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Explaining the Continuities and Changes in United States Policy in Relation to Taiwan for the Past Three Presidents

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Senior Thesis

Professor Kang

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Chapter I: Introduction

The Taiwan-China conflict remains one of the most potentially dangerous situations in the international system today. A devastating war that would destabilize Asia and also relations between the United States and China could occur if the actors involved in the situation make radical decisions. Because of the potential severity of the conflict, the United States has made the Taiwan-China conflict a priority in its foreign policy since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949. Each of the past three US presidents: Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama have treated this issue delicately in hopes of solving the conflict without provoking a violent confrontation with the People's Republic of China (PRC). In many ways over the past three administrations the foreign policy of the United States towards this issue has stayed relatively the same; however there have been notable important changes in the policies between the three presidents. The international relations three levels of analysis: individual level, state level, and systemic level help explain why this policy has remained the same and why it has changed. The individual and systemic factors mostly explain why the policy has shifted while the state level and some systemic aspects illustrate the continuities. Of these

three levels of analyzes, the most important factors are the economic and military realities between the actors, and the influence that the United States military arms corporations have on the decision-making process.

The three levels of analysis is an important framework for understanding international relations issues such as the Taiwan-China conflict, and helps explain why there are changes and continuities between presidential administrations. The first part of this framework is the individual level of analysis. This level deals with the personality and leadership qualities of the individuals who are charged with making the policy decisions. The individual level attempts to analyze how their emotions, cognitive skills, ambition, ego, and other such factors affect the way they act. The second level of analysis is concerned with the state itself and the different factions that act within the state. Analysis for this level includes understanding how the different branches of government affect each other and also how interest groups affect the decision-making process. The final level focuses on the systemic issues of the problem. These include external constraints on the actors involved, the realities of the international system, and power relationships within the international system.ⁱ The three levels of analysis are important in understanding the Taiwan-China conflict because it takes an encompassing view on the issue. It recognizes that multiple factors on different levels are responsible for the final policy outcome.

Background Information

The Taiwan-China rift began during the Mao Revolution of 1949. During this revolution, communists defeated the nationalists and took over the county. After the war, Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek took 2 million refugees to Taiwan and vowed to

retaliate and take back China. These refugees from China clashed with the local population of Taiwan and started to impose martial law on the island. The United States started to support Taiwan after the Korean War when they sent naval ships to protect Taiwan and act as a buffer against the expansion of communism. In the 1960s because of the rule of the mainland minority, many native Taiwanese started to call for independence. Shortly after this time, the United States began to improve relations with Mainland China because the US wanted to use China as a means against the Soviet Union. As a result the United States severed international ties with Taiwan and took the stance of the “One China” policy. However, the United States would continue to unofficially sell arms to Taiwan. In 1987, Taiwan officially ended its martial law policy and became more democratic.ⁱⁱ On March 23 1996, Taiwan officially had its first democratic election.ⁱⁱⁱ This transition towards a more democratic regime would have important implications for US foreign policy in the area.

The issue of Taiwan for the PRC is important both symbolically and politically important. One of the focal points of Chinese military development is to attain the ability to influence or coerce Taiwan and prevent their independence movement. For China, commitment to a modern national-racial identity makes unification an important nationalist and psychological goal.^{iv} As of a result of this interest, China has increased its military capabilities drastically over the past two decades. China has upgraded its military with little help from the United States and many other countries because there are many restrictions in the selling of military arms to China after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. Despite this, the Chinese have created a large arsenal of short-range missiles that are aimed at Taiwan in the hopes that it will influence their decision to not declare formal

independence.^v China's aggressive stance towards Taiwan has complicated the issue for the United States and has made this situation more volatile for all the actors.

The United States has often had conflicting policies in regards to settling the situation since 1949. In 1979 the United States Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which mandated that the US sell arms to Taiwan for its defense. However, also in 1979 the United States and China signed a Joint Communiqué that restarted diplomatic relations between the two countries for the first time since 1949. This remains significant in light of the conflict because the US transferred diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing and reiterated the Chinese's "One China" policy.^{vi} On August 17, 1982 another important Communiqué was signed between the US and China that stated the US would gradually decrease its selling of arms to Taiwan and that eventually the arms trade would end.^{vii} This new treaty was not signed by the US Congress while the TRA was. This has caused tension for the US because there are two conflicting treaties regarding the selling of arms;^{viii} however the TRA is still fulfilled because the US still sells large amounts of military equipment to Taiwan. These treaties and the historical trends in policy towards the issue are significant because they have a large impact on the policy options of each president.

Taiwan and China relations recently have been relatively stable; however there have been three major crises between Taiwan and China since 1949. The first crisis occurred from August 11, 1954 to May 1, 1955. Following large Taiwanese troop movements to Matsu Island and the small islands of Quemoy, China began to bombard Quemoy. The United States reacted forcefully in support of Taiwan and even seriously considered the use of nuclear weapons against China. After negotiations in April of 1955,

the crisis came to halt.^{ix} This crisis remains significant because it was the first time that the US came to the defense of Taiwan. By debating the use of nuclear weapons it illustrates the commitment of the US towards Taiwan. This underlining notion of defending Taiwan for the US has continued to influence policy for each of the last three presidents.

The second Taiwan Crisis began in 1958 following the initiation of the “Great Leap Forward” by the Chinese Communist Party. This movement shifted China’s foreign policy from a “soft” approach to a more “hard” line one in 1958. Starting August 23, 1958 the Chinese began bombarding Quemoy and Matsu again and they blockaded the islands. The United States quickly stated their support of Taiwan once this began. The strong US response surprised the Chinese and in September of 1958 diplomatic talks began among the actors involved.^x The effect that the US response had on the Chinese indicates the influence that the US has in the Taiwan-China conflict. The United States’ military capabilities acted as a deterrence factor in the second crisis. The US’s ability to deter Chinese force has continued to remain vital in US policy towards the Taiwan-China conflict.

The third Taiwan-China Crisis occurred in 1995-96. It demonstrated that the conflict could erupt into a deadly conflict even in today’s international system. This crisis began when Cornell University invited the President of Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui, to speak at the university. President Clinton at first did allow President Lee to visit. However, both the United States House of Representatives and the US Senate went against Clinton’s decision and overwhelmingly approved a measure to allow Lee to visit.^{xi} The People’s Republic of China vehemently disapproved of this visit and accused the United States of

violating the “One China” agreement that had been in place since the 1970s. After the visit to Cornell, the US and the PRC opened up a discussion regarding Taiwan once again. The negotiations reached a climax when China began military exercises and missile tests near Taiwan. The US responded by sending two aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait. This heated confrontation eventually simmered and the United States and the PRC began to have normal negotiations.^{xii} This potential crisis exhibits the notion that two of the most powerful countries in the world could engage in a violent conflict, and that each president must cautiously implement policies to maintain the status quo.

Literary Review

Many articles were written as an attempt to explain the policy of each US president towards Taiwan and China, but these articles do not attempt to understand how the policy was constructed on all three of the levels of analysis. These articles help highlight the important factors that contribute to why the United States has acted the way it has in regards to the Taiwan-China conflict; however, few if any article have explicitly examined the changes and continuities between the past three US presidents. Much of the literature also does not directly examine how the different levels of analysis relate to each other, and usually they just study one or two aspects of the problem. The consistencies and changes between administrations occur because of factors in each level of analysis. The changes between the past three administrations is also important in understanding the aspects of the policy that will likely persist and which aspects are subject to change when the next administration comes into power. Thus, using a three level analysis framework when examining this issue is vital to properly understand the actions of the United States.

A couple of articles examine the personality and leadership qualities of the

president and their impact on policy in general. These scholarly articles attempt to understand the correlation between the foreign policy of each president and their individual traits. These articles do not talk directly about each president's personality and its impact on the policy towards Taiwan. They just offer important insights into how each president conducts general foreign policy. For example, Jason Berggren and Nicol C. Rae state President George W. Bush had strong religious and moral convictions that were influential in his foreign policy decisions.^{xiii} David Frum, President Bush's former speechwriter, also explains how Bush's religious and moral beliefs affected his presidency when he said Bush was on a Crusade that was about good vs. evil. There was also the popular view that Bush set out to make the world safe for democracy similar to Wilson did in his presidency.^{xiv} President Bush was not an realist and instead embraced a Wilsonian-based ideological foreign policy.^{xv} This remains important especially when one examines the nature of the conflict between the democratic Taiwan and the more authoritative government of China. As for Clinton, Michael Lyons describes how president's high ambition, indecisiveness, and flexibility were important components in the formulation of his general foreign policy.^{xvi} There is not as much literature on President Obama's personality because he has only been in office for just under two years, however his character traits still play an important role in how he conducts foreign policy. Richard Cohen talks how Obama is more of a realist in his policy decisions,^{xvii} and Donald Douglas describes how his patience and pragmatic standpoint towards the international system have had an important impact on his foreign policy.^{xviii} The personality traits of each president and how they individually conduct foreign policy is vital in further understanding their approach to the Taiwan-China conflict.

There are also a number of illuminating articles that describe how many state-level factors contribute to the US foreign policy towards Taiwan. Graham Allison helps to explain the structural dynamics of the decision-making process and its impact on the final outcome for a particular policy. He talks about how the government is not fully informed, centrally controlled, and value-maximizing. Instead the government is made up of a conglomerate of semi-feudal organizations whose final outcome on a policy can be properly realized by understanding their standard behavior.^{xix} This complex structural nature of decision-making has a substantial impact on the formulation of policy towards Taiwan. Although the President has the most authority in regards to the final outcome, other organizations such as Congress, lobbyists, and the military industrial complex play a vital role in shaping the President's final decision.

Graham Allison's third model of analysis also helps explain why the structural aspects are significant. He talks about how the decision-makers for a particular policy are not a monolithic group, but instead consist of a number of actors engaging in a competitive political game. The final outcome for a decision is the result of compromises made between the many actors involved.^{xx} This relationship described by Allison helps explain why Congress plays an important constraining role in the formulation of policy towards Taiwan.

There are also other sources that detail the impact that state-level aspects have on policy. One book written by retired Congressman Lee Hamilton illustrates how the foreign policy decision-making process has become politicized, and he also talks about how compromises between the US Congress and the Executive Branch are necessary in the construction of foreign policy.^{xxi} Other articles and US Congress bills help to

illustrate how the actions of the Congress inhibit or allow the president to conduct the foreign policy he wants. One article by Jiemian Yang illustrates this by describing how the number of bills that Congress passes affects the foreign policy towards Taiwan. This article also points out that the domestic interest in the issue plays a role in determining the policy towards Taiwan, and that military lobbyists plays an important role in determining the foreign policy too.^{xxii} Another article by Joshua Su-Ya Wu extends on this interest group factor and finds that the impact of Taiwan lobbyists in the US Congress is immense and substantial.^{xxiii} These articles are correct in understanding that the military industrial complex and other lobbyist groups play a part in the formulation of policy towards Taiwan, however they do not fully recognize the extent to which this is true.

Other articles have elaborated on the impact that the military industrial complex has on formulating US policy, but they vary on the degree in which this is true. A couple of the articles by Henry Rosemont and James Nolt talk about how policymakers in the United States have over-hyped the China threat in order to spend more on the military.^{xxiv}^{xxv} There are also some articles that describe the relationship between military arms corporations donating money to Congress and the impact that it has on passing bills in favor of increased relations with countries that will buy arms from the US. Richard Fleisher examines PAC donations by Defense contractors and their impact on creating policies that are favorable to their interests, such as selling military arms to Taiwan.^{xxvi} Some political observers, such as Jiemian believe that the military industrial complex has been influential in all administrations, but under President Bush this influence has been even greater.^{xxvii} Some articles reject the notion that the military industrial complex plays

a large role in policy formulation. Andrew Kennedy writes about how military interest groups do not significantly affect policy towards Taiwan. The author believes that the stakes are too risky in this conflict for the United States to be persuaded by the economic benefits of the military contractors.^{xxviii} These articles that deal with US military contractors make important arguments about the impact that they have. However, they do not place this issue in the context of all three levels of analysis as an attempt to understand the changes and continuities between Clinton, Bush, and Obama.

Systemic level factors also play an important role in policy formulation, and there are a couple of articles that attempt to understand their impact. One article from the Heritage Foundation by Peter Brookes describes how the United States supports Taiwan because it has a greater agenda of promoting democracy in the region.^{xxix} Andrew Kennedy's article expands upon this and offers even more explanations for why the United States risks a catastrophic war with China over Taiwan. These reasons include: the "nervous" hegemon theory that states the US is using the Taiwan conflict to combat China's rising superiority, and the "entangled" ally theory, which states the US is supporting Taiwan so they do not lose face by abandoning a longstanding ally.^{xxx} These explanations offer valuable insights into the ideology of US foreign policy; however they do not examine the impact that state-level and individual-level factors have on the responses of the US towards Taiwan.

Scholarly writings also detail the external constraints that affect the United States ability to conduct foreign policy. The Defense Department released a report in 2010 that detailed the rise of China's military and the impact that this has on the Taiwan-China conflict. Due to China having a greater military capabilities recently, the United States

cannot antagonize or be too aggressive with China because they risk escalating the conflict into a violent war.^{xxx} Military capabilities are not the only systemic constraint on the US's policy towards Taiwan. The economic reality of the two countries is also important in understanding why the US has often remained cautious in the conflict. Keith Bradsher details how the massive trade imbalance between the United States and China has made the two countries reliant on each other economically. As a result of this, the United States is constrained by the possibility of an economic backlash if they act too drastically in regards to the Taiwan-China conflict.^{xxxii}

The terrorist attack on September 11th, 2001 and its role in changing of policies towards Taiwan has also been examined by scholars. One article describes how the United States following September 11th did not want the Taiwan conflict to become a major issue because the leaders of the US were more concerned with combating terrorism. Jiemian Yang talks about how the US took a softer approach towards China on the issue in order to appeal for support for terrorism related issues such as Iran and North Korea.^{xxxiii} The United States cannot afford to make this issue too volatile because they have other military priorities. The reality of the post-September 11 international system has had important implications towards changing the policy towards Taiwan and China.

Chapter II: The Policies of the three Presidents

President Bill Clinton's Policy towards the Taiwan-China Conflict

When President Clinton took power in 1993, he approached the Taiwan-China conflict carefully and cautiously. President Clinton used "strategic ambiguity" in his position towards defending Taiwan.^{xxxiv} This meant that Clinton never explicitly stated the extent to which the United States would respond if China tried to forcefully take over

Taiwan. Clinton also instituted the "Three Noes" policy in which the US would not advocate for a Taiwanese independence movement, a One China, one Taiwan policy, nor would the US lobby for Taiwan to join the UN.^{xxxv} Despite this policy the Clinton administration still continued the longstanding policy of selling military products to Taiwan. During Clinton's presidency, there was even an increase in selling military arms to Taiwan from previous administrations.^{xxxvi} Clinton also utilized an engagement oriented diplomatic strategy in regards to dealing with China and the Taiwan issue.^{xxxvii} As mentioned before, Clinton did however try to appease the Chinese government by not allowing President Lee to visit Cornell, which showed that his administration's policy towards Taiwan and China was one of retaining the status quo. Clinton did not want to antagonize China and tried to maintain the policy of "One China". However, once Congress voted against Clinton's position and China responded to President Lee's visit by having military exercises near Taiwan, Clinton reacted forcefully by deploying naval ships. This action shows that Clinton wanted to maintain the "One China" policy, yet he still was willing to risk a potential war to protect Taiwan.

President Bush's Policies Toward Taiwan and China

President George W. Bush notably both continued and changed US policy towards Taiwan and China from the Clinton administration. During the 2000 election Bush campaigned that he would approach the situation differently than his predecessor, Clinton. President Bush wanted to take a tougher stance on China and make his commitment to Taiwan explicit. While President Clinton favored "strategic ambiguity, President Bush's policy centered on "strategic clarity". This is exemplified in Bush's official stance on China and Taiwan during his election campaign, which stated:

“Our policy is based on the principle that there must be no use of force by China against Taiwan. We deny the right of Beijing to impose its rule on the free Taiwanese people. All issues regarding Taiwan's future must be resolved peacefully and must be agreeable to the people of Taiwan. If China violates these principles and attacks Taiwan, then the United States will respond appropriately in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act. America will help Taiwan defend itself.”^{xxxviii}

President Bush in 2002 even met with the Defense Minister of Taiwan for the first time since 1979 signifying a change in attitude on the part of the US. President Bush also tried to spur Taiwan to upgrade their military and defense infrastructures in anticipation of a potential Chinese attack. These events and statements illustrate a change in policy over Taiwan with President Bush, but this strong support for Taiwan would wane over the course of Bush’s presidency.

As Bush’s presidency progressed, he realized that a strong stance on China in the Taiwan conflict would not have the results he desired at the beginning of his presidency. Events such as the attacks on September 11th and the continuing economic rise of China were major factors in this change in course. President Bush realized that an unstable Taiwan was not in his best interests regarding foreign policy considering the new enemies that the United States was facing. Thus he lessened his stance on Taiwan; however, this stance was still strong compared to President Clinton. Bush still proceeded with his plans of a missile defense system around China and included Taiwan in the strategy. A number of factors in each level of analysis can help explain the similarities and changes between the presidencies of Clinton and Bush.

President Obama's Policies Towards Taiwan and China

President Barack Obama approached the Taiwan-China conflict in many of the same ways as President Bush, albeit with a few exceptions. Before continuing on with President Obama's approach, one must note that Obama's presidency is still relatively new, and as a result his policy towards Taiwan and China is still subject to change. Despite this, Obama has still made some key decisions regarding the issue that help illustrate his policy. Similar to the preceding presidents, Barack Obama renewed the arms deal for Taiwan of President Bush's presidency to the dismay of the PRC. Barack Obama has also been hard-nosed on China and has tried to use this strategy to maintain stability in the region. Barack Obama has not been shy to criticize China for its actions in the conflict, such as its recent military buildup.^{xxxix} Obama has also continued the policy of upholding the "One China" policy. This is exemplified when President Obama stated in 2009 that: "I have been clear in the past that my administration fully supports a one-China policy... We don't want to change that policy and that approach."^{xl} Obama has also continued the trend from the later parts of Bush's presidency by trying to engage China and establish a constructive and stable relationship.^{xli} Campaign promises are never fully indicative of how the president will act when in office; however Obama's statements during his election campaign could help highlight what his future plans might consist of. During the election, Obama promised to find a peaceful solution for the China-Taiwan conflict, increase military-military relations with China, increase transparency with China, and try to ensure that China follows human rights standards.^{xlii} Barack Obama's statements and policies towards China and the Taiwan issue indicate that his position has not strayed far from Bush.

Chapter III: Individual-level Factors

Individual level factors are important in highlighting how changes in general policy towards Taiwan and China came about but they are not as affective in understanding the continuities. The leadership styles of each president have played a role in formulating policy towards Taiwan. Since the leadership styles of Clinton and Bush, and then Bush and Obama are different, it helps explain why changes in policy occurred. The discrepancies of the three presidents stemming from foreign policy ideology and moral outlook on the international system affected their overarching strategy towards Taiwan and China. Some leadership aspects of the three presidents do account for several of the continuities, but it is not as prominent.

Individual-level Factors and Clinton

There are a number of leadership characteristics and personality traits of Clinton that could help one understand his policy towards Taiwan and China. One of his significant personality traits was ambition, which played an underlining role in formulating his sometimes risky foreign policy towards Taiwan and China. Both on the campaign trail and during his two terms in office Clinton was considered ambitious. This high ambition and determination led Clinton to gamble more in his policies.^{xliii} This tendency helps explain Clinton's actions during the Taiwan-China Crisis of 1995-1996. The placement of US naval ships in the Taiwan Strait following the military exercises of China constitutes a foreign policy gamble. In the international system, deploying military ships in a region to counteract another actor's military could potentially develop into a violent encounter. President Clinton was willing to make this gamble because he wanted to clearly exhibit his administration's desire to protect Taiwan from Chinese aggression.

His actions demonstrate ambition in his desire to protect Taiwan and his willingness to risk a violent conflict to do so. Therefore, President Clinton's ambition and risky nature help explain his policy towards Taiwan and China.

President Clinton's flexibility and openness to alternate interpretations also play an underlining role in explaining the actions of his administrations towards Taiwan and China. Psychological tests have been tried on Clinton that indicates that he seeks personal approval and that he also seeks flexibility.^{xlv} Clinton's flexible nature explains his willingness to change his strategy towards China and Taiwan. After the 1995-1996 Crisis, President Clinton changed his overarching strategy towards the situation. He began to implement a "comprehensive engagement" policy to form a "constructive strategic partnership" with China.^{xlv} Clinton's openness to change likely made this policy transition easier. Thus his personality and leadership traits played a role in the overall development of his policy towards Taiwan and China.

President Clinton's ideology, or lack thereof, is also important in understanding his overarching Taiwan-China policy. Clinton believes that ideology can be dangerous because it prevents one from changing their actions. This is exemplified during his speech at the American Center for Progress: "The problem with ideology is, if you've got an ideology, you've already got your mind made up. You know all the answers, and that makes evidence irrelevant and arguments a waste of time".^{xlvi} His views on not using an ideological basis for policy extend into his decision-making process for Taiwan and China. President Clinton did not have a clear and decisive overarching foreign policy theory, nor does he have a moralist outlook on the international system like that of President Bush Jr., which will be shown later. Not having a definitive foreign policy

view, President Clinton is not restricted in what he can do. Along with his flexible nature, this helps explain his willingness to change course on an issue such as Taiwan.

Individual-level Factors and Bush

President Bush's personality and leadership traits have had a significant impact on why he has notably changed some aspects of the overall direction of US policy towards Taiwan from Clinton. One of the most significant traits of Bush was his moral and religious outlook on foreign policy, which helps explain the change in an overarching strategy from Clinton. President Bush was an evangelical Christian and his religion affected the way he viewed global conflicts.^{xlvii} President Bush saw Taiwan and its democracy as the "good" country that needed protection from the authoritative China. This explanation is simplified; however it still helps illustrate why President Bush differed from President Clinton. Bush took a stronger stance on defending Taiwan because his religious and moral convictions influenced his foreign policy decisions. Although the former President changed his stance and became softer on the Taiwan-China conflict as his presidency progressed, he still viewed the conflict through a religious and moral lens. The president had to take a softer stance because he needed the support of China to combat an enemy more dangerous to the international system: terrorism. Therefore, his religious and moral view on foreign policy significantly impacted his decision-making process in regards to the Taiwan-China conflict.

President Bush's hawkish nature also had a large influence on his approach towards the conflict and why his policies changed from Clinton. President Bush has often been considered a part of the conservative right. This conservative right is more hawkish and still has a Cold War mentality on foreign policy decisions. President Bush's

administration viewed China through a prism of ideology as the inevitable enemy similar to the Soviet Union.^{xlviii} This Cold-War mentality helps illuminate Bush's tough stance on China. Since the Bush administration had a Cold War mentality in regards to China, it follows that many of the policies would mirror those used against the Russians. Like with Russia, the United States wanted to have a strong stance that prevented any action that would try and impede upon a democratic state. Thus, Bush's firm policy towards China is partially a result of his administration's hawkish perception of the international system.

Individual-level Factors and Obama

Obama had a different leadership style than Bush, but unlike how the differences between Bush and Clinton led to changes, Obama's style has allowed his administration to follow the policies of Bush. Barack Obama's pragmatist approach for his foreign policy helps explain why he was willing to continue the policies of Bush.^{xlix} Obama has not followed in the footsteps of Bush and based his foreign policy on ideology and morality. Although this distinction between the two presidents would likely lead one to believe that Obama would change his policy towards Taiwan and China, his pragmatic view of the international system in fact leads him to continue Bush's policies. There are many complex dimensions to the Taiwan-China conflict, and although Bush had an ideological basis for his decisions, Obama still follows Bush's policies because a stable Taiwan-China relationship is important for the United States. A radical shift in emphasis could create undesirable instabilities. Obama understands that one cannot antagonize China too much and risk an unstable relationship considering the economic and potential violent consequences. By following in the footsteps of Bush, Obama shows that he understands that a Taiwan policy must support the Taiwanese, but also at the same time

not anger the Chinese to a certain point. Therefore, Obama's stance on Taiwan and China can be directly related to his pragmatic leadership style.

Another key aspect of President Obama's personality and leadership style is his flexibility in his decision-making process, which helps explain his willingness to follow Bush's policies. Obama is similar to Clinton in that both are open to diverse viewpoints and willing to listen when in the decision-making process.¹ In the same way that Clinton's flexibility affected his decisions towards Taiwan, Obama's flexibility has influenced the final policy towards the issue. Obama campaigned on the basis that he would fundamentally change from the Bush administration the way the United States interacted with the world. This has been true for a number of foreign policy issues, however as mentioned before Obama has often continued many of the policies of Bush in regards to Taiwan. The strategy towards the conflict that Obama inherited was largely enacted by Republican conservatives who do not share the same foreign policy philosophy as Obama. However, Obama still proceeded and continued with Bush's policy. Obama was willing to take into account viewpoints from the opposite political spectrum. Therefore, by following policies from the opposing political party, Obama illustrates that his flexibility influences his decisions regarding the Taiwan and China conflict.

Chapter IV: State-Level Factors

There are also structural aspects of the decision-making process that contribute to the continuity between the presidents. Presidents do not possess a unitary ability to formulate foreign policy. Congress and interest groups play a role in the final policy. These structural aspects have varying degrees of influence with military arms interest groups having the most influence of the structural aspects. Congress has a large impact as

well, but it can only make significant decisions in special cases and usually can only marginally affect the overall policy towards Taiwan. Lobbyists have the least amount of significance because they cannot dictate policy, but can only raise awareness and try to influence Congress.

Executive vs. Legislative Branch

The structural aspect pertaining to the relationship between the executive branch and legislative branch is important in understanding many of the continuities between the three presidents. In creating foreign policy, the government can respond to foreign events. Technically the United States Congress must approve a measure that is in response to an international situation but most of the time it follows the president lead. The executive branch can also make policy statements regarding an issue, negotiate an international agreement, and propose legislation for Congress to approve. However, despite the power that the President wields, the legislative branch has a lot of input in the foreign policy process. Congress can enact resolutions and policy statements, legislative directives, legislative restrictions/funding denials, informal advice and congressional oversight. Congress does not wield as much power as the executive branch in the decision making process, however they are able to slightly change the President's foreign policy.^{li} Congress is also vital in understanding the policy decisions of the president because the executive branch does not solely dictate the final outcome of policy. As such, Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama have all had to deal and make compromises with the US Congress in orchestrating a successful policy towards Taiwan and China. Thus by understanding the intentions and role of Congress in each of these administrations, one can further grasp how the changes and continuity between presidents came about.

The United States Congress throughout all three administrations has played an important role in maintaining an overall pro-Taiwan policy. The United States Congress has consistently been one of Taiwan's greatest supporters.^{lii} Congress has favored the Taiwanese over the Chinese for a number of reasons that involve the military industrial complex and lobbyists. There are also ideological reasons for their support with the main one being that Congress sympathizes with Taiwan due to shared democratic and human rights values.^{liii} Unlike many other issues, the Taiwan conflict does not generate intense partisan divide within Congress; instead most Democrats and Republicans support Taiwan over China. This sentiment towards Taiwan is important in understanding how each presidential administration is constrained by Congress. All three presidents must accommodate this in their foreign policy. Thus this constraining factor partially explains continuity between the past three presidents in regards to supporting Taiwan.

The United States Congress has played an important constraining role in President Clinton's administration's policy towards the Taiwan conflict. One of the main examples of this influence has been mentioned earlier. This pertains to how the US Congress overwhelmingly approved Taiwan's President Lee visit. President Clinton's administration initial policy of disallowing the president to visit was a function of Clinton trying to uphold the status quo and avoid antagonizing China. Since the President could not ignore Congress's actions, he had to significantly alter his policy towards the issue of the visiting President Lee. Again as mentioned before, this had significant consequences. As such, even though the Clinton administration knew that a visit by the Taiwanese President could destabilize the conflict, the President had little to no choice on the matter. Therefore, this exemplifies that Congress for better or for worse has an enormous impact

on the decision-making process in the Taiwan-China issue.

During Clinton's presidency, Congress also enacted other measures that tried to force the administration to further support Taiwan's position. In 2000, members of the House of Representatives passed a resolution, which was named the Taiwan Security Enhancement, which called for the administration to more clearly follow the Taiwan Relations Act. This resolution was adamantly opposed by the Clinton Administration. However, the Senate never took this bill up and as a result it only remained a House Resolution.^{liv} This resolution could not have the desired results of affecting foreign policy because both Houses of Congress did not pass the bill. This failed resolution illustrates that although Congress typically supports Taiwan more than the President, the internal system and rules of Congress sometimes prevents itself from enacting the desired policy. Therefore after examining some of Congress's actions during the Clinton administration, one realizes that Congress has had some success in forcing the president's policy to become more pro-Taiwan; however, Congress cannot always influence the President's decisions in regards to Taiwan and China.

During President Bush's presidency, Congress also played a similar role from that of the Clinton's administration in the Taiwan-China policy construction, which helps explain many of the continuities between the two administrations. Between 2002-2006 there were twenty-four different Taiwan-related legislations introduced on the House floor. From all 50 states, there were a total of 547 cosponsors with about an average of 23 co-sponsors per resolution. Almost all of these measures also passed unanimously too.^{lv} Again this shows that Congress continued its strong support of Taiwan during the Bush's administration. Although President Bush had a strong relationship with Taiwan, he was

still limited in his policy options due to Congress. Therefore, part of the continuity for the strong support towards Taiwan between the Clinton and Bush administrations can be partially attributed to the power relationship between the Executive and Legislative branches, and the measures that the latter branch enacted.

During Obama's administration, the United States Congress has also further continued the trend of ensuring that president remains supportive of Taiwan. The Obama administration has only been in office for one Congressional session, the 111th session, yet there has still been some notable Congressional measures. These include H.CON.RES.18, which centers around allowing improving Taiwan relations and trying to help them become an official state^{lvi} and H.CON.RES.200 which condemns China for placing ballistic missiles pointing at Taiwan.^{lvii} These two resolutions illustrate that Congress's tendency to favor Taiwan has not waned since the Clinton administration. Another notable aspect of these two resolutions is that H.CON.RES.18 has mostly republican cosigners while H.CON.RES.2000 has mostly democratic cosigners. This helps exhibit the notion that the Taiwan conflict does not have a deeply politicized partisan divide within Congress like many other foreign and domestic issues. Similar to the previous two administrations, these Congressional responses to the conflict limit and influence the potential policy decisions that President Obama can undertake. Obama does not always need to follow the stances of Congress but they ensure, like they did with Clinton and Bush, that he cannot stray too far from a pro-Taiwan position.

Lobbyists and Their Influence

Taiwan and China lobbyists have played a role in both the continuation and changes in final policy of each of the three presidents, however this influence is marginal

and not as significant as other structural aspects. Each lobbyist group tries to influence both the Legislative Branch and the Executive Branch; however they have more impact on the Legislative Branch. Interest groups for Taiwan and China try to raise awareness and spend money in hopes of swaying members of the decision-making process to endorse their position. Taiwanese lobbyists want Congress to continue their longstanding pro-Taiwan policy while Chinese lobbyists have tried to undermine this support. Over the past three administrations Taiwanese lobbyists have been vastly more influential than Chinese lobbyists over the issue; however the Taiwan lobbyists have lost some of the power since the beginning of the Clinton administration, and as such their significance in continuing a pro-Taiwan policy has diminished.

During the Clinton Administration, Taiwan related lobbyists had their highest degree of influence among the three presidents on United States policy towards the conflict. Taiwan lobbyists, from the grassroots up to the official Taiwan diplomats, have usually been influential in helping shape a sympathetic Taiwan policy.^{lviii} During the Clinton administration, this remained evident. Taiwan lobbying during the Clinton administration followed the historical trend of such lobbyists being strong, robust, and having lots of influence.^{lix} They had a unified position in which to try and rally support among members of Congress, which allowed them to have more success. They spent money and raised awareness among the members of Congress, which then helped gain them support.

Because Taiwan had such a large influence in American politics, China during Clinton's administration sought to generate greater influence within Congress and the American public. This change in emphasis on the part of China occurred after the Taiwan

Crisis of 1995-96, when they realized the impact that Taiwan had on US domestic politics.^{lx} This was called the "China Plan" but it proved controversial because there were allegations that there was illegal trading of secrets and funds in order to implement this plan. There were even allegations that this controversy might have even affected the presidential race that year in which Clinton won re-election. This was proven to be false and the verdict regarding the presidential election was that this controversy had minimal significance during the election.^{lxi} However, because of the scandal that followed the "China Plan", the Chinese lobbyists failed to achieve its goal of generating greater support for China. It most likely only further strengthened the opposition towards China within the American public and Congress. Thus, because of the negative publicity of Chinese lobbyists and the large positive impact of lobbyists pertaining to Taiwan, lobbyists had an important influence on domestic and Congressional perceptions and views during the Clinton Administration. Therefore, since as mentioned before pro-Taiwan sentiment within Congress has a role in shaping foreign policy, Clinton's pro-Taiwan strategy can be partially explained by the role of lobbyists.

During the Bush administration lobbyists would continue to have a marginal impact on continuing the pro-Taiwan policy; however this influence diminished compared to the Clinton administration. One of the main reasons for this decrease in sway among lobbyists pertains to the democratization and increased pluralism of Taiwan. Once Taiwan started holding democratic elections, the KMT "machine" that used to lobby on behalf of a unified stance for Taiwan eroded due to the presence of other political parties. Now there are many Taiwan messages and some congressional observers believe that this lack of a unified message has diminished the lobbyists influence in

Congress.^{lxii} This erosion of the KMT "machine" began during the Clinton administration it became more significant after the 2000 election, right before Bush came into power. This erosion became magnified because the main lobbyist organization in the US: Taipei Economic Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) lost much of its support from Taiwanese government. The new DPP government at the time did not trust TECRO because of its previous ties with the KMT party, and as such the clout that the lobbying group once had diminished.^{lxiii} Because of this reduced influence on the part of lobbyists during the Bush administration, the president did not face the same external pressures that President Clinton faced during his presidency. As a result, during the later years of his presidency, Bush could more easily take a more conciliatory stance towards China in regards to the conflict.

Lobbyists still marginally helped maintain the pro-Taiwan policy from Bush to Obama. The trend of Taiwan supporting Political Action Committee (PAC) donations to members of Congress has continued relatively the same going into the Obama administration.^{lxiv} The amount of money spent by the main Taiwan related PAC has not significantly changed since the presidency of George Bush. This helps illustrate that lobbying firms in favor of Taiwan have not significantly changed their behavior in the advent of a new president, and as such they have continued the process of raising awareness and spending money to influence congressional votes. Since their behavior between the two presidents has stayed relatively the same, it follows that their limited influence on continuing a pro-Taiwan policy has remained unchanged.

Military Industrial Complex


The military industrial complex has played a substantial role in continuing the pro-Taiwan policy of each president. Taiwan is currently the top Asian buyer of United States military equipment.^{lxv} Since the United States has obliged to sell military arms to Taiwan, many military arms corporations have become involved with ensuring the continuation of such a policy. Military arms corporations like to sell to Taiwan because they possess a large foreign currency reserve to spend without the need of US government credit or loans from plans like the Foreign Military Finance Program.^{lxvi} This advantage for the military industrial complex has resulted in the industry donating massive amounts of money to Congress, and it has allowed many in the industry to become involved in the decision-making process to try and influence a financially favorable Taiwan policy. They have been successful in influencing an advantageous policy and as a result they have had a profound impact on why all three presidents have continued the policy of ensuring the selling of arms to Taiwan even in the face of intense opposition from China.

The military contractors also have pro-Taiwan sentiment because there are many limitations to selling to China. After the Tiananmen Massacre of 1989 the United States along with many other countries stopped selling military equipment to China. The US has recently begun to sell military to China again, but the United States still drastically outsells equipment to Taiwan than to China.^{lxvii} This difference helps explain why contractors in the United States are much more inclined to try and influence a pro-Taiwan policy than a pro-China policy.


The military industrial complex is important to each of the presidential administrations and Congress for a number of reasons. Economically, military contractors

provide thousands of jobs and revenue. For many members of Congress who have military factories in this district, the demands of the military contractors are taken seriously. International agreements for trading of arms are also crucial in maintaining these contractors financially especially when one recognizes that the domestic demand for military equipment has recently decreased.^{lxviii} Military arms trade is also crucial for the United States because it helps balance the trade deficit with many countries including Taiwan.^{lxix} Because of the benefits that these contractors provide, they are able to influence policy in many substantial ways.

Two of the major military arms corporations, Lockheed and Boeing, have made significant contributions in order to dictate a pro-Taiwan strategy. In the case of an arms sale, the Executive Branch along with the United States Congress must approve the measure according to the Constitution. As such, lobbying efforts and PAC donations to Congress from military corporations like Lockheed and Boeing can have a large impact on the final outcome of an arms policy towards Taiwan. Their contributions are shown in the graphs below.



Graph 1.0




Graph 2.0

As shown above in Graphs 1.0 and 2.0, Lockheed Martin and Boeing have donated substantial amounts of money help further their own cause. If one looks at Lockheed Martin and to a lesser extent Boeing, one can recognize that their donations have increased relative to other periods during 1996, 2000-02, and 2008-10. These periods correlate to times where the United States has debated and then eventually authorized the sale of military weapons to Taiwan. Whether this is causal will be discussed within the context of each presidential administration. Lockheed Martin and Boeing's lobbying efforts have had considerable success according to the non-partisan group Center for Responsive Politics. Lockheed Martin and Boeing have lobbying influence scores of 66 and 64 out of 100 for 2010 respectively.^{lxxii lxxiii} This might not seem that high but this number is only for 2010 when the debate over a new arms deal for Taiwan ended early in the year. Also compared to other famously known lobbying groups such as Goldman Sachs, whose score was an 80 in 2010, these numbers illustrate that major military contractors have a relatively high degree of influence with their lobbying efforts.

The military industrial complex is also influential in continuing the policies between the three presidents because of the connections within the bureaucracy of the decision-making process. Lockheed Martin and Boeing are part of the United States State Department's International Security Advisory Board.^{lxxiv} This interconnection between the top two military contractors and an important foreign policy bureaucratic organization only furthers the point that these corporations have a large amount of input in the US's policies towards Taiwan. Some such as the Director at the Center of Public Integrity argue: "the defense industry is one of the major industries that enjoys close ties with the US government".^{lxxv} These close ties between the military industrial complex and the government indicate that contractors have a significant degree of influence in the formulation of policy. Thus this high degree of influence helps explain the continuities in arms deals with Taiwan for the last three presidents.

President Clinton's administration was affected by the lobbying and donation efforts of the military industrial complex. As mentioned before Clinton continued the trend of adhering to the TRA and selling weapons to Taiwan. There is even the view that Clinton was more receptive to selling arms to Taiwan than his predecessors; however he refused to sell items that were not necessary to security, such as diesel submarines and electronic war systems for frigates.^{lxxvi} Clinton wanted to uphold the TRA, but at the same time he did not want the Chinese to feel too anxious regarding the buildup of Taiwan. If one examines Graphs 1.0 and 2.0, it is evident that for both contractors 1996 and 1998 signified an increase in efforts. This increase likely correlates to the next graph where the US dramatically increased their arms dealings to Taiwan.



Graph 3.0

This correlation between the lobbying efforts of Boeing and Lockheed, and the steep increase in US arms sales to Taiwan is clearly causal. An arms deal to Taiwan is a major source of revenue for military contractors and as a result their efforts to dictate policy are highly likely to increase. Because of this the US Congress is more likely to advocate and sign for a larger deal. As a result President Clinton's policy towards the Taiwan-China conflict becomes more pro-Taiwan.

President Bush's administration faced similar pressure from the military industrial complex, and as such this largely explains the continuities in his arms trade policy from the Clinton administration. During President Bush's tenure, arms trading with Taiwan decreased from Clinton, but this is largely due to the aftereffects of the Taiwan Crisis of 1995-96 diminishing. US arms trading with Taiwan was still significant even though the extreme levels of trading following the Third Taiwan Crisis came down. Using a correlation between the graphs above and the dates of international agreements for arms trade with Taiwan, one recognizes that again military contractors have influenced US policy. In 2000-2002 there is a spike in money spent by Lockheed Martin and Boeing,

and it is likely that this is no coincidence with the arms deal that President Bush agreed on in 2001 with Taiwan. One must note that these spikes in money spent could also be attributed to other reasons such as the competition for the right to construct the new Joint Strike Fighter Program in 2001.^{lxxviii} However, despite this these numbers still help illustrate that lobbying for military contractors increases in the period leading up to an arms deal with Taiwan. Also, as indicated in Graphs 1.0 and 2.0, in 2004-2006 there is a high level of lobbying efforts for Boeing while there is an increase in lobbying efforts for Lockheed. This correlates to an increase in arms dealing with Taiwan of 2004-2006 as illustrated in Graph 3.0. During this period Taiwan was actually the leading arms trade partner with the US, which helps further the point that military lobbyists had a large impact on US arms policy towards Taiwan. Therefore, this helps explain the continuities between the two presidents pro-Taiwan policy regarding military arms deals towards Taiwan.

Connections among members of the Bush administration and military contractors also help illustrate the continuities between Bush and Clinton. Two of the more notable examples of interconnection between military contractors and the US government during the presidency of Bush include United States Vice President Dick Cheney's ties with Lockheed Martin and the vice president of Lockheed Martin during Bush's administration. The Vice President in Bush's administration, Dick Cheney, had ties to Lockheed Martin because his wife served on the board from 1995 until his inauguration in 2001. The vice president of Lockheed Martin, Bruce Jackson, during the Bush administration was also a financial chair and fundraiser for Bush's 2000 campaign.^{lxxix} These two examples illustrate that during the Bush administration there were some

notable conflict of interests regarding the government and contractors. This high-profile connectivity helps further explain Bush's pro-Taiwan stance regarding arms trade even in the face of trying to engage China.

Military contractors have also had a significant impact on the formulation of arms trade policy in Barack Obama's administration, and as a result it helps explain why continuities exist between Obama and Bush. During Obama's administration there has been a drastic increase in spending by the lobbyists. The graphs 1.0 and 2.0 indicate this sharp increase in 2008-09. This phenomenon likely correlates to the debate regarding a new massive arms deal that Obama signed in the beginning of 2010. This arm deals states the United States will sell \$6.4 billion worth of military equipment, including missiles, advanced communication systems, naval ships, and helicopters to Taiwan.^{lxxx} This move greatly angered the Chinese yet the United States still went through with deal. The large spike mentioned earlier in spending by Boeing and Lockheed are likely partially responsible for this massive arms deal. The two corporations also might have decided to devote greater resources to this undertaking because the United States has recently begun to scale back its military operations in Iraq. This scale back results in a loss of revenue for these corporations and as such they likely realized that a substantial arms deal with Taiwan could help them recover from their expected losses. Therefore, the continuation between President Bush and Obama regarding an arms deal with Taiwan even when the two are trying to engage China can be attributed to the large influence that the military industrial complex has on the government's decision-making process.

Chapter V: Systemic-level Factors

For each presidential administration, systemic factors of the international order

have played a significant role in shaping their foreign policy towards Taiwan. Systemic factors account for both changes and continuities in policies between the three presidents, however they have had a greater impact on the changes. These factors include the impact of the terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001, the politics of Taiwan and China, and power relations between the United States and China. Because of these factors, the three presidents often have to rationally limit their options in regards to the Taiwan conflict. Each of these systemic factors has undergone some form of change from the dawn of the Clinton presidency to present day. As such, by understanding the changing nature of the systemic factors, one understands that these factors play an important role in the continuities and changes between the presidential administrations.

The Impact of the September 11th Attacks

The terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001 marked the beginning of a new era in the international system and was responsible for a large change in policy regarding Taiwan. In the aftermath of the attack, the United States and many of its allies had a new enemy: terrorism, which was neither easily identifiable nor easy to eliminate. The War on Terror, which was begun by George W. Bush shortly after 911, sought to defeat terrorism wherever it might exist. This monumental task required a lot of resources and commitment for the United States and its allies. Before the attacks, the US wanted to begin to have an increased presence in Asia, but due to the attacks the US had to change their overall foreign policy strategy and focus on the Middle East, where the terrorist threat is mostly located. This change in emphasis forced the United States to change their policy towards China because they now needed China's assistance in the War on Terror. The United States has attempted to use China as a point of leverage against countries

vital in the War on Terrorism, such as Iran and Pakistan.^{lxxxix}

This new focus on terrorism pertains to the Taiwan-China conflict for a number of reasons. The United States recognizes that in today's post-911 international system, an unstable Taiwan-China conflict is not in their best interests.^{lxxxix} In regards to China the cooperation between the US and the PRC has been limited; however the tone and context of counterterrorism has helped stabilize and transform the bilateral relationship.^{lxxxix} Because of these external limits placed upon the United States, the two presidents following the 911 attacks have had to alter their policy to ensure that the conflict remains stable so that it does not compromise other foreign policy interest. A consequence of the US insistence of China's help on the War on Terror is that the United States cannot take such an aggressive stance in supporting Taiwan.

The attacks on September 11th 2001 help illuminate some of the causes that led to changes and continuities between Clinton and Bush administrations. For Clinton, he did not govern in the new international system, and as a result he was not limited in his foreign policy options in regards to Taiwan. Clinton likely could not have acted as aggressively in the Taiwan Crisis of 1995-96. Such an action in today's international system would not just have potentially destructive consequences for the US-China relationship but also towards the status of the War on Terror. Clinton did not usually have a heated relationship with China, and as a result an aggressive policy towards China in regards to the Taiwan conflict was more open than for the subsequent two presidents.

The attacks on September 11th had an administration altering affect on the Bush presidency, which subsequently led to a change in policy towards Taiwan. As mentioned before, President Bush changed his outlook on foreign policy and began to view the

international system as a battleground for good vs. evil. President Bush's foreign policy is often defined by his actions to combat the War on Terror. As such, this new priority changed his stance on the Taiwan conflict. Bush started his administration with an aggressive hawkish policy towards China. However, following 911 Bush began to follow Clinton's lead in regards to China. He proceeded to approach the Taiwan situation with care and caution.^{lxxxiv} Bush no longer adamantly defended Taiwan because he did not wish to antagonize China nor endanger the stability of the area. Therefore, the relative continuity between Clinton and Bush's later policies can be partially explained by the events of September 11, 2001.

Some of president Obama's continuities with the Bush administration are also attributable to the post-911 international system. Obama must attend to many of the same issues that the Bush administration dealt with in the new global order. Like President Bush, Obama must attempt keep the conflict stable because of other foreign policy interests involving China and terrorism. As mentioned before Obama to a large extent has tried to maintain the balance in the region and in the relationship with China. Despite this, one must note that the US desire to appease China after 911 is still sometimes not greater than the obligation to fulfill the TRA. After the announcement of the 2010 arms deal with Taiwan, China repeatedly expressed its displeasure with the deal. China's response has been some of the strongest in years and they stated that if the US approved the new deal that cooperation between the two countries would suffer.^{lxxxv} Despite the consequences for the War on Terror and US-China cooperation, Obama still proceeded with the deal. This illustrates that the post-911 realities that often force the US to appease China do not always exist.

Power Relations Between the United States and China

The US relationship with the PRC and its impact on US policy in regards to the War on Terrorism helps to illuminate a larger issue: the new power relations between the United States and China. The changing nature of the relationship has significantly contributed to continuities in policies between the presidents, but more often it has forced the three presidents to update and change their policy. China's rise over the past two decades has shifted the international system and as such the acting president must sufficiently deal with this. China has drastically progressed both its economy and its military capabilities in this time. As a consequence of this progress China might eventually change the international order from a unipolar to a bipolar or multipolar system. In response to this and China's progress the US has changed the nature of its interaction with China. In many ways the US has tried to improve relations with China. However, there is a growing fear of a rising China in the US thus the US has often become more hostile towards to China. These shifts have had a profound impact on the Taiwan conflict. The United States now must balance its interests with a rising China with its interests towards Taiwan. Therefore a large part of both the continuities and changes between the three administration can be attributed to power relations between the United States and China.

Economic Aspect of Power Relationship

In regards to the economy this power shift is one of the main reasons why US policy towards Taiwan has undergone significant changes since the dawn of the Clinton administration. Since the Clinton administration the economic growth of China has drastically increased as illustrated in the Graph 4.0.

Graph 4.0

http://www.billcara.com/archives/2006/08/china_gdp_growt.html^{lxxxvi}

An economically rising China has had a significant impact on the United States. As a result of the substantial economic growth, China has begun to buy US Treasury Holdings as indicated by the Graph 5.0.

Graph 5.0

<http://blogs.cfr.org/geographics/category/countries/japan/>^{lxxxvii}

With this increased debt, the United States cannot afford to antagonize China too much and risk an economic backlash. Along with the massive debt that the US has towards China, another key economic factor is the appreciation of Chinese currency. The United States feels that China's RMB has been undervalued for some time and that is negatively impacting the US economy. This sentiment in the US has led to anti-China rhetoric among US politicians and among the public. This then leads to calls for a tougher stance on China in general. As a result this sentiment spills into the Taiwan conflict and therefore the politicians become more supportive of Taiwan.

For President Clinton the economic relationship between the US and China played an important role in the formulation of policy towards Taiwan, but the impact was not as significant as it would become in the subsequent administrations. As illustrated in the Graph 4.0, China had not become an economic superpower when Clinton took office. China had just begun to rise but it did not command the influence that it does now. As for the debt during the Clinton administration, it was not a major issue that affected his

policy towards China and Taiwan. Similar to the systemic factors related to a pre-911 international order, Clinton was not limited in his options towards China. For example he could afford to escalate the situation as he did in 1995-96 without dire economic consequences.

President Bush on the other hand had to balance the United States' economic interests in his policies toward Taiwan, and as a result his policies towards China had to change from Clinton's administration. During his administration China emerged as an economic superpower. As noted in the Graph 5.0, during his presidency US debt to China skyrocketed. This increased debt placed pressure on Bush and he could not take an aggressive pro-Taiwan stance without angering China. This external constraint on his policies helps explain his shifting policy towards Taiwan during his tenure. When the debt to China was not too massive he could afford to utilize a hawkish foreign policy towards China in regards to the Taiwan conflict. However, as his presidency progressed the debt became more significant and prominent. Bush could not maintain his aggressive Chinese policy without economic consequences. Thus, this helps explain his administration's policy shift towards an engagement-oriented strategy with regards to China in the conflict.


Bush had to shift his policy due to the debt; however there were internal pressures on him maintaining an aggressive anti-China policy because of the evaluation of the RMB. The RMB evaluation has become a prevalent issue among many politicians in the US. Strong anti-China sentiment has emerged because of this evaluation and this likely contributes toward the continuing trend of the US Congress opposing China on issues such as Taiwan. Because of these domestic views against China, Bush cannot become too

friendly with China without some political backlash. Therefore this partially contributes to the answer of why Bush did not try to fully appease the Chinese in regards to the Taiwan-China conflict.

These economic factors have been largely influential in Obama continuing the policy trends of George Bush. The economic rise of China has not stagnated during Obama's two years as president. China still possesses large quantities of the US debt. As of 2009 China holds about \$1 trillion of the US's \$10 trillion debt.^{lxxxviii} The issue of the RMB and the detrimental affect it has on sentiment towards China has continued. Another key economic component for the Obama administration is that the US is willing to manage China's recent economic rise but it does not want China to become an economic hegemony in the area.^{lxxxix} As of result of these economic conditions and strategies Obama faces the same internal and external pressures when formulating policy towards Taiwan. Therefore these factors partially explain why Obama has continued Bush's later policies of engaging China while maintaining close ties with Taiwan.

Military Aspect of Power Relationship

The military aspect of the power relationship between the US and China is one of the most important reasons for why there are both changes and continuities in US policies. Increased military capabilities between the two countries have played a fundamental role in developing a policy towards Taiwan for each of the three presidents. China has upgraded its military since the beginning of the Clinton administration; however this increased military is still punitive compared to the US military.




Graph 6.0

xc

(Graph from Professor Kang)

Graph 6.0 shows that despite a 21% increase in military expenditures, China still significantly lags behind the US. Graph 7.0 indicates the disparity between US military expenditures and the rest of the world including China.



Graph 7.0

xci

This military superiority has given each administration more options when dealing with China. The US recognizes that with a superior military it can deter China from invading Taiwan.

Despite this massive military advantage for the US, the worry is that China will develop capabilities to attack Taiwan and prevent the US from successfully intervening. For the last three administrations China has not attacked Taiwan; however there are suspicions that if their nonviolent means of coercing Taiwan fail to work they might try to use force. A 2009 Congressional Report indicates that China recently has upgraded their military to fight short duration conflicts.^{xcii} This recent buildup in short duration military arms is likely implemented so that China can neutralize Taiwan's defense before the US could successfully intervene.^{xciii} This remains important because if China decided to attack Taiwan their goal would be a quick and swift takeover of the island. Therefore this recent buildup only reaffirms the fear that China could try to quickly take over Taiwan with minimal to no military involvement from the US.

For President Clinton, the military relationship played a significant role in developing his policy towards Taiwan. Because of the US's military superiority, he could risk deploying navy ships during the 1995-96 crisis. This was a symbolic military act that showed that the US was serious about preventing China from bullying Taiwan. The threat of US intervention probably lowered the risk. Rationally China understands that if a war occurred the US would likely be victorious because of their military superiority. Therefore this illustrates that during Clinton's presidency the superior military capabilities of the US helped play an important role in his policy of maintaining the status quo and stability in the conflict.

For President Bush, the military power relationship between the US and China also played an important role in developing his stronger stance towards China from Clinton. When Bush tried to take a hard-line stance on China in the beginning of his presidency he could afford to take such a stance because of his country's military advantage. His "strategic clarity" defense position had to be taken seriously by the Chinese because of the superiority the US enjoyed militarily. Just as in Clinton's case, Bush's military advantage and commitment to Taiwan likely deterred the Chinese from taking any violent drastic measures against Taiwan because of the risk of the US retaliating. Bush strived to maintain the status quo of the situation like Clinton. The military superiority that he enjoyed during his presidency allowed him to succeed in this regards.

Since the military advantage of the US has not wavered in the Obama administration, Obama has had success in continuing the policies of Bush and maintaining the status quo. Because the military disparity between the two remains, albeit to a lesser degree, the deterrence factor of the US military still exists. It aids the Obama administration just like it did during the Clinton and Bush administrations. The recent buildup for China could potentially change the status quo in the future though because China is developing weapons that could prevent the US from helping Taiwan. The Chinese buildup for a possible war with Taiwan reaffirms the notion that the US and Taiwan must continue to amount a defense policy. Therefore, this need partially explains why Obama continued the policy of following the TRA and even helps exhibits why he signed such a massive arms deal with Taiwan. Although Obama is obliged by the TRA to sell arms to Taiwan, it is unlikely that the US would engage in such a large military arms

deal with Taiwan if China did not present a serious military threat considering the adverse effects it had on US-China relations. Thus the military power relationship between the US, China, and Taiwan has played a substantial role in the formulation of policy for Obama.

Taiwanese Politics

The ideologies of the Chinese and Taiwanese government have important implications for the US in the decision-making process, and as such their actions have had an important impact on changes in policies between the presidents. China has undergone individual changes in regards to their leadership since the dawn of the Clinton administration; however their stance towards Taiwan has not significantly wavered. Since China's government is a one-party system, the same party with the same ideology has remained in power. Taiwan on the other hand has gone through significant political changes that have affected their outlook on the conflict. The two major parties in Taiwan, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Koumintang (KMT), have different ideologies regarding how to approach the conflict. The KMT supports a "One China" policy while the DPP advocates Taiwan becoming a separate entity from China.^{xciv} The ideologies of the two major parties have had a large amount of influence on each of the three presidents.

For most of President Clinton's tenure, Taiwan was ruled by President Lee and the KMT party. This had important implications in Clinton's policies towards Taiwan. Lee was a member of the more conciliatory KMT, yet he still managed to escalate the situation with China. The most notable examples include his trip to the US that spawned the 1995-96 crisis and his statements in 1999 in which he said Taiwan and China should

be on a "special state-to-state" basis.^{xcv} This statement implied that Taiwan was a separate state from China and resulted in another military display similar to the one in 1995-96 by the Chinese. These two incidents put Clinton in a tough position in which he had to respond. Since Clinton wanted to utilize an ambiguous policy towards Taiwan, these two international incidents forced him to take a definitive position regarding the conflict. Thus this illustrates that the political makeup and leadership of Taiwan affected Clinton's policy.

The political atmosphere during Bush's presidency also influenced his policies, and forced Bush to change his policies to one that required him to sometimes shy away from strong pro-Taiwan rhetoric. During Bush's administration the DPP came into power. The leader of the Republic of Taiwan from 2000-2008, President Chen, worried both the Chinese and the Bush administration. Bush saw the president as a troublemaker^{xcvi} while the Chinese regarded him as an envelope pusher and a risk taker.^{xcvii} Cross strait dialogue between Taiwan and China beyond seeking detente did not exist during Chen's tenure.^{xcviii} This had important implications for the policies of Bush because Chen added extra tensions to an already volatile conflict. Through his strong separatist statements Chen caused tensions between the US and Taiwan. Chen's referendum for independence in 2004 put the Bush administration in the unique position of criticizing the Taiwanese while defending the Chinese.^{xcix} Other similar problems with the Chen administration would occur which influenced Bush's new direction of more engagement with China. Therefore this illustrates that Chen's controversial leadership partially influenced Bush's shift away from a strong Taiwanese position.

The new leadership of Taiwan has also had important implications for the Obama

administration and his ability to continue the policies of Bush. In 2008 the KMT took over and Ma Ying-Jeou became president. The new Taiwanese administration is more Beijing friendly than the Chen administration. As such this has eased tensions in the conflict. Obama has not been forced to deal with strong separatist language and the external constraints on policy formulation that accompany it. The effect of this is that it has not constrained or forced Obama to act a specific way. Therefore the new political leadership is favorable for Obama and his ability to formulate the policies that he desired.

Chapter VI: Conclusion

There are many factors that contribute to the final outcomes for each president, however some of these aspects explained are more significant than others. The individual level dynamics are not as influential as some of the other aspects. The president's personality and leadership style act as a template for the decision-making process, but it does not guarantee nor fully explain how the president will act. The president is constrained by many other internal and external factors that reduce the impact of the president's personality, morality, and ideological beliefs on decisions regarding Taiwan. However, these factors still offer important insights into the three presidents' grand foreign policy plan towards Taiwan.

Some state-level factors are not as significant as others. Congress has an important constraining influence on the president, yet it still fails to consistently push its agenda on Taiwan. Congress is overwhelmingly supportive of Taiwan yet each of the presidents has not enacted a foreign policy that fits within the ideology of Congress as a whole. Congress has had some success in policy formulation, for example during the 1995-96 crisis, and it has successfully constrained the executive branch from straying too

far from a pro-Taiwan stance. Thus Congress is not as important as other factors; however it still plays a relatively significant role in ensuring the continuation of a pro-Taiwan strategy between the three presidents.

Taiwan and Chinese lobbyists also have had an impact on the continuation of policy between each president; however, this influence is less than all other factors examined. The United States Congress takes into account the Taiwan lobbyists, yet Congress can only act so much. Chinese lobbyists have little to no influence in Congress, and in certain cases they have actually increased sympathy towards Taiwan. The overall lack of a unified position has also diminished the influence of the lobbyists. These factors illustrate that the lobbyists do not have the same influence as other aspects of the three-level analysis.

The military industrial complex remains one of the most important factors in understanding the continuities between the presidents. Each president has authorized arms deals in part because of the massive influence that the military industrial complex has. The large military corporations have spent substantial amounts of money and have become integrated in the decision-making process. The military industry also has important functions within the government because of its impact on trade and the domestic economy. As such the government often takes into account their lobbying. Even though there are two conflicting treaties over arms selling and the Chinese adamantly oppose such trading, the United States still continues to sell massive amounts of military equipment. This thus illustrates the enormous impact that the military industrial complex has on policy formulation.

Systemic factors also play a substantial role in each of the presidents' decision-making process and help explain both the changes and continuities between the presidents. Because of the external constraints brought upon by 911 and China's economic and military rise, the presidents have had to shift and change their policy. The president must act rationally within the realities of the international system. On the other hand, the enormous advantage that the US has in military capabilities has increased the options in which each president can utilize. As such, all three presidents can continue the overarching policy of maintaining a peaceful status quo because of the deterrence factor of the US military. The political realities of Taiwan are also important in why each president has acted in the ways that they do. The political ideologies of the Taiwanese government have had significant consequences that have altered the intensity of the conflict and thus the policy that the president pursues.

The Taiwan-China conflict remains one of the most potentially destructive international situations. If the conflict escalates into a shooting war, there are many unknowns that could destabilize not only Eastern Asia, but the entire international system. Relations between the three main actors involved have improved; however the conflict is far from resolved. The rise of China does not seem to be slowing and as a result the nature of the conflict could easily change in the future. As such in order to understand the future, US decision-makers need to recognize on all three levels why the US has continued yet changed many aspects of its policy towards Taiwan. This will allow the current and future leaders of the US to more adequately understand the nature of the conflict, which will therefore reduce the risk of the conflict boiling over into a heated conflict.

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