabylia in the northeastern corner of Algeria were surprisingly green - golden green in the late summer - with olive groves, fig orchards, vegetables, and shimmering sand-colored cereals waving in the breezes. Much of the country was an array of gold, tans, browns, and reds, dotted here and there with verdant green orchards, herds of sheep, goats, and camels, interspersed in patchworks of grain fields. With so

¹⁴² "Although no property titles verified the claims of individual families, their possession of the fields was legitimized by cultivating them, and was continuous and hereditary." (Valensi, 26) This fact became incredibly important after colonization, and the French exploited the lack of paperwork that affirmed families' claims to certain properties.

¹⁴³ Valensi, 26

¹⁴⁴ De Liette, "Degannes Memoir."

little annual rainfall, the land required careful cultivation and management to bring forth a yield abundant enough to provide a living for the inhabitants.¹⁴⁵

Despite the differences in language, religion, modes of dress and social structures among the Indigenous Americans and Algerians, both the Americans and French entered complex and diverse social landscapes for which they were unprepared. Neither the Americans nor the French had the intellectual schemas, language skills, or useful anthropological knowledge required to understand the people with whom they interacted upon their arrival in the Wabash Valley and Algeria. Consequently, kinship structures, political institutions and practices, judicial procedures, land claims nor land management techniques made sense to the colonizers.

Nevertheless, both the Wabash Valley and Constantine province were highly desirable lands to acquire. Both were important communication and trade hubs that would provide the colonizers' access to the information and commercial networks they desired. These locations could also serve as significant strategic military acquisitions and bases from which to launch new campaigns. Additionally, both were (and are) fertile regions that could provide food for the troops stationed there. In contrast to settler myths about territories peopled with "roaming nomads" who had little or no "rightful" claim to property because they did nothing to improve it, local Indigenous inhabitants already practiced extensive agriculture in both Constantine and the Wabash Valley. In spite of all of the evidence to the contrary, these myths would persist in both French and American propaganda and literature about these regions.¹⁴⁶ While Indigenous

¹⁴⁵ Diana K Davis, *Resurrecting the Granary of Rome: Environmental History and French Colonial Expansion in North Africa*, Ohio University Press Series in Ecology and History (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007), 1–44; Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 26–27; Valensi, *On the Eve of Colonialism*, 26–27.

¹⁴⁶ For more on settler myths, see Daiva Stasiulis and Nira Yuval Davis, "Introduction: Beyond Dichotomies-Gender, Race, Ethnicity and Class in Settler Societies," Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis, *Unsettling Settler Societies*; Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native."

communities practiced farming and careful land management in both regions, herding (in Algeria) and hunting (in America) provided sources of protein and supplemented agricultural yields. Thus, the population that confronted the colonizers in each place was well-fed, well-connected, and well-informed - a daunting prospect for any would-be settler - militia-man, soldier, and farmer alike.

According to the settler narrative, with much effort and bloodshed, civilization, peace, and prosperity replaced violence and want. Boone asserts that he and others bought the land with their blood and toil so other Americans may enjoy the fruits of their suffering and perseverance. It was a vision familiar to many Americans by 1784 when his account was published alongside that of John Filson's in a promotional tract for Kentucky settlement. A decade before, however, early settlers had to make a strong case for the preservation and protection of their exposed position on the frontier. Similarly, French leaders in Algeria and merchants in Marseille fought for continued French presence in the North African region.¹⁴⁷ Both resorted to high-flying prose about the fertility, beauty, and quality of the land, the profits to be gained, and the honor that would accrue to the mother countries. With hope and not a small amount of desire, soldier-settlers and speculators set their sights on the American and Algerian promised lands.

¹⁴⁷ For more on the settler work ethic and sacrifice as justification for colonization and land claims, see Wolfe, "The Settler Complex."

Chapter 2: Conquest

What thanks, what ardent and ceaseless thanks are due to that all-superintending Providence which has turned a cruel war into peace, brought order out of confusion, made the fierce savages placid, and turned away their hostile weapons from our country! May the same Almighty Goodness banish the accursed monster, war, from all lands, with her hatred associates, rapine and insatiable ambition. Let peace, descending from her native heaven, bid her olives spring amidst the joyful nations; and plenty, in league with commerce, scatter blessings from her copious hand.

This account of my adventures will inform the reader of the most remarkable events of this country. — I now live in peace and safety, enjoying the sweets of liberty, and the bounties of Providence, with my once fellow-sufferers, in this delightful country, which I have seen purchased with a vast expense of blood and treasure, delighting in the prospect of its being, in a short time, one of the most opulent and powerful states on the continent of North America; which, with the love and gratitude of my country-men, I esteem a sufficient reward for all my toil and dangers.¹

Two republics. Two military occupations. Two settler colonies. Separated by time and space, the conquest and occupations of the American Wabash Valley and French Algeria were, nevertheless, grounded in similar motivations and ideologies. International competition with Great Britain and domestic political tensions formed ties that bound metropolitan American and French interest to the fates of their territories. While the initial invasion of the Wabash Valley was sponsored and carried out by the American settlers themselves, the French occupation of

¹ Daniel Boone, in Filson, *The Discovery, Settlement and Present State of Kentucke*, 61–62.

Algeria was undertaken for monarchical political gains and legitimacy and carried out by professional soldiers. However, each region became a settler colony as a result of contingent decisions made by military leaders and the settlers who followed them rather than premeditated metropolitan intentions to expropriate land from the Indigenous inhabitants and establish settler colonies. The military conquests of the lands around the Wabash River in North America and in Algeria reveal the confluence of military, political, commercial, financial, and proprietary interests.

At the time of the American occupation, the United States had just been organized as loosely affiliated confederate states joined together to fight for independence from Great Britain. If the new government did not succeed in its revolution, its leaders could be hanged, drawn and quartered for treason. If American militia commander George Rogers Clark's mission failed in what was then "the west," the backcountry settlers could endure additional Indigenous warriors' raids and be forced to relinquish lands back to the Natives. The British military could execute the planned pincer move to cut off the northern from the southern states with the hope of breaking the rebellion. Much was at stake.

King Charles X of France believed his situation no less dire than that of the earlier Americans. Aware of increasing social unrest and dissatisfaction with his government, he and his cabinet understood the grave and growing threat to his political power. Timing the Algerian campaign to coincide with upcoming elections, Charles hoped to bolster domestic political support, distract French citizens from their unhappiness, inspire national pride, and prevent the British from the rumored acquisition of Algiers, the jewel of the Mediterranean.²

² Bertier de Sauvigny and Pinkney, *History of France*, 266–271; Wright, *France in Modern Times*, 184; Georges Dupeux, *French Society, 1789-1970* (London: Methuen, 1976); Jean Lucas-Dubreton and Elsie Finimore Buckley, *The Restoration and the July Monarchy* (New York:

Each conquest was predicated on the stated intention to prevent further Indigenous aggressions against citizens of the metropolitan states. In the case of North America, the United States declared its objective to be the preservation of the backcountry settlers' lives and livelihoods through the cessation of Native American attacks.³ In Algeria, France proclaimed itself the savior of European interests in the Mediterranean by breaking the stronghold of the Barbary pirates.⁴ The threats posed by Native Americans and the Barbary pirates supplied compelling justifications for military intervention.

United States: Conquest of the Wabash Valley

Political ambitions and desperation launched both military campaigns, but it was not that simple. The newly formed United States was fighting for its life against Great Britain while at the same time settlers advanced into the frontier west and north, inciting Indian opposition and occasional reprisals as squatters encroached on Native lands. In 1777, George Rogers Clark, a surveyor and militaristic settler leader proposed an invasion of the Wabash River Valley to cripple the British forts there, cut ties between the British and their Native allies, and end American Indian raids on the backcountry.⁵ Patrick Henry, the governor of Virginia, along with

AMS Press, 1967), 155–158; H. A. C. Collingham, *The July Monarchy: A Political History of France, 1830-1848* (London: Longman, 1988), 247; Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 46–48; Sessions, *By Sword and Plow*, 19–28.

³ “Committee on Indian Affairs Report to the Continental Congress,” 15 October 1783, *Journal of the Continental Congress* 25: 681-696.

⁴ Jean-Toussaint Merle, *Anecdotes Historiques et Politiques pour Servir à l'Histoire de la Conquête d'Alger en 1830* (Paris: G.-A. Dentu, 1831); Lahouari Addi, “Colonial Mythologies: Algeria in the French Imagination,” in *Franco-Arab Encounters*, ed. L. Carl Brown and Matthew S. Gordon (Beirut, Lebanon: American University of Beirut, 1996), 98–99.

⁵ “Petition by John Gabriel Jones and George Rogers Clark,” October 1776, *George Rogers Clark Papers, Illinois Historical Collections* 8: 19.

several prominent political leaders and landholders agreed to fund Clark's plan and reward him and his militiamen with 300 acres each in the territory if they were successful.⁶

The Wabash and Ohio Valleys were valuable territories and highly desirable as both strategic military sites and locations for American settlements. In the fall of 1777, Clark wrote to Patrick Henry to describe the French town of Kaskaskia, its location in the Wabash Valley, inhabitants, defenses, the threat it posed to the American backcountry settlements while under British control, as well as its strategic value as a military acquisition. Clark accused the British-appointed governor of the village, Philippe-François de Rastel de Rocheblave, of inciting the "Waubash Indians to invade the frontiers of Kentucky" and "daily [treated] with other Nations, giving large presents and offering great rewards for scalps."⁷ Because of its location on the Kaskaskia River, near the Spanish town Ste. Genevieve [Misère] and close to the Mississippi River, it was an important trade and diplomatic hub with Native, Spanish, and French communities that Americans hoped to recruit for the revolutionary war effort. Since Kaskaskia was situated near the mouth of the Ohio River, Clark observed that the British would

be able to interrupt any communication that we should want to hold up and down the Mississippi without a strong guard; having plenty of swivels they might, and I don't

⁶ Clarence Walworth Alvord, *The Illinois Country, 1673-1818*, vol. 1, Sesquicentennial History of Illinois (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1920), xix-xx.

⁷ George Rogers Clark to [Virginia Governor] Patrick Henry, 1777 in *George Rogers Clark Papers, 1771-1781*, IHC 8:31. Philippe-François de Rastel de Rocheblave was a French officer who served with the colonial army during the French and Indian War (1754-1763) and remained in North America following the conclusion of the war. A soldier of fortune, Chevalier de Rocheblave settled in Kaskaskia until the British occupied the fort there in 1765. At that time he moved to Ste. Genevieve across the Mississippi River to command the Illinois Country for the Spanish until 1773 or 1774 when an argument with the Spanish governor forced him to return to Kaskaskia in 1773 or 1774, where he then served as commandant for the British until his capture by the Americans under George Rogers Clark in 1778. (Pierre Dufour and Marc Ouellet, "Rastel de Rocheblave, Pierre de," in *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, vol. 7, University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003-, accessed March 18, 2015, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/rastel_de_rocheblave_pierre_de_7E.html.)

doubt but would keep armed boats for the purpose of taking our property. On the contrary, if it was in our possession it would distress the garrison at Detroit for provisions, it would fling the command of the two great rivers into our hands, which would enable us to get supplies of goods from the Spaniards, and to carry on a trade with the Indians.⁸

If the Americans were able to take the town, Clark maintained, they would have access to some of the most important trade routes on the continent, made even more so during the British blockade and trade embargoes. The extensive river systems of the region would provide access to French and Spanish towns for supplies, information, and, potentially, military support. Controlling the Wabash River Valley would also place the Americans in a position to prevent further raids on the American backcountry settlements. After taking this town and advancing on Vincennes and Cahokia, two other strategic military acquisitions, Clark also planned to launch an attack on the British stronghold at Detroit.

Between December 1777 and early 1778, Clark, laid out and lobbied for his military objectives in the Wabash Valley. By demonstrating the strategic value of the region - militarily, commercially, and financially - Clark won over Virginia's leaders. Together, the Virginians hoped to take and hold the British forts west of Detroit to stage a later attack on this British bulwark, prevent additional Native raids on American backcountry settlers, and open new lands for settlement. In December 1778, Governor Henry reminded Clark how intertwined these objectives were with the "honor and interest of the State."⁹ If Clark was successful, Virginia

⁸ Clark to Henry, 1777, in *George Rogers Clark Papers, 1771-1781*, IHC 8: 31–32.

⁹ Instructions to George Rogers Clark From the Gov. Patrick Henry, December 15, 1778, in Clarence Walworth Alvord, *Kaskaskia Records, 1778-1790*, Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library, Virginia Series 2 (Springfield, IL: The Trustees of the Illinois State Historical Library, 1909), 60–63.

would greatly expand its own boundaries, wealthy Virginians stood to profit from land sales to new settlers, and the state would acquire access to lucrative trade routes along the Mississippi and Ohio River systems.

The connection between the military conquest, prevention of Native American raids on the settlements, and opening territory for additional American settlement in the choice fertile lands of the Ohio and Wabash Valleys was not coincidental. These three objectives were and are common among settler colonizers. Individual aspirations for upward socioeconomic mobility through land acquisition, investment and sales, metropolitan concerns about power and international relations, and military goals were closely intertwined in the settler colonial project.¹⁰ Indeed, Virginia's leading politicians knew Clark's true designs and stood poised to profit handily from the conquest, should Clark succeed. Consequently, they did not hesitate to promise 300 acres to each of the militiamen who took part, following their service. By granting land contingent on their success rather than payment in specie, the Virginia Assembly provided

¹⁰ "The Land Office is not opened as yet, so that nothing could be done for you towards securing the Land you wanted. But as soon as there is an Opportunity I shall not forget you." (Henry to Clark, 12 December 1778, Williamsburg, in *IHC* 8: 75).

"I am very desirous to get two of the best Stallions that possibly be found at the Illinois. I hear the Horses are fine. (72) ... have particular Care of the Horses, for I am vastly anxious to get the finest Horses of the true Spanish Blood (72)... I wish you also to get for me upon receipt of this Eight of the best Mares you can purchase. I don't desire you to be particular in their Blood so much as that of the Horses. I want the Spanish Blood & the Mares to be as large as you can get, & not old. Don't loose a moment in agreeing for the Mares, for vast Numbers of people are about to go out after them from here & will soon pick them all up & raise the price very high. I hear they are now cheap, & if they are risen, pray don't fail to buy them & send them to Col. Wm. Christians, by some good men coming in" (73).

Clark's response describes the horses and his plans to procure those requested by the governor. He also thanked him for remembering Clark's question about land: "I thank you for your remembrance of my situation respecting lands in the Frontiers, I learn that Government has reserved on the lands on the Cumberland for the Soldiers. If I should be deprived of a certain tract of land on that River which I purchased three Years ago, and have been at a considerable expense to improve, I shall in a manner lose my all, It is known by the name of the great french [sic] Lick on the South or West side containing three thousand Acres, if you can do any thing for me in saving of it, I shall for ever remember it with gratitude" (304)

both an incentive to the men involved in the campaign and relief from the financial pressures facing the overburdened new government.

The intricacies of forest diplomacy and strategy greatly complicated the maneuvering of Natives, French, British, and settlers in the campaign to control this region. Alliances were critical to all sides, but increased the leverage of Indigenous inhabitants with both Clark and British Lieutenant Governor Henry Hamilton. Each knew he could not hold any territory in the region without the acquiescence of the local Native communities and the augmentation of French militia to their small contingents. Although Clark was already aware of this, Patrick Henry and the Virginia Assembly reiterated how crucial it was to win friends among the Wabash Valley inhabitants:

I consider your further Successes as depending upon the goodwill & friendship of the Frenchmen & Indians who inhabit your part of the Commonwealth. With their concurrence, great Things may be accomplished. But their Animosity will spoil the fair prospect which your past Successes have opened. You will therefore spare no pains to conciliate the Affections of the French & Indians. Let them see & feel the Advantages of being fellow-citizens & free men. Guard most carefully against every Infringement of their property, particularly with Respect to Land, as our Enemies have alarmed them as to that. ... The Honor and Interest of the State are deeply concerned in this & the attachment of the French & Indians depends upon a due observance of it.¹¹

¹¹ "Instructions to Clark from the Virginia Council," 12 December 1778, *Journal of the Council, 1777-1778*, 379 et seq., Virginia State Archives.

By December 1778, the Americans were willing to accept French aid and even that of their Indian neighbors to expel the British from the newly minted Virginia county of Illinois.¹² While Clark was instructed to treat for peace and welcome offers of assistance, he was to say nothing on the subject of land and (for the time being at least) prevent incursions into Native territories. Clark, Henry, and the Virginia Assembly recognized that American settlers' penchant for encroaching on Native territory weakened their position in dealing with the Native Americans. This had not escaped British commanders' notice either, and they used this fact as a powerful prod to encourage Indian support. The warriors most effective for the British fought to deny the Ohio River and Wabash valleys to the land-hungry Americans, and not out of love for a British "father."¹³

In the contest for this fertile and prosperous region, British colonial officials took advantage of American acquisitiveness to ally with local Native communities to "clear all the Illinois of these invaders," and force the Big Knives (Virginians) into retreat. The British also hoped to cut off American communication from the French, Spanish, and Native leaders in the Wabash Valley. To do so, British commanders needed to employ American Indians as their primary military force against the revolting Americans, which required unity among Native leaders. This task proved more difficult than the British imagined.

Native American leaders used the British military's need for their assistance to protect and preserve their own lands and people, a common theme in settler colonialism. Indigenous

¹² Patrick Henry informed Clark that the "several posts in the Country of the Illinois and on the Wabash" he took over in the fall 1778 now fell within the limits of the newly created and designated "Illinois County." It is important to note that the Virginians assumed ownership over this territory despite the residency of thousands of Indigenous inhabitants, their land claims, and the fact that the Americans had never defeated the Native warriors in any battle. "Instructions to Clark from the Virginia Council," 12 December 1778, *Journal of the Council, 1777-1778*, 379 et seq., Virginia State Archives.

¹³ Richard White, *The Middle Ground*, 367.

civil and military leaders also worked to maintain access to necessary trade goods, including guns, powder, and ammunition through alliances with the British, Americans, French, and Spanish. Each tribal and community leader approached these objectives differently. So much was at stake that important decisions divided chiefs, even those from the same tribe. Some, like the Piankeshaw, sought to preserve the peace by selling land to the Americans or providing intelligence and assistance to American rebels, as did White Eyes, a Delaware chief. Others sought out the war hatchet and allied themselves with the British against all American intruders, like the Munsee community from the Delaware tribe.

While Clark prepared for his march on Kaskaskia, British Governor of Detroit Henry Hamilton conducted councils with numerous tribal leaders in Detroit to court their affection and ensure continued alliance in the battle for the frontier. In a large conference that began on June 14, 1778, nearly 1700 Native American men and women from the Ottawa, Chippewa, Huron, Potawatomi, Delaware, Shawnee, Miami, Mingo, Mohawk, Wea, Saginaw Chippewa, and Seneca gathered to hear what Hamilton had to say and to pledge their support to the British.¹⁴ Hamilton opened the conference promising to “never forget the manner in which you have acted ... nor the good will with which you took up your Father’s axe, striking as one man his Enemies and yours, the Rebels.”¹⁵ As was customary in these meetings, Hamilton reminded those gathered of their chain of friendship and acknowledged their accomplishments:

You may remember when you received a large belt of alliance here last year, the number of nations who took hold of it, you know the consequences have been good, as you have

¹⁴ According to the council minutes, 1,683 Native Americans of both sexes from the Ottawa, Chippewa, Huron, Potawatomi, Delaware, Shawnee, Miami, Mingo, Mohawk, Wea, Saginaw Chippewa, and Seneca gathered to hear what Hamilton had to say and to pledge their support to the British.

¹⁵ Council Notes, Detroit, 14 June 1778 in *MPHC* 9: 443-444.

succeeded in almost all your enterprises, having taken a number of prisoners and a far greater number of scalps. You have driven the Rebels to a great distance from your hunting ground & far from suffering them to take possession of your lands, you have forced them from the Frontiers to the Coast where they have fallen into the hands of the King's Troops, as I had foretold you would be the case, for which good service I thank you in the name of the King my master.¹⁶

The council minutes reveal what Hamilton later denied – that he had specifically encouraged and sent warriors to attack the settlers on the frontier. More importantly, those warriors brought back many more scalps than prisoners.

Governor Hamilton then held a smaller council with the Wea, Kickapoo, and Mascouten of the Wabash Valley on June 29, 1778. Their leaders were more reluctant to side with the British and therefore required greater convincing. Hamilton pulled out his strongest argument, which found evidence in numerous grievances that other Native leaders had previously brought before the British Indian agents and colonial officials:

The rebels not contented to act against their sovereign have also acted against the Indian nations and want to dispossess them of their Lands, the King always attentive to his dutyfull children ordered the axe to be put into the hands of his Indian children in order to drive the Rebels from their Land, while his ships of war & armys clear'd them from the sea. Children! These strings are to remind you that the King never tried to take any of your Lands, but that it was the rebels.¹⁷

¹⁶ Council Notes, Detroit, 14 June 1778 in *MPHC* 9: 445.

¹⁷ Council Notes, Detroit, 29 June 1778, *MPHC* 9: 454-5.

As the 1778 Chickasaw message to the Kickapoo makes clear, many Native leaders understood American colonists' aspiration for greater access to their lands.¹⁸ Lacking the desire or intent to stay in their colonies, British military commanders could disavow any interest in Native lands. Rather, according to Hamilton, the avaricious American colonists were to blame as they crossed the Allegheny Mountains and became settlers, encroaching on hunting grounds and pressuring Native leaders to cede ever larger territories.

Many of the Indigenous civil and military leaders gathered at Detroit in June recognized that, for them, the American Revolution was a battle for their homelands. For the Seneca, Mohawk, and Delaware who had already been forced to move west before the tide of American settlement, and the Wea, Kickapoo, Mascouten and others in the Wabash and Ohio Valleys who were soon to be on the front lines of this battle, there was only one choice - to ally themselves with the British who did not seek to acquire any of their land and provided greater trade opportunities than the impoverished Americans.¹⁹ A few, however, like the Piankeshaw and some among the Delaware, realized that the Americans might win their war, and, for that reason, it might be better to placate them by either remaining neutral or offering assistance in their efforts.

¹⁸ "... The words of the Chicasaws addressing all the people of the Ouabach as well as the Miamis: My Beloved brothers! We have long desired to see you but the Virginians have occupied us, & we know that they intend to go to you. We pray you not to receive them but tell them to withdraw from your lands, &c. If you would defend yourselves we will help you -- we are worthy of pity, we are not in the enjoyment of an inch of ground fur hunting, and if you give them your hand you will be also like us obliged to work the land for a living We tell you in the name of all the nations our neighbors, You know that for a long time we have worked, that all the brown skins should act as a single man to preserve our lands. We have made peace with all the nations; you are the only ones who will be deaf, you see now, however, that we only work for a good thing; we hope my brothers that you will listen to us." (Speeches Brought to Detroit by Mr. Beaubien, 27 September 1778, in *MPHC*, 10: 297-298.)

¹⁹ Richard White, *The Middle Ground*, 367.

While tribal leaders conferred with Hamilton and amongst themselves, the American Big Knives began to move. After a hard eight-day journey, traveling by river and over land, Clark and his small band surrounded and took the fort at Kaskaskia under cover of darkness on the night of July 4, 1778 without firing a shot. The militia secured Governor Rocheblave and sent runners through the town, ordering people to stay indoors or near their homes “on pane of Death.”²⁰ The inhabitants of Kaskaskia did not require much convincing, having heard whisperings of the savagery of the Big Knives, and they immediately complied with the orders.

Clark decided it would be best to win the affection of the Kaskaskians rather than to continue terrorizing them. He had few men and realized that he would need the support of the Wabash Valley inhabitants to take Cahokia and Vincennes. Moreover, he needed the backing of the French *habitants* to influence the “numerous Tribes of Indians attached to [them]” to remain neutral.²¹ Consequently, he called the townspeople together, informed them that France had signed a treaty of alliance with the Americans and that he had come to grant them their freedom from the English. If they were willing to take an oath of fidelity to the United States, they would be welcomed into the enjoyment of American democratic governance, which would respect their religious practices and property. According to Clark, both his message and his men were warmly received. He reported that the French inhabitants of Kaskaskia appeared overjoyed that France had sided with the American cause. However, their expressions of joy may have had more to do with the fact that the Big Knives had decided not to kill or enslave them, as they had previously supposed.²²

²⁰ Clark to Mason, 19 November 1779, *IHC* 8: 118-123.

²¹ Clark to Mason, 19 November 1779, *IHC* 8: 120.

²² Clark to Mason, 19 November 1779, *IHC* 8: 118-123.

After sending Captain Joseph Bowman to Cahokia and Captain Leonard Helm to Vincennes with detachments, Clark turned to negotiations with neighboring Native leaders. He described them as confused by the warm reception that the French and Spanish offered the Big Knives, with whom the Ohio Valley and Southern tribes were at war.²³ Describing his approach to Indian affairs, Clark wrote,

[I] always thought we took the wrong method of treating with Indians, and strove as soon as possible to make myself acquainted with the French and Spanish mode which must be prefferable [sic] to ours, otherwise they could not possibly have such great influence among them; when thoroughly acquainted with it exactly Coin[c]ided with my own idea, and Resolved to follow that same Rule as near as Circumstances would permit.²⁴

However, his subsequent actions demonstrated that he did not truly understand French or Spanish diplomacy with the Illinois and Wabash Valley Native communities. His unwillingness to observe various Nations' manners and customs and to practice them, as had the French and the Spanish in this region, would cost him and the frontier dearly.²⁵

Since the British had retaken Vincennes in mid-December 1778, Clark launched another campaign in February 1779 to carry out his orders to maintain the ground he had won the previous year. He knew he must reclaim the post for the Americans if he was to have any influence over the Native leaders in the Wabash Valley and Illinois Country. It was also an essential step toward capturing Detroit, which was strategically important for the Revolutionary

²³ The Wabash tribes did not declare themselves definitively in the British camp until June 1778 at a council held at Detroit about the same time that Clark 'conquered' the Illinois Country. However, it was a common misperception among Kentucky settlers that the attacks they suffered came from the Illinois and Wabash Indians.

²⁴ Clark to Mason, 19 November 1779, *IHC* 8: 124.

²⁵ Richard White likened Clark to a war chief and substantiated the claim by pointing to Clark's leadership style, his inability to communicate effectively with village or civil chiefs, and his narrow focus on military concerns. He was a blunt hammer even when delicacy was required.

effort as well as for the prevention of further raids on the frontiers. Clark wrote in retrospect that he expected to “be able to fulfill [his] threats with a Body of Troops sufficient to penetrate into any part of their Country: and by Reducing Detroit bring [the Native Americans] to [his] feet.”²⁶ In his letter to George Mason, Clark explained that his desire to take Detroit did not proceed from vainglory but from an eagerness to establish a “Profound Peace on the Fronteers.”²⁷ Clark set off on February 4, 1779 with about 200 men to retake Vincennes and avenge the deaths of fellow backcountry settlers.

Across the flooded plains of the Wabash Valley, Clark led his small band of militia through freezing chest-high waters. Their only protection was their daily bane. No one would suspect an attack in February nor look for them to cross 240 miles of inundated prairies. According to all accounts, the march was treacherous and miserable. Encouraged by Clark’s doggedness and leadership, the men continued on, and although it rained incessantly they “never halted for it.”²⁸ To make matters worse, the boat laden with provisions did not catch up to the men as they waded through the icy waters, and there were few places dry enough to stop and sleep.

By February 20, Captain Bowman reported that their “camp [was] very quiet but hungry some almost in despair[.] Many of the Creol Volunteers talking of returning.”²⁹ The next day they hoped to reach Vincennes by nightfall, so they “plunged into the Water sometimes to the Neck for more than one league when [they] stop’d on the second hill ... there being no dry land near [them] on one side for many leagues ... [It rained] all ... day [and still there were] no

²⁶ Clark to Mason, 19 November 1779, in *IHC* 8: 148.

²⁷ Clark to Mason, 19 November 1779, in *IHC* 8: 150.

²⁸ Journal of Joseph Bowman, 29 January - 20 March 1779, in *IHC* 8: 158.

²⁹ Journal of Joseph Bowman, 158.

Provisions.”³⁰ Clark rallied his men the next day and led them charging into the waters again with war whoops. Weak with cold and hunger, having survived four days *sans* sustenance, the promise of wreaking vengeance on the “Hair Buyer,” British General Henry Hamilton, urged them on.³¹ The following day, they set off across the flooded four-mile-wide Horseshoe Plain.

Firing commenced on the fort that night as Clark continued to carefully conceal his true numbers and give the impression of a much greater force. At about nine in the morning on February 24, Clark sent a notice to Hamilton threatening him to surrender immediately or incur the wrath of Clark’s men, who would treat everyone in the fort as the murderers they were. Knowing he could not rely on the French to hold out much longer and after losing more men in the heated battle, Hamilton sent a messenger to Clark, proposing a three-day cessation of hostilities to negotiate terms of peace.³²

Shortly after a meeting between Clark and Hamilton, Hamilton capitulated and offered unconditional surrender to the Americans. There were too few militiamen to guard the prisoners, so Clark sent the British volunteers back to Detroit after they took an Oath of Neutrality. Hamilton was sent off to a prison in Williamsburg with several of Clark’s men to guard him on the journey. It was well they went because the backcountry settlers were so incensed with Hamilton for sending Indian raiding parties against them that they frequently threatened his life and fired shots at him whenever possible.³³

³⁰ Bowman’s Journal, 21 February 1779, in *IHC* 8: 158-9.

³¹ Bowman’s Journal, 23 February 1779, in *IHC* 8: 159.

³² Clark to Mason, 19 November 1779, in *IHC* 8: 150; Henry Hamilton, “Report by Lieutenant Governor Henry Hamilton on his Proceedings from November, 1776 to June, 1781,” in *IHC* 8: 174-207.

³³ Clark to Mason, 19 November 1779, in *IHC* 8: 150; Henry Hamilton, “Report by Lieutenant Governor Henry Hamilton on his Proceedings from November, 1776 to June, 1781,” in *IHC* 8: 174-207.

In the aftermath of the battle, Clark turned once again to negotiating (as he described it) with Native leaders, but his message to them ended ominously:

...you may be Assured that no peace for the future will be granted to those that do not lay down their Arms immediately. Its as you will[.] I don't care whether you are for Peace or War; as I Glory in War and want Enemies to fight us ... this is the last Speech you may ever expect from the big knives, the next thing will be the Tomahawk. And You may expect in four Moons to see Your Women & Children given to the Dogs to eat, while those Nations that have kept their words with me will Flourish and grow like the Willow Trees on the River Banks under the care and nourishment of their father the Big Knives³⁴

Shortly thereafter, Captain Helm, the American commander at Vincennes reported to Clark that by April 1779 numerous nations were conspiring to avenge the deaths of their allies and kinsmen whom Clark killed in front of the fort gates.

...there are belts sent to all nations by the Chippewa, Ottawa, Huron, &c. to join them, to come down and cut off the village St. Vincent [Vincennes] for revenge of the murdering their friends in the street. They declared they would not spare a French man no more than American as they looked on them as one. They also sent several belts of black wampum to the Wabash and Kickapoo to join them when called on or they would strike them first.³⁵

Thus, Clark's intention - to demonstrate that the British would not intervene to save their Native allies - had the unintended consequence of provoking further attacks, the opposite result of that he was instructed to achieve. On the other hand, some of the Wabash Indians, including the

³⁴ Clark to Mason, 148-9.

³⁵ [Captain] Leonard Helm to Clark, Vincennes, April 10, 1779, *Missouri Historical Society, Clark Papers*. Miami 1779 Records, OVGLEA.

Kickapoo had decided to support the Americans and determined to meet Captain Helm at Vincennes to keep the way between them clear.³⁶ Nevertheless, a month later, Helm wrote to Clark again that discipline must be enforced among the Americans who did not distinguish between friend and foe when they met Indians, killing them indiscriminately. He warned, “if [there] is not a stop put to killing Indian friends we must expect to have all foes.”³⁷

This was a mere foreshadowing of the bloodshed that would follow. Unable to control Indian-hating militiamen and backcountry settlers, American commanders watched in frustration as they killed Native men, women, and children without distinction. Ironically and tragically, it was often those most skilled at, and amenable to, negotiations with the Americans who were murdered.³⁸ Frontiersmen declared their own Indian policy, one that neither their commanders nor metropolitan officials could alter or restrain. The situation was made worse when leaders, like Clark, either gave their consent or even instigated the attacks. By the fall of 1781, Clark’s gains had vanished, and American influence among the French and Indians had declined sharply.

³⁶ “The Delaware chief has come since your departure with [a] number of belts and many speeches, also one Chickasaw with a very large white belt. Likewise, Capt Bull from the Chocktaws, Cherokee, Shawnees and Creek nations, which speeches I shall send you shortly as there is people going to Illinois soon. The inhabitants of this place is much terrified at the news of the Lake Indians. I think highly necessary for Mr. Kennedy to be continued at this post, as he is well acquainted with the people and no person better fit to deal with them.” (Helm to Clark, Vincennes, 10 April 1779. *Missouri Historical Society. Clark Papers*, Miami 1779 Records, OVGLEA.)

³⁷ Helm to Clark, Vincennes, IN, 9 May 1779 in *IHC* 8: 316-317.

³⁸ White, *The Middle Ground*, 384.

The French Conquest of Algiers

*The seizure of Algiers begins a new era for world civilization. If we are able to exploit it, part of Africa in a few years will be blessed with a hard-working population, like America, and the Mediterranean will no longer be a mere lake.*³⁹

The conquest of Algiers was undertaken for a myriad of reasons, but the formation of a settler colony was not among them.⁴⁰ The desire to establish the legitimacy of the French government under Charles X for both domestic and international audiences provided the impetus for the campaign. “The expedition of Algiers was not connected with the colonial policy of the Restoration Bourbon monarchy, [but] a makeshift expedient for internal political consumption, carried out by a government in difficulty seeking the prestige of a military victory.”⁴¹ Like the American military campaign, foreign and domestic political and commercial interests prompted the French invasion of Algeria.

In 1827, a fly swatter lit the fire that enflamed French passions and launched a series of events that culminated in the assault on Algiers. To understand why, we must first return to Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798. To feed his troops, Napoleon bought grain from two Jewish merchants in Algeria but never repaid them. Following Napoleon's downfall, the next French government under Louis XVIII ignored the previous regime's debts, as did the successive regime under Charles X. Hussein Dey, the Ottoman governor of Algiers, finally called in the loans of these two Jewish merchants in 1827, but they claimed that they could not meet their obligations to the *dey* until they themselves were repaid by the French. While trying to resolve

³⁹ *Le Constitutionnel*, 11 July 1830, translation by Lahouari Addi in “Colonial Mythologies: Algeria in the French Imagination,” *Franco Arab Encounters*, edited by L. Carl Brown and Matthew S. Gordon (Beirut, Lebanon: American University of Beirut, 1996), 94.

⁴⁰ Wright, *France in Modern Times*, 192–193; Sessions, *By Sword and Plow*, 1.

⁴¹ Ageron, *Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present*, trans. and ed. Michael Brett (Trenton, 1991), 5.

the issue, the *dey* met with French consul Pierre Deval. However, Deval refused to discuss the matter, remarking that His Most Christian Majesty would not deign to correspond with the *dey*. Finally losing his temper, Hussein Dey struck Deval with his flywhisk.⁴²

News of the mutual insults flew around the Mediterranean, causing international embarrassment for the French government. The *dey* repeatedly explained that he had only responded to the aggravating individual responsible for continued tensions between France and Algiers and that he meant no disrespect to King Charles or the French government in general. In retaliation for the perceived slight, France broke off diplomatic communication with Algiers and blockaded her port. The *dey* then ordered several important French trading posts destroyed at Bône (Annaba) and La Calle on the Algerian coast.⁴³

As tensions rose between France and Algeria, so, too, did social unrest within France. King Charles X supported both the nobility and clergy and had kept or appointed like-minded ministers whose views ran counter to the rising nationalist sentiments of the politically-engaged populace.⁴⁴ At the same time, the prosperity of the early- to mid-1820s quickly vanished as poor grain harvests led to rising costs for staple foods, bankruptcies, a banking crisis, and an economic

⁴² Ageron, *Modern Algeria*, 5–6; Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 40–47; Sessions, *By Sword and Plow*, 19–28; Lucas-Dubreton and Buckley, *The Restoration and the July Monarchy*, 155–156; Addi, “Colonial Mythologies: Algeria in the French Imagination,” 96–97.

⁴³ These posts were particularly significant because they were part of France’s “concessions” from the Ottoman Empire. The first Capitulation, or commercial treaty, between France and the Ottoman Empire was signed in 1536 and “allowed French merchants to trade freely in Ottoman ports, to be exempt from Ottoman taxes and to import and export goods at low tariff rates . . . and granted extraterritorial privileges to French merchants by permitting them to come under the legal jurisdiction of the French consul in Istanbul, thus making them subject to French rather than Ottoman-Islamic law” (William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 4th Ed. [Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2009], 50). Thus, the *dey*’s attack on the French trading posts at Bône and La Calle was a direct assault on emblems of French commercial interests and the European Capitulations that had weakened the Ottoman Empire.

⁴⁴ Bertier de Sauvigny and Pinkney, *History of France*, 263; Dupeux, *French Society, 1789-1970*, 98–99; Wright, *France in Modern Times*, 99–102.

depression.⁴⁵ This, in part, was also a consequence of the French blockade of Algiers. French shipping companies were forced to transport products in convoys that included armed merchantmen to protect the goods from Algerian retaliation. Consequently, shipping costs rose to extraordinary levels, as did the price of the transported goods.⁴⁶

Under pressure from political opposition Charles X appointed a moderate prime minister, Jean-Baptiste Sylvère Gay, Vicomte de Martignac, in 1827.⁴⁷ Two years later, Martignac sent a plenipotentiary to Algiers to negotiate a settlement with the *dey*. After delivering his offer of peace, the French plenipotentiary and his staff alighted the waiting ships and began to sail for home. Shortly after their departure, Algerian batteries fired parting shots over the bow of the French flagship, infuriating the French once again. Irritated by this failure, Charles fired Martignac and appointed Prince Jules de Polignac in his place on August 8, 1829.⁴⁸

Following the insult at the court of Algiers, War Minister Clermont Tonerre's first proposal for an invasion indicated that it would be politically advantageous to distract the French populace from domestic political problems. "It could be useful to Your Majesty to have a pretext for organizing an army ... to remind France... that military glory survived the Revolution and that the legitimate Monarchy not only guarantees the country against foreign invasion, but that it

⁴⁵ Dupeux, *French Society, 1789-1970*, 113–114; Bertier de Sauvigny and Pinkney, *History of France*, 263–266; Lucas-Dubreton and Buckley, *The Restoration and the July Monarchy*, 139–140.

⁴⁶ Wright, *France in Modern Times*, 192–193; Bertier de Sauvigny and Pinkney, *History of France*, 270–271; Lucas-Dubreton and Buckley, *The Restoration and the July Monarchy*, 155–156.

⁴⁷ Wright, *France in Modern Times*, 102; Lucas-Dubreton and Buckley, *The Restoration and the July Monarchy*, 143–144.

⁴⁸ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 47; Bertier de Sauvigny and Pinkney, *History of France*, 264–267; Peter Dunwoodie, *Writing French Algeria* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 8–9.

can also carry our standards into distant countries.”⁴⁹ Tonnerre declared in this initial suggestion of war for political purposes that its primary objective would be “the glory that [would] be reflected onto the KING [and] the force that such an expedition [would] give to his government.”⁵⁰

Subsequent Minister of War Count Louis de Bourmont lent his support to Tonnerre’s original recommendations, explaining in December 1829 that an “expedition against Algiers would capture the national imagination; it would give new vigor to the army, stoke the hopes of trade, and reunite all opinions by uniting all interests.”⁵¹ As in the American campaign in the Wabash Valley, individual ambitions were intricately linked to metropolitan political maneuverings, as well as military and commercial interests. Newly appointed Prime Minister Polignac agreed that an invasion provided the perfect distraction to take the French electorate’s mind off rising socio-political tensions. As de Bourmont made preparations for the campaign, Polignac planned the next elections to coincide with the anticipated conquest of Algiers. “It will never be said that the King of France bore the insult of a pirate chief with impunity,” War Minister de Bourmont declared.⁵²

Propping up the Restoration Monarchy and avenging the *dey*’s insult were not the only motivating factors. Competition with Great Britain also prompted the French government to initiate the campaign. After losing its position of imperial influence in Egypt to Great Britain in

⁴⁹ Service Historique de la Défense, Chateau de Vincennes (SHD) 1H 1, Ministre de la Guerre (Clermont-Tonnerre), “Rapport au Roi sur Alger,” 14 October 1827, in Sessions, 27.

⁵⁰ SHD 1H 1, Ministre de la Guerre (Clermont-Tonnerre), “Rapport au Roi sur Alger,” 14 October 1827 in Session, 25.

⁵¹ “Rapport au Roi sur Alger,” 14 October 1827, in Sessions, 27.

⁵² J. T. Merle, *Anecdotes historiques et politiques pour servir à l’histoire de la conquête d’Alger en 1830* (Paris: G. A. Dentu, 1831), 11. Author Translation. Jean-Toussaint Merle was known as a “man of letters” as manager of the Parisian Porte-Saint-Martin Theatre. In 1830, he witnessed and published an account of the conquest of Algiers.

1801, France had suffered another devastating blow when the British navy handily defeated the allied French and Spanish fleets in the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805. These two losses and the continued expansion of British imperial power around the globe in the early nineteenth century concerned a French government highly conscious of its slipping prestige on the international stage. Hints of Britain's intentions on Algiers may have been the final straw for the French king. With its influence in Egypt, control over Algiers would have given Great Britain authority over much of the North African coast and with it, access to profitable trade routes across the Sahara and throughout the Mediterranean. Unwilling to lose further ground economically or politically, it was clear that the French really only had one option: conquer Algiers before the British had the opportunity. A successful conquest, it was hoped, would generate personal and international political capital for Charles X and for France. The conquest also offered a chance to start anew, to replace France's lost American colonies, and reinvent the state as a modern imperial power, but this realization unfolded slowly over the course of the first decade of occupation.⁵³

The decision was made, and preparations began in earnest in early 1830. By May 11, 1830, French troops had assembled in Toulon and readied for departure but were forced to wait for more favorable winds. Two weeks later, the breeze had picked up and 34,184 soldiers, along with 3,389 noncombatants and sailors set off for the shores of Algeria on May 25, commanded by General Louis-Auguste-Victor, Count de Ghaisnes de Bourmont and Admiral Guy-Victore Duperré. On board the fleet of 635 ships, they stowed field artillery, siege artillery, and cavalry horses.⁵⁴ Unable to land on May 31 as planned due to inclement weather, the French were forced

⁵³ Lucas-Dubreton and Buckley, *The Restoration and the July Monarchy*, 156–157; Wright, *France in Modern Times*, 184–186, 193; Dunwoodie, *Writing French Algeria*, 8–9; Sessions, *By Sword and Plow*, 6–8; Addi, “Colonial Mythologies: Algeria in the French Imagination,” 94–95.

⁵⁴ Merle, *Anecdotes historiques*, 38; Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 48.

to wait until June 14 to disembark in the Bay of Sidi Ferruch, west of Algiers. It took five days to off-load all of the equipment and horses, and by that time, their camp was the size of a large city.

Meanwhile, Agha Ibrahim, the *dey's* son-in-law, began to gather the Algerian forces to mount a defense. Comprised of approximately 7,000 Turks, 19,000 troops provided by the Beys of Constantine and Oran, and 17,000 Kabyles the Algerian forces were poorly outfitted with vastly inferior artillery, but their soldiers were armed with longer-range rifles than those of the French.⁵⁵ Still trying to pull the disparate battalions together, Ibrahim's army offered only weak resistance. Instead of bombarding the French and forcing them back to their boats, inadequate Algerian firepower allowed Bourmont to establish and expand a bridgehead, creating a defensive lodgment. By the time the Algerians were sufficiently organized to launch an attack, the invading forces were firmly ensconced and prepared for war.⁵⁶

In conference with the Agha at Sidi Ferredj, Hadj Ahmed, *bey* of Constantine, advised him to abandon the idea of constructing redoubts around the seacoast to prevent the French from disembarking. Ahmed saw that it would be impossible to transport the necessary cannons and munitions in time. It was already too late. Instead, he counseled the Algerians to offer some resistance as the French unburdened their vessels and draw the troops away from Algiers to terrain favorable for the Algerian style of combat. Once the French completed the evacuation of the ships, the Algerians awaited them on the plains of Staouéli, trusting that "God always comes to the aid of true believers against the infidels who come to attack the city [Algiers] placed under

⁵⁵ Kabyles were and are the largest of four Berber groups living in Algeria and primarily occupied the region known as Grand Kabylie in the eastern province of Constantine. Cf. Patricia M. E. Lorcin, *Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice and Race in Colonial Algeria* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1995).

⁵⁶ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 48–49.

his protection, and this time his aid would not fail [them] either.”⁵⁷ Hastily, the Algerian forces constructed redoubts, fitted them with cannons and waited.⁵⁸

After overpowering the Algerian batteries, the French forced the Algerians into a disorganized retreat at the Battle of Staouéli on June 19, 1830. Directly disobeying their commanding officers, French soldiers summarily shot the 2000 prisoners they had taken before continuing their march toward Algiers.

The Staouéli plateau [was] strewn with corpses. Two thousand prisoners [were] taken. In defiance of their officers, the soldiers themselves insist[ed] on shooting them all. 'One battalion's fire brought down this rabble and two thousand of them will never see the light of day again.'⁵⁹

After the rout, Mustapha Boumezrad assumed leadership over the Algerian troops, commanding unanimous support from the *Janisseries* (Ottoman soldiers) and auxiliary forces. His efficacious leadership led to daily death tolls of at least 250 French soldiers between June 24 and 28. During this time, Bourmont was busily engaged in acquiring and establishing his artillery to advantage.⁶⁰

The French advance guard reached the plateau of El-Biar on June 29. They were then within striking distance of the Sultan Kalassi (Fort de l'Empereur), the main defensive structure that guarded the western approach to Algiers.⁶¹ After two days of fierce fighting in which the

⁵⁷ “Memoire d’Ahmed Bey,” Centre des Archives d’outre-mer (CAOM), F80 Series, 80 MIOM 1673/1.

⁵⁸ “Memoir d’Ahmed Bey.”

⁵⁹ From the account of First Officer of the French ship *Ville de Marseille*, Amable Matterer in Assia Djebar, *Fantasia, an Algerian Cavalcade* (Portsmouth, N.H: Heinemann, 1993), 18.

⁶⁰ Auguste Théodore Hilaire Barchou de Penhoen, *Mémoires D’un Officier d’État-Major* (Paris: Charpentier, 1835), 230–233.

⁶¹ This was one of two forts that guarded that landward approaches to Algiers. The other, known as the “Star” was built above the Casbah in 1568. This fort, Sultan Kalassi, was built to face the southern approach between 1545 and 1580 on the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V’s campsite

French Fourth Light Horse division was almost completely destroyed, the main body of French troops arrived in front of the fort on June 30. They then faced the monumental tasks of digging entrenchments, fighting off continual Algerian assaults on their position, and setting up the huge batteries. At last, in the pre-dawn hours of July 4, the final attack on the fort began. The French breached the fort's walls at 10 o'clock in the morning after five hours of intense artillery bombardment. The Turks guarding the fort blew up what remained of it and fled, leaving the road to Algiers open.⁶²

[The French] knew that the Dey had placed his last hopes in the ramparts of this fortress, which had been so skillfully besieged, the attacks on which were led with so much talent that four days of entrenchment and seven hours of our batteries' fire was enough to reduce it to such an extreme that the garrison, comprised of the elite of the Turkish militia, no longer heard anything but their own despair, blew up their ramparts, with the intent to bury [the French soldiers] under their debris.⁶³

Following the fall of Fort de l'Empereur, the French moved their batteries to its ruins and prepared to bombard the Casbah, "the Citadel." Emissaries traveled back and forth between the French commander, General de Bourmont and Hussein Dey while the shelling of the Casbah continued. During a pause in bombardment, two Algerian ambassadors left French headquarters with the realization that they could not avoid foreign incursion into the capital city through negotiation. The only hope of keeping the French out lay in a desperate armed resistance. By afternoon, the first groups of refugees began to flee the city and by evening, all was chaos.

from his disastrously unsuccessful Algerian expedition in 1541. (Julien, *History of North Africa*, 289.) Cf. *Ibid.*, 229–232.

⁶² Merle, *Anecdotes Historiques et Politiques pour Servir à l'Histoire de la Conquête d'Alger en 1830*; Barchou de Penhoen, *Mémoires D'un Officier d'État-Major*, 230-233.

⁶³ J.T. Merle, 187.

Thousands rushed the city gates with their families and the few possessions they could carry, clogging the streets to Constantine in the East and Bab el-Oued in the West. Others took boats to Cape-Matifou by moonlight. In a single night, more than half of the city's population evacuated before the arrival of the French.⁶⁴

The next day, July 5, 1830, drums announced the approach of the victorious French military led by their artillery.⁶⁵ During a meeting with Marshal de Bourmont, Hussein Dey agreed to the terms of surrender, which the French almost simultaneously violated:

The fort of the Casaubia [*sic*], all the other forts belonging to Algiers, and the port of that city will be delivered to the French troops at 10:00 this morning French time.

The General in Chief of the French Army pledges to His Highness the Dey to allow him the freedom and possession of all his personal property.

The Dey will be at liberty to retire with his family and his personal property to whatever place he determines; and as long as he remains in Algiers he and his family shall remain under the protection of the General in Chief of the French Army. A guard will guarantee his security and that of his family

The General in Chief guarantees to all the soldiers of the militia the same advantage and the same protection.

The exercise of the Muslim religion shall be free. The liberty of the inhabitants of all classes, their religion, their property, their business and their industry shall remain inviolable. Their women shall be respected.

The General in Chief makes this engagement on his honor.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Barchou de Penhoen, *Mémoires D'un Officier d'État-Major*, 233–264; Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 48–49; "Memoire d'Ahmed Bey."

⁶⁵ Assia Djebar, *Fantasia: An Algerian Cavalcade*, trans. Dorothy S. Blair (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1993), 40–43.

The guarantees of the capitulation convention provided none of the promised protections, but they were not meaningless. Rather, they provide standards by which to measure French actions in Algeria, standards of their own design. On the very day of the capitulation, after guaranteeing the *dey's* personal property, Jean-Toussaint Merle reported,

The Casbah was quickly filled with so many troops that they naturally spread throughout the entire palace, and one imagines that the first objects that presented themselves to the soldiers were [highly] tempting. I saw several objects in their hands. . . . This dissoluteness lasted for several hours, and it was [largely] the fault of the superior officer tasked with governing the Casbah[. He] lost his head first and took such poor measures that the sentries were not placed and the billet distributed until 6:00 that evening.⁶⁷

The city, already in mourning over the military defeat, suffered greatly at the hands of triumphant French soldiers. Bedazzled by Algerian possessions they believed theirs for the taking as spoils of war, soldiers “violated person, property, and holy places many times over” on the day of the capitulation.⁶⁸ In the suburbs of Algiers “all the houses that were not occupied by the officers were practically demolished; the doors and beams were taken to be used for fires.”⁶⁹ Officers joined their out-of-control soldiers in pillaging Algiers. General Loverdo, as just one

⁶⁶ Ministère de la Guerre (France), *Collection des actes du gouvernement depuis l'occupation d'Alger jusqu'au 1er octobre 1834*. (Paris: 1843), 1-2, translation in John Rudy, *Modern Algeria*, 49.

⁶⁷ Merle, *Anecdotes*, 230-231. Author Translation. “La Cassauba fut bientôt tellement remplie de troupes, que naturellement elles se répandirent dans toutes les parties du palais, et on s' imagine bien que les premiers objets qui s'offrirent aux soldats furent des objets de tentation. J'en ai vu plusieurs entre leurs mains... Ce désordre dura à peine quelques heures, et ce fut par la faute de l'officier supérieur qui avait été chargé du gouvernement de la Cassauba, qui perdit la tête d'abord, et prit si mal ses mesures, que les sentinelles ne furent placées et les logements distribués que dans la soirée du 6.”

⁶⁸ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 50-1.

⁶⁹ Rozet, *Voyage dans le régence d'Alger* (Paris: Arthur Bertrand, 1833), Vol 1, 223-4 in Bennoune, 36.

example, was observed “leaving the city with six mules loaded with stolen goods.”⁷⁰ In addition to the looting, French military engineers were responsible for destroying 425 buildings in Algiers in the days following the collapse of the Ottoman government.⁷¹ By 1831, the French had overtaken 60 percent of the 5000 remaining buildings, and “the wretched owners, the majority of whom were expropriated without any compensation, were reduced to begging.”⁷² Between 1830 and 1834, Algiers lost two-thirds of its population as people suffered and died or fled the city in droves; only 12,000 of the original inhabitants remained in 1834.⁷³

The immediacy with which the French negated the guarantees of the capitulation terms boded ill for both the city and surrounding territories. Although French officers were interested in at least a veneer of legality, the convention meant little in practice to French military leaders and soldiers. Personal, professional, and political profits were of far greater interest. Of the 500 million franc treasury the *dey* was said to possess, only 48.7 million francs made it to the French government. The rest, although it was supposed to be protected under the terms of capitulation, disappeared.

The army’s looting and immediate violation of the convention signaled the fact that it considered itself exempt from the law, the very law its force had inaugurated. This amounted to a portentous announcement that the new regime did not plan to rule based upon affirmation and consent, law and legitimacy, institutions thought to be typical of the

⁷⁰ Gabriel Esquer, *Les Commencements d’un Empire. La Prise d’Alger, 1830* (Paris, 1929), 382 in Brower, *A Desert Named Peace*, 15. Gabriel Esquer was an archivist and administrator of the Bibliothèque Nationale d’Alger from 1910 to 1948.

⁷¹ This figure is for 1830-1831 and comes from René Lespès, *Alger: Esquisse de Géographie Urbaine* (Algiers: Carbonel, 1925), 110.

⁷² Aristide Guilbert, quoted in Mostefa Lacheraf, *L’Algérie: Nation et Société* (Paris: Maspero, 1965), 57.

⁷³ Brower, *A Desert Named Peace*, 15; Bennoune, *The Making of Contemporary Algeria, 1830-1987*, 36.

modern state. Instead, it prepared a specific set of institutions for colonial rule inspired by the most unsophisticated forms of power.⁷⁴

Following the conquest of Algiers, a tourist guidebook author later wrote, “Losing America, we have regained Africa, to which Algeria is the gateway.”⁷⁵ The French military agreed and sought to hold the territory they had fought for, even while metropolitan administrators held negotiations with the Ottoman Sultan to exchange Algiers for an extension of their concessions along the North African coast from Cape Bougaroun to the border of the Tunisian Regency.⁷⁶

General de Bourmont proceeded to expel the Ottoman rulers from Algiers and the neighboring territories, stating that he could not “allow [the Algerians] to fall back under the rule of the Turks.”⁷⁷ He then followed metropolitan orders to attack Bône but for his own reasons. Parliament was interested in Bône because it had historically controlled trade through its port under an earlier Ottoman Capitulation agreement, and it sought to keep the Marseillais merchants content by protecting their Mediterranean interests. A successful Bône campaign, they believed, might also cause Ahmed, *bey* of Constantine, to submit to French authority. Metropolitan officials did not intend the military to go beyond securing this city, but Bourmont continued after an unsuccessful attempt to conquer Bône, to march on Blida, Bougie, and Oran in an effort to “forc[e] the hand of his government in Paris.”⁷⁸ The July Revolution of 1830 blocked his efforts. When Louis Philippe replaced Charles X, he removed Bourmont from his position, whose

⁷⁴ Brower, 16.

⁷⁵ Addi, “Colonial Mythologies: Algeria in the French Imagination,” 94–95.

⁷⁶ Ageron, 6.

⁷⁷ de Bourmont, “Proclamation,” in Ageron, 7, trans. Michael Brett.

⁷⁸ Ageron, 7.

successor, General Bertrand Clauzel, firmly supported the idea of continued conquest, but to extend French, rather than Algerian, rule in the North African territory.⁷⁹

Conquests: Real and Imagined

Armed with the Republican ideals of freedom, law, and order, the Americans and French marched into the Wabash Valley and Algiers, proclaiming the territories' independence from British and Ottoman tyranny, respectively. Despite such rhetoric, however, military officials in each territory resorted to the use of brutal force to assert their authority and to “pacify” desirable lands. Even General de Bourmont, who sought to instantiate an Algerian leadership following French conquest, set in motion events that led to the massacre of an entire city (Blida) and ignored his officers’ confiscation of Algerian homes, property, and lands. Subsequent French generals employed even harsher techniques to bring Algeria to heel, and those who refused to do so were quickly removed from office. As French officers and soldiers profited from the spoils of war, American militia leaders through their own efforts or those of the state were rewarded for their incursion into the Wabash Valley with valuable property.

George Rogers Clark was sent into the Illinois Country equipped with weapons, munitions, and promises of freedom for the French and Indigenous inhabitants of the region. Admonished to “spare no pains to conciliate the affections of the French and Indians,” Clark struggled to follow orders.⁸⁰ Governor Patrick Henry sent him the Virginia Declaration of Rights as well as the Treaty of Alliance with France to induce the French inhabitants to join the

⁷⁹ “Early impetus to acquisition of rural land was provided by Count Bertrand Clauzel, the second Commanding General, who replaced the legitimist Bourmont on September 2, 1830. In many ways a man of the eighteenth century, Clauzel saw Algeria replacing France’s lost new-world empire as a source of exotic commodities, and he became a vigorous proponent of active settlement in Algeria.” (Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 52)

⁸⁰ Instructions to George Rogers Clark from the Gov. Patrick Henry, 15 December 1778, Draper MSS., 60 J 1. - Copy from Virginia State Archives, Miami Records 1778, OVGLEA.

Americans, as had their sovereign, in the fight against Great Britain and inform the French residents of the freedoms to which they were entitled as citizens of Virginia:

These will serve to shew [sic] our new friends the ground upon which they are to stand, and the support to be expect[ed] from their countrymen of France. ... Equal liberty and happiness are the objects, to a participation of which we invite them. Upon a fair presumption that the people about Detroit have similar inclinations with those at Illinois and Wabash, I think it possible that they may be brought to expell [sic] their British masters and become fellow citizens of a free state.⁸¹

To John Todd, who was commissioned as the civil commandant of Illinois Country, Governor Henry requested that he point out the advantages of American liberties offered to the Illinois inhabitants. “The difference between the State of free Citizens of this Commonwealth and that Slavery to which Illinois was destined” must be made plain to them. They were also to be informed that they could soon expect “free and equal representation ... together with all the improvements in Jurisprudence and police which the other parts of the State enjoy.”⁸²

Henry emphasized that Clark and Todd should “conciliate the affections of [both] the French and Indians. Let them see and feel the advantages of being *fellow citizens and freemen*.”⁸³ This statement deserves some attention, for it reveals that some Americans could conceive the French and Indians as equals and, potentially, even *fellow citizens* of the Americans. Henry’s proclamation also highlights the American belief (or rhetoric, at least) that the French and Indians were not already free people, but rather “slaves” under the British king’s oppressive

⁸¹ Instructions to George Rogers Clark From the Gov. Patrick Henry, 15 December 1778, Draper MSS., 60 J 1. - Copy from Virginia State Archives, Miami Records 1778, OVGLEA. The Virginia Declaration of Rights was written by George Mason and ratified June 12, 1776. The Treaty of Alliance with France was signed 6 February 1778.

⁸² Instructions from Governor Patrick Henry to John Todd, 12 December 1778 in *IHC* 8: 85.

⁸³ Henry to Todd, 12 December 1778, in *IHC* 8: 85.

hand. Contrary to American assumptions, Native leaders in the region contested the idea that they were at the beck and call of the British. In fact, Delaware representatives to Congress reminded the Americans that they were a “free and Independent people (which the Delaware Nation have ever declared themselves to be).”⁸⁴ The French demonstrated their own independence through their decisions to choose or switch sides in the larger revolution, as well as in the smaller battles for the Wabash Valley.

It is significant that Governor Henry’s missive also limned the consequences of refusing the United States’ generous offer. “It is thought the Indian nations may be overawed and inclined to peace with us by the adoption of proper measures with you. Or if that cannot be effected that such of them as send out parties toward our frontiers on this side of Ohio may be chastised by detachments from your quarter.”⁸⁵ The conflicting messages of this letter demonstrate the complexity of thoughts and emotions that Henry (and many others) held regarding Native Americans and their capacity to become “fellow citizens.” He does not write that Clark needs to ‘overawe’ the French but rather conciliate them, but he does use this language in reference to Clark’s attitude and mission vis-à-vis the Indians. If Clark could intimidate them with a brilliant display of American military power, Indigenous leaders, it was thought, would be more inclined to treat for peace. If this attempt failed to produce the desired outcome, however, Clark was free to ‘chastise’ Indian war parties that came south of the Ohio River.

⁸⁴ Speech of Delaware to Washington and Congress, 10 May 1779 in *Frontier Advance on the Upper Ohio, 1778-1779*, ed. Louis Phelps Kellogg, vol. 23 of the Collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Draper Series Vol. 4. (Madison: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1916), 317-321. As “free and independent people,” the Delaware in this same speech, laid out their land claims with the expectation that they would be honored by the United States as the property of a sovereign people.

⁸⁵ Instructions to George Rogers Clark from the Gov. Patrick Henry, 15 December 1778, in *IHC* 8: 60-61.

Similarly, in Algeria, the French claimed to be interceding for and occupying Algiers to liberate the Algerians from the tyrannical rule of the Ottoman Empire. General de Bourmont even drafted proclamations “to the *Kouloughlis*, the Arabs, and the inhabitants of Algiers,” informing them that the French army’s mission was “to drive out the Turks, your tyrants” and would return governance to Algerian hands instead of handing the city back over to the Ottomans, as the French government under Prime Minister Polignac fully intended.⁸⁶ In the early years of conquest, Tocqueville described Ottoman rule in similar terms and reproved the Arabs who cooperated with the Ottoman rulers and allowed them to subjugate their countrymen:

The Turkish domination was established more easily over the Arabs [than the Kabyles], who ... live on the open plains. This is how they did it: 5,000 to 6,000 Turks confined to Algiers could not alone have subjugated these mobile tribes, who flee at the approach of the hand that would seize them. But tyrannies never would have been established if the oppressors had not found their instruments among the oppressed.⁸⁷

He continued, “this supposed Turkish government was not truly speaking a government but a continuation of conquest, a violent expatriation of the conquered by the conquerors.”⁸⁸ He clearly wanted to create a contrast between the onerous nature of Ottoman rule with enlightened and civilized French government. It is telling that in subsequent letters he would find it difficult to make this case.

French propaganda also drew parallels between their invasion of Algeria and the Crusades to reclaim Jerusalem from the Muslim occupants.⁸⁹ To bolster support for Charles X

⁸⁶ In Ageron, 7, trans. Michael Brett.

⁸⁷ Alexis de Tocqueville, “First Letter on Algeria,” *Writing on Empire and Slavery*, trans. Jennifer Pitts (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 11.

⁸⁸ Tocqueville, “First Letter on Algeria,” 12.

⁸⁹ Lorcin, *Imperial Identities*, 18–20; Sessions, *By Sword and Plow*, 40.

and his royalist, pro-Cleric government, propagandists described the French army as the defender of the Christian monarchy sent to vanquish the injustice, tyranny and oppression of the Muslim Ottoman regime. France portrayed itself as striking a blow for all of Europe to avenge the enslavement of “Christian” (read: European) sailors and travelers and the supposed wrongs committed against the Algerians. French officials denounced “the [Ottoman] enslavement of their subjects, the tributes that the [Ottoman] *dey* demands from them, and the piracy that eliminates all security from the Mediterranean coast and constantly threatens ships that navigate that sea.”⁹⁰ Just before the planned invasion, the French royalist press complained in March 1830 that “it is a religious duty [for the Muslim *dey*] to violate the sworn faith of [Christian] infidels,” therefore, “it must also be the divine mission of France’s Most Christian King to protect the Christian faithful.”⁹¹ Even a decade after the collapse of His Most Christian Majesty’s government in 1830, Tocqueville referenced this popular analogy during his 1841 tour through the colony, writing, “We have just spent the evening with the bishop, who told us himself about the circumstances of the prisoner exchange. It was a scene out of the Crusades.”⁹² Subtract the armor and broad swords, and the negotiations between the Bishop, as a representative of the Christian French Empire and the heir of the Holy Roman Empire, and Abd-al-Qadir’s lieutenant, the leader of the Muslim resistance fighters, could have taken place eight hundred years before in the Holy Land. However, in this rewriting of history, the Muslims were not the “invaders”; rather, the French had invaded and conquered significant regions of the Dar al-Islam (Muslim territory), as recompense for the loss of the Holy Lands to the Muslim forces during the Crusades.

⁹⁰ *Moniteur universel*, 20 April 1830 in Sessions, 33.

⁹¹ “Expédition d’Alger,” *Moniteur universel*, 26 March 1830 in Sessions, 34.

⁹² Tocqueville, “Notes on the Voyage to Algeria in 1841,” *Writings on Empire and Slavery*, 41.

It is significant that Tocqueville still employed this language more than a decade after the fall of King Charles' government in 1830. The rhetoric held a deeper meaning than the first publicists realized. It connected to a vision and aim older than Charles's support for the Church and the contrast his publicists tried to create between his just and Christian rule and that of the barbaric, oppressive Muslim Ottoman Empire. The imagery of the Crusades conjured up not only an ancient loss, which France claimed to avenge, it also positioned France, figuratively, as the heir of the Holy Roman Empire. This imagery, language, and mythology was repeatedly recycled throughout the nineteenth century as France sought to regain her prominent position in the international political hierarchy, redefine herself after the loss of her first colonial empire, and justify the colonization of the Maghreb. The Romans ruled North Africa before the arrival of the Arabs, so, as the heirs of the Roman Empire, the French attempted to discursively show that they had a greater claim to legitimacy than did the Arabs or the Turks. The Americans also employed similar discursive sleights of hand in rationalizing their domination over Indigenous peoples and lands.

Upon arriving in Algeria, the French disembarked with documents in French and Arabic declaring their purpose to be the liberation of Algerians from Ottoman rule. The terms of capitulation with Hussein Dey repeated these assertions: "The exercise of the Muslim religion shall be free. The liberty of the inhabitants of all classes, their religion, their property, their business and their industry shall remain inviolable. Their women shall be respected."⁹³ However, the French made less effort than the Americans to extend the freedoms they claimed to offer. They did not bring along any constitutional documents, the Declaration of the Rights of Man

⁹³ Ministère de la Guerre (France), Collection des actes du gouvernement depuis l'occupation d'Alger jusqu'au 1er octobre 1834. (Paris: 1843), 1-2, translation in John Rudy, *Modern Algeria*, 49.

(1789), or any other governing texts with which to inform and assure the Algerians of their rights. On the other hand, some prominent statesmen and thinkers, such as Alexis de Tocqueville, believed that the Algerians could and should one day become citizens of France. “It is easy to predict,” Tocqueville optimistically wrote in 1837, “a time in the near future when the two races will be intermixed in this way throughout much of the regency. But it is not at all enough for the French to place themselves next to the Arabs if they do not manage to establish durable ties with them and finally to form a single people from the two races.”⁹⁴ In Tocqueville’s words, we see a familiar echo of Thomas Jefferson’s famous statement of hope that the Americans and Indigenous peoples would form one people of common blood.⁹⁵

However, like the Americans’, the French offer of citizenship would only be extended to those who met the qualifications – whether it be an oath of fidelity, as it was for the French in American Illinois Country or meeting French definitions of cultural and linguistic assimilation in their own colonies. On the one hand, a number of the American politicians may have truly believed it possible and fully intended to make good on their promises to extend citizenship to cooperative Native Americans. On the other hand, the militia men tasked with carrying out the military conquest from the British, the establishment of American systems of government, and the extension of citizenship to those who took the oath were uninterested in offering it to the Indians they blamed for raids on their families. Revenge, security, and protection motivated these men far more than larger national and international objectives. In the Algerian case, French

⁹⁴ Tocqueville, *Writings on Empire*, “Second Letter on Algeria,” 22 August 1837, trans. Jennifer Pitts (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 25.

⁹⁵ “In time, you will be as we are. . . . You will become one people with us. Your blood will mix with ours; and will spread with ours over this great Island...” Thomas Jefferson, “Indian Address” to the Chiefs of the Wyandots, Ottawas, Potawatomes, Chippewas, and Shawnees, 10 January 1809, in *The writings of Thomas Jefferson: being his autobiography, correspondence, reports, messages, addresses, and other writings, official and private*, ed. H. A. Washington (Washington, D. C.: Taylor & Maury, 1854), 234.

justifications for the conquest in terms of extending liberty to the Algerians fell flat. Not only were soldiers motivated by revenge for their comrades' deaths on the field of battle, for the insult to the French crown, and by personal glory and profit, but French administrators also had little intention of considering Algerian Muslims as their equals. Actual citizenship would not be offered to Algerians and Native Americans until the twentieth century. The idea that Indigenous people could become assimilated citizens of the métropole was held by only a few statesmen and only for a brief moment. Many quickly realized that it would be counter-productive to their colonial aims to follow through on the offer.

Between conquest and the extension of citizenship, there was a significant disconnect between the aforementioned rhetoric of freedom and the reality of actions undertaken on the ground. Rather than ruling by law, as the colonizers claimed, they used violence and brute force as tools of governance. This decision, undertaken by the military leaders charged with both civil and military responsibilities, undermined their attempts to work with and through Indigenous notables. Colonizers' initial brutality toward Indigenous inhabitants prompted further resistance by creating an atmosphere of fear and distrust, which made their task infinitely more difficult in the long run.

Just after receiving the Virginia Declaration of Rights from Governor Patrick Henry, along with an admonition to conciliate both French and Indigenous inhabitants of the region, Clark ruthlessly attacked a group of warriors returning from the frontier with scalps. Believing them to be responsible for murders and raids on the American backcountry settlements, in the midst of his offensive against Fort Vincennes in February 1779, Clark ordered their execution before the fort gate for all to witness. British Lieutenant Governor Henry Hamilton recounted the details with horror, noting that it served "to contrast the behavior of His Majesty's Subjects with

that of the Rebels, so often celebrated for humanity, generosity, and indeed everything virtuous, elevated, and noble.”⁹⁶ After the Americans had killed two of the Indians and captured the rest, they brought them to the street in front of the fort gate where

One of them was tomahawk’d immediately. The rest sitting on the ground in a ring bound — seeing by the fate of their comrade what they had to expect, the next on his left sung his death song, and was in turn tomahawk’d, the rest underwent the same fate, one only was saved at the intercession of a Rebel Officer, who pleaded for him telling Coll Clarke that the Savages’ father had formerly spared his life.

The Chief of this party after having had the hatchet stuck in his head, took it out himself and deliver’d it to the inhuman monster who struck him first, who repeated his stroke a second and a third time, after which the miserable spectacle was dragged by the rope about his neck to the River, thrown in, and suffer’d to spend still a few moments of life in fruitless strugglings — Two serjeants who had been Volunteers with the Indians escaped death by the intercession of a father and a Sister who were on the spot. Mr. Francis Maisonville ... was set in a Chair, and by Coll Clarke’s order a Man came with a scalping knife, who hesitating to proceed to this excess of barbarity on a defenseless wretch, Colonel Clarke with imprecations told him to proceed, and when a piece of the scalp had been raised, the man stopp’d his hand, he was again order’d to proceed, and as the executor of Coll Clarke’s will, was in the act of raising the Skin, a brother of Mr. Maisonville, who had joined the Rebels, step’d up and prevailed on Coll Clarke to desist. ... Colonel Clarke yet reeking with the blood of these unhappy Victims came to the Esplanade before the Fort Gate, where I had agreed to meet him and treat of the surrender

⁹⁶ Henry Hamilton, “Report,” in *IHC* 8: 188.

of the Garrison — He spoke with rapture of his late achievement while he washed the blood from his hands stained in this inhuman sacrifice.⁹⁷

Clark would not have balked at Hamilton's depiction; it was precisely the image he wanted to portray. The Big Knives were fearsome warriors who sought to instill terror in their enemy's hearts through their barbarity. However, as Hamilton observed, Clark's actions made it more difficult for the Americans to claim the moral high ground when they treated their enemies in the same manner they had decried when used against them.

By 1781, Clark's convoluted diplomacy and ruthlessness cost the Americans almost all of their French and Indigenous support in the region.⁹⁸ He proved that no course of action was out of bounds and used threats, intimidation, and psychological abuse to achieve his desired ends. These tactics were not only employed against American Indians, but also against the French villagers in Kaskaskia, Cahokia, and Vincennes. While he may have hated Indians, as some historians have argued, Clark remained willing to ally himself with them because he recognized his precarious position in the Wabash Valley surrounded by French and Native villages (which were not mutually exclusive). The only time he treated Euro-American men and women differently from Native inhabitants was in the case of the warriors' execution in front of Fort Vincennes. He spared the lives of the Euro-Americans, but it should be noted that he only did so after one of his militiamen recognized his own son among the Indians and pled for his life. Clark was a brutal man, hardened by his experiences as an American colonist-turned-settler frontiersman.

The French military, although filled with seasoned warriors, did not have the excuse that the Algerians presented an immediate threat to their loved ones. Rather, the grievances were

⁹⁷ Hamilton's Report, in *IHC* 8: 189-190.

⁹⁸ White, *Middle Ground*, 386-396.

further removed from the soldiers' daily existence. Nevertheless, when the French military moved beyond Algiers under the direction of General de Bourmont's replacement, General Bertrand Clauzel, they mercilessly attacked the city of Blida in November 1830, leaving few survivors. The Blideans put up a strong resistance, killing twenty-one French soldiers. In response, General Clauzel ordered the massacre and despoilation of the town's inhabitants. Under these orders, the soldiers

killed randomly in the hours following their arrival in this town. Pell-mell executions of people assembled as prisoners followed, which included firing squads and the sabering and bayoneting of those who survived. This improvised slaughter dragged on for more than six hours. ... French soldiers initiated this slaughter, [a French] reporter wrote, and Blida's entire population 'were all treated like the enemy,' contrary to the codes of military conduct. When troops departed, they left the town deserted. The reporter concluded: 'This unfortunate town can be considered no longer to exist.' Those who survived the murderous violence, 'the debris of the population,' returned to Algiers under the army's protection.⁹⁹

The disproportionate French reaction to the reasonable response of the threatened villagers against a military force is common among colonizing powers. There was a perceived need to demonstrate the invading force's power, to intimidate and awe the Indigenous population. The massacre at Blida was, in part, to demonstrate the French army's power to itself, but it also served a more pragmatic purpose.¹⁰⁰ It cleared a town of its residents and prepared it for

⁹⁹ *Spectateur militaire* in Brower, 16.

¹⁰⁰ In this observation, I agree with Brower's stance in *A Desert Named Peace* that this attack seemed to serve the autoerotic purpose of displaying French military might for the military itself (p. 17), but the show of force was also for the Algerians. As in America, it was deemed essential to intimidate and "overawe" the Indigenous population to compel submission and "pacify" them.

incoming settlers who would no longer have to concern themselves with the original owners. During the brief moment in which the French government attempted to compensate Algerians for the loss of their lands and homes, the Blideans would not be around to make any claims on the properties then inhabited by Europeans. It was a convenient, albeit horrifying, solution to the problem of pesky Indigenous land claims.

Furthermore, the violence of conquest did not end with the first sack of Algiers but was perpetuated by the continued French presence. French soldiers proved unruly and difficult to control, especially in the wake of victory, and their officers were little better behaved and sometimes worse. The destruction of homes, property, and shops reduced once self-sustaining people to poverty, destitution, begging, and prostitution. Algerians who chose to flee were left homeless if they chose to return because either their unoccupied home was destroyed or it was commandeered by the military. Proving ownership *ex post facto* was often difficult.¹⁰¹ “The physical violence and usurpation of property with which the era began continued for many years [and gradually gave] way to institutionalized forms of violence and usurpation.”¹⁰²

In 1833, the French Parliament sent a commission of inquiry to Algeria to write a report on the conditions in French occupied territories and offer recommendations based on their findings. In a remarkable passage, the report summarized and condemned the callousness with which the French governed themselves in relation to the conquered Algerians:

We have sent to their deaths on simple suspicion and without trial people whose guilt was always doubtful and then despoiled their heirs. We massacred people carrying [our] safe conducts, slaughtered on suspicion entire populations subsequently found to be innocent; we have put on trial men considered saints by the country, men revered because they had

¹⁰¹ Ruedy, *Land Policy in Colonial Algeria: The Origins of the Rural Public Domain*.

¹⁰² Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 50.

enough courage to expose themselves to our fury so that they could intervene on behalf of their unfortunate compatriots; judges were found to condemn them and civilized men to execute them. We have thrown into prison chiefs of tribes for offering hospitality to our deserters; we have rewarded treason in the name of negotiation, and termed diplomatic action odious acts of entrapment. . . . In contempt of a solemn capitulation and the most fundamental and natural of the rights of people. In a word, we have outdone in barbarity the barbarians we have come to civilize and complain about our lack of success with them.¹⁰³

At the same time, colonial apologists rationalized the violence by claiming that the Algerians killed each other in tribal clashes, covering over the reality that French soldiers wielded the weapons responsible for the deaths. Or, they justified “*l’oeuvre française* on the grounds that it was liberating the natives from the hold of an obscurantist worldview and offering them the advantages of a superior civilization.”¹⁰⁴ As in America, the Indigenous communities who bore the brunt of the “civilizing” assaults impugned such specious claims.

To augment and legitimize colonial authority, negotiations with Indigenous inhabitants were indispensable in both regions. Both the Americans and the French were numerically inferior to the Indigenous inhabitants, necessitating strategic alliances or peace treaties. The need to work with the Indigenous population in Algeria was not immediately clear to metropolitan leaders, but it was to the American leadership in the Wabash Valley. Clark recognized his vulnerability and the necessity of assuring Indian neutrality, and Governor Henry made clear that

¹⁰³ *Procès verbaux et rapports de la Commission nommée par le Roi, le 7 juillet 1833, pour aller recueillir en Afrique tous les faits propres à éclairer le Gouvernement sur l’état du pays et sur les mesures que réclame son avenir* (Paris: 1834), vol. 1, 333-34. Translation by John Ruedy in *Modern Algeria*, 50-1

¹⁰⁴ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 50-1.

both Clark and Todd were to avoid threatening Indian lands and to conciliate them, if at all possible. Conversely, the French military under General de Bourmont, intent on capitalizing on his victory, expelled Ottoman administrators after the conquest of Algiers, and discussions ensued about replacing resistant Algerian officials with more tractable leaders.

General De Bourmont's replacement in Algeria, General Clauzel took his predecessor's plans a step further. While Bourmont thought it best to return Algiers to the Algerians and establish local elite rule, Clauzel believed that *France* could govern *its possessions* in Algeria through the installation of Muslim notables as French agents and began negotiating with Indigenous leaders in Tunisia on the advice of French Consul to Tunis De Lesseps.¹⁰⁵ Clauzel's maneuverings however, risked war with Morocco to the west, and he was quickly recalled to France. Further hesitation and indecision on the part of the French leadership muddied relations with Algerian notables who received conflicting messages throughout the first decade of the French occupation.

Vastly outnumbered by the French and Indigenous populations in the American territory of Illinois, Clark recognized that cultivating their support or at least neutrality was vital to his mission.¹⁰⁶ "My situation and weakness convinced me that more depended on my own Behaviour and Conduct... Situated among French, Spaniards [sic] and Numerous Bands of Savages on every Quarter."¹⁰⁷ Immediately following his capture of Kaskaskia, Clark treated with several Native leaders through Captain Helm, who served as his ambassador to determine whether or not they were inclined to support the Americans or at least remain neutral in the war. Clark reported that the tribes nearest the village of Kaskaskia - the Kaskaskia, Peoria, and

¹⁰⁵ Ageron, *Modern Algeria*, 9–11; Schreier, "From Mediterranean Merchant to French Civilizer," 635–637.

¹⁰⁶ Clark to Mason, 19 November 1779, in *IHC* 8: 120.

¹⁰⁷ Clark to Mason, 19 November 1779, in *IHC* 8: 129

Michigamea - promptly treated for peace. He then sent letters with Captain Helm to the chiefs of the Kickapoo and Piankashaw who were at Vincennes, asking them “to lay down their Tomahawk, and if they did not chuse it[,] to behave like Men and fight for the English as they had done; but they would see their great father[,] as they called him[,] given to the Dogs to eat.”¹⁰⁸ Clark’s language in these messages was repeated to other tribes from the Ohio and Wabash Valleys, as well as the Great Lakes region. The harshness of these speeches, he explained, was due to the “want of Men” and “knowing that it was a mistaken notion in many that soft speeches was best for Indians.”¹⁰⁹ George Morgan, one of the first and most successful American Indian agents, disagreed and resigned his post in May 1779 because he found the American policy, which increasingly aligned with Clark’s, to be distasteful and ineffectual.¹¹⁰

Despite Clark’s poor communication and awkward negotiation tactics, five tribes: the Winnebago, Sac, Fox, Potawatomi, and some Miami, “who had received the hatchet from the English emissaries... submitted to [American] arms all their English presents, and bound themselves by treaties and promises to be peaceable in the future” by early September 1778.¹¹¹ Governor Henry was able to report to Congress by November that the Great Blackbird, a Chippewa chief had also sent a peace belt to Clark. The Americans interpreted this as a sign of the Chippewa’s “dread of Detroit’s being reduced by American arms.”¹¹² Captain Helm, stationed at Vincennes, reported that “the Wabash and Upper Indians, consisting of the Piankeshaws, Tawas, Peorias, Delawares, ... [Mascouten], and some of the Shawanese chiefs,

¹⁰⁸ Clark to Mason, 19 November 1779, in *IHC* 8: 124.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰ For Morgan’s resignation, see Morgan to Congress, 28 May 1779, in *Frontier Advance on the Upper Ohio, 1778-1779*, *WHC* 23: 345. For American policy see White, *Middle Ground*, 381, 384.

¹¹¹ Gov. Patrick Henry to the Virginia Delegates in Congress, 16 November 1778, in *IHC* 8: 72.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

had also given up all their tokens of attachment to our enemies, and pledged their fidelity to the United States.”¹¹³ Such reports are rather misleading though. British correspondence reveals that while some minor chiefs may have sought peace with the Americans, they did not speak for entire tribes. Through treaty negotiations, Americans attempted to establish the legitimacy of those willing to meet with them, but Indigenous clans refused to recognize treaties signed by men other than the leaders they themselves authorized. Throughout the two decades of American occupation examined in this study, American Indian agents continually attempted to designate alternative Indigenous leaders, as did the French in Algeria, but Native communities remained resistant to their efforts and divided in their loyalties.¹¹⁴

The French were more intentional in their efforts to install new and more malleable Algerian leaders. Shortly after conquest, French Consul to Tunis De Lesseps suggested placing Tunisian princes as *bey*s in the provinces of Oran and Constantine. Before receiving metropolitan approval, General Clauzel, on his own authority, signed two treaties with the Tunisian *dey*. The first granted the Tunisians full sovereignty and the *beylik* of Constantine on their western border. The second secured a Tunisian *bey* for the province of Oran, which had fallen into anarchy as the Moroccan sultan and Algerian tribes vied for ascendancy in the vacuum created by the abdication of the Ottoman *bey*.¹¹⁵ There were two versions of these treaties. The French version, communicated to Paris but unknown to the Tunisian signatories placed the Tunisian *bey*s under French authority, while the Arabic versions contained no such caveats.¹¹⁶

¹¹³ Gov. Patrick Henry to the Virginia Delegates in Congress, 16 November 1778, in *IHC* 8: 73.

¹¹⁴ White, *The Middle Ground*, 417–440; Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires*, 232–236; Banner, *How the Indians Lost Their Land*, 112–149.

¹¹⁵ Schreier, “From Mediterranean Merchant to French Civilizer,” 635.

¹¹⁶ Ageron, 11.

Similarly, there were two versions of the treaty between General Desmichels and Abd al-Qadir, Algerian marabout, military and civil leader in the West. The secret version of the treaty, this time, was written in Arabic and ceded to Abd al-Qadir a commercial monopoly over the port of Arzew, recognized his sovereignty in the West, and promised him aid and arms.¹¹⁷ In direct contradiction, the French version of this treaty conveyed to Paris that Desmichels had achieved the submission of the province of Oran and a free-trade agreement. Thus, the French military commanders were willing to deceive their North African counterparts by placing them, unbeknownst to them, under French authority. More worrisome for the French government, military leaders also demonstrated their willingness to defy or dismiss the metropolitan administration's authority and deceive Parisian government officials about the deals negotiated with North African notables in order to achieve the military's aims - pacification and the removal of all Ottoman officials and remnants of Ottoman authority.

French meddling in the politics of Algerians was not limited to conspiring with the Tunisians or crafting secret treaties. They also interfered in the customary structures of leadership as their influence stretched into Constantine and beyond to confront Abd al-Qadir's resistance - a story that will be told in greater detail in the next chapter. For now, it is important to observe that some French thinkers recognized the potential of governing through Algerian notables, and a version of this idea was later implemented. In 1837, Tocqueville advised

In Algeria as elsewhere, the great task of a new government is not to create what does not exist at all, but to use what does exist. ...The Arabs name their own leaders; we must preserve this privilege. They have a military and religious aristocracy; we must by no means seek to destroy this, but rather to get hold of it and take part of it into our pay, as

¹¹⁷ Ageron, 12.

the Turks did. It is not only useful to draw upon the Arabs' political customs, but necessary to modify the rules of their civil law only gradually.¹¹⁸

Rather than following Tocqueville's sage advice and work through the tribes and leadership structures that already existed in Algeria, France sought to create new ones. Beginning in 1840 General Bugeaud and other French administrators attempted to create an artificial Algerian aristocracy through which France could exert its will. Instead of "the strong, unified and respected aristocracy envisaged by the French, the experiment produced a weak and disparate body of leaders whose legitimate, that is, inherited, authority was often vastly disproportionate to the powers thrust upon them by the French."¹¹⁹ Once established, however, the French found it difficult to dismantle this *royaume arabe*. It took decades to unravel the ineffective power structures because the Algerians had co-opted them to suit their own political purposes.

While there were advantages to working *with* rather than against the invaders, there was a fine line to walk. For as much power as they may have accrued through their relations with the colonizers and willingness to bend to their wishes, Indigenous leaders also risked enraging their countrymen who, if circumstances permitted, might rise against them in retaliation for their cooperation with the foreign aggressors. Resistance to their presence provoked attacks, but cooperation did not necessarily preserve the safety and security of accommodationist leaders from colonial settlers, militias, or even the military forces with whom they had allied themselves. As both Tocqueville and numerous American observers noted, those who worked most closely with the colonizers were often the ones who suffered the most at their hands.

¹¹⁸ Alexis de Tocqueville, "Second Letter on Algeria," 22 August 1837, in *Writings on Empire and Slavery*, 23.

¹¹⁹ Siviers, "Insurrection and Accommodation," 262.

The motivations, intentions, and objectives of Indigenous leaders were far more complex and often contradicted European and American assumptions. A few, like the Delaware and Shawnee at Coshocton, resolutely supported the American cause, regardless of their treatment, but this would not last. Shortly after the Delaware delivered their message to Congress, John Todd, the American civil governor of Illinois County, warned Clark of an impending war with them. However, British Indian agent, Captain Alexander McKee, clarified that the Delaware were “frightened by the encroachment of the [American] Rebels,” whom they knew to be avowed Indian haters. By 1779 and 1780, it had become dangerous for even friendly Indians to deliver messages to American forts and settlements warning of British attacks. On just such an errand, long-time American friend and ally, American settlers murdered Delaware chief White Eyes. When news of his death reached the Coshocton Indians, they renewed their vow of neutrality in spite of widespread fear.¹²⁰

By 1781, the idea that the only avenue to peace was to eradicate the Other took root among Native and settler communities alike.¹²¹ In a speech to British Commandant of Detroit Major De Peyster, a Miami war chief asked for British assistance in a campaign against the American stronghold at Vincennes. Necessity, he acknowledged, compelled him to make this request. He argued that if they

¹²⁰ Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance*, 77-79.

¹²¹ In a meeting with some of the few American-allied French from Vincennes along with some Piankeshaw and Wea warriors, the Miami refused to take the hand extended to them. One speaker stepped forward, declaring, “By a red cloth blanket you see our village stained with blood, you can think that we are not going to extend the hand to your friends [the Americans] who are our enemies, you can understand that if we find you with them that we will not make any distinction. You say that I am wanted to go to Post Vincennes that I shall be well received. I should be entirely lost[.] If I go[,] this is the way in which I shall present myself (he rose and sung the war song and many other Miamis have followed his example).” Speeches. [Wea, Piankeshaw, Miami] Miami Village, 25 February 1781, *MPHC* 19: 593-6.

let [the American fort at Vincennes] exist, it is the help of our enemies and the cause of all the troubles among the nations. . . . We ask you all to join us in this undertaking, it is of interest to us all. . . . This is the best time to insure great peace. My father, we extend the hand and pray thee to let us know thy sentiments on this subject. . . . This is the true time to make all peaceable.¹²²

Shortly thereafter, De Peyster wrote to Brigadier General Powell that by all accounts, Clark was planning an expedition into Indian Country and wished it were in his power to assist in their defense. Prisoners from the backcountry informed him that if Clark's incursions failed, "the settlers upon Kentucke will leave that country altogether."¹²³ Already, British Indian agent, Alexander McKee informed him that the Kentucky settlers were "night and day employed in removing their Families and Effects to a large Settlement called Bryant's Station."¹²⁴ General Haldimand, too, expressed his desire to send troops with the Miami and other British-allied Indians to "extirpate that reprobate settlement for while it exists it will be a continual source of alarm to the Indians and a receptacle for our Enemies from the Missi[iss]ippi & other countries."¹²⁵

The Americans had long expressed such sentiments and since 1779 had raided nearly a dozen Indian villages with the express purpose of driving them from their lands - both to remove the threat of further attacks and to acquire the territory for future settlements. Simon Girty, British Indian agent and interpreter, reported to Major De Peyster that on April 20, 1781,

¹²² Miami Speech to Major DePeyster, Detroit, 9 March 1781, in *MPHC* 19: 596-7.

¹²³ Major Arent S. De Peyster to Brig. Gen. H. Watson Powell, Detroit, 4 April 1781, in *MPHC* 19: 614-5.

¹²⁴ Bryan Station (Bryant's Station) was an early Kentucky settlement near present-day Lexington. Major Arent S. De Peyster to Brig. Gen. H. Watson Powell, Detroit, 4 April 1781, in *MPHC* 19: 614-5.

¹²⁵ Gen. Frederick Haldimand to Brig. Gen. H. Watson Powell, 24 April 1781, in *MPHC* 19: 628.

American Colonel Daniel Brodhead and 500 militia had burned Coshocton, a town of peaceful Delaware, and killed fifteen men. He took the women and children prisoners, along with four men, all of whom he later released. Deflecting blame, Brodhead stated that he could not control the enmity of the militiamen and was not at fault for the deaths of the fifteen men. However, he went on to proclaim that within seven months, “he would Beat all the Indians out of this Country.”¹²⁶ Even the American commander at Fort Pitt was puzzled by Brodhead’s choice to attack the friendly Indians at Coshocton who, he reported, had “always given the most convincing proofs of their attachment to the Cause of America, by always giving us Intelligence of every party that came against the frontiers; and on the late expedition, they furnished Col. Brodhead and his party with a large quantity of provisions when they were starving.”¹²⁷ Sadly, this was only a precursor of the atrocity to come a year later. Those who seemed to suffer the most from frontiersmen’s Indian hatred were the very people who willingly offered them the most assistance.

In a prescient letter, British General Frederick Haldimand wrote to Major De Peyster that the settlers alone were the enemy on the frontier because Virginia could not spare troops to support them.¹²⁸ Observing that they were taking advantage of lulls between Indian raids to “establish themselves in good settlements,” Haldimand pointed out that the Native warriors were capable of preventing this and should at all costs. “The Body of Indians assembled at [Sandusky], if Vigilant & Enterprising have it in their power to Repel all attempts that can be

¹²⁶ Simon Girty to Major Arent De Peyster, Upper Sandusky, 4 May 1781, in *MPHC* 10: 478-9.

¹²⁷ Dowd, 86; (Later Indiana Territorial Governor, 1800-1801 & 1812-1813) John Gibson to Virginia Governor Thomas Jefferson, Fort Pitt, 30 May 1781, in *Calendar of Virginia State Papers* 2: 131.

¹²⁸ Frederick Haldimand was the British Governor of Quebec between 1778 and 1786 and oversaw the northern district, including the Great Lakes region and Illinois Country during the Revolutionary War.

made,” but after the settlers “have tasted the sweets of their situation,” they will be difficult to remove.¹²⁹ Native leaders were not deluded or imprudent. They saw through all American protestations of innocence to their true motives. In a message from the Shawnee, Mingo, and Delaware to British Indian agent McKee, the chiefs proclaimed,

We mean to defend ourselves to the last man, before we give up our Lands & we will spare none, if they begin with us; we likewise desire you to inform all the Indians about Detroit our situation immediately, let them be strong and consider for the best, as the Americans we see are determined to take the Country from them & us, we beg of you (Father) at any rate to tell the Hurons, Ottaways, Chippaways & Six Nations as soon as possible & bid them be strong, there is wampum gone thro' all the Indians to the same purpose.¹³⁰

Frontier leader, George Rogers Clark for all of his bluster and rashness was no fool either. In early October 1781, he wrote that “all the Illinois and the Indians to a man, except the Kaskaskia will set on us with inveteracy. Two-thirds of those formerly in our interest, have already taken up the hatchet this fall... But necessity will oblige the whole of them to take up the hatchet in a short time to clothe themselves.”¹³¹

Just as relations broke down between Americans and Indigenous communities in the western territories over land disputes, negotiations also fell apart in Algeria for the same reason. During his 1841 tour through Algeria, Tocqueville recorded a conversation with the French commander at Djijelli, who described the difficulty he faced in negotiating peace with three nearby Kabyle communities. The tribes were certain that the French intended to expropriate

¹²⁹ Haldimand to De Peyster, Quebec, 24 June 1781, in *MPHC* 10: 490-2.

¹³⁰ Chiefs of Shawnee, Mingo & Delaware to Alexander McKee, 20 September 1781, in *MPHC* 2: 5.

¹³¹ Clark to Thomas Nelson, Fort Nelson, 1 October 1781, in *IHC* 8: 606-7.

their land. This was not an unreasonable assumption, given the French military's decade-long track record in the territory. Nevertheless, the Djijelli commander had nothing of the sort in mind. Rather, he merely intended to reduce conflict between the French and neighboring Kabyles. He went on to explain that

you can make a temporary treaty but not a true alliance with [the Kabyles], and that they always take care not to get tied too closely to us. The Beni-Caids are about to go to war with their neighbors. I had us propose to help them. They were careful not to accept. They would have been forever compromised with their compatriots, and no momentary interests are worth this drawback to them.¹³²

It was just as well that the Kabyles kept their distance, as Tocqueville noted repeatedly, "all our alliances have led to the destruction or the reduction of those who trusted us."¹³³

Conquest was an essential first step in establishing settler colonies. Even though these two métropoles did not initially intend to create them in the two regions they occupied, they, nevertheless, began their military campaigns with similar motivations and were guided by common ideologies. That does not mean that the same catalysts prompted the foundation of all settler colonies, but the parallels between the American and French projects examined in this study are striking. Individual ambitions for socio-economic mobility, metropolitan concerns about domestic and foreign political power, and military goals were interrelated catalysts for both offensives. The ideological similarities between the United States and France can be traced to their shared Enlightenment heritage, democratic impulses (though not fully realized in 1830s France), their common competition with Great Britain, as well as familiar definitions of civilization and power.

¹³² Tocqueville, "Notes on Voyage to Algeria 1841," *Writings on Empire and Slavery*, 55.

¹³³ Tocqueville, "Notes on Voyage to Algeria 1841," 41.

Both military operations and occupations were grounded in similar ideologies and shared aspirations. Not coincidentally, both the Americans and French were compelled to make choices based on their adversarial relationship with Great Britain, either due to war or international imperial competition. Great Britain at the end of the eighteenth and throughout the nineteenth centuries had become and continued to be the farthest-reaching and most powerful empire with its dominant army, navy, and merchant marine. While the United States was in the midst of fighting a revolution against Great Britain at the time of their incursion into the Wabash Valley, France continued to decline in international prestige through its loss of Egypt and the Battle of Trafalgar to the British navy. Both the Wabash Valley for the Americans and Algeria for the French proved to be strategic military assets in their rivalry with the British.

Internal politics motivated metropolitan leaders in each location as well. Both governments saw the military campaigns as a way to establish or prop up the legitimacy of the current administration. American Revolutionary leaders' lives depended on the successful outcome of the war, and it was advantageous to support their constituents' defense from British-allied Indian raids believed to have originated in the Wabash Valley. In France, Charles X was losing support while social unrest grew over the flagging economy and frustration with unresponsive Royalist policies. A successful conquest of Algiers, the den of the Barbary pirates, would demonstrate the justness of Charles' rule and unite the populace behind the military endeavor. Individual profit motives and access to important commercial centers and trade routes cannot be ignored as stimulants for military conquest either. However, a baser motive also underlay many of the others: revenge. For the American militia, comprised of backcountry settlers, it was personal. Indian raids had touched each of their lives. Family members and friends were killed, maimed, or captured. Well-aimed tomahawks and musket shots shattered

dreams. Blaming the British for inciting these attacks, the militia responded with a vengeance. Those who joined George Rogers Clark on the campaign fought to chastise the British, conquer their forts, and safeguard their homes and families by preventing further Indian raids. The French soldiers were compelled to fight in Algeria to avenge the insult their country and king's honor had sustained. They also sought to prevent the Barbary pirates from attacking European ships, enslaving European sailors, and seizing valuable merchandise if not paid off in bribes.

It is not difficult to understand, then, why each métropole cited liberation as its primary mission. Conveniently, this claim created a legally justifiable defense for the conquest. Who the invaders claimed to be freeing *is* surprising, however. While the American militia fought to defend their homes and families, Virginia officials also claimed that their objective was to liberate the French and Indian inhabitants from the tyranny of the British. Similarly, just as the French army fought to prevent further pillaging of European ships, they declared that they had also come to free the Algerians from the oppressive rule of the Ottoman Empire. Both American and French military leaders offered assurances to the inhabitants of each territory that their religion, property (and women) would be respected. Unfortunately, the proclamations were just that – empty words – that were almost simultaneously contradicted by the invading force. Violence and brute force, rather than enlightened governance, were the conquerors' tools of choice.

There was a brief moment at the outset of occupation, in which American and French philosophers believed that the Euro-American and Indigenous populations could eventually become one people. Citizenship was held out to the Native inhabitants as a real possibility if they cooperated with the colonizing forces. This moment did not last long, though. Before many

actions could be taken on these enlightened, albeit paternalistic, ideas, colonial officials realized it would be detrimental to their long-term goals for the territories.

Military leaders did not want to lose control over what they had fought for and sought to extend the conquest while maintaining territory already in their possession. Due to the distance between the occupied lands and the métropoles, the decisions of these men greatly influenced metropolitan policies and the trajectory of each region. The next chapter examines the extension of conquest, the ways in which the invaders transformed occupied territory into settler colonies and their arguments for doing so.

It is important to remember that settler colonization was not limited to a single form of metropolitan government. Both representative democracies, like the United States, and monarchies, like France in 1830, established these types of colonies. The initial invasion could be small – carried out with just a few hundred militiamen, as in the American case, or it could a large-scale military assault undertaken by thousands of professional soldiers. These campaigns were launched for a variety of reasons, but in these two case studies, domestic and international politics weighed heavily in the decision. The two case studies under investigation here also demonstrate that administrators on the ground in the colonies were integral to their formation, but so, too, were Indigenous leaders who resisted, accommodated, remained neutral, or played competing powers off one another. So often, studies paint choices and actions as dichotomous, but this chapter begins to expose the myriad options available to the actors involved.

By distinguishing between the motivations for conquest and the formation of settler colonies, it becomes clear that armed invasion was a necessary first step, but it was not sufficient, by itself, to form settler colonies. While neither conquest was truly complete, the French had legitimately defeated the Algerians, and the *dey* signed a formal capitulation.

Whereas, the American invasion of the Wabash Valley that began in 1778 succeeded in claiming British forts, the militias had not yet beaten Wabash warriors on the field of battle. Still, the Americans claimed victory and attempted to exert power over Native communities if they were conquered peoples. The imagined American conquest had real consequences for both settlers and the Indigenous peoples in the trans-Appalachian west, just as the actual French defeat of Algerian forces did in the North African Regency.

Chapter 3: Colonization

*Daniel Boone was a man. Yes a big man.
With an eye like an eagle and as tall as a
mountain was he.
Daniel Boone was a man. Yes a big man.
He was brave, he was fearless and as tough
as a mighty oak tree.
From the coonskin cap on the top of ol' Dan
to the heel of his rawhide shoe
The rippin'est roarin'est fightin'est man the
frontier ever knew.
Daniel Boone was a man. Yes a big man.
And he fought for America,
to make all Americans free.
What a Boone. What a doer.
What a dream come'a truer was he.¹*

*We march, overwhelming all, opening a route
On the highest of these walls, we plant our
flags.
With rage the Arab opposes us in vain.
At each step some new obstacle
Everywhere their efforts oppose our
Courage
The more difficult [the obstacles] are, the
more beautiful is success.
...Oh! My country, oh beautiful France,
Receive the prize of our success,
Constantine is in your power,
Your laws there reign henceforth.
If whatever rival troubles
Contested your glorious self-evident rights,
Remind your children
[Of] the blood [that] sealed this conquest.²*

Songs of conquest celebrated settler soldiers' continued invasions of North America and Algeria. Just as Daniel Boone laid claim to the lands on which American settler blood had spilled, so the French soldier in the second song claimed the justness of France's subjugation and occupation of Constantine, for which he and his comrades had fought, bled and died. The narratives and myths of the conquests were foundational to the later development of an identifiable settler identity that was distinct from the Indigenous peoples and from the metropolises. Settlers maintained that shedding their blood on and for the colonial soil bound them to it, and justified their appropriation and settlement.

Disregarding metropolitan directives, American colonizers pushed into new western territories and immediately began the simultaneous processes of dispossession, land surveys, and

¹ Ken (Matson) Darby, "Daniel Boone," TV Series Theme Song, <https://youtu.be/8hwqdQ0SkjQ> (Accessed 27 March 2015). The TV Series starred Fess Parker as Daniel Boone and ran from September 1964 to September 1970 on NBC.

² A. Bregi, "Ma Campagne à Constantine, Pot-Pourri Militaire" (Song, Paris, 1837), Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris.

settlement between 1780 and 1787. French colonizers followed suit in Algeria between 1830 and 1837.³ In both locations, number of powerful competing Native groups resided, and throughout the first two decades of colonization, both Constantine and the American Northwest Territory became important sites of Indigenous resistance, accommodation, and persistence. While the colonizers sought to capitalize on divisions among Native groups to achieve their objectives. This chapter explores the continuation of armed conflict after the initial encounters in both regions, interrogates international rivalries and competing claims over the lands, and examines the role of both militant settlers and Indigenous leaders in shaping this stage of settler colonial development.

The process of transforming the American colonies into states equal in status and rights with the original thirteen and incorporating Algeria into the French state were complicated, contested, and fraught processes. This transition was not merely the result of top-down policies. Frequently, legislation was slow to catch up to events that had already transpired. Settlers, militiamen, soldiers, and Native resistance leaders in the contested territories compelled the métropoles to craft policies to govern and protect their newly acquired colonies.⁴

In North America, violent exchanges continued as increasing numbers of Americans moved into the backcountry. Their presences put greater pressure on already tense relations between the colonists and their Indigenous neighbors. At the same time, the appearance of

³ I use the term “colonizers” here to denote those who were to continuing to advance the colonial project. Some were settler-soldiers but not all, so I use the broader term “colonizer” as opposed to “settlers.”

⁴ This approach and perspective is in direct contrast to that of Barbara Alice Mann in her 2008 work, *George Washington’s War on Native America*, in which she takes a top-down view of the American-Indigenous relations and settlement processes in the Old Northwest Territory. She argues that Washington lost the Revolutionary War in the western territories because he did not conquer the Indigenous population there but rather compelled many communities to ally themselves with the British against the Americans.

surveyors portended the American belief that Native lands were, or would soon become, the property of the United States. Coercive treaty negotiations with unauthorized representatives of Wabash and Ohio Valley Indigenous communities further strained relations between American settlers, authorities, and Native communities in and near the contested territories.⁵ Even as American militias led campaigns against Native villages and settlers flooded into disputed territories, Indigenous leaders fought legal, diplomatic, and military battles to protect their homelands and families. Some maintained ties with Great Britain to acquire arms and ammunition; others forged trade connections with the Spanish in St. Louis and New Orleans to the same ends.⁶ Each of the stakeholders in the contest for the trans-Appalachian west strove to protect their interests against competing claims, even at the cost of their lives.

Likewise, control over Algerian lands was bitterly contested. While the French military sought to extend its reach into the hinterland outside previously occupied cities, Algerian resistance fighters took advantage of British national interest in North Africa to acquire military supplies for their campaigns. In the eastern province of Constantine, Hadj Ahmed Bey maintained ties to his sovereign, Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II in an effort to bolster his defenses against French incursions. All the while, French generals disregarded the official policy of restricted occupation and extended France's claims beyond the initial conquest of Algiers and its surrounding territory. Furious over Hadj Ahmed Bey's staunch refusal to acquiesce to their demands, a small French force under General Bertrand Clauzel suffered a demoralizing defeat at the gates of Constantine in 1836. Following the 1837 Treaty of Tafna with Abd al Qadir, the

⁵ Communities involved in the Treaty of Fort Stanwix (1784): Six Nations of the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois), which included the Seneca, Mohawk, Onondaga, Cayuga, Oneida, and Tuscarora. The Treaty of Fort McIntosh (1785) included the Wyandot, Delaware, Chippewa and Ottawa. The Treaty of Fort Finney (1786) included the Shawnee.

⁶ Richter, *Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America*, 224; DuVal, *The Native Ground*, 154.

resistance leader in the west, the French Minister of War finally acceded to General Charles-Marie Denys de Damrémont's request to attack Constantine again and avenge the previous year's loss. With this decision, the metropole finally moved to support its military's aggressive campaigns of acquisition. Bellicose settlers and military leaders in both the Wabash Valley and Algeria compelled metropolitan administrators to both recognize the process of colonization already underway and develop reactive policies to legitimize prior actions.

America: The Battle for Legitimacy and Sovereignty

Even as they fought to ensure that nation's continued existence, backcountry settlers and leading statesmen determined that the lands on which Americans were settling should be brought into the new nation. The trans-Appalachian settlers presented a 1776 petition to the Virginia Assembly. The settlers begged for assistance against avaricious land speculators trying to claim the territory for North Carolina and against the constant Indian threat. They recounted recent settlement history, stating that "many of [the] petitioners became adventurers in this part of the Colony in the year 1774," the same year as Lord Dunmore's War, "in order to provide a subsistence for themselves and their posterity."⁷ Shawnee and Mingo attacks on the countryside convinced a number to abandon their settlements until the following year, "after the country had been discovered and explored," when "many more became adventurers."⁸ 1776 saw even greater numbers of "adventurers," and more "cabin improvements were made [that year] than in any [prior] year."⁹

⁷ "Petition from the Inhabitants of Kentucky, 15 June 1776," in *George Rogers Clark Papers*, *IHC* 8: 11-12.

⁸ *Ibid*, 11-12. Map: "Indian Tribes, 1790," *The Norton Anthology of American Literature*, Nina Baym, ed., 8th edition, online.

http://wwnorton.com/college/english/naal8/section/volA/maps/american7_4.jpg (Accessed 27 March 2015).

⁹ Draper MSS 4C485 in Footnote 1, *IHC* 8: xxi.

The Kentucky settler petitioners argued that settlement would benefit Virginia because it would provide a buffer against Native American attacks: “And as at this time of general danger, we cannot take too much precaution to prevent the inroads of the savages, & prevent the effusion of innocent blood...”¹⁰ Their argument ignored the fact that the attacks were the direct result of their settlement. Not only would Virginia be safer, but would profit from continued settlement and access to navigable rivers and extant trade networks.

If these arguments were not enough to convince Virginia’s leadership to defend the settlements, the petitioners also demonstrated their commitment to the recently proclaimed American ideal of representative rule and popular sovereignty as the basis for political legitimacy.¹¹ At a time when Virginia’s most prominent leaders were locked in a deadly struggle with England over these very principles, this was a powerful argument. They had already elected a governing council and two men to represent them at the Convention, for, they observed “without law or authority, vice here could take its full scope, having no laws to restrain, or power to control.”¹² This fact had already been amply demonstrated by the rash actions of the militant settlers in the events leading up to the Battle of Point Pleasant in 1774, but the petitioners maintained that they had institutionalized law and order by 1776. Their argument followed that as responsible citizens who were even willing to raise and fund their quota of men to support the revolutionary cause, they deserved sponsorship, support, and protection from Virginia. As the

¹⁰ “Petition from the Inhabitants of KY,” 15.

¹¹ The first settlers in the Trans-Appalachian West established assemblies for self-government, drafted and posted petitions to ensure agreement before electing representatives to carry them to first the Virginia House of Burgesses and later to Continental Congress. In their petitions they took pains to demonstrate their commitment to democratic forms of government, law, and order. James Rood Robertson, ed., *Petitions of the Early Inhabitants of Kentucky to the General Assembly of Virginia, 1769-1792* (John P. Morton (incorporated) printers to the Filson club, 1910) See especially, "Petition from the Inhabitants of Kentucky," June 15, 1776 in *IHC* 8: 11-16.

¹² “Petition from the Inhabitants of Kentucky,” 15 Jun 1776.

previous chapter demonstrated, Virginia’s governor heeded the settlers’ call for aid and provided funds and arms to the settlers to defend themselves under the leadership of George Rogers Clark and secretly urged him to carry the fight to the British and Native warriors in the Wabash Valley.

In the Philadelphia meeting room of the Continental Congress on October 10, 1780, the American government finally agreed with the frontiersmen. On that date, Congress declared its intention to make the western territories, even the unappropriated [Native] lands, available to all Americans once the states ceded their claims, thereby acknowledging the federal government’s



Figure 5: Map of Political Boundaries of North America After 1783 Treaty of Paris¹³

dependence on state compliance to achieve their aims. Once the states granted the federal government jurisdiction over the western territories, the Continental Congress resolved to bring those territories into the union as republican states with “the same rights of sovereignty, freedom

¹³ “Map of Political Boundaries of North America After 1783 Treaty of Paris,” *Library of Congress, Global Gateway*. <http://international.loc.gov/intldl/fiahtml/map6.html> (Accessed 31 March 2015).

and independence, as the other states.”¹⁴ However, the authors made no mention of the Native sovereigns of the lands to which they laid claim.

Similarly, the Treaty of Paris that ended the American Revolution in 1783, proclaimed peace between Great Britain and the United States, but it made no mention of the Native Americans who served on both sides of the war. In the treaty, Great Britain recognized American independence and sovereignty east of the Mississippi River, south of the Great Lakes, and north of the Spanish Floridas, despite the fact that Indigenous peoples were the true sovereigns of most of the newly acquired territory.¹⁵ As soon as rumors of the treaty reached the Northern and Wabash Valley tribes, leaders met with British commanders to determine the gossip’s veracity and express their outrage if it was true. After centuries of dealings with the Euro-Americans, Native ambassadors were well versed in the language of rights and law and used it to bolster their legal claims to their own lands. Great Britain could not cede what it did not possess. Indigenous headmen declared that they were “a free People subject to no power upon earth-- That they were the faithful Allies of the King of England, but not his subjects, that he had no right whatever to grant away to the States of America, their rights or properties without a manifest breach of all Justice and Equity, and they would not submit to it.”¹⁶ It was true that Native leaders had permitted Frenchmen to settle amongst them to trade and allowed the British to use the forts built on Native grounds for the same purpose after the British victory over the French in 1763. However, the Native peoples of the Great Lakes and Wabash Valley had never

¹⁴ 10 October 1780, *Journals of the Continental Congress (JCC)*, 18: 915

¹⁵ Richter, *Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America*, 223–225; Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance*, 93; Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country*, 272–280.

¹⁶ Brig. Gen. Allan Maclean to Gen. Frederick Haldimand, Niagara, 18 May 1783, in *MPHC*, 20: 119. “Your Excellency will look upon this as very strong Language, but it is nevertheless true, and exactly as Translated to me by the Principal Indian Interpreter, it therefore becomes my duty to report it to Your Excellency for Your Information.” (Ibid)

granted “one inch of Land, but what these Forts stood upon,” nor ceded their sovereignty to any foreign power.¹⁷ Great Britain’s pretension to give away Indigenous lands to the United States was the greatest betrayal of their trust.¹⁸ Even after the Revolution, Great Britain still remained an active partisan in the affairs of the Great Lakes region and sought to “undermine the [land] cession that the treaty explicitly promised” to the American government.”¹⁹

American fears, especially of British influence in the west, were well founded, but the British were not the only threat Americans faced. In successfully pressing the British to retain their forts in the Great Lakes region and support Indigenous leaders in their efforts to maintain the Treaty of Fort Stanwix (1768) boundary line, the Native peoples of the Northwest Territory demonstrated that they were not “mere pawns in an imperial game.”²⁰ Rather, they governed the relations and events in this region. Their ability to re-assert the boundary line from the 1768 treaty and the fact that the British backed this stance highlights Native agency and independence of thought, as well as British dependence on their Indigenous allies. Through continued trade and military support in the Great Lakes region, the British assuaged their guilt over ignoring their Native allies in the American peace treaty.²¹

After the war’s conclusion in 1783, peace depended primarily on the actions of the backcountry settlers. The British reported that although anxious and aggrieved over continued hostilities through 1782, their Native allies “sat on their mats” and waited peacefully with a forbearance that surprised British officials. Many militant American settlers, on the other hand,

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ General Haldimand to Hon. Thomas Townshend, Quebec, 23 October 1782, in *MPHC*, 10: 662-4.

¹⁹ White, *The Middle Ground*, 410.

²⁰ Taylor, *The Divided Ground Indians, Settlers and the Northern Borderland of the American Revolution*, 115.

²¹ White, *The Middle Ground*, 408–410.

indiscriminately blamed all Native peoples for the depredations committed against their settlements and sought revenge.²² It would be the Americans who first broke the uneasy truce.²³

Once the peace treaty between the United States and Great Britain was signed in 1783, thousands of Americans and immigrants to the new country flocked to the western borderlands. The surge was so strong that the military could not contain it settlers pushed into unappropriated Native territories.²⁴ Speeches made at the Sandusky council held between the British and Native leaders in September 1783 confirmed military commanders' observations about the volume and destinations of westward migrating American settlers. At the council, Deyonquat, or the Half King, of the Delaware rose to speak to the British commanders on behalf of the Indigenous confederation:

Father! Listen! As also our Brethren the Six Nations, you have told us there is Peace. You know the Rights of our Indians in this Country, and you also know that the Tomahawk is now laid down. Brethren the Six Nations you know where the Boundary Line was fixed, since you were the people who fixed it. We now inform you that the Virginians are already encroaching upon our Lands, and we desire you and our Father to be strong, and desire them to desist from encroaching upon us, otherwise they will destroy the good

²² Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country*, 272–281; General Haldimand to Hon. Thomas Townshend, Quebec, 23 October 1782, in *MPHC* 10: 662-4; De Peyster to Brig. Gen. Maclean, 21 November 1782, in *MPHC* 11: 321-323; De Peyster to Haldimand, 3 May 1783, in *MPHC* 11: 362-363.

²³ De Peyster to McKee, Detroit, 6 May 1783, in A. S. De Peyster, *Miscellanies*, Appendix, XL. Miami Records 1781-4, OVGLEA.

²⁴ Arthur Lee, Commissioner to treat with Western Indians in 1784, "Journal," Neville B. Craig, ed., *The Olden Time; a Monthly Publication Devoted to the Preservation of Documents and Other Authentic Information in Relation to the Early Explorations and the Settlement and Improvement of the Country around the Head of the Ohio* (Cincinnati: R. Clarke & Co, 1876), 334–344; Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country*; White, *The Middle Ground*, 417; Griffin, *American Leviathan*, 183–211; Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires*, 224–225.

work of Peace which we are endeavoring to promote.²⁵

After years of warfare and unofficial raids and counter-raids, the assembled Native leaders agreed that they were grateful for the peace Americans offered, but not for their terms. A 1783 Congressional investigatory committee relayed the same message to American statesmen – that although the recently hostile tribes were ready for peace, they were not yet inclined to turn over the lands the Americans so desperately coveted.²⁶ While the committee observed that “motives of policy as well as clemency ought to incline Congress to listen to the prayers of hostile Indians for peace,” they suggested instead that “lines of property should be ascertained and established between the United States and them.”²⁷

The commissioners offered several justifications for appropriating Native lands. They reminded Congress that they had promised portions of the uncultivated lands “as a bounty to their army and in reward of their courage and fidelity.”²⁸ In addition, the rising domestic population and increasing emigration necessitated the “speedy provision for extending the settlement of the territories of the United States.” What was more, the United States government was broke, or in the words of the committee, “the public finances do not admit of any considerable expenditure to extinguish the Indian claims upon such lands.”²⁹ This statement also reveals that at least some American statesmen recognized Native property rights and the need to “extinguish” them before the United States could truly claim ownership. Nevertheless, the deplorable state of American finances required that a way be found to generate revenue as

²⁵ Deyonquat speech, “Transactions with Indians at Sandusky,” 26 August – 8 September 1783, in *MPHC* 20: 182.

²⁶ Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country*, 281–282; Francis Paul Prucha, *The Sword of the Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier, 1783-1846* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987), 7–8.

²⁷ *JCC*, 25: 681.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *Ibid.*

quickly as possible. The public creditors, the committee recalled for Congress, “have been led to believe and have a right to expect that those territories will be speedily improved into a fund towards the security and payment of the national debt.”³⁰

The Committee on American-Indian affairs concluded that even if “an Indian war should be rekindled, repeated victories might produce the retreat of the Indians, but could not prevent them from regaining possession of some part of the distant and extensive territories, which appertain to the United States.”³¹ Americans recognized that their military was not strong enough, nor (implicitly) did they have enough settlers in the region to prevent the Indians from reclaiming their lands, even *if* the United States could push them off in the first place. There was no guarantee of success. This was all conjecture. Even if the United States succeeded in winning “repeated victories,” a feat they had not hitherto accomplished, they could not hold the territory they won. Nevertheless, Americans referred to these territories as “appertaining to the United States,” not to the Indigenous peoples who inhabited them.

In 1783, resorting to warfare against the Native population in the northern and western territories would be costly. Even if the Native population could be “totally expelled,” the American military commanders, along with Secretary of War Henry Knox, feared pushing them into the arms of the British in Canada. Augmenting British Canadians’ strength with Indians, they would “become formidable in case of any future rupture, and in peace, by keeping alive the resentment of the Indians for the loss of their country, would secure to its own subjects the entire benefit of the fur trade.”³² Once again, American military commanders in the western territories refused to recognize that the Indians were grieved over American actions and reported that it was

³⁰ *JCC*, 25: 682-3.

³¹ *JCC*, 25: 681-2.

³² *JCC*, 25: 682.

solely the fault of the British for stirring up Indian resentment and pushing them to violence.³³

Native communities needed no British reminders of American land appropriations and depredations. However, this obstinate perception perpetuated the common myth that the British were behind all Indigenous raids, the confederacy, and warfare, ignoring the fundamental agency of Native civil and military leaders, as well as the significant role Indigenous women played in the decision-making process.³⁴

The committee and American Congress further deluded themselves into believing that the Indigenous peoples could not possibly have “any reasonable objections against the establishment recommended,” since they were “aggressors in the war, without even a pretence [sic] of provocation.”³⁵ Once again, the American commissioners chose to ignore what the Native leaders reiterated: their young men raided the frontiers because American settlers repeatedly encroached on Indigenous lands. Furthermore, as the borderland tensions grew and finally burst in the 1782 American massacre of the peaceful Gnadenhutten and Salem Indians, Indigenous communities had more than just cause for outrage and reprisal.³⁶ Ignoring the settlers’ attacks on their Indigenous neighbors, the commissioners only recounted their exaggerated grievances

³³ John Doughty to Knox. Fort McIntosh, 21 October 1785, in C.W. Butterfield (Ed), *Journal of Captain Jonathan Heart, 1785* (Albany, 1885), 90-91; Arthur Lee, Commissioner to treat with Western Indians in 1784, “Journal,” in *The Olden Time*, ed. Neville B. Craig, 2: 334-344.

³⁴ White, *The Middle Ground*, 413–417; For women’s roles in native communities, see Taylor, *The Divided Ground Indians, Settlers and the Northern Borderland of the American Revolution*, esp. 18–20, 36, 47–48, 122–123, 396–403. For decline in power, see 134134; Sleeper-Smith, *Indian Women and French Men*; Lucy Eldersveld Murphy, *A Gathering of Rivers: Indians, Métis, and Mining in the Western Great Lakes, 1737-1832* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000).

³⁵ *JCC*, 25: 683.

³⁶ Patrick Wolfe, “Recuperating Binarism: A Heretical Introduction,” *Settler Colonial Studies* 3, no. 3–4 (November 1, 2013): 257–79, doi:10.1080/2201473X.2013.830587; Lorenzo Veracini, “On Settleness,” *Borderlands* 10, no. 1 (May 2011); Veracini, *Settler Colonialism*, 2010; Bateman and Pilkington, *Studies in Settler Colonialism*; Wolfe, “The Settler Complex”; Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis, *Unsettling Settler Societies*.

against the Indians: “in return for proffered protection, and liberal supplies [from the British], and to the utter ruin and impoverishment of thousands of families, they wantonly desolated our villages and settlements, and destroyed our citizens.”³⁷ Even if they chose to waive the right of conquest, the commissioners maintained that “a bare recollection of facts is sufficient to manifest the obligation [the Indians] are under to make atonement for the enormities which they have perpetrated, and a reasonable compensation for the expences [sic] which the United States have incurred by their wanton barbarity; and they possess no other means to do this act of justice than by a compliance with the proposed boundaries.”³⁸

While modern scholars have indicted American leadership for ignoring the atrocities committed on both sides of the frontier conflict, contemporaries decried the one-sided coverage as well. Congressmen and reporters recounted the injustices done to American families, but they ignored the desolation American militias wrought on Native communities, crops, and families. An American journalist denounced his fellow countrymen for presenting one side of the story, narrating only the horrific violence that Native warriors committed on the backcountry settlements without explaining the militant settlers’ provocations that led to the raids. Responding to an account published in the *Massachusetts Spy*, the editorial author railed,

[The writer of the letter published in the *Spy*] ought to have told us, that Col. Lewis and his companions met their fate when attempting to prosecute a scheme in disobedience to the order of Congress and their treaty with the Indians, -- He ought to have told us, that just before the close of the late War, a number of the Western people, under the mask of friendship, went to a neutral Indian village, near the forks of the Muskingum and there in cold blood butchered more than one hundred of these people.-- He ought to have told us,

³⁷ *JCC*, 25: 683.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

that all the murders committed by the Indians in that quarter since the peace, were on the wretches concerned in the Muskingum wickedness; or on those who by their crimes have provoked a just resentment.³⁹

Even in 1786, not all Americans were comfortable with bellicosity of backcountry settlers and astutely observed that settlers' raids as much as those of the Indigenous warriors continued the cycle of violence and that one could not be blamed without looking at the culpability of the other as well.

Despite this uproar, Congress acted on the myth that the western territories ceded by Great Britain became American lands by right of conquest. Beginning in 1784, the United States sent commissioners to treat with Western nations, as well as the Six Nations and Southern tribes to acquire land they believed to be theirs and make it official by treaty.⁴⁰ While claiming lands by right of conquest was common practice among both European and Native American nations in the eighteenth century, Indigenous leaders contested American claims on the grounds that the Americans had *not* defeated their Native warriors on the field of battle.⁴¹ Nevertheless, on

³⁹ "Respecting the Indians, &c. in the Western Territory," *Thomas's Massachusetts Spy; or: The Worcester Gazette*, 16 February 1786, Delaware Records 1786-1787, OVGLEA.

⁴⁰ British Brigadier General Allan Maclean tried to reassure his Indigenous allies that "the States of America ... never would act so much contrary to their own Interest, as to quarrel with [the Natives] Wantonly, or go to war" with them to exert their perceived right of conquest to their lands. "Such an action would render them infamous to all the World," Maclean proclaimed. (Brig Gen Allan Maclean to Gen Frederick Haldimand, Niagara, 18 May 1783, in *MPHC* 20: 120). He was wrong. See also, Josiah Harmar to John Dickinson, Fort McIntosh, 15 January 1785, in *Memoirs*, Pennsylvania Historical Society 7: 415-416. Delaware Records 1785.

⁴¹ Brig Gen Allan Maclean to Gen Frederick Haldimand, Niagara, 18 May 1783, in *MPHC* 20: 117-121; "Transactions with Indians at Sandusky," 26 August – 8 September 1783, in *MPHC* 20: 174-182; Mc Kee to De Peyster, Sandusky, 8 September 1783, in *MPHC*, 11: 385-6, Haldimand Papers [B 123 p 406]; Brig Gen Maclean to Gen Frederick Haldimand, Niagara, 27 September 1783, in *MPHC* 20: 187-188; "Journal of Arthur Lee, Commissioner to treat with Western Indians in 1784," in *The Olden Time*, Ed. Neville B. Craig, 2: 340; White, *The Middle Ground*, 408, 417. "The American republic that claimed to have conquered most of the *pays d'en haut* [the former French Upper Country] was in fact but one of a group of powers competing for the

October 22, 1784, Arthur Lee, a Commissioner Plenipotentiary for the United States, signed a new Treaty of Fort Stanwix with the Six Nations, granting peace to the Six Nations, as conquered foes in the late war. In exchange for peace, the Six Nations agreed to return prisoners captured during the war and cede a large portion of their territory to the United States, completing the boundaries of present-day Pennsylvania except for a tiny triangle in the state's northwest corner (granted in 1792).⁴²

Just two months after the signing of the 1784 Treaty of Fort Stanwix, Lee observed the unceasing waves of settlers pouring into the western lands: “Batteaux pass daily, with whole families, stock, and furniture, for Kentucky. Those from Virginia take boat[s] at Wheeling, which is situated on the Ohio, about ninety miles below Pittsburgh.”⁴³ He also observed that the

Western Indians were both discontented and angry with the Six Nations, for having made a treaty with us without consulting them. This was the object of the general confederacy which they mentioned, at Fort Stanwix; and these Indians charge the Six Nations with a breach of faith, plighted in this confederacy. It is certain this was the wish of the Six Nations, and the intent of their speech; but the decided language we held obliged them to an immediate determination, which bids fair to prostrate their confederation, and its

region. . . . The theory of conquest foundered on the weakness of the new republic” (White, 417); Taylor, *Divided Ground*, 111-117; Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country*, 277-283; Banner, *How the Indians Lost Their Land*, 112, 121-129.

⁴² Andrew R. L. Cayton, *The Frontier Republic: Ideology and Politics in the Ohio Country, 1780-1825* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1986), 36-37; For the treaty transcript, see “Treaty with the Six Nations, October 22, 1784,” in Francis Paul Prucha, ed., *Documents of United States Indian Policy*, 3rd ed (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 4-5. For maps and a digital image of the original treaty, see: “Treaty and Land Transaction,” Fort Stanwix, *National Park Service*, <http://web.archive.org/web/20150323045012/http://www.nps.gov/fost/learn/historyculture/treaty-landtransaction-1784.htm> (12 December 2014).

⁴³ “Journal of Arthur Lee, Commissioner to treat with Western Indians in 1784,” in *The Olden Time*, ed. Neville B. Craig, 2: 340.

diabolical object.⁴⁴

The Six Nations had a long history of unilaterally making decisions without the consultation or consent of neighboring Indigenous communities, making their 1784 treaty negotiations with the United States unsurprising and yet doubly aggravating.⁴⁵ Furthermore, their independent actions threatened the Native confederation that had formed in 1783 to safeguard Native lands from American avarice.⁴⁶ While other communities were incensed over the Six Nations' treaty with the Americans, it must be recognized that the American commissioners compelled their representatives to make a quick decision and gave them no time to confer with their own communities, let alone any others in a strategic move to undermine the confederacy.⁴⁷

In 1785, delegates from the Wabash communities also signed a treaty with the American commissioners – the Treaty of Fort McIntosh – unbeknownst to their villages. These delegates were instructed to hear the American message and deliver it back to their civil chiefs *without action*.⁴⁸ However, Half King of the Wyandot and Captain Pipe of the Delaware took it upon themselves to *sign* the treaty.⁴⁹ As in the Treaty of Fort Stanwix negotiations the year before, the

⁴⁴ “Journal of Arthur Lee, Commissioner to treat with Western Indians in 1784,” 2: 341-2.

⁴⁵ Cf. Taylor, *The Divided Ground Indians, Settlers and the Northern Borderland of the American Revolution*.

⁴⁶ White, *Middle Ground*, 413. The confederacy began to coalesce in 1783 at Sandusky and was composed of at least 35 Native clans and ethnic groups, as opposed to the American conceptualization of a confederacy of unified and homogenous tribes (White, 413; Taylor, *The Divided Ground*). Gregory Dowd's study also reveals that between 1783 and 1794 thousands of Native Americans “shared a vision of pan-Indian cooperation” to continue their commercial ties to Great Britain, defend their homelands and political autonomy, or as an expression of religious nativism and desire for Indian unity (Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance*, 91).

⁴⁷ Cf. White, *The Middle Ground*; Taylor, *The Divided Ground Indians, Settlers and the Northern Borderland of the American Revolution*; Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country*; Witgen, *An Infinity of Nations*.

⁴⁸ Indian Council at Detroit, 20 September 1785, in *MPHC* 11: 465-7.

⁴⁹ Other Native delegates included Abraham Kuhn, Ottawerreri, Hobocan, Walendightun, Talapoxie, Wingenu, Packelant, Gingewanno, Waanoos, Konalawassee, Shawnaqum, and Quecookkia. George Rogers Clark, Richard Butler, and Arthur Lee were the American

commissioners at Fort McIntosh held several Indigenous leaders prisoner until both white and black Americans captured during the Revolution were returned. Both the 1784 Treaty of Fort Stanwix and the 1785 Treaty of Fort McIntosh set boundaries between Native and American settlements. However, the strong language used in the Treaty of Fort McIntosh broke with the simplicity of its precedent. In an innovative departure from the language of the previous treaty, the authors of the Treaty of Fort McIntosh, declared, "The said Indian nations do acknowledge themselves and all their Tribes to be under the protection of the United States and no other Sovereign whatsoever."⁵⁰ Furthermore, the Treaty of Fort McIntosh allowed Wyandot, Delaware, and Ottawa to live and hunt *only* within the bounds of the lines set by the United States, which represents an important shift in thinking about Native lands.⁵¹ Rather than drawing geographic borders around American settlement, the treaties of the 1780s began to restrict Natives to circumscribed lands, slowly forming the basis for what became the reservation system in the nineteenth century.⁵² This process paralleled that of the French *cantonement* system in Algeria, explored in the next chapter.

The Treaty of Fort McIntosh also clarified matters of legal jurisdiction that the previous treaty ignored. If any American citizen or non-Native person tried to settle on Indian land, they forfeited United States protection, and the "Indians may punish the offenders as they please[d]. If any Indian or Indians shall commit a Robbery or murder on any Citizen of the

representatives present at the council. ("Treaty of Fort McIntosh, 1785: Articles of Agreement Between the United States and the Indians," in *MPHC*, 25: 687-689.)

⁵⁰ Treaty of Fort McIntosh, 1785: Articles of Agreement Between the United States and the Indians" in *MPHC*, 25: 687-689. This statement also indicates the United States' concern about Native Americans' allegiance to Great Britain, the hopes of some for a renewed alliance with France, and the potential willingness of a number of communities to develop stronger ties to the Spanish in North America.

⁵¹ "Treaty of Fort McIntosh, 1785," in *MPHC* 25, 688.

⁵² Banner, *How the Indians Lost Their Land*, 127–129; Horsman, *Expansion and American Indian Policy, 1783-1812*, 19–23.

United States, the Tribe to which he shall belong, shall be bound to deliver him over to the nearest post, to be punished according to the ordinance of Congress."⁵³ This clause not only spelled out the rights and obligations of the Indigenous communities and the United States in dealing with the fractious backcountry settlers and wayward Natives, but it also revealed the federal government's weakness and inability to police its own borders.⁵⁴

While the Treaty of Fort McIntosh attempted to be more thorough than the previous in establishing legal precedents, and Americans perceived it as legitimate, it was never enforced. The Native delegates sent to this council were only authorized to hear, but not act, on the American message, so their communities rejected the treaty as invalid.⁵⁵

Similarly, the 1786 Treaty of Fort Finney with the Shawnee, repeated the language of the 1785 treaty and stubbornly perpetuated the myth of the conquest of Native Americans: "The Shawanoe nation do acknowledge the United States to be the sole and absolute sovereigns of all the territory ceded to them by treaty of peace, made between them and the King of Great Britain the fourteenth day of January, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-four."⁵⁶ However, this treaty, like that of Fort McIntosh, was also unenforceable because the negotiations were poorly

⁵³ Ibid, 688-689.

⁵⁴ Banner, *How the Indians Lost Their Land*, 112–129; Francis Paul Prucha, *American Indian Policy* (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1971); White, *The Middle Ground*; Griffin, *American Leviathan*; Taylor, *The Divided Ground Indians, Settlers and the Northern Borderland of the American Revolution*.

⁵⁵ According to [Indian Land Cessions in the United States, 1784 to 1894](#): "This treaty was never carried into effect, owing to the hostile attitude assumed by a large proportion of the Ohio tribes, and it was finally superseded by the treaty of Aug. 3, 1795, at Greenville." (Clara NiiSka, "Detailed Descriptions of Territory Claimed by the U.S. Through Treaty Cessions," *Maquah Publications* http://web.archive.org/web/20150323042647/http://www.maquah.net/Historical/Treaties/cession_details.html (22 March 2015).

⁵⁶ "Treaty of Fort Finney," 31 January 1786.

http://www.ohiohistorycentral.org/w/Treaty_of_Fort_Finney_%281786%29_%28Transcript%29 (Accessed 5 January 2015).

attended by an unrepresentative group of delegates who were unauthorized to sign them.

Afterward, even the Delaware signatories Half King and Captain Pipe renounced the treaties as “dictated” or forced, stating that they feared the Americans would burn their villages if they did not sign them. What was more, the ensuing frontier violence prevented American surveyors from mapping and marking the appropriated lands.⁵⁷

The rapid succession of Native treaties signals how American officials scrambled to keep pace with the flow of settlers into the western territories. The mid-1780s treaties were hastened by both the rapidity with which emigrants poured into the trans-Appalachian west and by the urgency of President Washington and Congress to pay for war debts through western land sales.⁵⁸ Following the treaty agreements at Forts Stanwix and McIntosh, Washington wrote to Indian Commissioner Arthur Lee,

I am pleased to find that the Indians have yielded so much; from the temper I heard they were in, I apprehended less compliance, on their part. This business being accomplished, it would give me pleasure to hear that Congress had proceeded to the disposal of the ceded Lands at a happy medium price, in a District sufficient and proper for a compact State. Progressive seating will be attended with many advantages; sparse settlements with many evils. ...⁵⁹

The interests of the landed elite in government diverged from those of the Commissioners, whose interests lay much closer or coincided with those of the settlers, especially when George

⁵⁷ Celia Barnes, *Native American Power in the United States, 1783-1795* (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2003), 68–71; Banner, *How the Indians Lost Their Land*, 127–129.

⁵⁸ Banner, *How the Indians Lost Their Land*, 124–127.

⁵⁹ Washington to Arthur Lee, Mount Vernon, 15 March 1785, in George Washington, *The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745-1799*, ed. John Clement Fitzpatrick and David Maydole Matteson, vol. 28 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1931), 106.

Rogers Clark participated in the treaty negotiations. Washington was clearly concerned about both the Indigenous and settler threats to peace in the western territories, whereas the Commissioners' sole purpose was to acquire as much land as possible from the Native communities for distribution among American settlers who were flooding into the lands regardless of what Congress decided to do with them.

At the same time, metropolitan officials, Indian Commissioners, and the settlers held similar ideas about how to acquire Native lands. Washington continued in a letter to Congress that "if the other tribes are in earnest and will observe the Treaty and a third treaty is concluded with the more southerly Indians, their spirit must yield, or they could easily be extirpated."⁶⁰ In other words, President Washington brazenly stated that if the Indigenous leaders could not be convinced "peacefully" to move off federally claimed lands, the United States could uproot and totally destroy them.

Native Chiefs were not naïve about American intentions. As one among many examples, the Shawnee wrote to their translator and emissary, Alexander McKee, begging him to intercede for them and help them create an Indigenous alliance against their common enemy – the American settlers: "You now see trouble is coming upon us fast. We think it nigh at hand. The Virginians are settling our Country & building Cabbins [sic] in every place. ... Acquaint our younger Brethren the Lake Indians and the Six Nations with our situation that the Americans intend to pay us a visit early this Spring, when the grass is four inches high."⁶¹

⁶⁰ Washington to the President of Congress, Mount Vernon, 15 March 1785, in *ibid.*, 28:108–109.

⁶¹ Message from the Shawnee Towns to Alexander McKee, 20 March 1785, in *MPHC*, 25: 690, Delaware Records 1785. See also: Indian Council Held at Wakitunikee, 18 May 1785, in *MPHC*, 25, 691-693, Delaware Records 1785, OVGLEA.

The treaties resulted in one significant accomplishment, however: the unification of many of the Indigenous villages from the Six Nations communities in the east to the Illinois villages in the west. John Doughty, Major Commandant at Fort McIntosh under Colonel Harmar reported to General Knox on October 21, 1785:

This treaty [at Fort McIntosh] and the one at Fort Stanwix, with the steps the Honorable the Continental Congress have thought fit to take in sending out the surveyors, have had the effect to unite the Indians and induce them to make a common cause of what they suppose their present grievances. They are told by the British, and they are full in the persuasion, that the territory in question was never ceded to us by Britain further than respects the jurisdiction or putting the Indians under the protection of the United States. From this reasoning, they draw the conclusion that our claim in consequence of that cession ought not to deprive them of their lands without purchase. I believe you may depend upon it that this is the reasoning of their chiefs. I am so informed by several persons who have been among them.⁶²

Native leaders viewed the early Treaty of Fort Stanwix (1768) as a legally binding agreement that was not to be overturned in subsequent treaties. It was this understanding that formed the backbone of Indigenous leaders' legal case against the treaties of the 1780s.

Representing Native counter-claims, Major Doughty wrote to American Secretary of War Henry Knox in 1785. His letter reveals the acuity of Indigenous leaders, as well as their familiarity with Anglo-American legal constructs. Referring to conversations with Delaware and

⁶² John Doughty to Knox, Fort McIntosh, 21 October 1785, in Jonathan Heart, *Journal of Capt. Jonathan Heart on the March with His Company from Connecticut to Fort Pitt, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, from the Seventh of September, to the Twelfth of October, 1785, Inclusive: To Which Is Added the Dickinson-Harmar Correspondence of 1784-5 ; the Whole Illustrated with Notes and Preceded by a Biographical Sketch of Captain Heart*, ed. C. W. Butterfield (Albany: J. Munsell's Sons, 1885), 90–91.

Wyandot representatives, Doughty observed,

Our acting upon the late treaty made at this place last winter, in beginning to survey their country, is certainly one great cause of their present uneasiness.

If a confederacy of the Indian tribes to the westward should take place, of which there is a prospect, they will become very formidable from their numbers. Should an event of this kind appear probable, from what information Congress may have before them, it appears to me evidently for our interest that some steps should be taken to engage some of their nations in our favor; in this case, I beg leave to offer it as my opinion that one great step to be pursued should be a distribution of a few presents among them, and a constant intercourse with them by emissaries well acquainted with their language and manners, who shall always be in their towns, counteracting the unfavorable impressions that are daily forming against us.⁶³

While the United States did attempt to follow this rational course of action, there was little funding to support the gifts necessary for diplomacy with Native Chiefs. To complicate matters, the men who served as diplomats were often ill suited to the task because of their biases and unwillingness to understand and observe Native customs. Even those who sought to reestablish a middle ground of diplomacy rather than coercion were largely unsuccessful because continued settler encroachment on Native lands and violence against Native peoples undermined American ambassadors' efforts at every turn.⁶⁴

⁶³ John Doughty to Knox, Fort McIntosh, 21 October 1785, in *Journal of Captain Jonathan Heart*, 90-91.

⁶⁴ White, *The Middle Ground*; David Andrew Nichols, *Red Gentlemen and White Savages: Indians, Federalists, and the Search for Order on the American Frontier* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2008).

United States: Fending Off Internal and External Threats

A confluence of interests compelled the United States to pay attention to the trans-Appalachian west and the backcountry settlers: external threats from Great Britain and Spain, internal discord among the states, and the need to repay public creditors.⁶⁵ Between 1783 and 1812, threats from the British and Spanish compelled the United States to take steps to bind settlers to the federal government by conciliating some of their requests for recognition of land claims and for defense.⁶⁶ The government also sought to ease the path to citizenship for immigrants and improve transportation routes to enhance commercial and communication networks. By improving roads and constructing canals on the waterways between the east and west, George Washington hoped to stave off British and Spanish influence and attach the backcountry settlers more firmly to American interests. “For if this Country,” Washington warned,

which will settle faster than any other ever did (and chiefly by foreigners who can have no particular predilection for *us*), cannot, by an easy communication be drawn this way, but are suffered to form commercial intercourses (which lead we all know to others) with the Spaniards on their right and rear, or the British on their left, they will become a distinct people from us, have different views, different interests, and instead of adding strength to the Union, may in case of a rupture with either of those powers, be a

⁶⁵ Cathy D. Matson and Peter S. Onuf, *A Union of Interests: Political and Economic Thought in Revolutionary America*, American Political Thought (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1990); Peter S. Onuf, *Statehood and Union: A History of the Northwest Ordinance*, *Midwestern History and Culture* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987); Peter S. Onuf, *The Origins of the Federal Republic: Jurisdictional Controversies in the United States, 1775-1787* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983); Washington to Richard Lee, 14 December 1784, in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., *The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745-1799* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1931-1944) 28: 9-12.

⁶⁶ Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country*, 262–271.

formidable and dangerous neighbor.⁶⁷

Not only did Washington and other American officials worry about the dangers Great Britain and Spain posed but also decried the hazards that contentious states posed to the union. Regarding state squabbles over Native American land cessions in the western territories, Washington wrote to Richard Henry Lee, then President of the Congress,

For the copy of the treaty held with the Six Nations at Fort Stanwix, you will please to accept my thanks. These people have given I think, all that the United States could reasonably have required of them; more perhaps than the State of New York conceives ought to have been asked from them by an other than their own Legislature. I wish they were better satisfied. Individual States opposing the measures of the United States, encroaching upon the territory of each other; and setting up old and obsolete claims, is verifying the prediction of our enemies, and is truly unfortunate.⁶⁸

Rival land claims and contending local interests were bedeviling the larger federal project, Washington complained.

a kind of fatality attending all our public measures, inconceivable delays, particular States contracting the plans of the United States when submitted to them, opposing each other upon all occasions, torn by internal disputes, or supinely negligent and inattentive to everything which is not local and self interesting and very often short sighted in these, make up our system of conduct. Would to God our own Countrymen, who are entrusted with the management of the political machine, could view things by that large and

⁶⁷ Washington to Henry Knox. Mount Vernon, 5 December 1784, in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., *The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745-1799* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1931-1944) 28: 3-5.

⁶⁸ Washington to Richard Lee, 14 December 1784, in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., *The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745-1799* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1931-1944) 28: 9.

extensive scale upon which it is measured by foreigners, and by the Statesmen of Europe, who see what we might be, and predict what we shall come to. In fact, our federal Government is a name without substance: No State is longer bound by its edicts, than it suits *present* purposes, without looking to the consequences. How then can we fail in a little time, becoming the sport of European politics, and the victims of our own folly.⁶⁹

Here lay the powerful trope for pulling quarreling states and factions into a new political order. New York ceded its claims to western territories in 1781, but Virginia did not cede the land it claimed west of the Appalachian Mountains to the federal government until 1784. On March 1, 1784, Congress accepted Virginia's cession of the western lands along with all seven of the state's stipulations on which the cession was based.⁷⁰ By so doing, Congress removed one of the final impediments states posed to their objectives: to take advantage of the flood of settlers by selling land to cover the national debt and to reconcile the states to federal interests.

⁶⁹ Washington to Henry Knox, Mount Vernon, 5 December 1784, in Fitzpatrick, *The Writings of George Washington*, 28: 5.

⁷⁰ Jerry A. O'Callaghan, "The Western Lands, 1776-84: Catalyst for Nationhood," *Journal of Forest History* 31, no. 3 (July 1987), 137; "Virginia Cession of Western Land Claims," 1 March 1784, *Territorial Papers of the United States* (Washington, D.C. : U.S. G.P.O., 1934) 2: 6-9.




Figure 6: United States Land Claims and Cessions 1782-1802⁷¹

Once states ceded their claims on the western lands, Congress could determine how to govern them and honor both their public debts through land sales and the military land bounties promised to veterans, thereby establishing the colonial system of the United States.⁷² On the

⁷¹ "United States Land Claims and Cessions 1782-1802" by Kmusser - Own work. Licensed under CC BY-SA 2.5 via Wikimedia Commons - http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:United_States_land_claims_and_cessions_1782-1802.png#mediaviewer/File:United_States_land_claims_and_cessions_1782-1802.png (Accessed 21 December 2014).

⁷² I am not the first to refer to the American territorial system as a "colonial" system. A number of other historians have depicted the ordinances of the 1780s similarly, dating back at least to William Cutler, the grandson of one of the leading proponents of settlement in the Northwest Territory, Manasseh Cutler. See: R. Douglas Hurt, "Historians and the Northwest Ordinance," *The Western Historical Quarterly* 20, no. 3 (1989): 261–80, doi:10.2307/969535. My views also correlate with those expressed in recent scholarship such as Go, *Patterns of Empire*; Rana, *The Two Faces of American Freedom*; Ford, *Settler Sovereignty*. However, it should also be noted that I am taking a stance that contrasts sharply with that of Robert Remini and others who view the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 as the document that saved the early American Republic and

same day that Congress accepted Virginia's land cession, Thomas Jefferson proposed to divide the territory into states and gradually implement a representative government in each territory.⁷³ While Jefferson's suggestion was not immediately acted upon, it planted seeds that grew into the Land Ordinance of 1785. This ordinance established the methods for appointing and regulating surveyors of the western territories ceded to the United States through treaties. It also established the rectilinear method of dividing the land into six-mile-square townships and then into one square mile (640-acre) plats. Additionally, land was apportioned for the Secretary of War and the use of the military. The ordinance prescribed the manner in which lots were to be sold, as well as a minimum price so the land could not be devalued or overvalued through speculation. Finally, it honored the promise of land to soldiers and their families who served in the Continental Army, thus honoring the government's debt to them.⁷⁴

Elated with the passage of the land ordinance, Richard Henry Lee, then president of the Continental Congress, wrote of his hopes that the disposal of lands northwest of the Ohio River in accordance with the ordinance would "extinguish about 10 Millions of the pub[lic] debt." He praised the institution of federally-run land sales as "almost the only [means] that we have for discharging our oppressive debt."⁷⁵ More than that, however, the Land Ordinance of 1785

prevented it from collapsing into an empire. See: R.V. Remini, "The Northwest Ordinance of 1787: Bulwark of the Republic," *The Indiana Magazine of History* (1988), 15–24.

⁷³ John D. Barnhart and Dorothy Lois Riker, *Indiana to 1816; the Colonial Period*, The History of Indiana, v. 1 (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Bureau, 1971), 250.

⁷⁴ "To a major general 1100 acres, to a brigadier 850, to a colonel 500, to a lieutenant colonel 450, to a major 400, to a captain 300, to a lieutenant 200, to an ensign 150, and to a noncommissioned officer and soldier 100." ("Land Ordinance of 1785," 20 May 1785, *Territorial Papers*, 2: 12-18.)

⁷⁵ Richard Henry Lee to James Madison, 30 May 1785, in Edmund Cody Burnett, *Letters of Members of the Continental Congress*, Papers of the Dept. of Historical Research (Washington, D.C: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1921), 8: 130–131.

signaled that the United States intended to acquire *all* the lands northwest of the Ohio River and all the way to the Mississippi River.⁷⁶

American Commissioners acted on the belief that moving quickly would create the desired state of affairs in fact, even if the Native leaders objected to the treaties. With a flood of thousands of settlers rushing onto their lands, the Commissioners knew it would be difficult for the Native communities to prevent further encroachments. In this way, Indigenous headmen would be forced to accept the treaties and land loss as a fact whether they liked it or not. This belief prevailed in the long run, but it ran counter to the realities on the ground in the 1780s.

Out of all the metropolitan officials, Secretary of War Henry Knox best understood that the myth of land acquisition by right of conquest was just that – a myth.⁷⁷ With a tiny support staff of three clerks and a messenger, he organized a meager army – approved only in 1784 to combat the threat of an Indian war. On him “rested the burden of garrisoning the West, of protecting the settlers, and above all in his mind, of maintaining the honor of the United States by just and humane dealings with the Indian tribes.”⁷⁸ Knox concluded that the United States faced two options: (1) forcefully pushing the Indigenous peoples off their lands with an expanded and disciplined army, or (2) negotiating land sales through treaties with Indigenous leaders. The costs of the first far outweighed those of the second, and in a bout of conscience, to which, it must be said, many early American leaders were prone, he observed that a “conciliatory system” would absolve the United States from “blood and injustice which would stain the

⁷⁶ See Figure 7: “United States land claims and cessions 1782-1802.”

⁷⁷ Banner, *How the Indians Lost Their Land*, 113; White, *The Middle Ground*; Prucha, *The Sword of the Republic*; Prucha, *American Indian Policy*; Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance*; Griffin, *American Leviathan*.

⁷⁸ Prucha, *The Sword of the Republic*, 9. After disbanding the army following the Revolution, Congress voted on June 2, 1784 to request 700 men to protect settlements as well as stores of provisions and arms in the western territories.

character of the nation ... beyond all pecuniary calculation.”⁷⁹

By 1785, reports from the backcountry revealed the disparity between the myth and reality. Not only did outraged Indigenous peoples present a threat to Congress’ plans, but so, too, did American settlers.⁸⁰ In May 1785, Colonel Harmar, stationed in the western territories, reported that “the number of settlers farther down the river [from Fort McIntosh] is very considerable and, from all accounts daily increasing.”⁸¹ Harmar was only able to clear illegal settlers up to 150 miles from the fort but no farther, so he devised a plan to establish additional forts along the river in an attempt to keep up with the rapid pace of settlement. Writing again in October 1785, Harmar hoped the army’s new position at Fort Harmar on the mouth of the Muskingum River would make this task easier. The squatters pled with Harmar to allow them to gather their crops before leaving, but “Lenity [sic],” Harmar reported to Knox, “I thought to be out of the question, and have directed Captain Doughty, on his way down to burn and destroy any remaining cabins between [Fort] McIntosh and Muskingum.”⁸²

Then serving as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, John Jay, agreed with Harmar’s assessment and promoted a more orderly and peaceful approach to westward migration. Jay also lobbied for more concentrated settlements rather than the wide dispersal that Virginian policies had encouraged, warning that if his advice was not observed, the white settler “savages” would pose a greater threat to the union than the resident Native inhabitants.

⁷⁹ “Report from Henry Knox, Secretary of War to the President of the United States, relating to the several Indian tribes,” 15 June 1789, in *American State Papers: Indian Affairs*, 1: 12-14.

⁸⁰ White, *Middle Ground*, 417; Taylor, 137; Prucha, *The Sword of the Republic*, 10-19.

⁸¹ Harmar to President of Congress, 1 May 1785 in Butterfield, ed., *Journal of Captain Jonathan Heart*, 65-66.

⁸² Harmar to Knox, Philadelphia, 22 October 1785, in C.W. Butterfield (Ed), *Journal of Captain Jonathan Heart, 1785* (Albany, 1885), 92-94, Delaware Records 1785, OVGLEA.

In my Opinion our Indian Affairs have been ill managed. Details would be tedious. Indians have been murdered by our People in cold Blood and no satisfaction given, nor are they pleased with the avidity with which we seek to acquire their Lands. Would it not be wiser gradually to extend our Settlements, as want of Room should make it necessary, than to pitch our Tents through the Wilderness in a great Variety of Places, far distant from each other, and from those Advantages of Education, Civilization, Law, and Government which compact Settlements and Neighbourhood afford? Shall we not fill the Wilderness with white Savages, and will they not become more formidable to us than the tawny ones who now inhabit it?⁸³

In an April 1787 report to Congress, Knox argued that haphazard incursions into Native territories and United States public lands, such as Harmar and Jay described, would prevent “the great national advantages resulting from a wise administration of the western territory.”⁸⁴ Unless such behavior was curtailed immediately, it would be impossible to remove subsequent intruders.

It was therefore necessary for the United States government to exert its authority over the settlers as much as over the Indigenous population American officials attempted to control. Congress voted to provide more troops for this purpose a week later. By then, it was already too late.

The rapid and illegal settlement of the Ohio and Wabash Valleys provoked “warm hostilities” with the Native communities who sought to protect their homelands and hunting grounds. Consequently, in June 1786 Virginia sent two more companies of soldiers to the rapids

⁸³ John Jay to Thomas Jefferson, 14 December 1786, *Founders Online*, accessed March 24, 2015, <http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-10-02-0457>.

⁸⁴ Report of Knox, 19 April 1787, *JCC*, 32: 222.

of Ohio “to repel the incursions or depredations of the Indians.”⁸⁵ At the same time, Congress also considered a petition from the inhabitants of Kaskaskia, requesting to organize a government for the region. In response, the Secretary of Congress informed them that Congress was considering the matter and that it would draft a plan for a temporary government as quickly as possible.⁸⁶ That plan became the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 – the blueprint the United States used to establish colonial governments, transform all of its colonies into states thenceforth, and rationalize its growing settler empire.

Algeria: The Battle for Continued Occupation

Soldier settlers provided the impetus to maintain occupied lands in French Algeria. Men such as General Bertrand Clauzel and General Monck d’Uzer extended the military’s holdings beyond the initial conquest to enhance French prestige and to personally profit from land acquisition. Clauzel, in particular, saw Algeria as compensation for the American colonies France lost to Great Britain in the Seven Years’ War.⁸⁷ However, it took years to bring a majority in Parliament to this view.

Envisioning an agricultural settler colony, Clauzel compensated for Parliament’s indecision by acting of his own volition while serving as Governor General in 1830-1831 and 1835-1837. His “Ferme expérimental d’Afrique,” however, failed when he attempted to create a model farm of tropical crops that France had to purchase elsewhere. Nevertheless, French colonial scientists remained interested in the idea and continued experimenting with tropical cash crops, and other colonial administrators sought to aid their studies through the development of

⁸⁵ Knox to Harmar, War Office, 27 June 1786, Harmar Papers, Reel 2, Clements Library, Miami Records 1785-1787, OVGLEA.

⁸⁶ Resolution in Congress, 27 June 1786, Harmar Papers, Vol. 3, Clements Library, Illinois Records 1780-1787, OVGLEA.

⁸⁷ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 52.

gardens and nurseries.⁸⁸ When Clauzel returned to North Africa in 1835, he continued to encourage colonization, proclaiming, “By force of perseverance, we shall create a new people who will grow even more rapidly than those established on the other side of the Atlantic [in North America].”⁸⁹ While French agronomists continued to study the feasibility of Clauzel’s agricultural dreams, Clauzel advanced his vision for the settler colony in 1836 by establishing a system whereby settlers could acquire land according to their abilities and means to “improve” it. Settlers who were granted concessions had to cultivate the land and meet certain production requirements within a period of years after taking possession. If these requirements were met, settlers obtained full title to the lands they worked.⁹⁰ Through his *concessionnaire* program and his own acquisition of Algerian lands as a settler soldier, Clauzel pressed Parliament to maintain and defend the colony he helped to create.⁹¹

Beginning in 1830, even before the French parliament had voted to keep its possessions in Algeria, military reports included detailed accounts of the geography, produce, demography, and political maneuverings in Constantine. The city of Bône captured French interest because of its history as one of the areas France had “acquired” or at least had commercial access to through the capitulations with the Ottoman Empire since 1560 C.E.⁹² In 1827, the Algerians reclaimed the city, along with La Calle, another French commercial port, and forcefully removed French

⁸⁸ Sessions, *By Sword and Plow*, 178–9; Adolphe Blanqui, *Algérie: Rapport Sur La Situation Économique de Nos Possessions Dans Le Nord de L’afrique* (Paris, 1840), 75–77; Michael A. Osborne, “The System of Colonial Gardens and the Exploitation of French Algeria, 1830-1852,” *Proceedings of the Meeting of the French Colonial Historical Society* 8 (January 1, 1985): 160–68.

⁸⁹ Governor General Bertrand Clauzel, Proclamation, 1835 in Collingham, *The July Monarchy*, 250.

⁹⁰ Sessions, *By Sword and Plow*, 248. Clauzel’s system remained in place from 1836 through 1848.

⁹¹ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 52–53.

⁹² Julien, *History of North Africa*, 291.

merchants from both.

Regardless of Parliament's hesitation and cautionary missives, the French military made three attempts to take Bône between 1830 and 1832, exhibiting a dogged determination to restore French honor by reclaiming its former commercial outpost as well as a foothold in the coveted eastern province. During this time, a three-way contest ensued for the city and region between the French under Captain Édouard Buisson d'Armandy, the province's Ottoman-Algerian governor, Ahmed Bey, and the pretender Ibrahim Bey who sought control over the province.⁹³

This city was of particular interest to Hadj Ahmed Bey of Constantine because it lay within his province and because it served as a hotbed of intrigues against him. Knowing this, the French took advantage of the political ambitions of several local leaders, and even an emigré – Yousuf, an interpreter from Tunis and *capitaine indigène* under General Clauzel, who aspired to power in the eastern province of Algeria.⁹⁴ At the same time, the Algerian (and Tunisian) leaders manipulated French interests to suit their own quest for power, establishing mutually beneficial relationships, but ones that lasted only as long as one side found the other useful in their efforts to advance their own cause.⁹⁵

⁹³ Prochaska, *Making Algeria French*, 62-63.

⁹⁴ Schreier, "From Mediterranean Merchant to French Civilizer," esp. 637. Yousuf, an ethnic Jew, claimed he had been born in Italy and was captured by pirates as a child, converted to Islam and then raised in the Tunisian court before General Clauzel asked him to serve as an interpreter and later appointed him a *capitaine indigène*, or commander of the Algerian auxiliaries who fought for the French. Yousuf was also in business with one of the most powerful merchants in Algeria in the early to mid-nineteenth-century – Jacob Lasry – and together, they procured food and material goods for the French military, allowing it to continue its conquest. Their brutal methods of acquiring goods from the people in Tlemcen and the surrounding area in 1836 led to much criticism both in Algeria (see Ahmed Bey's memoir) and in France, where most of the outrage was directed at General Clauzel who had hired them (see Collingham, *The July Monarch*, 248).

⁹⁵ At the same time, relations between Hadj Ahmed Bey and the Bey of Tunis were strained – something which both the French military informants and Ahmed, himself, noted. The Bey of Tunis was anxious not to give the French any reason to enter his own territory, and coveting the

After most of the population had already suffered a severe famine and then fled the three-way struggle for their city, the French, with Yousuf leading the attack, finally conquered Bône in 1832.⁹⁶ At last, the French had a foothold in the desirable eastern province, two years before Parliament finally decided to keep the lands. The military of course, had other ideas, and the commandant at Bône launched exploratory missions into other areas of the province as soon as the French had ensconced themselves there.

First, the French occupied the buildings of Bône. In a preindustrial society land is the single most valuable commodity, and the French viewed Algeria after 1830 as a place where land was virtually for the taking. That it was taken at the expense of the Algerians was simply of no concern.⁹⁷

Algerian land was just waiting to be taken and used “appropriately” – settled by Europeans and farmed using “modern” western agricultural techniques.⁹⁸

In Bône such a situation as existed after 1832 is usually described euphemistically as ‘fluid.’ After all, beachheads operate according to snafus, not law. Most everything is ad

fertile and prosperous region of Constantine, even offered some support for the French in return for promises of being made governor over Constantine as well.

⁹⁶ Memoir of Ahmed Bey; Military Report, “Beylick de Constantine,” 1832. 80MIOM 1671/1, CAOM; David Prochaska, *Making Algeria French: Colonialism in Bône, 1870-1920* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 62. Finding, translating, and incorporating Ahmed Bey’s memoir serves to address one of the major problems in the English-language Algerian historiography: the lack of Algerian voices. Sources do exist, but many are in Arabic or are not yet available to the public. It appears that the field is slowly moving towards such analyses, as James McDougall and Julia Clancy-Smith’s works demonstrate, but there is much more work to do and many more questions to explore, especially in the period prior to 1871, to which almost no attention has been given, and none has been paid to the French conquest and construction of imperial institutions between 1830 and 1871 since the foundational works of Charles Ageron, Jacques Berque, and John Ruedy’s recent synthesis that covers this period in a scant few chapters. Berque, *French North Africa*; Berque, *Maghreb, Histoire et Sociétés*; Berque, *L’intérieur Du Maghreb*; Ageron, *Modern Algeria*; Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*.

⁹⁷ Prochaska, 64.

⁹⁸ The Americans saw the western territories, which were, in reality, the property of the Native communities there, in a very similar way.

hoc; what is determinative is the *fait accompli*. So it was in Bône. Land transactions occurred faster than they could be recorded, administrative procedures and practices were applied after the fact, corruption was rampant as bribes exchanged hands, and the law did its best to cloak the proceedings in a veneer of legitimacy. In short, there is simply no way to sort out in any precise manner the volume or chronology of land sales in such a situation.⁹⁹

Land transactions in Bône followed the Algiers pattern closely, despite French administrators' efforts to impose discipline and systematic land acquisition practices. When Clauzel came to Algeria on September 2, 1830 to replace General de Bourmont, Clauzel expanded the Comité des Domaines, the office of public domain in Algeria. Headed by Captain Prosper Gérardin, an Arabic interpreter, two native Algerians formed the rest of this committee: Mustapha ben Chau and Mohammed ben Cobtau. Upon arrival Clauzel confirmed Gérardin's position, appointed two European assistants, a *receveur des domaines* and a *percepteur de droits divers*, and retained two Muslims but different men than those first commissioned. Although the committee's name changed under Clauzel, its mission remained the same but was equally unsuccessful.

Their mission was to tally the holdings and wealth of the Algerian Beylik (including all of the Ottoman ministers in Algiers), but their task was made difficult by the uncooperative and vague responses they received from Hussein Dey's officials. The French attempted to bring some order to the chaos that ensued following the conquest of Algiers, to map and record the *beylikal* lands that had fallen into France's public domain in Algeria with the conquest and establish

⁹⁹ Prochaska, 64.

procedures for both public domain lands and private land transactions.¹⁰⁰ Despite their industry, confusion in property matters was growing fast. A horde of speculators had followed hard on the heels of the Army of Africa. Properties of all kinds and of all legal status were bought and sold at a furious pace. Many natives sold what they had no legal right to sell, including beylik properties of which they were only tenants. ... Many an army officer and civil functionary profited from the Algerian tour to enrich himself personally. A decree of November 8, 1830, officially forbidding the alienation of domain lands, seems to have had almost no effect on slowing the speculative fever or protecting public lands.¹⁰¹

This state of affairs reveals the depth of oversimplification of the American colonization process in French reports. The parliamentary commission sent to report on the state of affairs in Algeria contrasted their struggles to fix themselves profitably on Algerian soil with their perception of European colonization in North America. Unlike MacMahon's triumphal 1870 account, the commissioners remained skeptical about the potential success of their endeavor in 1833:

The establishments of Europeans in North America have prospered because they were founded by hardworking, religious men who went in search of freedom to practice their religion and not by men [who were] enemies of all constraint and moral restraint. They found in this vast temperate continent, forests that furnished the most useful materials for constructing homes, heavy fertile soil, and rivers as numerous as [they were] powerful, opening an easy road/avenue to export the products of the colonists' labors. What is more, the country was only occupied by tribes who nourished/fed themselves by hunting

¹⁰⁰ Ruedy, *Land Policy in Colonial Algeria: The Origins of the Rural Public Domain*, 10:17. The name changed to Administration des Domaines et revenus publics with Clauzel's administration in late 1830.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 10:18. This is precisely what began to happen in the mid-1780s as American commissioners cajoled and bribed Native representatives to turn over portions of their territories. Concurrent with the passage of those contested treaties, speculators sent surveyors out to the lands, and thousands of settlers began to flood into the newly acquired territories. However, for the complete takeover, and the speed of transactions in the American territories to match what happened in Bône, it was necessary for the Americans to continue fighting with the Native population who was still very much in control over most of the lands in the Ohio and Wabash Valleys for another decade, and really for several decades beyond that before the Americans truly were sovereign over the lands they claimed.

and fishing; tribes who traversed a certain expanse of territory... who were completely ignorant of agriculture, never even raising beasts (livestock), and knowing nothing of land ownership: so that, naturally and without effort, they carried into the most remote places their arrow and fish hooks, as game and fish disappeared before the population and the arts of civilized men. ...All of these immense advantages, which permitted the United States to attain this great degree of prosperity that, at this moment has captured the attention of the world, cannot be found in Africa. There, no forests; except perhaps on the slopes of the Atlas [mountains] where we have not penetrated; there are no rivers to the sea, only a few [inland] streams, sometimes swollen/flooded by the winter rains, sometimes dried up by the burning summer heat, at all times, navigation is impractical; the ground is in some places sandy and arid, in other places clayey and marshy; and you cannot use this soil. The least infertile [meaning, the most fertile] places are situated near towns or in sheltered valleys, and are possessed by owners who will not cede their land except for a high price, if the French government covers/provides them with justice or they will become irreconcilable enemies if they are dispossessed by violence or by the reprehensible maneuvers of the Europeans. The rest of the plains is the domain of nomadic tribes, who need them for pasture in order to exist ... the desire for vengeance and the need to pillage are instilled in them at birth.¹⁰²

¹⁰² Procès Verbaux, 1833 Commission Report and Discussion, “Première Partie: De la continuation de l’occupation d’Alger,” 399-400. « Les établissements des Européens dans l’Amérique septentrionale ont prospéré, parce qu’ils ont été fondés par des hommes laborieux, religieux, qui allaient chercher la liberté de professer leur culte, et non [p. 400] par des hommes ennemis de toute contrainte et de tout frein moral. Ils ont trouvé, dans ce vaste continent tempéré, des forêts qui fournissent les matériaux les plus commodes pour construire les habitations, un sol profond et fertile, et des fleuves aussi nombreux que puissants, ouvrant une voie facile à l’exportation des produits du labeur des colons. Le pays n’était, d’ailleurs, occupé que par des hordes se nourrissant de la chasse et de la pêche; hordes qui parcouraient certaine étendue de territoire, excluaient de certaines forêts et des bords de certaines rivières les autres hordes, mais qui ignoraient absolument l’agriculture, n’élevaient pas même de bestiaux, et ne connaissaient point dès lors la propriété du sol : de sorte que, naturellement et sans efforts, elles ont porté dans des lieux plus reculés leurs flèches et leurs hameçons, à mesure que le gibier et le poisson disparaissaient devant la population et les arts des hommes civilisés. ... Tous ces immense avantages, qui ont permis aux États-Unis de s’élever à ce haut degré de prospérité qui fixe en ce moment les regards du monde, ne se trouvent nullement en Afrique. Là point de forêts, si ce n’est peut-être sur les flancs de l’Atlas où nous n’avons pas pénétré; point de fleuves, seulement des rivières, tantôt gonflées par les pluies de l’hiver, tantôt desséchées par les ardeurs de l’été, en tout temps impraticables à la navigation; un sol tantôt sablonneux et aride, tantôt argileux et marécageux; et de ce sol vous ne sauriez en disposer. Les parties les moins stériles, celles qui sont situées à portée des villes ou dans des vallées abritées, sont possédées par des propriétaires qui ne céderont leur terrain qu’à haut prix, si le Gouvernement français les couvre de sa justice, ou qui deviendront des ennemis irréconciliables s’ils sont dépouillés par la violence ou par les manoeuvres coupables des Européens. Le reste des plaines est le domaine de tribus nomades, qui ont besoin du parcours de ces pâturages pour exister ... c’est faire naître en elles le désir de la vengeance et le besoin du pillage. »

Nevertheless, the commissioners recommended France keep its possessions in North Africa because “abandoning our conquests would offend the nation’s legitimate pride [and] sacrifice the commercial advantages and political power.”¹⁰³ Parliament also sought to appease the European settler constituency that had grown up in Algeria during their four years of indecision. “In that time the original Marseille interest was significantly reinforced by an on-site constituency composed of new property owners, speculators, would-be settlers, merchants, military officers and civil administrators, all of whose interests in different ways depended upon retention of the conquest.”¹⁰⁴ Even though the colonization of Native lands was a long, drawn-out, hard-fought, and violently contested affair, Parliament eventually supported the objectives of European settlers and the French military in Algeria.

General Monck d’Uzer was one of the most prominent, powerful, and vocal members of the European Algerian constituency. Beginning in 1832, his endeavors in eastern Algeria, though disputed in the metropole, served to advance France’s “commercial advantages” through land expropriation around Bône. Military commanders and settlers like d’Uzer disregarded the official policy of restricted occupation and continued pushing the colonization of Algeria into new territories. The ad hoc policies, land grabs, support for new settlers to set up farms and businesses, and persistent lobbying efforts of settler soldiers turned dreams of empire into reality and ambiguously defined land into settler colonies, whether the metropolises were ready for them or not.¹⁰⁵ After the capture of the city, General d’Uzer replaced Captain d’Armandy as commandant of Bône on May 15, 1832. There he remained until Yousuf temporarily replaced

¹⁰³ Ibid, 405. « Abandonner nos conquêtes serait offenser la nation dans son légitime orgueil [et] sacrifier des avantages de commerce et de puissance politique.»

¹⁰⁴ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 52.

¹⁰⁵ Prochaska, 62-65; Ageron, *Modern Algeria*, 9; Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 52.

him while waiting for Governor General Clauzel to take command in 1836.¹⁰⁶ As commandant of Bône, d’Uzer lobbied against the application of the 1832 decree banning property transactions between Algerians and Europeans in the city and “promptly became one of the biggest landowners in the area by buying up no less than 2,000 acres for 30,000 francs plus 1,200 francs in rent” from beleaguered and terrified Algerians.¹⁰⁷

And the manner in which he obtained the property was more scandalous still, for it was alleged that he colluded with ‘his’ Algerian agent, one Mustapha ben Kerim – who just happened to be the chief of police for the Algerians of Bône – to hoodwink the Algerians into selling their land. In other words, d’Uzer was engaging in precisely the sort of speculation that the 1832 land law attempted to halt.¹⁰⁸

The scale of his land speculation and his use of soldiers to work the farms as free labor was too much for the Parisian officials to ignore, however, and they recalled d’Uzer to Paris, replacing him with Yousuf. Undaunted, d’Uzer returned to Bône and continued lobbying the Governor General, a land speculator himself with grand plans for turning the Algerian countryside into European farmland, for more extensive settlement. Successful in his efforts, d’Uzer received authorization to establish a new village, Duzerville, just outside Bône. He owned all of the land on which the town sat including the neighboring farms, which he worked as a settler until his death in 1849.¹⁰⁹ Although his example was one of the more extreme cases of land appropriation and exploitation, d’Uzer’s ardor for the region around Bône was not at variance with other

¹⁰⁶ Military Report, “Beylick de Constantine,” 1832. 80 MIOM 1671/1, CAOM. Yousuf served under Major Leroy Duverger while interim commandant of Bône.

¹⁰⁷ Prochaska, 65.

¹⁰⁸ Prochaska, 65.

¹⁰⁹ Prochaska, 66.

French commanders' views of that province. They saw the conquest of Bône as the gateway to the fertile province of Constantine.

Between the conquest in 1830 and 1834, while France was still undecided whether or not conquered Algerian cities should be kept as French colonies, Parliament sent a commission to Algeria in 1833 to collect data and offer recommendations.¹¹⁰ During the interval in which General d'Uzer held Bône, the French Parliament at last voted in 1834 to keep the possessions they had already acquired in Algeria and to consider Algeria as an official French colony. The parliamentary commission's report the previous year concluded that despite the failures, France should stay in Algeria to honor public opinion and uphold national pride in the face of Great Britain's meddling support of the Algerian resistance.¹¹¹ Unable to vote one way or the other on the commission's suggestion, Parliamentary discussions devolved into a deadlock between pro- and anti-colonial factions. To break the impasse, the Minister of War, Soult, Duc de Demaltie drafted the Royal Ordinance of July 22, 1834, which created "a military colony named 'les possessions françaises dans le Nord de l'Afrique,' [and] placed [it] under the authority of the Ministry of War."¹¹² Louis Philippe signed the ordinance into law and officially recognized Algeria as a French colony. While an official policy of "limited occupation" was in place, the military acted as if it had never heard of the decree and continued its march into new towns and regions of Algeria not yet under French control.

After the French Parliament voted to keep its holdings in Algeria and retain it as a colony in 1834, the Minister of War directed the military to pursue a policy of limited occupation, but

¹¹⁰ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 53–54; Collingham, *The July Monarchy*, 246–7.

¹¹¹ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 54.

¹¹² Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 54. Nicolas Jean de Dieu Soult, Duc de Demaltie was Minister of war from November 17, 1830 to July 18, 1834, when he was replaced by Étienne Maurice who served until November 10, 1834.

Governor-General Clauzel had different ideas and organized the first campaign against Constantine in 1836.¹¹³ Fortunately for the governors-general, King Louis Philippe was a proponent of the Algerian conquest. He believed it bolstered national pride, gave the army an outlet, and legitimated the ascension of one of his sons to the throne upon his death.¹¹⁴ Although a monarch, Louis Philippe believed that royalty should demonstrate their mettle and ability to lead on the battlefield as proof of their worthiness for the position they held. Champion of a pacific international policy, at least in Europe, King Louis Philippe understood that peace did not offer prospects for military honor for his sons. However, the conquest of Algeria provided opportunities for the *dauphins* [princes] to prove themselves and to win distinction on the battlefield.¹¹⁵ Parliament's policy of restricted occupation remained the official objective until the siege and fall of Constantine by 1837 opened up coveted tracts of land to European settlers.¹¹⁶ Thereafter, in a significant change in colonial land policy, the French government aligned itself with its military and supported an aggressive approach to land acquisition and management in the Tell (the mountainous coastal region north of the Sahara).¹¹⁷

Algeria: The Conquest of Constantine

In 1835, after reestablishing his power and overcoming upstart rival leaders who sought to take his place as governor of Constantine province, Ahmed Bey received a letter from Governor-General Clauzel. Clauzel offered to recognize him as Bey of Constantine, but only if Ahmed agreed to pay the *lezma* (a graduated poll tax) and submit himself to French rule. A reformer,

¹¹³ Clauzel served as Governor-General between 1830 and 1831, then again between 1835 and 1837.

¹¹⁴ Collingham, *The July Monarchy*, 248–249; Sessions, *By Sword and Plow*, 83.

¹¹⁵ Sessions, *By Sword and Plow*, 83; Collingham, *The July Monarchy*, 249.

¹¹⁶ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 23–24; Sessions, *By Sword and Plow*, 212; Collingham, *The July Monarchy*, 247.

¹¹⁷ Collingham, *The July Monarchy*, 250.

Ahmed had created a council of local leaders, his *divan*, which he brought together to hear their advice on all significant matters, including international diplomacy. He did so again when he received General Clauzel's letter, which he read to the *divan* as soon as they convened. His councilors stated that since Constantine was a province of the Algerian Regency, the decision ultimately rested with the Ottoman Sultan, Mahmoud II. Therefore, it was necessary to write to the Sultan and inform the French that they could not respond to General Clauzel's offer until they had received a response from the Porte.¹¹⁸ However, Ahmed noted that even before receiving Sultan Mahmoud's response, the French capture of Bône, in 1832, completely ruptured any possible relationship between them. From that moment on, he recalled, he had "no other thought than to present the greatest possible obstacles to their subsequent endeavors."¹¹⁹

Reports such as Captain Saint-Hippolyte's notes on Constantine also served to whet French appetite for the fertile lands in North Africa. This report, in particular, provided information essential for planning Clauzel's campaign against the stronghold of Constantine – travel times, prominent geographical features, as well as the desirability of the province to justify the conquest. "Of the three Beyliks of the Algerian Regency," Saint-Hippolyte effused, "the most extensive, the richest, and the most important was that of Constantine in the East," which was bordered by the sea, the Jurjura Mountains and salt marshes, and the Regency of Tunis.¹²⁰ With coastal access to the north, an eastern border with Tunisia, and the desert to the south, Constantine was a hub of trade networks that connected sub-Saharan Africa, eastern North

¹¹⁸ "Mémorial de Ahmed Bey," 5, CAOM. Ahmed Bey followed the same course of action – convening the *divan* each time he received a letter from the French, and their advice corresponded with both his own feelings and the wishes of Sultan Mahmoud – continue to respond evasively, defer to the Sultan and keep the French at bay. (C.f. "Mémorial," 10-11, 24.)

¹¹⁹ "Mémorial de Ahmed Bey," 8. CAOM.

¹²⁰ "Expédition de Constantine: Notes extraites des Mémoires du Capitaine Saint-Hippolyte." 30 Août 1836. 80 MIOM 1672, no. 1. CAOM.

Africa, and the Mediterranean. “Farther away is the desert whose solitude is frequently [broken] by caravans coming from the center of Africa toward Tunis and Tripoli in particular, which having frequent enough relations with Turkey, offers an avenue to products from the Tropics.”¹²¹

French military commanders, and travelers alike, repeatedly described the province of Constantine as the most extensive, important, and the richest of the three *beyliks* of Algeria. Additionally, it was the foremost among them in the production of wax, honey, butter, wheat, barley, and livestock. It was a coveted gem and one that French administrators believed to be the linchpin of their colonial strategy and ultimate success.¹²² It was therefore essential that the French survey, map, and claim as much of this territory as possible. For this reason, in 1837, the colonial administration began to organize a survey office, or Cadastre, that would be responsible for visualizing space and assigning economic values to land.¹²³ When Governor General Clauzel took over command of the French portion of the eastern province in 1836, it was to launch an assault against Constantine. On a previous visit to Paris, he had easily convinced French Prime Minister Adolphe Thiers that the French needed to conquer Constantine and establish a system of “absolute domination”:

The establishment of this system required a series of military operations to be undertaken simultaneously in three large sections of the Regency. Preparations for the planned expedition began in the first days of August ... But on the 30th of the same month, an order from the Minister of War [Nicolas Joseph, Marquis Maison] suspended the

¹²¹ “Expédition de Constantine: Notes extraites des Mémoires du Capitaine Saint-Hyppolyte.” 30 Août 1836. 80 MIOM 1672, no. 1. CAOM.

¹²² Note de M. Lebois-Lecomte à M. Thiers sur la situation de l'Algérie au 1er octobre 1840. F80/1673 2, CAOM.

¹²³ Ruedy, *Land Policy in Colonial Algeria*, 27; Alvaro Santana-Acuña, “The Taming of Nature during the Napoleonic Period: Projects for the Modernization of the Cadastre (1800-1802),” Presentation at Society for French Historical Studies Conference, Boston, 7 April 2013.

preparations. The Maréchal was told to withdraw [back] into the existing limits of the occupation, reserving to the new cabinet the task of deciding on the proposed system.¹²⁴

The new Prime Minister, Louis-Mathieu Molé, replaced Minister Thiers in September 1836. Molé was as conservative as his new Minister of War, and refused Clauzel's request for troops to conduct the proposed expedition. Heedless of the government's wishes, Clauzel set off for Constantine with approximately 8,600 men in November 1836, just as the winter rains turned to sleet.¹²⁵

In the summer of 1836, rumors of this planned expedition reached Ahmed Bey. He immediately sent spies to Bône to gather more information and set about preparing for the expected attack. In short order, he procured arms, cannons, ammunition, food, and called his troops in from the surrounding area. In addition to his 1500 infantrymen and 5000 cavalrymen, he had 1000 men on guard inside the city walls, comprised of Turks, Algerians who refugees from the 1830 conquest of Algiers, as well as his own contingent of artillerymen.¹²⁶

As the French set out for Constantine, Ahmed made good on his promise to challenge his enemies at every step. With his city guard firmly ensconced and well prepared, he set out to harass the soldiers on their miserable march through the mud and snow. By the time the French army arrived at the nearly impregnable city, hundreds of injured and ill soldiers had already been left behind. While Clauzel divided his army into two units to attack two gates into the city, Ahmed, following behind the French, caught them in a pincer between his artillery firing from

¹²⁴ "Gouvernement Centrale," in the annual military report from Constantine, 1836. 80 MIOM 1671/1. CAOM. Author Translation.

¹²⁵ Ageron, 14; Rapport du maréchal Clauzel à M. le ministre de la Guerre, sur l'expédition de Constantine, Bône, le 1er décembre 1836 (Lyons: Impr. de Boursy fils, 1836); Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 57; Collingham, *July Monarchy*, 249.

¹²⁶ "Memoire of Ahmed Bey," 16, CAOM. "Constantine à l'intérieur (janvier – Novembre), Dossier de 1836. 80 MIOM 1671/1. CAOM.

the battlements of the city in front of them and his infantry and cavalry behind. Finally admitting defeat, Clauzel called for retreat.¹²⁷

Ahmed feared that totally destroying the army would further provoke France and instill an unstoppable desire for revenge. However, his troops were incensed at the attack and pushed their Bey to lead them, albeit reluctantly, in pursuit of the struggling French army. Stopping in Guelma, a short distance from Bône, Ahmed waited for a French negotiator to arrive to discuss the terms of French surrender, but no one ever came. When he realized that no ambassador was coming, he began the return trip to Constantine, collecting discarded supplies the French army left behind in their hasty retreat. With the seized equipment, ammunition, and food, he recovered all his expenses from the battle and profited an additional 100,000 douros.¹²⁸

After his victory, Ahmed began putting Constantine in a state of readiness for the next attack. He informed Sultan Mahmoud of their victory but also that he suspected that the French would try again. In response, the Sultan congratulated Ahmed for his triumph and promised to send “a sufficient quantity of men and cannons.”¹²⁹ Soon after receiving this message, another note arrived apprising Ahmed of four Ottoman ships that had just landed at Tunis filled with Ottoman troops, 12 cannons and 150 artillerymen bound for Constantine. However, the Bey of Tunis refused to let the troops and armaments cross Tunisia to get to Constantine. He begged the sultan and Ahmed’s pardon but feared French reprisals for any aid he offered Constantine, even tacitly.¹³⁰

¹²⁷ Collingham, *The July Monarchy*, 249; Sessions, *By Sword and Plow*, 144–147; Ernest Mercier, *Les Deux Sièges De Constantine (1836-1837) / Vernet, Horace,; 1789-1863. ; (Illustrator)* (Constantine: L. Poulet, 1854), 17–41.

¹²⁸ “Memoire of Ahmed Bey,” 16-20. CAOM; Temimi, *Le Beylik De Constantine Et Hadj `Ahmed Bey (1830-1837)*.

¹²⁹ “Memoire of Ahmed Bey,” 20-21. CAOM

¹³⁰ “Memoire of Ahmed Bey,” 21-23, CAOM.

Meanwhile, Charles-Marie comte de Damrémont had replaced Clauzel as Governor-General and Lieutenant General Thomas Robert Bugeaud concluded the Treaty of Tafna with France's greatest threat in western Algeria, the Emir, Abd al-Qadir, on May 20, 1837.¹³¹ With this treaty, France was freed of fighting a war on two fronts.¹³² At the same time, Damrémont made, he thought, a generous offer to Ahmed Bey that would allow him to maintain his position as a colonial governor of the province, but under French rather than Ottoman rule, in return for a 100,000 franc per annum tribute. The Bey flatly refused the proposal and waited for Ottoman military support to come to his aid against the French. When this news reached Paris, it provided the French Minister of War an excuse to authorize Damrémont's request to attack the city. By this time, French administrators had begun to support the military's acquisitive stance in Algeria and moved away from their previous policy of restricted occupation. The second siege of Constantine marked this significant transition.

Under the direction of General Damrémont, the French military, once again divided itself into two corps upon arrival at the fortified city. Ahmed, believing the same tactic would work a second time, placed the French in a crossfire between troops he left to guard the city and the combined forces of his infantry and cavalry. To augment Ahmed's troops, Kabyles from Djidjelli and Collo marched to the capital city, but they arrived too late. Following a week of bombardment, the French had already breached the city's one weakness – the Djedid gate – by the time of their arrival. In an attempt to slow the military down, Ahmed signaled to his artillery to aim for the generals, which included one of the royal princes. While his artillery succeeded in

¹³¹ Collingham, *The July Monarchy*, 249; Sessions, *By Sword and Plow*, 147–153; Lucas-Dubreton and Buckley, *The Restoration and the July Monarchy*, 278.

¹³² The significance of the Treaty of Tafna in France's decision to attack Constantine again is discussed at length in Abdeljelil Temimi, *Le Beylik de Consantine et Hadj 'Ahmad Bey (1830-1837)* (Tunis, 1978), 184-190.

killing Governor-General Damrémont along with dozens of other soldiers, the French redoubled their assault on the city.¹³³

Left in charge of the city, Algerian commander Ben Aissa foresaw the brutal effects the French breach would have on the Constantinois and began evacuating everyone, beginning with the women, children, and elderly. They streamed out of another gate and fled to the cliffs of Rummel, lowering themselves, some successfully, some tragically, down the sheer walls. From his perch on the cliffs at Constantine, French writer Jean-Joseph-François Poujoulat recorded with horror the human toll of the 1837 French conquest of this Algerian stronghold.

I stood on the edge of the terrifying ravines and stared at the sloping peaks over which thousands of men and women, trusting the abyss more than the mercy of the French victors, sought to escape. Their means of salvation were ropes attached to the upper walls of the rocks. When these ropes broke, human masses could be seen rolling down this immense wall of rock. It was a veritable cascade of corpses.¹³⁴

Following the collapse of the Constantinois resistance, thousands of men and women preferred to flee their homes and take their chances with the gorges of Rummel. Hundreds fell to their deaths when frail ropes snapped, and many more lost everything they had when they abandoned their property to the French, who then declared it vacant and confiscated it for the public domain.

The Tafna Treaty had left the eastern boundary of France's Algiers enclave unclear, however, and 'Abd al Qadir had extended his authority into regions that occupation

¹³³ "Memoire of Ahmed Bey," 21-23, CAOM; Collingham, *The July Monarchy*, 249; Mercier, *Les Deux Sièges De Constantine (1836-1837) / Vernet, Horace,; 1789-1863. ; (Illustrator)*, 56–66; Lucas-Dubreton and Buckley, *The Restoration and the July Monarchy*, 279; Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 61.

¹³⁴ Jean-Joseph François Poujoulat, *Voyage en Algérie: Etudes Africaine (nouvelle édition)* (Paris: Librairie d'éducation, 1868), 244. Translation from Mahfoud Benoune, *The Making of Contemporary Algeria, 1830-1987* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 38.

troops would have to cross in order to travel to [the newly conquered city and province of] Constantine. After attempting and failing to get a modified convention, the French forced the issue in October and November 1839 by sending a force headed by the Crown Prince on a fateful march from Constantine through the disputed territory to Algiers. ‘Abd al Qadir and his advisors, who had seen the break coming ... now ... issued a formal declaration of jihad and on November 20 [1839] Arab irregulars descended on French farms in the Mitidja Valley, destroying in a few days the settlement efforts of several years and sending those *colons* fortunate enough to survive fleeing back to Algiers in panic. It was now clear that the policy of restricted occupation ... had reached the end of its road. France must evacuate the country or subjugate it completely.¹³⁵

The conquest of Constantine had opened this question and provided the linchpin in French colonial policy-making. With the siege, France declared not only that would it keep the cities and properties it had already conquered but also would continue to attack and seize as much land as possible east from Algiers to the border of Tunisia.¹³⁶

Comparative Synthesis

Colonizers created narratives of conquest that later became the foundational myths of the settler colonial states. Sometimes, settlers themselves generated these stories, as in the case of Daniel Boone and George Rogers Clark on the American frontier. Boone asserted that the settlers bought the land on which they lived with their specie, blood, and toil. Through their struggle, the settlers had ‘earned’ the right to keep the land. What is more, American settlers began to claim that Native homelands ran in *their* blood as much as, and because, the lands ran

¹³⁵ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 63.

¹³⁶ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 63.

with it.¹³⁷ In Algeria, military commanders, like General Monck d’Uzer staked claims to vast tracts of land they bought, or forced purchase, from Algerian inhabitants. Others simply claimed property by occupancy when Algerians fled from violent confrontations in the cities. When the rightful owners returned to their homes, they found French officers and soldiers had expropriated them and faced uphill battles to regain their houses and lands, if they were able to at all.¹³⁸

Additionally, martial settlers were a crucial component of advancing settler colonialism. General d’Uzer in Algeria and Major Clark in America provide two case studies of the significant role that settlement-minded soldiers and aggressive settlers played. The American and French colonial projects could not have gotten off the ground without self-interested men of action who displayed little regard for official policy and who identified themselves with the settler community. Clark, a surveyor for the Ohio Land Company, wrote enthusiastically to his father and brother in 1774. He described the land he had explored in the Ohio Valley and of his ambition to claim much of it for himself, even as he surveyed it for others. As one of the first “pioneers,” Clark witnessed and participated in the brutal raids between the settlers and their Native neighbors. He became a violent man shaped by a violent world who used any means necessary to accomplish his land acquisition objectives. Similarly, General d’Uzer pushed his settlement agenda once he had conquered the city of Bône, Algeria. Taking advantage of the inhabitants’ fear of the French invaders, he bought much of the territory surrounding Bône for a fraction of the land’s value, despite metropolitan policies forbidding such practices at the time.¹³⁹

Just as frequently, government officials, too, crafted narratives of conquest to take advantage of what the settlers and military had already accomplished on the ground, thereby

¹³⁷ Wolfe, “The Settler Complex.”

¹³⁸ Ruedy, *Land Policy in Colonial Algeria: The Origins of the Rural Public Domain*.

¹³⁹ Prochaska, *Making Algeria French*, 64.

coopting their successes for metropolitan objectives. Through the Treaty of Paris, Americans laid the groundwork for the creation myth of the United States.¹⁴⁰ They claimed that the Native Americans had instigated the war, and since they had sided with the British, they were conquered peoples. Therefore, the United States had a right to seize Indigenous lands as spoils of war. To add insult to injury, not only did the American negotiators of the treaty forget about the invaluable support, intelligence, and literal guidance their Native allies provided them, they also conveniently forgot that they had not actually defeated Indigenous forces in any decisive battles. Similarly, through discourses of conquest, French officials claimed that all *beylikal* lands (lands belonging to the Ottoman governor, or *bey*) became part of the French public domain in Algeria since the military had defeated the *bey*. However, the commanders in Algeria claimed far more land to be “beylikal” than the *bey* had actually held, thus appropriating far more territory than was legally justifiable. Since the metropole remained unsure about whether or not keeping conquered Algerian lands was desirable, Parliament passed laws that attempted to curb continued land acquisition. Colonial proponents, like Governor General Clauzel and General Monck d’Uzer vociferously fought such limitations and frequently disregarded them during the first six years of occupation, leading up to and including the first siege of Constantine.

In addition to the epic conquest of Algiers in 1830, the two battles for Constantine formed the foundation of the creation myths of the French Algerian state. The French had taken two fortified cities that were previously believed to be impregnable, and even more significantly, had finally occupied Constantine, the province that showed the strongest visible connections with the Roman legacy of the region.

This myth held that French military and metropolitan administrators were the most suitable

¹⁴⁰ For other references to the narrative of the United States creation as myth, see White, *The Middle Ground*, 417; Buss, *Winning the West with Words*.

inheritors of Rome's former imperial holdings in North Africa. France appropriated Rome and its colonial legacy on four levels: scientific, religious, literary and mythical, which "suggests that there was more to the process than the justification of an imperial presence."¹⁴¹ The mythology connecting Rome and France coalesced gradually and grew out of the circumstances of conquest and occupation. The education and classical training of military officers, colonial administrators, and scholars prompted them to view Algeria through the lens of its position as an ancient Roman territory. Furthermore, Roman texts on their North African colonies provided a "reassuring point of reference" in unknown territory and offered a guide to methods and the possibilities that colonizing this region presented even though Rome's example served as a theoretical bulwark for the French colonial project.

Constantine was the linchpin to this vision, the figurative and literal gateway to creating and maintaining a French colony throughout the entire Regency and extending their lands toward the eastern borders of ancient Roman territories. The conquest of the fortified capital of the eastern province marked a turning point from a metropolitan policy of restricted occupation to the adoption of the military's policy of conquest and hold.

Waged to uphold French honor and extend French control in Algeria, the 1837 Constantine campaign was celebrated in the arts both during and after the siege and conquest.

¹⁴¹ Patricia M. E. Lorcin, "Rome and France in Africa: Recovering Colonial Algeria's Latin Past," *French Historical Studies* 25, no. 2 (2002): 296.



Figure 7: "La Prise de Constantine"¹⁴²

While the soldier on the frontlines gloried in the victory and its import for the motherland, the monarchy celebrated the military triumph as well. Massive commissioned paintings depicted the princes' achievements on the battlefield, including a series dedicated to the siege of Constantine in 1837, in which the Duc de Nemours, the son of King Louis Philippe, distinguished himself, is representative of the symbolic dimension of this war for the French monarchy. Even though Louis Philippe's hopes to establish a hereditary and meritocratic monarchy were later dashed, the Orléanists' symbolic and real investment in the colonial project provided the impetus to perpetuate the war and settlement despite legislators' outcries over the expense.¹⁴³ While undertaken for political reasons, the settlers in Algeria viewed such actions as evidence of the government's commitment to the new colony.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴² "La prise de Constantine 1837 par Horace Vernet" by Horace Vernet. Licensed under Public Domain via Wikimedia Commons - http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:La_prise_de_Constantine_1837_par_Horace_Vernet.jpg#/media/File:La_prise_de_Constantine_1837_par_Horace_Vernet.jpg (Accessed 31 March 2015).

¹⁴³ In sum, Louise Philippe's quest for military opportunities for his sons motivated his continued support for Algerian colonization. (Sessions, *By Sword and Plow*, 124; Peter Dunwoodie, *Writing French Algeria* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998], 9.)

¹⁴⁴ Sessions, *By Sword and Plow*, 83-124.

As the successful second siege of Constantine served as a discursive gateway to the rest of the Regency, the Treaty of Paris (1783) served as the United States' legal and discursive gateway to the western (i.e. Native) territories for American settlers. The treaty confirmed Native leaders' growing fears and established in American law the boundaries of the new nation as the Great Lakes to the northwest, the Mississippi River on the west, and the thirty-first parallel as the southern border.¹⁴⁵ Both Indigenous and French inhabitants of the Wabash Valley dreaded American incursions into their lands and viewed the treaty as an ominous first step toward the possible loss of their lands.¹⁴⁶ For their part, American government officials and negotiators initially used the Treaty of Paris to propagate the myth of Native Americans as "conquered" peoples. This legal myth was then employed to compel Native leaders into treaty negotiations in the mid-1780s.¹⁴⁷

In response to native protests over the conclusion of the treaty without their input or consent and the view that the British had ceded their lands to the United States, American commissioners at the Treaty of Fort Stanwix (1784), declared:

¹⁴⁵ Prucha, *The Sword of the Republic*, 3.

¹⁴⁶ Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country*, 278–280.

¹⁴⁷ However, it must be noted that British-Indigenous alliances remained strong in the Great Lakes and Wabash Valley regions and allowed Indigenous headmen to resist the enforcement of treaties of questionable legality. Prucha, *The Sword of the Republic*, 20; Taylor, *The Divided Ground Indians, Settlers and the Northern Borderland of the American Revolution*; Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance*; White, *The Middle Ground*; Lindsay Gordon Robertson, *Conquest by Law: How the Discovery of America Dispossessed Indigenous Peoples of Their Lands* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Banner, *How the Indians Lost Their Land*; Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country*, 282–3.

You are mistaken in supposing that having been excluded [from the treaty] you are become a free and independent nation, and may make what terms you please. ... It is not so. You are a subdued people, you have been overcome in a war.¹⁴⁸

Through the mid 1780s, the United States attempted to perpetuate this myth and transform it into a reality through questionable treaty negotiations with unauthorized members of Native communities. Deploying the “right of conquest” justification for land appropriations, American commissioners compelled Native signatures on hastily drawn up treaties that ceded large swaths of Indigenous lands to the United States. While the Indigenous confederation contested the legality and validity of these treaties, settlers rushed to take advantage of the newly acquired land, as did the federal government. Surveyors were sent out almost simultaneously with the commissioners to survey and plat land for immediate sale to settlers to raise much-needed funds for the impoverished government.¹⁴⁹

As the settlers and military leaders continued to push farther into Native territories, metropolitan officials sought to understand what was happening on the ground, but they rarely trusted either the settlers or military leaders to provide accurate and actionable reports and therefore sent out investigatory commissions. The perceived necessity of such investigations reveals the split between colonial administrators in the métropole and settlers, militia, and military on the ground. The resulting reports provided detailed answers to specific questions to guide legislation and, while they deplored the methods used, advised both the United States and France to continue to colonize the regions of interest.

¹⁴⁸ *Revolution and Confederation*, ed. Colin G. Calloway, Vol 18 of *Early American Indian Documents: treaties and Laws, 1607-1789*, ed. Alden T. Vaughan (Washington: University Publications of America, 1979-), 317, 323-324.

¹⁴⁹ Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country*, 278–283; White, *The Middle Ground*, 408–418.

Despite the efforts of the militaries, settlers, and metropolitan administrators to exert their will over the territories they desired, the Indigenous peoples of both regions limited their actions. Europeans and Americans on the ground often recognized the mismatch between stated policies and the realities they faced. In the Wabash and Ohio Valleys, Native communities still held the vast majority of land and were the de facto sovereigns of it, regardless of American posturing and myth-making following the Revolution. The Indigenous confederacy, for example, successfully contested the treaties of the 1780s. Indigenous leaders invalidated the treaties of Fort Stanwix (1784), Fort McIntosh (1785), and Fort Finney (1786) because the Native representatives sent to the treaty councils were not authorized to sign on behalf of their communities. They had been instructed to listen to the American message only and report it back to their villages for deliberation before any decisions were reached or actions taken. The subsequent two decades of continual fighting between American backcountry settlers and militias and Native warriors made clear that the United States did not yet govern the territory it sought to incorporate into the union. Likewise, it took a decade of total war under General Robert Bugeaud, followed by two more decades of fighting before France could declare Algeria “pacified.” In that first decade after the conquest of Constantine, Abd al Qadir led the resistance movement in the east while Hadj Ahmed Bey continued to battle the French and “present every possible obstacle” to their progress until finally capitulating in 1848.

Indigenous leaders sought the aid of former colonial governments to support their resistance to American and French invasions. Even as their representatives met with American commissioners to plead for the recognition of the firm boundary of the 1768 Fort Stanwix treaty between their peoples, many Algonquian diplomats pragmatically continued to lobby the British for aid, guns, and ammunition to defend their families and homes from the encroaching

Americans. In Algeria, Ahmed Bey negotiated with the Ottoman Sultan Mahmoud II for soldiers and arms to resist the incursion of the French military into his province and his capital. While the resistance leaders were unable to obtain the support necessary to hold the colonizers at bay, they continued to struggle against the settlers and the militaries that backed them for decades.

In both regions, Indigenous territory became borderlands through the incursion of settlers and the advancement of the colonizing military presence that compelled the inhabitants to flee or sell their property for a mere fraction of its worth. Despite Jefferson's revised version of this process, his original is closer to the truth. It still does not paint it starkly enough though. Violent confrontations created borderlands in settler colonies as militaries and settlers moved in to exert their will over, and appropriate lands from, the Indigenous populations.

By 1783 in America and 1834 in Algeria, militant settlers forced metropolitan administrators to recognize the colonization that had already begun. Left with few choices that would preserve their honor, the metropolises declared the lands to be official colonies, asserted their intention to incorporate them into the metropolitan governing structure and take advantage of the opportunities they presented. While officials wrote policies and created a legal veneer for the activities already taking place on the ground, settlers and martial men, who were not mutually exclusive groups, pressed into new lands, establishing settlements and staking their claims.

On the surface, and from the safety of the capital cities, this transitional stage appeared as a logical and smooth progression. It was anything but that. It took years for the administrators to decide to keep the lands, even though they were already settled with Euro-Americans (North America) and Europeans (Algeria). Moreover, land acquisition was not a simple undertaking because the desired territories were already occupied. The lifeways of the inhabitants who had

lived there for generations were integrally tied to the land, and they did not give up their homes and property easily merely because others wanted it. Many of the Indigenous people were not acquisitive; they sought the means to survive and they sought social capital, sometimes through material possessions they could give as gifts, and sometimes through political capital they could exert as power. Through fear and manipulating the desires of a few Indigenous leaders, the colonizers sought leverage to acquire more and more land. However, the Native leaders of the Wabash Valley and Constantine were not to be so easily outmaneuvered.

Chapter 4: Control

When the colonizing militaries finally defeated the confederated and organized Native resistance forces in the Wabash Valley (1795) and Algeria (1848), they had firmly established their settler colonies at last. In the decade that preceded these victories, metropolitan legislation finally began to catch up to the military policies already in force on the ground. Internal, as well as external, pressures and perceived threats compelled both French and American governments to shore up methods of control, or “technologies of rule.” This concept describes material, symbolic, and representational devices used to understand and rationalize the population, land, and resources over which the metropolitan governments claimed to have power. These technologies relied on the use of experts, such as surveyors, as well as symbolic and real forms of power.¹ “Legibility” was another essential element of Western statecraft and describes colonial administrators’ impulse to impose order and simplify seemingly chaotic social structures, resources, and land into an orderly, coherent, manipulable, and controllable system.² In the first two decades of settler colonization, with long-term commercial interests in mind, the metropolises’ single most important objective was to establish control.³

¹ This definition is my own but stems from Foucault’s examination of governmentality in his 1978-1979 series of Collège de France lectures and has been influenced by reading analyses of Michel Foucault’s work [such as Thomas Lemke, “An Indigestible Meal? Foucault, Governmentality, and State Theory,” *Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory*, No. 15 (2007)]; Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). Symbolic and real forms of power, in this case included maps and military might. See also Lauren Benton, “Spatial Histories of Empire,” *Itinerario* 30, no. 3 (2006): 19-34.

² James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 1–24.

³ For the American case, cf. Horsman, *Expansion and American Indian Policy, 1783-1812*; Prucha, *American Indian Policy*; Onuf, *Statehood and Union*; David Andrew Nichols, *Red Gentlemen & White Savages: Indians, Federalists, and the Search for Order on the American Frontier*, Jeffersonian America (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2008). I am extending arguments that have been made about the United States during the early republican

When the United States claimed the western territories following the Treaty of Paris in 1783 and France invaded Algeria in 1830, they had few tools to craft settler colonial institutions or governing structures. From experience as British colonies (the United States) and colonizing American territories (France), they developed numerous creative legislative tools and justifications over time and tailored to each situation as it arose within the settler colonies. These colonial technologies of rule came to include increased military forces; policy development; institutions of control such courts and prisons; land surveys; treaty negotiations. As the colonizing forces (militaries, officials, and settlers) sought access to more land, they also created a number of policies to remove the Indigenous peoples and make space for settlers. Sequestration, *refoulement* (pushing Indigenous peoples back from desirable property), and *cantonnement* (placing boundaries around Indigenous communities and/or creating “reservations” for them) entered the settler colonial toolbox.

This chapter looks at the final moment of the initial phase of settler colonization when the military and metropole began to work in greater harmony. In America, it traces Indigenous resistance movements and American counterattacks through the Native Confederacy's defeat at the Battle of Fallen Timbers against American General Anthony Wayne's forces in 1794. It places particular emphasis on the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which established a template for integrating colonized lands into the United States as territories under the administration of the US government and eventually as states. It then uncovers similar French land policies in Algeria, the role of Indigenous leaders in fighting, fleeing, or accommodating the French, as well as the discursive moves the French government made to justify its acquisition of Indigenous lands.

period to the context of French Algeria. Both metropolitan governments felt pressured to establish their legitimacy in answer to internal and external exigencies. Additionally, the United States and France developed congruent solutions to meet similar challenges that their colonies posed.

United States: Black Clouds and Council Fires

Immediately after signing the Treaty of Paris that ended the American Revolution in 1783, American officials attempted to impose the “right of conquest” on Native peoples in the Ohio and Wabash Valleys to justify the acquisition of land. However, their stance predated their ability to enforce the mid-1780s treaties and land cessions by a decade. From 1783 through 1793, Native war chiefs led successful campaigns against American backcountry settlers to protect their homelands. The Treaties of Fort Stanwix (1784), Fort McIntosh (1785), and Fort Finney (1786) were unenforceable because Native communities in the Wabash and Ohio Valleys maintained their sovereignty over the region, despite the United States’ claims to the contrary. The treaties also had the unintended consequence of uniting these Indigenous communities against the United States. Under the leadership of the Miami and militant Shawnee, the Kickapoo, Potawatomi, Piankeshaw, Wea, Five Nations, and even the Wyandot and Delaware (formerly United States allies) formed a powerful Native confederacy.⁴

Loosely organized in 1783, the ties that bound the Native confederacy together became stronger in response to the mid-1780s treaties. As the confederacy became more powerful and rallied around a common commitment to resist the imposition of those treaties, it pushed the United States to step back from its rhetoric of conquest and take a more conciliatory tone in negotiations.⁵ In a council meeting, Shawnee, Delaware, and Wyandot war chiefs warned that “if

⁴ Frazer Dorian McGlinchy, “A Superior Civilization’: Appropriation, Negotiation, and Interaction in the Northwest Territory, 1787-1795,” in *The Boundaries Between Us: Natives and Newcomers Along the Frontiers of the Old Northwest Territory, 1750-1850*, ed. Daniel P. Barr (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2006), 118-142. Dowd also argued that the “Americans’ killing of neutralist supporters among the Delawares, Shawnees, Cherokees, and Creeks between 1782 and 1788 brought unprecedented opportunities to Indian militants” and strengthened the bonds between Native communities in the borderlands. (Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance*, 99)

⁵ Richard White, *Middle Ground*, 433-443. White argues that this confederacy also came to absorb European alliances toward the end of the 1780s and depended on British aid by the early

the surveyors [came...] to survey the land or if any of the white people [came] to sit Down on it, [they would] put [their] Old men and Chiefs behind [them] and fight for [their] land while [they had] a Man.”⁶ Similarly, American trader David Duncan reported that the Ottawa, “Chippewa and other nations that arrived at the Shawnee Town on their way to the council at the mouth of the Miami” decided that if the council should be about obtaining Native lands, they would return home and the Americans “shall have as much [land] as they want that is the Breadth of their Back, Belly or side[,] which ever way [they] fall [dead in battle].”⁷ Duncan concluded that the commissioners responsible for the previous negotiations had “done a Great injury to [the] United States” by stirring up the resentments of the Indigenous communities with whom they treated.⁸

By 1786, the civil chiefs who attempted to maintain peaceful relations along the frontier had lost control over their young men. They kept their people close to home and at peace but were powerless over the furious warriors, especially those of other nations.⁹ Speaking on behalf of Shawnee leaders as well, they stated that they had “done all [they could] to Stop these Bad People but [could] do nothing with them.”¹⁰ They faced a difficult predicament.

1790s. The confederacy pushed for acceptance of the principle of common Native land ownership and for the Ohio River to be the boundary, which they later pushed back to the Muskingum River. This principle meant that land could not be ceded to the Americans unless the confederacy, not an individual leader or community, agreed to the cession.

⁶ David Duncan to Harmar, Pittsburgh, 28 March 1786, Harmar Papers, Reel 4, William Clements Library. Delaware Records 1786-1787, OVGLEA. See also, White, *Middle Ground*, 436-439.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Barnes, *Native American Power in the United States, 1783-1795*.

¹⁰ A missive from Delaware and Wyandot Chiefs at Sandusky to American Major Hamtramck on June 1, 1786 revealed how little they could do to prevent continued cycles of violence on the frontiers. Delaware and Wyandot Chiefs of Sandusky, Speech to Major Hamtramck, Sandusky, 1 June 1786, Harmar Papers, Reel 2, William Clements Library, in Delaware Papers 1786-1787, OVGLEA.

In conversation with one of the United States surveyors in 1786, Captain Pipe of the Delaware chided the Americans for being in too great a hurry to survey the lands they desired. Wyandot chief, Half King, then explained that the Wyandot and Delaware could not offer up the lands the Americans wanted just yet. They were “between two fires” – afraid of the Americans but also of the powerful “back Nations” of the Wabash Valley and Illinois Country. Half King’s evocative imagery provides a useful metaphor for the quandary of Indigenous communities, settlers, and even metropolitan officials in settler colonies. In their own way, each existed between two fires – settlers between metropolitan policies and Native warriors that limited their freedom; Indigenous civil leaders between martial settlers and militant Natives; and metropolitan officials who sought to mitigate the threat Indigenous peoples posed to their expansionist policies as well as the dangers their own settlers posed to regional stability.

Martial settlers, like George Rogers Clark, only made relations worse. Raising a company of men to “chastise” the Natives at the end of June 1786, Clark was “determined not to return without d[e]stroying their country or reducing them to Terms of [his] own.”¹¹ Simultaneously, Secretary of War Henry Knox counseled just the opposite approach to General Harmar, revealing once again the chasm between officials’ vision of the settlement process and American-Native relations and those of the martial settlers. The official United States policy was not to “chastise” Native people but merely to “repel the incursions or depredations of the Indians [and] . . . not form any offensive operations into the indian [sic] country without . . . express orders.”¹²

Knox’s orders indicated a significant shift in United States policy in 1786. Previous orders were to keep the settlers out of “Indian Country” and prevent them from harassing the

¹¹ Clark to Wyllys [opened by W. Finney], Danville, 25 June 1786, Harmar Papers, Reel 2, William Clements Library, in Delaware Records 1786-1787, OVGLEA.

¹² Knox to Harmar, War Office, 27 June 1786, Harmar Papers, Reel 2, Clements Library. Miami Records 1785-1787, OVGLEA.

Indigenous peoples. Instead of protecting Indigenous peoples from the lawless “white savages,” the American state quickly transitioned to protecting their settlers.¹³ However, if settlers squatted on lands that the United States government had not yet sold them or migrated onto Native lands, they were beyond the pale. Such settlers flouted U.S. authority, provoked Native hostility, and circumvented the revenue-generating function that western lands were supposed to serve for the American government. In both Native treaties and American law, the U.S. government gave the Native peoples permission to punish the wayward settlers.¹⁴

Furthermore, an “Indian war” would “exceedingly embarrass the United States” and ought to be avoided “[consistent] with the dignity of the nation.” Knox ordered Harmar to prevent or remove every just cause of complaint on the part of the Indians. But if they will wantonly be the aggressors, and attack the troops or settlers under the protection of the troops, make them if possible repent it with bitterness. But you will remark that this conduct is only to be dictated by the principle of unprovoked aggression on their part.¹⁵

The problem with this prescription was that the settlers believed every Native attack was unprovoked.¹⁶

Knox’s views contrasted strongly with a number of military leaders on the frontier, as well as with the settlers living in constant fear of Indian raids. Anxiously awaiting word of impending Indigenous campaigns against him, Captain Finney was “convinced that Military force only can make a permanent preece [sic] with the Indians & Circomscribe [sic] their Bounds,

¹³ For “white savages,” see Jay to Jefferson, 14 December 1786.

¹⁴ Cf. “Northwest Ordinance of 1787,” *Territorial Papers*, 2: 45; “Treaty of Greenville,” 3 August 1795, *Territorial Papers*, 2: 525-534.

¹⁵ Knox to Harmar, War Office, 27 June 1786, Harmar Papers, Reel 2, Clements Library. Miami Records 1785-1787, OVGLEA.

¹⁶ Taylor, *The Divided Ground Indians, Settlers and the Northern Borderland of the American Revolution*, 138–139; Griffin, *American Leviathan*, 192–193; White, *The Middle Ground*, 384–420.

the Treasure Expended on Treaty's might be much more Advantageously apply'd in Equipping Troops for that purpose."¹⁷ While not unanimously subscribed to, parallel sentiments that minimized the humanity of the "other" developed on *both* sides of the settler colonial conflict in response to the unceasing cycle of violence.

Many Native young men came to view the backcountry settlers in terms that mirrored settlers' understanding of them. "The Indian nations of the American side [as opposed to Spain's nominally held territory] are so decidedly displeas'd and irritated against the Americans, that daily we are receiving news that they kill them whenever they meet them."¹⁸ Similarly, [Captain] Le Gras reported from Vincennes that 450 warriors had gathered to "massacre all the Americans they should find," but the Native warriors still differentiated between white settlers and warned the French of the impending attack.¹⁹

Congress waited in great expectation for the western land sales to fill the depleted coffers; the work of the surveyors was, therefore, immensely important. Consequently, Knox advised Harmar to "take the field and collect the greater part of your force immediately in the neighborhood of the surveyors, so as to prevent their being sacrificed by the banditti Cherokees, whose residence on the head waters of the Scioto [River] would enable them to frustrate the wishes of Congress by deterring or killing the surveyors."²⁰ Guarding the surveyors protected the

¹⁷ Finney to Harmar, Fort Finney, 3 July 1786, Harmar Papers Reel 2, Clements Library, Miami Records 1785-1787, OVGLEA.

¹⁸ [Spanish commandant of St. Louis] Franco Cruzat to [Spanish Governor] Don Estevan Miró, St. Louis of Ylinueses, 19 July 1786, *Spain in the Mississippi Valley*, Part 2, ed. Lawrence Kinnaird (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), 173-4.

¹⁹ Le Gras to General George Rogers Clark, Post Vincennes, 22 July 1786, *Spain in the Mississippi Valley*, Part 2, ed. Lawrence Kinnaird (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), 175-181, in Delaware Papers, 1786-1787, OVGLEA.

²⁰ Knox to Harmar, War Office, 27 June 1786, Harmar Papers, Reel 2, Clements Library. Miami Records 1785-1787, OVGLEA.

interests and will of Congress, the government of the new republic.²¹ Successfully defending the will of the government would serve to legitimate its authority over both the Native population and settlers it sought to control. Completing the land surveys and plats also served to make the land “legible” to the government and therefore controllable. In the late 1780s, both American administrators and settlers continued to relentlessly, desperately pursue their intended course of action and persisted in surveying the lands that they claimed according to the hotly contested treaty cessions of the previous years.²²

On August 7, 1786, Congress passed the “Ordinance for the Regulation of Indian Affairs,” thereby establishing a system of military governance, the responsibilities of territorial superintendants and procedures for trade.²³ The ordinance redefined the two geographically based departments and placed them under the United States War Department. The southern department consisted of all lands within the boundaries of the United States south of the Ohio River, while lands north of the Ohio River and west of the Hudson River comprised the northern department. A superintendent governed each department and reported directly to the Secretary of War. The ordinance also granted the northern superintendent the right to appoint two deputies “to reside in such places as shall best facilitate the regulations of the Indian trade” and to grant trade licenses to Americans.²⁴ The superintendent reported on the sentiment among the Native communities in his department to the Secretary of War and governors if the Natives threatened action against their states. He also oversaw the gifts given to Native leaders, in addition to American-Native trade, and sent records of the transactions to the Board of Treasury, thus

²¹ Report of Committee of United States Congress, 20 October 1786 in *Pennsylvania Archives*, 1st Ser, 9: 72-3.

²² Treaties of Forts Stanwix (1784), McIntosh (1785), and Finney (1786).

²³ “Ordinance for the Regulation of Indian Affairs,” 7 August 1786, *Territorial Papers 2*: 19-22.

²⁴ “An Ordinance for the Regulation of Indian Affairs,” 7 August 1786, *Territorial Papers 2*: 20.

linking the treasury with the oversight of Indigenous commerce, the movement of Native peoples and American citizens, and the Department of War.

At the same time, government officials continually expressed fears about internal and external threats to American political stability. Whether or not the American state was actually at risk of falling apart or that the western territories were truly on the cusp of allying with Great Britain or Spain against the United States is debatable.²⁵ However, early American leaders' perceptions that those possibilities were real and posed a grave threat to national security drove their decision-making. Therefore, determining how to satisfy backcountry settler demands for protection and incorporation into the American federal government became an essential task for Congress as 1786 faded into 1787, and tensions continued to escalate in borderlands.

Congress optimistically passed the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 to officially recognize the colonies that settlers had established, provide for their governance, and outline the process by which they could become states. It created a system of limited representative governance under an authoritative governor and declared that as new states within the union, they would enjoy equal rights and privileges, including full representation in Congress.²⁶ At a time when more than

²⁵ Peter S. Onuf, *The Origins of the Federal Republic: Jurisdictional Controversies in the United States, 1775-1787* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983, 2001), see esp. 183-184.

²⁶ Horsman, *Expansion and American Indian Policy, 1783-1812*, 37-38; Onuf, *Statehood and Union*, xiii-xiv, 58-66; White, *The Middle Ground*, 416, 431; Barnes, *Native American Power in the United States, 1783-1795*, 54, 121; Banner, *How the Indians Lost Their Land*, 132-133. The ordinances of the 1780s formed the foundation of the American colonial (viz. 'territorial') system and provided a template for bringing all future colonial projects and lands under the sovereignty of the United States and into the federal governing structure. The 1754 Albany Plan of Union was the first proposal of westward colonies on the Ohio River and in Great Lakes region, Wozniak argues (288). The settlement of western territories was linked to establishing and maintaining border security (288). Wozniak suggests that the ordinances addressed three dilemmas the colonies were meant to overcome: (1) security concerns over potential Indigenous, British, and Spanish attacks, (2) acquiring western claims, and (3) 'the desire for a sphere of continued growth of colonial trade, settlement and land speculation' (302). (C. J. Wozniak, "The

a few American and international statesmen speculated that the United States teetered on the brink of collapse under the weight of regional divisions, the threat of Native American war, and the constitutional crisis, the Confederation Congress looked forward to a successful expansive union.

Given that the Revolutionary War had been fought, in part to protect property rights, Congressmen were sensitive to the many petitions they received from both French and American settlers seeking to safeguard their land claims in the backcountry. The French, on the one hand, relied on their “ancient” right acquired from the original inhabitants, the Piankeshaw, in much the same way early Anglo-American colonists justified their own property rights in New England.²⁷ American settlers, on the other hand, made a compelling case by documenting their alignment with American revolutionary principles and values. Many of the early settlers were veterans of the war and were owed land in payment for their service. They also pointed to the merits of their character – they were worthy of the lands they claimed as intrepid adventurers who were neither

borne down under the weight of poverty nor deterred by difficulties, determined to seek an asylum into some of the rich countries which the fate of war had subjected to the American empire ... unmindful of a long & perilous navigation, of the inclemency of the seasons, of the savage fury of innumerable Indian tribes through whom we had to fight our way.²⁸

New Western Colony Schemes: A Preview of the United States Territorial System,” *The Indiana Magazine of History* (1972): 283–306.)

²⁷ Stuart Banner, *How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier*; “Petition of the Inhabitants of Post Vincennes,” 26 July 1787, *Territorial Records* 2: 58-60.

²⁸ “Petition to Congress from the Illinois Country,” August 27, 1787, *Territorial Records*, 2: 68.

These men and women, according to their petitions at least, embodied a steadfastness that early Republican leaders admired. "By becoming champions of individual liberty and local sovereignty, [the frontiersmen] forced men in positions of power to accommodate, but not to surrender their notions of social order."²⁹ What was more, their home state of Virginia sanctioned their settlements, and the cession of land from Virginia to the United States "stipulated ... that the settlers who had professed themselves citizens of that State should have their possessions & claims confirmed to them; which was agreed to by Congress."³⁰

In recognition of the justness and legitimacy of their claims, they requested that Congress acknowledge and confirm their property ownership and guarantee to them 500 acres for every white male American citizen in the territory,

With a respectful confidence that the Honorable the Congress will not overlook our grounded expectations as claimants under the French Charters, our rights as Settlers under the State of Virginia, and our sufferings as a wandering family, Your Petitioners as in duty bound will ever pray for the honor welfare & glory of the United-States of North-America.³¹

After numerous similar petitions, Congress confirmed the settlers' land claims in the summer of 1788.³² In their response, Congress sought to attach both the French and American settlers firmly to the interests of the United States.

²⁹ Andrew Cayton, *The Frontier Republic: Ideology and Politics in the Ohio Country, 1780-1825* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1986), xi. Cayton also maintains that the frontiersmen's independence in the Ohio Valley and the individualistic land rush by common people rather than the orderly land speculation of gentlemen "was part of the larger revolution in American life in the late eighteenth century" (xi).

³⁰ "Petition to Congress from the Illinois Country," August 27, 1787, *Territorial Papers*, 2: 69.

³¹ "Petition to Congress from the Illinois Country," 70.

³² "*Resolved*: That measures be taken for confirming in their possessions and titles the french [sic] and Canadian inhabitants and other settlers at post St Vincents who on or before the year

By the late 1780s, the Native confederacy compelled the United States to give up the myth of conquest as the pretext for acquiring Native lands and to return to the former policy of “purchasing the right of soil of the Indians[. R]eceiving a deed of sale and conveyance of the same, is the only mode of alienating their lands, to which they will peaceably accede.”³³ With the reputation of the United States ever in mind, Knox observed,

Your Secretary humbly apprehends that the United States may conform to the modes and customs of the Indians in the disposal of their lands, without the least injury to the national dignity. . . . to attempt to establish a right to the lands claimed by the Indians, by virtue of an implied conquest, will require the constant employment of a large body of troops, or the utter extirpation of the Indians.³⁴

While the latter two options – expanding the military presence in the American backcountry or driving the Native peoples out of the lands using any means necessary – were under consideration, Knox and most Congressmen viewed them unfavorably.³⁵ These means of acquiring the desired territories were only to be used as a last resort. Yet, correspondence,

1783 had settled there and had professed themselves citizens of the United States or any of them, and for laying off for them at their own expence [sic] the several tracts which they rightfully claim & which may have been allotted to them according to the laws & Usages of the Governments under which they have respectively settled.” (“Resolution of Congress: The Inhabitants of Vincennes,” August 29, 1788, *Territorial Papers*, 2: 145).

³³ “Report of the Secretary at War: Indian Affairs,” May 2, 1788 in *Territorial Papers*, 2: 104; Banner, 133-134.

³⁴ “Report of the Secretary at War: Indian Affairs,” May 2, 1788 in *Territorial Papers*, 2: 104.

³⁵ Washington to Henry Knox, Mount Vernon, 5 December 1784 in Fitzpatrick, *The Writings of George Washington*, 28: 3-5; Washington to the President of Congress, Mount Vernon, 15 March 1785 in Fitzpatrick, *The Writings of George Washington*, 28: 108-109; Knox to Harmar, War Office, 27 June 1786, Harmar Papers, Reel 2, Clements Library.

particularly among military commanders, exposes their willingness and that of the United States to employ force to achieve their objective.³⁶

Furthermore, the political instability during the “Constitutional crisis” – waiting for the states to ratify the new Constitution to replace the Articles of Confederation and establish a durable government – pushed United States officials to acquiesce to Native demands.³⁷

As an extensive indian [sic] war in the present political crisis, and with an exhausted treasury, would be an event pregnant with unlimited evil, your Secretary submits, with all deference, the consideration of the propriety of so modifying the instructions to the Governor of the Western territory, and the Superintendent of Indian Affairs, as to admit of their extinguishing, by purchase, the indian [sic] claims to the Western country, described in the former treaties [of 1784, 1785, and 1786], with such additions, as the said commissioners shall be able to effect.³⁸

The American stance reverted to a recognition of Native land rights and sovereignty shortly after the signing of the 1786 Treaty of Fort Finney when the confederated Native communities threatened war, and Knox reported that the United States could not fund a proper defense.³⁹

³⁶ Harmar to Knox, Philadelphia, 22 October 1785 in C.W. Butterfield (Ed), *Journal of Captain Jonathan Heart, 1785*. (Albany, 1885), 92-94; Finney to Harmar, Fort Finney, 3 July 1786, Harmar Papers, Reel 2, Clements Library. See also, “Report of Committee of United States Congress,” 20 October 1786 in *Pennsylvania Archives*, 1st Ser, 11: 72-3. “That the Committee, therefore, deem it highly necessary that the Troops in the Service of the United States be immediately Augmented, not only for the protection and support of the frontiers of the States bordering on the western territory and the valuable settlements on and near the margin of the Mississippi, but to establish the possession and facilitate the surveying and selling of those intermediate lands which have been so much relied on for the reduction of the Debts of the United States” (Report of Committee of US Congress, 1786, page 72).

³⁷ Onuf, *The Origins of the Federal Republic*, 183–186; Onuf, *Statehood and Union*; Nichols, *Red Gentlemen & White Savages*, 88–97.

³⁸ “Report of the Secretary at War: Indian Affairs,” 2 May 1788, in *Territorial Papers*, 2: 105.

³⁹ Horsman, *Expansion and American Indian Policy, 1783-1812*, 32–52.

Those on the ground took a different stance, however. Notably, Governor Arthur St. Clair's tone shifted in 1788 to align with that of the militant settlers. In his communications with Native leaders, St. Clair became antagonistic and threatening. Imperiously addressing Algonquian peoples in the Wabash and Ohio Valleys, he raged about the frontier violence. However, he neglected to acknowledge the atrocities by backcountry settlers behind the latest cycle of attacks. What was more, the symbol of the United States, its flag, had been fired upon! Of greater concern was the attack on "a small party of Soldiers [who] were sent to watch the Council Fire, kindled at your request; --to build a Council House for you to meet in; and to take care of the provisions sent there to feed you."⁴⁰ Venting his umbrage, he continued,

Answer me, Should these things be? In the name of the United States I require an immediate explanation of these transactions, and demand satisfaction and the restitution of the Prisoners – Until these are made, as there can be no confidence[,] it will be improper we should meet one another in Council. ... *Brothers* The United States are sincerely desirous of Peace, but if you will have War, why you shall have War.⁴¹

Native statesmen expected such brashness from American war leaders, like George Rogers Clark, but St. Clair was a civilian governor, despite his military rank. His intermingled threats and convoluted peace offerings were both confusing and menacing to the recipients of his messages. After receiving reports from a recent council of the confederated tribes, St. Clair determined that "a war with the Western tribes ... seems inevitable ... a war with them will probably involve some others [tribes]; and it will soon become general," he posited. "In that case, permit me to give you my Ideas of the most effectual manner of bringing them to their

⁴⁰ St. Clair to the Indians in Council, 13 July 1788, *Territorial Papers*, 2: 128.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

Senses.”⁴² St. Clair’s arrogant assumptions about how to bring the “haughty” Indigenous peoples “to their senses,” proved to be ill-conceived when both General Josiah Harmar (1790) and forces under his own command (1791) suffered the worst defeats the American military had ever seen.⁴³

American settlement and the establishment of governing structures and institutions of control continued apace. In 1788, St. Clair reported that the “Government [of the territories] has been put in motion – a County erected by the name of Washington, Courts instituted, and the Officers necessary for the Administration of Justice appointed.”⁴⁴ The following year, Acting Governor Winthrop Sargent enumerated the settlement progress between August 1786 and December 1789: “the Migration from the Head Waters [of the Ohio River] & under Observation of Fort Harmar ... stands thus: 1264 Boats – 23618 Souls, 10244 Horses – 2539 Cows – 2280 Sheep – 687 Waggon[s] [sic] – in which is comprehended Our Settlements.”⁴⁵ Emigrants arrived almost faster than they could be counted and often outran the land that had been surveyed, platted, and prepared for sale. Looking back on a century of settlement in the Northwest Territory, Israel Ward Andrews triumphantly described “The Beginnings of the Colonial System of the United States” in 1885:

The formation of this society comes at an opportune moment. In a little more than three years a century will have elapsed since the first permanent white settlement was made within the limits of the great region Northwest of the River Ohio. That settlement was the

⁴² St. Clair to Knox, 14 September 1788, *Territorial Papers*, 2: 158.

⁴³ Cayton, *The Frontier Republic*, 38–39; Prucha, *The Sword of the Republic*, 20–27; White, *The Middle Ground*, 454; Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance*, 104–107; Alan D Gaff, *Bayonets in the Wilderness: Anthony Wayne’s Legion in the Old Northwest*, Campaigns and Commanders, Vol. 4 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004), 3–20.

⁴⁴ St. Clair to the Secretary of Congress, 2 September 1788, in *Territorial Papers*, 2: 152.

⁴⁵ Sargent to Knox, Marietta, 7 December 1789, in *Territorial Papers*, 2: 224.

beginning, not only of this good State of Ohio, but also of Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin, which have all been formed from that Northwest Territory. It was not an accidental settlement that was made on the 7th of April, 1788, at the mouth of the Muskingum, nor was it any fortuitous collection of men that first planted themselves on the soil of Ohio. It was the result of careful deliberation by wise and prudent and patriotic men.⁴⁶

As the “rage of emigration” continued, St. Clair, Washington, and Knox worried about the United States’ loss of control over the settlers and the settlement process. The “Advantages of [that] Country” drew settlers to migrate of their own accord and “establish themselves without Authority.” St. Clair feared that those who settled the land outside of the aegis of the United States government “would introduce a Spirit of Licentiousness ... that might not be very easily repressed.”⁴⁷ His concerns were well founded and shared among other leading officials.

To address concerns about the lack of control and the possibility that the United States might be seen as weak, St. Clair requested funds and men to augment the administrative and judicial infrastructure of western territories. He asked that more judges be sent out from each of the states to develop a coherent set of legal codes to which the diverse population would be

⁴⁶ Israel Ward Andrews, “The Beginnings of the Colonial System of the United States,” An address delivered before the Ohio Archaeological and Historical Society at its first public meeting, 12 March 1885, in *Ohio Archaeological and History Quarterly* (June 1887), 1. Andrews refers to the settlement of Marietta, OH. Andrews’ tone and rhetoric is certainly “triumphant” as I’ve characterized it here, which begs the question: Can an account be triumphant if it does not acknowledge the vanquished foes? Or is that the true measure of victory – that such a reference is unnecessary? According to Wolfe and Veracini’s theorization of settler colonialism, this was (and is) the ultimate goal of settler colonies: to eliminate the Native, including discursively. While the United States did not completely remove the Native peoples, the formerly dominant narrative of American history would have readers believe it. Andrews’ address built upon Jefferson and other leading statesmen’s characterization of American history. Their remarks contributed to an American settler colonial narrative that ignored or sadly “observed” the “inevitable fate” of Native Americans.

⁴⁷ St. Clair to Washington, Cahokia, 1 May 1790, in *Territorial Papers*, 2: 246.

amenable. An attorney general, he stated, was essential to assist him in understanding the policies the judges drafted, as he had little legal training, and finally, he recommended that a printer, press, and supplies be sent to publicize the laws once they were passed.⁴⁸ The following year, he sent orders to Kaskaskia to build a prison

As there is nothing more necessary for the happiness of society than the proper administration of justice, the prevention of crimes or the punishment thereof in cases where it is impossible to prevent them, and that good citizens be protected in their lives, and their property.⁴⁹

Control over the settlers, as much as the Native population, was of utmost importance to the United States.

An important aspect of exerting control over the settlers was ensuring their attachment to the United States and preventing a transfer of their allegiance to nearby foreign powers. Great Britain and Spain eagerly awaited the collapse of the United States and an opportunity to regain their lost American colonies. American officials and military leaders walked a fine line as they attempted to regulate settlement – keeping Americans out of Native territories, maintaining peace between the backcountry Americans and their Indigenous neighbors, while they acquired and surveyed more Native land. In an effort to keep Americans loyal to their government, St. Clair did his best to place troops and militia strategically to protect the settlements.⁵⁰ However, settlers continued to encroach on Native lands and attack Native villages, adding fuel to the cycle of violence.

⁴⁸ St. Clair to Washington, August 1789, in *Territorial Papers*, 2: 204-212.

⁴⁹ St. Clair, “Orders for Erecting Prisons at Kaskaskia,” 6 June 1790, in *Territorial Papers*, 2: 277.

⁵⁰ Horsman, *Expansion and American Indian Policy, 1783-1812*, 36–52.

By 1790 when St. Clair sent Antoine Gamelin to the Wabash villages with a message of peace and an invitation to a treaty council, Gamelin received ambivalent and cool responses from the confederated Native leaders. At each village he visited – the Piankeshaw, then the Kickapoo communities, and the Wea – he received the same response: the chiefs could not give him an answer until they had consulted with the Miami, the leaders of the confederacy. The Shawnee war chief Blue Jacket refused to provide an answer until he had sent word to the British commandant at Detroit – a response that infuriated the Americans.⁵¹ Blue Jacket explained that the Shawnee did not trust the

sincerity of the Big-knives [American settlers], so called, having been already deceived by them. That they had first destroyed [Shawnee] lands, put out their fire ... taken their women [and...] they [could not] forget these affronts. Moreover, that some other nations were apprehending that offers of peace would ... tend to take away their lands⁵²

and the new American settlement on the Ohio River served “as certain proof that [the Americans] intend to encroach on [Shawnee] lands.”⁵³ After hearing that Gamelin’s mission failed to bring the Wabash nations in to sign a peace treaty, St. Clair concluded that Wabash communities had essentially declared war.⁵⁴

The only response, St. Clair proclaimed, was to employ “force to reduce them to reason” and to defend the reputation of the United States. “Should the Savages be suffered to insult the Government, and murder and rob the People with impunity, its credit would be lowered very

⁵¹ Antoine Gamelin, Journal (5 April 1790 – 5 May 1790), *American State Papers, Indian Affairs*, 1: 93-4.

⁵² Gamelin Journal, *American State Papers, Indian Affairs*, 1: 94.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ St. Clair to County Lieutenants, Circular Letter, 15 July 1790, *American State Papers, Indian Affairs*, 1: 94-95.

much, both with foreign Nations and its own Citizens.”⁵⁵ Consequently, Congress agreed to fund and launch a campaign against the confederacy in the Wabash Valley.⁵⁶ With 1,453 troops comprised mostly of untrained militia and only three hundred soldiers, Harmar set out for the Miami towns in late September 1790.⁵⁷

St. Clair and Harmar initially portrayed the campaign as a success. “The substance of the work is this,” Harmar wrote in November,

our loss was heavy, but the head quarters of iniquity were broken up. At a moderate computation, not less than 100 or 120 warriors were slain, and 300 log-houses and wigwams burned. Our loss about 180. The remainder of the Indians will be ill off for sustenance; 20,000 bushels of corn, in the ears, were consumed, burned, and destroyed, by the army with vegetables in abundance. The loss of Major Wyllys and Lieutenant Frothingham, of the Federal troops, and a number of valuable militia officers, I sincerely lament.⁵⁸

British sources reveal that it was the worst American military defeat to date.⁵⁹ American military commander and Northern “Indian” Superintendent, Rufus Putnam, later recalled the significance of Harmar’s loss:

⁵⁵ St. Clair to Washington, Cahokia, 1 May 1790, in *Territorial Papers*, 2: 245.

⁵⁶ Knox to Hamilton, 23 August 1790, *American State Papers, Indian Affairs*, 1:98; Nichols, *Red Gentlemen and White Savages*, 114-116.

⁵⁷ Nichols, *Red Gentlemen & White Savages*, 117; R. Douglas Hurt, *The Ohio Frontier: Crucible of the Old Northwest, 1720-1830*, A History of the Trans-Appalachian Frontier (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 106–118.

⁵⁸ Harmar to Knox, 4 November 1790, *American State Papers, Indian Affairs*, 1: 104.

⁵⁹ Matthew Elliott to Col. Alexander McKee, 23 October 1790, in *MPHC* 24: 108-109; “The Information of Captain Matthew Elliott of the Indian Department,” 29 November 1790, in *MPHC* 24: 133-134; “Information of Blue Jacket,” 1 November 1790, in *MPHC* 24: 134-135; Captain Joseph Brant to Sir John Johnson, 8 November 1790, in *MPHC* 24: 141-142.

Our prospects are much changed. in stead of peace and friendship with our Indian neighbours a [horrid] Savage war Stairs us in the face. the Indians in stead of being humbled by the Destruction of the Shawone [Shawnee] Towns & brought to beg for peace, appear determined on a general War, in which our Settlements are already involved. [The Native peoples] were much elated with [their] success & threatened there should not remain a Smoak on the ohio by the time the Leaves put out.⁶⁰

In an attempt to recover from the defeat and prevent additional Native raids on the frontier settlements, Washington promoted Governor St. Clair to Major General and placed Colonel Richard Butler second in command while General Harmar was being tried by court martial to determine his culpability for the dramatic rout of American forces.⁶¹

Near the headwaters of the Wabash in the pre-dawn hours of November 4, 1791, a joint Shawnee, Miami, and Delaware war party under the leadership of Miami chief Little Turtle, launched a surprise attack on St. Clair's unprepared army. Within minutes, Little Turtle's 1400 warriors had dispersed the front line of militia who scrambled back to the main encampment.⁶² The Americans' hasty retreat disrupted the soldiers and militia at the next line of defense so they could not rally in time to face the oncoming warriors. Picking off the commanders, especially those firing the artillery, the allied Algonquian warriors caused even more chaos. Without

⁶⁰ Rufus Putnam, *The Memoirs of Rufus Putnam and Certain Official Papers and Correspondence*, ed. Rowena Buell (Boston, 1903), 113, 247.

⁶¹ Hurt, *The Ohio Frontier*; Josiah Harmar and United States, *The Proceedings of a Court of Enquiry, Held at the Special Request of Brigadier General Josiah Harmar, to Investigate His Conduct, as Commanding Officer of the Expedition Against the Miami Indians, 1790: The Same Having Been Transmitted by Major General St. Clair, to the Secretary of the United States, for the Department of War. Published by Authority* (Philadelphia: Printed by John Fenno, 1791).

⁶² Harvey L. Carter, *The Life and Times of Little Turtle: First Sagamore of the Wabash* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 100–107; White, *The Middle Ground*, 454–456; Horsman, *Expansion and American Indian Policy, 1783-1812*, 88–89; Gaff, *Bayonets in the Wilderness*, 3–21.

leaders, the undisciplined men threw down their weapons and ran, leaving women and children behind in the field to be killed along with the remaining men who attempted to make a stand. Apart from General St. Clair, only one other officer escaped with his life. More than 800 men of the 1669 were killed in battle, more than 1000 people total when women and children are counted in the number.⁶³ “The retreat in those circumstances,” recounted St. Clair, “was... a very precipitate one; it was, in fact, a flight.”⁶⁴ In St. Clair’s own words, the results of his campaign were devastating. He did not even attempt to put a positive spin on what can hardly be termed a “battle.”

Yesterday afternoon the remains of the army under my command got back to this place, and I have now the painful task to give you an account of as warm and as unfortunate an action as almost any that has been fought, in which every corps was engaged and worsted, except the First Regiment.⁶⁵

Little Turtle’s unquestioned victory over the American forces strengthened the ties of the Native confederacy and gave them additional leverage in treaty negotiations for several years.⁶⁶ Faced with the decision of abandoning its colonial project and the quickly growing settlements in

⁶³ Cayton, *The Frontier Republic*, 38–39; Prucha, *The Sword of the Republic*, 20–40; Randolph C. Downes, *Frontier Ohio, 1788-1803*, Ohio Historical Collections, vol 3 (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Society, 1935), 9–21; Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires*, 242–244; Hurt, *The Ohio Frontier*, 102–118; Thomas Irwin, *St. Clair’s Defeat. As Told by an Eye-Witness--from Original Mss*, 1902; Winthrop Sargent, *Winthrop Sargent’s Diary While with General Arthur St. Clair’s Expedition Against the Indians*, 1924; Arthur St. Clair, *The St. Clair Papers: The Life and Public Services of Arthur St. Clair: Soldier of the Revolutionary War, President of the Continental Congress; and Governor of the North-Western Territory: With His Correspondence and Other Papers* (Cincinnati: R. Clarke, 1882).

⁶⁴ St. Clair to Knox, 9 November 1791, in *St. Clair Papers*, 2: 264.

⁶⁵ St. Clair to Knox, Fort Washington, 9 November 1791, in *St. Clair Papers*, 2: 262.

⁶⁶ White, 454-481; Prucha, *Sword of the Republic*, 20-27; Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires*, 243; Patrick Griffin, “Reconsidering the Ideological Origins of Indian Removal: The Case of the Big Bottom ‘Massacre’,” *The Center of a Great Empire: The Ohio Country in the Early Republic* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2005), 23-29.

the borderlands or committing more resources to their protection, Washington, his cabinet, and Congress chose to defend the settlers. Secretary of War, Henry Knox, echoing the sentiments of Washington and other officials, declared

It would appear, that the principles of justice as well as policy, and, it may be added, the principles of economy, all combine to dictate, that an adequate military force should be raised as soon as possible, placed *upon* the frontiers, *and disciplined according to the nature of the service*, in order to meet, with a prospect of success, the greatest probable combination of the Indian enemy.⁶⁷

To that end, Washington, with the advice of his cabinet, appointed former Revolutionary War commander Anthony Wayne to lead, train, and discipline the soldiers raised for the next campaign.⁶⁸

With 3000 well-trained professional soldiers, Wayne surprised a portion of the allied Native fighting force after they had fasted for several days awaiting a battle that arrived later than expected. Mustered at Fort Recovery built on the site of St. Clair's defeat, Wayne whipped the men into shape, punishing desertion severely and balancing harsh discipline with mercy to ensure the loyalty of the troops. By the summer of 1794, Wayne's force was ready to take the field against their Indigenous enemies.⁶⁹

Aware of Wayne's intention, 1300 warriors assembled, set out for "the most advantageous ground," and began ritual preparations for battle. One of their spies reported that Wayne would attack on August 18 unless the troops stopped to build a fort, in which case, he

⁶⁷ Knox, "Statement Relative to the Frontiers Northwest of the Ohio," *American State Papers, Indian Affairs*, 1: 198.

⁶⁸ Nichols, *Red Gentlemen & White Savages*, 140; Gaff, *Bayonets in the Wilderness*.

⁶⁹ Gaff, *Bayonets in the Wilderness*; Prucha, *The Sword of the Republic*, 27–32; Nichols, *Red Gentlemen & White Savages*, 140–141, 151, 160–165, 169, 171.

would attack the following day.⁷⁰ Wayne struck as the warriors were still assembling and recovering from a previous day's fast.⁷¹ After a short sharp battle, Indigenous warriors retreated below the British fort, "imagining their loss to be much greater than it since appears to have been[,] having seen several of their principal Chiefs fall."⁷² Eight Wyandot and two Ottawa chiefs were killed and more were wounded. When they appealed to Fort Miami for aid, the British shut the gates in their former allies' faces, including the French- and English-speaking Canadians who fought along side the Native warriors. The loss of British support and assistance left the Indigenous communities starving and dejected following their defeat and the devastation American forces wrought on the countryside. In the aftermath of the battle, the American military swept through the surrounding territory, destroying homes and crops, mutilating the remains of Native warriors and opening graves to drive stakes through dead and decaying Indigenous corpses.⁷³

The Indigenous confederacy's failure at the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794 dashed their hopes of maintaining the Ohio River as the boundary between their own communities and American settlers. It also signified the loss of much-needed British assistance and the beginning of true starvation that forced reliance on their American foes. That was only the beginning, however. In the 1794 agreement that Secretary of Foreign Affairs John Jay negotiated with Great Britain, the British agreed to abide by the Treaty of Paris (1783) that ended the Revolution. According to Jay's Treaty, the British consented to remove their troops from the Great Lakes forts they had held since 1763. Signed November 19, 1794, Jay's Treaty threatened to remove

⁷⁰ McKee to Chew, 27 August 1794, in *MPHC*, 20: 370.

⁷¹ Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance*, 113.

⁷² McKee to Chew, 27 August 1794, in *MPHC*, 20: 370.

⁷³ Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance*, 113; McKee to Chew, 27 August 1794, in *MPHC*, 20, 370-372; Wayne to Knox, Grand Glaize, 28 August 1794, *American State Papers, Indian Affairs*, 1: 491.

the British from the immediate vicinity of their Native allies, which would compel Native leaders to turn to the Americans for trade goods and food.⁷⁴

“Starving, disarmed, and undoubtedly weary of twenty years of war, the northern Indians came to terms with Wayne in the Treaty of Greenville, signed over the course of the summer of 1795.”⁷⁵ The Treaty of Greenville was a major step toward establishing the territories were firmly within the grasp of the American nation as settler colonies.⁷⁶ It was also an opportunity to exert the United States’ newfound authority, obtained through the professionalization of their military.

to indemnify the United States for the injuries and expences [sic] they have sustained during the War; the said Indians tribes do hereby cede & relinquish forever, all their claims to the lands lying Eastwardly and Southwardly of the general boundary line now described. ... And whenever the United States shall think proper to survey and mark the boundaries of the lands hereby Ceded to them, they shall give timely notice thereof to the said Tribes of Indians, that they may appoint some of their wise chiefs to attend and see that the lines are run according to the terms of this treaty.⁷⁷

The Treaty of Greenville laid the foundation for John Marshall’s 1831 declaration that Indigenous peoples were "domestic dependent nations" under the sovereignty of the United States: “the said Indian tribes again acknowledge themselves to be under the protection of the

⁷⁴ Prucha, *Sword of the Republic*, 38-40; Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance*, 113-114. When the Americans were supposed to take over the forts in 1795, however, the United States could not field enough soldiers to do so, and the British remained the dominant non-Native powers in the Great Lakes region until 1815.

⁷⁵ Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance*, 113.

⁷⁶ In the introduction to *Contested Territories*, Beatty-Medina and Rinehart state that the Treaty of Greenville (1795) served as a catalyst for opening the NW Territory to settlement, but I contend that The Treaty of Paris and then the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 did that prior to 1795 (for their argument see the introduction to their edited volume, pages xvii-xviii).

⁷⁷ “Treaty of Greenville,” 3 August 1795, *Territorial Papers*, 2: 526-7.

said United States, and no other power whatever.”⁷⁸ While the United States had difficulty enforcing this position, it was another significant move to establish its settler imperial authority over Native peoples.

Twelve Native groups agreed to cede most of the present state of Ohio and the southeast corner of Indiana to the United States government, thereby creating “the original nucleus of public domain in the Old Northwest.”⁷⁹ Lands in the public domain, as we shall see more clearly in the Algerian example, were crucial. They provided a cornerstone on which to build structures of colonial governance and control and a place for the settlers clamoring for land, as well as revenue to fund colonial administration and continued conquest.

Algeria: Conquering Space, Settling People

Upon the fall of Algiers in 1830, the French military acquired thousands of acres of *beylikal* lands for the French public domain and took the first step toward settler colonization. When the Dey of Algiers capitulated to the French military on July 5, 1830, General Louis Comte de Bourmont declared France to be in possession of all *beylik* lands thenceforth by right of conquest.⁸⁰ *Beylik* lands belonged to the *dey* of Algiers and the *beys* of Constantine, Titeri, and Oran and composed the public domain or state-held property.⁸¹

As the military continued its campaign beyond Algiers, it created small circles of French power around the conquered cities. Within these zones of French occupation, French military

⁷⁸ “Treaty of Greenville,” 529. See “Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia,” 30 U.S. 1 (1831), <http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=30&invol=1> (Accessed 28 February 2015).

⁷⁹ Thomas Campion, “Indian Removal and the Transformation of Northern Indiana,” *Indiana Magazine of History* 107, no. 1 (March 2011), 36.

⁸⁰ Terms of the capitulation can be found in Ministère de la Guerre, *Collection des actes du gouvernement depuis l’occupation d’Alger jusqu’au 1er octobre 1834* (Paris: 1843), 1-2.

⁸¹ Ruedy, *Land Policy in Colonial Algeria: The Origins of the Rural Public Domain*, 10:1, 9, 13–17.

commanders sought to enrich themselves through land acquisition and by selling some of these properties to anxious speculators.⁸² They, in turn, sought financial gain through land sales to incoming settlers. Of dubious legality, the colonizers scabbled to place at least a veneer of legitimacy on these transactions.⁸³ French bureaucrats based their claims on the French Civil Code of 1804, specifically two of the six General Dispositions in Book III - Of the Modes of Acquiring Property, as follows:

713. Property which has no owner belongs to the nation.

714. There are things which belong to no one, and the use whereof is common to all. The laws of police regulate the manner of enjoying such.⁸⁴

Codes 713 and 714 were used extensively as Algerians fled before the French military and subsequently did not present themselves to the Direction des Domaines to obtain a (French) certified title to their property. A decree announced March 1, 1833 specifically cites Article 714 as justification for land seizures if Native Algerians did not deposit evidence of their land titles to the French domain administration within three days of the notice's publication.⁸⁵ The decree's author, Pierre Genty de Bussy, like a number of other French military officials sought to acquire lands by any means necessary. Major General Eugène Pelissier de Reynaud reported that de Bussy had a great desire to discover domanical properties whose titles, for the most part, had disappeared through carelessness of M. De Bourmont's administration, and for this his favorite

⁸² General Bertrand Clauzel and General D'Uzer led this effort. Eugène Pelissier de Reynaud, *Annales Algériennes*, 2nd Edition, Volume 2 (Paris: J. Dumaine, 1854), 78-9.

⁸³ Their justifications sounded eerily similar to those of the English in North America two hundred years prior, but there were French legal precedents closer to hand than that distant and English past. Cf. Banner, *How the Indians Lost Their Land*.

⁸⁴ "French Civil Code," General Dispositions, Book III - Of the Modes of Acquiring Property (19 April 1803) http://www.napoleon-series.org/research/government/code/book3/c_general.html (Accessed 28 February 2015).

⁸⁵ Decree, 1 March 1833, *Bulletin officiel*, I, 282-283. See Ruedy, *Land Policy in Colonial Algeria*, 22.

idea of which the decree of March 1 was but a pale reflection, was to seize all the properties in the regency without distinction, except for those who might be able to make their rights prevail.⁸⁶ The desire to acquire land and its actual appropriation, whether for the French state or personal profit, advanced the development of a settler colony, with or without metropolitan approval.

Based on the suggestions of the 1833 commission to Algeria, Parliament decided on a policy of restricted occupation to maintain French control over regions already seized, and this remained Parliament's (but not the military's) primary objective for much of the first decade of colonization. With the passage of the Royal Ordinance of 22 July 1834, France formally recognized its military colony, the "French Possessions in North Africa" (*les possessions françaises dans le Nord de l'Afrique*). On September 1, 1834, a subsequent decree delineated the hierarchy of governance. The Minister of War was responsible for drafting legislation for the colony at the recommendation of the Governor-General, who held both civil and military authority in Algeria. "This measure conferred upon Algeria a regime of legislation by executive decree totally at odds with French public law, which recognizes the principle of separation of powers but which in attenuated form survived until 1946."⁸⁷

While Parliament sanctioned the 1837 siege and conquest of Constantine, it was not yet ready to commit itself to a more aggressive system of colonization. 1840 found General Thomas-Robert Bugeaud still chastising the Assembly about its lack of clear goals and unsystematic approach to colonization in Algeria.⁸⁸ However, Abd-al-Qadir's provocations in 1839, Bugeaud's admonitions and proposals in 1840, and King Louis Philippe's support finally

⁸⁶ Reynaud, *Annales Algériennes*, 1st Edition, Volume 2 (Paris: Anselin et Taulteir Lagoine, 1836-1839), 23. The unusual syntax is translated by John Ruedy in his work, *Land Policy in Colonial Algeria*, 23.

⁸⁷ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 54.

⁸⁸ Robert Bugeaud, *Le maréchal Bugeaud, d'après sa correspondance intime et des documents inédits, 1784-1849*. Vol. 2, ed. Henry d'Ideville (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1881), 142-146.

prompted the French Parliament to join the military in taking an aggressive approach to land acquisition and management.

Abd al-Qadir's renewed declaration of war in 1839 pushed newly appointed Governor General Thomas Robert Bugeaud, to launch his "scorched earth" policy (November 1840 - 1847).⁸⁹ In a meeting of the lower Parliamentary council, the Chamber of Deputies, on January 15, 1840, Bugeaud laid out his plan to vanquish Algeria.⁹⁰

...I told the commandant of these columns [in Tlemcen, Mascara, and Medeah]: 'Your mission is not to run after the Arabs, which is useless; it is to prevent them from sowing, from harvesting, from grazing.' (*Movement [in the chamber]. Listen!*)

These murmurs seem to indicate that the Chamber finds this measure too barbarous. Sirs, one does not make war with philanthropy; he who wills the ends, wills the means!⁹¹

In the same speech, Bugeaud explained that generals won European wars by attacking the "centers of population, commerce, industry, customs, records," but those tactics were not possible because in Africa, there was "only one interest that can be wounded" - that of

⁸⁹ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 63; Antony Thrall Sullivan, *Thomas-Robert Bugeaud, France and Algeria, 1784-1849: Politics, Power, and the Good Society* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1983), 72-5. Abd al Qadir (alternative spelling: Abd el Kader) was an Indigenous resistance leader in western Algeria. His background and significance are introduced in a previous chapter on the conquest of Algiers and Constantine.

⁹⁰ The Chamber of Deputies was the lower chamber of Parliament during the July Monarchy (1830-1848) where deputies were elected by votes weighted by status documented in the most recent census.

⁹¹ Thomas-Robert Bugeaud, Speech in Chamber of Deputies, 15 January 1840, *Le Maréchal Bugeaud, d'après sa correspondance intime et des documents inédits, 1784-1849*. Vol 2 of 3. (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1881-1882), 138. Author translation.

The last statement may also be translated as "where there is a will, there is a way," but the direct translation I have provided is closer to Bugeaud's meaning in addressing the legislators who were uncomfortable with his methods.

agriculture.⁹² After pondering the difference between warfare conducted on European and African soil, he concluded, “I have reflected on this for a long time... I have not been able to discover any other way to subjugate the country except to seize [its agriculture].”⁹³

Bugeaud was able to sell this plan as necessary in 1840 because the Algerians were successfully resisting the extension of French military control and settlement. The Algerians coalesced around two powerful resistance leaders: Abd al-Qadir in the west and Hadj Ahmed Bey in the east.⁹⁴ While the implications of Bugeaud’s plan horrified French legislators, they agreed that it was necessary to achieve their goals. As Bugeaud and the military put his plan into action over the next seven years, French legislators and the public, alike struggled with the gruesome human toll it took on the Algerian population.

In June 1845, Bugeaud left his chief of staff, Colonel Aimable Jean Jacques Pélissier, on a cleanup mission in Dahra. A mountainous region halfway between Algiers and Oran, Dahra was the site of prolonged resistance to French incursions. The Governor General instructed him to “smoke out” the rebels if they retreated to their caves.

⁹² The entire French sentence reads: “Quand nous avons battu les armées belligérantes, nous saisissons les centres de population, de commerce, d’industrie, les douanes, les archives, et bientôt ces intérêts sont forcés de capituler.” Bugeaud, Speech in Chamber of Deputies, 15 January 1840. *Le Maréchal Bugeaud*, p. 137. The second quote comes from the following report of Bugeaud’s views in the *Moniteur Algérien* 25 December 1843: “L’intérêt agricole, que l’on néglige en Europe, est le seul que l’on puisse blesser en Afrique.”

⁹³ “J’y ai réfléchi bien longtemps ... je n’ai pu découvrir d’autre moyen de soumettre le pays que de saisir cet intérêt.” Bugeaud, Speech in Chamber of Deputies, 15 January 1840. *Le Maréchal Bugeaud*, 137.

⁹⁴ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 55–64; Raphael Danziger, *Abd Al-Qadir and the Algerians: Resistance to the French and Internal Consolidation* (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1977); Sullivan, *Thomas-Robert Bugeaud, France and Algeria, 1784-1849*, 70–75; Lucas-Dubreton and Buckley, *The Restoration and the July Monarchy*, 281–282. Much like the Indigenous armed resistance in the American Northwest Territory, which also formed a confederacy in the 1780s and 1790s for defense.

Defeated, the Ouled-Riah sought refuge in the impregnable caves in which they had placed their confidence to resist the French forces. Previously, they had sent their women, children, troops, and all of their riches into these caves. ... A simple blockade could last fifteen days and waste precious time in order to subjugate Dahra. Colonel Pélissier made the decision, therefore, to employ the means which Maréchal Governor [Bugeaud] had recommended in cases of extreme urgency. Many flaming bundles of sticks were thrown on top of the cave entrances, and all therein were suffocated. On this sad day (June 20), approximately 530 Arabs perished. These were the necessary consequences of this deplorable war constantly stoked by fanaticism.⁹⁵

Laurence Trent Cave, a British captain of the 54th Regiment and Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society described the French response to the massacre in Dahra: “That this was an unpardonable atrocity, admitting of no palliation, is sufficiently proved by the French themselves. The Count of Montalembert, Marshal Castellane, and the Prince de la Moskowa expressed their abhorrence of it in the Chamber of Peers; and the opposition Press denounced it

⁹⁵ Battus, les Ouled-Riah se réfugièrent dans des grottes inexpugnables qui leur avaient donné la confiance de résister aux armes françaises. D'avance ils avaient envoyé dans ces grottes leurs femmes, leurs enfants, leurs troupeaux et toutes leurs richesses. ... Un simple blocus pouvait durer quinze jours et faisait perdre un temps précieux pour la soumission du Dahra. Le colonel Pélissier se décida donc à employer le moyen qui lui avait été recommandé par le maréchal-gouverneur pour les cas d'extrême urgence. De nombreuses fascines enflammées furent jetées d'en haut à l'entrée des grottes, et tout ce qui s'y trouvait fut étouffé. Dans cette triste journée (20 juin), périrent à peu près 530 Arabes. C'étaient là les conséquences nécessaires de cette guerre déplorable incessamment rallumée par fanatisme. (A. Fouqueir, *Annuaire Historique Universel, ou Histoire Politique pour 1845* [Paris: Thoissier Desplaces, 1847], 251-252). Author translation. This publication was patterned after an English journal that reported on the year's most notable events and promoted metropolitan imperial achievements.

in strong terms...⁹⁶ Nevertheless, the French public remained generally supportive of the colonial project in Algeria.⁹⁷

In a devious but ingenious sleight of hand - or words, in this case - Bugeaud called his brand of punitive attacks on civilians “razzias,” a term borrowed from Arabic but that named a tactic developed in French Revolutionary wars in western France and Napoleon’s invasion of Spain.⁹⁸ The argument that Algerians were using the same tactics against the French seemed more plausible when the French used Arabic words to refer to French military strategies. The notion that the French were merely responding in kind justified, in their eyes at least, their harsh methods.

The shift to total warfare in 1840 actually motivated settler colonization as a “pacification” measure. French military officers believed that “settling the Algerian interior with Europeans solved both the practical issues of security - with settlers spreading out and securing the land - and provided the symbolic justification for the massive expenditures of the war, transforming the budget’s negative bottom line into hallowed sacrifices made for a higher good.”⁹⁹ As French objectives in Algeria transitioned to the formation of a “colonie de peuplement,” or settler colony, attitudes toward the Algerian inhabitants shifted, and “dépeuplement” by any means necessary increasingly became a topic of conversation and strategizing among French military leaders during the 1840s. Thus, “removal” of the Indigenous peoples lay at the heart of French settler colonialism in Algeria, much as it did in the United States.

⁹⁶ Laurence Trent Cave, *The French in Algeria*, [London, 1859] (Reprinted Elibron Classics, 2005), 208-9.

⁹⁷ Sessions, 171.

⁹⁸ Brower, *A Desert Named Peace*, 22.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 21; see also Lorcin, *Imperial Identities*, 45.

The Minister of War, General Schneider, suggested that French commanders also use land sequestration as a punitive measure against enemies of the French military and, by extension, the French state. Sequestration, he argued, was a way to accelerate both land acquisition and pacification processes. Even though this had been the unofficial practice since the conquest began in 1830, it became official policy in December 1840. Not only did this serve military purposes, but it also “g[a]ve to the European population that [was] settling in Africa establishments that [could] provide for the needs of the colony.”¹⁰⁰ His tactics coupled with Bugeaud’s total war opened up more and more land, and settlement did, in fact, accelerate after 1840.




Figure 8: Settlement in Algeria, 1838-1851¹⁰¹

¹⁰⁰ Schneider to Valée, 20 September 1840, *Bulletin officiel*, III, 137-138, translated and quoted in Ruedy, 60.

¹⁰¹ Data from the *Tableaux de la situation des établissements français dans l’Algérie*, France, Ministère de la Guerre (Paris, Imprimerie Royale, 1831-1850) (CAOM F80 Series; Corroborated in Sessions, 217).

By the late 1830s, a considerable European population was already present in Algerian urban centers and exerted pressure on the cadastral officials to attend to its needs first before surveying and recording the history of rural land ownership, as metropolitan officials desired. Despite metropolitan rhetoric and the machinations to establish an agricultural colony, most of the European emigrants settled in cities. As of 1848, only 15,000 *colons* settled in rural areas, of which, only 9,000 were French.¹⁰² Contrary to this reality, colonial proponents in Paris envisioned a rural utopia, comprised of rugged individuals, the way American and international accounts portrayed American settlers in the western territories.¹⁰³ Metropolitan officials believed that private agricultural property would redeem the immigrants from the corrupting influences of urbanization and industrialization. These visions echoed American dreams about their own frontier lands. However, in the United States, the settlement population *was* primarily rural and agricultural; whereas, the myth of this type of settler population in French Algeria persisted, despite the acknowledged reality that the opposite was true. The greater urbanization of Algeria compared to the American Midwest and fewer numbers of migrating farmers undermined French intentions for their settler colony.

After claiming ownership over *beylik* and, eventually, other lands, it was then necessary for the metropolitan administration to make this land "legible" — to understand the initial land classifications, boundaries, quality, and value in order to govern it in politically and economically advantageous ways.¹⁰⁴ The colonial department overseeing land surveys was much

¹⁰² Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 71.

¹⁰³ For the American narrative of "purification" of citizens through settlement on the frontiers, see Frazer Dorian McGlinchy, "A Superior Civilization!: Appropriation, Negotiation, and Interaction in the Northwest Territory, 1787-1795," in *The Boundaries Between Us: Natives and Newcomers Along the Frontiers of the Old Northwest Territory, 1750-1850*. (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press), 2006: 118-142.

¹⁰⁴ For a discussion and application of the concept of "legibility," see Scott, *Seeing Like a State*.

too small to accomplish the tasks colonial administrators demanded of it, and it took two decades and an immense expansion of the surveyors' ranks before French officials had a reasonably accurate account of the location, extent, and value of the *beylikal* properties it claimed between 1830 and 1837.¹⁰⁵

The Cadastre was created in 1838 to survey *rural* lands for promotion, appropriation and settlement purposes. By 1840, it was so preoccupied responding to city dwellers' demands for lot lines as well as plans for streets and additional fortifications, that the metropole reorganized it into separate autonomous rural and urban divisions.¹⁰⁶ Despite their efforts, renewed warfare in the countryside, name confusion, and a fundamental lack of understanding of Algerian land definitions plagued surveyors' efforts, and the Cadastre was unable to keep up with demand in the province of Constantine. Thus, rational, "enlightened" French administrators failed to subjugate the "chaotic" Algerian landscape to their scientific methods. Despite surveys and attempts to classify lands, most of the property in the eastern province remained largely incoherent to French eyes for nearly two decades. When it finally became legible, it was because the French military, settlers, and administrators used brute force to make it conform to French understandings of what a "modern" landholding system ought to be. Through *refoulement* (pushing Algerians out of cities and other areas of settlement), *cantonnement* (placing Algerians

¹⁰⁵ Ruedy, 27.

¹⁰⁶ Metropolitan administrators believed it was most urgent to determine where precisely settlement and agricultural production could begin. Ruedy, *Land Policy*, 27-8. See *Tableau de la situation des établissements français dans l'Algérie*, 1837, France, Ministère de la Guerre (Paris, Imprimerie Royale, 1838), 143; see also Pelissier de Reynaud, *Annales algériennes* 1st ed., Paris: Anselin et Taultier-Laguionie, 1836-1839, 2d ed. Paris: Librairie Militaire, 1854. 3 vols. 2: 344.

on or forming reservations around them), and reshaping urban landscapes according to French notions of “ideal” cityscapes, the French slowly “rationalized” the Algerian landscape.¹⁰⁷

Prior to these forceful measures, however, French officials attempted to create out of chaos a coherent and easily understood space, but the rational Cadastre was failing to keep pace. Settlers and speculators grew impatient. Tired of waiting for official lot lines to be drawn and property to “legally” come into the public domain for resale, speculators and *colons* joined forces in 1845 and 1846 to expropriate more land on their own. General Lamoricière wrote a detailed letter complaining about *colons* and speculators who met to discuss how to incite an Algerian rebellion in order to confiscate additional lands on the grounds that resistant Natives were enemies of the French state.¹⁰⁸ While commanders grew frustrated with the upheaval such activities created, metropolitan administrators sanctioned them in the decree of December 1, 1840, as long as the land became part of the public domain.¹⁰⁹ French colonialism meant much more than expropriation of Indigenous land. It was also about state power and the ability to control who settled, where, when, and how. The stories of Algerian and American colonization place these power relations and the governing structures they necessitated at the center of the settler colonial project.

¹⁰⁷ Ruedy, *Land Policy in Colonial Algeria: The Origins of the Rural Public Domain*; Sessions, *By Sword and Plow*; James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, Yale Agrarian Studies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).

¹⁰⁸ Lettre à Ministre de la Guerre de Lt. General, Gouverneur General par Interim Lamoricière, 2 Novembre 1846. F80/1675, CAOM.

¹⁰⁹ Title I of this decree states, “sequestration imposed at whatever time or for whatever cause is ... confirmed and maintained with regard to all those properties that, since July 5, 1830, ... have, in the absence of the native owners, been turned over to public services, inscribed on the registers of the domain, or placed in its possession.” *Collection des actes du Gouvernement*, Ministère de la Guerre (Paris, Imprimerie Royale), III, 218. Author Translation.

The land laws of 1844 and 1846 formally and legally established the long-standing justification for land expropriation: vacancy. Drafted by the French Minister of War and signed by King Louis Philippe for application in Algeria alone, these laws mandated the uses for particular parcels of land while stipulating financial penalties for those who chose to ignore the policy or could not meet its demands.¹¹⁰ Between 1830 and 1851, the French confiscated over 52,000 hectares (>128,000 acres) for the domain through declarations of vacancy.¹¹¹ The land laws of 1844 and 1846 were also meant to transform some of the land into “productive” spaces in order to recoup French financial losses incurred during the conquest. Metropolitan administrators also hoped that profits from land sales and exports would pay for subsequent expenses associated with colonizing efforts.¹¹²

In 1844, it became apparent to French administrators that much of the arable land, even that under European ownership, had yet to be cultivated, so the first of the land laws designated certain areas of “obligatory cultivation.” French administrators, once again, did more than just expropriate land. They situated themselves as the sole arbiters of land use and mandated particular activities they believed would make it more productive based on Western, scientific cultivation practices. Local knowledge of soil, climate contributed to finding a balance between agriculture and grazing to provide enough food for the community, but French officials failed to recognize this. Indeed, under the land law of 1844, those individuals holding uncultivated property were to pay a yearly tax of 5 francs per hectare on all unused territory, and property for

¹¹⁰ Sessions, *By Sword and Plow*, 254–258. The Minister of War in 1844 was Nicolas Jean de Dieu Soult, duc de Dalmatie (29 October 1840 – 10 November 1845), and the Minister of War in 1845 was Alexandre Pierre Chevalier Moline de Saint-Yon (10 November 1845 – 9 May 1847).

¹¹¹ Ruedy, *Land Policy in Colonial Algeria: The Origins of the Rural Public Domain*, 10:97.

¹¹² Sessions, *By Sword and Plow*, 254–258; Ruedy, *Land Policy in Colonial Algeria: The Origins of the Rural Public Domain*, 10:92–97. In the same way, American officials expected revenues from land sales to replenish their depleted treasury after the Revolutionary War.

which this tax remained unpaid for a period of six months or longer would then revert to the public domain.¹¹³ The first *arrondissements* (districts) to be so designated were Algiers, Oran, and Mostaganem in the West, and Philippeville in the East. Later decrees brought the regions around the cities of Bône (February 1845), Constantine (March 1849), and La Calle (November 1849) under this mandate.¹¹⁴

In each of the regions of “obligatory cultivation,” the law of 1846 directed the Cadastre to conduct surveys and verify Algerians’ pre-1830 ownership of the properties they claimed. Those who could not show that their property had been in their hands or that of their family before the conquest of Algiers were immediately subject to dispossession. Modern and self-proclaimed enlightened French administrators who could not read Algerians’ “chaotic” land tenure and ownership practices then imposed an external, “rational,” albeit subjective, order on the Algerians in a way that was illegible for Indigenous landowners. Following this law, French surveyors mapped nearly 200,000 hectares of land for verification purposes, and in the Algiers region alone, claimed 95,000 ha for the state out of the 168,000 investigated. The Algiers Cadastre granted an additional 37,000 ha. to individual Europeans, leaving a meager 11,500 to Muslims.¹¹⁵

¹¹³ This tax was never enforced and was later repealed by the land law of 1851 (Ruedy, *Land Policy*, 95).

¹¹⁴ Ruedy, *Land Policy in Colonial Algeria: The Origins of the Rural Public Domain*, 10:94.

¹¹⁵ Ageron, *Modern Algeria*, 26.




Figure 9: Land Allotment Around Algiers by 1847¹¹⁶

This process became one means of *cantonnement* or “containing” Native Algerians on specific plots of land and appropriating the remaining land for French use that the French state declared was unnecessary for Algerians to maintain their livelihoods. This had the effect of making more land available for European settlement, but it also made Algerian-held land legible to the state and therefore manageable.¹¹⁷ *Cantonnement* was also a response to *refoulement*, a policy that pushed Algerians out of cities and away from certain areas *en masse*. The military often employed *refoulement* directly during the first two decades of conquest. Alternatively, *refoulement* was also an indirect result of military actions as terrified Algerians fled from French soldiers’ depredations. Philippeville, an eastern coastal city, is a prominent example of deliberate

¹¹⁶ Data from Ageron, *Modern Algeria*, 26.

¹¹⁷ This practice echoes the American Indian removal policies in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that first limited Native American lands and then forced them to move from their homelands and relocate on reservations in the least desirable or productive areas of the country.

refoulement policies. Founded on the ruins of Tapsa, an ancient Phoenician city, Philippeville was one of the first in the province of Constantine that the French limited to European inhabitants alone in 1838.¹¹⁸ An English visitor described it as having the “appearance of a fine provincial town thinly inhabited” in 1852. She noted that it was populated “almost exclusively with emigrants from Provence, Marseilles, and Corsica” and observed that “many of the houses [were] shut up, and the number of bills for lodgings, visible in every window, [were] a sufficient proof of the depopulation of the city.”¹¹⁹

Based on Philippeville’s example, among others in the province, General Bedeau, the provincial commandant, decried the policy of *refoulement* and suggested *cantonnement* as a preferred method to deal with Indigenous Algerians, even arguing that it was in their best interests.¹²⁰ Later legislation protected the policies of *refoulement* and *cantonnement*, as well as past “irregular” (underhanded and often illegal) practices of land acquisition. The land law of July 1851 and the *Sénatus-Consulte* of 1863 respected existing property rights of both Europeans and Indigenous Algerians, legitimizing all previous dispossession schemes.

The French military subjugated most resistant Algerians along the coast by 1848, thereby opening up more land for the settlers that Generals Clauzel, d’Uzer, and Bugeaud, among others, believed so necessary to the French colonial enterprise. The military sequestered land from “enemies of the French state” and practiced *refoulement* by pushing Algerians out of cities, such as Philippeville. Displaced Indigenous families were often left to fend for themselves after the military took their homes or they were forced into *cantonnements* (reservations). Through

¹¹⁸ The Phoenician city (constructed ~47 BC) eventually grew into the vibrant Roman city, Rusicade, beginning in 186 AD with Cesar’s victories in Africa. The Vandals later destroyed Rusicade in the fifth century. “Aspect Historique: Skikda antique,” *Wilaya Skikda, Site Officiel*. http://www.wilayadeskikda-dz.com/histoire_antique.php (22 March 2013).

¹¹⁹ Laure Prus, *A Residence in Algeria* (London: W. Pickering, 1852), 3.

¹²⁰ Ruedy, 89.

dispossession, the French military created a settler colony and Parliament was left to decide what to do with it.

By the 1840s, the French government and military finally began to march to the same beat, each reinforcing the technologies of rule the other developed. While the army continued its physical conquest of territory, Parliament passed legislation to strengthen hierarchies of power, legitimize previous expropriations, and establish justifications for further land acquisition. At the same time, the government sought to establish order and make Algerian lands legible and therefore profitable. This objective was intimately connected with the goals and structures of settler colonialism. The very tools used to make land legible also served as tools of dispossession, thereby perpetuating invasion and the creation of settlers.

Comparative Synthesis

In the first two decades of conquest and colonization, both the French and American settler colonial projects reached several decisive moments. Each of those moments presented colonial officials with several options. They could cut their losses and abandon the endeavor. They could maintain the status quo by supporting existing institutions and military establishments but offer no additional support through funds, men, or materials. Or they could increase expenditures, expand existing institutions, develop new governing structures, and commit more soldiers to increasingly aggressive military tactics to break Indigenous resistance and ensure the safety of the settlers. Both governments chose the last option. Why?

The metropolitan governments of the United States and France perceived multiple real and potential threats to their governments, as well as their sovereignty in the settler colonies. American officials were acutely aware of foreign interest in their republican experiment, France among them. American leaders were acutely aware of the impending disaster if they failed; Great

Britain and Spain were waiting in the wings at the edges of American frontiers to swoop in and claim or reclaim vast swaths of American land. American statesmen feared that each of these powers would woo American settlers, along with their wealth and property, away from the United States to augment their own treasuries, as well as their armed forces if war broke out again. George Washington expressed concern over the fact that many of the emigrants to the backcountry were born in European nations and suggested that the United States ease their path to citizenship to attach them to American interests as quickly as possible.

While threats to the French government came primarily from within the country itself, Parliament also perceived foreign threats to its sovereignty in North Africa. Fears about interference from the region's former imperial government – the Ottoman Empire – as well as European states, particularly Great Britain, induced French officials' decision to increase its military presence and extend its zones of control.¹²¹ Settlers in French Algeria, like those in America's western territories, were a *mélange* of European immigrants and *émigrés* from the motherland and therefore required careful oversight. Eventually, the French Parliament voted to grant French citizenship to all settlers of European descent as a way to bind them firmly to French interests in the colony. To ensure control over both exogenous settlers as well as the Indigenous population, France governed Algeria through its military, as the Americans did in the Northwest Territory, for more than a quarter century.

France and the United States each created similar technologies of rule over time in response to perceived needs and circumstances on the ground in the settler colonies. To put down Indigenous resistance movements and protect the settlers, both sent more soldiers, which had the additional benefit of allowing both governments to extend their sovereignty over

¹²¹ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 53; Collingham, *The July Monarchy*, 253.

increasingly larger regions. Military leaders successfully lobbied the governments for more soldiers, arguing that they were necessary to defeat their Indigenous foes. In the eyes of government officials, the larger military presence also provided a show of force meant to awe both the Indigenous populations as well as other foreign powers. In the American territories, the military presence also served to curb some of the most violent settler outbursts or punish them when they could not be prevented.

The men tasked with carrying out the most brutal aspects of colonial rule shared similar perspectives and employed parallel strategies. George Rogers Clark, as already noted, was a militant American settler, promoted to General by the 1790s and granted 150,000 acres for he and his militiamen from the US government in the Treaty of Greenville in 1795. American General Wayne, who defeated the Native confederacy at the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794, precipitating the Treaty of Greenville the following year, declared, “by the sword we must procure peace.”¹²² French General Bugeaud, the man behind the scorched earth policies in Algeria was a self-described “soldier peasant,” or a “settler soldier” like Clark, who dreamed “of collectivized colonization by the military.”¹²³ Repeating Wayne’s language, but referencing ancient Rome, Bugeaud’s motto, “Ense et aratro,” or “by sword and plow,” guided his strategy in Algeria.¹²⁴ “By sword,” he ruthlessly put down Indigenous resistance in the 1840s, and “by plow,” or colonization, he sought to maintain the “peace” he had won.

¹²² Wayne to Knox, 26 October 1792 in Anthony Wayne et al., *Anthony Wayne, a Name in Arms: Soldier, Diplomat, Defender of Expansion Westward of a Nation; the Wayne-Knox-Pickering-McHenry Correspondence*, ed. Richard C. Knopf (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1959), 121.

¹²³ Ageron, 25.

¹²⁴ P. Christian, *L’Afrique Française, l’Empire du Maroc et les Deserts de Sahara* (Paris: A. Barbier, 1846), 362.

Furthermore, the discipline with which Wayne in the United States and Bugeaud in Algeria prepared their soldiers for total war was nearly as brutal as the tactics the soldiers were trained to perform on the Indigenous populations. In 1840s Algeria

[t]he conquest had been carried out by conscripts harshly disciplined for the purpose under a regime which in some units, the Africa Battalions and the Foreign Legion, amounted to torture. In action against the enemy [the Indigenous peoples], meanwhile, the worst excesses of the troops were ignored by their commanders.¹²⁵

While the troops underwent intensive training that many considered abusive, the havoc they wrought on the countryside of Algerian and American territories went far beyond the harsh military discipline they experienced. Following the American Battle of Fallen Timbers, Wayne recounted,

We remained three days and nights on the banks of the Miami, in front of the field of battle, during which time all the houses and cornfields were consumed and destroyed for a considerable distance, both above and below fort Miami, as well as within pistol shot of that garrison, who were compelled to remain tacit spectators to this general devastation and conflagration ... The army returned to this place on the 27th, by easy marches, laying waste to the villages, and great quantity of corn, to be consumed or destroyed, upon Au Glaize and the Miami.¹²⁶

Similarly, reporting on the terrible success of total war strategies in Algeria, a French commander wrote, “More than fifty fine villages built of stone and roofed with tiles were

¹²⁵ Ageron, *Modern Algeria*, 21.

¹²⁶ Wayne to Knox, Head Quarters, Grand Glaize, 28 August 1794, *American State Papers, Indian Affairs* 1: 491.

destroyed. Our soldiers made very considerable pickings there.”¹²⁷ Like Wayne, Bugeaud reported that he “began to chop down the fine orchards and to set fire to the magnificent villages under the enemy’s eyes.” Likewise, General Saint Arnaud informed his superior that he “left in [his] wake a vast conflagration. All the villages, some 200 in number, were burned down, all the gardens destroyed, all the olive trees cut down.”¹²⁸ In 1847, Tocqueville concluded that France had “made Muslim society far more miserable, disorganized, ignorant and barbarous than ever it was before it knew us.”¹²⁹ The same could be said of the Indigenous population in America’s western territories. Tocqueville recommended that France consider the rights and needs of the Indigenous Algerians, rather than merely subduing and taxing them.¹³⁰ Tocqueville’s advice went unheeded in this first epoch of settler colonialism.

As soon as the metropolitan governments began to consider how best to maintain the territories already won through military actions and treaties, they turned to the task of passing legislation and creating policies for their new settler colonies. These laws focused on the métropole’s relationship to the newly acquired land, how it would be governed, relationships between settler-soldiers and the Indigenous populations, punishments for infractions, and how land transactions were to take place. One of the most important pieces of legislation for the American colonies was the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which provided an outline for territorial governance and the eventual incorporation of the those territories into the United States.¹³¹ It established a governor who also served as the commander of the militia to defend the settlements, called for judges to draft laws based on those of their states that applied to the

¹²⁷ In Bennoune, 40.

¹²⁸ Bugeaud, in Bennoune, 40; Saint Arnaud, 1846 in Bennoune, 40.

¹²⁹ Tocqueville, “First Report on Algeria, 1847,” *Writings on Empire and Slavery*, 141.

¹³⁰ Tocqueville, “First Report on Algeria, 1847,” 146.

¹³¹ Onuf, *Statehood and Union*. Onuf also refers to the government that the Northwest Ordinance established as “colonial.” (See *Statehood and Union*, xiii).

particular circumstances they found in the territories, and enabled settlers to elect representatives to a general assembly. The ordinance also outlined the rights of settlers in the territories, as well as the qualifications to vote and to serve as a representative in the general assembly. Once the general assembly formed, they were to take over legislative duties from the judges and elect a non-voting representative to participate in debates in the United States Congress. Grounded in “the fundamental principles of civil and religious liberty,” the stated objective of the legislation was to extend those principles into the western territories “as the basis of all laws, constitutions, and governments [and] to provide also for the establishment of States, and permanent government therein, and for their admission to a share in the federal councils on an equal footing with the original States.”¹³²

Just as the settlers in the American western territories petitioned for recognition, rights, and representation, settlers and proponents of colonization in Algeria sought similar measures from the French government. Some pro-colonial officials went so far as to claim that “the new conquest ‘must not be called a colony,’ with all that term connoted, but rather must be made ‘one of the most beautiful provinces of France.’”¹³³ In this, the United States provided an apt model since its “territories” were rarely referred to as colonies in contemporary discourse, even though that is what they were. Furthermore, “‘It is vital,’ wrote one [French settler in Algeria] in 1845, ‘to legislate for the incorporation of Algeria into France as an integral part of its territory. Neither the press nor the settlers themselves must rest without winning this crucial point.’ And indeed, from 15 April 1845 the civil territory of Algeria, at least, was assimilated into the

¹³² “Northwest Ordinance of 1787,” *Territorial Papers*, 2: 45.

¹³³ Alexandre de Laborde, speech to the Chamber of Deputies, 29 April 1834, AP 89:490; Abbé Landmann, « Exposé sur la colonisation de l’Algérie adressée à MM. les pairs de France, lors de la discussion des crédits supplémentaires 1846 » (Paris, 1846), 10 in *Sessions*, 183.

metropolitan system of government.”¹³⁴ By 1847 and 1848, settlers, speculators, and pro-Algerian factions in the French government were highly successful in their lobbying efforts. As the July Monarchy neared its end (by coup, as it happened), “projects for assimilating the settled areas of Algeria were well underway, and the desire to make the colony part of France was brought to fruition by the republicans of 1848.”¹³⁵

As the governing bodies of each mother country passed laws, sent and supplied troops, and drew up treaties with Native leaders to acquire more land, questions arose about how to control the amalgamation of émigrés to the territories. As the United States organized its governance of the Northwest Territory, it selected and sent judges out to write policies specifically for the territories as the need arose and to try cases in an attempt to keep order in the contentious backcountry. After all, American Governor St. Clair wrote, prisons were equally necessary to ensure justice and maintain peace and happiness for inhabitants. Therefore, one of the first tasks he ordered to be completed in Kaskaskia, one of the outpost settlements in the Northwest Territory, was to build a prison near the church. While legislation had been passed to set aside land for schools in each territory, prisons appeared to be prioritized as an immediate need.¹³⁶

The French, too, were highly concerned with maintaining order and created, and re-created, a hierarchy for legislation and a judicial system for both the European settlers and the Indigenous population.¹³⁷ In Algeria, French desires to “rationalize” Islamic judicial systems for

¹³⁴ Ageron, 26.

¹³⁵ Sessions, 183-4.

¹³⁶ For the significance of prisons in the display and exertion of political power, see Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979).

¹³⁷ While this process was much more streamlined in the American case with its tiny bureaucracy and still-small nascent republican government, France’s large colonial machine churned out many administrators, each with different ideas about how the colony should be organized. As

the Algerian population in addition to installing their own for the Europeans complicated this process. Whereas, the American government with its tiny bureaucracy for the western territories left Indigenous “law” and punishment systems in the hands of Native leaders, the French saw colonization as an opportunity to instill greater order in Native institutions while imposing new colonial judicial, administrative, and social structures.¹³⁸

In the early stages of the settler colonial projects, it was also important to develop systems of land management: acquisition, surveying, platting, marketing, selling, assessing, and taxing. In the United States, while squatters moved out and set up homes and farms in ungovernable droves, the government simultaneously requested the military remove them from their illegal settlements while their surveyors worked to inspect and map out the lands, as well as the all-important boundaries between American settlements and Indigenous property. Both settlers and Indigenous peoples complicated the work of the surveyors. Squatters settled on land they had not purchased, in fact, was not even ready for sale by the United States government, and Native leaders contested the validity of the treaties the United States cited as their legal grounds for claiming the territories the surveyors had been sent to appraise. Consequently, Native

they rotated through the revolving door of colonial governance, each governor-general and his administrative staff re-organized various features of the governing structures. Over the course of France’s 132-year rule in Algeria, the dramatic changes in the metropolitan government brought numerous transformations to colonial governance. For a survey of these top-level changes, see Ageron, *Politiques Coloniales Au Maghreb*; Julien, *Histoire De l’Algérie Contemporaine*; Sessions, *By Sword and Plow*; Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*; Bennoune, *The Making of Contemporary Algeria*; James McDougall, *History and Culture of Nationalism in Algeria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). “Attitudes in France to the Natives in Algeria and the methods applied in Africa itself, tended to differ. The initial impatience, as Clauzel put it, with ‘you natives ... who so far have not sufficiently appreciated the advantage and honour of being considered equals by those who raised you up to their level’, often quickly turned to anger. Punishments and military measures could often be brutal, or certainly seem so, to those far from the environment wherein they were practiced.” (Collingham, *The July Monarchy*, 251)

¹³⁸ Allan Christelow, *Muslim Law Courts and the French Colonial State in Algeria* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985).

warriors haunted the footsteps of the surveyors and occasionally attacked the men as they worked their way through the wilderness.¹³⁹ Finally, officials requested military escorts to allow the surveyors to complete their work because the government was already unable to keep up with the pace of settlement and demand for land and needed to profit from it to recover from the recent expensive war.

In Algeria, French surveyors were equally behind the pace of land acquisition, sale, and resale. Their task was made more difficult because of the government's desire to assess rural lands for sale, while the settlers clamored for attention to be paid to their urban homes to support both the resale of the properties and to create maps from which infrastructural improvements could be planned and enacted. This tension was so great that the government had to divide the Cadastral department into rural and urban divisions so that both projects could proceed apace. The Cadastral surveys not only mapped the land but also began to provide reports on census data, making the land and people legible, countable, and taxable.

Methods of disciplining inhabitants, or "technologies of rule" were essential to the maintenance of the colonies, so managing relations between the Indigenous peoples and settlers was another fundamental task for French and American colonial officials. During the conquest and initial stages of settlement, the military was primarily responsible for controlling settlement and maintaining peace. Over time, military oversight was no longer sufficient or an efficient method of promoting harmony on the frontiers. Colonial officials needed intermediaries who represented the interests of Native communities while balancing them with the needs and concerns of the settlers and maintaining a positive relationship with the military, should they be

¹³⁹ For more on the wilderness as a common trope in settler narratives, see James Hart Merrell, *Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier*, 1st ed (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999).

needed to quash violence. Both colonies developed similar institutions to fill this need. The United States inherited a system of “Indian Departments” from the British and then created additional departments and added more officials to oversee relations with the Native Americans. These departments eventually became incorporated as the Bureau of Indian Affairs in 1824. In Algeria, France created the *bureaux arabes*, which served a similar role, and like the “Indian agents” sent to the Native American communities, most of the officials had a military background if they were not actively serving at the time of their appointment.

The United States built on the English model of managing Indigenous affairs and developed its “Indian policy” slowly over time. “Principles were worked out from time to time as experience and as circumstances changed,” but American principles were also grounded in British colonial experience.¹⁴⁰ In 1755, Great Britain established northern and southern “Indian departments” with one superintendent for each. On August 7, 1786, the American Continental Congress passed “An Ordinance for the Regulation of Indian Affairs” to organize an *American* “Indian” affairs bureaucracy to replace that of the British.

Like American “Indian” policy, “‘Arab policy’ was decided [by French military commanders] empirically, on the spot.”¹⁴¹ French Governor-Generals appointed a Muslim or French “Arab *agha*” to govern a military colonial district and then created an “Arab office” (*bureau arabe*) under La Moricière (1833-4). Under Pellissier de Reynaud (1837-9), the Arab Office became the Directorate of Arab Affairs, which prompted General Valeé to adopt the protectorate system in the Constantine province outside of the public domain lands and to divide Algeria into “civil territory open to European settlement and military territory from which this

¹⁴⁰ Prucha, *American Indian Policy*, vii.

¹⁴¹ Ageron, *Modern Algeria*, 22.

was excluded.”¹⁴² In this, the French innovated on the simpler American organization by attempting to keep the military separate from the civilians and keep settlers out of “unpacified” territories. After 1839, Bugeaud dismantled the directorate in favor of the Turkish *makhzan* system on which his mentor, Clauzel (1834-1836), had previously relied. Then the new director of the *Bureaux Arabes*, Eugène Daumas (1841-1847), carefully studied resistance leader Abd al-Qadir’s administration and convinced Bugeaud to adopt a similar system of indirect government through Arab chiefs. “This resort to the traditional nobility, at least to those of its members who wished to serve the French, became the rule of native policy.”¹⁴³ A student of the Arabic language and of Algerian moors and customs, himself, Daumas then resurrected the Directorate of Arab Affairs and began to establish *bureaux arabes* in each military circle of the provincial subdivisions.

By contrast, inside the “pacified” domanical lands, the former *beylikal* lands that France claimed following conquest, France established civil governments and allowed European settlement. Civil servants and magistrates in these locations “behaved as if they were in France” and instituted “a French system of justice in which only French metropolitan law was applied.”¹⁴⁴ Algerians still resided in these territories and would have otherwise lived under Muslim law adjudicated by *qadis*. However, with the establishment of the French metropolitan judicial system and the forced assimilation of Algerians under the French civil governments effectively destroyed Muslim institutions in these locales.¹⁴⁵

Governments run on money. Finding ways to raise revenue was (and is) absolutely essential. While American citizens and statesmen were averse to taxes immediately after the

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Ageron, 24.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

Revolutionary War, France had long levied them on their citizens and sought ways to do so more effectively. The United States therefore, had to be more creative in its funding sources, making the acquisition and disposition of land through sales and payments for services a significant focus of fiscal policy. The public lands became the nation's most valuable asset, a bargaining chip in domestic politics, a goad to settlement, a source of wealth and power in an agricultural society. Ironically, a nation conceived in a tax revolt against a colonial power determined to have the locals pay for their imperial protection now used newly-acquired land to help fund the governance and protection settlers pouring across that same real estate.¹⁴⁶

In addition to land disposition, controlling and taxing trade became another important governing structure in both settler colonies, although this particular technology of rule looked different in each location.

Whereas the safety and tranquility of the frontiers of the United States do in some measure depend on the maintaining of good correspondence between their citizens and the several nations of Indians in amity with them: And whereas the United States in Congress assembled, under the 9th of the Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union have the sole and exclusive right and power of regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians not members of any of the states...¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁶ For more on the role of public lands in American history, see Banner, *How the Indians Lost Their Land*; Saler, *The Settlers' Empire*; William H. Bergmann, *The American National State and the Early West* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Daniel Feller, *The Public Lands in Jacksonian Politics* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984); John Robert Van Atta, *Securing the West: Politics, Public Lands, and the Fate of the Old Republic, 1785-1850*, Reconfiguring American Political History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014); Robert Wooster, *The American Military Frontiers: The United States Army in the West, 1783-1900*, Histories of the American Frontier Series (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2009).

¹⁴⁷ "An Ordinance for the Regulation of Indian Affairs," 7 August 1786, *Territorial Papers 2*: 19.

The “Ordinance for the Regulation of Indian Affairs” also spelled out the process by which Americans were to obtain licenses to trade, pass through, and reside in Native territories. To acquire a trade license, the applicant first had to be a United States citizen and obtain a certificate signed and sealed from his state’s governor verifying his character and qualifications for employment. He then had to take that certificate, along with payment for the fifty-dollar license fee to the Indian Department superintendent in the region in which he wished to conduct business. Finally, he had to provide a bond of 3000 dollars to the United States government and agree to all rules and regulations Congress had passed and all future legislation pertaining to Native affairs. When he had finally accomplished all of this to the satisfaction of the superintendent, he was allowed to trade, but only for one year before he had to renew his license. The superintendent for the region was also tasked with collecting and recording the fees, bonds, and fines for crossing into Native territory without the proper permit and then transmitting the money, bonds, and the records to the United States Board of Treasury.¹⁴⁸

Trade licenses also allowed traders to live in Native communities, as “white persons” were not otherwise permitted to reside on Indigenous lands. If someone was not a trader but still wanted to enter Native territories they had to go through a similar process to obtain a passport that would grant them permission to legally enter the space. Officials intended these permits to

¹⁴⁸ “An Ordinance for the Regulation of Indian Affairs,” 7 August 1786, in *Territorial Papers 2*: 19-22. The United States “Board of Treasury” was one of the original titles given to the committee tasked with overseeing the new government’s finances under the Continental Congress. The Articles of Confederation Congress maintained a committee with the same function under the same title until President Washington approved the creation of the “Department of Treasury” on September 2, 1789. See “U.S. Department of Treasury – History, 1600-1799,” *U.S. Department of Treasury*, <http://www.treasury.gov/about/history/Pages/1600-1799.aspx> (Accessed 29 March 2015).

limit and monitor the movement of people as much as govern Native trade because they were highly concerned about the character of Americans entering or settling near Native territory.¹⁴⁹

France faced similar problems in Algeria and while some officials saw the colony as a dumping ground for the urban poor and those militating against the government, colonial officials in Algeria worried about the disruption such colonists might create in the already unstable and volatile environment.

Authorities in Paris and Algiers used controls on the issuance of passports and the influence of local officials in France to prevent ‘undesirable individuals from reaching the colony. ...the Algerian colonial state [was] a trans-Mediterranean entity that sought to regulate the movements and behavior of European emigrants as much as those of indigenous Algerians.¹⁵⁰

As American traders had to obtain verification of their upstanding moral character from their state governors before receiving permission to enter Native lands, French emigrants had to show signed guarantees of their character from their mayor to secure their passports to Algeria, which was also still largely Indigenous territory in the 1830s and 1840s.¹⁵¹ However, pressure from elite settlers already in the colony pushed the metropolitan government to ease their restrictions and even to provide free passage to able-bodied laborers beginning in 1838.¹⁵²

The rate of settlement increased in the second decade of conquest and colonization and pushed metropolitan administrators to begin creating an infrastructure to support the settler colonies. Consequently, the métropoles gave birth to the structures of settler colonial

¹⁴⁹ “An Ordinance for the Regulation of Indian Affairs,” 7 August 1786, *Territorial Papers 2*: 19-22.

¹⁵⁰ Sessions, 267.

¹⁵¹ Sessions, 271.

¹⁵² Sessions, 277.

governance. The institutions they created needed to fulfill several of the government's basic needs for control and revenue generation. They also had to meet the needs of settlers by creating relatively secure zones for settlement in areas where the colonizing militaries had quashed Indigenous resistance movements. Through land surveys, the métropoles sought to quantify and locate already acquired properties, and through legislation, they sought to establish procedures to appropriate and sell additional lands. To fortify metropolitan and settler authority, administrators drafted policies to govern the territories, laws to which settlers and Indigenous peoples were held accountable, as well as courts and prisons to ensure their enforcement. Another key to control in the colonies was to regulate the movement of people. Both the United States and France sought to select desirable settlers with which to populate the territories by requiring character references before granting licenses to trade with Indigenous communities or passports to travel into Indigenous lands.

The United States and France created similar technologies of rule in response to colonial exigencies, as well as to actual and perceived internal and external threats. This suggests that both métropoles faced congruent challenges and developed parallel solutions. Invasion continued past the first battle as the American militia and French army pressed their advantage, attacking additional Indigenous villages. Confronted with powerful Indigenous communities, American and French statesmen opted to augment their military forces to preserve national honor and to open colonial territory for new colonial settlements. After the first decade of conquest, metropolitan policies began to align with and support the colonization that was already underway. Predominantly led by settler soldiers, the first wave of *colons* petitioned their home governments to pass legislation that would make it easier to acquire land and to incorporate the colonial territories into the structures of metropolitan governance. Settler bellicosity also pressed

the metropolitan governments to install institutions of control as much to exert power over the settler as the Indigenous populations.

By the end of the first two decades of colonization (1795 in the United States and 1848 in French Algeria), both metropolitan governments had assembled all of the elements necessary to maintain their settler colonies. Thousands of settlers were already established under military protection and oversight. Both American and French métropoles instituted military governments that ran through the war department for their settler colonies. Within each of those governments, metropolitan administrators and military commanders employed technologies of rule to rationalize space and control people in each of the territories. Surveyors mapped space to make it easier to govern and prepare for sale, track ownership, assess and tax it (in French Algeria). The French Cadastre also began taking a census during this early period of development, whereas reports on settlement in the American territories remained informal for several more years. With metropolitan financial, military and political backing for the de facto settler colonies that sprang up in the wake of military conquests in the American Wabash and Ohio Valleys and Algeria, the settler colonies were firmly rooted and would prove difficult to dislodge more than hundred years later.

Chapter 5: Connections

An event, person, or process is said to be remarkable if it is worthy of observation and conversation. The comparison between the American and French settler colonial projects in North America and Algeria is “remarkable” in this sense in both the past and present. It is also “conspicuously unusual.” Few scholars have examined Anglophone and Francophone settler colonialism in a comparative framework, nor have historians contextualized the French colonization of Algeria in relation to its model – the flourishing American settler state.¹ While some scholars have begun to reframe the narrative of American history within the framework of settler colonialism, few have looked at its influence on other settler states.² Nevertheless, American settler policies and practices did not escape the notice of colonial officials elsewhere.³

¹ For larger comparative works that extend beyond just the United States and France, see Veracini, *Settler Colonialism*, 2010; Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native”; Russell, *Colonial Frontiers*; Wolfe, “The Settler Complex”; For comparisons between French and British colonialism (though not necessarily settler colonialism), see Lowe, *Critical Terrains*; Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Cooper and Stoler, *Tensions of Empire*.

² The study of the United States as a settler empire encompasses a large and growing body of literature. For some recent examples, see Michael Adas, “From Settler Colony to Global Hegemon: Integrating the Exceptionalist Narrative of the American Experience into World History,” *The American Historical Review* 106, no. 5 (December 1, 2001): 1692–1720, doi:10.2307/2692743; Joyce E. Chaplin, “Expansion and Exceptionalism in Early American History,” *The Journal of American History* 89, no. 4 (March 1, 2003): 1431–55, doi:10.2307/3092549; Hoxie, “Retrieving the Red Continent: Settler Colonialism and the History of American Indians in the US”; Rana, *The Two Faces of American Freedom*; Go, *Patterns of Empire*; Craig Yirush, *Settlers, Liberty, and Empire*; Walter L. Hixson, *American Settler Colonialism: A History*, First edition (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Stephen Pearson, “‘The Last Bastion of Colonialism’: Appalachian Settler Colonialism and Self-Indigenization,” *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 37, no. 2 (January 1, 2013): 165–84; Saler, *The Settlers’ Empire*.

³ James Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783-1939* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Jacobs, *White Mother to a Dark Race*; Ford, *Settler Sovereignty*; Veracini, *Settler Colonialism*, 2010; Sessions, *By Sword and Plow*; Go, *Patterns of Empire*. “The most important continuity was the fact that, from the sixteenth century, North America and the Caribbean formed the reference point, the font of experience, law and practice that defined British settler colonialism thereafter” (Lisa Ford, *Settler*

In the international exchange of ideas, political ideals, and policies, the United States and France not only influenced one another, but also strengthened one another's position as developing settler empires at the end of the eighteenth and through the nineteenth centuries.

At every turn – from the war for independence, to the backcountry campaigns, to the establishment of a professional military to maintain the frontier settlements, France backed the United States and provided the support it needed to accomplish each of its objectives, fostering its growth into a settler state in the process. The 1778 Franco-American Alliance during the Revolutionary War gave the United States the men, arms, resources, and morale it needed to succeed in its struggle against Great Britain. It also gave the American militia in the backcountry a bargaining tool that was essential to their conquest of British forts in the Wabash Valley and Illinois Country.⁴ French soldiers, officers and military engineers greatly aided the America war effort and contributed to the professionalization of the army that the United States' attempts to conquer and settle the frontiers made necessary following the Revolution.⁵ After the war's conclusion, a veritable flood of American settlers descended on the backcountry, prompting a cycle of violence as Native Americans resisted further encroachments on their lands. Congress's decision to provide for the defense of the western settlements and continue treaty negotiations with Native leaders for more land necessitated a military to protect American settlers and their

Sovereignty, 5-6). Settler colonies constantly compare themselves with others. "Settler colonialism is indeed a form of peer reviewing: even when indigenous and settler agencies are the only ones left contending on the ground, there is always an absent presence, metropolitan or otherwise, that contributes to shaping the settler colonial situation" (Veracini, *Settler Colonialism*, 24).

⁴ Jessica M. Parr, "Franco-American Alliance and France's Military Contribution," in *The Routledge Handbook of American Military and Diplomatic History: The Colonial Period to 1877* (New York: Routledge, 2014), chapter 13.

⁵ Norman B. Wilkinson, "The Forgotten 'Founder' of West Point," *Military Affairs* 24, no. 4 (Winter 1960): 177–88; White, *The Middle Ground*, 367–378; Jay Gitlin, *The Bourgeois Frontier French Towns, French Traders, and American Expansion*, The Lamar Series in Western History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 26–46.

property.⁶ Along with foreign threats to the eastern seaboard, this suggested the wisdom of establishing a military academy to train military commanders and engineers. The French, once again, bolstered the new American government's mission. Louis de Tousard, a French-trained artillery commander and engineer who fought with the Americans during the Revolutionary War, designed a training program for military officers that became the foundation for West Point Military Academy.⁷

Following closely on the heels of the American Revolution, Enlightenment ideals, mingled with the rise of commercial capitalism and French discontent over economic disparities and hardships, provoked a revolution in France at the end of eighteenth century.⁸ Despite French political upheaval between 1789 and 1830, the legacy of the French Revolution – the idea that

⁶ Prucha, *The Sword of the Republic*; Griffin, *American Leviathan*; White, *The Middle Ground* Harmar to Knox; Knox to Congress (on need for military).

⁷ Wilkinson, "The Forgotten 'Founder' of West Point." Tousard grew up in a military family, trained at the military academy of Strasbourg, and received specialized training in fortification design and artillery at Bayonne, Douay, Bapaume, and Mézières. During the Revolution, he served with distinction as an artillery commander under Gilbert de Motier, Marquis de Lafayette, and after serving with similar distinction on several continents for the French army, he returned to the United States and continued his service by designing and overseeing fortifications along the eastern seaboard. In his 1798 memoir, which he shared with Secretary of War James McHenry, he laid out a specific training program for military commanders and engineers and requested that the McHenry present it to Congress. Congress dawdled, and did not approve a military academy until 1802. While the program strayed from Tousard's plan, his 3-volume text, *The Artillerist's Companion* was adopted as one of the core West Point text books in 1816 (Wilkinson, "The Forgotten 'Founder' of West Point"). Thus, the American Military Academy's curriculum was founded on French military and engineering educational systems and the expertise of one of the most experienced military commanders and engineers that system produced.

⁸ William H. Sewell, "Connecting Capitalism to the French Revolution: The Parisian Promenade and the Origins of Civic Equality in Eighteenth-Century France," *Critical Historical Studies* 1, no. 1 (March 1, 2014): 5–46, doi:10.1086/674564; Lynn A. Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution*, 20th anniversary ed, Studies on the History of Society and Culture 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); Keith Michael Baker, *Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French Political Culture in the Eighteenth Century*, Ideas in Context (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Mlada Bukovansky, *Legitimacy and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions in International Political Culture* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).

sovereignty rested with the people and the corollary governmental duty to respect the popular will (albeit within certain limits) – continued to guide French politics.⁹ Indeed, it was the desire to win popular support for King Charles X’s government through the military conquest of Algiers, thereby propping up his flagging government, that launched the French ships toward the opposite Mediterranean shore in 1830.¹⁰

As in the American western territories, militaristic settlers and soldiers compelled the French government to accept the settler colonization that was already underway in Algeria. Following the formal recognition of Algeria as a French colony, prominent nineteenth-century French statesmen, such as Alexis de Tocqueville, Michel Chevalier, and Governor General of Algeria Patrice de MacMahon, used the United States as a model and a benchmark by which to measure French settler colonial “progress” in Algeria. French political leaders’ use of the United States as a standard of settler empire-building may account for at least some of the similarities in the colonies’ trajectories. However, it does not explain all of them, particularly those in the initial phases of conquest. It also does not explain variations of detail stemming from local environments, Indigenous cultures, religious beliefs, and economic interests. Despite the differences between the two contexts, the congruency between the stages of settler colonial development in modern Indiana and Illinois and French Algeria suggests commonalities in the formation of settler colonies more broadly.

⁹ Bukovansky, *Legitimacy and Power Politics*.

¹⁰ Bertier de Sauvigny and Pinkney, *History of France*, 266–271; Dupeux, *French Society, 1789-1970*; Wright, *France in Modern Times*, 184; Sessions, *By Sword and Plow*, 19–28; Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 46–48.

Comparison exposes settler colonialism as a global, rather than exceptional, phenomenon with extensive historical roots.¹¹ Comparative settler colonialism undermines three fundamental features common to hegemonic settler narratives. First, it overturns settler state claims of uniqueness. Secondly, this approach confronts settlers' privileged position as sovereign subjects. And thirdly, comparative settler colonial studies that recognize Indigenous actors' formative role in shaping the settler state undermine the state's elision of this reality.¹²

An examination of American and French settler colonial projects in the Old Northwest Territory and Algeria reveals that these two prototype settler colonies were not unique endeavors. Rather, settler colonization in both regions went through parallel stages of development, and each was grounded in similar motivations and ideologies. Both the United States and France faced international competition with Great Britain and other imperial powers – Spain in America and the Ottoman Empire in North Africa. Anxieties over internal political unrest also compelled each government to demonstrate its power over potential colonial territories to either prop up or establish its legitimacy. Profit motives spurred officials to encourage settlement in the colonies and propelled settlers to migrate. Access to land, natural resources, and potentially lucrative trade routes made both the American Wabash Valley and the Algerian Tell desirable assets. Furthermore, officials from both metropolitan governments

¹¹ Cf. William H. Sewell, "Marc Bloch and the Logic of Comparative History," *History and Theory* 6, no. 2 (January 1, 1967): 208–18, doi:10.2307/2504361; Chris Lorenz, "Comparative Historiography: Problems and Perspectives," *History and Theory* 38, no. 1 (February 1, 1999): 25–39; George M. Fredrickson, "From Exceptionalism to Variability: Recent Developments in Cross-National Comparative History," *The Journal of American History* 82, no. 2 (September 1, 1995): 587–604, doi:10.2307/2082188; Jürgen Kocka, "Comparison and Beyond," *History and Theory* 42, no. 1 (February 1, 2003): 39–44; Chaplin, "Expansion and Exceptionalism in Early American History"; Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, "Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisée and the Challenge of Reflexivity," *History and Theory* 45, no. 1 (February 1, 2006): 30–50; Go, *Patterns of Empire*.

¹² Gabriel Piterberg, "Literature of Settler Societies: Albert Camus, S. Yizhar and Amos Oz," *Settler Colonial Studies* 1, no. 2 (January 1, 2011): 3, doi:10.1080/2201473X.2011.10648811.

expressed concern over the security of their citizens and property. Locating the threat within the desirable territories provided a justifiable cause for military invasion.

While these reasons were rational, other, more complicated motives, lay underneath the decision to send militaries to these territories; the role of strong emotions in the events of history cannot be overlooked or underestimated.¹³ Revenge for insults, as well as physical and diplomatic attacks, motivated metropolitan administrators and militant settlers in the United States and France to attack and hold the land they claimed in the American western territories and North Africa. In America – many, but not all, Native Americans sided with Great Britain during the Revolution; in Algeria, the *dey* insulted the French foreign ambassador and supported pirates' raids on European (and American) ships. Subsequently, colonial proponents and propagandists in both mother countries portrayed conquest as righteous revenge and liberation from Native American and Algerian threats.¹⁴

One distinguishing feature about these two settler colonies, however, was that colonization was not initially the plan of metropolitan administrators. Even though some officials dreamed of acquiring the desirable lands in America and Algeria and installing settler farmers on them, the governments did not formally recognize the settlements as colonies for several years after the initial conquest. Dreams are not plans, after all. While scholars have largely ignored the settlers or treated them as given, cohesive blocs, it was the settlers and military forces in the each

¹³ For examples of the increasing attention given to the significance of affect to the unfolding events in American history, see: Sarah Knott, *Sensibility and the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009); Nicole Eustace, *Passion Is the Gale: Emotion, Power, and the Coming of the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008); Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, *This Violent Empire: The Birth of an American National Identity* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010).

¹⁴ Addi, "Colonial Mythologies: Algeria in the French Imagination," 95–99.

region that provided the initial impetus for the settler colonial projects.¹⁵ After years of indecision, the confluence of four key interests motivated metropolitan administrators to, at last, engage in the task of establishing governing structures and policies for the settler colonies. Pecuniary interest was one of the first and most persuasive factors; there were financial gains to be made through the acquisition and sale of lands. This interest was interlaced, and substantiated by, settler desires for upward social mobility through land acquisition in both territories and new business opportunities in Algeria. The aforementioned access to ports and trade routes inspired metropolitan commercial interest in the colonies as well.¹⁶ Furthermore, administrators saw strategic military advantages in maintaining the hard-won territories. Through colonization, they could reduce or remove threats to national interests and borders and prevent further Native American and Algerian piratical aggressions. What was more, through monitored settlement processes, the governments could open an escape valve through which social and political agitators could pass, leaving the mother countries and their governments undisturbed.¹⁷ Both American and French politicians and political thinkers hoped that resettlement in the colonies, especially on productive farmland, would rehabilitate immigrants from the pernicious effects of urbanization and, later, industrialization.¹⁸

Although separated by time, place, cultural heritage, and religion, important similarities existed between Algeria and the American Wabash and Ohio River Valleys prior to colonization. While the Indigenous populations in each location differed in their belief systems and specific socio-political structures, they were both heterogeneous societies with established social

¹⁵ Prochaska, *Making Algeria French*, 5–6.

¹⁶ Merchants formed a powerful lobbying force, particularly the Marseillais in France. (See Collingham, *July Monarchy*, 248; Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 52.)

¹⁷ Cf. Collingham, *The July Monarchy*, 248–9; Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783-1939*, 146.

¹⁸ Sessions, *By Sword and Plow*, 200–207.

hierarchies, political structures, and pre-capitalist economies based on subsistence farming, semi-nomadic herding or hunting, and trade. Communities in both locations held communal and semi-communal notions of land use and ownership and practiced careful and sustainable land management, which was especially important in Algeria's harsh and fragile environment. The majority of both populations held varying but strong spiritual beliefs that differed in significant ways from the nominally Christian western colonizers.¹⁹

Distant as the colonies were from each other, their geographies presented similar opportunities and benefits to the colonizers. Land in the Ohio and Wabash watersheds and in the region known as the Tell in Algeria, particularly in the Algerian province of Constantine, were fertile and appealing farmlands. Both regions had access to important ports (Algeria), navigable rivers (America), and trade routes. Moreover, their significant geopolitical locations meant that conquering these territories was essential to advance the settler colonial project and secure the each colony's borders.

Myths, military might, and legislation all advanced settler colonization. These three components of colonial rule promoted and rationalized structures of dispossession, creating racialized hierarchies of land rights and use, and entrenching American and French indigenizing claims to the soil as its true and rightful protectors. The military conquest of the American Wabash Valley and Algeria took different forms but with similar long-term results. In North America, George Rogers Clark and the United States militia attacked British forts in the region and later used their success as the basis for their claims to the territory since they acted on behalf

¹⁹ White, *The Middle Ground*; Eccles, *The Canadian Frontier, 1534-1760*; Alvord, *Kaskaskia Records, 1778-1790*; De Liette, "Degannes Memoir"; Valensi, *On the Eve of Colonialism*; Charles Robert Ageron, *Politiques Coloniales Au Maghreb*, Collection Hier (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1972); Mahfoud Bennoune, *The Making of Contemporary Algeria, 1830-1987* (Cambridge University Press, 2002); Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*.

of the United States government and for its cause during the Revolution. In the Treaty of Paris that concluded the Revolutionary War in 1783, the United States recognized only the nominal British claims to land, not Native sovereignty. It was not until the United States attempted to act on this belief and faced stiff Native resistance that it had to reluctantly recognize Indigenous sovereignty over the lands it had claimed and then negotiate land sales with Native leaders through the end of the eighteenth century.

“Settler-soldiers,” the militiamen who had settled in the backcountry, were largely responsible for the violence used to establish claims to land in these territories. Many of these settler soldiers initially took up arms in defense of their families and newly built homes on lands they believed were legitimately theirs. They then went on the offensive to push back the neighboring Native communities and their warriors, who fought, similarly, to protect their own families and homelands. On the other side of the Atlantic, France sent a naval convoy carrying roughly 30,000 professional soldiers rather than frontier militias to invade Algeria. However, as in the American case, French soldiers pushed the conquest beyond the initial point of entry without explicit metropolitan approval. French military commanders in Algeria saw an opportunity to exploit the Algerians’ desperate flight before them and continued to march on and conquer additional cities, abandoned properties, and their hinterlands.

Nevertheless, both metropolitan governments attempted to live up to their lofty Enlightenment ideals and recognize Indigenous land ownership, especially in the first decade of colonization. The military and settler-soldiers obstinately refused, though, and continued their rampage through the countryside, expropriating lands whenever and wherever possible. Consequently, martial settlers were a crucial component of advancing settler colonialism in both the Wabash Valley and Algeria. The men tasked with carrying out the most brutal aspects of

colonial rule shared similar perspectives and employed parallel strategies of total war and simultaneous settlement to maintain the lands won in war.

The French and American colonial toolboxes incorporated discursive instruments that buttressed concrete forms of dispossession, power, and invasion. Following successful military campaigns, whether or not they were officially sanctioned, government officials crafted narratives around the conquests to take advantage of what the settlers and military had already accomplished on the ground. Even if metropolitan administrators had not initially approved the campaigns, their subsequent narratives served to legitimate the actions after the fact, thereby coopting settler success for metropolitan objectives. Pro-colonial propagandists proclaimed the victories won over Indigenous peoples as glorious triumphs that accrued honor to the military and the métropole, even as detractors decried the violent methods used. With few easy choices, administrators opted to press on and drafted legislation to legalize land transactions and legitimize military campaigns after they had taken place. With the decision to keep the territories won, officials transitioned to crafting justifications for colonization, land acquisition, and settlement. The Treaty of Paris (1783) served as the United States' legal and discursive gateway to the western (i.e. Native) territories for American settlers, just as France's successful second siege of Constantine served as a discursive gateway to the rest of the Algerian Regency. Colonial officials and propagandists successfully used these victories to advocate for and justify the advancement of colonization.

According to the myths that emerged, the United States saved Native Americans from malevolent British rule that drove them to commit violent raids on the frontiersmen and then suffer American retaliation. A number of American statesmen, like Thomas Jefferson and Henry Knox, also viewed the United States' intervention into Native affairs as a benevolent civilizing

force that would help Indigenous peoples bridge the gap between themselves and the Americans in the hierarchy of civilization. Similarly, French publicists proclaimed that their military had saved Europeans from Algerian pirates' depredations *and*, simultaneously, saved Algerians from the tyranny of Ottoman colonial rule.²⁰ A witness of the conquest of Algiers exulted that despite the doubts of left-leaning politicians, the French army was successful. "In twenty days," Jean Toussaint Merle wrote, "the piracy, that had distressed Christians for three hundred years, had been destroyed: *Algiers, the warrior*, had succumbed to French forces; the *dey's* standard had been replaced by the white flag [of France]."²¹ No longer could the Algerian *dey* hold Christian governments hostage and demand ransom for the protection of their shipments and sailors from the Barbary pirates. No longer would European captains and crewmembers contemplate with dread, their fates at the hands of corsairs. So went French rhetoric about their heroic deeds in Algiers.

Not only had the French saved all of Christendom from the dreaded Barbary pirates, but they had also saved the Algerians from Ottoman despotism! In 1847, General Bedeau reiterated the already common rhetoric and justification for French colonization in Algeria:

[French] power... has destroyed the oppressive privileges of Turkish authority... In the eastern province, the Turkish power existed in Constantine until the French government decided to occupy this city. The Turkish power was oppressive: its main principle had been to divide and disunite the populations; to exploit the greatest number through a privileged minority. The French power, which has replaced it has immediately declared

²⁰ Addi, "Colonial Mythologies: Algeria in the French Imagination," 97–99.

²¹ J.T. Merle, *Anecdotes historiques et politiques pour servir à l'histoire de la conquête d'Alger en 1830* (Paris, G. A. Dentu, 1831), x. Author Translation.

and practiced its intention to be just; it has recognized the rights of all of the influential families.²²

Despite numerous portrayals like Bedeau's, the Ottoman government was incapable of exercising anything more than a light hand in its far-flung provinces in North Africa. Algerians paid taxes that funded imperial governance, but those taxes also often gave them access to land and a percentage of its produce. In direct contrast to their circumstances under French rule, the Ottoman imperial government had much less impact on Algerians' day-to-day lives than local and immediate community, tribal, and family affairs.

French and American settlers also established mythic connections to Ancient Rome in an attempt to legitimate their colonial projects and substantiate their claims as the rightful sovereigns of lands appropriated from Indigenous inhabitants. American surveyors and settlers imaginatively linked the mounds of the ancient Indigenous peoples in the eighteenth-century American Northwest Territory to the burial mounds of ancient Trojans, "the ancestors of the Roman republicans. 'Certainly there had been an elaborate civilization on the spot of the Ohio Company settlement and the Mariettans felt a primitive nobility exuding from its remnants.'"²³ George Washington, who first visited these lands during the French and Indian War, painted vivid images of Roman colonies, purged of slavery, purified, erected on the sites of these ancient civilizations and captured the imaginations of his comrades during the Revolution. The same men who sat dreaming with Washington around the campfires at Valley Forge formed the Ohio Company and set out to bring those visions into reality – connecting the new United States to

²² Marie Alphonse Bedeau, "Projet de colonisation pour la province de Constantine," *Projets de colonisation pour les provinces d'Oran et Constantine* (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1847), 190-191. Author translation.

²³ Frazer Dorian McGlinchy, "'A Superior Civilization': Appropriation, Negotiation, and Interaction in the Northwest Territory, 1787-1795," in Barr, *The Boundaries Between Us*, 122.

ancient Rome on sites that resembled burial mounds of Rome's predecessors.²⁴

By harking back to antiquity, Americans could distance themselves from the corruption and decadence of contemporary Europeans, despite their shared heritage. Secondly, the stance shows an unwillingness or inability to acknowledge the potential sophistication of the American Indian population at any time, past or present. By creating parameters of savagism and civilization for their current situation, it would be entirely contradictory to acknowledge any lineage between the supposedly heathen Indians and sophisticated creators of the earthworks.²⁵

Similarly, France reimagined the significance of the ancient Roman Empire in North Africa and expounded a mythic connection between it and France's nineteenth-century colonial project. In this myth, writers drew parallels between the two and claimed that France was the rightful heir of the Roman Empire and therefore the rightful governor of Algerian affairs.²⁶ French administrators, scholars, and colonial publicists drew the deforestation and declensionist narratives from their understanding of the Roman colonial legacy in North Africa. E. Pelissier de Reynaud's publications in *Exploration Scientifique*, for example, pointed to the ubiquitous Roman ruins in evidence throughout Algeria to support his theory. During the Roman period, Reynaud postulated, a dense population lived there but Algeria had experienced massive deforestation and a decline in fertility since it served as the "granary of Rome." While he didn't explicitly assign the Arab population fault for this series of events, "his description pointed to a change in the environmental narrative from one of an innate fertility not being properly

²⁴ Roger G. Kennedy, *Hidden Cities: The Discovery and Loss of Ancient North American Civilization* (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1994), 113.

²⁵ Frazer Dorian McGlinchy, "'A Superior Civilization': Appropriation, Negotiation, and Interaction in the Northwest Territory, 1787-1795," in Barr, *The Boundaries Between Us*, 123.

²⁶ Davis, *Resurrecting the Granary of Rome*; Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*; Lorcin, "Rome and France in Africa."

husbanded to one of an ancient fertility that had declined or been destroyed.”²⁷ Views such as Reynaud’s served as justification for the expropriation of hundreds of thousands of acres of property from Indigenous Algerians. J.A.N. Périer, another member of the *Commission Scientifique de l’Algérie*, civilian colonist, and medical doctor, wrote a two-volume set on medical sciences for the *Exploration Scientifique*, remarking that ‘it is our responsibility to raise Algeria from her fallen state, and to return her to her past [Roman] glory; for this privileged soil possesses all the elements of a surprising fecundity, of a great prosperity.’²⁸ Thus, Périer and Reynaud, two prominent members of the scientific commission, linked Algeria’s Roman past to the perception of environmental degradation, and France’s role as Algeria’s savior from both despotic Turkish rule and ignorant, destructive Arabs.

French military and metropolitan administrators saw themselves as the most suitable inheritors of Rome’s former imperial holdings in North Africa. Out of the many studies of Roman colonial Algeria and comparisons between Rome and France in North Africa emerged two beliefs: (1) the French colonial project not only rivaled but surpassed the Roman work in Algeria, and (2) the Latin/Mediterranean Myth, which served to anchor “the ‘Latins’ in Algerian soil, both temporally and spiritually, as its ‘rightful’ owners and responded to métropole anxieties by emphasizing the regenerative capacities of this ‘newly emerging race.’”²⁹ This myth sought to create unity out of an essentially unstable social environment “around which society could coalesce.”³⁰ Highlighting the connection between Roman and French colonial projects in North Africa set off a contrast between Western and Eastern imperialism. The French depicted

²⁷ Davis, 37.

²⁸ J. A. N. Périer, *De l’hygiène en Algérie*, Vol. 1, *Sciences médicales* in series *Exploration Scientifique de l’Algérie* (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1847), v.

²⁹ Patricia Lorcin, “Rome and France in Africa: Recovering Colonial Algeria’s Latin Past,” *French Historical Studies* 25, no. 2 (Spring 2002), 328.

³⁰ Lorcin, “Rome and France,” 329.

the latter as barbaric and retrograde and positioned themselves as Algeria's liberators from Turkish tyranny. Finally, the mythical connection between Roman and French colonialism created a myth of regionality: the creation and regeneration of "Latin Africa."³¹

The imagined connection to the ancient Roman Empire bound the settlers to the Algerian soil through the discourse of reclaiming "Latin Africa." Therefore, French colonization in Algeria was a figurative, as well as a spiritual homecoming. It was also a physical return of "Latins" to North African shores.³² At Philippeville, France re-inscribed European landholding on the remains of an ancient Roman city, creating a palimpsest that echoed their forbears while also paying homage to French modernity.³³ This had the effect of literally and figuratively displacing urban Algerian property-holders and governors with an entirely European population.

Similarly, the Americans saw themselves as recreating a Roman republic on American soil. This "mythological future" necessitated a mythical Roman past for the American landscape. Thus, American writers connected the elaborate mounds and remains of cities belying ancient Indigenous architecture to Roman predecessors, negating "the [Indigenous] present in real as well as ideological terms."³⁴ Ultimately, to achieve their desired future, "the native had to be marginalized and dispossessed" discursively but also in reality.³⁵

Ideologies of land use were prominent in the myth-making process and central to the development of settler colonies. French administrators attempted to understand the unfamiliar

³¹ Locin, "Rome and France," 329.

³² Lorcin, "Rome and France," 317.

³³ John Reynell Morell, *Algeria: The Topography and History, Political, Social, and Natural, of French Algeria* (Algeria: N. Cook, 1854), 20.

³⁴ Frazer Dorian McGlinchey, "'A Superior Civilization': Appropriation, Negotiation, and Interaction in the Northwest Territory, 1787-1795," in *The Boundaries Between Us: Natives and Newcomers Along the Frontiers of the Old Northwest Territory, 1750-1850* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2006), 126.

³⁵ Ibid.

land and people by situating them in existing schemas, or mental models. Metropolitan and military officials used the scientific studies that scholars conducted to bolster the colonial regime by rewriting the meaning attached to these studies. Harnessing history and appropriating the past gave colonizers further justification to appropriate land in the present and formed another intellectual technology of rule.

A chasm of perception and experience separated metropolitan administrators and their aims from those of military commanders and settlers in the colonies. To gain a more objective sense of what was happening in the colonies and receive less biased recommendations, both American and French governments sent commissions on fact-finding missions, demonstrating the disconnect between colonial officials and settlers *in situ* and the metropolitan administrations.³⁶ The 1783 report from the Committee on American Indian Affairs stated that Commissioners were sent to

obtain information of the numbers and places of residence of the citizens of the United States who have seated themselves on the north west side of the Ohio; to signify to them the displeasure of Congress that they have taken this step, with which the publick [sic] interests and repose are so intimately connected, without permission or authority ... to discourage to the utmost of their power, all intrusions into any of the territories of the United States within their respective Departments.³⁷

The settlers, acting of their own accord and in direct contradiction to both the objectives and policies of the federal government “seated themselves” on Native lands. Furthermore, settler militias attacked peaceful neighboring Native communities without metropolitan authorization.

³⁶ Collingham, *The July Monarchy*, 247; Prucha, *The Sword of the Republic*, 8; Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 50–51.

³⁷ *JCC*, 25: 689-690.

Consequently, tensions escalated to the point of armed conflict and obliged the United States government to spend money it did not have in an attempt to end hostilities between them.³⁸ Similarly, the French Parliament sent a delegation on a reconnaissance mission to Algeria in 1833. Despite the report's exposé and condemnation of the methods employed, the commission recommended that Parliament vote to keep the territories already occupied but suggested a policy of restricted occupation – a policy the military commanders in the colony chose to ignore.³⁹

When American and French metropolitan administrators were forced to recognize the colonization that had already begun, they asserted their intention to incorporate these lands into the metropolitan governing structure and take advantage of the opportunities they presented. While officials wrote policies and created a legal veneer for past actions, settlers and militaries continued to press into new lands, establishing settlements and staking claims. Nevertheless, over time in response to perceived needs and exigencies on the ground, France and the United States each created similar technologies of rule to govern their newly acquired and acknowledged settler colonies.

As settlers continued to pour into the colonies during the second decade of conquest and colonization, they compelled metropolitan administrators to develop judicial and political structures for them. Just as the settlers in the American western territories petitioned for recognition, rights, and representation, settlers and proponents of colonization in Algeria sought similar measures from the French government. The institutions that the mother country created

³⁸ Prucha, *The Sword of the Republic*; White, *The Middle Ground*; Griffin, *American Leviathan*; Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires*; Richter, *Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America*; Prucha, *The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians*; Gaff, *Bayonets in the Wilderness*; Michigan Historical Commission et al., *Michigan Historical Collections* (Lansing, n.d.); Alvord, Illinois, and Illinois State Historical Society, *The Illinois Country, 1673-1818*.

³⁹ Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 50–51; Collingham, *The July Monarchy*, 247–248; Bennoune, *The Making of Contemporary Algeria, 1830-1987*, 35; Naylor, *North Africa*, 153.

fulfilled the government's basic needs for control and revenue generation and provided relatively secure zones for settlement by quelling Indigenous resistance movements. The métropoles also developed systems of land management from acquisition to surveying, platting, marketing, selling, assessing, and taxing. Through land surveys, officials sought to quantify and locate settler-claimed properties as well as those that the governments considered domanial lands.⁴⁰ Legislation followed initial land acquisition, as the American Congress and French Parliament sought to standardize the processes by which additional property would be legitimately appropriated and sold.

Determining how to regulate the movement and behavior of people in the colonies was one of the central metropolitan concerns. Administrators tried to define and circumscribe who was allowed to settle in the territories, where they could migrate within the territories, and frequently differentiated what behaviors were deemed acceptable among settlers and the Indigenous population. In short order, they also installed courts and prisons to ensure the enforcement of their laws. Both the United States and France attempted to select "desirable" settlers to populate the territories by requiring character references before granting licenses or passports to travel or settle in the colonies or trade with Indigenous communities. Such efforts were short lived, however, and gave way to the competing notion that settler colonies could serve as "safety valve" for undesirable elements of the metropolitan population.

Consequently, managing relations between the Indigenous peoples and settlers was another fundamental task for French and American colonial officials. During the conquest and initial stages of settlement, the military was primarily responsible for controlling settlers and

⁴⁰ Domanial lands are government-owned public domain lands and included those the United States government acquired from Native Americans through treaties and those that France acquired in *beylikal* lands following the conquest of each Algerian province.

maintaining peace. However, by the time the colonies were peopled with American and European settlers, a new institution was necessary. Bureaus of Indigenous affairs, comprised of men thought to be familiar with the languages and customs of the Indigenous peoples, strove to mediate between *colons* and their Native neighbors. The selection of military commanders and officers of the Indigenous affairs bureaus was important because, despite metropolitan administrators' best efforts, those on the ground actually decided Indigenous policy. Therefore, colonial officials, settlers, and the soldier-settlers who existed somewhere in between ultimately determined American and French colonial policy and charted the course of colonial development within the limits that Indigenous peoples dictated during the first two decades of colonization.

This dissertation grounds the developing theoretical framework of settler colonialism in two historical contexts and further supports the validity of this framework through the comparison of these two case studies. Theory is an abstraction from the specifics to find the general. This study, then, returns to the specifics to gauge how well the abstraction fits. In many instances, the theoretical framework holds up, but this return to case studies also reveals gaps and oversights. For instance, settler colonial theory begins with the assumption that metropolitan governments set out to create settler colonies. While settlers were the essential ingredient in their creation, the theory also posits that top-down policies drove development and gave the colonies their shape.⁴¹ Both Veracini and Wolfe recognize that the presence of settlers constituted the formation of settler colonies, but settlers as individuals and as agents often get lost in top-down analyses. However, an examination of the American Northwest Territory and French Algeria cases reveals that settler- and military-led ad-hoc, grassroots processes were responsible for the establishment of settler colonies in these two locations.

⁴¹ See, for example: Veracini, *Settler Colonialism*, 2010; Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native"; Bateman and Pilkington, *Studies in Settler Colonialism*.

Through the close historical analysis of the United States as a settler empire and French Algeria, we can expand the framework of settler colonial studies to include not three, but four, primary sets of actors: metropolitan officials, military/colonial administrators, Indigenous leaders, and settlers. Veracini's triadic approach does not differentiate the influential military leaders/colonial administrators on the ground from metropolitan officials.⁴² However, they deserve a separate category because their aims and means frequently conflicted with metropolitan instructions.

Although Veracini observes that settler colonial studies has grown out of Indigenous studies, ethnohistory, and historical colonial studies, the theory that frames much of the field's work neglects the heterogeneity of Indigenous peoples, motives, and objectives.⁴³ Veracini argues that settler colonial studies is not, and should not be, overly concerned with the particulars of Indigenous societies or their histories.⁴⁴ I disagree. Settler colonial structures, their formation, and the very real limits placed on their creation and power cannot be understood without an examination and understanding of the Indigenous peoples who shaped and bounded settler colonial socio-political institutions of power, especially in the early stages of colonization.⁴⁵ In former British colonies, Annie Coombes and the contributors to *Rethinking Settler Colonialism* (2011) similarly found that “the colonisers’ dealings with indigenous peoples – through

⁴² Veracini, *Settler Colonialism*, 2010; Veracini, “On Settlerness.”

⁴³ Lorenzo Veracini, “‘Settler Colonialism’: Career of a Concept,” *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 41, no. 2 (June 1, 2013): 313–33, doi:10.1080/03086534.2013.768099.

⁴⁴ Veracini, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview*, 15; Veracini, “On Settler Colonialism and Borderlands,” Session 169, AHA Panel Discussion, New York City, 4 January 2015.

⁴⁵ For others who take a similar approach to settler colonial studies, see: Smith, *Conquest*; Kevin Bruyneel, *The Third Space of Sovereignty: The Postcolonial Politics of U.S.-Indigenous Relations*, Indigenous Americas (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007); Ford, *Settler Sovereignty*; Morgensen, *Spaces between Us*; Corey Snelgrove, Rita Dhamoon, and Jeff Corntassel, “Unsettling Settler Colonialism: The Discourse and Politics of Settlers, and Solidarity with Indigenous Nations,” *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society* 3, no. 2 (2014).

resistance, containment, appropriation, assimilation, miscegenation, or attempted destruction – is the historical factor which has ultimately shaped the cultural and political character of the new nations, mediating in highly significant ways their shared colonial roots/routes.”⁴⁶ Extending Coombes’ argument beyond the Anglo world, I contend that the role of Indigenous peoples was also important in the French Algerian settler colony. More than that, though, the Indigenous peoples, themselves, were significant actors – important for more than the ways in which the colonizing forces sought to exert power over them – in both American and French settler colonies.

The motivations behind the institution of this rediscovered form of colony are important to understand the ways in which settler colonies developed as well as their effects over time, which is at the heart of settler colonial studies.⁴⁷ Five key interests prompted metropolitan administrators to keep the colonized territory that the settlers and military had already won. Colonial officials saw the revenue potential that colonial lands offered both the government and individuals. A number of metropolitan leaders themselves were or became involved in colonial land speculation and sales, taking advantage of the property that the military had already appropriated from Indigenous populations. Merchants and traders also pressed officials to recognize the commercial benefits the colonies could provide through access to natural resources and existing trade routes. Military advisors highlighted the strategic geographic positions of the territories since both the Wabash Valley and Algeria bordered other imperial possessions. Control over these regions would also reduce the threat the Indigenous peoples posed to national security and settlement could provide a buffer zone between the colonial frontiers and the mother

⁴⁶ Coombes, *Rethinking Settler Colonialism*, 1–2.

⁴⁷ For “rediscovered form of colony,” see Lorcin, “Rome and France in Africa”; Sessions, *By Sword and Plow*; McGlinchey, “‘A Superior Civilization’: Appropriation, Negotiation, and Interaction in the Northwest Territory, 1787-1795.”

country, especially in the case of the United States since the colonies were contiguous with the American state's borders. Seizure of the desirable colonial lands, American and French officials persuaded themselves, could also convey metropolitan power and legitimacy – both in the eyes of their own citizens and those of foreign powers. While the specifics for other métropoles may have differed, some combination of similar factors – fiscal, commercial, military, and political interests – motivated the formation of their own settler colonies. These foundational interests then shaped the kinds of institutions that each government built.

Furthermore, the mother country's form of government mattered less than the stimuli. Whereas the United States was, and remained, a republic when it created its settler colonies in the Northwest Territory, France was a monarchy at the time of conquest, but its government changed drastically over the 132-year span of its colonization of Algeria. Despite its many transformations from various versions of constitutional monarchies to republics to "empires," French leaders always chose to maintain their colonial holdings and often expanded them.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ Even within the time frame of this study, France began the conquest under its monarch, King Charles X, and shortly after the invasion of Algiers, the July Revolution replaced the king with Louis Philippe, who inaugurated an only slightly modified constitutional monarchy, the "July Monarchy," from 1830 to 1848. The Revolution of 1848 replaced the July Monarchy with the Second Republic (1848-1852), which was then overthrown by Napoleon III, commencing the Second Empire (1852-1870). With every change in government and leadership, Algeria remained the cornerstone of France's second empire.




Figure 10: First and Second French Empires⁴⁹

Significantly, the stages of colonization and colonial structures that both the United States and France instituted were highly similar. This suggests that the forms settler colonies took did not depend upon their Anglophone or Francophone heritage. The objectives of metropolitan administrators, settlers, and the situations to which they responded on the ground – namely the threat that Indigenous peoples posed to continued settlement and colonial sovereignty – mattered more.

That both the United States and France shared a similar philosophical heritage from Christianity, European legal rationales for colonizing the Americas, the Enlightenment, and the growth of capitalism was equally influential in shaping their approaches to settler colonial governance.⁵⁰ This shared heritage reveals itself in common ideologies and values expressed in

⁴⁹ Map: "French Empire 17th century-20th century" by Kayac1971 - Own work. Licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 via Wikimedia Commons - http://web.archive.org/web/20150316154740/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_colonial_empire

⁵⁰ Denoon, *Settler Capitalism*; Said, *Orientalism*; Macfie, *Orientalism*; Pagden, *Lords of All the World*; Williams, *The American Indian in Western Legal Thought*; Tierney, *The Idea of Natural Rights*; Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World*; White, *The Middle Ground*; Rana, *The Two Faces*

the justifications given for colonization.⁵¹ Since at least the fourth century, European (and much later, American) writers penned travel narratives that incorporated elements of the Christian pilgrimage, including struggles against dark forces, experiencing novel and wondrous sights, redemption, and arrival in the Promised Land.⁵² Narratives of conquest and colonization often followed similar trajectories and cast the colonizers as the heroes, liberating both themselves and their countrymen from the threat of the Indigenous peoples they defeated. Simultaneously, colonial propagandists also proclaimed that their intention was to free the Indigenous population from their former colonial oppressor. Furthermore, the colonizers declared that they were benevolent rulers who sought to tutor the “backward” Indigenous peoples and inculcate in them enlightened ideas and social mores. Both the United States and France, at least initially, espoused assimilationist aims and built institutions to support their “civilizing missions.”⁵³ Settler colonial scholars have demonstrated that these assimilationist policies served the settler colonial

of American Freedom; Ford, *Settler Sovereignty*; Caroline Ford, “The Inheritance of Empire and the Ruins of Rome in French Colonial Algeria,” *Past & Present* 226, no. suppl 10 (January 1, 2015): 57–77, doi:10.1093/pastj/gtu016; Sessions, *By Sword and Plow*, 198–199; Addi, “Colonial Mythologies: Algeria in the French Imagination.”

⁵¹ Sessions, *By Sword and Plow*, 179–186.

⁵² Mary B. Campbell, *The Witness and the Other World: Exotic European Travel Writing, 400-1600* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Said, *Orientalism*; Martha Pallante, “The Trek West: Early Travel Narratives and Perceptions of the Frontier,” *Michigan Historical Review* 21, no. 1 (April 1, 1995): 83–99, doi:10.2307/20173493; Lowe, *Critical Terrains*; Mills, *Discourses of Difference*; Leslie Penn Peirce, *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Jill Lepore, *The Name of War: King Philip’s War and the Origins of American Identity*, 1st ed (New York: Knopf: Distributed by Random House, 1998); Ann M Little, *Abraham in Arms: War and Gender in Colonial New England*, Early American Studies (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007).

⁵³ Raymond F. Betts, *Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory, 1890-1914*, Columbia Studies in the Social Sciences, no. 604 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961); Roy Harvey Pearce, *Savagism and Civilization: A Study of the Indian and the American Mind* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967); Berkhofer, *The White Man’s Indian*; Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize*; Rana, *The Two Faces of American Freedom*; Wright, *France in Modern Times*, 193.

government's ultimate purpose – the “elimination of the Native.”⁵⁴ However, it is important to observe the origins of this impulse in Western nations and therefore the foundational reasons for the similarities among their settler colonies.

In addition to, and, in part, because of their shared Enlightenment heritage, popular will became the basis for political legitimacy in the mid- to late-eighteenth century as political leaders in America and Europe began to press against the notion that bloodlines and divine right sanctioned rulers. This shift in the basis for political legitimacy to popular sovereignty had important implications for the settler colonies that each state established. While Lisa Ford's work examines the development of sovereignty as a legal construct that came to be based on land, my work focuses on the previous, political understanding of sovereignty and its transformation as a *political* construct in the establishment of settler colonies.⁵⁵ Prior to the American and French revolutions, political sovereignty rested in the person of a sovereign – a king who inherited his position either by bloodlines, claims to divine selection, or both. However, during this period of political ferment, this concept underwent dramatic transformations in Euro-American political thought, especially in the two métropoles under present consideration.⁵⁶ Settlers then connected

⁵⁴ Jacobs, *White Mother to a Dark Race*; Veracini, *Settler Colonialism*, 2010; Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native.” Wolfe's seminal article, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native” argues that the underlying objective and intent of settler colonial powers is the physical and/or cultural eradication of the Indigenous population. Even though most colonial powers have been unable to carry out this genocidal impulse, Wolfe argues that it is the most significant, central motivation and drive amongst all settler colonial governments. Most studies of settler colonialism take Wolfe's thesis as axiomatic.

⁵⁵ Ford, *Settler Sovereignty*. Ford contends that the definition and establishment of settler sovereignty was a crucial development in the formation of settler colonies. Her work examines the process by which the legal definition of sovereignty and jurisdiction transitioned from power over people to power over place and therefore came to be based on territoriality. Using the state of Georgia (United States) and New South Wales (Australia) as case studies, she maintains that the Anglo world's definition underwent this transformation at the same time because they faced similar challenges from Indigenous populations in their settler colonies.

⁵⁶ Bukovansky, *Legitimacy and Power Politics*.

the idea of popular sovereignty to territorial rights. This compelled metropolitan governments to walk a fine line between placating the settlers to maintain their legitimacy and exerting power over them to prevent the worst of militant settlers' violent excesses.

Grappling with the historical contingency of American and French settler colonialism complicates the theoretical framework and paints a more nuanced picture than the monolithic depictions of primary agents in the creation of settler colonies. Patrick Wolfe portrays the métropole as a coordinator of a “comprehensive range of agencies... with a view to eliminating Indigenous societies.”⁵⁷ While this may have been true of many settler colonial métropoles over the *longue durée*, such a statement overlooks the objectives of the legislators involved, as well as the complicated negotiations that took place to create those policies. Even if metropolitan administrators agreed that access to more land was desirable, many were uncomfortable with the methods that settlers and militaries employed to acquire that land. At the same time, Wolfe’s larger point is valid – the elimination of Native societies was essential for the preservation of settler colonies.⁵⁸

Settler colonialism’s legacy continues to influence geopolitics, national policy decisions, and people’s daily lives. Hence, the formation and structures of settler colonialism are germane to understanding not only a widespread phenomenon foundational to many contemporary societies, but also to uncover a holistic knowledge of empire, settler roles, and Indigenous actions within colonial contexts. This knowledge is especially important in modern settler societies where settler colonialism is no longer visible but perceived as “normal.” To deconstruct settler epistemologies, my research exposes the processes and institutions of settler colonialism in the Old Northwest Territory and French Algeria, as well as Indigenous influences on their

⁵⁷ Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” 393.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 388.

forms and limits.

Immigrants become settlers by dispossessing the Indigenous population. This was the driving force behind settler colonialism, according to Patrick Wolfe and Lorenzo Veracini's formative work. The expropriation of land that lies at the heart of settler colonialism has left a legacy that continues to influence geopolitics, inter/national policies, and everyday realities around the world. Comparing the plantation of settler colonies in the American Northwest Territory (1778-1795) and French Algeria (1830-1848) uncovers how the complex interactions between the Indigenous populations, settlers, colonial administrators, the military, and the métropole shaped colonial governance.

In spite of differences in geography, the relative size of the military presence, and Indigenous demographics, both colonies took similar paths from conquest through the establishment of settler governments. Settler colonies in the American Midwest and Algeria resulted from a bottom-up process in which settler desires for land and greater economic opportunities compelled them to migrate and stake their claim to these territories by dispossessing Indigenous communities. This movement then served as a catalyst for makeshift metropolitan policies that only became systematized and institutionalized at the end of the first decade of colonization.

Nineteenth-century French statesmen, such as Gouverneur Général Patrice de MacMahon and Monsieur Michel Chevalier, used the United States as a benchmark in their analysis of Indigenous relations and the rate of colonization in Algeria. The United States became an important model for modern settler colonialism and Indigenous policy. Likewise, Algeria has long been considered a model of European settler colonialism, but the process of its formation

required further study. Moreover, the actions of settlers and Indigenous peoples shaped the colony and its governance as much as those of colonial administrators.

Based on findings from my dissertation research, I will examine the development of settler colonies after initial formation through the creation of stable semi-autonomous settler governments in the American Midwest and French Algeria. I am interested in clarifying how the relationship between settlers and the Indigenous populations in both locations, as well as administrators' responses to prevailing circumstances on the ground shaped the establishment of stable settler governments in both locations (1795-1832 in the United States and 1848-1871 in French Algeria). Using colonial administration reports, correspondence, newspapers, legislation, and Parliamentary and Congressional records, I will investigate the incorporation of the colonies into the métropole through the transition of colonial territories into states in the United States and through the annexation of Algeria to France. Additionally, I will look at the development of parallel institutions, such as the bureaus of Indigenous affairs, as well as the suppression of Indigenous resistance, and the organization of semi-autonomous civil settler governments.

In a follow-up study, I would like to compare Indigenous strategies of persistence in settler colonies. For Indigenous communities, simply living and persevering as a people was an act of rebellion against the settler state. Thus, this study has the potential to call into question the dichotomy of resistance/accommodation that scholars have used to describe colonizer-colonized relationships in the past. Instead, an examination of the diverse ways in which Indigenous people endured in settler colonies offers a more nuanced understanding of colonial relations, agency, and the limits of colonial power.

By examining the processes of settler colonial formation, the nature and limits of power becomes clear on multiple levels. The métropole played an important role in founding and

governing settler colonies. However, other actors previously misinterpreted by political history – settlers, militaries, and soldier-settlers, in particular – truly motivated the institution of settler colonies. These actors, along with Indigenous leaders indelibly shaped policy formation and implementation in the colonies. Additionally, this study has opened up new avenues for research by establishing a base on which to build. With a greater understanding of the stimuli and means of settlement, the role of ideology and which ideologies carried the most weight become evident. The interplay between race, class, and gender can then be examined in context. This study takes another step towards addressing French Algeria’s settler colonial past and the present state of settler colonialism in the United States. The first step toward healing the wounds of the past and addressing continued injustice is to recognize and understand their history.

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