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War, Race, and Gender in American Presidential Elections in 1964 and 1972

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CLAREMONT McKENNA COLLEGE
WAR, RACE, AND GENDER IN AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN 1964
AND 1972

SUBMITTED TO
PROFESSOR EDWARD HALEY
AND
DEAN GREGORY HESS
BY
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Introduction

In a “typical” American election the partisan split is around 1-5 percent.¹ However, the presidential elections of 1964 and 1972 show an unprecedented shift in partisanship from an overwhelming majority voting Democrat in 1964 to a similar majority voting Republican in 1972. This paper will argue that a combination of race, gender and the number of American casualties in the Vietnam War were some of the causes of the partisan shift. Through the use of political polling and public opinion this paper will demonstrate that there is a significant shift in the party for which citizens voted for in these two elections. This is an issue of concern for all Americans. These unusual elections with tremendous partisan shifts are indicative of a long term shift in the general political thinking of the voters. Because the United States is a hegemonic power, this shift toward a more conservative voter base, culminating with the election of President Reagan in 1984 has a global impact.

This paper has three main chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter addresses how Americans’ reactions to the civil rights movement and the riots that came along with it contributed to the partisan shift from a Democratic majority in the 1964 election to the Republican majority in the 1972 election. Specifically, I examine how the race riots and civil rights movement of the 1960s impacted voter registration, turnout, and ultimately partisan alignment. The chapter will conclude that black voters will be loyal to whichever party is most likely to support equality and promote rights for blacks. Although the shift of black voters from voting Democrat in 1964 to the percentage that switched to vote

¹ Scammon, Richard M., and Alice V. McGillivray, eds. *America Votes*. 1976 ed. Vol. 12. Washington, D.C.: Elections Research Center, 1977.

Republican in 1972 is the smallest out of the examined categories, the chapter maintains that the 7 percent that did shift was influential.

The second chapter examines the role of gender in elections. It will argue that a large portion of the partisan shift that occurs is due to women. This argument is formed by taking into account societal role change of women during the Vietnam War as well as through voter turnout statistics. The chapter concludes that women and men alike are slowly moving away from the Democratic Party. It also concludes that women, although they do not make the difference, have a significant impact in the partisan shift between Democrats and Republicans in the 1964 and 1972 elections.

The final chapter addresses the direct impact that public reaction to the United States casualty count in the Vietnam War had on party identification. This chapter will demonstrate the counterintuitive fact that voter turnout continues to decline in times of international conflict. In relation to the decline of voters there is a shift away from strong party identification.

Lastly, the conclusion addresses the implications of the partisan shift in current politics by exploring theories of watershed elections. While some scholars have said that these elections were not indicative of a party realignment, using the criteria that Angus Campbell has provided the 1964 and 1972 election are realignment elections.² Given what has already been said this paper will examine how these elections can be seen as an overall shift toward a more conservative country. It will further conclude each of these

² Ronald R. Stockton and Frank Whelon Wayman, *A Time of Turmoil: Values and Voting in the 1970's* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1983), 15.

factors by themselves cannot significantly change the outcome in any election, but combined, the potential is tremendous.

Background

This paper studies the variation in partisan voting during two anomaly elections. In order to prove that these elections varied significantly from normal elections, “normal” must first be defined. In the scope of this paper a normal election is one whose difference between the percent votes received by the Democrats and Republicans is less than a ten percent. Examples of normal elections include the 1968, 1976, and 1982. The mere fact that the 1968 election only had a .7 percent margin of victory for the Republican Party during the middle of the Vietnam War suggests that there must be other significant factors that impacted the partisan shift.³

In an average election, about five to ten percent of registered Republicans or Democrats will vote the opposite party.⁴ In the 1964 election a drastic 20 percent of Republicans voted for the Democratic candidate, Johnson. Also abnormal, 13 percent of Democrats voted for a Republican in 1964.⁵ In contrast 33 percent of registered Democrats voted for Nixon, the Republican candidate in 1972.⁶ These statistics prove that many Americans, during atypical elections, do not remain loyal to their party affiliation.

³ Scammon, Richard M., ed. *American Votes*. 1968 ed. Vol. 8. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Gallup. <http://www.gallup.com/poll/9454/election-polls-vote-groups-19601964.aspx> (accessed September 28, 2010).

⁶ Gallup. <http://www.gallup.com/poll/9457/election-polls-vote-groups-19681972.aspx> (accessed September 28, 2010).

The chart below examines the party affiliation of voters between the two major parties by year. It is therefore inferred that the remaining voters identify themselves as independent. The chart shows that historically, an overwhelming majority identify themselves as Democrats. This in itself proves that many Democrats do not vote their party identification. Further, the fact that in the elections being focused on (1964 and 1972) have 25 and 37 percent respectively identifying as Independents means that Independents have the ability to have a large impact in these elections.

TABLE 17.1
Party Identification, 1952–80
(as a percentage)

<i>Date</i>	<i>Democrat</i>	<i>Republican</i>	<i>Total Support for Two Major Parties</i>
1952	47	27	74
1960	46	27	73
1964	51	24	75
1968	45	24	69
1972	40	23	63
1976	39	24	63
1980	41	23	64

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SOURCE: University of Michigan CPS.

Due to the large number of Independents, it is important to take into consideration how independents typically vote. The second graph depicts a breakdown of independent

⁷ "Party Identification, 1952-80," chart, University of Michigan CPS, in *Political Parties in American Society*, by Samuel J. Eldersveld (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1982), 389.

voting by year up through 1968. Out of the eight elections that were studied for the graph, the majority of Independents voted Democrat four years and Republican the other four. Therefore, it can be concluded that the Independent vote is constantly up for grabs.

TABLE 1-8 The Distribution of Votes for President by Independents from 1940 to 1968

	1940	1944	1948	1952	1956	1960	1964	1968
Democratic	61%	62%	57%	33%	27%	46%	66%	32%
Republican	39	38	43	67	73	54	34	47
Wallace (1968)								21
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
n =	?	?	?	263	309	298	219	228
	(Gallup Poll)			(Survey Research Center)				

Sources. George Gallup, *The Political Almanac*, 1952, p. 38; Survey Research Center; and William H. Flanigan, *Political Behavior of the American Electorate*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon Inc., 1972), p. 44.

Lastly, the third graph shows voter loyalty to the parties they identify with. This graph shows which groups ultimately end up voting against their party affiliation in particular elections.

⁸ "The Distribution of Votes for President by Independents from 1940 to 1968," map, Survey Research Center, in *American Public Opinion: Its Origins, Content, and Impact*, by Robert S. Erikson and Norman R. Luttbeg (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1973), 12.




Figure 1-2. Vote for President by Partisans and Independents in 1952, 1956, 1960, 1964, and 1968. (Source. Survey Research Center. Reprinted from William H. Flanigan, *Political Behavior of the American Electorate*, 2nd ed., © Copyright 1972 by Allyn and Bacon, Inc. Used by permission.)

Another factor that must be discussed is voter turnout. While one's intuition would rationalize an increase in political interest and therefore an increase in voter turnout during times of international conflict the statistics prove otherwise. From 1960-

⁹ "Vote for President by Partisans and Independents in 1952, 1956, 1960, 1964, and 1968," map, Survey Research Center, in *American Public Opinion: Its Origins, Content, and Impact*, by Robert S. Erikson and Norman R. Luttbeg (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1973), 11.

1976 (roughly the span of the Vietnam War) the average voter turnout of eligible voters was about 60 percent with a sharp decline to the mid/lower 50s in the 1972 and 1976 elections.¹⁰ One factor in the drastic decline was the 26th amendment.

The 26th amendment to the United States constitution, which changed the voting age to 18, was ratified at the end of 1971. By decreasing the voting age an entire new population of young men and women were able to cast ballots in the 1972 presidential election. In theory, this should have increased voter registration and turnout in the 1972 election. Instead, this became one of the largest declines in the percentage of voter turnout.

While the average increase in the voting age population between presidential elections is around 11 million, the increase between the 1968 and 1972 elections was over 20 million. The voter registration only increased by 15 million and the percent of the voting-age population that voted was a meager 55.2 percent instead of the previous average of 60 percent. It is possible to conclude that the new, younger voting population is to blame for this sharp decline. Since the ratification of the 26th amendment there has been a continuous decline in the percent turnout of the voting-age population.¹¹

While voters' reactions to shifts in perceptions of race, gender, and the Vietnam War will be the focus of this paper there are more factors that must be examined. Some of these include type of work, education level, and political scandals during a campaign. Occupation played a role in the partisan shift of 1964 and 1972. In polling data, occupations are divided into three categories; professional and business, white collar, and

¹⁰ "National Voter Turnout in Federal Elections: 1960-2008," Information Please, <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0781453.html> (accessed October 13, 2010).

¹¹ Ibid.

manual. In the 1960 election 40 percent of both professionals and white collar workers voted for the Democratic candidate and about 50 percent for the Republican candidate. Manual workers voted 60 percent for the Democrat and 40 percent for the Republican.¹² However, in 1964, the professionals and white collar workers voted in the 50 percent for the Democrat candidate and in the low 40 percentage for the Republican. The manual workers had an 11 percent increase in their votes for the Democrat. This same shift is evident in the 1968 and 1972 elections except the shift went in favor of the Republican candidate.¹³

Education is a key factor in any voter turnout study. Polling data indicates that the higher the level of education a person has, the more likely they are to vote and be informed voters. However, few studies examine how education level affects party votes. In a normal election (as defined above) about 60 percent of college graduates vote Republican and 40 percent vote Democrat, high school graduates typically split 50-50, and grade school graduates usually vote 60 percent Democrat and 40 percent Republican.¹⁴ With this knowledge, this paper seeks to use public opinion polls to demonstrate that factors greater than education, occupation, and political scandals have the ability to create a significant shift in party identification.

Although the Watergate scandal happened before President Nixon was reelected in 1972, the story didn't come out until 1973. This delay gave Nixon time to appoint a

¹² Gallup. <http://www.gallup.com/poll/9454/election-polls-vote-groups-19601964.aspx> (accessed September 28, 2010).

¹³ Gallup. <http://www.gallup.com/poll/9457/election-polls-vote-groups-19681972.aspx> (accessed September 28, 2010).

¹⁴ Ibid.

Republican vice president before he was forced to resign.¹⁵ However, in the first presidential election following the scandal the country elected a Democrat. This is indicative of a pattern that has occurred throughout history. After Bill Clinton's scandal was revealed the country continued this pattern and voted not necessarily for the Republican Party, but against the Democratic Party.

Each of these factors come together to contribute to any type of partisan shift no matter how large or small or from which party to which. Although the statistical information points out that certain factors weigh more heavily in certain electoral outcomes, none of these factors is strong enough to be the sole cause of any party's victory.

¹⁵ Watergate, "Watergate Chronology," Watergate Info, <http://www.watergate.info/chronology/1974.shtml> (accessed November 28, 2010).

Race and the Partisan Shift

The Vietnam War may have attracted the most controversy internationally during the 1960s but beyond the anti-war protests inside the United States an unprecedented movement was taking place: the civil rights movement of the 1960s. This chapter argues that Americans' reaction to the civil rights movement and the riots that came along with it contributed to the partisan shift from a significant Democrat majority in the 1964 presidential election to an almost landslide victory for the Republican Party in 1972. The increase in black voter registration and turnout through this time allowed for a greater political voice among the black community. However, even with the increase in black voter turnout, the white majority was still able to outvote and therefore have a greater impact in the presidential elections of 1964 and 1972. The civil rights movement during the 1960s paved the way for future political activism in the black community but has not had a dramatic impact in any electoral turnout.

This chapter will begin with a brief background to the civil rights movement and the riots that occurred in the 1960s. Following this is historical data on the voting pattern of blacks which demonstrates that blacks are loyal to the party that best benefits the advancement of their societal standing and equality. Culminating all of this is the analysis of how these factors along with others such as education caused black voters to shift from an overwhelming majority voting Democrat in 1964 to only a majority voting Democrat in 1972.

The civil rights movement first reached the attention of large numbers of Americans in 1955 when Rosa Parks refused to give up her seat on a bus in Alabama.¹⁶ This demonstration was followed by further discrimination which led to non violent sit-ins, demonstrations and eventually racial violence. As the movement for racial equality progressed riots began to break out around the country in many cities. The first riot was the Watts riot in Los Angeles that took place in 1965. This riot was followed by equally severe uprisings in Newark in 1966 where the National Guard had to be called in and the Detroit riot in 1967 where federal troops had to be used. The largest of these riots was the Chicago riot that took place on April 5, 1968 in direct response to the assassination of civil rights leader Martin Luther King. Following his death, 95 riots sprang up across the nation in the following year.¹⁷ Although these were the major uprisings of the time the movement inspired unrest in over 127 cities across the nation.¹⁸

Prior to the riots, in the summer of 1964 hundreds of volunteers from various organizations came together in Mississippi to launch a voter registration drive. The drive was intended to help southern blacks gain equality and allow them to have a political impact. It registered thousands of new voters by teaching the importance of voting.¹⁹ Up until this time African Americans in the south had been deterred from voting by rigged tests of eligibility and threat of violent reprisals. Further, there was no way to monitor poll taxes and therefore blacks were often taxed a rate so high that they could not afford to vote. The voter registration drive in Mississippi produced a voter turnout increase

¹⁶ Michael Clodfelter, *Warfare and Armed Conflicts: a Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500-2000*, 2nd ed. (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2002), 703.

¹⁷ Ibid., 704.

¹⁸ Ibid., 705.

¹⁹ Ibid., 703.

throughout the state of 110,975 people.²⁰ Throughout the South, voter registration drives such as this, increased the overall African American registered voters by about half a million.²¹ Although black voter turnout increased dramatically in 1964, nearly all voting for Democratic candidates, white voters still outnumbered blacks substantially and most Mississippians voted Republican. This indicates that the sharp increase in voter turnout in Mississippi was due, in part, to a surge of white voters trying to suppress the black minority.

Throughout the nation 94 percent of nonwhite voters supported Democratic presidential candidate or voted to reelect Democratic president Lyndon Johnson in the 1964 election.²² It has been agreed upon by historians that the 1964 election was one of the most racially polarized elections in recent history. Ironically, scholars also believe that race alone was not the deciding factor.²³ This overwhelming support for the Democratic candidate was a relatively new concept for African American voters at the time. Blacks, like women, had a conservative voting history. African Americans strongly supported the Republican Party up until 1936 Republican Party had brought blacks Emancipation and the brief period of reconstruction. Blacks then strongly supported the New Deal presidential coalition until 1956 when they voted Republican at a higher level than anytime since 1932.²⁴ By 1960 the civil rights movement had gained speed and the

²⁰ Scammon, Richard M., ed. *American Votes*. 1964 ed. Vol. 6. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966.

²¹ Rhoda Lois Blumberg, *Civil Rights: The 1960s Freedom Struggle* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1984), 94.

²² Gallup. <http://www.gallup.com/poll/9454/election-polls-vote-groups-19601964.aspx> (accessed September 28, 2010).

²³ Jeremy D. Mayer, *Running on Race: Racial Politics in Presidential Campaigns, 1960-2000* (New York: Random House, 2002), 40-41.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 4.

black vote was anybody's guess. As Gallup polls demonstrate, a very heavy majority 68 percent of nonwhites voted Democrat in the 1960 election.²⁵ This dramatic shift only intensified into the 1964 election when African Americans shifted their party affiliation and loyalty to the Democratic Party. This shift toward the Democrat party can be explained partially by the way presidential candidates treated the civil rights movement and also by societal factors. Johnson campaigned for racial equality. He repeatedly pledged to pass laws that supported equal rights. Goldwater's solution, on the other hand, was to focus on the southern white vote and claim that it was up to the state to determine future racial laws.²⁶ He claimed that each state knew what it needed best and that integration was not a legal issue but instead an issue of the heart and therefore it was not the duty of the federal government to pass integration laws.²⁷ Being that this presidential election was racially charged, it was detrimental that Barry Goldwater was unable to persuade black voters that he was a viable presidential candidate.

From the 1964 to the 1972 presidential elections nonwhite voters shifted from 6 percent voting Republican to 13 percent voting Republican.²⁸ This 7 percent change is only average in size throughout the historical changing opinion of black voters. One reason for this average shift is the lack of attention that was being given to the civil rights movement at this time. Nixon had since become accustomed to the riots and was now doing what he could to calm the south while still carrying on with Vietnam. This shift of

²⁵ Gallup. <http://www.gallup.com/poll/9454/election-polls-vote-groups-19601964.aspx> (accessed September 28, 2010).

²⁶ Jeremy D. Mayer, *Running on Race: Racial Politics in Presidential Campaigns, 1960-2000* (New York: Random House, 2002), 43.

²⁷ 4 President Corporation, "Barry Goldwater for President," 4President, <http://www.4president.org/brochures/goldwater1964brochure.htm> (accessed November 27, 2010).

²⁸ Gallup. <http://www.gallup.com/poll/9457/election-polls-vote-groups-19681972.aspx> (accessed September 28, 2010).

African American voters from traditional Republican voting to a more recent Democratic majority is demonstrated in the chart below. The shift that takes place is demonstrative of how blacks have drastically changed their party affiliation and voting tendencies since 1952.




Figure 6-12. Race and presidential voting, 1952-1968. Percentages are of two-party vote, 1952-1964; of three-party vote, 1968. (Source. Gallup Poll.)

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Voter registration among African Americans has always been a topic of concern for civil rights activists. A main reason for this was that in 1952 only 4 percent of eligible

²⁹ "Race and Presidential Voting, 1952-1968," chart, Gallup Poll, in *American Public Opinion: Its Origins, Content, and Impact*, by Robert S Erikson and Norman R Luttbeg (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1973), 188.

southern African Americans were registered to vote.³⁰ Government programs and registration drives throughout the country dramatically increased that number to 63 percent by 1968. Strikingly, this statistic was only true in the south. Northern African Americans had a 64 percent registration rate even in 1952 and 83 percent of the non southern African Americans turned out to vote in 1964. This large influx in voter turnout among blacks in the north was only part of the Democratic victory. Not only did the 1964 election have a high number of African Americans turn out to vote but a large portion of the voting population that did turn out to vote were young African Americans. The younger generation that turned out to vote was the same group that was putting together demonstrations. The activism for societal equality went beyond education and job opportunities. This young group also protested for political equality which included equal voting rights. The level of young African Americans who turned out for the 1964 election has not since been reached in another election until 2008.³¹

In 1964 about 70 percent of the white voting population turned out to vote while a record high 58 percent of blacks showed up to vote. Due to the surge of white voters in 1964 as a result of the black voter registration drives, it is logical to think that the surge would continue in 1968. This is partially true in that the percentage of white voter registration increased from 61.1 percent in 1960 to 76.5 percent in 1967.³² However,

³⁰ M. Margaret Conway, *Political Participation in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc, 2000), 32.

³¹ U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Census Bureau, <http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/historical/tabA-9.csv> (accessed November 11, 2010).

³² Paul Kleppner, *Who Voted? The Dynamics of Electoral Turnout, 1870-1980* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), 116.

white voter turnout continued to decrease as did black voter turnout with black voter turnout decreasing at a slower rate.³³ The graph below shows the steady decline in both voter registration and voter turnout by race in presidential and midterm elections from 1966 to 1996.

TABLE 2-2
*Reported Registration and Voter Turnout by Race, Presidential and
Midterm Elections, 1966-1996*

Year	Presidential elections				Midterm elections			
	Percent registered		Percent voting		Percent registered		Percent voting	
	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
1968	75.2	66.2	69.1	57.6	71.7	66.2	64.5	52.1
1972	73.4	65.5	64.5	52.1	69.1	60.8	56.0	43.5
1976	68.3	58.5	60.9	48.7	63.5	54.9	46.3	33.8
1980	68.4	60.0	60.9	50.5	63.8	57.1	47.3	37.2
1984	69.6	66.3	61.4	55.8	65.6	59.1	49.8	43.0
1988	67.9	64.5	59.1	51.5	65.3	64.0	47.0	43.2
1992	70.1	63.9	63.6	54.0	63.8	58.8	46.7	39.2
1996	67.7	63.5	56.0	50.6	64.6	58.5	47.3	37.1

SOURCES: Bureau of the Census, "Voter Participation in November 1972," *Current Population Reports*, ser. P-20, no. 144 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, December 1972), Tables A and B; "Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1988," *Current Population Reports*, ser. P-20, no. 440 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, October 1989), Tables A and B; <http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/voting/history/htable01.txt>.

³³ U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Census Bureau, <http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/historical/tabA-9.csv> (accessed November 11, 2010).

Measuring African American turnout in absolute terms leads to an unrealistic comparison to other ethnicities. Studies have shown that people who are better educated and have a higher income turn out to vote in higher numbers and with greater regularity. The better educated voters with a higher income tend to be white. Therefore, it is imperative that these differences be taken into consideration when talking about the impact that race has in voter turnout and ultimately in presidential elections. Paul Kleppner has looked into these differences in his book *Who Voted? The Dynamics of Electoral Turnout, 1870-1980*. By accounting for these differences Kleppner was able to find a realistic comparison between the two ethnicities. This comparison shows what voting would be like between whites and blacks if all societal factors were equal.

The graph below demonstrates how the adjustment of the factors previously mentioned can be taken into account and then compared to the average white voter. The negative sign indicates that even with the adjustments white voters had a higher voter turnout. The difference attributed to race begins to shrink in 1962 and continues to shrink until disappears in the north in 1964 and in the south in 1968.

The 1972 election provides an interesting situation for African American voters. In 1972, 33 percent of registered Democrats voted for Nixon (the Republican candidate). Of this 33 percent, the black population made up about 13 percent. This is a 6 percent

³⁴ "Reported Registration and Voter Turnout by Race, Presidential and Midterm Elections, 1966-1996," chart, Bureau of the Census, in *Political Participation in the United States*, by M. Margaret Conway (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 2000), 33.

increase from the 7 percent of blacks who voted Republican in 1964.³⁵ A major cause for this shift was the slowing of the civil rights movement. The riots had come to a stop and the movement had died down. There was a new found sense of equality and the issues at hand for black voters had changed slightly. The slight shift explains why the overwhelming majority remained loyal to the Democratic Party.

Differences Between the Turnout Rates of Black and White Voters^a

	South			Nonsouth		
	(Wtd. N)	Unadjusted	Adjusted ^b	(Wtd. N)	Unadjusted	Adjusted ^b
<i>President</i>						
1952	(349)	-47.6	-35.9	(1342)	-21.8	-14.6
1956	(487)	-41.1	-25.9	(1396)	-25.7	-16.7
1960	(583)	-45.3	-28.7	(1473)	-14.3	-10.8
1952-60 ^c	(1419)	-44.9	-29.4	(4211)	-20.2	-14.1
1964	(380)	-22.4	-11.0	(1204)	-3.1	+8.6
1968	(369)	+8	+14.9	(1091)	-17.3	-10.8
1972	(628)	-7.1	+11.5	(1714)	-2.5	+1.3
1976	(554)	-2.1	+12.4	(1733)	-1.2	+3.5
1980	(286)	-6.1	-2.0	(712)	-11.4	-5.2
1964-80 ^c	(2217)	-4.9	+7.0	(6454)	-5.6	-.1
<i>Off-Year Congress</i>						
1958	(506)	-24.9	-16.7	(1402)	-13.4	-4.0
1962	(330)	-14.2	-3.6	(959)	-20.7	-14.5
1966	(309)	-14.9	-.9	(995)	-5.7	+5.0
1970	(406)	-9.0	-.5	(1075)	-17.3	-3.9
1974	(692)	-4.3	+3.8	(1726)	-20.0	-15.8
1978	(346)	-9.7	-1.5	(1018)	-12.0	-7.4
1962-78 ^c	(2083)	-9.0	+6	(5773)	-15.1	-7.4

^aEntries are differences between black and white turnout rates, with minus signs indicating higher white turnout. The 18-20 age group has been excluded for all years.

^bDifferences between group turnout rates adjusted for the effects of age, education, income, and sex.

^cDerived from pooled data sets.

³⁵ Gallup. <http://www.gallup.com/poll/9457/election-polls-vote-groups-19681972.aspx> (accessed September 28, 2010).

It is evident from the above graphs and analysis that although race was not decisive in determining the outcome of the elections from 1964 to 1972, it played a role in the outcome of the 1964 and 1972 contests. In 1964 when the civil rights movement was still very prominent race was a main topic of conversation during the election. By 1972 when the civil rights movement had settled down, other topics of interest took the forefront. Race played only a moderate role in the 1968 election, despite the race riots, as Vietnam had taken primary concern.

Although the peak of the civil rights movement is in the distant past there are still racial issues that factor into presidential elections. Race had become less of a concern for several years until in 2008 the United States elected its first black president. This has been monumental for the racial equality movement and has proven how far Americans have come from segregated schools to electing an African American leader of the free world. Aside from this accomplishment, many citizens continue to feel that equality has still not been achieved and until that has occurred race will continue to play a factor in all elections.

³⁶ “Differences Between the Turnout Rates of Black and White Voters,” chart, Paul Kleppner, *Who Voted? The Dynamics of Electoral Turnout, 1870-1980* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), 117.

Gender and the Partisan Shift

Throughout history women have been thought of as inferior. Women had a role in the house as a wife, mother, and housekeeper. They were often not welcome in the workforce and when they were, their salaries were less than their male counterparts and there was no such thing as equal treatment in the work place. This chapter seeks to examine how the changing role of women at home, in society and the Vietnam War impacted the voting turnout and partisan shift of women. To begin, the chapter will give background on how women's role in society and at home changed during the 1960s. It will then look into historical voting trends of women and how they have changed over time. Lastly, the chapter will analyze how the Vietnam War has impacting these voting trends, thus concluding that since the 1960s women have identified better with the Democratic Party. Although women tend to identify themselves as Democrats, there are particular instances in which the majority of women voted Republican such as the 1972 election. This also allows one to conclude that women are not as closely tied to party identification as males. These findings are important to future campaigns. The knowledge that at least a large percentage of the female vote is flexible allows for politicians to focus large parts of their campaign on the female vote.

The struggle for political standing was interrelated to the struggle for societal equality. However, just as African Americans had to fight to gain equality, and subsequently gained it, so too did women. This fight for equality between men and women began around 1918 when women's suffrage became a feasible goal. Although the struggle continues today, the 1960s were a time for women to step away from their traditional conservative roles and become politically active.

The 60's were known for the Beatles, drugs, and the countercultural movement. This was the perfect setting for women to stand up and make a point. Many women were ready to change everything. They changed their appearances by changing their makeup, hairstyle, and most obviously, the drastic change in clothes. The shy, conservative, housewife was no longer the role these women wanted to fulfill.

Even with a striking social shift taking place in the 1960s, it has not been until recently that scholars and politicians began to study gender roles as a factor in partisan identification and turn out. This new field began to study the “gender gap” which refers to the difference in political opinion and voting between men and women. The normal gender gap on any issue is about five to ten percentage points.³⁷ This means that in normal elections, men and women should statistically not be the cause of any partisan shift. The only way a partisan shift can be caused by gender is if either males or females make a drastic change in their opinion on several issues, thus causing a change in party identification. However, if men and women tend as a group to vote in the same way on a particular issue (for instance tough on crime or welfare benefits) then a single issue has the ability to be the cause of a majority of the population to change party affiliation.

In the 1950s most female voters identified themselves with the Republican Party.³⁸ There were two specific reasons for this. The first was that many females, both those who worked and those who stayed at home were not in unions. This was generally the cause because union jobs were not offered to women. Either way, females were not in unions and therefore had no desire to affiliate with a party that was very much union

³⁷ Lois Drake Whitaker, ed. *Voting the Gender Gap* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2008), 9.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 10.

based at the time. The second reason is that women in society thought of themselves and were seen as tradition housewives who were religious and conservative in both dress and speech. This stereotype produced a natural alignment with the Republican Party which tended to have a more religious based policy agenda.

As is expected there are certain issues which evoke a gender gap. The first, and perhaps the most obvious, is violence. This difference originated in the 1940s with men being more supportive of the death sentence and women being more favorable to gun control.³⁹ A Gallup poll done in 1967 revealed that when asked if the person would favor a law requiring a police permit before buying a gun 83 percent of women said yes while only 66 percent of men agreed.⁴⁰ When asked if a person who was convicted of murder should receive the death penalty, 51 percent of women were *opposed* while only 36 percent of males were *opposed*⁴¹. This difference in opinion continues in the debate over international violence. With international violence come casualties and sometimes poorly planned military operations. These events have a higher rate of leading to the injury or death of civilians, therefore decreasing women's approval ratings. Therefore it is no surprise that when asked if the United States should have stayed out of Vietnam, 69 percent of women and 57 percent of men agreed.⁴²

The second issue that men and women generally disagree on is what is called compassion issues. This category includes things like welfare and equality laws. The

³⁹ Ibid., 11.

⁴⁰ "Opinion Differences Between Men and Women on Selected Issues," chart, Gallup Opinion Index, in *American Public Opinion: Its origins, Content, and Impact*, by Robert S. Erikson and Norman R. Luttbeg (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1973), 206.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² "Opinion Differences Between Men and Women on Selected Issues," chart, Survey Research Center, in *American Public Opinion: Its origins, Content, and Impact*, by Robert S. Erikson and Norman R. Luttbeg (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1973), 206.

origin of this gap is directly correlated to transformation of women's ideologies and the gaining of equality in society through the 60s and 70s. This gap began to gain recognition in the early 70s.⁴³ While there are several explanations for the growth of this gap, scholars tend to agree that the basic reason for this underlying difference is maternal instinct. Mothers want their children to have equal opportunities throughout life and want to know that if their children are in a tough economic situation that they will be provided for by the government. The fathers tend to have a "tough love" approach and believe that their children will be able to succeed or fail on their own accord.

The National Election Studies (NES) has conducted surveys on voters' views of using military force in international conflict. Contrary to the above survey, this NES survey was used to find the approval rating of wars once they had already started and to measure how the approval ratings changed throughout the war. The first survey was conducted in 1952 asking men and women separately how they felt about the United States being involved in the Korean War. To this question, 57 percent of men and only 42 percent of women thought that United States involvement was the right thing to do.⁴⁴ The same survey, with the same wording, was again used during the 1960s and 1970s to determine men's and women's opinions concern both the involvement in Vietnam. While overall support fell from 61 percent in 1964 to 34 percent in 1972, the gender gap remained solid with a nine percent difference throughout the war.⁴⁵ This concludes that while the gender gap was not the sole factor in the partisan shift between the two

11. ⁴³ Lois Drake Whitaker, ed. *Voting the Gender Gap* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2008),

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 18.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 18.

elections, it was on the brink of being an abnormal split which is anything above ten percent difference between men and women.

As time passes gender issues tend to shift and along with this is a change in party identification. From the point when women acquired the right to vote until the beginning of the countercultural movement women tended to identify more with the Republican Party. This was due to the conservative nature of women's roles. During the 1960s and 1970s as women's roles began to change so did their party affiliation. Women started to become more liberal in both society and politics. The one issue that they remained conservative on was religion. Women tend to be more likely to support prayer in school and drug and alcohol laws.

Although each of the categories mentioned above play a role in the gender gap, the overarching theme is party identification. NES has been conducting partisan alignment surveys of both men and women since 1952. The support for the Democratic Party among men peaked in 1954 and 1964 at 61 percent and declined to 41 percent in 1994. The support among men for the Democratic Party remained in the 40s until the 2008 election where men split down the middle for Democrats and Republicans.⁴⁶ The support for the Democratic Party among women also declined. Women's support peaked in 1964 with 62 percent, and since declined to 51 percent in 1984. Since 1984 women's support for the Democratic Party has remained in the low 50s or upper 40s. The exception was the 2008 election in which 57 percent of women voter for Obama.⁴⁷ Although there has been a slight decline in support of the Democratic Party among

⁴⁶ Gallup. <http://www.gallup.com/poll/139880/Election-Polls-Presidential-Vote-Groups.aspx#1> (accessed November 23, 2010).

⁴⁷ Ibid.


women, the majority continues to stay in favor of Democratic candidates. Meanwhile, men have consistently decreased their support for Democrats at a rate of about one percent per election cycle.⁴⁸

The gender gap in terms of party affiliation is not consistent. Leading up to the 1960s women were far more Republican than men were, but ten percent less of eligible women voters turned out to vote. Therefore the party gap between the genders was not statistically significant until 1956. At this point a shift began to occur and men started to identify with the Republican Party and women became more Democratic in identification. At this point women began to speak up more about their voting rights and become more involved with societal issues. In the 1960s as the Vietnam War gained momentum and the duration became unclear women identified better with the anti-war party which was usually Democrat. Thus, as women gained status in the working field during the war many of the women felt they should continue to gain equality in the work force, therefore reinforcing the most prominent issue for women as social issues. As noted in the figure below the shifting of parties crossed in 1964 and became statistically significant in 1972. From 1972 forward the gender gap, in regards to party identification has remained significant in the majority of elections.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Lois Drake Whitaker, ed. *Voting the Gender Gap* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2008), 25.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 26.

Figure 1.6. Democratic identification and the gender gap.



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An important category that is often over looked is the sway of registered Independent female voters. As the two charts below demonstrate, there is a significant difference when independents are forced to take a side in a two party system. The first chart shows party identification by gender which includes voters who identify themselves as strong and weak Democrats or Republicans. The second chart shows party preference which includes voters who are strong, weak, and independents who lean Democrat or Republican. The difference in the numbers show that 8 percent of female voters who identified themselves as independent sided with the Democratic Party in 1964 while only 5 percent sided with Republicans. A larger gap is shown in the male independent voters. 11 percent of independent voters when asked which direction they would lean sided with the Democratic Party and only 7 percent sided with Republicans. This lean in independent voters, combined between men and women, had the possibility to account for 19 percent of the votes for Democrats in the 1964 election. This election was a landslide election and the Democrats won the election by about 23 percent. However, the independent vote may have counted for a significant part of that landslide.

The 1972 election was a landslide for the Republican Party. President Nixon also won the election by about 23 percent. In the 1972 election 12 percent of male Independent voters said they leaned Democrat while 13 percent said they leaned Republican. In the same election 11 percent of Independent female voters said they would side with the Democratic Party and 9 percent said they would side with

⁵⁰ "Democratic Identification and the Gender Gap," chart, in *Voting the Gender Gap*, ed. Lois Duke Whitaker (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2008), 26.

Republicans. Collectively, male and female Independents would make up 23 percent of Democrats and 22 percent of Republicans. Therefore it can be concluded that gender within Independent voters did not play a significant factor in the landslide election of 1972 but it did have a significant impact in 1964.

TABLE 2.3
Party Identification by Gender, 1952-1984
(percentages)

Year	Democrats		Republicans		Democratic Edge for Women
	Females	Males	Females	Males	
1952	48	47	29	25	+1
1954	46	50	29	25	-4
1956	42	45	32	26	-3
1958	49	48	29	28	+1
1960	49	45	30	28	+4
1962	45	49	31	26	-4
1964	53	50	26	23	+3
1966	46	46	26	23	0
1968	47	43	23	15	+4
1970	45	43	25	23	+2
1972	43	37	24	23	+6
1974	41	35	24	22	+6
1976	43	37	26	22	+6
1978	41	38	22	18	+3
1980	44	37	23	22	+7
1982	49	38	22	25	+11
1984	43	37	30	30	+6

SOURCE: Percentages computed from data in Miller, Miller, and Schneider (1980) for 1952-1978. The 1980, 1982, and 1984 percentages are from the respective American National Election Studies, Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan.

NOTE: *Party identification* is defined as the relative proportion of party identifiers. Democratic identification is the percentage strong + weak Democrats. Republican identification is the percentage strong + weak Republicans.

TABLE 2.2
Party Preference by Gender, 1952-1984
(percentages)

Year	Democrats		Republicans		Democratic Edge for Women
	Women	Men	Women	Men	
1952	56	58	36	33	-2
1954	54	60	35	31	-6
1956	47	54	40	35	-7
1958	54	57	34	33	-3
1960	52	54	36	35	-2
1962	51	57	37	32	-6
1964	61	61	31	29	0
1966	55	55	32	33	0
1968	56	54	31	35	+2
1970	54	55	32	32	-1
1972	54	49	33	36	+5
1974	52	50	31	34	+2
1976	53	50	34	34	+3
1978	55	53	30	30	+2
1980	55	49	32	34	+6
1982	59	50	29	35	+9
1984	53	46	41	46	+7

SOURCE: Percentages computed from data in Miller, Miller, and Schneider (1980) for 1952-1978. The 1980, 1982, and 1984 percentages are from the respective American National Election Studies, Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan.

NOTE: *Party preference* is defined as the relative proportions of Democratic and Republican preferences. The Democratic preference is the percentage strong + weak + leaning Independent Democrats. The Republican preference is the percentage strong + weak + leaning Independent Republicans.

⁵¹ "Party Identification by Gender, 1952-1984," chart, Miller, Miller, and Schneider, 1980, in *The Politics of the Gender Gap: The Social Construction of Political Influence*, ed. Carol M. Mueller (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1988), 44.

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The elections that are being focused on in this paper are the 1964 election and the 1972 election. This graph shows that in 1964 the opportunity to gain the vote of both males and females was even. There was no statistical gender gap and therefore gender should not play a role in the partisan shift. However, Gallup Polls for the 1964 election indicate that 60 percent of men and 62 percent of women voted for the Democrat candidate.⁵³ In 1972 the Republican candidate received 63 percent of the male votes and 62 percent of the female votes.⁵⁴ In 1964 about 60 percent of men and women identified themselves as Democrats according to the graph above. Therefore it is in line with this that about 60 percent of each gender voted Democrat. However, in 1972 we begin to see a shift. As mentioned above, around this time women began to identify more with the Democratic Party and men began to shift toward the Republican Party. As the graph above shows, slightly less than 50 percent of men still identified themselves as Democrats whereas about 55 percent of women did. The surprise is in the turnout of the presidential election. In 1972 63 percent of men and 62 percent of women voted Republican. Therefore, approximately thirteen percent of men voted against their party identification in the 1972 election and almost twenty percent of women voted against their party identification.

⁵² "Party Preference by Gender, 1952-1984," chart, Miller, Miller, and Schneider, 1980, in *The Politics of the Gender Gap: The Social Construction of Political Influence*, ed. Carol M. Mueller (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1988), 43.

⁵³ Gallup. <http://www.gallup.com/poll/9454/election-polls-vote-groups-19601964.aspx> (accessed September 28, 2010).

⁵⁴ Gallup. <http://www.gallup.com/poll/9457/election-polls-vote-groups-19681972.aspx> (accessed September 28, 2010).

The table below places a numerical value to the gender gaps that take place in each election cycle. One surprising factor is that out of four elections where a possible third candidate was in the running, two of those elections resulted in an extremely large gender gap in favor of men supporting the third candidate. This table also indicates the potential power that gender gaps can have in the outcome of an election. There was a steady increase in the gender gap beginning in the early 1960s, peaking in 1996 and then slowly shifted back toward a non-existent gender gap until 2008 when it reemerged.

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Table 1.1. Gender Gap in Votes for Presidential Candidates

Year	Democratic Candidate Gap	Republican Candidate Gap	Other Candidate Gap
1948	-2.9	2.9	
1952	-2.1	2.1	
1956	-6.2*	6.2*	
1960	-5.4*	5.4*	
1964	3.7	-3.7	
1968	4.7	1.8	-6.4*
1972	6.6**	-6.6**	
1976	0.3	-0.3	
1980	6.9*	-7.1*	.1
1984	7.6**	-7.6**	
1988	6.5*	-6.5*	
1992	10.1**	-1.5	-8.5**
1996	14.7**	-12.7**	-2.1
2000	9.1**	-9.1**	
2004	6.8#	-6.7#	

The gender gap is measured by the percentage of women minus the percentage of men voting for a candidate. Thus, a positive gap number indicates more women than men supported a candidate. The other party candidate in 1968 was George Wallace; in 1980, John Anderson; and in 1992 and 1996, Ross Perot.

= $p \leq .10$; * = $p \leq .05$; ** = $p \leq .01$

From this data we can conclude that Nixon, the Republican candidate in 1972, had to run a campaign that focused both on the economics aspects that Republican men had started to identify with, and on the moral and civil rights issues that women identified with. In 1964, with about 60 percent of men and women identifying with the Democratic Party it is not surprising that the Democrat candidate would receive roughly 60 percent of the votes from both genders. What is interesting is the shift that took place between the two elections. This is when the Vietnam War began to pick up. As international conflict increased so too did the need for the use of military actions. As noted earlier, women have an overall disapproval of international military use. Thus, it would make sense that in 1964 women would support a Democrat candidate who was less inclined to use military action. The 1968 election, although in the middle of the two extremes, is also unique. With a third candidate in the running, female voters were pulled in three directions. 12 percent of women who voted in 1968 voted for Wallace, the third candidate.⁵⁶ That allowed for this 12 percent to be up for grabs in the 1972 election. It was, perhaps, this 12 percent that realigned with the Republican Party to create the partisan shift from 1964 to 1972. However, counterintuitive to the 1964 election is the striking amount of women who voted Republican in the 1972 election. The approval

⁵⁵ "Gender Gap in Votes for Presidential Candidates," chart, in *Voting the Gender Gap*, ed. Lois Duke Whitaker (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2008), 27.

⁵⁶ Gallup. <http://www.gallup.com/poll/139880/Election-Polls-Presidential-Vote-Groups.aspx#1> (accessed November 23, 2010).

rating among women had declined which would lead to a logical conclusion that women would vote for a candidate who was less inclined to use further military action and continue the war. This was not the case. Instead, women voted on more than just one issues. Taking into account issues such as civil rights and other compassion issues, women were able to make a decision to support a candidate who was opposite their party identification.

This chapter therefore concludes that as the role of women became more liberal, so too did their partisan identification. This identification has become a prominent factor in presidential elections since the 1970s. The exception to this pattern was the 1972 election in which Nixon ran on the idea of “Vietnamization” which would allow for Vietnam to start fighting their own war and pull out American troops. This strategy would mean less international violence which was a large area of concern for women. Therefore, although the majority of women voters identified themselves as Democrats, over 60 percent voted Republican. There are now over twenty organizations that seek an active role in getting women out to vote. Women continue to identify as more liberal than their male counterparts and have continued to increase not only voter registration but also actual turnout at the poll.

American Casualties in Vietnam and the Partisan Shift

There are few things that can change a person's outlook on life in the way that a war can. War has the ability to change domestic and global economic situations, change family structure, and change interactions within a society. This chapter will argue that as more American soldiers were killed in the Vietnam War, public opinion for the war decreased which resulted in a partisan shift from a Democratic majority in 1964 to a Republican majority in 1972. This theory is derived from the concept that as more American soldiers were killed in Vietnam and as it became more evident that there was no way to "win" the war, people began to seek any candidate that was against the war regardless of party. One might also expect Americans to look for a presidential candidate who wanted either to withdraw troops as soon as possible or to adopt a new, innovative strategy that would reduce the number of American deaths. That candidate was Richard Nixon who campaigned on the idea of "Vietnamization" in 1972. Many Americans were losing brother, husbands, and sons, the longer the war lasted. It was therefore very important for families that the war was ended as soon as possible and the fruitless loss of life was stopped.

This chapter will first examine how an issue such as an international war can transcend traditional party lines therefore allowing for landslide elections. It will then analyze the change that took place in public opinion as the casualty count of American troops increased which will conclude that as casualties rise, public support for the war

declines. To support these public opinion polls, studies are included that have found five main factors that determine the level of a support for a war. The analysis will then focus on how demonstrations, rallies, and general public activism were received by the majority of the population. Lastly, the chapter will conclude by combining these factors to show that each one contributed to the partisan shift from a Democratic majority in 1964 to a Republican majority in 1972.

There are certain times in history where all stereotypes are erased and international concerns are able to transcend traditional party politics. In Paul Kleppner's book *Who Voted?* it is argued that the period between 1960 and 1970 is one of the few times in history where political party differences become irrelevant.⁵⁷ As issues such as war began to transcend traditional party values, voters also began to change customary voting patterns. Most voters, regardless of party affiliation, had a new found respect for life as they continuously watched thousands of American soldiers lose their lives without anything to show for.

A Harris poll taken in 1967 asked a sample group of registered voters if they had been directly affected by the Vietnam War and what they found most troubling about the war. Ironically, most people responded to the first question by saying that had not been directly affected by the war. However, it is strikingly obvious that what people found most troubling in the war was the loss of lives. The same questions were again asked in 1968, where concern about the number of casualties rose 13 percent.

⁵⁷ Paul Kleppner, *Who Voted? The Dynamics of Electoral Turnout, 1870-1980* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), 136.

Table 2
TROUBLING ASPECTS OF THE VIETNAM WAR—JULY 1967^a

	Percent of Total Responses
Casualty or Casualty-Related Aspects	
1. Loss of our young men/casualties/loss of lives/killing	31
2. Family separated/destroyed	7
3. Killing innocent people/women and children	6
4. Sending our boys over there/sending them so young	6
5. Boys not trained well/not supplied properly/ undergoing needless suffering	5
6. Bombings/terrorism	2
Other Aspects	
1. We are not making any apparent progress/should escalate/taking so long to end	12
2. Don't understand the war/why we are fighting/it's a senseless war	9
3. Rising cost/mishandling of funds	7
4. Danger of becoming a third world war	5
5. Political war/credibility gap	3
6. People not backing the government	3
7. Vietnamese don't care/understand/want to understand	2
8. Inequality of the draft	1
9. No support from our allies	1

^aFree form responses to Harris poll 1734, question #6: "What two or three things about the war in Vietnam most trouble you personally?" See text for discussion.

⁵⁸ "Troubling Aspects of the Vietnam War- July 1967," chart, in *Casualties, Public Opinion, and Presidential Policy During the Vietnam War*, by Mark Lorell and Charles Kelley Jr. (Santa Monica: Rand, n.d.), 25.

Table 3
TROUBLING ASPECTS OF THE VIETNAM WAR—MARCH 1968^a

	Percent of Total Responses
Casualty or Casualty-Related Aspects	
1. Boys being killed/casualties/too young to die/loss of human life/deaths	44
2. Killing of South Vietnamese women and children/ destruction of Vietnam	4
3. Against violence/immoral/don't believe in wars	2
4. More Negroes dying in Vietnam/Negroes are being used	1
Subtotal	51
Other Aspects	
1. Should fight to get it over with/our side is limited/the limited type of war it is	2
2. Relatives/friends being drafted/having to go	7
3. High cost of living/higher taxes/higher prices	7
4. We should not be over there/it's not our war/attitude of the Vietnamese people/not willing to fight	6
5. Nothing	3
6. Corruption the war has caused/black market	2
7. Dissension here in U.S./draft card burners	1
8. Too much politics/no progress/it's not a declared war/why are we fighting?/and all other responses	10
Subtotal	48

^aFree form responses to Harris poll 1813, question #12c: "What two or three things about the war in Vietnam most trouble you personally? Anything else?" See text for discussion.

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The disapproval of the Vietnam War had a lot to do with the international status of Vietnam. Vietnam has been considered a third world country for several decades and

⁵⁹ "Troubling Aspects of the Vietnam War- March 1968," chart, in *Casualties, Public Opinion, and Presidential Policy During the Vietnam War*, by Mark Lorell and Charles Kelley Jr. (Santa Monica: Rand, n.d.), 27.

continues to be considered as such as recently as 2009 by United Nations statistics.⁶⁰ Public opinion polls have proven that average Americans are less likely to support the use of weapons in internationally lower ranking countries.⁶¹ The only third world country that continues to have significant importance among Americans is Mexico and that is directly correlated to its proximity.

Several studies have been conducted to determine what factors affect Americans' public opinion on international intervention. The results show that there are five deciding factors which determine how much support military action will receive in third world countries.⁶²

1. distance from the United States
2. economic importance to the United States
3. sociocultural affinity based on economic development
4. type of government
5. presence or absence of a formal military alliance with the United States.

Out of these five factors distance from the United States is by far the most important. In fact, this one variable alone can be used to determine domestic support. The distance (in miles) between the United States and the foreign nation is almost directly proportionate to what support will be. This relationship creates a linear line of declining support. In relation to this, the economic importance of the country to the United States (based on total trade) only became a significant factor when nuclear weapons were being used or

⁶⁰ United Nations, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/> (accessed October 28, 2010).

⁶¹ Mark Lorell and Charles Kelley Jr., *Casualties, Public Opinion, and Presidential Policy During the Vietnam War* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1985), 11.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 11.

considered.⁶³ With Vietnam being thousands of miles away, having little to zero economic importance to the United States, the sociocultural affinity being extremely low, not having a stable government, and lacking a formal military alliance with the United States, it is easy to understand why public opinion for the war was dismal.

These studies conclude that not only does domestic support decline as the conflict moves farther away, but social unrest also follows. Unless American citizens view the conflict as a direct threat to the security and safety of the United States there will be little to no support given to military intervention at any point. In fact, not only will support be withheld but protests, strikes, and crime rates in the United States will increase.⁶⁴ Therefore the only way for the government to get involved in a third world country's international conflicts is either with very little military action, thereby requiring only minimal sacrifice from the public, by providing aid in an indirect manor which keeps the American public in the dark on the situation, or by quickly providing military intervention followed by success and a fast withdraw.

As the war in Vietnam progressed, the domestic support of any type of military action overseas greatly diminished. This trend is reflected in the perceived notion of what the defense budget should be. According to public opinion, many Americans thought the defense budget should be lowered until 1974 when public opinion against the war reached its peak. Beginning in 1976 Americans have increasingly become more supportive of a larger defense budget. This can be due to several things. The first is the American people may be favorable to increased military spending in order to avoid

⁶³ Ibid., 11.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 13.

another disaster such as Vietnam.⁶⁵ Or, there may have been a large enough time span from Vietnam until more recent polling that a new generation of voters, who are likely to be polled for public opinion, did not experience Vietnam and therefore have no recollection of the atrocity.

The graph below demonstrates how quickly public support can decline as the reality of the war becomes evident. In 1965 when the war in Vietnam was still relatively new 60 percent of Americans polled were supportive of United States intervention. However, this trend quickly drops off as more money and troops are consistently being sent to Vietnam. The slight ups and downs are indicative of international negotiations and shifts in international policy. Although the chart ends in 1971 when Gallup stopped asking if going into Vietnam was a mistake, other research concludes that public support continued to decline until the end of the war. Therefore, it can be said that while the above mentioned factors are important in determining the support of a war, another key factor is the way in which the war is handled. In other words, because there was no conclusive result or plan for Vietnam, public support diminished. Had there been a clear motive, with a set plan and goals being achieved, the public may have given the war more support for a longer time period.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 15.




Fig. 4—Trends in public support for the Vietnam war

John E. Mueller from the University of Rochester and Jeffrey Milstein have done extensive research into the cause of the great decline in the public support of both the Korean and Vietnam wars. They both found that the most important variable in the

⁶⁶ "Trends in Public Support for the Vietnam War," chart, in *Casualties, Public Opinion, and Presidential Policy During the Vietnam War*, by Mark Lorell and Charles Kelley Jr. (Santa Monica: Rand, n.d.), 19.

decline of public support during a war is the casualty rate. This differs from the above studies in that the above studies analyzed support for initial involvement, Mueller and Milstein focused primarily on public opinion once the war had already started. As the casualty rate of American soldiers increased, public support decreased. Mueller was able to find a systematic decrease in the support of the war. His study of the two wars showed that every time casualty rates went up by a factor of ten, public support declined by 15 percent.⁶⁷ Milstein's study found the correlation to be 0.94. Both of these findings conclude that there is a direct correlation to the death rate and public support. By comparing the below graph with the above approval ratings it becomes evident that this correlation holds true.

Another factor that is rarely taken into account when studying public support of wars is the desensitization of the public. With nightly coverage of war and death notifications, the public eventually becomes desensitized to people being killed. Over time the reporting of more deaths becomes incomprehensible. The general population is no longer able to relate to that one death and casualties turn into statistics.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 21.




Fig. 5—Cumulative American casualties in the Korean and Vietnam wars

A later study was conducted by Samuel Kernell from the University of California at San Diego which concluded that it was not just number of United States casualties that affected the approval ratings of the president but also the number of bombings that were taking place. Combined these two factors account for 80 percent of the presidential disapproval rating.⁶⁸

The relation to disapproval ratings can also be tied into party identification. In 1968 as the disapproval rating was sky rocketing, the Survey Center began linking party identification with public opinion of Vietnam. In a survey conducted in 1968 it was found that 83 percent of Democrats, given normal voting at elections, wanted immediate withdrawal from Vietnam while only 12 percent of Republicans felt immediate

⁶⁸ Ibid., 23.

withdrawal was advantageous.⁶⁹ Even during a time where a large portion of Democrats felt immediate withdrawal was necessary (typically a strategy more closely related to a Democratic candidate) 12 percent of Democrats voted for the Republican in 1968.⁷⁰ Assuming this sentiment continued, it is surprising that 33 percent of Democrats voted Republican in the 1972 election.⁷¹ Thus proving that public disapproval of the war was not the only cause in the partisan shift from Democratic to Republican.

This shift indicates that while the majority of the population was unsatisfied with the war effort, an overwhelming majority were otherwise satisfied with Nixon's leadership capabilities. One of the characteristics that allowed for Nixon to create such a landslide election turnout was his policy of Vietnamization. This policy was based on the idea that more fighting should be turned over to the South Vietnamese which would decrease American casualties. This policy is reminiscent of what Johnson had promised during his 1964 landslide election. The fact that both a Republican and a Democrat used the same sentiment to win landslide elections is indicative that the Vietnam War was the single issue which voters were concerned about. Voters were willing to transcend party identification in order to get troops out of Vietnam.

While approval of the war was plummeting the unrest in the United States was steadily increasing. It is commonly thought that the majority of citizens took place in some sort of antiwar protest during Vietnam. This, however, could not be more incorrect. While there were several groups that actively created and participated in demonstrations

⁶⁹ Robert S. Erikson and Norman R. Luttbeg, *American Public Opinion: Its Origins, Content, and Impact* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1973), 229.

⁷⁰ Gallup. <http://www.gallup.com/poll/9457/election-polls-vote-groups-19681972.aspx> (accessed September 28, 2010).

⁷¹ Ibid.

it was in no way the majority. The overarching goal of any protest is to change public opinion enough to force the government to act accordingly. Many scholars agree that the antiwar protestors failed to change the level of public support for immediate withdraw during the war. A study done by William Berkowitz found that in 15 significant protests there was zero correlation between the protests and public opinion. Further, most antiwar protestors were actually viewed negatively by 75 percent of Americans. Lastly, psychologists have found that it is very possible that the antiwar protests actually increased support for the war by acting as a “negative reference group”. In other words, because the majority of Americans disapproved of the protests so much, they actually began to approve of the war just to spite the protestors.⁷² The change in approval of the war may also be indicative of a shift toward Republican voting patterns as Republicans tend to be more active in international military affairs.

Nixon was able to use the Vietnam War to secure his election in 1968 and win a near landslide election in 1972. Historical patterns indicate that a majority of the time during any large international military war the incumbent party is voted out of the white house the majority of the time.⁷³ Therefore it is normal that many voters would be upset with the incumbent party and elect a Republican in 1968. What is unusual was the amount of support Nixon was able to accumulate between 1968 and 1972. He was able to prove his worth by continuously coming up with new plans for Vietnam that gave the voting population hope. This landslide election is just one example of how merely giving Americans hope that the military can still succeed is enough to increase the tolerance for

⁷² J. Justin Gustainis, *American Rhetoric and the Vietnam War* (Westport: Praeger, 1993), 108.

⁷³ Gallup. <http://www.gallup.com/poll/9454/election-polls-vote-groups-19601964.aspx> (accessed November 28, 2010).

casualties. This pattern is again reflected in President Obama's election in 2008. Many Americans had lost hope in the war in Iraq and by simply planning a new strategy, president Obama was able to secure his election.

It is clear from the data that as casualty count increased public opinion of both the war and the administration decreased. This, however, is not enough to come to a conclusive decision that the casualties in the Vietnam War were the direct cause of the partisan shift from Democrat to Republican between the 1964 and 1972 elections. This was merely one factor in the general movement of the voting population toward the right.

It is fairly well known that wars without domestic support do not end well. If there is no domestic support then there will be no sacrifices made and now a president has to worry about both his domestic problems and international issues. Although the factors included in the above chapter all impact the overall approval rating of a president and the war efforts, these factors can all be summed up by one phrase: cost-benefit. The American public takes into account the cost of the war (casualties) and weighs it against the benefit (success). In the case of the Vietnam War there was no success to show for and no other benefit for American voters to compare the cost to. Therefore, it was an easy decision that without any benefit, the war would not be supported. This lack of support due to casualty count has since been renamed as a casualty phobia. It is the fear that becoming militarily involved in another country will lead to too many casualties without a result. This phobia has played out in presidential decisions up through the present. The

phobia has prevented military intervention in locations such as Rwanda, the Congo, and Sudan.⁷⁴

⁷⁴ Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler, *Paying the Human Cost of War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 4.

Conclusion

The years covered in this thesis were of momentous upheaval in history. They included years of race riots brought on by the civil rights movement, international unrest caused by the Vietnam War, and a gender movement that spurred from women wanting more independence. Together, each of these movements contributed to a time of tension and societal disconnects which were reflected in the presidential elections of 1964 and 1972. I will first determine if these two presidential elections can be considered watershed elections in their own way or if they were merely landslide elections. I will then further examine the immediate and long term implications of these trends. In doing this, I will analyze how these two elections contributed to the eventual election of President Reagan and a more general move toward conservative politics. Due to the fact that the Watergate scandal lies beyond 1972 it will not be considered as a factor.

Congressional Quarterly defines a watershed election as any election that serves as a “crucial turning point in American political history”.⁷⁵ By this definition, scholars agree there have only been four watershed elections in history. They occurred in 1800, 1828, 1860, 1896, and 1932.⁷⁶ A more common occurrence is a landslide election. This term indicated that the candidate won with at least 60 percent of the popular vote and 80 or 90 percent of the Electoral College vote. Using this definition there have been four landslide elections between 1824 and 1996, they occurred in 1936, 1964, 1972, and 1984.⁷⁷ Instead of these elections demonstrating a continuous change in voting behavior or of political alignment, three out of four of these elections resulted in the immediate, or

⁷⁵ Congressional Quarterly, *Political Parties in America* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2001), 116.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 116.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 120.

very quick, reversal of presidential party in the white house. Therefore, landslide elections can be considered as possibly having a long term effect on political alignment, but more importantly, are typically indicative of an immediate reversal.

The 1964 election can only be viewed as a watershed election in terms of how presidential campaigns from this point on would treat race. Jeremy Mayer, in his book *Running on Race* classifies the 1964 as the only racial watershed election to ever take place.⁷⁸ He claims that the election was a decisive time in which the Republican and Democratic parties were forced to take a stance on racial issues. These stances have maintained themselves since this election, meaning that they were a crucial turning point in racial political history. The way in which race was handled in 1964 and 1968 allowed for a permanent change in regional voting patterns. These elections allowed for the solidified the allegiance of the southern black vote to the Democratic Party for years to come. The elections also balanced this out with gaining the support of southern whites for the Republican Party. Bringing in trends of voter turnout based on race allows one to conclude that the south will continue to be majority Republican because whites vote at a higher rate than any other ethnicity.

Perhaps the largest reason that most scholars refuse to claim the 1964 election as a watershed is the notion Johnson was immediately followed by a Republican, which is not indicative of a permanent political shift. This sole factor allows scholars to conclude that this was a landslide election but not a watershed. In fact, Johnson won the presidential election by gaining the largest percentage of the popular vote that any president has ever

⁷⁸ Jeremy D. Mayer, *Running on Race: Racial Politics in Presidential Campaigns, 1960-2000* (New York: Random House, 2002), 40

acquired.⁷⁹ Demonstrative of the party's disapproval of Johnson by the end of his term, mainly due to his perceived failure with Vietnam, was the rising of a potential presidential challenger from within his own party. Once word was released that Johnson would be challenged by Humphrey he announced he would not seek a second term in office.


The 1972 election came closer to becoming a watershed election. Nixon had proved his worth by winning in 1968 in a close presidential race. His popularity skyrocketed from this point until his landslide reelection in 1972. Most scholars do not view the 1972 election as a watershed election due to the fact that within two years the Watergate scandal had come to the forefront of national politics and Nixon was forced to resign. However, Nixon's election in 1968 and landslide reelection in 1972 were the beginning of an overarching change in the political identity of the United States. Aside from gaining new support from the Democrats, Nixon was able to win over the vast majority of the 13.6 percent of the population that had voted for the third candidate, Wallace, in the 1968 election.⁸⁰ This 13.6 percent could have gone to either party directly after the 1968 election. It was this swing group that helped to make Nixon's second election a landslide election. Although Nixon was followed by a Democrat, one can only assume that it is natural for a nation to immediately move away from the party that caused a scandal such as Watergate. The movement toward the right is then continued with Reagan twice followed by Bush senior.

⁷⁹ Congressional Quarterly, *Political Parties in America* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2001), 121.

⁸⁰ Gallup. <http://www.gallup.com/poll/9457/election-polls-vote-groups-19681972.aspx> (accessed September 28, 2010).

It was over 20 years from the time that Nixon was first elected that a Democratic president would be elected again for more than one term. It was Bill Clinton who was elected as president in 1992 and again in 1996 and then immediately followed by a Republican. David G. Lawrence, in his book *The Collapse of the Democratic Presidential Majority*, found a new way to show the Democrats' decline in presidential influence. He found that if elections since the Depression are broken up into different groups, 1932-1948, 1952-1968, and 1972-1988 there is a fall in the percentage of popular vote received from 55.2 to 48 to an ultimate low of 43 percent in the last grouping.⁸¹ Johnson was the only president who gained more than these averages. The support for the Democratic Party was even less than these percentages in the elections of Eisenhower and Reagan. The graph below depicts this shift and shows the overall diminishing support for the Democratic Party.

⁸¹ David G. Lawrence, *The Collapse of the Democratic Presidential Majority* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 23.




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The shift away from the Democratic Party is also evident by examining how close or far voters perceive themselves and the opposing party affiliates from their parties. By looking at both conservative, liberal, and centrists from both parties in 1972 and 1984 it becomes clear that conservative Republicans and centrist Republicans feel closer aligned on the issues with their party than all Democrats do. In 1972 when Democrats were asked how close they were to their party on the issues they perceived themselves as being only


⁸² "Percentage and Standard Deviation Democratic Five-Election Sequences," chart, in *The Collapse of the Democratic Presidential Majority*, by David G. Lawrence (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 24.

.09 more to the left than their party while they thought Republicans were .13 more to the right. When Republicans were asked the same question, they saw themselves as being more liberal and to the left than the party and perceived Democrats to be an astronomical .27 points more liberal than the party. Further, when centrists from each party were asked the same questions, Democrats saw Republicans as being closer in ideological alignment with their party, being only slightly more conservative than the Democratic Party. Democrats saw themselves as being far removed from their party and centrist Republicans viewed this gap to be even larger. This explanation is depicted in the graphs below to demonstrate the identity gap between party affiliates and overall party action. It can be concluded from the 1972 study that Democrats, especially centrist Democrats had a great reason to shift away from their candidate and vote Republican. They essentially saw themselves as being closer aligned to the Republican Party than to their own. This was statistically the case for centrist Democrats and general Democrats saw themselves to far removed, ideologically, from their own party that they had little reason to maintain allegiance.



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⁸³ "Perceived Distance for all Partisans: 1972," chart, in *The Collapse of the Democratic Presidential Majority*, by David G. Lawrence (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 87.




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The 1984 election, as shown below, also indicates a further shift to the right of Republicans. The study was only asked of the centrists of both parties in 1984 and for the first time in several years, centrist Democrats saw themselves as closer in identification to their own party than to that of the opposition. Democrats perceived themselves as closer

⁸⁴ "Perceived Distance for Centrist Partisans: 1972," chart, in *The Collapse of the Democratic Presidential Majority*, by David G. Lawrence (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 91.

to the center than Republicans. Taking into account this change in political affiliation, it is evident that Reagan did not win based on an overall shift toward the right. It is otherwise suggested that the 1980 victory was caused by Carter himself. In other words, it was not necessarily Reagan who won the election, but rather Carter who lost. Reagan was then able to accomplish great economic success within his last two years of his first term which ultimately led to his landslide election in 1984. Although this economic success came at a later price, it moved the image of the Republican Party further to the right where it has since remained.⁸⁵



⁸⁵ Ibid, 165.

New issues have emerged in the political spectrum since the 1984 election and they cut across the party cleavage. Two of these main issues are race and foreign relations. An NES survey concluded that Democrats are perceived to be better at handling race and civil issues while Republicans are perceived to be better at handling foreign relations issues.⁸⁷ This has resulted in the general population becoming less party affiliated. Instead of a realignment taking place throughout the nation, researchers are referring to the movement as a de-alignment.⁸⁸ In other words, the general population is moving away from traditional party values because the big issues have changed.

It can therefore, be concluded from this study that the direct cause of the partisan shift that took place between 1964 and 1972 is due to a combination of race, gender, American casualty count, and several other factors. The implication of this shift has been long lasting and clearly indicates either realignment or at least a de-alignment of the general population and the two party system. The future is the only definite indicator of these permanent party shifts.

⁸⁶ "Perceived Distance for Centrist Partisans: 1984," chart, in *The Collapse of the Democratic Presidential Majority*, by David G. Lawrence (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 92.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 173.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 30.

Appendix

National Voter Turnout in Federal Elections: 1960-2008

This page provides information about voter statistics, including age of voting population, voter registration, turnout, and more.

Year	Voting-age population	Voter registration	Voter turnout	Turnout of voting-age population (percent)
2008*	231,229,580	NA	132,618,580*	56.8%
2006	220,600,000	135,889,600	80,588,000	37.1%
2004	221,256,931	174,800,000	122,294,978	55.3
2002	215,473,000	150,990,598	79,830,119	37.0
2000	205,815,000	156,421,311	105,586,274	51.3
1998	200,929,000	141,850,558	73,117,022	36.4
1996	196,511,000	146,211,960	96,456,345	49.1
1994	193,650,000	130,292,822	75,105,860	38.8
1992	189,529,000	133,821,178	104,405,155	55.1
1990	185,812,000	121,105,630	67,859,189	36.5
1988	182,778,000	126,379,628	91,594,693	50.1
1986	178,566,000	118,399,984	64,991,128	36.4
1984	174,466,000	124,150,614	92,652,680	53.1
1982	169,938,000	110,671,225	67,615,576	39.8
1980	164,597,000	113,043,734	86,515,221	52.6
1978	158,373,000	103,291,265	58,917,938	37.2
1976	152,309,190	105,037,986	81,555,789	53.6
1974	146,336,000	96,199,020 ¹	55,943,834	38.2
1972	140,776,000	97,328,541	77,718,554	55.2
1970	124,498,000	82,496,747 ²	58,014,338	46.6
1968	120,328,186	81,658,180	73,211,875	60.8
1966	116,132,000	76,288,283 ³	56,188,046	48.4
1964	114,090,000	73,715,818	70,644,592	61.9

1962	112,423,000	65,393,751 ⁴	53,141,227	47.3
1960	109,159,000	64,833,096⁵	68,838,204	63.1

*Source 2008 election results: http://elections.gmu.edu/Turnout_2008G.html.

n.a. = not available. NOTE: Presidential election years are in boldface.

1. Registrations from Iowa not included.

2. Registrations from Iowa and Mo. not included.

3. Registrations from Iowa, Kans., Miss., Mo., Nebr., and Wyo. not included. D.C. did not have independent status.

4. Registrations from Ala., Alaska, D.C., Iowa, Kans., Ky., Miss., Mo., Nebr., N.C., N.D., Okla., S.D., Wis., and Wyo. not included.

5. Registrations from Ala., Alaska, D.C., Iowa, Kans., Ky., Miss., Mo., Nebr., N.M., N.C., N.D., Okla., S.D., Wis., and Wyo. not included.

Source: Federal Election Commission. Data drawn from Congressional Research Service reports, Election Data Services Inc., and State Election Offices.

Election Polls -- Vote by Groups, 1968-1972

	1968			1972	
	Humphrey	Nixon	Wallace	McGovern	Nixon
NATIONAL	43.0%	43.4%	13.6%	38.0%	62.0%
SEX	%	%	%	%	%
Men	41	43	16	37	63
Women	45	43	12	38	62
RACE					
White	38	47	15	32	68
Nonwhite	85	12	3	87	13
EDUCATION					
College	37	54	9	37	63
High school	42	43	15	34	66
Grade school	52	33	15	49	51
OCCUPATION					
Prof. & Business	34	56	10	31	69
White collar	41	47	12	36	64
Manual	50	35	15	43	57
AGE					
Under 30 years	47	38	15	48	52
30-49 years	44	41	15	33	67
50 years & older	41	47	12	36	64
RELIGION					
Protestants	35	49	16	30	70
Catholics	59	33	8	48	52
POLITICS					
Republicans	9	86	5	5	95
Democrats	74	12	14	67	33
Independents	31	44	25	31	69

REGION

East	50	43	7	42	58
Midwest	44	47	9	40	60
South	31	36	33	29	71
West	44	49	7	41	59

LABOR UNION

Union families	56	29	15	46	54
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SIZE OF COMMUNITY

Urban	x	x	x	x	x
Suburban	x	x	x	x	x
Rural	x	x	x	x	x

NOTES:

National figures are based on actual election outcomes, re-percentage to exclude minor third-party candidates.

Demographic data are based on Gallup Poll final pre-election surveys, re-percentage to exclude "no opinions" and support for minor third-party candidates; results are then weighted to conform with actual election results.

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Election Polls -- Vote by Groups, 1960-1964

	1960		1964	
	Kennedy	Nixon	Johnson	Goldwater
NATIONAL	50.1%	49.9%	61.3%	38.7%
SEX	%	%	%	%
Men	52	48	60	40
Women	49	51	62	38
RACE				
White	49	51	59	41
Nonwhite	68	32	94	6
EDUCATION				
College	39	61	52	48
High school	52	48	62	38
Grade school	55	45	66	34
OCCUPATION				
Prof. & Business	42	58	54	46
White collar	48	52	57	43
Manual	60	40	71	29
AGE				
Under 30 years	54	45	64	36
30-49 years	54	46	63	37
50 years & older	46	54	59	41
RELIGION				
Protestants	38	62	55	45
Catholics	78	22	76	24
POLITICS				
Republicans	5	95	20	80
Democrats	84	16	87	13
Independents	43	57	56	44
REGION				
East	53	47	68	32

Midwest	48	52	61	39
South	51	49	52	48
West	49	51	60	40
LABOR UNION				
Union families	65	35	73	27
SIZE OF COMMUNITY				
Urban	x	x	x	x
Suburban	x	x	x	x
Rural	x	x	x	x

NOTES:

National figures are based on actual election outcomes, re-percentage to exclude minor third-party candidates.

Demographic data are based on Gallup Poll final pre-election surveys, re-percentage to exclude "no opinions" and support for minor third-party candidates; results are then weighted to conform with actual election results.

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UNITED STATES

PRESIDENT 1960

1960 Census Population	State	Electoral Vote		Total Vote	Republican	Democratic	Other	Plurality	Percentage			
		Rep.	Dem.						Total Vote	Major Vote	Rep.	Dem.
3,266,740	Alabama		5*	570,225	237,981	324,050	8,194	86,069 D	41.7%	56.8%	42.3%	57.7%
226,167	Alaska	3		60,762	30,953	29,809	—	1,144 R	50.9%	49.1%	50.9%	49.1%
1,302,161	Arizona	4		398,491	221,241	176,781	469	44,460 R	55.5%	44.4%	55.6%	44.4%
1,786,272	Arkansas		8	428,509	184,508	215,049	28,952	30,541 D	43.1%	50.2%	46.2%	53.8%
15,717,204	California	32		6,506,578	3,259,722	3,224,099	22,757	35,623 R	50.1%	49.6%	50.3%	49.7%
1,753,947	Colorado	6		736,236	402,242	330,629	3,365	71,613 R	54.6%	44.9%	54.9%	45.1%
2,535,234	Connecticut		8	1,222,883	565,813	657,055	15	91,242 D	46.3%	53.7%	46.3%	53.7%
446,292	Delaware		3	196,683	96,373	99,590	720	3,217 D	49.0%	50.6%	49.2%	50.8%
4,951,560	Florida	10		1,544,176	795,476	748,700	—	46,776 R	51.5%	48.5%	51.5%	48.5%
3,943,116	Georgia		12	733,349	274,472	458,638	239	184,166 D	37.4%	62.5%	37.4%	62.6%
632,772	Hawaii		3	184,705	92,295	92,410	—	115 D	50.0%	50.0%	50.0%	50.0%
667,191	Idaho	4		300,450	161,597	138,853	—	22,744 R	53.8%	46.2%	53.8%	46.2%
10,081,158	Illinois		27	4,757,409	2,368,988	2,377,846	10,575	8,858 D	49.8%	50.0%	49.9%	50.1%
4,662,498	Indiana	13		2,135,360	1,175,120	952,358	7,882	222,762 R	55.0%	44.6%	55.2%	44.8%
2,757,537	Iowa	10		1,273,810	722,381	550,565	864	171,816 R	56.7%	43.2%	56.7%	43.3%
2,178,611	Kansas	8		928,825	561,474	363,213	4,138	198,261 R	60.4%	39.1%	60.7%	39.3%
3,038,156	Kentucky	10		1,124,462	602,607	521,855	—	80,752 R	53.6%	46.4%	53.6%	46.4%
3,257,022	Louisiana		10	807,891	230,980	407,339	169,572	176,359 D	28.6%	50.4%	36.2%	63.8%
969,265	Maine	5		421,767	240,608	181,159	—	59,449 R	57.0%	43.0%	57.0%	43.0%
3,100,689	Maryland		9	1,055,349	489,538	565,808	3	76,270 D	46.4%	53.6%	46.4%	53.6%
5,148,578	Massachusetts		16	2,469,480	976,750	1,487,174	5,556	510,424 D	39.6%	60.2%	39.6%	60.4%
7,823,194	Michigan		20	3,318,097	1,620,428	1,687,269	10,400	66,841 D	48.8%	50.9%	49.0%	51.0%
3,413,864	Minnesota		11	1,541,887	757,915	779,933	4,039	22,018 D	49.2%	50.6%	49.3%	50.7%
2,178,141	Mississippi	*		298,171	73,561	108,362	116,248	7,886 U	24.7%	36.3%	40.4%	59.6%
4,319,813	Missouri		13	1,934,422	962,221	972,201	—	9,980 D	49.7%	50.3%	49.7%	50.3%
674,767	Montana	4		277,579	141,841	134,891	847	6,950 R	51.1%	48.6%	51.3%	48.7%
1,411,330	Nebraska	6		613,095	380,553	232,542	—	148,011 R	62.1%	37.9%	62.1%	37.9%
285,278	Nevada		3	107,267	52,387	54,880	—	2,493 D	48.8%	51.2%	48.8%	51.2%
606,921	New Hampshire	4		295,761	157,989	137,772	—	20,217 R	53.4%	46.6%	53.4%	46.6%
6,066,782	New Jersey		16	2,773,111	1,363,324	1,385,415	24,372	22,091 D	49.2%	50.0%	49.6%	50.4%
951,023	New Mexico		4	311,107	153,733	156,027	1,347	2,294 D	49.4%	50.2%	49.6%	50.4%
16,782,304	New York		45	7,291,079	3,446,419	3,830,085	14,575	383,666 D	47.3%	52.5%	47.4%	52.6%
4,556,155	North Carolina		14	1,368,556	655,420	713,136	—	57,716 D	47.9%	52.1%	47.9%	52.1%
632,446	North Dakota	4		278,431	154,310	123,963	158	30,347 R	55.4%	44.5%	55.5%	44.5%
9,706,397	Ohio	25		4,161,859	2,217,611	1,944,248	—	273,363 R	53.3%	46.7%	53.3%	46.7%
2,328,284	Oklahoma	7*		903,150	533,039	370,111	—	162,928 R	59.0%	41.0%	59.0%	41.0%
1,768,687	Oregon	6		776,421	408,060	367,402	959	40,658 R	52.6%	47.3%	52.6%	47.4%
11,319,366	Pennsylvania		32	5,006,541	2,439,956	2,556,282	10,303	116,326 D	48.7%	51.1%	48.8%	51.2%
859,488	Rhode Island	4		405,534	147,502	258,032	—	110,530 D	36.4%	63.6%	36.4%	63.6%
2,382,594	South Carolina		8	386,688	188,558	198,129	1	9,571 D	48.8%	51.2%	48.8%	51.2%
680,514	South Dakota	4		306,487	178,417	128,070	—	50,347 R	58.2%	41.8%	58.2%	41.8%
3,567,089	Tennessee	11		1,051,792	556,577	481,453	13,762	75,124 R	52.9%	45.8%	53.6%	46.4%
9,579,677	Texas		24	2,311,845	1,121,699	1,167,932	22,214	46,233 D	48.5%	50.5%	49.0%	51.0%
890,627	Utah	4		374,709	205,361	169,248	100	36,113 R	54.8%	45.2%	54.8%	45.2%
389,881	Vermont	3		167,324	98,131	69,186	7	28,945 R	58.6%	41.3%	58.6%	41.4%
3,966,949	Virginia	12		771,449	404,521	362,327	4,601	42,194 R	52.4%	47.0%	52.8%	47.2%
2,853,214	Washington	9		1,241,572	629,273	599,298	13,001	29,975 R	50.7%	48.3%	51.2%	48.8%
1,860,421	West Virginia		8	837,781	395,995	441,786	—	45,791 D	47.3%	52.7%	47.3%	52.7%
3,951,777	Wisconsin	12		1,729,082	895,175	830,805	3,102	64,370 R	51.8%	48.0%	51.9%	48.1%
330,066	Wyoming	3		140,782	77,451	63,331	—	14,120 R	55.0%	45.0%	55.0%	45.0%
179,323,175	TOTAL	219*	303*	68,838,979	34,108,546	34,227,096	503,337	118,550 D	49.5%	49.7%	49.9%	50.1%

UNITED STATES

PRESIDENT 1964

State	Electoral			Total Vote	Republican	Democratic	Other	Plurality	Percentage			
	Vote								Total Vote		Major Vote	
	Rep.	Dem.	Other						Rep.	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.
Alabama	10			689,818	479,085		210,733	268,353 R	69.5%		100.0%	
Alaska		3		67,259	22,930	44,329		21,399 D	34.1%	65.9%	34.1%	65.9%
Arizona	5			480,770	242,535	237,753		4,782 R	50.4%	49.5%	50.5%	49.5%
Arkansas		6		560,426	243,264	314,197	2,965	70,933 D	43.4%	56.1%	43.6%	56.4%
California		40		7,057,586	2,879,108	4,171,877	6,601	1,292,769 D	40.8%	59.1%	40.8%	59.2%
Colorado		6		776,986	296,767	476,024	4,195	179,257 D	38.2%	61.3%	38.4%	61.6%
Connecticut		8		1,218,578	390,996	826,269	1,313	435,273 D	32.1%	67.8%	32.1%	67.9%
Delaware		3		201,320	78,078	122,704	538	44,626 D	38.8%	60.9%	38.9%	61.1%
Florida		14		1,854,481	905,941	948,540		42,599 D	48.9%	51.1%	48.9%	51.1%
Georgia	12			1,139,335	616,584	522,556	195	94,028 R	54.1%	45.9%	54.1%	45.9%
Hawaii		4		207,271	44,022	163,249		119,227 D	21.2%	78.8%	21.2%	78.8%
Idaho		4		292,477	143,557	148,920		5,363 D	49.1%	50.9%	49.1%	50.9%
Illinois	26			4,702,841	1,905,946	2,796,833	62	890,887 D	40.5%	59.5%	40.5%	59.5%
Indiana	13			2,091,606	911,118	1,170,848	9,640	259,730 D	43.6%	56.0%	43.8%	56.2%
Iowa	9			1,184,539	449,148	733,030	2,361	283,882 D	37.9%	61.9%	38.0%	62.0%
Kansas		7		857,901	386,579	464,028	7,294	77,449 D	45.1%	54.1%	45.4%	54.6%
Kentucky		9		1,046,105	372,977	669,659	3,469	296,682 D	35.7%	64.0%	35.8%	64.2%
Louisiana	10			896,293	509,225	387,068		122,157 R	56.8%	43.2%	56.8%	43.2%
Maine		4		380,965	118,701	262,264		143,563 D	31.2%	68.8%	31.2%	68.8%
Maryland		10		1,116,457	385,495	730,912	50	345,417 D	34.5%	65.5%	34.5%	65.5%
Massachusetts		14		2,344,798	549,727	1,786,422	8,649	1,236,695 D	23.4%	76.2%	23.5%	76.5%
Michigan		21		3,203,102	1,060,152	2,136,615	6,335	1,076,463 D	33.1%	66.7%	33.2%	66.8%
Minnesota		10		1,554,462	559,624	991,117	3,721	431,493 D	36.0%	63.8%	36.1%	63.9%
Mississippi	7			409,146	356,528	52,618		303,910 R	87.1%	12.9%	87.1%	12.9%
Missouri		12		1,817,879	653,535	1,164,344		510,809 D	36.0%	64.0%	36.0%	64.0%
Montana		4		278,628	113,032	164,246	1,350	51,214 D	40.6%	58.9%	40.8%	59.2%
Nebraska		5		584,154	276,847	307,307		30,460 D	47.4%	52.6%	47.4%	52.6%
Nevada		3		135,433	56,094	79,339		23,245 D	41.4%	58.6%	41.4%	58.6%
New Hampshire		4		288,093	104,029	184,064		80,035 D	36.1%	63.9%	36.1%	63.9%
New Jersey		17		2,847,663	964,174	1,868,231	15,258	904,057 D	33.9%	65.6%	34.0%	66.0%
New Mexico		4		328,645	132,838	194,015	1,792	61,177 D	40.4%	59.0%	40.6%	59.4%
New York	43			7,166,275	2,243,559	4,913,102	9,614	2,669,543 D	31.3%	68.6%	31.3%	68.7%
North Carolina	13			1,424,983	624,844	800,139		175,295 D	43.8%	56.2%	43.8%	56.2%
North Dakota	4			258,389	108,207	149,784	398	41,577 D	11.9%	58.0%	41.9%	58.1%
Ohio	26			3,969,196	1,470,865	2,498,331		1,027,466 D	37.1%	62.9%	37.1%	62.9%
Oklahoma		8		932,499	412,665	519,834		107,169 D	44.3%	55.7%	44.3%	55.7%
Oregon		6		786,305	282,779	501,017	2,509	218,238 D	36.0%	63.7%	36.1%	63.9%
Pennsylvania	29			4,822,690	1,673,657	3,130,954	18,079	1,457,297 D	34.7%	64.9%	34.8%	65.2%
Rhode Island		4		390,091	74,615	315,463	13	240,848 D	19.1%	80.9%	19.1%	80.9%
South Carolina	8			524,779	309,048	215,723	8	93,325 R	58.9%	41.1%	58.9%	41.1%
South Dakota		4		293,118	130,108	163,010		32,902 D	44.4%	55.6%	44.4%	55.6%
Tennessee		11		1,144,046	508,965	635,047	34	126,082 D	44.5%	55.5%	44.5%	55.5%
Texas	25			2,626,811	958,566	1,663,185	5,060	704,619 D	36.5%	63.3%	36.6%	63.4%
Utah		4		401,413	181,785	219,628		37,843 D	45.3%	54.7%	45.3%	54.7%
Vermont		3		163,089	54,942	108,127	20	53,185 D	33.7%	66.3%	33.7%	66.3%
Virginia		12		1,042,267	481,334	558,038	2,895	76,704 D	46.2%	53.5%	46.3%	53.7%
Washington		9		1,258,374	470,366	779,699	8,309	309,333 D	37.4%	62.0%	37.8%	62.4%
West Virginia		7		792,040	253,953	538,087		284,134 D	32.1%	67.9%	32.1%	67.9%
Wisconsin	12			1,691,815	638,495	1,050,424	2,896	411,929 D	37.7%	62.1%	37.8%	62.2%
Wyoming		3		142,716	61,998	80,718		18,720 D	43.4%	56.6%	43.4%	56.6%
District of Columbia		3		198,597	28,801	169,796		140,995 D	14.5%	85.5%	14.5%	85.5%
United States	52	486	-	70,644,510	27,178,188	43,129,484	336,838	15,951,296 D	38.5%	61.1%	38.7%	61.3%

UNITED STATES

President 1968

State	Electoral Vote			Total Vote	Republican	Democratic	AIP	Other	Plurality	Percentage Total Vote		
	Rep.	Dem.	AIP							Rep.	Dem.	AIP
Alabama			10	1,049,922	146,923	196,579	691,425	14,995	494,846 A	14.0%	18.7%	65.9%
Alaska	3			83,035	37,600	35,411	10,024		2,189 R	45.3%	42.6%	12.1%
Arizona	5			486,936	266,721	170,514	46,573	3,128	96,207 R	54.8%	35.0%	9.6%
Arkansas			6	619,969	190,759	188,228	240,982		50,223 A	30.8%	30.4%	38.9%
California	40			7,251,587	3,467,664	3,244,318	487,270	52,335	223,346 R	47.8%	44.7%	6.7%
Colorado	6			811,199	409,345	335,174	60,813	5,867	74,171 R	50.5%	41.3%	7.5%
Connecticut		8		1,256,232	556,721	621,561	76,650	1,300	64,840 D	44.3%	49.5%	6.1%
Delaware	3			214,367	96,714	89,194	28,459		7,520 R	45.1%	41.6%	13.3%
Florida	14			2,187,805	886,804	676,794	624,207		210,010 R	40.5%	30.9%	28.5%
Georgia			12	1,250,266	380,111	334,440	535,550	165	155,439 A	30.4%	26.7%	42.8%
Hawaii		4		236,218	91,425	141,324	3,469		49,899 D	38.7%	59.8%	1.5%
Idaho	4			291,183	165,369	89,273	36,541		76,096 R	56.8%	30.7%	12.5%
Illinois	26			4,619,749	2,174,774	2,039,814	390,958	14,203	134,960 R	47.1%	44.2%	8.5%
Indiana	13			2,123,597	1,067,885	806,659	243,108	5,945	261,226 R	50.3%	38.0%	11.4%
Iowa	9			1,167,931	619,106	476,699	66,422	5,704	142,407 R	53.0%	40.8%	5.7%
Kansas	7			872,783	478,674	302,996	88,921	2,192	175,678 R	54.8%	34.7%	10.2%
Kentucky	9			1,055,893	462,411	397,541	193,098	2,843	64,870 R	43.8%	37.6%	18.3%
Louisiana			10	1,097,450	257,535	309,615	530,300		220,685 A	23.5%	28.2%	48.3%
Maine		4		392,936	169,254	217,312	6,370		48,058 D	43.1%	55.3%	1.6%
Maryland		10		1,235,039	517,995	538,310	178,734		20,315 D	41.9%	43.6%	14.5%
Massachusetts		14		2,331,752	766,844	1,469,218	87,088	8,602	702,374 D	32.9%	63.0%	3.7%
Michigan		21		3,306,250	1,370,665	1,593,082	331,968	10,535	222,417 D	41.5%	48.2%	10.0%
Minnesota		10		1,588,506	658,643	857,738	68,931	3,194	199,095 D	41.5%	54.0%	4.3%
Mississippi			7	654,509	88,516	150,644	415,349		264,705 A	13.5%	23.0%	63.5%
Missouri	12			1,809,502	811,932	791,444	206,126		20,488 R	44.9%	43.7%	11.4%
Montana	4			274,404	138,835	114,117	20,015	1,437	24,718 R	50.6%	41.6%	7.3%
Nebraska	5			536,851	321,163	170,784	44,904		150,379 R	59.8%	31.8%	8.4%
Nevada	3			154,218	73,188	60,598	20,432		12,590 R	47.5%	39.3%	13.2%
New Hampshire	4			297,298	154,903	130,589	11,173	633	24,314 R	52.1%	43.9%	3.8%
New Jersey	17			2,875,395	1,325,467	1,264,206	262,187	23,535	61,261 R	46.1%	44.0%	9.1%
New Mexico	4			327,350	169,692	130,081	25,737	1,840	39,611 R	51.8%	39.7%	7.9%
New York		43		6,791,688	3,007,932	3,378,470	358,864	46,422	370,538 D	44.3%	49.7%	5.3%
North Carolina	12		1	1,587,493	627,192	464,113	496,188		131,004 R	39.5%	29.2%	31.3%
North Dakota	4			247,882	138,669	94,769	14,244	200	43,900 R	55.9%	38.2%	5.7%
Ohio	26			3,959,698	1,791,014	1,700,586	467,495	603	90,428 R	45.2%	42.9%	11.8%
Oklahoma	8			943,086	449,697	301,658	191,731		148,039 R	47.7%	32.0%	20.3%
Oregon	6			819,622	408,433	358,866	49,683	2,640	49,567 R	49.8%	43.8%	6.1%
Pennsylvania		29		4,747,928	2,090,017	2,259,405	378,582	19,924	169,388 D	44.0%	47.6%	8.0%
Rhode Island		4		385,000	122,359	246,518	15,678	445	124,159 D	31.8%	64.0%	4.1%
South Carolina	8			666,978	254,062	197,486	215,430		38,632 R	38.1%	29.6%	32.3%
South Dakota	4			281,264	149,841	118,023	13,400		31,818 R	53.3%	42.0%	4.8%
Tennessee	11			1,248,617	472,592	351,233	424,792		47,800 R	37.8%	28.1%	34.0%
Texas		25		3,079,216	1,227,844	1,266,804	584,269	299	38,960 D	39.9%	41.1%	19.0%
Utah	4			422,568	238,728	156,665	26,906	269	82,063 R	56.5%	37.1%	6.4%
Vermont	3			161,404	85,142	70,255	5,104	903	14,887 R	52.8%	43.5%	3.2%
Virginia	12			1,361,491	590,319	442,387	321,833	6,952	147,932 R	43.4%	32.5%	23.6%
Washington		9		1,304,281	588,510	616,037	96,990	2,744	27,527 D	45.1%	47.2%	7.4%
West Virginia		7		754,206	307,555	374,091	72,560		66,536 D	40.8%	49.6%	9.6%
Wisconsin	12			1,691,538	809,997	748,804	127,835	4,902	61,193 R	47.9%	44.3%	7.6%
Wyoming	3			127,205	70,927	45,173	11,105		25,754 R	55.8%	35.5%	8.7%
Dist. of Col.		3		170,578	31,012	139,566			108,554 D	18.2%	81.8%	
United States	301	191	46	73,211,875	31,785,480	31,275,166	9,906,473	244,756	510,314 R	43.4%	42.7%	13.5%

UNITED STATES

President 1972

State	Electoral Vote			Total Vote	Republican	Democratic	Other	Plurality	Percentage			
	Rep.	Dem.	Other						Total Vote	Major Vote	Rep.	Dem.
Alabama	9			1,006,111	728,701	256,923	20,487	471,778 R	72.4%	25.5%	73.9%	26.1%
Alaska	3			95,219	55,349	32,967	6,903	22,382 R	58.1%	34.6%	62.7%	37.3%
Arizona	6			622,926	402,812	198,540	21,574	204,272 R	64.7%	31.9%	67.0%	33.0%
Arkansas	6			651,320	448,541	199,892	2,887	248,649 R	68.9%	30.7%	69.2%	30.8%
California	45			8,367,862	4,602,096	3,475,847	289,919	1,126,249 R	55.0%	41.5%	57.0%	43.0%
Colorado	7			953,884	597,189	329,980	26,715	267,209 R	62.6%	34.6%	64.4%	35.6%
Connecticut	8			1,384,277	810,763	555,498	18,016	255,265 R	58.6%	40.1%	59.3%	40.7%
Delaware	3			235,516	140,357	92,283	2,876	48,074 R	59.6%	39.2%	60.3%	39.7%
Florida	17			2,583,283	1,857,759	718,117	7,407	1,139,642 R	71.9%	27.8%	72.1%	27.9%
Georgia	12			1,174,772	881,496	289,529	3,747	591,967 R	75.0%	24.6%	75.3%	24.7%
Hawaii	4			270,274	168,865	101,409		67,456 R	62.5%	37.5%	62.5%	37.5%
Idaho	4			310,379	199,384	80,826	30,169	118,558 R	64.2%	26.0%	71.2%	28.8%
Illinois	26			4,723,236	2,788,179	1,913,472	21,585	874,707 R	59.0%	40.5%	59.3%	40.7%
Indiana	13			2,125,529	1,405,151	708,668	11,807	696,586 R	66.1%	33.3%	66.5%	33.5%
Iowa	8			1,225,944	706,207	496,206	23,531	210,001 R	57.6%	40.5%	58.7%	41.3%
Kansas	7			916,095	619,812	270,287	25,996	349,525 R	67.7%	29.5%	69.6%	30.4%
Kentucky	9			1,067,499	676,446	371,159	19,894	305,287 R	63.4%	34.8%	64.6%	35.4%
Louisiana	10			1,051,491	686,852	298,142	66,497	388,710 R	65.3%	28.4%	69.7%	30.3%
Maine	4			417,042	256,458	160,584		95,874 R	61.5%	38.5%	61.5%	38.5%
Maryland	10			1,353,812	829,305	505,781	18,726	323,524 R	61.3%	37.4%	62.1%	37.9%
Massachusetts		14		2,458,756	1,112,078	1,332,540	14,138	220,462 D	45.2%	54.2%	45.5%	54.5%
Michigan	21			3,489,727	1,961,721	1,459,435	68,571	502,286 R	56.2%	41.8%	57.3%	42.7%
Minnesota	10			1,741,652	898,269	802,346	41,037	95,923 R	51.6%	46.1%	52.8%	47.2%
Mississippi	7			645,963	505,125	126,782	14,056	378,343 R	78.2%	19.6%	79.9%	20.1%
Missouri	12			1,855,803	1,153,852	697,147	4,804	456,705 R	62.2%	37.6%	62.3%	37.7%
Montana	4			317,603	183,976	120,197	13,430	63,779 R	57.9%	37.8%	60.5%	39.5%
Nebraska	5			576,289	406,298	169,991		236,307 R	70.5%	29.5%	70.5%	29.5%
Nevada	3			181,766	115,750	66,016		49,734 R	63.7%	36.3%	63.7%	36.3%
New Hampshire	4			334,055	213,724	116,435	3,896	97,289 R	64.0%	34.9%	64.7%	35.3%
New Jersey	17			2,997,229	1,845,502	1,102,211	49,516	743,291 R	61.6%	36.8%	62.6%	37.4%
New Mexico	4			386,241	235,606	141,084	9,551	94,522 R	61.0%	36.5%	62.5%	37.5%
New York	41			7,165,919	4,192,778	2,951,084	22,057	1,241,694 R	58.5%	41.2%	58.7%	41.3%
North Carolina	13			1,518,612	1,054,889	438,705	25,018	616,184 R	69.5%	28.9%	70.6%	29.4%
North Dakota	3			280,514	174,109	100,384	6,021	73,725 R	62.1%	35.8%	63.4%	36.6%
Ohio	25			4,094,787	2,441,827	1,558,889	94,071	882,938 R	59.6%	38.1%	61.0%	39.0%
Oklahoma	8			1,029,900	759,025	247,147	23,728	511,878 R	73.7%	24.0%	75.4%	24.6%
Oregon	6			927,946	486,686	392,760	48,500	93,926 R	52.4%	42.3%	55.3%	44.7%
Pennsylvania	27			4,592,106	2,714,521	1,796,951	80,634	917,570 R	59.1%	39.1%	60.2%	39.8%
Rhode Island	4			415,808	220,383	194,645	780	25,738 R	53.0%	46.8%	53.1%	46.9%
South Carolina	8			673,960	477,044	186,824	10,092	290,220 R	70.8%	27.7%	71.9%	28.1%
South Dakota	4			307,415	166,476	139,945	994	26,531 R	54.2%	45.5%	54.3%	45.7%
Tennessee	10			1,201,182	813,147	357,293	30,742	455,854 R	67.7%	29.7%	69.5%	30.5%
Texas	26			3,471,281	2,298,896	1,154,289	18,096	1,144,607 R	66.2%	33.3%	66.6%	33.4%
Utah	4			478,476	323,643	126,284	28,549	197,359 R	67.6%	26.4%	71.9%	28.1%
Vermont	3			186,947	117,149	68,174	1,624	48,975 R	62.7%	36.5%	63.2%	36.8%
Virginia	11		1	1,457,019	988,493	438,887	29,639	549,606 R	67.8%	30.1%	69.3%	30.7%
Washington	9			1,470,847	837,135	568,334	65,378	268,801 R	56.9%	38.6%	59.6%	40.4%
West Virginia	6			762,399	484,964	277,435		207,529 R	63.6%	36.4%	63.6%	36.4%
Wisconsin	11			1,852,890	989,430	810,174	53,286	179,256 R	53.4%	43.7%	55.0%	45.0%
Wyoming	3			145,570	100,464	44,358	748	56,106 R	69.0%	30.5%	69.4%	30.6%
Dist. of Col.		3		163,421	35,226	127,627	568	92,401 D	21.6%	78.1%	21.6%	78.4%
United States	520	17	1	77,718,554	47,169,911	29,170,383	1,378,260	17,999,528 R	60.7%	37.5%	61.8%	38.2%

Table A-9. Reported Voting Rates in Presidential Election Years, by Selected Characteristics: November 1964 to 2008

(Numbers in thousands)		2008	2004	2000	1996	1992	1988	1984	1980	1976	1972	1968	1964
Characteristics													
United States													
Total, votin		225,499	215,694	202,609	193,651	185,684	178,098	169,963	157,085	146,548	136,203	116,535	110,604
Total voted		131,144	125,736	110,826	105,017	113,866	102,224	101,878	93,066	86,698	85,766	78,964	76,671
Percent vo		58.2	58.3	54.7	54.2	61.3	57.4	59.9	59.2	59.2	63	67.8	69.3
Race and Hispanic Origin													
White		59.6	60.3	56.4	56	63.6	59.1	61.4	60.9	60.9	64.5	69.1	70.7
White non-		64.8	65.8	60.4	59.6	66.9	61.8	63.3	62.8 (NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)
Black ¹		60.8	56.3	53.5	50.6	54	51.5	55.8	50.5	48.7	52.1	57.6	58.5
Asian and I		32.1	29.8	25.4	25.7	27.3 (NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)
Hispanic (c		31.6	28	27.5	26.7	28.9	28.8	32.6	29.9	31.8	37.5 (NA)	(NA)	(NA)
Sex													
Male		55.7	56.3	53.1	52.8	60.2	56.4	59	59.1	59.6	64.1	69.8	71.9
Female		60.4	60.1	56.2	55.5	62.3	58.3	60.8	59.4	58.8	62	66	67
Age													
18 to 24 ye		44.3	41.9	32.3	32.4	42.8	36.2	40.8	39.9	42.2	49.6	50.4	50.9
25 to 44 ye		51.9	52.2	49.8	49.2	58.3	54	58.4	58.7	58.7	62.7	66.6	69
45 to 64 ye		65	66.6	64.1	64.4	70	67.9	69.8	69.3	68.7	70.8	74.9	75.9
65 years ar		68.1	68.9	67.6	67	70.1	68.8	67.7	65.1	62.2	63.5	65.8	66.3
Northeast, Midwest, and West													
Total, votin		143,097	138,505	130,774	125,571	122,025	117,373	112,376	106,524	99,403	93,653	81,594	78,174
Total voted		83,608	82,224	72,385	69,467	76,276	69,130	69,183	64,963	60,829	62,193	57,970	58,282
Percent vo		58.4	59.4	55.4	55.3	62.5	58.9	61.6	61	61.2	66.4	71	74.6
Race and Hispanic Origin													
White		60.8	61.8	57.5	57.4	64.9	60.4	63	62.4	62.6	67.5	71.8	74.7
White non-		65.5	67.3	61.6	61	68.5	63.3	65	64.3 (NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)

Black1	58.3	56.7	53.1	51.4	53.8	55.6	58.9	52.8	52.2	56.7	64.8	72
Asian and I	33.8	30.7	26.1	26.3	27.9 (NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)
Hispanic (c	32.6	28.2	26.8	26.3	27.4	26.8	32.8	29.8 (NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)
South												
Total, votin	82,402	77,188	71,835	68,080	63,659	60,725	57,587	50,561	47,145	42,550	34,941	32,429
Total voted	47,536	43,512	38,441	35,550	37,590	33,094	32,695	28,103	25,869	23,573	20,994	18,389
Percent vo	57.7	56.4	53.5	52.2	59	54.5	56.8	55.6	54.9	55.4	60.1	56.7
Race and Hispanic Origin												
White	57.7	57.6	54.2	53.4	60.8	56.4	58.1	57.4	57.1	57	61.9	59.5
White non-	63.4	62.8	58.2	56.7	63.6	58.5	59.8	59.2 (NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)
Black1	62.9	55.9	53.9	50	54.3	48	53.2	48.2	45.7	47.8	51.6	44
Asian and I	25.4	25.7	22.2	22.6	24.5 (NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)
Hispanic (c	30	27.6	28.7	27.6	32	32.9	32.4	30.1 (NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)

Footnotes:

Note: NA Not available.

Note: Because of changes in the Current Population Survey race categories beginning in 2003, 2004 and 2008 data on race are not directly comparable data from earlier years.

1 Black category includes other races in 1964.

2 Prior to 1972, data are for people 21 to 24 years of age with the exception of those aged 18 to 24 in Georgia and Kentucky, 19 to 24 in Alaska, and 20 to 24 in Hawaii.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Surveys 1968 to 2008.
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