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The External Action Service and its Effect on the Cohesion of EU Foreign Policy

Timothy Stretton

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ABSTRACT

This study is designed to evaluate the European External Action Service (EEAS) by analyzing its effectiveness in achieving a greater level of cohesion amongst European Union (EU) member states. The research examines voting patterns in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) by EU member states between 2003 and 2012. This study uses each committee of the UNGA, as a variable to determine voting patterns on specific policy areas. This paper includes the enlargements of 2004 and 2007, while also extending the data collection up to the most recent completed session of the UNGA. The years 2009, 2011, and 2012 are important in this study because in 2009 the Lisbon Treaty created the post of High Representative, and 2011 and 2012 are the only years the EEAS has been in operation. This research can be used to determine how the EEAS and enlargement affect harmonization of EU foreign policy amongst EU members, and what the EEAS can do to help increase harmonization.

KEYWORDS

External Action, Foreign Policy, Voting Cohesion, United Nations

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) have created one of the most unique multilateral partnerships in the world. Since the EU was granted observer status in 1974, the EU has been given enhanced participation rights as it belongs to over 50 international UN agreements and participates in numerous conventions. Alongside its memberstates, the EU works with the UN to promote peace and security, sustainability, development, human rights, and the rule of law, while at the same time giving itself more clout politically on the world stage.

On October 11, 1974, the European Community (EC) became the first international organization to be granted observer status in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) with the passage of resolution A/RES/3208 (XXIX). The status of observer is granted to political actors and international organizations such as the Holy See, Palestinian Authority, and the Arab League. Within the General Assembly observers have the right to speak and participate in procedural votes but can't speak in debates, submit proposals or amendments, and may not vote on substantive matters such as resolutions. Before being granted observer status, the EU would address the plenary session of the UNGA by which member state held the presidency of the EU. The Single European Act of 1987 required that when all EC member states belong to the same international organization, EC member states shall speak with one voice (Hosli, 2010, p.9).

When dealing with foreign policy decisions and positions internationally for the EU, eluding its participation at the UN, the EU took a longer and problematic route. The Treaty of Maastricht of 1991, created the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The CFSP was designed to integrate the foreign policy of member states into one cohesive and uniform policy. Article Twenty of the Treaty of Maastricht required delegations and missions of member states to cooperate with one another and that they represent the position and best interests of the greater EU. This is tricky because foreign policy was left up for each member state to control. EU leaders especially those from smaller states wanted to create the CFSP because one statement of policy from the EU, as a single bloc, is much stronger than twenty-seven individual responses from each member state.

In order to help manage the CFSP, the European Union created the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, who is responsible to coordinate and negotiate foreign policy between the member states. In 2007, in a new effort to integrate further, the EU signed the Treaty of Lisbon. The Treaty of Lisbon combined and updated previous treaties while creating an EU Constitution. In the fall of 2008, 26 members, all but Ireland, ratified the treaty. Once the constitution was removed from the treaty the EU-27 signed and ratified the treaty. As a condition of the Treaty of Lisbon, the new post of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy replaced the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy and the European Commissioner for External Relations.

The European External Action Service (EAAS) was established by the European Parliament on July 8, 2010 and approved by the Council of Ministers on July 26, 2010. The EEAS is tasked with assisting the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, to promote European views and values across the world and to propose European solutions to world problems.

The EU has set up 141 embassies and diplomatic missions all across the world including missions at the United Nations headquarters in New York and at other UN agencies in Ge-

neva, Paris, Nairobi, Rome, and Vienna (United Nations Regional Information Centre for Western Europe, 2007). Over 1,300 EU meetings are held annually in New York on a variety of topics such as trade, humanitarian aid, environmental policy, and peace and security. The number of EU embassies is expected to increase throughout the world.

In December 2012, the EEAS along with the Spanish Foreign Ministry announced a plan to open a Spanish embassy to be located in the premises of the EU Delegation to Yemen. Luxembourg has already announced a similar plan to open their embassy to Ethiopia on the premises of the EU delegation. The EEAS believes that the sharing of embassy space confirms the trend of strong relations between the member states and the EU, working hand in hand to build a common European diplomacy that allows the EU to speak with one voice in the international arena.

With the passage of resolution A/65/276, on May 3, 2011, the EU took a great leap forward when it was given an enhanced observer status in the UNGA. EU representatives can now be invited to participate in general debate of the General Assembly and represent common positions of the EU to the General Assembly. EU representatives also have the right to present proposals and amendments but still can't vote on substantive matters. Resolution A/65/276 permits EU publications on issues before the General Assembly to be circulated as documents of the General Assembly. Previously, as a regular observer, the EU could never deliver their own General Assembly speech before the opening session of the UNGA, but rather would have to rely on the member state who held the rotating Presidency of the EU.

The EEAS is two years old and is helping the EU deal with international issues such as climate change; arms control and disarmament; peace and security; and the unraveling political unrest in the Middle East. The EEAS must coordinate the foreign policies of all twenty-seven member states, if it wishes to have a significant role on the global stage.

LITERATURE REVIEW

There have been studies on cohesion rates of the EU in the UNGA by a few research teams but none of the studies have incorporated the current EU-27. With the last study being from 2005, none of the studies include the years when the EEAS has been in operation. Being tasked with harmonizing EU foreign policy, the EEAS should have increased cohesion of EU foreign policy.

Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith were the first ones to examine cohesion rates of the EU at the UNGA. In their findings, cohesion amongst EU member states increased throughout the 1990s but starting in 2000, decreased. The last year of their study was in 2003, the year prior to the largest expansion in EU history with the addition of 10 new member states into the Union. Regional blocs, such as the Central and Eastern European Countries, have forced the EU to pay more attention to certain global issues, such as human trafficking, because these problems are much more salient for the new members (Laatikainen & Smith, 2006). It is important to examine how EU member states are speaking with one voice when dealing with issues of foreign policy and how the majority position has changed with enlargement.

Other studies have also found increased cohesion among the European Union in the UNGA. In June 2010, Madeleine Holsi, Evelyn van Kampen, Frits Meijerink, and Katherin Tennis, published their research on EU voting cohesion in the UNGA between 1952 and 2005. Due to rising EU cohesion rates since the 1980s, cohesion rates among the EU member states were higher than cohesion levels for the remaining members in the UNGA. The

Hosli study also identified significant cohesion in specific categories of foreign policy issues especially in dealing with the Middle East. Middle Eastern affairs had the highest cohesion rate than any other policy area.

Since the EEAS was established on January 1, 2011, they've been instrumental in working for South Sudanese independence, arms control, and unrest in the Middle East. Some innovations contained in the Lisbon Treaty have the potential to give the EU a more coherent and unitary presence on the world stage (Pirozzi & Ronzitta, 2011). Article Thirty-Four of the Lisbon Treaty requires that the member states serving on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) be in contact with the High Representative and the rest of the EU. It is the role of the EEAS to make sure this coordination happens. In 2011, the UNSC passed resolution 1973 authorizing a no-fly zone in Libya. France, Portugal, and the United Kingdom all voted in favor of the resolution. Germany who was serving as a non-permanent member on the UNSC, abstained from voting. The disparity on how the EU members voted on Resolution 1973 identifies the continuing challenge for the EEAS in harmonizing EU foreign policy.

In January 23, 2012, Oxfam published a report, Fit for Purpose: The European External Action Service one year on, where it recommends, in order to be successful, that the EEAS must develop an overarching strategy and a plan for where the EU wishes to be by 2015 as a global actor. The Oxfam report also encourages the strengthening of EU Delegations abroad, and "increase operation coordination with other EU institutions and member states" (Blockmans, S., Alonso, N., & Wald, T., 2012).

Previous research of the voting patters of EU member states in the UN have shown periods of increased and decreased cohesion in relation to the remaining members of the UNGA, on specific policy areas. With the last study on voting cohesion being from 2005, two years prior the last enlargement, it is important to research how the EEAS has helped harmonize foreign policy. The EU is experiencing the first enlargement in six years with Croatia entering the Union on July 1, 2013, making it important to know the effect enlargement has on a cohesive foreign policy.

METHODOLOGY

First, using the *United Nations Documentation: Research Guide*, I sorted through resolutions passed in each session of the UNGA between the 58th Session (2003-2004) and the 66th Session (2011-2012)¹, and identified which resolutions were voted upon by a roll call vote. You can only use resolutions voted on by a roll call vote because the majority of resolutions in the UNGA are passed by consensus; voting records aren't kept for consensus votes but rather only for roll call votes, only a small percentage of resolutions in the UNGA are passed by a roll call vote. Using the *United Nations Bibliographic Information System*, I then recorded how each member state of the EU voted on the General Assembly resolutions since 2003. By starting in the 58th Session and including the years 2009, 2011, and 2012², I will be able to examine how enlargement of the EU and the EEAS has affected the cohesion rate of European Union foreign policy.

The total unanimity score is the percent the number of votes in which all EU member states voted exactly the same way, divided by the number of total roll call votes in that session.

¹ The 66th Session is the most recent completed Session of the UNGA.

² The years of study will include 2009, with the creation of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and 2011 and 2012, the two years the External Action Service has been in operation.

If all member states voted in favor of a resolution and one member state either voted against or abstained, this resolution is not unanimous. In this study, member states failing to vote on a resolution prohibits a resolution from receiving unanimity from the EU, even if all voting members voted to the same way. I have calculated the unanimity rates for each UNGA session and for each of their committees.

By using the different UNGA committees as variables for different policy areas such as: disarmament and international security; economic and financial affairs; social, cultural, and humanitarian affairs; and political and decolonization, I am able to see how cohesion in different policy areas compares to one another.

DATA

As seen in Figure 1, there are only two occasions in which there are two consecutive years that total unanimity increased over the previous session. First, the 59th Session increased from 65.7% total unanimity to 76.3% in the 60th Session, and increased to 77.9% in the 61st Session. In the 64th Session, total unanimity increased from 63.6% to 70.4% in the 65th Session, and increased again to 76.8% in the 66th Session. Total unanimity increased 12.2% points between the 59th Session and the 61st Session, but total unanimity increased 13.2% from the 64th Session to the 66th Session. The EEAS was established during the 65th Session.




Figure 1. Percentage of total unanimity in the UNGA

Source: Data from United Nations Bibliographic Information System (n.d.).

58th Session

The 58th Session of the General Assembly is an important place to start when analyzing the cohesiveness of foreign policy amongst member states. During the 58th Session of the General Assembly, which met from 2003-2004, the EU saw the largest wave of expansion in its history including the largest growth in terms of the number of member states, landmass, and population. On May 1, 2004 the EU opened its membership to ten counties: eight countries from Eastern Europe: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, as well as the two Mediterranean island nations of Cyprus and Malta. With the expansion of 2004, the EU-15 became known as the EU-25. With the new members, the EU now had ten additional member states that must agree on foreign policy issues.

When collecting data for the 58th Session some votes only consisted of the EU-15 and some consisted of the EU-25 depending on the date of the vote and if that vote was before or after the accession on May 1, 2004. Out of the seventy-five roll call votes in the 58th Session, only three resolutions were voted on as the EU-25, and the remaining seventy-two roll call votes consisting of the EU-15. Both resolutions 58/292 and 58/317 were in plenary session and 58/307 was the only roll call vote in the 5th Committee (Administrative and Budget). Resolution 58/292 and Resolution 58/307 both passed with the support of the whole EU-25. The EU-25 unanimously abstained, with the exception of Estonia, which didn't vote, on Resolution 58/317.

Out of the seventy-five roll call votes during the 58th Session of the UNGA only fifty-two resolutions passed with unanimity. The EU member states voted unanimously 69.3% of the time during the 58th Session. As shown in Table 1, the EU voted unanimously 85.7% of the time in plenary session, 47.6% of the time in DISEC, 50% of the time in ECOFIN, 75% of the time in SOCHUM, 76.9% of the time in SPECPOL, and 100% of the time in the Administrative & Budget Committee. There were no roll call votes in the Legal Committee.

Tuble 1. 50 Session			
Committee	# of Roll Call Votes	# of Unanimous Votes	% of Unanimity
Plenary	14	12	85.7%
DISEC	21	10	47.6%
ECOFIN	2	1	50%
SOCHUM	24	18	75%
SCECPOL	13	10	76.9%
Administrative & Budget	1	1	100%
Legal	0	0	N/A
TOTAL	75	52	69.3%

Table 1, 58th Session

Source: Data from United Nations Bibliographic Information System (n.d.).

59th Session

During the 59th Session, the EU-25 voted unanimously 65.7% of the time, dropping 3.6 percentage points from the previous 58th Session. There were a total of seventy roll call votes taken in the 59th Session of the UNGA and the EU-25 reached consensus on forty-six of those resolutions. The unanimity score may have fallen since the previous session since now the EU has twenty-five members during the whole session to reach a consensus rather than just fifteen.

As shown in Table), the EU voted unanimously 50% of the time in plenary session, 50% of the time in DISEC, 100% of the time in ECOFIN, 90.5% of the time in SOCHUM, and 66.6% of the time in SPECPOL. The EU did not vote unanimously in either the Administrative & Budget Committee or the Legal Committee.

60th Session

During the 60th Session of the UNGA, the EU-25 voted unanimously 76.3% of the time, an increase of 10.6% points over the previous 59th Session. The 60th Session had the third highest level of total unanimity and the largest increase than the previous session than any other session in this study. The EU-25 reached unanimity on fifty-five of the total seventy-six resolutions voted on by a roll call vote.

As shown in Table 3, the EU voted unanimously 70% of the time in plenary session, 69.2% of the time in DISEC, 75% of the time in ECOFIN, 94.7% of the time in SOCHUM, 66.6% of the time in SPECPOL, and 100% of the time in the Administrative & Budget Committee. There were no roll call votes in the Legal Committee.

Table 2. 59th Session

Committee	# of Roll Call Votes	# of Unanimous Votes	% of Unanimity
Plenary	10	5	50%
DISEC	20	10	50%
ECOFIN	2	2	100%
SOCHUM	21	19	90.5%
SCECPOL	15	10	66.6%
Administrative & Budget	1	0	0%
Legal	1	0	0%
TOTAL	70	46	65.7%

Source: Data from United Nations Bibliographic Information System (n.d.).

Table 3. 60th Session

Committee	# of Roll Call Votes	# of Unanimous Votes	% of Unanimity
Plenary	10	7	70%
DISEC	26	18	69.2%
ECOFIN	4	3	75%
SOCHUM	19	18	94.7%
SCECPOL	15	10	66.6%
Administrative & Budget	2	2	100%
Legal	0	0	N/A
TOTAL	7	55	76.3%

Source: Data from United Nations Bibliographic Information System (n.d.).

61st Session

During the 61st Session, the EU experienced its last expansion, with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania on January 1, 2007. The EU voted unanimously 77.9% of the time. Out of the eighty-six resolutions voted on by a roll call vote, the EU voted on sixty-seven unanimously. Only three resolutions were voted after the accession of Bulgaria and Romania. Bulgaria and Romania both joined the EU majority to unanimously approve Resolution 61/250 B and Resolution 250/C. Romania chose not to vote on RES/61/295. The 61st Session of the UNGA had the highest rate of EU unanimity in this study, rising 1.6 percentage points from the previous section.

As shown in Table 4, the EU voted unanimously 58.3% of the time in plenary session, 70% of the time in DISEC, 100% of the time in ECOFIN, 100% of the time in SOCHUM, 73.3% of the time in SPECPOL, and 100% of the time in the Administrative & Budget Committee. There were no roll call votes in the Legal Committee.

Committee	# of Roll Call Votes	# of Unanimous Votes	% of Unanimity
Plenary	12	7	58.3%
DISEC	30	21	70%
ECOFIN	4	4	100%
SOCHUM	21	21	100%
SCECPOL	15	11	73.3%
Administrative & Budget	3	3	100%
Legal	0	0	N/A
TOTAL	86	67	77.9%

Table 4, 61st Session

Source: Data from United Nations Bibliographic Information System (n.d.).

62nd Session

The EU voted unanimously 69.6% of time in the 62nd Session of the UNGA, falling 8.3 percentage points from the previous 61st Session. Out of seventy-nine resolutions, the EU unanimously agreed on fifty-five. This was the second largest drop in total unanimity in this study. The reduction in unanimity could possibly be explained with the inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania, as they were new EU members during the whole session of the UNGA.

As shown in Table 5, the EU voted unanimously 45.5% of the time in plenary session, 53.8% of the time in DISEC, 60% of the time in ECOFIN, 100% of the time in SOCHUM, 71.4% of the time in SPECPOL, and 100% of the time in the Administrative & Budget Committee. There were no roll call votes in the Legal Committee.

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Committee	# of Roll Call Votes	# of Unanimous Votes	% of Unanimity
Plenary	11	5	45.5%
DISEC	26	14	53.8%
ECOFIN	5	3	60%
SOCHUM	20	20	100%
SCECPOL	14	10	71.4%
Administrative & Budget	3	3	100%
Legal	0	0	N/A
TOTAL	79	55	69.6%

Source: Data from United Nations Bibliographic Information System (n.d.).

63rd Session

During the 63^{rd} Session of the UNGA the EU-27 voted unanimously 74.6% of the time rising five percentage points from the previous 62^{nd} Session. There were a total of seventy-five roll call votes during the 63^{rd} Session, fifty-six of which reached consensus amongst EU members.

As shown in Table 6, the EU voted unanimously 45.5% of the time in plenary session, 70.3% of the time in DISEC, 100% of the time in ECOFIN, 94.7% of the time in

SOCHUM, 71.4% of the time in SPECPOL, and 100% of the time in the Administrative & Budget Committee. There were no roll call votes in the Legal Committee.

Table 6. 63rd Session

Committee	# of Roll Call Votes	# of Unanimous Votes	% of Unanimity
Plenary	11	5	45.5%
DISEC	27	19	70.3%
ECOFIN	3	3	100%
SOCHUM	19	18	94.7%
SCECPOL	14	10	71.4%
Administrative & Budget	1	1	100%
Legal	0	0	N/A
TOTAL	75	56	74.6%

Source: Data from United Nations Bibliographic Information System (n.d.).

64th Session

The EU-27 voted unanimously 63.6% of the time in the 64th Session of the UNGA, dropping 11 percentage points from the previous 63rd Session, the largest drop in total unanimity in this study. Out of sixty resolutions, voted on by a roll call vote, the EU reached unanimity on forty-two.

As shown in Table 7, the EU voted unanimously 33.3% of the time in plenary session, 50% of the time in DISEC, 100% of the time in ECOFIN, 85.7% of the time in SOCHUM, 71.4% of the time in SPECPOL, and 100% of the time in the Administrative & Budget Committee. There were no roll call votes in the Legal Committee.

Table 7. 64th Session

Committee	# of Roll Call Votes	# of Unanimous Votes	% of Unanimity
Plenary	12	4	33.3%
DISEC	20	10	50%
ECOFIN	5	5	100%
SOCHUM	14	12	85.7%
SCECPOL	14	10	71.4%
Administrative & Budget	1	1	100%
Legal	0	0	N/A
TOTAL	66	42	63.6%

Source: Data from United Nations Bibliographic Information System (n.d.).

65th Session

During the 65th Session of the UNGA the EU-27 voted unanimously 70.4% of the time, rising 6.8 percentage points from the previous 64th Session. Out of a total seventy-one resolutions that were voted on by a roll call vote, the EU reached unanimity on fifty.

As shown in Table 8, the EU voted unanimously 54.5% of the time in plenary ses-

sion, 60.8% of the time in DISEC, 100% of the time in ECOFIN, 93.3% of the time in SOCHUM, 64.7% of the time in SPECPOL, and 100% of the time in the Administrative & Budget Committee. There were no roll call votes in the Legal Committee.

Table 8. 65th Session

Committee	# of Roll Call Votes	# of Unanimous Votes	% of Unanimity
Plenary	11	6	54.5%
DISEC	23	14	60.8%
ECOFIN	3	3	100%
SOCHUM	15	14	93.3%
SCECPOL	17	11	64.7%
Administrative & Budget	2	2	100%
Legal	0	0	N/A
TOTAL	71	50	70.4%

Source: Data from United Nations Bibliographic Information System (n.d.).

66th Session

During the 66th Session of the UNGA the EU-27 voted unanimously 76.8% of the time, increasing 6.4 percentage points from the previous 65th Session. Out of a total of sixtynine roll call votes in the 66th Section, the EU reached unanimity on fifty-three.

As shown in Table 9, the EU voted unanimously 66.7% of the time in plenary session, 75% of the time in DISEC, 100% of the time in ECOFIN, 85.7% of the time in SOCHUM, 71.4% of the time in SPECPOL, and 100% of the time in the Administrative & Budget Committee. There were no roll call votes in the Legal Committee.

Table 9. 66th Session

Committee	# of Roll Call Votes	# of Unanimous Votes	% of Unanimity
Plenary	15	10	66.7%
DISEC	20	15	75%
ECOFIN	4	4	100%
SOCHUM	14	12	85.7%
SCECPOL	14	10	71.4%
Administrative & Budget	2	2	100%
Legal	0	0	N/A
TOTAL	69	53	76.8%

Plenary Session

Excluding the increase between the 59th Session and the 60th Session, unanimity steadily decreased since 2003 before plateauing in 2008 and decreasing again in 2009. In plenary sessions, unanimity doubled in voting of EU members between the 64th Session and the 66th Session, the only period that unanimity increased for two consecutive years. Even though the 58th Session had the largest unanimity score in plenary sessions in this study, the EU only

had fifteen member states, rather than the twenty-five members states in the 59th Session thru the 63rd Session and the twenty-seven members during the 64th Session thru the 66th Session. More members makes harmonization more difficult.




Figure 2. Percentage of unanimity in plenary sessions

Source: Data from United Nations Bibliographic Information System (n.d.).

DISEC

The lowest unanimity score for DISEC in this study was 47.6% in the 58th Session and the highest was during the 61st Session, which had a unanimity score of 7%. Only twice in this study did unanimity drop from a previous section. First unanimity dropped 16.2 percentage points from the 61st session to the 62nd Session and again in the 64th Session which, dropped 20.3 percentages points from 70.3% during the 63rd Session. The unanimity score between the 64th Session and the 66th Session increased a total of 25 percentage points, the largest increase between two sessions in this study. It is important to note that the EEAS was established during this period³. The 64th Session increased from 50% to 60.8% in the 65th Session and increased again to 75% in the 66th Session, the largest unanimity score for DISEC in this study. See Figure 3 on next page.

ECOFIN

Throughout this study unanimity in ECOFIN is relatively consistent with just a few outliers. Six out of the nine sessions in this study had a unanimity rate of 100%. It is interesting to point out as seen in Figure 4, five out the last six sessions, including both the 65th Session and the 66th Session the two years the EEAS has been in operation, received a 100% unanimity rate. The 58th Session of the UNGA only received a unanimity score of 50% because Belgium did not vote on Resolution 58/60/198, one of only the two resolutions voted on by a roll all vote. The 60th Session received a score of 75% because Italy did not vote on Resolution 60/200, one of the four roll call votes in ECOFIN. The 62nd Session received a unanimity score of 60% because the Czech Republic was the sole member state to oppose the Resolution 62/188 and did not vote on Resolution 62/190. See Figure 4 on next page.

^{3 3}The EEAS was established during the 65th Session on January 1, 2011.




Figure 3. Percentage of unanimity in DISEC

Source: Data from United Nations Bibliographic Information System (n.d.).




Figure 4. Percentage of unanimity in ECOFIN

Source: Data from United Nations Bibliographic Information System (n.d.).


SOCHUM

In the nine years of voting that this study analyzed, voting in SOCHUM appears to be normally distributed. Unanimity increased every session between the 58th Session and the 61st Session, were it remained at 100% until the following session. After the 62nd session, unanimity decreased every year until the 65th Session. The 65th Session increased to 93.3%, 7.6 percentage points over the 64th Session, but decreased again 7.6 percentage points in the 66th Session.

SPECPOL

In the nine years that this study looked unanimity rates in SPECPOL, unanimity rates ranged between 66.6% and 76.9%, a range of 10.3. Since the 62nd Session, the unanimity rate has been 71.4% every year except the 65th Session, which decreased to 64.7%. Unanimity increased back to 71.4% during the 66th Session. Unanimity was highest in the 58th Session,

when the EU only consisted of the EU-15⁴.



Source: Data from United Nations Bibliographic Information System (n.d.).




Figure 6. Percentage of unanimity in SPECPOL

Source: Data from United Nations Bibliographic Information System (n.d.).

Administrative and Budgetary

In the Administrative & Budget Committee, the EU voted unanimously 100% of the time in every session in this study, except for the 59th Session. Resolution 59/307 was the only resolution to be voted on by a roll call vote in the 5th Committee of the 58th UNGA. Resolution 59/307 (*Financing the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon*) was approved by all EU member states except for Poland who did not vote. *Financing the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon* was approved unanimously by the EU member states in every other session in his study. The lowest number of resolutions in the Administrative & Budget Committee was one, and the maximum number of resolutions voted in the Administrative & Budget

⁴ All resolutions were voted on during the 58th Session except for RES/58/292, RES/58/307, and RES/58/317.

Figure 7. Percentage of unanimity in Administrative & Budget 100 90 80 70 60 100 50 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 40 30 20 10 0 59th 58th 60th 61st 62nd 63rd 64th 65th 66th Session Session Session Session Session Session Session Session Session (03-04) (04-05) (05-06) (06-07) (07-08) (08-09) (09-10) (10-11) (11-12)

committee in any of nine sessions in this study was three.

Source: Data from United Nations Bibliographic Information System (n.d.).

DATA ANALYSIS/DISCUSSION

Each section below is broken up into the committees of the UNGA with their corresponding resolutions that have consistently been voted on unanimously by EU members. By analyzing how EU members voted in each committee of the UNGA, you can infer how the EU views specific policy areas such as: disarmament and international security; economic and financial issues; social, humanitarian, and cultural issues; and political and decolonization issues. Percentage of total unanimity of EU members in the UNGA has increased every year the EEAS has been in operation. It is significant that the two years in which the EEAS has been in operation, total unanimity went from the session with the lowest unanimity score in the study to the session with the second highest unanimity score, increasing a total of 13.2 percentage points. Unanimity has also specifically increased in both plenary sessions and in DISEC, during each session since the establishment of the EEAS back in 2011.

Plenary Session

Unanimity increased each year since the EEAS was established, increasing a total of 33.4 percentage points since the last session in which the EEAS had not yet been established. In plenary session, EU member states unanimously approved year after year the following resolutions: Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States on America against Cuba⁵; Special information programme on the question of Palestine of the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat⁶; Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine⁷;

⁵ See RES/58/7; RES/59/11; RES/60/12; RES/61/11; RES/62/3; RES/63/07; RES/64/6; RES/65/6; and RES/66/6

⁶ See RES/58/20; RES/59/30; RES/60/38; RES/61/24; RES/62/ 82; RES/63/28; RES/64/18; RES/65/15; and RES/66/16. Hungary did not vote on RES/62/82 preventing unanimity.

⁷ See RES/58/21; RES/59/31; RES/60/39; RES/61/25; RES/62/83; RES/63/29; RES/64/19; RES/65/16; and RES/66/17

Oceans and the law of the sea⁸; and Jerusalem⁹.

Cyprus and Malta were the only member states not to abstain but rather supported the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat¹⁰. This resolution only received a unanimous vote from the EU in the 58th Session, when Cyprus and Malta were not yet EU member states. Since the 59th Session, Cyprus and Malta have been the only two member states to abstain on this resolution. Cyprus also was the only member state to abstain both in the 64th Session and the 65th Session on the resolution, Status of internally displaces persons and refugees from Abkhazia, Georgia, and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, Georgia¹¹; the majority of the EU states supported this resolution both years it was voted on.

During the 65th Session, all members approved *Participation of the European Union in the work of the United Nations*¹². This resolution is significant because it increased the EU's status in the UN and gave the EU more rights and therefore more influence. During the 66th Session EU members unanimously approved both Resolution 66/253 A and Resolution 66/253B (*The situation in the Syrian Arab Republic*). While speaking to the UNGA, European Council President Herman Van Rompuy said, "The European Union [is] worried about the 'brutal and ongoing repression' of its own people by the Syrian regime." This is significant because Resolution 66/253 A&B were approved unanimously after the creation of the EEAS, which shows that the EU was effective in responding to a crisis with one unified voice.

DISEC

Voting unanimity in DISEC increased each year amongst EU member states since the EEAS had been established. Member states consistently approved resolutions; Conventional arms control at the regional and sub-regional levels¹³; the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East¹⁴; Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty¹⁵; Prevention of an arms race in outer space¹⁶; and Implementation of the Convention on Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of the Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction¹⁷. According to their goals for the 66th Session, The EU outline the importance of their continued support to counter the devastating consequences of landmines by "devoting particular attention to assisting the victims of these

13 See RES/58/39; RES/59/88; RES/60/75; RES/61/82; RES/62/44; RES/63/44; RES/64/42; RES/65/46; and RES/66/37

⁸ See RES/58/240; RES/59/24; RES/60/30; RES/61/222; RES/62/215; RES/63/111; RES/64/71; RES/65/37A; and RES/66/231. Resolutions 59/24, 64/71, and 65/37A were not unanimous because member states failed to vote.

⁹ See RES/58/22; RES/59/32; RES/60/41; RES/61/26; RES/62/84; RES/63/30; RES/64/20; RES/65/17; and RES/66/18.

¹⁰ See RES/58/18; RES/59/28; RES/60/36; RES/61/22; RES/62/80; RES/63/26; RES/64/16; RES/65/13; and RES/66/14

¹¹ See RES/64/296 and RES/65/287

¹² See RES/65/276

¹⁴ See RES/58/68; RES/59/106; RES/60/92; RES/61/103; RES/62/56; RES/63/84; RES/64/66; RES/65/88; and RES/66/61

 $^{15\} See\ RES/58/71; RES/59/109; RES/60/95; RES/61/104; RES/62/59; RES/63/87; RES/64/69; RES/65/91; and RES/66/64$

¹⁶ See RES/58/36; RES/59/65; RES/60/54; RES/61/58; RES/62/20; RES/63/40; RES/64/28; RES/65/44; and RES/66/27

¹⁷ See RES/58/53; RES/59/84; RES/60/80; RES/61/84; RES/62/41; RES/63/42; RES/64/56; RES/65/48; and RES/66/29

weapons."The EU announced in the fall of 2011 it was going to participate in the Second Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (EEAS, 2011).

The EU consistently voted in opposition against: the Role of science and technology in the context of Internet security¹⁸ and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons¹⁹.

Although it is important to note that the EU does support "progress towards the aim of establishing a Middle East Free Zone of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction," (EEAS, 2011) it is interesting to point out that France and the United Kingdom, who both have nuclear weapons voted against the EU majority on several resolutions dealing with nuclear disarmament including: Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas²⁰, Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace²¹, and Towards a nuclear-weapon free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments²², and Promotion multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation²³. With some members having nuclear weapons and some states without, there will clearly be some opposing viewpoints when dealing with issues of disarmament and international security. Nuclear disarmament will continue to prove to be a challenge for the EU in formulating a cohesive disarmament and international security policy.

ECOFIN

Unanimity in ECOFIN amongst EU member states remained at 100% since 2008–2009. In 2009, the High Representative for the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was created, followed by the EEAS in 2011. In ECOFIN, the EU has consistently supported the Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources²⁴ and Oil Slick on Lebanese shores²⁵.

EU member states consistently abstained on *Unilateral economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries*²⁶. The EU uses sanctions against countries such as Iran and North Korea for political and economic coercion. According to the EU Priorities for the current 67th Session of the UNGA, the EU promises to promote the implementation of UN sanctions regimes.

SOCHUM

The EU believes strongly in promoting human rights of individuals all around the world. In the EU's Priorities for the 67th Session of the UNGA, the EU outlines its plan to promote the ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and "adopt a unified and proactive position in the negotiation of resolutions on racism in order ensure broad consensus." Throughout this study the EU consistently approved: Global

¹⁸ See RES/58/33; RES/59/62; RES/60/51; and RES/61/55

¹⁹ See RES/58/64; RES/59/102; RES/60/88; RES/61/97; RES/62/51; RES/63/75; RES/64/59; RES/65/58; and RES/66/57

²⁰ See RES/58/49; RES/59/85; RES/60/58; RES/61/69; RES/62/35; RES/63/65; RES/64/44; and RES/65/58

²¹ See RES/58/29; RES/60/48; RES/62/14; RES/64/23; and RES/66/22

²² See RES/60/56; RES/61/65; RES/62/25; RES/63/58; RES/64/57; RES/65/59; RES 66/40

²³ See RES/63/50; and RES/64/34

²⁴ See RES/58/229; RES/59/251; RES/60/183; RES/61/184; RES/62/181; RES/63/201; RES/64/185; RES/65/179; and RES/66/225

²⁵ See RES/61/194; RES/62/188; RES/63/211; RES/64/195; RES/65/147; and RES/66/192

²⁶ See RES/58/198; RES/60/185; RES/62/183; RES/64/189; and RES/66/186

efforts for the total elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance and the comprehensive implantation of and follow-up to the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action²⁷, The right of the Palestinian people to self-determination²⁸, The right to development²⁹, Strengthening the role of the United nations in enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections and the promotion of democratization³⁰, The right to food³¹, Situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo³², Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran³³, Situation of human rights in Turkmenistan³⁴, Situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea³⁵, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women³⁶, and Rights of the Child³⁷.

The EU consistently rejected: Use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination³⁸, Combating defamation of religions³⁹, Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of all human rights⁴⁰, Human rights and unilateral coercive measures⁴¹, Promotion of peace as a vital requirement for the full enjoyment of all human rights by all⁴².

SPECPOL

Since 2008, unanimity has remained at 71.%, only decreasing to 64.7 during the 65th Session, the session in which the EEAS was established. Voting unanimity increased back to 71.4% in the 66th Session. Throughout this study the EU consistently supported *Assistance to Palestine refugees*⁴³, *Persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 and subsequent hostilities*⁴⁴,

²⁷ See RES/58/160; RES/59/177; RES/60/144; RES/61/149; RES/62/220; RES/63/242; RES/64/148; RES/65/240; and RES/66/144

²⁸ See RES/58/163; RES/59/179; RES/60/146; RES/61/152; RES/62/146; RES/63/165; RES/64/150; RES/65/202; and RES/66/146

²⁹ See RES/58/172; RES/59/185; RES/60/157; RES/61/169; RES/62/161; RES/63/178; RES/64/172; RES/65/219; and RES/66/155

³⁰ See RES/58/180; RES/60/162; and RES/62/150

³¹ See RES/58/186; RES/59/202; RES/60/165; RES/61/163; RES/62/164; RES/63/187; RES/64/159; RES/65/220; and RES/66/158

³² See RES/58/196; RES/59/207; and RES/60/170

³³ See RES/58/195; RES/59/205; RES/60/171; RES/61/176; RES/62/168; RES/63/191; RES/64/176; RES/65/226; and RES/66/175

³⁴ See RES/58/194; RES/59/206; and RES/60/172

³⁵ See RES/60/173; RES/61/174; RES/62/167; RES/63/190; RES/64/175; RES/65/225; and RES/66/174

³⁶ See RES/60/230; RES/62/218; RES/64/138; and RES/66/131

³⁷ See RES/58/157; RES/59/261; RES/60/231; RES/61/146; RES/62/141; RES/63/241; RES/64/146; RES/65/197; and RES/66/141

³⁸ See RES/58/162; RES/59/178; RES/61/151; RES/62/145; RES/63/164; RES/64/151; RES/65/203; and RES/66/147

³⁹ See RES/60/150; RES/61/164; RES/62/154; RES/63/171; RES/64/156; and RES/65/224

⁴⁰ See RES/58/193; RES/59/184; RES/60/152; RES/61/156; RES/62/151; RES/63/176; RES/64/160; RES/65/216; and RES/66/161

⁴¹ See RES/58/171; RES/59/188; RES/60/155; RES/61/170; RES/62/162; RES/63/179; RES/64/170; RES/65/217; and RES/66/156

⁴² See RES/58/192; RES/60/163; RES/62/163; and RES/65/222

⁴³ See RES/58/91; RES/59/117; RES/60/100; RES/61/112; RES/62/102; RES/63/91; RES/64/87; RES/65/98; and RES/66/72

⁴⁴ See RES/58/92; RES/59/118; RES/60/101; RES/61/113; RES/62/103; RES/63/92; RES/64/88; RES/65/99; and RES/66/73

Operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East⁴⁵, Palestine refugees' properties and their revenues⁴⁶, Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the other occupied Arab territories⁴⁷; Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan⁴⁸; Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan⁴⁹. The EU has shown a strong commitment to help Palestinian refugees, contributing more than €5 billion to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian refugees in the Near East since 1994 (EUROPEAID).

France and the United Kingdom consistently went against the EU majority on the following resolutions: Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations⁵⁰; Economic and other activities which affect the interests of the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories⁵¹; Dissemination of information on decolonization⁵²; and Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples⁵³. France and the United Kingdom have a long history of colonialism, and both countries still own territories abroad. As long as France and the United Kingdom retain land abroad it remains unlikely that they will change their views on decolonization.

Administrative & Budget

Between the 58th Session and the 66th Session, EU members unanimously approved *Financing of the United Nations interim Force in Lebanon*⁵⁴ year after year. The EU has a strong history of supporting peacekeeping missions. The EU currently has 40,000 men and women serving in UN peacekeeping missions and contributes over 40% of total peacekeeping budget (Contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 2012).

CONCLUSION

The goal of this study was to identify how cohesion and harmonization of EU foreign

⁴⁵ See RES/58/93; RES/59/119; RES/60/102; RES/61/114; RES/62/104; RES/63/93; RES/64/89; RES/65/100; and RES/66/74

⁴⁶ See RES/58/94; RES/59/120; RES/60/103; RES/61/115; RES/62/105; RES/63/94; RES/64/90; and RES/65/101

⁴⁷ See RES/58/97; RES/59/122; RES/60/105; RES/61/117; RES/62/107; RES/63/96; RES/64/92; RES/65/103; and RES/66/77

⁴⁸ See RES/58/98; RES/59/123; RES/60/106; RES/61/118; RES/62/108; RES/63/97; RES/64/93; RES/65/104; and RES/66/78

⁴⁹ See RES/58/98; RES/59/123; RES/60/106; RES/61/118; RES/62/108; RES/63/97; RES/64/93; RES/65/104; and RES/66/78

⁵⁰ See RES/58/102; RES/59/127; RES/60/110; RES/61/121; RES/62/112; RES/63/101; RES/64/97; RES/65/108; and RES/66/82

⁵¹ See RES/58/103; RES/59/128; RES/60/111; RES/61/123; RES/62/113; RES/63/102; RES/64/98; RES/65/109; and RES/66/83

⁵² See RES/58/110; RES/59/135; RES/60/118; RES/61/129; RES/62/119; RES/63/109; RES/64/105; RES/65/116; and RES/66/90

⁵³ See RES/58/111; RES/59/136; RES/60/119; RES/61/130; RES/62/120; RES/63/110; RES/64/106; RES/65/117; and RES/66/99

⁵⁴ See RES/58/307; RES/59/307; RES/60/278; RES/61/250A; RES/61/250B; RES/61/250C; RES/62/265; RES/63/298; RES/64/282; RES/65/303; and RES/66/277. RES/61/250A was voted on as the EU-25 and RES/61/250B and RES/61/250C were voted on as the EU-2.

policy has changed since the creation of the EEAS. The EEAS was created to harmonize the foreign policy of member states around one central EU foreign policy. It was my hope that by analyzing how cohesion rates have been affected vis-à-vis the operations of the EEAS, that this research could be used to enhance the policies and practices of the EEAS in order to help the EU better speak with one voice on the world stage.

Although the data from this study is not statistically significant it does suggests that the EEAS has played a pivotal role in increasing cohesion of foreign policy. Percentages of total unanimity of EU members in the UNGA have increased every year the EEAS has been in operation. It is significant that the two years in which the EEAS has been in operation, total unanimity went from the session with the lowest unanimity score in the study to the session with the second highest unanimity score, increasing a total of 13.2 percentage points.

This study is consistent with Madeleine Hosli's study in that there is significant cohesion between member states on issues dealing with the Middle East. EU member states consistently voted unanimously on resolutions dealing with issues such as Israel and Palestine, Palestinian refugees, Syria, and Lebanon. The EU is committed to the Middle East and is a member of the Quartet in the Middle East peace negotiations, along side the United Nations, the United States and the Russian Federation.

EU member states increasingly vote unanimously on resolutions dealing with human rights. EU member states unanimously supported resolutions addressing the issues of human rights violations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Korea. The EU also unanimously approved resolutions protecting women and children.

Disarmament and nuclear weapons are going to prove to be a challenge for the EEAS. France and the United Kingdom are viewed as the two dominant military powers in Europe and are the only two of the twenty-seven EU member states with nuclear weapons. Resolutions supporting nuclear disarmament show the divide between France and the United Kingdom from other member states. France and the United Kingdom consistently voted against the EU majority when dealing with issues on disarmament and nuclear weapons. Several resolutions that were opposed by France and the United Kingdom are often abstained by the remaining members, which suggests that remaining members understand that nuclear weapons are important not only to the security of France and the United Kingdom but to themselves as well. The nuclear weapons belonging to France and the United Kingdom add a level of security to the entire region.

Unanimity rates in this study were lowered in some sessions because member states failed to vote on resolutions. A total of fifteen resolutions in this study failed to receive unanimity because some member states did not cast a vote. Even though there was unanimity amongst the voting-member states, it's important to note that this is not considered a unanimous vote. It's the responsibility of each member state to show up and vote; if the EU wants to be able to speak with one voice on the world stage, it needs to make sure all its members are present, and present and voting. The EEAS should focus on making sure all member states vote on resolutions, especially if there is consensus across the member states.

This study also served the purpose of identifying the effect enlargement has had on unanimity rates in voting. In both the 59th Session and the 62nd Session, the two sessions in which new EU member states were member states for the whole entire UNGA session after being admitted into the EU, unanimity rates dropped. The 59th session decreased 3.6 percentage points from the 58th Session and the 62nd session decreased by 8.3 percentage points from the 60th Session. In this study the resolution, *Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable*

Rights of the Palestinian People Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat only received a unanimous vote from the EU in the 58th Session, when Cyprus and Malta were not yet EU member states, when the EU was known as the EU-15. Based on previous patterns, once Croatia is admitted into the EU on July 1, 2013, one can expect to see a decrease in the 68th Session of the UNGA (2013-2014) over the current 67th Session, which if trends continue should be higher than the most recent 66th Session. This potential decrease in unanimity with the accession of Croatia is an opportunity for the EEAS to work especially hard to keep cohesion of foreign policy, at least its current levels, while still striving to keep increasing cohesion amongst its member states.

The EU does not currently have a 100 percent total unanimity score, which signals that more can be done to harmonize foreign policy, especially on issues of disarmament and international security; economic and financial affairs; social, cultural, and humanitarian affairs; and political and decolonization issues. The policies may include increasing cooperation with other EU institutions, further coordination with member states and civil society, as well as new roles and duties for EU diplomats and ambassadors.

In their report, The European External Action Service one year on, Oxfam encourages the strengthening of EU Delegations abroad, and "increase operation coordination with other EU institutions and member states." The best way to increase operation coordination with other EU institutions and member states is to continue sharing embassies. Last year the EEAS along with the Spanish Foreign Ministry announced a plan to open a Spanish embassy to be located in the premises of the EU Delegation to Yemen and Luxembourg announced a similar plan to open their embassy to Ethiopia on the premises of the EU delegation. The EEAS expects the number of European Embassies to be located in the premise of the EU Delegations to increase throughout the world (European External Action Service, 2012). One way to increase cohesion of foreign policy of member states in the UN would be to consolidate individual embassies of member states within the EU Embassy to the UN. Having only one diplomatic facility shared by the EU and its member states would make it easier to harmonize foreign policy because it's easier to communicate when you are in close proximity to other parties. Sharing of embassies also reduces operational costs. It would save money to have one diplomatic mission compared to having twenty-seven individual facilities that still need to communicate with the EU Delegation. The EEAS believes that the sharing of embassy space confirms the trend of strong relations between the member states and the EU, working hand in hand to build a common European diplomacy that allows the EU to speak with one voice in the international arena. Further study should be focused on how the EU Mission to the UN could integrate the individual missions of member states and the effect that would have on harmonizing foreign policy.

AUTHOR'S NOTES

Guidance by my thesis advisor on the European Union by Professor Francesca Vassallo and input on the United Nations by Professor Julia Edwards are gratefully acknowledged.

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
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