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Explaining the Perseverance of "Independence in Europe": Strategic Reinforcements of Minority Nationalist Pro-Europeanism

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Abstract

In the 1980's minority nationalist parties adopted a policy of “independence in Europe.” Paradoxically, the policy simultaneously advocated conceding powers to a supranational body and taking back powers from the state. EU regional development programs initially spurred these pro-European policies, but these programs have since failed. Given the EU incentives, why do minority nationalist parties remain pro-European? I test a bottom-up, party political theory and use the British case studies of the Scottish National Party and the Welsh nationalist party, Plaid Cymru. I argue that these parties have remained pro-European because they are small oppositional parties. As small oppositional parties, minority nationalist parties have unique strategic mechanisms that incentivize policy inertia. These mechanisms are: (1) the continuity and dominance of party leadership in making EU policy, (2) underdeveloped policy positions, and (3) the importance of transnational coalitions. Implications include the possibility that as minority nationalist parties grow in size and power, they might alter their European position to suit changing strategic considerations.

Keywords
Nationalism, Pro-European, Scotland, Wales
INTRODUCTION

“Scotland’s Future—Independence in Europe” dominates the front page of a 1990 Scottish National Party pamphlet. After decades of anti-European rhetoric, the Scottish National Party voted at a party conference in 1983 to support the European Community and the new slogan placed the pro-European policy at the center of SNP ideology. Today, the SNP’s pro-European position remains unchanged. Deputy leader Nicola Sturgeon pledged Scotland would be a “proud and constructive partner in the European family” upon independence (Johnson, 2013). Since the 1980’s, sustained pro-Europeanism has been a pattern in minority nationalist parties across Europe.

At the time that pro-European policies developed, the Europe of the Regions model created a hospitable environment for minority nationalists by valuing the input of sub-state regions and local authorities. Minority nationalist parties enjoyed the “pincer effect” as they squeezed state power locally and at the EU level (Lynch, 1996, p. 14). The 1980’s were also relatively hospitable for the European Union among mainstream parties. However, domestic and EU contexts have changed dramatically. Both mainstream Europhilia and the Europe of the Regions have faded over the past 30 years. Most positions in the Council of Ministers and European Commission are still dominated by parties in government and exclude regional powers (Elias, 2008). A “growing discrepancy between ‘regional’ priorities” hindered regional lobbying at the European Union (Rowe, 2011, p. 8). In conjunction with lack of regional unity, “national governments proved themselves to be highly adept at acting as ‘gatekeepers’” (Elias, 2008, p. 486). Domestically, “increased Euroscepticism has been the corollary of increased integration” (Taggart, 1998, p. 363).

Given the failure of the Europe of the Regions and increased Euroscepticism, why have minority nationalist parties remained pro-European? Minority nationalist parties have remained pro-European because they are small and oppositional. The characteristics of small and oppositional parties that incentivize them to remain pro-European are: (1) the dominance and continuity of party leadership on EU policy, (2) the underdeveloped nature of EU policy, and (3) the importance of transnational coalitions. Before elaborating upon these mechanisms, I will explain this paper’s structure.

My second section briefly explains and evaluates an existing top-down theory of the relationship between Europe and minority nationalist parties. The previous literature is split into two approaches: the top-down approach and the bottom-up approach. The first model focuses on how the EU fostered support in regions through the Europe of the Regions model and relies on the Europeanization concept of party-EU relations. In the third section, I review the bottom-up literature and describe my own party political methodology. To explain this methodology, I define “minority nationalist” and “small and oppositional.”

In section four, I present the argument for my specific theory that small and oppositional strategies of minority nationalist parties allow them to remain pro-European. This argument has three subsections echoing the mechanisms of small and oppositional strategy: dominance of leaders in EU policy, underdeveloped policies, and transnational coalitions. In the concluding section, I note the limitations of my argument, namely my restricted case

1 Minority nationalism is “the denial of exclusive claims on the part of the state nationalism and the assertion of national rights of self-determination for groups within it” (Keating 2001, 18). More definitions are included on page 6.

2 For more on the failure of the Europe of the Regions, see Loughlin (1996) and Hepburn (2008).

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study and definitional difficulties. These limitations reveal important implications as some minority nationalist parties grow. Before looking forward, I look back at the existing literature on minority nationalists and the EU.

**THE TOP DOWN APPROACH: EXAMINING AND EVALUATING PREVIOUS THEORIES**

The top-down group of literature, led by the early work of Michael Keating, pinpoints the Europe of the Regions concept as a major motivation for minority nationalist parties. This model allowed them to bypass their traditional enemy, the state (Keating, 1995). When faced with the development of a European Union, minority nationalists responded to it with their most dominant and well developed interest—the “autonomy goal” (Hoppe, 2007). Politically, the autonomy goal was furthered by the EU taking away power from the state. Economically, the Common Market nurtured stronger regional economies (Karolewski, 2007; Keating, 1995).

This top-down approach is framed by the process of Europeanization. Europeanization is a process in which European integration influences domestic political parties, electoral systems and policy. European integration is the independent variable, while political parties are dependent (Kulahci, 2012, p. 1). In this sense, the centrally European led initiatives of the Europe of the Regions—including the Committee of the Regions—can be seen as methods by which the European Union incorporates and influences political parties. Especially in relation to smaller parties, the EU is seen as the major actor and the initiator of contact. Europeanization is the first model that we can identify to explain our question and it suggests that minority nationalists became pro-European in response to EU-led incentives.

Although Europeanization may explain the initial shift towards pro-Europeanism, it is less applicable to current minority nationalist parties because European top-down influence on minority nationalist parties has been minimal. It has been more minimal than mainstream parties because minority nationalists are not ruling parties and the regional outreach of the 1990’s has died down. The party political literature begins to provide another explanation. In contrast to the Europeanization model, my argument suggests that minority nationalist party pro-Europeanism is underpinned by their own strategic behaviors, not those of the EU.

**A PARTY POLITICAL APPROACH: PREVIOUS LITERATURE, TERMINOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY**

The party political literature focuses on the internal structure of minority nationalist parties and their strategic behavior using the EU as a tool. It challenges the idea that nationalism alone causes pro-Europeanism. In the Welsh Plaid Cymru and the Galician Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG), “strategic and tactical considerations exerted a growing pressure on what position was formally espoused vis-a-vis the EU” (Elias, 2008, p. 577). Elias suggested an internal angle was necessary in understanding EU positions. Carolyn Rowe’s book (2011) focuses on representations in Europe and shows that regional goals go beyond nationalism. Janet Laible’s book (2008) complements Rowe’s research by showing that minority nationalist Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) use the European Parliament to criticize the norm, gain valuable resources, and engage on issues that are domestically important.

Although party political authors begin to argue that parties act strategically, they do not suggest what specific strategy might influence them. They focus on many diverse EU strategies but don’t identify an overarching strategic characteristic. These authors have also been
limited by the need to prove that the top-down approach is not appropriate. This leaves less room for alternative explanations.

In order to present a clear strategic argument, I must first clarify the definition of minority nationalism. Then I substantiate the two foundational arguments: minority nationalists are pro-European and minority nationalists are small and oppositional. These foundational arguments will build up to my argument: minority nationalists have remained pro-European because they are small and oppositional.

**Definition of Minority Nationalist**

Minority nationalism is “the denial of exclusive claims on the part of the state nationalism and the assertion of national rights of self-determination for groups within it” (Keating, 1996, p. 18). Minority nationalist groups seek autonomy outside of state structures. Minority nationalism has been substituted with the term “regionalism.” I do not use regionalism because it is not significantly different from “minority nationalism,” yet it is unpopular within the parties. Regionalism promotes the territorial, cultural, and political identities of a region but does not strive for a separate state (Karolewski, 2007, p. 32). The only difference with minority nationalism is that nationalists seek independence. However, minority nationalist parties oscillate between separatism and more autonomy depending on domestic strategy. Plaid Cymru leader Leanne Wood said, “Plaid Cymru wants an independent Wales within the European Union …but in order to get there, there are a number of posts along the way” so the party does not formally call for an independence referendum (Torrance, 2012). PC exemplifies how regionalists are minority nationalists who may have more posts to go along the way. Additionally, “nationalist” is what parties tend to call themselves.

**Definition of Small and Oppositional**

Minority nationalist parties are small and oppositional in relation to the state because the state has ultimate authority over EU relations. Minority nationalists are oppositional because they run only in their specific region of a state. They could only come into government as a minority party in a coalition but even this rarely occurs as their representation tends to be so miniscule in relation to the state. As a result of regional limitations, membership also remains small compared to state parties. For example, the SNP has the most members in Scotland (approximately 25,000), but this is small compared to the 134,000 member Conservative Party (Gardham, 2013; Dominiczak, 2013). Given these limitations, minority nationalists can always be seen as “small” and “oppositional” in the EU context. By pinning down the definitions of minority nationalism and by characterizing the parties further, I can focus on how small and oppositional characteristics foster and protect pro-Europeanism.

**Case Study Selection**

My research will focus on one country, the United Kingdom. This reduces the risk of country specific intervening variables that can complicate analyses (Kulahci, 2012, p. 7). The UK is a useful case study because it has multiple developed parties and devolution which allows regional data and news to be disaggregated. My UK case study focuses on two parties: the Scottish National Party (SNP) and Plaid Cymru (PC). Both the SNP and PC became pro-European in the 1980’s and have held that position for the last 30 years. Instead of a multi-country study, I compile intraparty, domestic, and European strategies and argue that these might be united under one single strategic concern. The SNP and PC are diverse
choices. The SNP has a majority in the Scottish Parliament and is soon voting on independence. PC is the third largest party in the National Assembly for Wales with regionalist goals. Despite differences, both utilize small and oppositional strategies.

I exclude Northern Irish nationalists because their nationalism is not minority nationalism. Irish nationalists want to rejoin Ireland, not become independent, and Irish nationalism is tied to sectarianism. Despite this exception, the pattern is not isolated. Strategic considerations can be generalized across small oppositional parties. The case studies illustrate these general truths.

**MINORITY NATIONALIST PARTY STRATEGY TOWARDS EUROPE AS SMALL AND OPPOSITIONAL**

Given the failure of the Europe of the Regions and the Euroscepticism of the British political system, why have minority nationalist parties in the UK remained pro-European? Minority nationalist parties have remained pro-European because of their unique strategic concerns as small and oppositional parties. Small and oppositional strategic mechanisms that allow them to remain pro-European are: (1) the dominance and continuity of party leadership on EU policy, (2) the underdeveloped nature of EU policy, and (3) the importance of transnational coalitions. By connecting these concepts and focusing on the mechanisms that drive the connection, I highlight how size and positioning foster pro-European policy inertia. In the following three subsections, I analyze each mechanism in turn.

**THE CONTINUITY AND DOMINANCE OF PARTY LEADERSHIP ON EUROPEAN UNION POLICY**

Small parties have more policy continuity between leaders and police internal dissent more strongly than mainstream parties which protects pro-European policies despite contextual changes.

*Policy continuity between leaders*

Leadership in small parties tends to be more united and less contested. Much of the EU policy continuity within minority nationalist parties is determined by agreement and stability between party leaders. I trace the leadership continuity in two ways: by tracing rhetorical continuity between leaders and by comparing leadership elections between small and large parties.

The SNP’s pro-European rhetoric has been passed down from leader to leader since Gordon Wilson pioneered it in the 1980’s. During the 1983 conference, “the SNP leader, Gordon Wilson, proposed a more positive approach towards the EC…Wilson started to advance the idea that European membership would have helped Scotland to withdraw from the British Union without suffering any kind of economic disadvantage” (Tarditi, 2010, p. 14). Wilson also argued that, “an independent Scotland could reap the same substantial economic benefits enjoyed by other small sovereign Community members, such as Denmark…[he talked] enthusiastically of opening Scottish trade offices in all European capitals” (Bradley, 1988). A decade later, the SNP’s frame of the EU’s benefits remained economic. The 1997 SNP manifesto focused on the economic security the EU provides for pensions, agriculture, and fisheries (SNP 1997 Manifesto, p. 14, 23, 25, 26). The 2011 manifesto promises to make Scotland “Europe’s green energy powerhouse” and to use EU funds to improve employability and education training (SNP 2011 Manifesto, p. 10, 12, 34, 36). Current party leaders echo Wilson’s calls of a Nordic relationship to the European Union. Member of the European Parliament Alyn Smith said to a Welsh audience, “Our people,
in Scotland and Wales, have already started down a different path. In our Parliament and your Senedd, proportional, coalition, minority governments! How European, how Nordic specifically. We have a different set of values...Those values fit into a social democratic Nordic Europe” (Smith, 2007).

Alex Salmond’s SNP led Scottish Government focuses on driving foreign investment and his ministers lead trade missions throughout Europe, just as Wilson envisioned. The SNP led government established institutions like Scotland’s Exchange, which promotes networking between Scots abroad, and expanded the Scottish Development International offices (SNP Manifesto 2011, p. 29). “The Scottish Government’s key international priority for 2013 and 2014 is to increase the level of engagement with the European Union and its member countries” and the 2014-2015 Draft Budget notes economic priorities are European events, EU wide renewable energy and creative industry partnerships across Europe (Scottish Government, 2013, p. 39; 108) focus on proactive economic engagement was initiated by the SNP’s Government and echoes Wilsons hope of increased trade across Europe. The 2003 Labour-led budget focused on obtaining funds not on proactive economic engagement (Scottish Government, April 2002). Thus, Gordon Wilson’s strategic view of the European Union as a platform for economic engagement remains a central SNP strategy for Europe today.

Europeanism is a policy that has been passed down through Welsh nationalism since the 1920’s. PC founding father Saunders Lewis’s “Europeanist ideas would shape Plaid Cymru’s constitutional thinking for generations to come. An alternative agenda of co-operative small nation politics within a broader international context would become deeply ingrained in Plaid Cymru’s political mindset” (Elias, 2013, p. 48). At a speech to the 2014 spring party conference, Plaid Cymru MEP Jill Evans said, “We gain from Europe, but we contribute to her as well. We are a modern, bilingual European nation. We can teach other countries as well as learn from them. What we need to build is an equal partnership” (Evans, 2014). Evans expressed the distinct Welsh angle of pro–Europeanism that portrays the relationship between Wales and Europe as a “cooperative” space and a “partnership.” This understanding of Wales’s relationship to the EU has passed from leader to leader.

Pro–European policy continuity between leaders is more likely in small parties because their leadership elections have been less contested and less controversial. Scottish National Party leadership elections have been won overwhelmingly since pro–Europeanism emerged in 1990. Alex Salmond won the 1990 election 486 to 186. Even though there was “a known preference of his parliamentary colleagues and Gordon Wilson” for his opponent, the overwhelming vote made him a clear successor (Chittenden, 1990). Salmond’s eventual successor, John Swinney, followed his gradualist approach and is now a key figure in Salmond’s Scottish Government. Swinney comfortably won the leadership post 547 to 268 in 2000 and 577 to 111 in 2004 despite what was seen as a divisive and potentially devastating internal battle between “gradualists” and “fundamentalists” (Quinn, 2012, Appendix G). Finally, Alex Salmond won the 2007 leadership election with 76 % of the vote and has led unopposed since (Quinn, 2012, Table G.1). In Plaid Cymru, Ieuan Wyn Jones won the leadership by 50.7 per cent of the vote in 2003 and remained leader for 9 years until he stood down (Quinn, 2012, Appendix H). In a two round election in 2012, Leanne Wood became Plaid Cymru leader with 57 % of the vote (Morris, 2012).

In contrast, larger parties’ leadership elections had more contenders and were less decisive. The Labour Party’s 2010 election had five candidates and the election needed four
stages before a leader was decided. In the fourth stage, Ed Miliband won with only 50.65% of the vote. His win was much more tenuous considering he trailed David Miliband for the first three rounds (Kelly, Lester, & Durkin, 2010, p. 15). Early on, David Cameron faced strong competition from Liam Fox and David Davis. Ultimately, Cameron lost the vote among Conservative Members of Parliament. Among MPs, he won 28.3%, Davis won 31.3% and Fox won 21.2%. In addition to having weak elite support, he only received 45.5% of the members’ votes. Before the party’s conference, Cameron had only 17% support from party members. During the election, he had to match his policies to better suit their needs and this radicalized his European policy (Quinn, 2012, p. 113).

Cameron’s situation shows how leadership elections drive leaders’ policy positions to be more distinct from their predecessors and more radical. Cameron had to “firm up his Eurosceptic credentials during the campaign” (Quinn, 2012, p. 118; Temko, 2005). The Daily Telegraph noted that “Cameron woos the right with an attack on Europe” and one Tory MP pressured him to be more clear with his policy, stating, “he can’t carry on being all things to all men forever” (Trefgame, Jones, & Sparrow, 2005; Brady & Barnes, 2005).

The SNP elite actively avoided this situation. When Alex Salmond chose to run in 2007, his biggest competition, Nicola Sturgeon, stepped down. Current Justice Secretary Kenny MacAskill also stepped down to allow Sturgeon to run for Deputy First Minister on Salmond’s ticket. The lack of strong opposition and the ability to compromise behind closed doors allows small party leaders to face less policy criticism and thus, are not pressured to change the policy positions of their predecessors.

**Strong consequences for dissent**

Minority nationalist parties are more likely to crack down upon internal dissent because as a small party they are less able to withstand internal fissures. Since the 1980’s, potentially divisive conversations have been suppressed so the EU remains exclusively an elite policy area. These biases against internal conflict allow party leaders to make EU policy unilaterally and strengthen pro-European policy continuity.

Recent conflicts within the Scottish National Party splintered the party and taught membership and leadership that conflict is best avoided. The best example of this is the 1982 expulsion of the socialist SNP organization the 1979 Group, which included many current leaders. Recently, Gordon Wilson said the traumatic expulsion of the 79 Group was necessary for the unity of the party and “history has proved him to be correct. Perhaps it’s the memory of that bitter time that ensures that the modern SNP are so disciplined” (The Herald, February 2014). In fact, by the late 1980’s the SNP had unified again. By then the party was finally “dedicating itself to achievement of a significant breakthrough and not allowing emergence of self-imposed obstacles” (Wilson, 1989). More recently, comparing the North Atlantic Trade Organization (NATO) debate in the SNP to recent backbench revolts on Europe in the Conservative Party exemplifies how much stronger aversion to internal dissent is within smaller parties.

Policy change on NATO was brought in from above, introduced and championed by MP Angus Robertson. Robertson’s policy change led to a close vote at the party’s 2012 autumn conference with the leadership ultimately prevailing as the motion passed 426 to 332 (BBC News 2012). The strong reaction by media and those within the party shows how important internal coherence is to the SNP. The NATO debate was framed as “an internal rebellion” by the media (Daily Record, October, 2012; Johnson, 2012). To combat this
rhetoric, SNP leaders were quick to assure each other and voters that unity was premium. In his opening words of the conference Alex Salmond reminded the party, “I trust this conference to operate in the best interests of achieving independence for Scotland. I trust this conference to debate the big issues in a comradely manner” (Salmond, 2012). Leaders also activated personal influence in their membership by calling on the support of well-respected former leaders like Winnie Ewing and by using party resources to distribute pamphlets throughout the party (Robertson, 2012).

The most serious result of the debate was the disaffiliation of Members of Scottish Parliament (MSPs) Jean Urquhart and John Finnie from the party. Their defection was portrayed the “near disappearance of [Alex Salmond’s] majority in the parliament – he now has 65 of the 129 MSPs” (Swanson, 2012). However, most of the dozen MSPs who had been against changing NATO policy fell into line with the decision. In fact, within the party, the mood after the debate ultimately felt self-congratulatory. Salmond echoed this feeling by commenting: “We had an excellent and democratic debate at party conference last Friday, and agreed a policy of reaffirming our opposition to nuclear weapons as a non-nuclear member of the NATO alliance – a position that will be accepted by the party as a whole” (BBC News, October 2012). The result reaffirmed that on policy, “Salmond has been trusted with a long leash” by his party’s own membership (Massie, 2012).

A general lack of interest in the EU reduces the impetus to overcome policy inertia and elite leadership. British public opinion on the EU can be generalized as “widespread indifference or uncertainty” (Usherwood, 2002, p. 216–219). The persistent lack of interest means that there is no strong grassroots impetus to internal conflict. To some extent, elite leadership within minority nationalist parties follows society wide elite leadership on Europe but elite leaders in small parties are more consistent (Hellstrom, 2008). Stewart Maxwell MSP confirmed that, “because there is a settled position, it’s the senior party members who deal with the EU. In terms of what the party does, it’s a few senior members of the party who drive the changes” (S. Maxwell, personal communication, January 8, 2014). EU policy has remained the same in minority nationalist parties because of the closer connections between these senior members and because unity is viewed as indispensable.

**Underdeveloped and Broad Policy**

Small and oppositional party policies are more likely to be underdeveloped, especially on foreign affairs. Broad EU policy encourages minority nationalist parties to maintain pro-European policy through two mechanisms: their reliance on Euro-enthusiasts for detailed decisions and the oppositional usefulness of broad pro-European rhetoric.

**Lack of resources**

A lack of resources reduces funding for small parties’ European policy and campaigning. Capital in smaller parties will almost always be more difficult to come by as a result of fewer membership fees and less reputational pull with big sources of funding. I measure spending on European policy through European Parliament campaign spending. Campaign spending provides a useful measurement because spending during that time indicates the amount of importance parties put on the European Union as a policy arena. Not only do small parties have less money, they spend a smaller proportion of money on European issues when compared to regional elections. This can be seen in Table 1 in the appendix. It is not strategically valuable for a small, oppositional party to fight with the same intensity in each
race. A Plaid Cymru party member explains: “Plaid Cymru is never going to be in power in Westminster...we’re the main opposition party in the Assembly and only Assembly elections will bring us self-determination” (Elias, 2013, p. 73).

This relative lack of spending on Europe affects policy through lack of spending on manifestos in small parties. According to the Electoral Commission party spending reports, in the 2009 European Parliament election, the SNP spent 1762 pounds, PC spent 840 pounds and the Scottish Green Party spent 120 pounds on manifestos. The Conservative Party spent 870 pounds in Scotland and 1773 pounds in Wales, but overall the party spent 11,197 pounds. The benefits from huge resources overall to develop policy at a national level that can then be used in devolved regions. Thus, the SNP’s spending on EP manifestos is on par with mainstream parties but when taking into account the mainstream spending across the UK, they are massively over powered by larger parties. Small party policy development is also constrained because they lack access to the European Commission and bureaucracy. Most EU institutions remain state-led. This may reduce small party knowledge of EU issues even if they might attempt to engage. While UK ministers are obliged to be present when devolved leaders communicate with the EU they are not obliged to inform Scottish or Welsh leaders of their communications.

How does a lack of monetary and informational resources maintain pro-European policy? Fewer resources to spend on manifesto writing and policy development mean that expert staff on Europe are a small group of people (MEPs and their staff) within the party who will tend to have some affiliation or innate interest in Europe. Additionally, there are fewer MEPs—Plaid Cymru has one (Jill Evans) and the Scottish National Party has two (Alyn Smith, Ian Hudghton) compared to the 26 of the Conservative Party. As a result of the small number of MEPs and the lack of resources spent on European policy, small parties rely on more narrow feedback from the European Parliament. Alyn Smith MEP explained, “We will to some extent take our line from the Scottish Government and where there isn’t a line we help to create a line.” (A. Smith, personal communication, January 10, 2014). Smith’s liaison to the Scottish Parliament Paul Togneri added, “Our MEPs have a larger role in ensuring that the party knows what’s happening in Europe and that the party hierarchy knows what’s going on” (P. Togneri, personal communication, January 15, 2014). MEPs in larger parties are much less likely to have this type of bottom up policy making influence because this would be too difficult to coordinate. Additionally, “when a party is in government, it could be damaging if its MEPs voted against what the government had agreed upon in the Council of Ministers or in the European Council” (Raunio, 2000, p. 218). Raunio’s empirical analysis and surveys of parties’ attitudes towards MEPs proves that “regarding party size, the effect is as expected, with MEPs being more influential in smaller parties” (Raunio, 2000, p. 220).

The influence of MEPs drives policy to become more pro-European because, “one of the consequences of the varying expertise in the European area within or among the political parties, especially those whose Euro-enthusiasm is cool, is that those individuals in the parties who do have specialist knowledge...will gain influence in the party in this area because of their rare knowledge and will invariably be Euro enthusiasts” (Gaffney, 1996). As a result of their reliance on MEPs and European Parliament (EP) staff as informational and policy making figures, small parties European policies will be biased towards Euro-enthusiasm.
Broad policy as an oppositional tool

Another reason that small party leaders detail only limited aspects of European Union policy is that it is strategically useful. Small parties are oppositional and thus by remaining broadly pro-European in a Eurosceptic party system they’re able to criticize most of the mainstream party positions on Europe. A review of minority nationalist press releases shows the oppositional nature of their EU policies.

The parties use the EU to criticize the UK government and governing parties for shunning the EU and also for incorporating EU policies. The SNP criticizes “internationally isolated Westminster, as Labour and the Tories both move towards an in/out referendum” and claims this isolationism is bad for business (Scottish National Party, January 2013; Scottish National Party, November 2013). On the other hand they oppose the government’s integration of EU policy on various issues including fisheries, agriculture and animal welfare. When mainstream parties do incorporate EU policy, the SNP suggests that they do not stand up for Scotland. One such claim is that “successive Labour and Tory government failure to stand up for our fishing industry in Europe has been a disgrace” (Scottish National Party, April 2009). MEP Ian Hudghton attacked the “London-led Labour and Lib Dems support [for] an attempted ban on trawling in the Atlantic, a move which would have had a devastating effect on the Scottish industry” (Greens-EFA, October 2013). Plaid Cymru portrays their own EU policy as “putting Wales first” and accuse mainstream parties of forgetting Wales. MEP Jill Evans suggests that “time after time we’ve seen the Labour Welsh government and the Tory UK government failing Wales, over transport routes and, most recently, over flooding” (Plaid Cymru, March 2014). Mainstream party Euroscepticism is portrayed as “petty point-scoring” and “posturing by London based political parties” (Plaid Cymru, May 2013). They portray Euroscepticism not as rejection of the EU but rather as a more basic dichotomy, claiming that “the advantages of EU membership far outweigh the alternative – isolationism.” Thus PC far outweighs the alternative choice—mainstream Eurosceptics (Evans speech, October 2013).

The SNP and PC take advantage of the fact that they cannot negotiate with the European Union by using opposition on the EU to bring up wider issues against mainstream parties. This behavior by oppositional parties is in line with the idea that, “the pivotal actor in electoral contests is not necessarily always the median voter…it may be optimal for executives in some institutional and strategic settings to target a narrow group of voters (e.g., voters in swing districts or partisan voters), whereas other contexts may encourage governments to represent broader electoral interests” (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008, p. 312). Since public attention to the details of EU policy is low, oppositional parties do not necessarily need to follow public opinion. Rather, they co-opt the issue of the EU to “represent broader electoral interests,” namely anti-government stances. Broad pro-European policies benefit small parties by providing a rhetorical way to express anti-mainstream policies and they also allow day to day policy decisions to be made by natural Euro enthusiasts—those already in Brussels.

The Importance and Benefits of Transnational Coalitions

Small, oppositional parties rely on transnational relationships at the EU level for monetary and reputational capital. Notably, these connections are generated horizontally—between parties—and not vertically like funding benefits of the Europe of the Regions.
**Resources gains at the European Union**

Small parties gain funding for staff and policy development through the European Parliament. Each Member of Parliament has a staff and services budget of €21,209 per month which can be used to employ assistants in Brussels and in their constituency. Small parties tend to make these staff budgets go further and share these budgets with national parliamentarians so staffing budget benefits the party’s domestic popularity. For example, SNP MEP Ian Hudghton employs 7 assistants, in full and in part. By partly employing assistants, Hudghton and fellow SNP MEP Alyn Smith share staff part time with MSPs who pay for them part time as well. In this way and also through sharing office costs, European Parliament budgets benefit the SNP domestically too. In general, small party MEPs employ more staff than mainstream parties. Plaid Cymru MEP Jill Evans employs six assistants, United Kingdom Independence Party leader Nigel Farage employs five assistants and Green MEP Jean Lambert employs 12. An average Conservative MEP has 4 assistants.3 Just as they focus their campaigning budgets on regional elections, minority nationalist MEPs spread their staffing budgets to add value at their main arena of focus—regional parliaments.

More benefits are accessed through party coalitions. Minority nationalist and Green parties have coalesced into the Greens-European Free Alliance (EFA) Party Group. European Parliament party groups receive their own funding separate from MEPs allowances. Mainly “the material benefits of being in a group include more office space and staff, and more money for organising meetings and distributing information” (Miller, 2009, p. 5). The SNP use the Greens-EFA Group to employ an SNP expert on fisheries policy who serves the whole group but provides European policy support to the SNP in particular. They gain more resources for their domestic priority—fisheries—but party groups also provide broader informational resources to process EU developments which can be difficult with few resources. Through the Greens-EFA Group, SNP MEPs gain the policy expertise of other parties across Europe. The Scottish MEPs “work very closely with the Greens. They have advisors who are looking at detailed consequences of the complete legislative package and then our advisors will look over what the Green group advisors nail it down to and we will look at the effects for Scotland separately. Then we see if we should vote along with the group depending on how it affects Scotland” (Togneri interview, 2014).

This information sharing within party coalitions also allows small party MEPs to better inform leaders, which is a main responsibility and source of leaders strategic information. The European Free Alliance defines itself as “a pro-European party that endorses the European Union’s values” and the Green Party also sees the EU as instrumental in environmental protection (EFA website, “About Us”; Greens-EFA website, “History”). Small party MEPs’ lack of resources necessitates reliance on their party groups for help processing information. This information is passed on to leaders who rely on their MEPs for European expertise. Through this informational chain, the pro-Europeanism of the Greens-EFA group maintains minority nationalist pro-Europeanism. Even without the Euro enthusiast informational bias, the aid in processing EU developments encourages minority nationalists to maintain strong European connections.

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Reputational gains at the European Union

Even more than resources, reputation is an important strategic concern for small parties who struggle to legitimate themselves in the domestic media. BBC archives “suggest that online news coverage is distorted in favor of the three largest parties, particularly Conservative and Labour. With the exceptions of the Greens and Respect, Labour and the Conservatives generally have about 10 times as many mentions in news stories as the other parties” (Ward, 2008, p. 142). Although the SNP was mentioned with the same frequency as the Liberal Democrats on BBC news, they still trailed by over 100 articles to the Conservatives and Labour. Plaid Cymru fared even worse, having only 40 news articles to their main regional competitor Labour’s 347 articles (Ward, 2008, Table 7.1, p. 143). Small parties struggle to challenge this lack of media coverage domestically because they are seen as perpetually oppositional. The SNP attempted to do so by mounting a legal challenge against the BBC for excluding Alex Salmond from leadership debates. However, “critics pointed out the SNP was not a UK party – it now has only six out of 650 Westminster seats – and it had no hope of becoming the government. Salmond was also standing down as an MP and had no prospect of becoming prime minister” (Carrell, 2010). Thus minority nationalists struggle to gain media attention domestically due to their regional limitations.

Europe can provide a solution to this lack of coverage and legitimacy. The European Parliament has a much better reputation than Europe as a whole. In fact, 52 % of Europeans feel that the Parliament should have a larger role and only 22 % feel it should have a reduced role (Parlemeter, February 2011). By linking party leadership with the European Parliament, small parties signal to the public that they are competent. Only 25 per cent of people trust their national parliament, while 31 % trust the European Parliament (Eurobarometer, December 2013).

One way small parties capitalize on the trust in the European Parliament is to nominate party leadership to become MEPs. As MEPs, they can represent the party with the legitimacy of the European Union. SNP MEPs Winnie Ewing and Ian Hudghton both served as party presidents, and MEP Allan MacCartney was deputy leader of the party. Alyn Smith said, “We [the SNP] have the European angle front and center” including a permanent MEP position on the party’s decision making body, the National Executive Committee (Smith interview, January 2014). Plaid Cymru MEP Jill Evans served as President until 2013. Many parties have an EU representative on the executive committee but “in larger parties, usually only the leaders of the EP delegation are members of the executive organs” (Raunio, 2000, p. 213). In small parties, the EU representatives are at the highest and most central levels of party decision making.

Small party MEPs use EU power to draw attention to the most important domestic issues but they need their transnational connections to do so. Transnational party political groups also provide procedural advantages like appointments to committees, allocating speaking time, and helping EU agenda setting (Miller, 2009, p. 6). Committee assignments are more important for small parties because they usually have a very limited EU policy focus that is specific to local lobbies and thus their specific policy interests might be very narrow. For example the SNP’s Ian Hudghton is on the fisheries committee, which is a major issue in Scotland. Jill Evans is on the Environmental Committee which allows her to speak authoritatively on renewable energy, which Party leader Leanne Wood promoted as the party’s mechanism for growing the Welsh economy (Wood, 2012). Having some real influence on the most pressing issues in their constituency allows MEPs to back up their
rhetoric that they “fought for” their constituency despite only having one or two MEPs in their party. Minority nationalists would be unable to do this through the state so it’s very important that they gain positions at the EP to suit their domestic needs. Transnational coalitions ensure this.

Smaller parties also use their EU relationships to draw positive attention. This was visible at the Scottish March for Independence in 2013, where “50 to 60 Flemish nationalist campaigners from the Vlaamse Volksbeweging (VVB) coalition were distributing leaflets to promote that march and a pan-European initiative to get one million signatures on a petition for self-determination sent in to the European Commission” (Carrell, 2013). Scottish success provided a rallying point and opportunity for Flemish nationalists to promote themselves and to seek validation. PC MEP Jill Evans also relied on other minority nationalist parties in speeches to legitimize Plaid Cymru’s plans. She noted transnational policy inspirations from economic plans in the Basque Country, the Peace Institute models of the Flemish, and the peaceful civic nationalist movement of the SNP (Evans, October 2013; Evans, November 2009). To justify their ability to change policies in Wales, Leanne Wood claimed that Plaid Cymru could be a government that “protects Welsh pensioners from cuts in council tax benefit by doing a deal with local government – like the one reached in Scotland – rather than simply acting as the Tories’ henchmen” (Wood, September 2012). Capitalizing on Scottish connections indicates to the public that Plaid Cymru’s policies are legitimate and well tested, which is more important for them because they have never been in government.

Forming transnational coalitions enables minority nationalist MEPs to draw attention to the issues they care about, to call attention to more successful parties, to increase staffing numbers which disseminates the benefits of European engagement throughout membership.

**Conclusion**

Given the failure of the Europe of the Regions and the Euroscepticism of the British political system, why have minority nationalist parties remained pro-European? Minority nationalists have remained pro-European because of the characteristics intrinsic to small and oppositional parties, namely: (1) the dominance and continuity of party leadership on EU policy, (2) the underdeveloped nature of EU policy, and (3) the importance of transnational coalitions.

Before discussing these characteristics I reviewed previous approaches to the relationship between minority nationalists and Europe. The more developed of these approaches is the top-down approach but this approach became outdated. The bottom-up literature provides an updated, party political angle. This literature’s contention that “strategic and tactical considerations exerted a growing pressure on what position was formally espoused vis-a-vis the EU” in minority nationalist parties was a foundational idea of this paper (Elias, 2008, p. 577).

The strategic considerations that have allowed minority nationalist parties to remain pro-European are those of small and oppositional parties. The small and oppositional mechanisms that maintain pro-Europeanism are a dominance of leadership in EU policymaking, a broadly oppositional EU policy, and transnational benefits. These characteristics encourage pro-European policy inertia by reducing incentives to develop detailed or new EU policy, providing strong oppositional uses of the EU and providing resource and reputational benefits. Notably I showed the influence of minority nationalist leaders on their party’s EU
positions is not dependent on their nationalism but rather on small party structures that champion unilateral leadership and strategic oppositional positions to attack mainstream party competitors.

**LIMITATIONS OF ARGUMENT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE**

These findings are limited by a small case study and definitional difficulties. However, my argument should not be seen in isolation but rather as a complement to broader work. Limiting my case study enabled a deeper look within parties and allowed me to examine the way that parties act at all levels of governance without having to explain differences between countries. Using a solely UK study may hinder generalizability. However, it adds depth of knowledge and information in a field with a wealth of multi-country comparisons through the work of Anwen Elias (2008), Carolyn Rowe (2011), Janet Laible (2008), Jurgen-Klaus Nagel (2004) and Michael Keating (1995, 2005, 2008).

In order to focus on party strategy, my definitions take nationalism and European integration as constant. This is ultimately not limiting because EU positions are shown to be a function of strategy not EU changes or nationalist ideology. Defining minority nationalists as small and oppositional could be questioned in light of growing Scottish and Catalan parties. However, I would suggest that the rise of some minority nationalist parties is an opportunity to examine further implications. I will do so using the SNP as a case study. In light of my argument, the SNP’s growth should reduce pro-European policy.

Although my claim that they are small and oppositional remains true at the state level, in devolved government the SNP is no longer in opposition. The Scottish Government and Parliament have had an SNP majority since 2011. This majority enabled their efforts to take advantage of devolution by seeking more power within the European Union. They have tried to take some negotiating powers, which have been traditionally reserved to states. Their change in positioning seems to have had some effect on their pro-Europeanism but any significant policy change has been hindered by lack of real governing power and the availability of the UK Government as a rhetorical scapegoat.

For example, the Scottish Government works with the European Commission on Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), through the Cabinet Secretary for Rural Affairs and the Environment Richard Lochhead. This has changed their small and oppositional strategy in two ways. First, Lochhead relies on Scottish Government civil servants to provide information on fisheries so informational responsibility is removed from the Euro-enthusiast experts within the party and in Brussels. As such, the SNP has developed a clear and detailed policy proposal on fisheries, which it does not do for each EU issue. Second, Lochhead has tried to insert himself into negotiations directly and has cooperated with both the EU and the UK Government for influence on fisheries (BBC News, October 2013). This means that his solutions have had to become more like those of a governing party. As a result, Lochhead’s criticism of the EU on fisheries has taken on a more Eurosceptic tone. He has said, “Many of the problems we have with the current system is ill-fitting regulations imposed on Scotland by Brussels” (Whitelaw, 2011).

However, there has not been substantive change to the overall pro-Europeanism of the party because the SNP still acts small and oppositional on overall EU policy. There have been no changes within the SNP’s internal decision making since gaining a majority. As such, SNP fisheries policy is still centrally decided. Additionally, Lochhead’s efforts to bypass the UK Government were not entirely successful. For example, the timing of their consul-
tation meant they did not have direct influence on decisions (Whitelaw, 2011). As a result of lack of access, the SNP policy on fisheries continues to be dealt with by MEPs and their staff which tempers the Eurosceptic language used by Lochhead. MEP Hudghton suggests that, “The management of Scotland’s fisheries over the past 40 years has been characterized by uncaring governments in London and an over-centralised approach in Brussels. This latter problem is being addressed to some extent” (Hudghton, 2014). Additionally, the SNP still aims their discontent with fisheries policy at mainstream parties, not the EU. SNP MP Angus Robertson argued to the UK Government, “You are right to describe the CFP as having been a disaster, but you should probably admit and acknowledge that it was a Conservative government that signed us into it in the first place” (Robertson, 2013).

Although SNP fisheries policy has taken on a more Eurosceptic tone, one issue area is not enough to create nuance to the party’s pro-European policy. If minority nationalist parties were to grow further, the process by which the SNP has become strongly critical on CFP could be echoed in more policy areas. However, current growth is not enough. Only further devolution on the EU could shift minority nationalists from small and oppositional strategy. My argument does imply that members of minority nationalist parties and EU scholars should not mistake the pro–Europeanism in minority nationalist parties for inherent Euro–enthusiasm. Size and positioning can change and when they do, they will change the way in which minority nationalist parties engage with the European Union and will create internal fissures on the matter. The most imminent possibility for a minority nationalist party to overcome their small and oppositional status is the Scottish independence referendum in September 2014. This case stands as a test to show what will happen once the small and oppositional incentives for pro–Europeanism fade. By changing their size and positioning, independence in Scotland or more devolution of EU policy to Scotland might alter the trend of minority nationalist pro–Europeanism and finally rattle the SNP’s 35 year policy of “Independence in Europe.”

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Explaining the Perseverance of "Independence in Europe"


