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AN EVER CLOSER UNION: THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HARD POWER CAPABILITIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Daniel Stepanicich

INTRODUCTION

The European Union represents one of the most successful geopolitical projects of the twentieth century, and in the last ten years it has been undergoing a revolution. Since the Single European Act in 1986 tore down prohibitive trade barriers, the European Union has emerged as the world’s leading economy with a gross-domestic product of over sixteen billion dollars (International Monetary Fund, 2011). The European Union (EU) is an economic giant on the world stage, but it has usually lacked political clout beyond trade negotiations. The post–Cold War global environment offered the EU a chance to expand its influence. With the advent of the European Security and Defense Policy (now the Common Security and Defense Policy) in 1999 the EU can no longer be considered only a civilian economic power. The EU will certainly not turn into a global superpower – it voluntarily shuns that possibility despite the claims of some fervent European autonomists – but it is taking a more active role in the world. The EU of the twenty-first century is outfitted with several new foreign policy tools, especially in crisis-management, that will allow it to act beyond Europe.

I will examine the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in an attempt to determine the extent of security and defense integration in Europe. ESDP is a broad policy that covers a range of activities from military operations to civilian crisis-management missions. The military capabilities of ESDP have been far more controversial than the civilian responsibilities since they touch upon the core areas of national sovereignty. While the civilian aspect of ESDP is interesting, I will focus on the military dimension. I attempt to answer two fundamental questions. First, why has European security and defense integration progressed since the 1990s? Second, what are the barriers to further integration that have caused ESDP to take its current limited form? In answering these questions, I attempt to embed the empirical data within a theoretical framework. If full integration is a standing European army with the national governments able to act with one voice then the EU has a long way to go, but its current progress is impressive considering the long and torturous history of European security and defense policy.
Structure of the Paper

Many previous studies on ESDP focused on either on policy initiation or policy outcomes to pass judgments on the prospects of defense integration. The EU has conducted twenty-four operations of which eight have been military operations. Defining operational success is difficult, and the failure of an operation to meet its mission goals is not necessarily due to a problem in the integration process. Instead, I look at the process of integration across key requirements for a common security and defense policy: common procurement, intelligence cooperation, interoperability, and operational planning capabilities. In the following sections, I will first provide a theoretical overview of European security and defense integration. Then I will closely examine the institutional development behind each selected indicator. I will conclude with a discussion on the impacts of the Lisbon Treaty on European security and defense integration and policy implications.

CONTENDING THEORIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

There have been few substantive attempts to theorize on European security and defense integration despite the rich theoretical work on European economic integration. Until the 1990s there was little reason to theorize on European security integration since there was very little action on the European level. The development of the European Security and Defense Policy presented difficulties to scholars since it was such a politicized issue with American observers denouncing it as power-balancing and Europeans calling it a key component of the European project. A theoretical void appeared since none of the traditional integration theories dealt with security and defense issues.

Most recent scholars and analysts attempted to explain ESDP through the intergovernmentalist literature. Stanley Hoffman (1966) provided the first important contribution to intergovernmentalism when he argued that integration will always be limited due to heterogeneous national preferences among the nation-states of Europe. In *The Choice for Europe* Andrew Moravcsik (1998) added another key contribution to the intergovernmentalist school. He argued that integration could be explained by the convergence of economic interests among the important European powers notably the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Skeptics of European defense integration quickly saw value in the intergovernmentalist framework. ESDP is under the purview of the Council of the European Union (Council), the intergovernmental legislative body of the EU. All decisions on European defense policy are made through the intergovernmental bargaining process. The theory also easily explained the lack of integration by placing the blame on the lack of Member State preference convergence. The problem with intergovernmentalism was that while it nicely explained treaty negotiations and Council meetings, it completely ignored the ability of EU actors and institutions to influence the positions of the Member States.

Prior to the intergovernmentalists, the supranationalists argued that elite actors on the supranational level were the drivers of integration. In *The Uniting of Europe*, Ernst Haas (1958) laid the foundation of European integration theory with his explanation of neo-functionalism. He argued that integration was a process where political actors shifted their loyalty from the national level to the supranational level creating a new state. This integration occurred through a process called “spill-over,” where integration in one sector led to further integration in another sector (Haas, 1958, p.293). Neo-functionalism incorrectly assumed that the integration process (spill-over) was self-deterministic leading automatically to full political integration. More importantly, it too quickly discounted the role of the nation-state

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in the integration process.

Both intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism ignore the role of the United States on European integration. As both theories are primarily concerned with economic integration this is forgivable, but the United States cannot be ignored in a discussion on European defense integration. There is no grand theory on the relationship between the United States and Europe over integration but realism and neo-realism attempt to understand the transatlantic relationship. The neo-realists propose that Europe is power-balancing against the United States but the development of ESDP does not fit such an explanation. In the realist school, Hegemonic Stability Theory provides a useful explanation suggesting that a hegemon provides security and stability, causing junior partners to free-ride and neglect their own responsibilities (Snidal, 1985). The presence of the United States hinders integration since there is little reason for Europe to devote its own scarce resources to develop institutional capabilities as long as NATO provides those services for minimal cost. While Hegemonic Stability Theory is useful in explaining the dynamic of the transatlantic relationship, it does not directly address European integration and must be used in conjunction with the traditional theories of integration.

**A Hybrid Model of European Security and Defense Integration**

Since intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism ignore key parts of the integration process, I propose a model that incorporates both theories and situates them within the larger transatlantic security framework as defined by the realist literature. The intergovernmentalist framework works best when analyzing the role of national governments, while neo-functionalism is useful in examining the actions and development of EU institutions in Brussels. Furthermore, I add a third dimension to account for the United States. My findings suggest that a three part model best explains the development of European security and defense integration.

A recent body of literature, known as “Brusselization” or “supranational intergovernmentalism,” is helpful in synthesizing the two traditional integration theory schools. “Brusselization” theory is not new to the debate on European integration and has previously been used to explain other policy areas of the EU. However, it has only recently been applied to ESDP. Brusselization theory argues that national representatives socialize together in Brussels and in the process establish an *esprit de corps* within the EU institutions such as COREPER, the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee, or the EU Military Staff. The national representatives work to find common solutions through frequent and intense meetings. Also they are often posted in Brussels for several years developing close working relationships with their counterparts (Lewis, 2005). Unlike Haas’s (1958) neofunctionalist theory, the representatives do not transfer their loyalty from their national governments to the EU. Instead the representatives believe they have a dual loyalty. Their role is to accurately represent their Member States, but they also have a responsibility to reach a collective agreement (Lewis, 2005). Insulation is one last important aspect of Brusselization. The national representatives are insulated from their domestic constituent pressures giving them some de facto decision-making capabilities independent of the national capitals (Lewis, 2005). Once the compromises are reached, the representatives return to their national governments to persuade them to accept the agreements (Cross, 2010). Brusselization provides the link between the intergovernmentalist and supranationalist literature since it accounts for the role of EU institutions without disregarding the intergovernmental negotiation process.
The United States/NATO framework is the first level of analysis. Over the last sixty years the United States via NATO has shaped the security and defense structure of Europe. In the process it has created certain lines that cannot be crossed. Some of these boundaries are intentionally created such as placing territorial defense solely under the purview of NATO. Attempts to expand ESDP into territorial defense were stiffly rebuked by Washington and never made it far in discussions. Other boundaries are unintentional and are the result of free-riding and bandwagoning by the European Member States. As the first security institution, NATO is able to shape the development of ESDP. The NATO security framework has its biggest impact on the development of national government preferences. In discussions on ESDP, national governments balance the benefits of an autonomous European security policy with the benefits and immense resources provided by the NATO alliance.

Next, the Member States negotiate with each other based on their national preferences. For the most part the European institutions cannot expand their authority or create new bodies without the approval of the individual Member States. Momentum for European security and defense integration in the last ten years has been driven by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UK). In particular, significant developments in defense integration have occurred between France and the UK with Germany acting as a pivot. The result has been the creation of European institutions through the intergovernmental process that mirror the preferences of the Member States especially Germany’s preference for an autonomous, civilian centered crisis-management capability (Miskimmon & Paterson, 2006).

Once institutions develop at the European level they begin to develop their own momentum and sustainability as according to Brusselization theory (Breuer, 2010). The policy-makers responsible for the day-to-day activity of ESDP spend most of their time in Brussels providing them some degree of autonomy from their national capitals. Over time they develop a “team spirit” and institutional identity that aims to reach compromises and ensure the success of ESDP. The policy outcomes developed by the EU institutions do not run counter to national preferences since the national governments still maintain a veto in the process, but the national governments are not able to micromanage the EU institutions. As a result the EU institutions are able to push back against the national governments and influence their preference formation through the supranational process. In sum, integration is the process where national governments facing internal and external demands cede authority to a supranational body which then overtime is able to influence the behavior and actions of the national governments.

Only a model that accounts for the United States, EU institutions, and European national governments can properly explain European security and defense integration. European defense integration moved forward in the late 1990s because changes in the transatlantic security environment gave a window for a European policy. In 1999 the preferences of France, Germany, and the UK moved close enough to allow for collaboration on European defense capabilities. However, defense integration has only slowly developed because of the continued presence of the United States, reluctance of national governments to give up sovereignty, and under-resourced EU institutions. This comprehensive model is useful in examining the four indicators.

**COMMON DEFENSE PROCUREMENT**

Joint weapons procurement has been a prominent feature of the European defense industry over the last sixty years. The individual European states lack the defense budgets and
domestic markets to independently procure advance military technology. Furthermore, the United States defense market places pressures on the European market to restructure and enticed European contractors to divert attention away from Europe. Multinational collaboration is a natural outcome of European defense market restructuring. Common defense procurement is important for European security and defense integration because it shows a shift away from national to European priorities. It encourages a convergence of thinking about international security among European governments leading to the possible formation of a European security identity (Keohane, 2002). From a practical standpoint, any European intervention force requires advanced equipment that no one Member State can fully provide.

**Joint Procurement from the WEU to ESDP**

In order to encourage and support joint procurement projects the Europeans initiated several institutions to facilitate armaments procurement. The 1948 Brussels Treaty included provisions to standardize weaponry, eventually forming the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG), but little effort was taken to rationalize procurement (Rees, 1999). In 1976 the United States pressured the Europeans to create the Independent European Program Group (IEPG) to coordinate European defense-industrial policies. The Europeans also hoped to use the IEPG to gain leverage in opening up the United States defense market to European firms (Lovering, 1999). In 1992, the IEPG was incorporated into WEAG. Yet, none of these institutions had any real power. The WEAG could only provide political coordination and discuss armaments standards; it could not force members to act or manage projects (Keohane, 2002). It was an organization with a lot of talking but little action or influence over the European defense industry.

In the 1980s, France and Germany began discussing a more ambitious alternative to the WEAG. Their goal was to create a European Armaments Agency, but during the 1980s nothing was established due to resistance from the national armed forces and a fear that the United States would benefit more from European cooperation (Lovering, 1999). The UK opposed efforts to establish an institution to manage procurement projects until it realized that its position put its firms at a disadvantage in continental Europe (Lovering, 1999). With no further British opposition, France and Germany along with the UK and Italy established the Organization for Joint Armaments Cooperation (OCCAR) in 1996. It became a legal entity in 2001 and now includes six members with the entry of Belgium and Spain. OCCAR’s key task was to establish clearly defined sets of procedures for managing joint procurement programs (Keohane, 2002). Unlike the WEAG, OCCAR played an active role in managing programs although it could not force a country to procure a weapons platform. The case of the A400M transport, the first project undertaken by OCCAR, shows that the organization has not completely solved the problems that plague joint procurement projects. By 2011, the A400M was about five million euros over budget and several years behind schedule (Kissler & Pearson, 2011). The failings of the A400M have tarnished OCCAR although it continues to be an active institution.

The institutions of the WEU collapsed into ESDP after the St. Malo summit. In 2003, France and the UK agreed to the formation of a new EU defense procurement agency. The European Defense Agency (EDA), launched in 2004, had three main tasks: harmonizing military requirements, coordinating defense R&D, and encouraging the convergence of national procurement procedures (Grevi & Keohane, 2009). The participants thought the EDA would have more influence than the WEAG since it would carry the political clout of
the EU (Grevi & Keohane, 2009). Like its predecessors the EDA could only help coordinate
Member States, and it did not have any power to “force Member States to spend more on
equipment or buy particular types of equipment” (Grevi & Keohane, 2009, p.85). In 2006,
the EDA introduced a defense procurement “Code of Conduct.” Countries that joined the
Code of Conduct vowed to open non-essential defense contracts worth over a million euros
to foreign bidders, and to aid the process the EDA set up a website to post those contracts
(Keohane, 2008). While the code showed that in principle the national governments agreed
that European defense markets need to be more open, in practice only very few of the vol-
untarily posted contracts were awarded to foreign bidders (Keohane, 2008). The added value
of the EDA was that it provided information that previously was not readily available. The
EDA maintained an immense amount of data on the European defense industry and national
policies. It also drafted various reports to indentify vital gaps in European defense capabili-
ties and provide a long-term vision (Grevi & Keohane, 2009). The EDA still faced the same
problems as the previous intergovernmental organizations, but it was more than a forum
for political discussion since it provided much more information to the Member States and
defense firms than the WEAG or the IPEG.

The Commission and a Common Defense Market

Until recently the Commission was unable to expand the common market to the
defense sector. The 1957 Rome Treaty that formed the European Community excluded def-
ense issues from a common market under Article 296. The article provided two exceptions
to the common market:

“(a) No Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of
which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security;
(b) any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the
protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the
production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material…” (Aalto, 2008, p.17).

The Commission repeatedly tried to expand its jurisdiction into defense but the Mem-
ber States strongly resisted by keeping Article 296 unchanged through the Maastricht, Am-
sterdam, Nice, and Lisbon treaties. An opening for the Commission emerged in the 1990s
and 2000s. Following a European Court of Justice ruling, the Commission declared com-
petence over arms exports but the national governments largely ignored the Commission
(Lovering, 1999). However, the Commission did win a concession over dual-use technolo-
gies. Then, in 2004 the Commission filed a report showing widespread misuse of Article 296
especially in the interpretation of “essential interests of its security” (European Commission,
2011). Member States were using Article 296 to cover all defense procurement since they felt
that the Commission’s public procurement directive was unsuitable for defense.

By the mid-2000s the Member States began to drop the opposition to the Commis-
sion playing a role in defense procurement due to their declining defense budgets and the
new approach taken by the Commission (Keohane, 2008). Instead of changing Article 296
the Commission developed a set of binding procurement rules designed for security and
defense issues. Member States could only use Article 296 for the most sensitive projects, but
they would have to provide reasoning (Keohane, 2008). The Council approved the directive
in August 2009 giving Member States two years to transpose the directive into national law.
It remains unclear how exactly the new directive will change the European defense industry especially since the Member States have not finished transposing the directive into law; however, the Commission is setting the foundation for a common defense market.

**INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION**

Intelligence cooperation is a second key component of security and defense integration. It allows for common threat perception since everyone has access to the same information, and on a practical level it ensures that forces operating under ESDP have the proper information to carry out their mission. Cooperation can take two forms. Horizontal coordination involves the construction of a network that national intelligence agencies use to exchange intelligence information with each other (Muller-Wille, 2004). Vertical assistance occurs when a supranational body produces its own assessments from the intelligence collected by national agencies or by the supranational body itself (Muller-Wille, 2004). The latter has been the most common method of cooperation undertaken by the EU due to several factors such as national sovereignty, trust, and privileged relationships.

**Intelligence Difficulties: Trust and the United States**

Distrust is an important factor hindering greater intelligence cooperation. In practice the problem of trust is visible in the relationship between the Big Three and the East European states admitted to the EU in 2004. It is widely assumed that the intelligence services of the former communist states are penetrated by the Russian Secret Service (Ruter, 2007). Many of these national agencies employ former agents of the KGB (Ruter, 2007). In 2008, a Russian spy with high level access to NATO’s classified information was uncovered in Estonia’s defense ministry furthering distrust between the West and East (Boyers, 2008). Also, Member States are afraid to disrupt privileged relationships with the United States. The strong link with the United States makes the UK hesitant to cooperate with its European partners or endorse a European intelligence project. The British do not want to open their intelligence network to all EU Member States for fear that the United States would stop sharing information. Likewise, the United States does not necessarily want everything it gives to the British to end up with other European nations (Ruter, 2007). Distrust between EU Member States is high, and the Member States place a high value on access to American intelligence information making cooperation difficult.

**European Intelligence Institutions**

The WEU was the first European institution to address intelligence cooperation. Prior to the WEU in the early 1970s the Europeans formed the informal Berne Group which was a forum for six European security services; now all twenty-seven EU members participate. It was the principle point of contact for the heads of the national intelligence agencies, but it lay outside of the EU and was mainly concerned with terrorism and organized crime (Aldrich, 2004). The WEU established the Torrejon Satellite Center in 1993. Despite its name, the Satellite Center did not own or operate any satellites (Nomikos, 2005). Instead, it purchased commercial images and analyzed them for the WEU or the WEU member states. Furthermore, it only had a staff of sixty-eight mainly tasked with processing the images (Muller-Wille, 2002). With the formation of ESDP, the Satellite Center was transferred to the EU where it fell under the indirect control of the Secretary-General/High Representative (SG/HR). While limited, the Satellite Center provided an intelligence processing capa-
Interoperability has been one of the least contentious aspects of European defense policy. Rarely do European states engage in large military operations outside the context of NATO, the UN, or other international organization. European militaries are used to working with each other and encourage bilateral or multilateral training arrangements. Such arrangements improve interoperability and allow for the pooling of scarce resources. If current defense spending trends continue then one way for the European states to field advanced military assets is by pooling. In the 1990s several joint training and asset pooling organizations were initiated to address European capability shortfalls that individual states could not reach on their own; however, the institutionalization of these organizations did not rapidly proceed at the European level.
Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation Efforts

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the Western European states established a variety of joint training and integrated military units. The Franco-German brigade established in 1987 was one of the biggest accomplishments during the period of Franco-German cooperation. While the brigade was more symbolic than substantive, it did set the groundwork for future efforts. The Franco-German brigade was transformed into the Eurocorps after 1992 with the inclusion of Spain, Belgium, and Luxembourg. The Eurocorps provides force headquarters capabilities to either NATO or the EU and can deploy up to 60,000 personnel drawn from the five framework nations (Laity, 1999). However, the Eurocorps mostly conducted operations under NATO rather than as part of ESDP. In 1994, France and the UK established the European Air Group (EAG) that now includes Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, and Germany. Its objective is “to improve the operational capabilities of the Parties Air Forces to carry out operations in pursuit of shared interests, primarily through mechanisms which enhance interoperability” (European Air Group, 2011). Unlike the Eurocorps, the EAG is not a standing force. To achieve its objective it engages in multinational training programs and coordination of air assets to improve interoperability. Other bilateral and multilateral arrangements outside the EU institutions include EUROFOR, EUROMARFOR, the European Gendarmerie Force, the Spanish-Italian amphibious force, the European Air Coordination cell, and the Athens Multinational Sealift Coordination Center.

The EU Battlegroups

The formation of ESDP gave the EU the ability to better coordinate the various cooperation arrangements that emerged in the 1990s. At the EU Helsinki summit in 1999 following the NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo, the EU governments agreed to the creation of the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) consisting of 60,000 troops plus supporting assets (Grevi & Keohane, 2009). In 2004, the ERRF was transformed into the battlegroup concept. France, the UK, and Germany proposed that the EU should establish thirteen battlegroups plus niche capabilities each consisting of 1,500 troops and deployable within two weeks for rapid crisis management. The concept required that two battlegroups always remain on standby (Mardell, 2008). Full Operational Capability was reached in January 2007. The battlegroups were intended to bolster the European military capability for both ESDP and NATO operations and allow for rapid peacekeeping interventions.

While the battlegroups are a significant step, they are limited and have faced difficulties. First, they do not actually represent any new forces as they consist of the former bilateral and multilateral initiatives. For example, in the second half of 2011 EUROFOR will provide one of the standby battlegroups (Eurofor, 2011). Second, the battlegroups do not represent any supranationalization of training. The EU has established broad guidelines for certifying the battlegroups, but the contributing states are responsible for certifying their own units (Lindstrom, 2007). As a result, there is no provision in the training system for EU-led exercises (Lindstrom, 2007). However, outside battlegroup certification the EU does engage in several training exercises each year. Third, it is unlikely that the EU could actually deploy 60,000 troops. Before the battlegroups became fully operational in 2007 the contributing states only volunteered “paper” armies. The contributing states found several ways to explain why the battlegroups could not be used to prevent their own forces from being deployed (Angelet & Vrailas, 2008). Finally, NATO has a similar rapid reaction force complicating the relationship between the EU and NATO. The two forces are designed to be complementary and rein-
forcing but concerns over duplication remain (Lindstrom, 2007). Furthermore, the NATO rapid reaction force has additional capabilities making it more effective at a wider range of tasks (Lindstrom, 2007). The EU battlegroups do represent a military capability available to the EU, but their use has been largely underutilized.

**OPERATIONAL PLANNING**

Whereas opposition to procurement and intelligence cooperation diminished in the last two decades, operational planning has been the most contentious aspect of ESDP. It refers to the planning and strategy necessary to conduct missions abroad. An autonomous European operational planning capability came into direct conflict with NATO’s integrated military command. Past integration efforts such as the WEU were involved with procurement, intelligence, or interoperability, but they completely lacked any autonomous planning capability. France wanted to use ESDP as the vehicle to finally provide the Europeans with their own operational headquarters (OHQ) capacity. The United States feared that such a step would decouple Europe from the United States security framework provided by NATO. An autonomous European planning capability was vehemently pushed by France and Germany just as transatlantic relations began to fray over the invasion of Iraq. Over time the European developed three methods to handle operational planning: the Berlin-Plus agreements giving the EU access to NATO assets, national operational headquarters, and an EU planning cell.

**NATO and Berlin-Plus**

NATO’s operational headquarters (OHQ) is the first option available to the Europeans, and it can be the most effective depending on the situation. In the mid-1990s, the WEU attempted to find a way to gain access to NATO assets. The resulting European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) allowed for the WEU to borrow assets, especially planning capabilities, from NATO and provided for the formation of a European identity separate from the United States within NATO (Howorth, 2007). ESDI failed in part because the United States was reluctant to lend its high-tech assets; however, the arrangement reemerged as Berlin-Plus in 2002 after six years of additional negotiations. The Berlin-Plus arrangement was first used in Macedonia during Operation *Concordia* (2003) where the EU was tasked with taking over for NATO forces. The mission was delayed several months due to Turkish opposition which became a recurrent problem when using Berlin-Plus (Gross, 2009). Disagreements between Cyprus (an EU member since 2004 but not a NATO Partnership-for-Peace member) and Turkey hindered cooperation between the two organizations (Keohane, 2009). Berlin-Plus is only problematic at the political stage, but “there is little doubt that, given NATO’s outstanding planning and C2 [command and control] capability, the Berlin Plus track represents the Union’s best planning and C2 bet so far if the potential EUFOR lies within the handover framework – the EU taking over a NATO operation (Simon, 2010, p.39).” In cases where NATO is not engaged, the EU has a second mechanism for operational planning.

**The Framework Nation Approach: National OHQs**

National OHQs have been used for all EU military missions outside the Balkans but have faced several difficulties. The framework nation approach consists of five national OHQs in France, UK, Germany, Italy, and Greece augmented by multinational staff (Guille, 2006). These are not permanent headquarters but they can be quickly set-up to handle ESDP operations. The central problem with the framework nation approach is that the
Member States do not always make their OHQs available for ESDP missions. For EUFOR RD Congo (2006) the French did not want to offer their OHQ since France had just concluded leading the previous ESDP operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Simon, 2010). The British did not want to lead an operation due to their commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Italians did not want to take up the issue during elections. Germany took up responsibility as a last resort, but it was unprepared due to its own commitment in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Kosovo and the arrival of a new government in Berlin (Simon, 2010). In theory there should always be a national OHQ available since each EU battlegroup on standby has an associated OHQ, but in practice the availability of national headquarters has been intermittent.

**The Civ/Mil Cell: a European Option**

In the absence of national OHQs and access to NATO assets, the EU Member States agreed to establish a European capability called the Civ/Mil Cell. France had long been the main advocate of an autonomous strategic level of command, but the UK was hesitant to create any institutions that would duplicate resources already available through NATO (Simon, 2010). Germany shared a similar view to the UK which explains the difficulty in establishing a European OHQ. While the UK and Germany did not want to create any autonomous capability for the EU, they did not oppose the creation of the Civ/Mil Cell. The UK saw the cell as a way to confine ESDP to civilian affairs (Simon, 2010). Germany saw the cell as a match to its own defense policy that stressed the link between the military and civilian aspects of conflict management. The compromise between the Big Three created the Civ/Mil Cell with the task to “reinforce the national HQ designated to conduct an EU autonomous operation, assist in coordinating civilian operations and have the responsibility for generating the capacity to plan and run an autonomous operation, once a decision on such operation has been taken” (Simon, 2010, p.21). Within the Civ/Mil Cell, an EU Operations Center was created to act as an EU OHQ. The Operations Center was not a standing OHQ, and it could only be activated when Member States decided not to use NATO assets and national OHQs were unavailable (Grevi, 2009). The Operations Center, operational since 2007, has yet to be used, but it does represent a European option available to the ESDP.

The Operations Center has not been used, but the Civ/Mil Cell has been increasingly active since it was established in 2005. Its permanent staff provides continuity to the ad-hoc nature of OHQ options available under ESDP. Furthermore, it presents added value by linking the civil and military dimensions of crisis management – an ability not offered by any other institution (Guille, 2006). The Civ/Mil Cell often finds itself playing an active role in planning even though it is supposed to play merely a support role to the OHQs. As mentioned above, the national governments are often hesitant to activate their OHQs. During EUFOR RD Congo, the German OHQ at Potsdam placed more of its emphasis on Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Kosovo. As a result, the Civ/Mil Cell and EUMS staff micromanaged much of the operation (Simon, 2010). The case of EUFOR DRC shows the greater role of ESDP institutions in planning missions, but this has often been a cause of mission delays. The Civ/Mil Cell is not designed to be an OHQ, yet at times it must act as a *de facto* OHQ due to the unpreparedness of the framework nation responsible for the mission.

**CONCLUSION: A NEW EUROPE?**

The EU’s foreign policy apparatus rapidly evolved after the end of the Cold War pro-
viding the Union with significant new tools to address world events. Skeptics refused to accept that the embryonic institutions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defense Policy were anything more than paper exercises. Writing in 2004 Robert Kagan observed that the “the effort to build a European force has so far been an embarrassment to the Europeans” (Kagan, 2004, p.53). This project was destined to fail because the central mission of the EU was to oppose power. Some staunch supporters of the EU agreed with Kagan’s assessment. The European project grew out of the desire to end war forever on the European continent through economic integration and civilian power. Acquiring military means would seem to go against everything on which the EU was built.

Europe’s new leaders of the post–Cold War era were aware that the world had changed. Frustrated with the lack of meaningful influence beyond the European borders, they recognized that the EU had to develop some hard power capabilities if it wanted to uphold its values. ESDP represents the most significant attempt in a long history of failed efforts to add a military dimension to the European project. Today, Europe is far more integrated on security and defense issues than it was twenty years ago, but it still faces many challenges. In this paper, I examined two questions: first, why has European security and defense integration progressed since the 1990s; second, what are the barriers to further integration that have caused ESDP to take its current limited form?

Assessing the Indicators

I developed a three part model to explain European security and defense integration. The transatlantic relationship governed by NATO sets a framework for possible integration efforts. This framework directly influences how the EU Member States assess their strategic priorities. The UK is the strongest NATO supporter, so its actions at the EU level ensure that NATO remains the primary security institution. Despite France’s historically difficult relationship with NATO, it still wants the United States to carry the burden of European security and defense. The next two levels of the model are part of a process called Brusselization. Through negotiations the Member States agree to cede authority to existing institutions or they establish new institutions under the EU framework. Overtime these institutions are able to assert a degree of autonomy from the Member State governments. The EU institutions then push back on the Member States influencing policy-making in the national capitals. This last process is crucial to integration. The creation of a central entity that lowers transaction costs and encourages nation states to collaborate is merely international cooperation, but if the central entity is able to influence and force the actions of the national governments toward a certain outcome then there is integration.

The level of integration across the four indicators – procurement, intelligence, interoperability, and operational planning – has been uneven. The United States via NATO has clearly played a key role. NATO has an indirect negative effect on integration that is visible for procurement and intelligence, relatively non-existent for interoperability, and moderately visible for operational planning. The transatlantic security framework has limited the options available to European security and defense integration.

The European national governments have played an active role in promoting and hindering European security and defense integration. France has been the most active proponent of an autonomous European capability; the UK has been the most resistant; and Germany has been somewhere in the middle. ESDP developed from compromises between the UK and France at St. Malo (later endorsed by Germany). On procurement and inte-
ligence the national governments have often placed barriers to further integration, while on interoperability and operational planning they have acted outside the EU framework. The national governments, while largely reluctant to cede authority, have played and will continue to play an active role in directing the shaping and extent of European security and defense integration.

EU institutions are playing a greater role in shaping European security and defense integration, but they remain rather limited. On intelligence cooperation and operational planning ESDP institutions exhibit some autonomy from the national governments. European institutions struggled to make an impact on defense procurement, but the Commission’s new directive may allow the EU to exert influence on procurement issues. The EU institutions are present on defense issues, and they have shown greater influence on the national governments as ESDP has matured. Just as NATO adds a dimension to the policy making of European national governments, the EU institutions contribute a new dimension that the national governments must address on defense and security issues.

Across the four indicators there has been progress toward greater security and defense integration. Twenty years ago there was only limited cooperation on procurement, no European intelligence capabilities, few bilateral training and pooling efforts, and no operational planning capability available to an autonomous European operation. ESDP has been only partially responsible for this progress. Often cooperation efforts started outside the EU framework. Cooperation on procurement has progressed due to the role of defense firms decoupled from their “home” governments and the Commission. ESDP has encouraged intelligence cooperation but some of the intelligence institutions were created in the waning years of the WEU before being transferred to the EU. The bilateral pooling arrangements were established prior to the St. Malo summit. ESDP staff does play a role in operational planning but all EU military operations have been formally conducted by NATO or national OHQs. European security and defense integration most likely would have progressed in the last two decades without ESDP; however, ESDP has provided the framework necessary for the EU to discuss military matters.

**European Defense Post-Lisbon**

The Lisbon Treaty made substantial changes to the EU and CFSP but it had surprisingly little effect on defense policy. Most of the changes were cosmetic, such as changing the name from ESDP to the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The creation of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (occupied by Catherine Ashton) will certainly elevate the role of the SITCEN and other institutions formerly attached to the SG/HR. The treaty also formally incorporated ESDP into the Treaty on the European Union declaring that “the common security and defense policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy” (Council of the European Union, 2010). Besides officially codifying the institutions of ESDP, the Lisbon Treaty established two additional provisions. First, the treaty included a solidarity clause: “if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power” (Council, 2010). The clause is a very watered-down version of NATO’s Article 5 solidarity clause as it does not require Member States to intervene on behalf of another Member State. It is more of a symbolic gesture than a new obligation for Member States.

Second, the treaty allows for a process called permanent structured cooperation. Per-
manent structured cooperation is not new to the EU as it has been used for the Eurozone and the Schengen Area for border control, but the Lisbon Treaty represents the first time that it has been formally applied to European defense. It allows for a select group of Member States with higher military capacities and desire to conduct more demanding missions under the auspices of the EU without the full twenty-seven Member States (Council, 2010). Only a qualified majority vote in Council is required to launch permanent structured cooperation (Council, 2010). A potential concern is that permanent structured cooperation could lead to multiple tracks of integration creating divisions between the Member States and preventing a common position (Margaras, 2010). Nonetheless, it gives the EU much more flexibility to conduct security and defense policy, and may prove to be an active tool for Member States in the near future. While not a permanent structured cooperation project, the Franco-British Treaty on Security and Defense Cooperation may act as a model for future collaborative efforts. Even if bilateral and multilateral arrangements become more common, they will be embedded within an EU security and defense framework. The Lisbon Treaty has secured ESDP as the EU’s security and defense policy mechanism.

__Final Thoughts: The Capacity versus the Will to Intervene__

The debate over whether the EU is experiencing security and defense integration is no longer important. European security and defense integration is a fact. It is not perfect and remains rather limited, but security and defense integration has progressed significantly since the end of the Cold War. Instead the debate should focus on the purpose of integration. First, does the EU have the capacity to intervene? As of 2011, the EU still lacks many important resources necessary for a more active military policy. The EU certainly cannot rival the United States, nor can it invade and occupy a foreign country. That was not the intention of ESDP. The EU’s security and defense policy is oriented toward crisis management. The fact that the EU has engaged in eight military missions affirms that the EU does have the capacity to use military force for limited humanitarian purposes. The EU may always be relegated to “cleaning the dishes,” but it does it on its own volition (Moravcsik & Nicolaides, 2005). Furthermore, the EU’s civilian apparatus bridges the civilian and military dimensions making it better suited for such tasks than the United States military’s emphasis on force projection.

The EU has the capacity to use military force, but it remains uncertain whether the Member States have the will to actively use the EU’s military capabilities. Darfur was seen as a perfect case for the EU to intervene since the atrocities went against the fundamental values of the EU. Instead, the EU Member States decided to assist the UN and the African Union. ESDP was designed to prevent a future Bosnia or Kosovo on the EU’s borders. In the early part of 2011, the political unrest in the Middle East and North Africa put the EU again in a difficult position. The EU will only launch a military operation with the legal backing of a UN Security Council Mandate or as a follow-on mission to a NATO operation, but the emergence of China and an assertive Russia in the last ten years have made the Security Council unwieldy for Europeans and Americans alike. ESDP is supposed to give the EU an autonomous security and defense policy, but the Europeans refuse to use it unilaterally. Furthermore, the EU institutions are bureaucratic and organized around consensus, which makes quick action difficult. This has caused some Member States, such as France and the UK, to work through bilateral channels to address crises. European security and defense integration has progressed enough to provide institutions with the capacity to intervene.
and contribute to European security; the Europeans just need the will to fully resource and utilize them.
## APPENDIX A
Integration from 1980 to 2010 by Indicator

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2000</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Procurement</td>
<td>Western European Armaments Group</td>
<td>EDA</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IEPG</td>
<td>OCCAR</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Industry Consolidation</td>
<td>Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transnational Industry Consolidation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>Berne Group</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Satellite Center</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Policy Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SITCEN</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligence Division (EUMS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interoperability</td>
<td>Franco-German Brigade</td>
<td>Eurocorps</td>
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<td></td>
<td>European Air Group</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EURIFOR/EUROMARFOR</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European Gendarmerie Force</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU Battlegroups</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Combined Joint Expeditionary Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operational Planning</td>
<td></td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
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<td>EU Military Committee</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Civ/Mil Cell</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Operations Center</td>
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