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Spencer Pearce
Brigham Young University

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ENTRAPMENT, ECONOMICS, AND GEOPOLITICS: THE OBSTACLES AND CONDITIONS FOR TURKISH EU MEMBERSHIP

Spencer Pearce

INTRODUCTION

Turkey first joined NATO in 1952. It was a founding member of the Council of Europe in 1949 and of the United Nations in 1945. Turkey was also recently elected as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. In fact, Turkey has been a member of these major international institutions longer than many current EU members. The Czech Republic, along with Poland and Hungary, joined NATO in 1999. Why are nations which have such a short history of international involvement members of the European Union while Turkey, which has been actively engaged in major international institutions for over 50 years, remains outside?

Turkey's candidate status with the European Union is the result of a long process of political and social reform. It became an associate member of the EEC (precursor to the EU) in 1963, and progress since then has been slow. Numerous theories attempt to explain the necessary conditions for accession to the EU, as well as the obstacles that candidate countries such as Turkey face. Even though these theories have important distinctions, explanations relating to economic and geopolitical forces seem to provide a common canvas for the description of this ongoing process. This study will assert that economic pressure actually plays a minor role in Turkey's EU candidacy and that geopolitical reasons offer the best explanation both for Turkey's candidacy and hopefully its eventual accession to the EU.

ECONOMICS

Andrew Moravcsik argues that economic concerns consistently outweighed geopolitical or strategic concerns for France, Germany, and the Benelux nations during the formative years of the European Economic Community (Moravcsik, 1998). In other words, Moravcsik believes that Germany and France created the European Coal and Steel Community for a single economic reason: they each had half of what both needed for vital economic activities. These economic forces were sufficient to induce cooperation among these nations. Consequently, an initial economic agreement was reached that all parties could accept, and this began the gradual integrative process that has created the EU. The reason this gradual

integration occurred (as per Moravcsik) is that each nation had common or compatible country preferences, state bargaining apparatus, and institutional choices. Although there is not space here to expound all of Moravcsik's theory, it is sufficient to state that he asserts that the European Community developed along economic lines, not geopolitical or strategic ones.

If Moravcsik's analysis is a good representation of the reason for the creation and enlargement of the EU, then Turkey faces serious challenges in its bid for EU Membership. Turkey already has reasonably close economic ties to the European Union due to the 1995 EU-Turkey Customs Union agreement. Turkey has a strong and mutually beneficial import-export relationship with several EU members, the foremost being the UK and Germany. The major problem for Turkey is that most of the benefits that EU members would enjoy if Turkey were to enter the EU are already realized vis-à-vis these mutual free trade agreements. The potential economic benefits of Turkish membership are therefore invisible to EU members, because they already enjoy most of them. Therefore, the pressing economic considerations that brought European nations together in the fifties are radically different from the economic realities that are currently influencing Turkey's membership bid. Even though Turkey is a candidate country, because the free trade agreement with Europe effectively mutes many of the benefits of further integration, the driving force behind Turkey's candidacy must be explained by something besides economic trade concerns.

Vachudova and Moravcsik use insights from basic bargaining theory in order to create another economic framework to explain EU enlargement. Their description of this model, which builds on the work of Nye and Keohane, illustrates how in a bargaining situation the nation which will benefit the most from the bargain will have to make the largest concession. Conversely the nation which has the least to gain from the agreement will have to give up the least because they have less anxiety about forgoing the more modest gains of cooperation (Moravcsik & Vachudova, 2003).

The authors use this bargaining framework to explain the positions of the Netherlands and France in the initial 1950s bargaining over the Treaty of Rome. The Netherlands, which had the most to gain from a customs union and was the least willing to forego ratification, actually had to make the most concessions of any European country. France on the other hand, as a larger and more self-sufficient economy, was much more capable of going at it alone (Moravcsik & Vachudova, 2003). Whereas the lack of a customs union would be a severe blow to the Netherlands, for France it would be only a minor setback. This meant that theoretically France should be able to wring large concessions out of the Dutch while giving up relatively little of its own goals (Moravcsik & Vachudova, 2003), which is more or less what happened in 1957.

This theory would also suggest an equilibrium where both bargainers receive about equal benefits from the transaction. The Dutch had to make large concessions in order to secure French support for the customs union so their overall end utility was actually much lower than they had hoped. France on the other hand received only minimal utility from the bargain to begin with, which only increased moderately as it received the desired concessions. Thus, French benefits increase from a low point, while Dutch benefits fall from a high point to meet somewhere roughly in the middle. Economic theory might suggest an exact equality, since France could theoretically keep pressuring the Dutch for concessions until the marginal benefit of the treaty for France is exactly equal to the Dutch's expected utility. In practice however, other geopolitical goals or perceived obligations may cause

France to stop asking for concessions somewhere before their level of utility vis-à-vis the Dutch hits the break-even point.

If bargaining theory is a good explanation for EU enlargement, then this is good news for Turkey since it has a strong bargaining position relatively similar in quality if not size to France in the example cited above. Turkey has the second largest population of any EU nation after Germany and is expected to pass Germany by 2020. Turkey also has a very diverse economy that has weathered the recent economic crisis extremely well. This can be seen by the fact that Turkey is one of the few European nations posting a positive GDP growth rate through these recent years of general economic downturn. In fact, Turkey has an average GDP growth rate of 3.75% per year, which is one of the highest growth rates in Europe (World Bank, 2010). Therefore, from a bargaining position, Turkey today looks somewhat similar to France in the 1950s. Both have a rebounding economy (France from WWII, Turkey from the recent worldwide recession) and a large workforce with high anticipated future growth.

As noted above, a free trade agreement with the EU passed in 1995 already allows Turkey to trade with EU members in machinery, semi-finished and other goods. This means that the most likely economic benefit to Turkey in the event of EU accession is probably not free trade in goods or commodities (which as discussed above is somewhat invisible due to the 1995 free trade agreement). Rather, increased growth would likely come after Turkey's EU accession boosts investor confidence which would cause a large inflow of investment capital. While these gains would be substantial and generate significant growth, it seems doubtful that they would serve as a sufficient condition to bring Turkey into the European Union. This logic is supported by the bargaining concept of perceived gains. As per the bargaining theory above, the nation with the most to gain must make the largest concession at the negotiating table. If the biggest economic gains in the EU-Turkey dyad really do come from increased direct investment, it is important to discuss whom this investment benefits most. Conventional thinking would suggest that Turkey would be the primary beneficiary of capital inflows, but this may not be the case.

Although foreign investment capital would generate new growth in Turkey, the impact of this inflow would be tempered by the fact that the past 20 years have seen a remarkable boom in domestic investment capital due to the creation of Islamic investment banks in Turkey. Islamic banks, which according to Islamic law are forbidden to charge interest, allow more religiously devout Turks an opportunity to invest their savings in the market. Additionally, these Islamic banks also grant Turkish businesses access to large amounts of Saudi and Kuwaiti investment capital (Fuller, 2008), something that was not possible earlier due to the reluctance of the some devout Saudis and Kuwaitis to invest in western style banks (which charge interest). In fact, the first Islamic banks in Turkey which opened in 1985 were joint Arab-Turkish projects (Fuller 45). These banks were huge successes and in the period 1985-1999 over 120 Islamic bank branches were opened throughout Turkey (Fuller, 2008). These Islamic banks are important because in generating large amounts of domestic capital they lessen the relative importance of foreign investment from Europe. Also, since most investors in Islamic banks are Turks, when funds are withdrawn for private spending that consumption goes directly to the Turkish economy. In the case of European investment capital, any money that is removed is likely to be spent somewhere in Western Europe.

The point of this example is that although European investment capital would be

welcome and important in the event of Turkish EU accession, due to the recent boom in Turkey's domestic capital markets the benefit of future European investments is probably not as high as European elites assume it is. In other words, Turkey does not need EU capital as much as European investors assume, which means that Turkey's economic bargaining position is actually stronger than it appears to the rest of Europe. This situation, where both Turkey and the EU believe they have a strong economic bargaining position creates a deadlock because each side assumes that it has the stronger position, and therefore waits for the other party to make bigger concessions. This deadlock is further reinforced by the fact that external economic conditions reinforce the assumptions of both Turkey and the EU. Turks see that they have a reasonable supply of domestic investment capital so they feel no hurry to make huge concessions to EU members (i.e. concessions to Greece on border disputes in order to remove Greece's veto on several chapters of the accession criteria). Conversely, European investors have not run out of profitable investment projects outside of Turkey, so they feel no great need to make bargaining concessions. Thus, the perceptions and bargaining positions of both sides reinforce each party's behavior and perpetuate a deadlock. Therefore, it is unlikely that an economic framework based on a bargaining model will be capable of explaining how and when Turkey will achieve full EU membership.

Of any European economy currently outside the EU, Turkey probably needs the European Union the least because it has such substantial trade relationships with non-EU nations such as Russia, China, and Iran. As mentioned above, EU members probably do not appreciate this fact. Conversely, it also appears that the EU is very capable of carrying on fine with Turkey outside of the EU as medium level trade partner. In other words, bargaining as formulated by Nye and Keohane does not predict the likely entrance of Turkey into the EU anytime soon. But, as Turkey has been given candidate status and is moving forward with the necessary reforms to achieve full membership, there are clearly other attractive forces at work. Nye and Keohane's theory is clearly able to explain some, if not most, of the economic reasons behind other countries' accession, but as noted above their theory simply reaffirms that Turkey's candidacy is not progressing due to economic reasons. We therefore see, after considering the economic models espoused by Morovcsik and Vachudova, that economic theories relating to trade, both in physical goods and investment capital, are unlikely to explain the conditions under which Turkey would be admitted into the EU. We must therefore look for non-economic explanations for Turkey's current EU candidacy.

ENTRAPMENT

Frank Schimmelfennig (2008) proposes another theory which attempts to explain the motivating power behind Turkey's candidate status. Schimmelfennig points out that from its inception the European Council decided on a rule-based process for enlargement. The author argues that "human rights, and liberal democracy...are the fundamental rules of legitimate statehood in the EU" and that, "fulfilling these requirements is the necessary and sufficient conditionality to entrap the EU" (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). Because of this collective decision for rule or criterion-based admission, the founding charter of Europe (Maastricht; Article 49) states that "Any European state which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) may apply to become a member of the Union" (Schimmelfennig, 2008). Thus, the members of the European Union may become rhetorically entrapped (i.e. their treaties may legally compel them to act in a manner that goes against their own immediate domestic political preferences). This makes sense because the cost of a single conces-

sion (i.e. Turkish candidacy) will almost certainly be smaller than the net gains of belonging to the EU. Therefore, because continued membership in the EU requires strict adherence to these treaties, existing member states may be compelled to accept Turkey as a candidate (after it fulfills the treaty requirements) even though it goes against the political preferences of some members' governments.

Because the EU is a rule-based organization, fulfillment of the legal treaty conditions for EU candidacy (as per the Copenhagen and Maastricht requirements) are also the precise conditions for successful rhetorical entrapment. These conditions are:

- The stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy
- The rule of law
- Respect for human rights
- Respect for and protection of minorities
- The existence of a functioning market economy
- Must be a "European country" (still not officially defined)

Thus, any nation which meets all the above criteria must be considered for EU candidacy as per the Maastricht and Copenhagen requirements. These requirements will therefore form a rhetorical trap or constraint for any member opposing such a candidacy.

One example of the theory of entrapment is the candidacy of Greece to enter the Eurozone (EMU). When the EMU requirements were first formulated, Germany (the chief mover behind the monetary union) did not envision a monetary system that would extend to less financially stable areas of the EU, such as Greece. Germany accordingly recommended what it felt was a very high bar for EMU admittance. Eventually, to Germany's great surprise, Greece (admittedly with some sleight of hand) made the budgetary and monetary policy changes necessary to join the Eurozone (R. Bronk, personal communication, March 3, 2010).

These EMU criteria, though different from the Copenhagen requirements for EU candidacy are nevertheless a reflection of the rule-based *modus operandi* employed by the EU. If a nation meets an organization's requirements, it must be admitted. This is just one aspect of the devotion to the rule of law which is the backbone of EU policy. Even though Germany did not expect that Greece would ever actually be able to meet the EMU requirements, the rules laid down for Eurozone membership 'entrapped' Germany and forced it to accept Greek EMU membership once the requirements had been met. This account provides good evidence that EU member states can be rhetorically entrapped to abide by the rule-based criterion they have set for full admission to their organizations. However, whether or not further integration will proceed with respect to Turkish EU candidacy depends on whether Turkey, like Greece, is willing to implement the domestic changes necessary to join the club (in this case the EU, not the EMU).

Even though Turkey has shown itself willing to adopt measures sufficient to be considered for EU membership, this does not necessarily mean that it will have the domestic political will to implement all changes requisite for full membership. In his book with Ulrich Sedelmeier, Schimmelfennig explains that different policies have different domestic costs for each nation, and that the cost of implementation may be greater than the current government is willing to bear (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). The authors point out that this is especially true for governments whose domestic political control is based on

authoritarian measures or repressive political maneuvers. Thus, it remains unclear whether the current Turkish government is willing or able to bear the political costs of implementing the entire EU *acquis communautaire* in order to progress from candidate country to full EU member. Turkey faces several issues that may prove stumbling blocks on its road to EU membership. These include civilian control of the military, Kurdish complaints of ethnic discrimination, the Armenian genocide, questions of economic stability and corruption, Greek territorial disputes, and the unresolved division of Cyprus. The remainder of this paper will discuss the relative difficulty of implementing reforms on these issues and how they are likely to affect Turkey's ability to rhetorically entrap EU member states.

GEOPOLITICS

Turkey has had numerous historical issues over civilian control of its military. This is a particularly central concern for the EU, since free and fair democratic elections are a founding principle of the union. The Turkish military, which views itself as the guardian of secular Kemalist principles, seized control of the government in 1960 and 1980 (Howard, 2001) in order to prevent the Turkish government from devolving into the hands of what it views as undesirable political parties. To the Europeans this is a gross violation of the principles of Western democracy, but as Ozay Mehmet points out, many Turkish nationals feel differently about the matter. Mehmet argues that many Westerners do not understand the unique role that the military plays in Turkey as the guardians of the secular state (Ismael & Aydin, 2003) and defenders of Kemalism (the secular ideology of Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey). It should be noted that the military coups, for all of their problems, did eventually return control of the government to civilian hands. Howard points out that General Kenan, leader of the 1980 coup, seized control of the state to stop the escalation of civil violence (5,241 deaths in two months due to civil unrest, bombings, etc) (Howard, 2001). In 1983 Kenan returned power to the civilly elected government after a new constitution was ratified by referendum and elections were held. Admittedly, the military has played a strong role in the new government, but Turkey is still a far cry from military dictatorships such as Burma (Howard, 2001).

In reference to the legitimacy of Turkey's current government, it should be pointed out that in counterpoint to other military regimes the military coups in Turkey have domestically been viewed as attempts to restore civil order and secularism to the nation (Howard, 2001). Long term military rule was never the goal, and has not been the result. Military involvement in the government via the National Security Council has been significant for several decades, though it has declined in recent years. Regardless, the government has always eventually returned to civilian control. The fact that democratic ideals have consistently resurfaced after repeated military coups shows that secularism and democracy are not transitory aspects of Turkey's political structure, but are integrated elements of a secular political culture. With respect to entrapment, this shows that Turkey is dedicated to democracy, and as such is fulfilling this requirement of the Copenhagen criteria and is therefore a qualified EU candidate.

Although EU leaders and citizens are alarmed to see an unelected group exercising considerable political power, Turkey is not the only European country to have such problems. Italy, a founding member of the EU, faces questions about the free and fair nature of its democratic elections because the Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, owns most of the television broadcasting media in Italy. This gives him a significant advantage in national

elections and constitutes a major source of political power that is not derived from a democratic source. Although owning TV stations in Italy is clearly different from holding an unelected post as a general in Turkey, there are similarities in that a person in either position has a substantial amount of power that is not derived from a democratic process. If Italy can be considered a stable democracy despite the threat to free and fair elections posed by Mr. Berlusconi's media monopolies, then Turkey should be afforded similar leeway with respect to the level of democracy in its elections, despite its history of military involvement in the government. Incidentally, the last successful military coup in Turkey was in 1980, at which time Poland, East Germany, and many other current EU members were still communist nations under the influence of the Soviet Union. If 30 years is enough time for these Eastern European nations to leave behind communism, fully embrace democracy, and join the EU surely it is enough time for a 58-year member of NATO to do the same.

This brings up another current challenge. In February of this year fourteen army officers were detained for involvement in a plot to overthrow the government. This plot, named Sledgehammer, came as an eventual result of the pro-army AK Party (Justice and Development Party) gaining considerable ground in Turkey's 2003 elections. Had it been successful, this plot could have led to a military coup such as the one that occurred in 1980. Orhan Kemal Cengiz, who reported the story for the online news source *Today's Zayman*, says that this represents a milestone in Turkish history. He is in turn quoting Ahmet Altan of the Taraf newspaper, who expressed that these arrests represent the beginning of the end of an epoch of military independence from civilian control (Cengiz, 2010).

Despite the initial shadow this incident casts over Turkey's candidacy it may actually be a sign that Turkey is developing a stronger commitment to democratic government. It must be reiterated that this was an unsuccessful military coup and that it was not the first of its kind in European history. For instance, at the time of Algerian succession there was a military plot by top-ranking French generals to take over the government of France. This plot was discovered and dealt with, just as the February plot in Turkey. The fact that the civilian government of Turkey is actually able to expose, arrest, and prosecute top-ranking military officials is actually a signal that Turkey is moving in the right direction, not the other way around. It should however be noted that these arrests were carried out with the knowledge and consent of the military high command, which was not in on the plot. As embarrassing as this failed coup may be it shows important progress in Turkey's century-long struggle for civilian control of the military. In the 1960 and 1980 coups, the military won without a contest. In 2010, the civilian government suppressed the coup without incident and put the military officers responsible behind bars. Call it what you will, that is progress. The purpose of comparing Turkey to Berlusconi's Italian government or the failed Algerian generals' coup in France is that Europe's history of stable democratic institutions is a very checkered past, even for some of the founding members of the EU.

The implications for entrapment are that Turkey's government and military units are now, perhaps more than ever before, under the civilian control of a freely and fairly elected democratic government. This incident demonstrates that Turkey is in fact fulfilling the Copenhagen requirement for "stable institutions guaranteeing democracy". Also, in terms of difficulty of implementation, it appears that the civilian government is not only likely, but eager to implement further democratic reforms, as this will strengthen their domestic power. The issue of civilian control of the military, which is very important both to the EU and to Turkey, is not likely to prove a major stumbling block to Turkey's candidacy.

Another major issue for Turkey with respect to EU accession is the problem of human rights. The two most important categories in this debate are the treatment of the Kurdish minority and the WWI genocide of Armenians by the Ottoman Empire. The Kurdish question, which from Ankara's perspective is a terrorism issue, looks to the Europeans more as a problem over minority rights (and therefore human rights). Turkey's government in particular has been criticized for the poor economic status of Kurds generally throughout the country. One Turkish perspective, as set forward by Ozay Mehmet (Ismael & Aydin, 2003) is that development, employment, and prosperity in Kurdish areas are lower because the incessant terrorism in these predominantly Kurdish areas has stunted the development of the infrastructure and economy in that region. Although the hard stance taken by Ankara is initially uninspiring, it appears that granting greater cultural rights to Kurds is a politically inexpensive policy for the government now that Öcalan (head of the PKK –Kurdistan Workers' Party) is in prison and his deputy, Karayilan, has declared a temporary cease-fire to seek a diplomatic end to the conflict (Yackley, 2010). There have already been steps taken to implement public education in the Kurdish language, and some broadcast media is now also available in Kurdish. The AKP (Justice and Development Party) has also begun investing heavily in the infrastructure of southeast Turkey where most Turkish Kurds live. Therefore, although the Kurdish issue may appear initially intractable, there are signs that the situation of this minority population in Turkey has improved recently and that they will continue to do so, at least as long as EU membership remains a possibility. If Kurdish treatment continues to improve, this human rights issue will cease to be an obstacle to Turkish accession and will be yet another tool of rhetorical entrapment in favor of Turkish accession.

The second important human rights issue is the still unresolved and unrecognized (by Turkey) issue of the Armenian holocaust. To some extent many among the Turkish political elite are in a collective denial over the Armenian genocide. They admit that atrocities were committed on all sides during WWI, but consider the Armenian deaths more a consequence of combat during war than a plan systematically designed to exterminate the Ottoman Empire's Armenian population. Most of the world recognizes this event – in which the Ottoman Empire killed over a million Armenians – as genocide and as a point of historical fact. In contrast, the mere mention of the word 'genocide' fills Turkish leaders with anger. The topic is not open for negotiation. In March 2010, just days after the U.S. and Sweden passed motions recognizing the Armenian genocide, Turkey recalled its ambassadors to both countries. This issue is obviously very sensitive for domestic political leaders, indicating that it must have a very heavy political cost. Clearly, the political fallout of recognizing the Armenian genocide would weaken the government that passed such a motion.

On the other hand, Turkey has recently begun working to normalize its relations with Armenia. Both the Armenian and Turkish leadership have stated that recognition of the genocide is not a precondition for talks. Therefore, although this is a sensitive issue, non-recognition of the Armenian genocide should not be enough to keep Turkey out of the EU, since it was not committed by Turkey, and Turkey is not legally responsible. From the standpoint of entrapment this is a moot point as even immediate recognition of the genocide would not entrap EU members since, as noted above, there is no legal requirement for Turkey to make restitution. Therefore, this is really only a particularly tender cultural hot-spot, but not a necessarily huge political roadblock for Turkey.

The next important geopolitical concern facing Turkey is whether it has a 'functioning market economy.' The overall economic performance is excellent as evidenced by its aver-

age GDP growth rate of 3.75% (World Bank, 2010). However, in addition to economic growth, one important element of a truly free and functioning economy is the guarantee to investors that the government will respect private property rights and, in the case of nationalization, properly compensate private owners for any government-induced property loss. One recent incident shows that Turkey is finally entering a stage where private property rights are accorded this degree of legal protection. The Uzan family, which owns 66% of the Cyprus-based Lubananco energy company, sued the Turkish government for \$21.5 billion for business losses which they incurred when the Turkish government expropriated their family's companies. The government claimed that the Uzan brothers were siphoning off company profits, but they claim that the move was purely a political move by the government (Daily Zaman, 2010). The matter has finally come before an international tribunal in Paris, where the brothers have come forward to testify in the court. Regardless of which party is found guilty, the fact that both parties have access to due process of law to assert their ownership rights is clear evidence that Turkey is committed to the protection of private property rights.

In regards to its EU candidacy, Turkey's efforts to create a more transparent legal apparatus for investors is clearly having a positive effect. As a result of recent reforms, investors have a better idea of the risks they face, and are more willing to invest in the Turkish economy. This relatively strong investor confidence is reflected in Turkey's average GDP growth rate (3.75%). In reference to entrapment, both the Uzan case and the high GDP growth are evidence that Turkey has a functioning market economy – it recently jumped from 26th to 17th in world GDP rankings – and is ready to join the EU. Furthermore, this economic growth is not the result of large oil resources, as is the case with nations such as Russia or Saudi Arabia. Compared to its neighbors in the Middle East, Turkey is extremely poor in natural gas and petroleum. Instead, the growth in the Turkish economy reflects an increasingly diversified mix of services and goods which can be provided by an ever more skilled and better educated population. Turkey's steadily improving economic performance shows that it meets this Copenhagen requirement, and as such must be considered for EU membership.

Relations between Greece and Turkey are and will continue to be a crucial issue in Turkey's accession negotiations. Although Greco-Turkish enmity dates back to Greece's war of independence from the Ottomans, recent history indicates that mutual cooperation is now possible. Onis points out that despite longstanding Greek animosity, Greece actually voted in favor of Turkish candidacy in the Helsinki Summit of 1999 (Onis, 2000). This spirit of cooperation came after two earthquakes hit Turkey and then Greece in the summer and early fall of 1999. Both countries responded to the other with bottom-up civil rescue efforts (Onis, 2000). The aid efforts after the earthquakes seemed to have brought about a mutual recognition that both countries shared common dependencies and that working together was both possible and desirable, which in turn led to Greek support in 1999 of Turkey's candidacy bid.

There are a host of territorial disputes and disagreements between Greece and Turkey, not the least of which is a hotly-contested claim by Greece to extend its territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles in the Aegean. However, there is neither space nor reason to enumerate all of them here. This is true because most, if not all, of these disputes existed prior to 1999 when Greece voted in favor of Turkish candidacy, thus signaling that all of these issues were – at least to the then-current government – negotiable and should not stand in the way

of Turkish candidacy.

One issue that has changed since 1999 is accession of Cyprus to the EU. Since then, Greece has blocked the opening of several accession chapters for Turkey, citing Turkey's failure to open its sea and air ports to Cypriot vessels. We can therefore logically conclude that this issue is a sufficient condition for Greece to continue blocking Turkey. Also, because Greece was willing to support Turkish candidacy prior to Cypriot succession, we can also therefore conclude that if the situation with Cyprus were resolved, the other outstanding Greco-Turkish disputes would once again be negotiable with respect to Turkey's candidacy. The rest of this paper will therefore focus on Turkey's relationship with Cyprus as this represents "the single overriding constraint on Turkey's progress to full membership..." (Carkoglu & Rubin, 2003).

With regards to entrapment, this means that Turkey must recognize Cyprus in order to be admitted to the EU, since recognition of fellow member states can be construed as a *de facto* Copenhagen requirement as per the points on the rule of law and respect for basic human rights. Logically, Turkey's non-recognition of Cyprus constitutes a *de facto* denial of basic legal and human rights to the Greek Cypriots on the part of the Turkish government, an issue which must be resolved if Turkey's candidacy is to move forward. Conversely, if Turkey normalizes relations with Cyprus, EU member states will not have just legal cause for halting accession negotiations and will be 'rhetorically entrapped' into moving towards Turkish membership.

The relationship between the Turkish minority and the Greek majority in Cyprus is at the heart of this conflict. The island has had a tumultuous history, due to the fact that at various times in the past century both Turk and Greek Cypriots have sought unification of the entire island with their ethnic kindred in either Greece or Turkey. This has led to understandable hostility from the other ethnic group. The two communities have experienced numerous failures since the Turkish invasion of 1974, but the most important aspect of the relationship can be summed up with two anecdotes.

In 1965 the UN Secretary General U Thant said in reference to the Turkish Cypriots (though it might be applied to both sides, since each has rejected peace settlements), "[L]eaders have adhered to a rigid stand against any measures which might involve having members of the two communities live and work together" (Council of Europe, 1999). This summarizes the intractable and hostile attitudes that have historically divided the island, as each group has voted down (in referendum or through elected officials) the attempted negotiations proposed by the other side.

This leads to the second anecdote. On Monday, March 22 the Greek Orthodox Archbishop of Cyprus crossed through the Ledra Street crossing point into Northern (Turkish) Cyprus. This was the first visit of a Cypriot archbishop to Northern Cyprus since the Turkish invasion. He first went to a monastery that has been abandoned since the 1974 partition of the island, where a conservation project is actually being planned. The Turkish news media reports that Prime Minister Erdogan of Turkey sent a letter to the Archbishop to express his personal approval of the restoration project for this historic site (Today's Zaman, 2010).

The point is this: It seems that finally both parties are willing to slowly begin talking and living as inhabitants of the same island. Obviously, all tension will not melt in a day or a year. But as the two sides begin to interact and normalize relations, the same sort of process can occur between Turkish and Greek Cypriots that occurred between France and Germany after WWII. The creation of the ECSC proved that over time social and eco-

conomic interactions can lead to dialogue that normalizes once-hostile relations and creates a proactive partnership. As Abraham Lincoln put it, “Do I not destroy my enemies when I make them my friends?”

If Turkey is able to cooperate with other EU members in the reunification of Cyprus, it will indeed have made friends of its former adversaries. This is possible if Ankara continues to project a moderate and conciliatory tone towards Cyprus. Such a stance would force Turkish Cypriots to soften their stance towards Greek Cypriots, who have little political or military power to back up their historically hostile separatist attitudes. The Greek Cypriots would also have incentives to soften their stance towards both Turkish Cypriots and Turkey proper as this could lead to eventual reparations for the Greek Cypriot property seized in the 1974 invasion and (hopefully) reunification of the entire island. The immediate goal for Turkey should therefore be the peaceful and equitable reunification of Cyprus, with the key requirement that Turkish be guaranteed as one of the official languages of whatever bi-partisan government emerges. This would be extremely beneficial for Turkey, as having Turkish recognized as an official language in an EU member state would mean that all official EU documents would have to be made available in Turkish. Even if Turkey remains outside the EU for years to come, having all official EU publications in Turkish would increase the coherency and transparency of the EU for the Turkish public and help build a more pro-European domestic movement. In the context of entrapment, Cyprus represents both the greatest threat and greatest potential asset to Turkey’s candidacy. If Turkey can help realize a reunified Cyprus, this could create the impetus for the removal of Greek and Cypriot vetoes on several Turkish accession chapters. Cypriot reunification would also remove the greatest rhetorical and legal justification that allows other EU members sufficient leeway to oppose Turkish membership. The EU as a body would therefore be rhetorically constrained to continue the integration process with Turkey by opening and implementing further chapters in Turkey’s succession negotiations.

CONCLUSION

This study has used Schimmelfennig’s framework to argue that rhetorical entrapment is likely Turkey’s only chance for admission to the EU, since as discussed above there are no strong economic forces that will draw it in. Also, because Turkey is predominately Muslim and speaks a non-European language it is unlikely that other cultural and religious factors will improve the Turkish membership bid. This study also asserts that there are no absolutely irreconcilable obstacles in Turkey’s path. The EU must follow its own legal requirements for admitting new member states. Therefore, fulfillment of the treaty requirements set by the EU for membership represent both a necessary and sufficient condition for the rhetorical entrapment of EU states to accept a new member. However, whether or not the EU will accept Turkey as a full member (and whether or not entrapment as a coercive force is able to actually to constrain EU states to accept a new member) is primarily dependent on Turkey’s ability to implement further domestic reforms.

It seems clear that the economic and social benefits of EU membership far outweigh the domestic political costs of resolving the geopolitical obstacles facing Turkey. This is particularly true in a current political climate where Kurdish militants are willing to negotiate, the Turkish Cypriots are willing to admit a Greek Archbishop, and domestic Turkish political reforms seem to be finally taking root in Turkish society. The major obstacle then to Turkey’s membership in the EU may not be a single geopolitical issue, but its ability

to grow in such a short time. The EU is itself working to digest the addition of 10 new member states. This is not so different from a Turkish population that is striving in one generation to adapt to a host of new liberal western governance principles. How fast and how completely these changes can be incorporated into Turkey will likely be the greatest determinant of the trajectory of Turkey's EU candidacy.

In a very unstable area of the world Turkey offers the European Union and the entire Western world the most secular and moderate partnership of any Muslim country in the world. Welcoming Turkey with open arms would introduce something that Europe has been lacking: a moderate stable voice that will resonate with European Muslim immigrants and encourage them to emotionally and politically buy into the European system of governance. Of course granting Turkey full EU membership does not mean that all the Muslims in Germany and France will move out of ghettos, or become politically and culturally integrated into European society. But, it does mean that these minorities will have the example of an entire nation which has the ability to be both Muslim and European. If the current EU member states genuinely want to integrate their Muslims immigrants into European society, they should seriously consider the benefits of admitting Turkey, the only Western-looking secular Muslim country in the world, into the European Union. The rate at which the Turkish government has passed sweeping economic political reforms in recent years indicates that it is serious about EU membership.

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