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History Education and Identity Formation: A Case Study of Uganda

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INTRODUCTION: EDUCATING ON THE PAST

"Until the lion has his own historian, the hunter will always be a hero."

- Ewe proverb (West Africa)

This piece of wisdom vividly captures the inherent bias in every retelling of the past. And yet, people know themselves from their history. Because of this, History[1] curricula are often controversial. Students in India and Pakistan learn about the history of partition from opposing perspectives: each country's national narrative vilifies the other, fanning the flames of mutual hatred.[2] In late nineteenth century America, government-operated Indian boarding schools sought to erase students' ethnic identities by teaching them a Eurocentric version of U.S. history that ignored the contributions of Native Americans. These are far from unique problems. Developing an inclusive national narrative poses real challenges to people throughout the world as identity groups struggle to control the interpretations of the past taught to younger generations. One forum for this struggle is the national History curriculum, through which the state provides its own account of the national narrative.

Teaching a national History through the nationalized education system promotes the formation of national identity among the population. In sub-Saharan African countries, the rapid expansion of nationalized education facilitates the creation of national identities where they previously did not exist and cultivates citizens' identification with the nation over subnational and supranational social groups. The augmentation of national identity has significant

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[1] Throughout this thesis, "history" refers to the study of past events, while "History" refers to the subject taught in schools.

[2] Jon Dorschner and Thomas Sherlock, "The Role of History Textbooks in Shaping Collective Identities in India and Pakistan," in *Teaching the Violent Past*, ed. Elizabeth A. Cole (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007): 275-316.

implications at the domestic and international level. First, people identify more closely with other members of their nation and less exclusively with other members of their ethnic group. Second, as people develop a greater identification with other nationals, they identify less with nonnationals. Shifts in identity alter people's political behavior toward other nationals and nonnationals. As more people identify with and integrate into the nation, they regard each other as members of the same community and build more peaceful relations with each other. But integration within the nation also polarizes the nation against other nations, risking international conflict. The main methodology employed here to explore the impact of History education on identity formation is a case study of education in Uganda.

Like other low-income countries, Uganda has received significant amounts of aid from foreign donors for education. International donors and governments worldwide hurriedly expend their efforts to realize the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Education for All (EFA) by 2015. Sub-Saharan African countries, in particular, have benefited from the surge in foreign aid for education during the past thirty years. In 2007, sub-Saharan Africa received the most Official Development Assistance to education out of all regions of the world.[3] The World Bank's International Development Association directs half its share of credits and loans to Africa.[4] Governments in low-income countries have generally used the aid to construct infrastructure to accommodate more pupils. As a result of these target-driven initiatives, primary and secondary education has expanded swiftly throughout the world: now, according to UNICEF, 84 percent of primary-school-age children across the world are enrolled in schools.[5]

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[3] UNESCO, *Education For All Global Monitoring Report 2010* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010), 444-445.

[4] World Bank, "What is IDA?" http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/IDA/0,,contentMDK:21206704~menuPK:83991 ~pagePK:51236175~piPK:437394~theSitePK:73154,00.html. The IDA lends money without an interest charge and requires repayments over a period of 35 to 40 years.

[5] UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children Special Edition*, (New York: UNICEF, 2009), ii.

Aiming toward achieving EFA (see Appendix A for EFA goals), international organizations have invested considerable resources into research on increasing access to quality basic education.

The MDGs and EFA assume the positive impacts of education. This faith in a generalized notion of education is at times taken to absurd and simplistic lengths. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) asserts that education plays an essential role in addressing all eight MDGs: education reduces poverty, combats child mortality, improves maternal health, fights diseases, ensures environmental sustainability, and even creates global partnerships for development.[6] A major recipient of international assistance, Uganda's Ministry of Education and Sports also embraces the MDGs and EFA goals as its own national objectives.[7] Overall, both international actors and the Ugandan government pour their efforts into increasing school enrollment rates. But a blind acceptance of education as a panacea can be problematic.

International donors typically overlook the content of recipient countries' History curricula. Despite the vast literature on the expansion of schooling in Africa, information about the historical knowledge taught to African students is sparse. As mass schooling expands to every corner of the world, it is crucial to evaluate the effect of teaching a state-sponsored History on intranational and international relations through case studies of various countries. Although findings from the Uganda case study cannot be generalized to the entire continent, they can inform further research on History teaching in sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-Saharan African countries like Uganda provide a unique context for studying nationalized education for three primary reasons.

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[6] UNESCO, "Education and the Millennium Development Goals," http://www.unesco.org/en/education-for-all-international-coordination/themes/education-and-the-mdgs/.
[7] Uganda Ministry of Education and Sports, "Education Sector Strategic Plan: 2004-2015," http://chet.org.za/manual/media/files/chet_hernana_docs/Uganda/National/Education%20Sector%20Strategic%20Plan%202004-2015.pdf , 2.

First, colonial powers initially created both the state and the nation in sub-Saharan Africa. During the infamous "Scramble for Africa", European countries carved up Africa in a fierce competition for global influence. While striving to ensure their access to the continent's wealth of resources, they severed ethnic groups and grouped different ethnicities together into colonies. European powers then built colonial governments to serve their interests over those of the colonized and to control the indigenous people. Thus, sub-Saharan African states originally functioned as an extension of the colonizing state's rule. After they gained independence, the international community automatically recognized the sovereignty of these same governments under new African leaders. Colonial boundaries define the African nations of today. Over fifty different ethnic groups compose the contemporary Ugandan nation. Thus, the indigenous people of sub-Saharan Africa participated in the initial formation of neither state nor national identity. The sub-Saharan African state use nationalized History education to socialize its citizens to adopt national identity even though there is little historical basis for a national community.

Second, Europeans imported their own form of education to Africa. During the precolonial and colonial periods, Christian and Catholic missionaries introduced European schooling as a part of their evangelizing efforts. Colonial regimes supported the missionaries' endeavors and built their own schools for the indigenous people.[8] Thus, the objectives of the colonial regime and missionary groups drove the expansion of colonial educational systems. Yet, the educational systems inherited from colonial powers have remained virtually the same since independence. The Ugandan nationalized education system, for example, mirrors the British education system. The missionary groups, who established the first European-style schools in Uganda, remain influential in the country's nationalized education system. Teacher colleges in

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[8] Jim N. Omatseye and Bridget O. Omatseye, *Going to School in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2008), 186.

Uganda train Ugandan teachers to employ European methods of instruction. Nevertheless, sub-Saharan African states promote this form of education over indigenous forms of education in their EFA campaign.

Third, sub-Saharan African states expanded mass education recently and rapidly. According to UNICEF, mass schooling has had the least penetration in Africa compared to the rest of the world: only 64 percent of the continent's primary-age school children attend school.[9] The median survival rate to the last grade of education, according to UNESCO, was lower for sub-Saharan Africa than for any other region in 2005. The region had a survival rate of 67 percent, while Uganda had an even lower survival rate of 31 percent.[10] On the other hand, sub-Saharan Africa also experienced the world's highest recent increase in total primary school enrollment rate: enrollment rose by 42 percent from 1996 to 2002.[11] In Uganda, the ratio of primary school-age population attending school nearly doubled from 1997 to 2009.

Because the expansion of nationalized education happened so quickly in Uganda, there is an enormous intergenerational gap in the level of schooling obtained. In addition, there are interethnic disparities in the penetration of mass education. The Karimojong people of northeastern Uganda have for long resisted international and national efforts to introduce mass education, whereas the Buganda people of central Uganda are the most school-educated ethnic group in Uganda. Since Uganda's national History curriculum has not significantly changed since independence, the most important independent variable is the change in access to education. The considerable intergenerational and interregional differences in exposure to schooling enable a comparison of the identities of school-educated and non-school educated Ugandans.

[9] UNICEF, "Children out of School," http://www.childinfo.org/education_outofschool.php.
[10] UNESCO, "Regional Overview: Sub-Saharan Africa," in *Education For All Global Monitoring Report 2009*, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0017/001784/178418e.pdf, 4.
[11] Ibid., 2.

Qualitative information, collected from interviews with Ugandans of different ethnicities and of different educational backgrounds, and quantitative information from countrywide surveys can help determine the impact of History education on identity across generations and ethnic groups.

The first two chapters of this paper establish the theoretical foundations on which to build the Uganda case study. An interdisciplinary theoretical overview, informed by empirical evidence from a diverse array of countries, validates two premises: First, people's ethnic, national, regional, and global identities influence their political behavior. Second, History teaching contributes to the formation of these identities. The third chapter introduces the Uganda case study with the history of education in Uganda. It follows trends in education during the precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial periods and illustrates how different actors employed education to manipulate identity. The fourth chapter completes the case study by explaining how History education promotes both national and regional identity, beginning with an overview of the national History curricula of primary and secondary schools. The Ugandan case confirms that nationalized History education contributes to changing the way people perceive themselves and the nation. The addition of national identity to Ugandans' self-conceptions has led to the development of more peaceful interethnic relations in the country while lowering the status of non-school educated populations. The paper concludes with a summary of the case study's key findings, situates itself within existing literature, identifies its limitations, and provides suggestions for further research. Finally, it offers the case study's implications for the provision of foreign aid for education, the revision of Uganda's History curriculum, and the reform of all countries' History curricula.

CHAPTER I: IDENTITYAND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

People's identities influence their political behavior, or behavior toward others, because how an individual sees himself in relation to others affects the way he interacts with them. This chapter first defines identity and explains the link between identity and behavior. It then elaborates upon the nature of identity framed at the ethnic, national, regional, and global levels. The chapter concludes that despite their different levels of inclusiveness, these collective identities share some similarities. When triggered, each of these identities guide people to engage in actions that reflect the values and expectations associated with the identity. Most notably, each identity assumes a common past. Since a shared group narrative is the essential foundation of collective identity, History education plays a particularly important role in communicating that narrative to younger generations and fostering the development of those identities.

Identity: Conditional, Relational, and Directive

Do I contradict myself?

Very well then I contradict myself.

(I am large, I contain multitudes.)

~Walt Whitman, *Leaves of Grass*

Identity is an individual's conception of the self. It is the response to the question: "Who am I?" The answer to the question is complicated. Every individual "contain[s] multitudes" of different identities. Just as Whitman discovers contradictions within himself, some of these identities may conflict with each other. This is because every identity is fundamentally linked to a social group, which ties together people with a certain set of values and norms. Social groups

vary in their level of cohesion. Some social groups, such as the Chicago Cubs, have institutions that coordinate the collective actions of the group and set requirements for entry into the group. Other social groups do not have organizations that bring together all members of the social group. Many individuals identify as Chicago Cubs fans, but few belong to an organization based upon the identity of Cubbie devotee. Nonetheless, even if the social group lacks organization, members of the group are bound together by the values, beliefs, and ideals associated with the group identity. Thus, having an identity means being part of a social group. Each individual has a unique set of identities, but each of these identities is shared with others who are members of the social groups attached to the identities. Both the individual and the social group contribute to forging the group's identity. Because identities are intrinsically linked to social groups that include some but excludes others, group identity influences social interactions. Three qualities demonstrate the significance of identity to interpersonal relations: Identity is conditional, relational, and directive.

First, identity is conditional. Individuals have constantly fluctuating identities from which they derive their self-conception. The definition of each identity can change over time. For example, the meaning of female identity may gradually shift as an individual attempts to navigate through the different definitions of womanhood offered by society. People discard some identities as they develop new identifications with different social groups. Take, for example, an adult who no longer identifies as an adolescent. At times, some identities become more salient than other identities. For instance, one can simultaneously self-identify as a student, a woman, and an Asian-American, but each of these identities vary in the degree of importance to the individual both across time and in different contexts.

One's self-conception can also vacillate in different circumstances. While collective identity, or the general idea of a group's identity, is relatively durable and persistent, individual identity can be situational and based upon context.[12] For example, the definition of Frenchness may be fairly stable overall among the French population, but the relevance and the meaning of being French to one individual partly hinges on his circumstances. The saliency of one identity at a certain point in time depends upon the elicitation of identities by the sociopolitical context and the individual's own activation of the identity. The specific context in question does not necessarily dictate the relevance of an identity, but situational factors can have a powerful influence upon how one perceives oneself. One Ugandan explains the importance of circumstance to her identity: "When I am in Uganda, my Acholi (ethnic) identity is most important. When I am outside of Uganda, being a Ugandan is most important."[13] This shift in the relevance of identity is an example of short-term identity salience. The social context highly influences short-term identity salience, but long-term identity salience develops over time. Over a longer span of time, an identity's strength is fairly stable throughout different contexts. If one has a weak long-term social identity, then that identity is unlikely to come to the fore when making decisions about how to act. That identity is generally irrelevant in comparison to others throughout different scenarios.

Second, identity is relational. Defining oneself and others requires comparison.[14] Distinguishing between members and non-members of the group necessitates drawing boundaries between the in-group and the out-group. Thus, identity simultaneously unifies and divides since it includes some while excluding others. Social groups differentiate themselves

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[12] Anthony D. Smith, "National Identity and the Idea of European Unity." *International Affairs* 68, no. 1(1992): 59.

[13] Acholi woman, telephone interview by author, January 8, 2011.

[14] H. Tajfel and J. C.Turner, "The social identity theory of intergroup behavior," in *Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, eds. S. Worchel and W. G. Austin, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1985), 7-24.

from others by emphasizing their distinctive characteristics. Groups desire a positive evaluation of their group by comparison, and the relational aspect of identity explains why group identity guides people's behavior towards the in-group and the out-group.

Third, identity is directive; it guides behavior. Developed mainly by social psychologists Henri Tajfel and John Turner, social identity theory has laid a framework for understanding the relationship between identity and behavior.[15] Theorists in psychology define identity as a cognitive schema which serves as a framework for understanding one's experiences.[16] Identity helps people recognize their position in their environment, and each identity carries a set of expectations for behavior. The salience of an identity determines an individual's receptiveness to cues for behavior linked to that identity.[17] Thus, the more important the identity to an individual, the more likely she will choose to act in a way that aligns with the expectations attached to that identity. For example, a religious Muslim woman will wear a burqa, while a religious Christian will wear a cross. Even if they live in the same nation, each will see the other across a religious chasm because of these distinctive behaviors dictated by their different beliefs and identities. Less religious Muslim or Christian women, however, may not be identifiable from their appearance and may be more likely to see their shared identity as women and as fellow nationals. Numerous case studies suggest that this theory of identity salience and its link to behavior is accurate.[18] If an individual strongly identifies with a social group and perceives herself as an

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[15] Ibid.

[16] Hazel Markus, "Self-Schemata and Processing of Information About the Self," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 35, no. 2 (1977): 63-78.

[17] Sheldon Stryker, *Symbolic interactionism: A social structural version* (Menlo Park, CA: Benjamin Cumming, 1980).

[18] Several studies demonstrate that the salience of identity predicts time spent in activities attached to identity. The following are a few examples. Examples include studies in religious identity and religious activities and blood donor identity and blood donations: Sheldon Stryker and Richard T. Serpe, "Commitment, Identity Salience, and Role Behavior: A Theory and Research Example," in *Personality, Roles, and Social Behavior*, eds. W. Ickes and E. Knowles (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1982), 199-218.; Peter L. Callero, "Role-Identity Salience," *Social Psychology Quarterly* 48 (1985): 203-14.

integral part of the larger group rather than as a separate entity, she appropriates the triumphs and the trials of the group as her own.[19] Thus, she will act to help the group as she would help herself. Therefore, identity guides an individual's behavior as a member of the social group.

Since identity is relational, conditional, and directive, circumstances that heighten intergroup differences can trigger a certain identity, which in turn guides behavior. Tajfel found that even randomly formed groups strive to acquire a positive social identity through competition with other groups.[20] In particular, perceived threats to the group's identity increase the saliency of the identity to the in-group. A threat implies that the group can potentially lose comparative status. In response, group members act to secure and elevate their group's position. Helping the in-group and hurting the out-group are essentially the same when groups believe that they are in a zero-sum competition for status. For example, when people of the same ethnicity feel that they are disproportionally affected by difficult conditions, they scapegoat other groups for their collective problems.[21] The in-group begins to devalue the moral status of the out-group and rationalizes harmful actions against them.[22] Paradoxically, intergroup conflict can enhance the cohesiveness and morale of each group as hostility deepens between the groups.

Identity can be used to mobilize support for the in-group and opposition against the out-group, but it does not conclusively determine behavior. Many other factors such as the individual's own interests influence behavior. A study on group identity in South Africa found that strong group sympathies do not necessarily lead to out-group antipathies and that the lack of

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[19] J. C. Turner et al., *Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), 50.
[20] M. Billig and H. Tajfel, "Social categorization and similarity in intergroup behavior," *European Journal of Social Psychology* 3, no. 1 (1973): 27–51.
[21] Ervin Staub, "Genocide and Mass Killing: Origins, Prevention, Healing and Reconciliation," *Political Psychology* 21, no. 2 (2000): 370.
[22] S. Opotaw, "Special issue on Moral Exclusion and Injustice," *Journal of Social Issues* 46, no. 1 (1990): 47-65.

intergroup contact was the best predictor of interracial intolerance.[23] Despite their inherently exclusive nature, identities can also form around the values of tolerance and respect toward others. Identity itself does not cause people to harm others. In Rwanda, Hutus did not kill Tutsis purely because of their Hutu identity. Rather, their Hutu identity was manipulated to justify killing to protect their ethnic group. Nonetheless, the salience of an identity in a certain context does influence political behavior and the justification of that behavior.

These three qualities of identity as conditional, relational, and directive illustrate its significance with regard to political behavior. Accordingly, notions of identity based upon membership in the ethnic group, nation, region, and world also carry these intrinsic qualities. Ethnicity, nationality, regional identity, and global citizenship constitute just a few of the possible identities within an individual's self-conception, but they are the most relevant to the relationship between citizen and state in postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa. Ethnic groups in sub-Saharan Africa had developed sociopolitical organizations to govern themselves before the advent of colonization. Members of the ethnic groups belonged to political entities, to which they pledged their allegiance as citizens would to their state. Many of these ethnic institutions continue to exist today. Hence, loyalty to the ethnic group, which is held together by one kind of political organization, fundamentally conflicts with loyalty to the nation, which is bound together by another kind of political organization – the state. Although a person can identify with both ethnicity and nationality, the salience of ethnic identity depends upon the salience of national identity, and vice versa. Similarly, allegiance to the greater region conflicts with loyalty to the nation. Identification with the international community, the most inclusive identity of all, clashes with all three of the other more bounded identities because it requires all of them to converge

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[23] James L. Gibson, "Do Strong Group Identities Fuel Intolerance? Evidence from the South African Case," *Political Psychology* 27, no. 5 (2006): 665-705.

together under one global identity. The general relationships among each of these identities for ethnically heterogeneous countries are illustrated in the following:

Ethnic < National < Regional < Global

Note: x<y indicates that x is less inclusive than y

Postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa offers a unique context in which to apply social identity theory and to compare how these different identities guide political behavior.

Ethnicity

Definition

Ethnicity is commonly defined as a primordial quality determined by one's blood or heritage.[24] This fixed and static conceptualization of ethnicity has been challenged by various scholars. Bruce Berman asserts that ethnicity is a dynamic, socially-constructed identity that is the "outcome of the continuous and generally conflict-ridden interaction of political, economic and cultural forces both external and internal to developing ethnic communities."[25] Objective characteristics related to common ancestry and subjective perceptions of ethnicity by both insiders and outsiders contribute to determining the importance of ethnic identity.[26] Rarely isolated or self-sufficient, ethnic groups are permeable entities that continually engage in cultural exchange with other social groups. Nevertheless, ethnic groups have drawn lines between each other even if they share similar ancestries. Witness the adamant self-differentiation among many Israelis and Arabs in the Middle East. Ethnicity has been defined by the boundaries of race, religion, language, and other exclusive characteristics, but for the sake of distinguishing ethnic

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[24]Clifford Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Africa and Asia* (New York: The Free Press, 1967).

[25] Bruce J. Berman, "Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism," *African Affairs* 97, no. 388 (1998): 310.

[26] Ibid., 44.

identity from nationality, the term "ethnic group" will be used in place of what is often referred to as a "tribe."[27]

Despite the socially-constructed nature of ethnicity, an individual's fixed conception of his ethnicity can be highly important to him. This is because, regardless of whether an ethnicity has long existed or was recently fabricated, it is deeply rooted in one's sense of self. One's self-definition includes both identities that are often conceptualized to be impermanent and changeable, such as occupational identity, and identities that are understood to be permanent and unchangeable, such as ethnic and racial identity. This widespread view that ethnicity is an immutable attribute demonstrates that it is a firmly established part of people's identities. Once someone is born as Japanese, she cannot change herself into another ethnicity. The conception of Japaneseness may be dynamic and different for each individual, but being Japanese is something that endures from birth until death. Hence, a threat to one's ethnic group can also be seen as a threat to the fundamental self.[28]

Ethnic Identity and Behavior

Because of the rootedness of ethnic identity in the self-conception, ethnicity has been manipulated as an instrument to achieve political and economic ends.[29] Different circumstances can trigger ethnic identity and lead individuals to engage in discriminatory behavior toward non-

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[27] In sub-Saharan Africa, this sort of ethnic grouping has been referred to as a "tribe." Examples of ethnic groups include the Baganda in Uganda and Xulu in South Africa. Despite its widespread use, there are negative and demeaning connotations associated with the word "tribe," which is usually employed to refer to non-Western ethnic groups. See for more information on the use of "tribe": "Words Matter: Terms of Global Conflict Debated," *National Public Radio*, February 7, 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=18767319. Hence, this thesis will use the term "ethnic group" to refer to what is usually conceptualized as a "tribe." Most ethnic groups in Africa are differentiated by language. Since linguistic boundaries do not always demarcate ethnic boundaries, as in the case of the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa of Rwanda, linguistic distinctions is not the basis of defining ethnicity in this thesis. In the case of Uganda, this thesis will study what are generally agreed to be ethnic groups. A map of the traditional regions of inhabitance of these ethnic groups is provided in Appendix C.

[28] Robert Daul, *Polyarchy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1971), 115.

[29] Abner Cohen, *Custom and Politics in Urban Africa: A Study of Hausa Migrants in a Yoruba Town* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969).

members of their ethnic group.[30] Ethnocentric individuals, who identify strongly with their ethnicity, maintain a belief that their ethnic group is centrally important and judge other groups relative to their own.[31] Ethnocentric arguments have justified many inexplicably horrific events in human history, including genocide and ethnic cleansing.

No doubt, a complex web of factors determines an individual's decision to take part in collective action with other members of their ethnicity. Whatever the motivations and whatever the mechanisms, human beings throughout history have taken various actions in the past that were obviously aligned along ethnic lines. But if these actors did not possess a relatively strong ethnic identity, hurting members of the out-group to benefit the in-group would not have been an option. Devising a comprehensive theory to explain how and why ethnic conflict emerges is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, it is possible to infer that the importance of ethnic identity to the individual and those around the individual is a requisite for his choosing to engage in ethnocentric behavior. This does not mean, however, that the stronger the salience of ethnic identity, the greater the likelihood of violent ethnic-based conflict. Deciding to engage in conflict remains the prerogative of the individual, but various contingent factors can facilitate the tendency for people to act on behalf of their group based upon their shared ethnicity.

Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa

In sub-Saharan Africa, ethnic identity has particular strength and importance, but the postcolonial state has enhanced the salience of national identity. Ethnic identities had initially carried more weight than national identity because of the artificial nature of postcolonial nations. National identity as defined by the state came into existence fairly recently in sub-Saharan Africa.

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[30] Some blame ethnic conflict on the elite by claiming that they manipulate the non-elite to fight against other ethnic groups. However, scholars continue to puzzle over why the masses follow the elites. Different theories to explain ethnic conflict are explored and critiqued in this seminal work: Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1985).
[31] W. G. Sumner, *Folkways* (New York: Ginn, 1906).

European colonizers had fabricated the boundaries of each nation. In order to prevent the unification of indigenous groups against their rule, British colonial regimes discouraged the integration of ethnic groups within each colony. By reinforcing ethnic identification, the British forestalled the rise of collective consciousness and a common identity among the different groups. Through divide-and-rule policies, colonial governments pitted indigenous ethnic groups against each other in pursuit of the social and economic advantages offered by the colonial bureaucracy.[32] As social identity theory suggests, colonial policies have served to heighten competition among different social groups, in this case, ethnic groups. In part, because of this colonial legacy of division, many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have suffered from internal fragmentation and conflict.

During the precolonial period, Africans had governed themselves through their own political organizations, which spanned the gamut from centralized kingdoms to decentralized kinship networks. These forms of social organization exist today but have lost considerable influence with the advent of colonialism and the ensuing postcolonial state. With the rise of the latter, the political role of the former has diminished. It is increasingly difficult for the indigenous people to remain loyal to their ethnic political organization. Although their ethnic identities may direct them to adhere to their traditional leaders' regulations and expectations, these laws and duties often conflict with those of the central government. The state has the upper hand because its authority is bolstered by more international recognition and a greater capacity to enforce its laws. Nevertheless, ethnic tensions have been transferred to the national level.

Scholars attribute the failure of democratization in African countries to the strength of ethnic identity. Donald Horowitz argues that the more ethnically divided a country is, the more difficult it is for democratization to succeed: while democracy encourages inclusivity, ethnicity

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[32] Christopher Clapham, *Third World Politics: An Introduction* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985).

is fundamentally exclusive.[33] Bringing a new perspective to the role of civil society in relation to violent conflict in India, Ashutosh Varshney explains that intraethnic civic associations fail to prevent ethnic violence and underlines the importance of building trust among ethnic groups through the formation of interethnic civic networks.[34] Civic associations founded on the common denominator of ethnicity can actually organize violence against those of other ethnic groups. Hutu Power, a civic association based upon Hutu identity, instigated ethnic conflict and division in Rwanda. Many political parties throughout the continent today have ethnic-based constituencies even though numerous regimes have prohibited the formation of political parties explicitly formed around an ethnicity.[35] Some scholars describe postcolonial African states as neopatrimonial regimes that maintain their authority through personal patronage: politicians construct networks of political support based on kinship or ethnic ties.[36] In addition, there are widespread perceptions that public officials who have the responsibility of working for the nation often engage in corrupt acts to benefit their ethnic group. However, this common characterization of African politics as "tribal" is an overgeneralization. When asked to choose between ethnic and national identity, 70 percent of respondents to surveys across sub-Saharan Africa claimed that they felt "only national" or "equally national and ethnic."[37] Both ethnic and national identities play important roles in guiding political behavior in sub-Saharan Africa. This changing landscape of identity in Africa is often overshadowed by the legacy of ethnic conflict on the continent.

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[33] Donald L. Horowitz, "Democracy in Divided Societies," *Journal of Democracy* 4, no. 4 (1993): 19.

[34] Ashutosh Varshney, "Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond," *World Politics* 53 (2001): 388.

[35] Anika Moroff, "Party bans in Africa - an empirical overview," *Democratization* 17, no. 4 (2010): 618-641.

[36] Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, "Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa," *World Politics* 46, no. 4 (1994): 458.

[37] Amanda Lea Robinson, "National versus Ethnic Identity in Africa: State, Group, and Individual Level Correlates of National Identification," *Afrobarometer Working Paper* 112 (2009): 12.

In Rwanda, people mobilized along ethnic lines in a struggle over power. Like the British, Belgian colonial rule had encouraged ethnic fragmentation in Rwanda. Belgians issued racial identification cards, officially labeling people as Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa, and they favored the Tutsis, claiming that they were intellectually and racially superior to Hutus.[38] Heightening ethnic differences exacerbated tensions between the two groups even though they shared virtually the same culture and spoke the same language. The end of colonialism did not spell the end of ethnic divisions. Hutu resentment against the politically and socioeconomically advantaged Tutsis continued to deepen even after the first Rwandan elections brought a Hutu-dominated government into power. Building tensions led to genocide. Extremist group Hutu Power rallied Hutus to systematically slaughter Tutsis and non-compliant Hutus. After the genocide, the Rwandan government prohibited political activity emphasizing Hutu or Tutsi identity and erased ethnicity from identity cards in an effort to reduce ethnic identification. Behind this façade of reconciliation and de-ethnicization, people's ethnic identities tenaciously endure.[39] The Rwandan case tragically illustrates how certain conditions enhanced the salience of ethnic identity. The Hutus perceived their ethnic group to be in a relatively lower position than the Tutsis. They then mobilized themselves around their common ethnic identity to exterminate the Tutsi, whom they blamed for their disadvantaged circumstances. Individual Hutus took part in genocidal acts because they perceived that they themselves were threatened by the Tutsis. The strength of ethnic identity prevented many Hutus and Tutsis from seeing each other as members of a common nation.

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[38] Catharine Newbury, "Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda," *Africa Today* 45, no. 1 (1998): 11.
[39] Helen Hintjens, "Post-genocide identity politics in Rwanda," *Ethnicities* 8, no. 1 (2005): 31.

Nationality

Definition

The idea of the nation assumes that nationals share a common past, present, and future. According to Anthony Smith, national identity rests upon several unifying factors including shared myths of origin, a claim to a common homeland, a common mass culture, and equal rights and duties under the law.[40] Bound by these shared qualities, nationals collectively strive to achieve their common interests. Yet, perceptions of such commonalities are often unfounded, leading scholars such as Benedict Anderson to call nations "imagined communities."[41] This is especially the case in sub-Saharan Africa, where postcolonial states define membership in nations along colonially-imposed boundaries. In this context, arbitrary characteristics, such as one's birthplace, determine one's citizenship in the nation. These requirements for citizenship do not necessarily demonstrate that an individual shares a common history and common interests with the rest of the nation. Even if people strongly believe that they belong to a community with other nationals, most of them will never meet each other and thus will never discover whether they indeed do have more in common than they do with nonnationals. These imagined communities have significant real implications for intranational and international relations.

Bolstering national identity can reduce ethnic conflict by providing a source of crosscutting identification among ethnic groups, but it can also justify the destruction of other nations. States inspire love and self-sacrifice for the nation, but they also instill fear and hate for the "Other."[42] Drawing boundaries between nationals and foreigners, national identity often crystallizes against the "Other." Before the nineteenth century, the French was the "Other" for the British. Warfare between the two nations reflected and reinforced these perceived differences

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[40] Smith, "European Unity," 60.
[41] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (New York: Verso, 1983).
[42] Anderson, 141.

as they built their identities against each other. For the Occident, the "Other" is the Orient; the Occident defined itself based upon what the Orient was not. Romanticized depictions of Asia and the Middle East served to justify Western imperial ambitions.[43]

Warfare between nations helped build the modern state by standardizing and polarizing identities. War forced disparate groups to join together under the state by creating the existential need to break out of kinship-based organizations and to build centralized political structures.[44] War itself had a homogenizing effect on identity, as soldiers fought on behalf of the entire nation and civilians contributed to national war efforts.[45] The convergence of identity within the state coincided with increased differentiation between states. States also mobilize their populations against their enemies by encouraging the crystallization of national identity against the "Other." Kamikaze suicide bombers in Japan during World War II willingly sacrificed their lives to attack the United States for the sake of the Japanese nation. Mass propaganda during World War II clearly illustrates how the state's distorted portrayal of enemy nationals as barbaric and animalistic rendered it extremely difficult for citizens to identify with them as fellow human beings.

The boundaries of existing states are not always aligned with those of extant nations, but the state and nation are closely interrelated. For some ethnically homogeneous countries such as Japan, ethnic identity and national identity are equated, so loyalty to the ethnic group also means devotion to the nation. But this is not the case for many countries. Although initially composed of diverse nations, the Soviet Union eventually disintegrated into different states that claimed to represent the different nations. The principle of self-determination has been evoked in countless circumstances during struggles for independence and recognition of sovereignty. Members of the

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[43] Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).
[44] Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1990).
[45] Ibid., 116.

nation assert a right to sovereignty and statehood because they perceive themselves as an autonomous group.[46] Ethnonationalists in separatist movements thus reject the legitimacy of the existing state's rule and agitate for their own state. Although it disagrees on the exact meaning of self-determination, the international community has reached a general consensus that nations should have the right to choose without external coercion the government under which they will live. The United Nations charter includes a declaration of the people's right to self-determination (Article I, Chapter I, Part 2).[47] Thus, stateless groups such as the Kurds, Basques, and French Canadians have claimed that they are nations separate from the states that rule them and formed their own national identities on this premise.

Despite such challenges, the idea of the nation carries tremendous power because of its "naturalness" and rootedness in the past. However, every nation has been created. Some nations, such as the French nation, currently have firmly established and well-defined identities. But each began as a collection of different, often conflicting ethnic groups that were gradually integrated into one nation under the state. State-led nationalism crafted nations where they previously did not exist.[48] According to Earnest Gellner, nationalism in Europe primarily arose in tandem with the transition from agrarian to industrial society: the functioning of a large complex industrial society, where people must cope with continually shifting functions and positions, necessitated cultural homogenization through state-led mass education.[49] One standard language was selected by the state and used as a medium for generating and communicating national histories,

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[46] Anderson, 7.

[47] United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 24 October 1945, 1 United Nations Treaty Series XVI.

[48] This thesis adopts the distinction made between state-led and state-seeking nationalism by Charles Tilly. See Charles Tilly, *Durable inequality*, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998), 175. The first is the formation of national identity directed by the state that makes claims about the common culture and interests of its designated members, and the latter is based upon claims made by a social group that does not have control of the state apparatus but asserts its own claims to statehood and nationhood. References to "nationalism" in this thesis should be assumed to mean "state-led nationalism."

[49] Earnest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).

traditions, and myths. Nationalism had a unifying effect upon the population but also induced conflict and separation from the state by ethnic groups, who asserted their own right to nationhood and statehood. The nation-state prototype, in which the state rules over a single, homogeneous nation, has served as the ideal for many different nationalist movements around the world.

Nationality in Sub-Saharan Africa

While recognizing these subtleties in defining the "nation," this thesis will refer to the "nation" as defined by the state in order to narrow its focus on the role of the African state and nationalized History education in promoting national identity. In fact, the development of national identity in Africa shares some similarities with the rise of nationhood in Europe but differs in many respects. Indigenous people appropriated the European-bred idea of nationhood in their struggles for independence. African freedom fighters used nationalist rhetoric to frame their demands for independence and sovereignty to their European colonizers. Although the colonizers had imposed the boundaries of each colony, new nations sprung from these boundaries. With increasing collaboration among the colonized in resistance to European colonial rule, national identities based upon the common experience of colonial oppression gradually formed in each colony. Tunisian Albert Memmi famously describes the dichotomy of the colonizer and the colonized: one cannot exist without the other. The colonized cannot define themselves without referring to their colonial relationship with the colonizer.[50] Africans defined themselves against their "Other," the colonizer, in nationalist movements for independence. Across the continent, Africans of different ethnic groups temporarily united in opposition against a common enemy, but their unity was by no means seamless: deep internal in the coalitions manifested themselves even more clearly after gaining independence.

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[50] Albert Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (Boston, Beacon Press, 1965).

National identity remains weak in sub-Saharan Africa because national boundaries do not reflect ethnic realities. While some states have covertly engaged in proxy wars with neighboring countries, there have been very few instances of nationwide mobilization in preparation for war against another country. The strength of ethnic identity has posed challenges to national integration: because citizens of the nation do not identify strongly with each other, they can identify against each other, making interethnic conflict more likely.

Claiming their right to nationhood and statehood, some ethnic groups in sub-Saharan Africa chose the path of secession from the state. Leaders of secessionist movements demand independence and recognition of their ethnicity as a nationality. Larger collective identities beyond the traditional ethnic group (i.e. Dinka, Nuer) have been at the forefront of rhetoric advocating the secession of southern Sudan. Various non-Arab ethnic groups traditionally inhabiting southern Sudan collectively identify themselves as "southerners" and call the Arabs "northerners." However, not all Sudanese living in either region agree with these distinctions, and many oppose secession along the borders drawn by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. During the 2011 historic referendum determining southern Sudan's separation from the rest of Sudan, the landslide vote for secession was accompanied by violent clashes in a contested area of the central region. [51] The secessionist movement in Sudan demonstrates how people's identification with their subnational regional identity, derived from ethnic identities, can be mobilized to justify their own nationhood and separation from the state claiming their allegiance.

Complications arise in the relationship between ethnic and national identity in cases where national boundaries split ethnic groups apart. Some ethnic groups fight for the annexation of territories from other states in order to include those of the same ethnicity into their nation. This straddling of boundaries is the reality for many ethnic groups in sub-Saharan Africa, and

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[51] "Sudan Deal to End Abyei Clashes," *BBC News*, January 14, 2011.

such circumstances may actually make people more amenable to adopting regional identities to unite with their ethnic counterparts in other countries.

Regional Identity

Definition

Regional identity presumes the common characteristics and shared identity of numerous nations and ethnicities in a specific region.[52] Citizens of different states within in a region often find that they share a common historical memory. For instance, Latin American identity encompasses countries as far apart as Mexico and Argentina; citizens of these countries share the common legacy of Spanish or Portuguese colonization. Ethnic and national identity can have strong ties to regional identity. Egyptian identity, generally speaking, has a strong association with Arab identity, even if Egyptian and Arab identities are distinct from each other. Similarly, ethnic identities in sub-Saharan Africa are linked to African identity. Recent efforts toward regional integration through the establishment of communal institutions indicate the growing importance of regional groupings, particularly in the realm of economics. Virtually all states are now members of multiple regional associations, which span the globe from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to the Union of South American Nations.

Regional organizations provide forums for countries of the same geographic region to make collective decisions for the future of the region. Regional institutions promote integration and solidarity among the member states, but regional identity generally remains politically feeble in comparison to ethnic and national identity. The behavior of government representatives in the regional organizations reflects an attachment to national identities over regional identities. Member states accuse each other of prioritizing their national interests over the goals of the

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[52] This is not to be confused with regions within one nation. Regional identity in this context is a supranational identity.

regional community. For example, despite the creation of a trilateral bloc through the North American Free Trade Agreement, the United States' heavy subsidies for corn have adversely affected poor Mexican corn farmers.[53]

The European Union (EU) has made significant strides in increasing regional economic and political integration, but its member states also grapple with the conflict between the promotion of national identity and European identity. The creation of the EU as a regional bloc has enabled Europeans to collectively compete against the existential threats of the United States and Japan. Member states have made conscious efforts to promote greater unity and the European identity as they gradually liberalize their trade policies with other EU members and loosen immigration restrictions on other Europeans. However, more powerful member states hold tremendous sway over the actions of regional institutions, reflecting existing power dynamics in the region. For instance, the six founding members of the EU have hesitated to expand membership to include applicant countries with weaker economies and tendencies for instability because of the potential negative impacts upon their own nations. Nationals also worry that merging into a larger regional entity dilutes their national identities. French political parties such as *Front National* voice their opposition to continued European integration, arguing that Europeanization has led to the deterioration of French culture. These concerns illustrate how the increasingly influential European identity has posed a challenge to each member country's fixed conceptions of national identity.

Regional Identity in Sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan African states' adamant claims to their own independence also hindered the development of a cohesive regional identity. In Africa, heads of state made similar attempts to

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[53] Norbert Fiess and Daniel Lederman, "Mexican Corn: The Effects of NAFTA," The World Bank Group, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/Pubs/TradeNote18.pdf.

build a regional organization to represent the interests of the continent, but the newly created institutions continue to emphasize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each member state. The formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 reflected the importance of African regional identity to political leaders throughout the continent and signaled their commitment to liberating all Africans from the common oppression of colonization and apartheid (see Article II, 1.a.).[54] This pledge to free other Africans echoes the ideals of Pan-Africanism. The rise of Pan-Africanist ideas and the *négritude* movement reflected the development of an African or Black identity that transcended the boundaries of colonial regimes. Intellectuals of the African Diaspora and the African continent wrote and spoke about the common oppression of all people of African descent by Europeans through the implements of slavery, racism, and colonization. They thus argued that the African people experienced a shared history and needed to join together to overcome common obstacles to their unity. Colonial borders only served to split the African community apart. Because of his belief in these ideas, Kwame Nkrumah declared that "Africa is one continent, one people, and one nation."[55]

Even though the OAU claimed to represent the collective interests of all Africans, it also maintained a strong commitment to respecting state sovereignty and the sanctity of states' existing borders (see Article III, 3.).[56] Often dubbed the "Dictator's Club," the OAU failed to protect the rights of the African people as it claimed; instead, it gained a reputation for supporting the status quo as member states reciprocally ignored the atrocities committed within each other's countries.[57] The successor to the OAU, the African Union (AU) was established in 1999 and symbolized the recentering of the organization on people rather than on states.

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[54] Organization of African Unity, *Organization of African Unity Charter*, 25 May 1963.
[55] Kwame Nkrumah, *Class struggle in Africa* (London: Panaf Books Ltd., 1970), 87-88.
[56] Organization of African Unity.
[57] Paul Reynolds, "African Union replaces dictators' club," *BBC News*, July 8, 2002.

However, the AU also maintained an adherence to the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of member states (see Article 4, g.) while declaring the right of the AU to intervene in "grave circumstances" with the Assembly's approval (see Article 4, h.).[58] This movement towards collective governance has also taken place at a smaller regional level.

East African states have also pushed toward regional integration and have considered serious proposals for joining together as a single sovereign state. Initially established in 1967 by Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, the East African Community (EAC) fell apart in 1977 due to ideological differences and conflicting economic interests among the leaders of the newly independent states. In 1999, the heads of state of these countries revived the EAC, and in 2007, they expanded its membership to include Burundi and Rwanda (see Appendix B for a map of the EAC).[59] Although definitions of "East Africa" have included the Horn of Africa, member states of the EAC promote a particular definition of East Africa in their campaigns for regional integration. Note the subjective nature of cardinal directions when used to demarcate regions: West simply ends where East begins, and North extends south until it reaches the northern tip of South.

Similar to the borders of its member states, the boundaries of the regional group reflect colonial legacies. The British had initially grouped the three colonies into what they named the East African region. Kenya and Uganda united in a customs union in 1917, and Tanganyika, the predecessor to Tanzania, later joined them in 1927.[60] A strong proponent of the EAC, Ugandan President Museveni refers to the shared past experiences of the East African states in his

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[58] African Union, *Constitutive Act of the African Union*, 11 July 2000.
[59] "An East African Federation: Big ambitions, big question-marks," *The Economist*, September 3, 2009.
[60] East African Community Portal, "History of the EAC," May 2010, http://www.eac.int/about-eac/eac-history.html.

arguments for regional integration.[61] He envisions uniting the entire continent together using regional blocs as building blocks.[62]

But the existence of regional organizations is not a sufficient measure of the salience of regional identity among the general population. The ordinary citizen did not participate in the formation of these regional institutions. Those in political power appoint a few individuals as their country's representatives, and these delegates participate in the policy-making process, alienating the vast majority of the people they represent. African statesmen, many of whom were perceived as illegitimate, established both the OAU and the AU.

The same ideas of social identity theory apply in explaining the guiding role of regional identity on political behavior in Africa. There exists a widespread notion of African identity and an appreciation for shared values among different nations and ethnicities, especially among those with darker skin, but this identification does not include serious calls for political unity. The African social group lacks cohesion and a common vision for the future, and Africans in general do not feel collectively menaced by any outside group. These challenges in perception hinder the development of solidarity among the African population. Instances of xenophobic violence continue against African migrants in South Africa.[63] After the demise of President Ggabo, the people of Côte d'Ivoire struggle to abandon the doctrine of "Ivorité," which divided the nation into "Ivorite" and "non-Ivorites."[64] In these circumstances, a highly exclusive notion of national identity guided chauvinistic behavior against other Africans labeled as nonnationals and overpowered any notions of shared African identity.

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[61] "President Museveni is the strongest EAC champion," *New Vision*, July 12, 2010.
[62] Ibid.
[63] "South Africa: Foreigners injured in xenophobia clashes," *BBC News*, July 20, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-10696292.
[64] Scott Stearns, "Ivory Coast Confronts Issues of Immigrant Identity," *Voice of America*, April 18, 2011, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/Ivory-Coast-Confronts-Issues-of-Immigrant-Identity-120070514.html.

Global Identity

Definition

A more inclusive identification with the global community reflects the transcending of ethnic, national, and regional borders. Global identity[65] assumes that human beings throughout the world share common characteristics, values, and responsibility for their communal past, present, and future. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights expresses these ideals and recognizes "the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family."[66] People with global identity identify with those of other ethnicities, nations, and regions as equal members of a common world community. Citing the interdependence of all states, liberal international relations theorists call for interstate cooperation to combat common threats. States throughout the world increasingly recognize the need for international cooperation to overcome global challenges such as global warming that impact the welfare of nations throughout the world. International organizations such as the United Nations (UN), International Criminal Court, and the World Trade Organization develop international laws to govern all nations. These international organizations uphold the sovereignty of the state[67] except under serious circumstances meriting international intervention. Concepts of "human rights," "crimes against humanity," and "humanitarian intervention" all echo the international consensus on the responsibility of all people, as members of a global community, to protect the lives and rights of other human beings.

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[65] This thesis will refer to "global identity" as identification with humans throughout the world. Many different terms have been employed to describe what this thesis will refer to as global identity. Terms such as "global citizenship", "world citizenship", and "cosmopolitanism" all convey roughly similar ideas, but they differ in who they include. Some definitions include nonhuman (e.g. animals) and alien (non-Earth) life forms, but they have not acquired the same popularity as notions of community with other human beings.

[66] United Nations General Assembly, *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III).

[67] The equal sovereignty of each member state is the fundamental basis for the UN. See Chapter I of *Charter of the United Nations*.

The effects of globalization have raised greater awareness of the bonds tying together the human community. Increased flows of information as a result of the dissemination of inexpensive technology have brought people, who may never meet physically, closer together. Experiencing these trends toward international integration, people throughout the world have become more conscious of their interconnectedness with other human beings. As national borders become more porous, states lose their ability to control the flow of economic, cultural, and social exchange with other nations. Thus, international integration has reduced the state's capacity to control its citizens and transformed the traditional relationship between the citizen and the state. Because of these trends, an international system, based upon the principles of state sovereignty and nonintervention set forth by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, no longer appears to be a workable paradigm. Under the Westphalian model, states are the principal actors in international relations, but contemporary states encounter significant challenges in monitoring their territory and excluding foreign actors. Noncitizens play gradually more influential roles within the domestic realm of each state. International economic integration has enabled transnational corporations to do business in several different countries at once. International non-governmental organizations play an important role in building a world culture because of their fairly autonomous status from states.[68]

Global identity stands out in contrast from the other forms of identity because of the contrasting role of the "Other" in group identity formation. Cosmopolitanist Emmanuel Levinas defines the "Other" as anyone outside of the self and explains that people depend upon others, and thus each other, to define themselves.[69] Desmond Tutu articulates a similar concept in the

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[68] John Boli and George M. Thomas, eds. *Constructing world culture: international nongovernmental organizations since 1875* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).

[69] Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, trans. A. Lingis (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1998).

African philosophy of *Ubuntu*: "My humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in yours…A person is a person through other persons."[70] Under the framework of global identity, one needs the "Other" in order to exist. Instead of identifying against the "Other," one welcomes the "Other" into the same community.

In sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the world, global identity in general does not have the same strength as ethnic, national, and regional identities because of the lack of collective global awareness necessary for building a global community. Global identity nonetheless guides individuals to behave toward other human beings, regardless of their ethnic, national, or regional background, in a respectful and equitable manner.

Commonalities of Different Identities

Different theories provide disparate conceptualizations of ethnic, national, regional, and global identities, but social identity theory explains the influence of all identities upon behavior. Although each social group defines identity at different frames of reference and carries different sets of expectations, all four identities share two characteristics that underscore the importance of History education in identity formation: First, all are founded upon an assumption of a common past. Second, all were created and continues to be re-created in a dynamic and fluid fashion.

First, all identities presuppose the common history of group members, but each identity frames the past in a different way. The ethnic group focuses on the collective narrative of the people who compose the ethnic group, while the nation tells the experiences shared by people throughout the nation. Regions also base their identities on historical ties between member nations. The international community joined together to form the United Nations after experiencing the horrors of World War II. The common experiences of the past bond people together and create a feeling of community. In addition to sharing the past, people share the

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[70] Desmond Tutu, *No Future Without Forgiveness* (New York: Doubleday, 1999), 31.

present and future as they move forward together as a group. Through the lens of ethnic identity, the ethnic group is the most important social unit, while from a globalized perspective, fragmentations into more exclusive identities are based upon artificial notions of a shared past, which should be abandoned for a more inclusive global identity.

Second, each identity was fabricated and continues to undergo change. Group members forge the group's identity from within, and outsiders contribute to shaping the group from without. The "Other" has played a significant role in the formation of each group. For ethnic, national, or regional groups, competition with the out-groups helped solidify the unity of the in-group. Lines drawn between the group and the "Other" sharpen with the rise of collective consciousness within the group, with the exception of the global community. However, the definitions and boundaries of each identity have shifted through time and across individuals.

Therefore, despite the manufactured and dynamic nature of each identity, each is perceived to be firmly rooted in the past and has a powerful potential for guiding behavior, and each social group transmits its collective narrative to future generations to bolster its social identity. But the ethnic group, region, and international community differ from the nation in one important respect: the state reinforces the idea of the nation, whereas the other social groups are not organized into political units with the same magnitude of power and influence. Moreover, the state is responsible for the powerful function of providing a national narrative that will be taught to its young citizens in schools throughout the country. History education creates a foundation for identity as students learn about their common past, whether it is that of the ethnic group, nation, region, or world. At the same time, History education presents a certain understanding of a social group's past. The next chapter explores this relationship between History education and identity formation with an emphasis upon the role of the state in nation-building.

CHAPTER II: HISTORY EDUCATION AND IDENTITY FORMATION

"The sense of 'whence we came' is central to the definition of 'who we are'."

– Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity*, p.22

Within countries, different groups vie to influence the national narrative studied in schools. These struggles reflect the widespread assumption that the historical knowledge taught to students greatly influences their identity. This chapter offers a theoretical basis for explaining how History teaching helps shape the identities discussed in Chapter One. In particular, state-sponsored History education provides a national narrative as a foundation for the construction of national identity. Case studies of France, Japan, Prussia, and Tanzania – formerly nationless regions that have developed strong and relatively well-defined national identities – demonstrate the link between nationalized education and the formation of the nation. The experiences of other states' nation-building endeavors inform Chapter Three and Four's case study of identity and education in Uganda.

History Education and Nation-building

Nationalized History education helps build nations because it provides a shared national narrative. All of the collective identities examined in Chapter One are founded upon a belief in a common past. The national narrative is thus a requisite for the formation of a cohesive national identity. An individual's understanding of her current position in the world is based upon what she remembers. Beyond simply teaching the past, History education builds the foundation for an individual's national identity by transmitting the myths and values of the nation. Eric Hobsbawm

claims that schooling is "the most powerful weapon for forming … nations."[71] Governments have employed history education to unify the nation under the state and to homogenize the population by instilling pride and loyalty to the nation over ethnicity.

Comparing History Education with Other Sources of Historical Knowledge

The teaching of the past is not limited to History education. While studying other subjects in school, students inevitably encounter history. Students learn about past scientific discoveries and theories in their Science classes and read passages about historical events in their English classes. Furthermore, teachers of all subjects also draw in their own historical knowledge from outside of the curriculum while teaching their students. Thus, even within schools, students learn about history from multiple sources of information. Aside from the content of the national History curriculum, the language of instruction, religious education, and civic education contribute to the historical knowledge provided to students in school.

Language is tied to history in many respects. Most sub-Saharan African states have designated one language, usually that of their former colonizers, as the language of instruction in their schools. Some African intellectuals decry these language policies as a form of linguistic imperialism: selecting a single language as the national language hastens the loss of indigenous languages and cultures. Kenyan writer Ngugi wa Thiong'o famously renounced writing in English and decided to primarily write in his mother tongue, Gikuyu. His bold choice reflects his desire to immerse his writing in Gikuyu culture: language conveys culture and reflects the way that people perceive their place in the world because language forms images of the world in people's minds.[72] In addition to carrying culture, language contains the collective memory of those who speak the language. When students learn about the history of their ethnic groups and

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[71] Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Capital 1845-1875* (London: Abacus, 1977), 120.
[72] Ngugi wa Thiong'o, *Decolonizing the Mind* (Nairobi: East African Publishers, 1994), 15.

nation in another language, such as English, certain nuances conveyed through their local language are lost. For example, the Buganda people of Uganda are known for using many proverbs when telling their stories. Despite the homogenizing effects of one-language policy, many attribute the success of Tanzania's nation-building efforts to its designation of Kiswahili as the national language: the government requires schools to teach in this unifying indigenous language. [73] Using Kiswahili as the medium of communication for teaching has enabled Tanzanian students of different ethnicities to communicate to and identify with each other.[74]

Religion, like language, is also intertwined with identity and history. Religious education includes the transmission of historical knowledge because sacred scriptures contain stories about the past. For instance, the New Testament records the lives and teachings of Jesus Christ and his followers. At Pakistani madrassas, students study Islam by reading the Qur'an and Hadith. They thus base their understanding of history on the content of ancient religious texts. In Uganda, students study Christian Religious Education or Islamic Religious Education depending upon the founding body of their school.[75] But religious education as a source of historical information differs from History education: neither Christianity nor Islam is taught uniformly throughout the country, whereas students learn the same History in all regions of Uganda. Therefore, religious education is also a contributor to students' historical knowledge but does not have the same influence and legitimacy as nationalized History education.

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[73] Jan Blommaert, "Language and Nationalism: Comparing Flanders and Tanzania," *Nations and Nationalism* 2, no. 2 (1996): 235–256.

[74] Jan Blommaert, "The debate is closed," in *Language Ideological Debates*, ed. Jan Blommaert (New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1999), 427-429. A common theme Blommaert identifies throughout the case studies in this book is the use of language in nation-building. In some cases, the language of an ethnic group was asserted as part of regional movements.

[75] Solomon Akugizibwe, "Religious Studies Education Becomes Political Hotbed," *UGPulse*, June 21, 2008, http://www.ugpulse.com/articles/daily/Government.asp?about=Religious+Studies+Education+Becomes+Political+Hotbed&ID=932.

Grooming young people to fulfill their civic duties to the nation necessitates fostering national pride. Schools at times include Civic education as a separate subject to inculcate national values and patriotism. Along with teaching about citizenship in the nation, Civic education teaches the nation's past. Schools in the United States have used civic education to teach democratic ideals and patriotism since the early twentieth century.[76] Ugandan schools do not teach Civics as a separate subject, but through History education, they teach students about their government and the importance of national unity.

Primary and secondary school students learn about history from other sources apart from nationalized education. The media, encompassing newspapers, radio, and television, provides explanations about the causes and consequences of various events in the past. Parents and grandparents teach their own version of history to their children. Religious organizations, community members, and peer groups also supplement students' historical knowledge. Thus, even though History education does not monopolize students' understanding of the past, it is the most influential form of transmitting historical knowledge for two central reasons: First, schools are effective socializing agents. Second, schools hold sway over young people at a critical stage of identity development.

Education as the Socialization of Youth

First, primary and secondary schools have immense socializing effects because of the perceived legitimacy of the information they communicate to students. Schools instill knowledge, skills, attitudes, and values into students, who can use these assets to gain a higher status in society. Societal structures reinforce the belief that the information taught in schools is valuable to one's personal success because education provides the means for improving one's life,

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[76] John J. Cogan, "Civic Education in the United States: A Brief History," *International Journal of Social Education* 14, no. 1 (1999): 52-64.

particularly economically. According to legitimation theory, mass education legitimates a certain theory of knowledge and specific types of knowledge over others by institutionalizing a basic educational classification system, basic rules for employment, and rules for professional certification.[77] In other words, education defines access to desired social positions. Noam Chomsky explains that "once you are educated, you have already been socialized in ways that support the power structure, which, in turn, rewards you infinitely."[78]Schools reproduce and perpetuate social, economic, and cultural hierarchies through their indoctrination of students.[79] These social inequalities are reinforced when students learn a version of history that privileges the perspective of dominant elites.

Michel Foucault emphasizes the inseparable relationship between historical knowledge and power.[80] The dominant political and economic apparatuses including universities, the military, and the media exercise hegemony over the production and transmission of truth, and the inculcation of this "truth" into the people through education helps sustain and extend the power of the elites.[81] The content of the national History curriculum is a state-sanctioned "truth" and carries the legitimacy of the state. It is thus considered as valid knowledge. When schools test students on their historical knowledge based upon what they learn in History, they institute the History curriculum as "truth" along with grammar rules in English and the Pythagorean Theorem in Mathematics. Furthermore, students study History as its own separate subject in an organized, usually chronological, manner. Thus, in comparison to other sources of historical information,

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[77] John W. Meyer, "The Effects of Education as an Institution," *The American Journal of Sociology* 83, no. 1 (1977): 66.
[78] Ibid., 16.
[79] Noam Chomsky, *Chomsky on Miseducation* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).
[80] Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: selected interviews and other writings, 1972-1977*, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 52.
[81] Ibid., 132-132.

History education is often easily accepted as history because of its institutionalization in educational systems.

Second, History education has a relatively large influence during a crucial period of identity formation. Psychologist Erik Erikson observes that identity takes shape over time beginning in childhood through a process of "reflection and observation."[82] Developmental psychologist Jean Piaget further theorizes that national identity becomes clearly visible from ages eight to eleven.[83] Thus, the age of adolescence is an especially central period of identity development in one's life. During their childhood, people spend around six hours every weekday in the classroom with their teacher and fellow students instead of at home with their family. Boarding students only return home during their holidays and have even less contact with their family and community of origin. As they spend less time with their family, students spend more time being socialized in school. A survey of students in Ghanaian schools suggest the validity of Piaget's assertion that national identification develops early in life and generally endures once established and reinforced. The study inferred student's awareness of their nationality from their responses to the question, "What is the name of your nation?" While only 40 percent of primary students responded correctly, 92 percent of secondary school students responded correctly.[84] The results suggest that nationalized education plays a significant role in crystallizing children's national identity through continual reinforcement.

Challenges of Teaching History

Because of the powerful effects of History education on identity, states must address numerous problems involved in teaching History and developing a national History curriculum.

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[82] Erik Erikson, *Identity: Youth and Crisis* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1968), 22.
[83] Jean Piaget and Anne-Marie Weil, "Development of Idea of Homeland," *International Social Science Bulletin* 3 (1951): 561-78.
[84] Lynn F. Fischer, "Student Orientations Toward Nation-Building in Ghana," in *Values, Identities, and National Integration*, ed. John Paden (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1980), 274.

First, in comparison to other subjects such as English and Math, History has unclear objectives and expected outcomes. For example, governments set literacy as a goal for English teaching, and they assess the achievement of that goal through fairly objective criteria such as demonstrating the ability to read and write simple sentences. On the other hand, the objectives of History teaching are less well-defined, difficult to measure, and sometimes conflict. Objectives may include both the inculcation of national values and the development of skills in critically analyzing information, but as students hone their critical thinking skills, they may also begin to question and reject national values. Measuring the level of students' patriotism and critical thinking skills is also not a straightforward task.

Second, inherent subjectivity plagues all national Histories because of the impossibility of including every recounting of past events, not to mention the inaccuracy of human memory. More and more interpretations of past events surface every day but often do not find their way into History textbooks; since the History curriculum must be developed before teachers receive training and students begin learning, it cannot be continually updated without significant costs. According to a survey of United States History textbooks, the information presented to students differs greatly from recent developments and popular consensus in academia.[85] Historians themselves disagree over the reliability and validity of different sources of historical knowledge. In the field of education, debates have exploded over how teachers should teach students the causality and consequences of events. Some argue that since history is a story, every nation should have its own way of telling its version of the story.[86] Although each individual experiences and recounts the past in their own way, states can construct a more inclusive national narrative. After World War II, Germany revised its History curriculum to more accurately

[85] James W. Loewen, *Lies My Teacher Told Me* (New York: The New Press, 2008).
[86] Sakurai Yoshiko, *Japan, schools, and children from journalist Yoshiko Sakurai's view*, Yokohama City Education Board, Yokohama, Japan, 1996.

portray the brutality of its regime toward minorities.[87] Germans reduced the bias associated with their History curriculum by incorporating more perspectives about the country's violent past into its national narrative.

The unclear ends and the insuperable subjectivity of History education create complications in evaluating its contribution to common goals such as economic development. International donors for education confront challenges in measuring the effect of History teaching on the countries they support. Although countries teach Mathematics and English in fairly similar ways, they do not agree upon how to teach History. Each state centers its nation in the teaching the past, and within each nation, disagreements abound over the accuracy of the official national narrative. National sovereignty comes to the fore when one country assesses the History curriculum of another country because they usually have differing perspectives on what had happened in the past. The aid recipient country may reject the imposition of donors' historical interpretations on its own History curriculum even though the same country may be willing to accept assistance for improving its Science curriculum. As a result of this ambiguity and these delicate tensions between donor and recipient, there has been little scrutiny of the History curriculum in low-income countries. Notwithstanding these challenges, states across the world have been tasked with providing education to its population.

Nationalized Education as an International Norm

Although the controversies of teaching History remain, nationalized education has rapidly spread throughout the world. Mass education has become a universal responsibility of the state during the past two centuries.[88] Rather than limiting education to the elite, mass

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[87] Elizabeth A. Cole, "Introduction: Reconciliation and History Education," in *Teaching the Violent Past*, ed. Elizabeth A. Cole (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 14.

[88] John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez and Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, "World Expansion of Mass Education, 1870-1980," *Sociology of Education* 65, no. 2 (1992): 129.

nationalized education provides all school-age citizens the opportunity to gain access to the same

state-sponsored knowledge. From its beginnings, mass education has been tied to the nation: its

birth coincided with the emergence of the principles of nation-building and state sovereignty.[89]

By the twentieth century, almost every single western European state had adopted state-

sponsored education. Because of sweeping societal trends including the waning influence of the

Catholic Church, the European state grew in its strength and influence upon its population.[90]

Religious movements that undermined the cultural and political hegemony of the Catholic

Church during the Reformation and Counter-Reformation contributed to legitimizing the state as

"the guardian of the nation."[91] Virtually all contemporary states have included their hopes to

achieve universal education in their constitutions and national laws.[92] At the World Education

Forum in 2000, 164 governments pledged to achieve Education For All by 2015 with the support

of the United Nations and the World Bank.[93]

Several theories seek to explain the advent and expansion of mass education, but all of

them relate education to national cohesion in one way or another. Functional theories argue that

the political elite have employed education to solve the problems of industrial society. Education

maintains elite dominance and social order through the homogenization and cooptation of

divisive elements that arose with industrialization.[94] However, this societal-level explanation

does not explain the worldwide trends toward state-sponsored mass education. John Meyer and

others argue that, in recent years, states have expanded mass education to conform to the world

[89] Ibid.
[90] Ramirez and Boli.
[91] Ramirez and Boli, 12.
[92] John Boli-Bennett and John Meyer, "The Ideology of Childhood and the State: Rules Distinguishing Children in National Constitutions, 1870-1970," *American Sociological Review* 43, no. 6 (1978): 797-812.; Robert Fiala and Audri Gordon Lanford, "Educational Ideology and the World Educational Revolution, 1950-1970," *Comparative Education Review* 31, no. 3 (1987): 315-332.
[93] UNESCO, "Education for All International Coordination," http://www.unesco.org/new/en/education/themes/leading-the-international-agenda/education-for-all/.
[94] Meyer, Ramirez and Soysal, 128-129.

model of the nation-state. Existing Western European states serve as examples of the nation-state prototype. Postcolonial states' desire to conform to this model accords with their commitment to "development." States often implicitly define the process of development as following the path of industrialized Western European states. In this endeavor to reach nation-state status, states use mass schooling as a "mechanism for creating symbolic links between individuals and nation-states."[95] State-sponsored mass education presupposes that all members of the state share a common national culture.[96] History education plays a vital role in achieving the goal of national integration to turn this assumption into a reality.

Few empirical studies exist on this relationship between History education and identity salience. It is difficult to measure the saliency of a continually changing, context-specific identity of an individual, and it is even more challenging task to measure the general saliency of identity among all members of a population. Yet, it is possible to draw inferences from case studies of countries that have rapidly expanded nationalized education. Where national identity has arisen and become more salient over a period of time, one can reach some conclusions about the impact of nationalized History education on identity.

Four Experiences in Nation-Building

Four case studies illustrate the importance of nationalized education in nation-building. France, Japan, and Prussia began as ethnically diverse populations and employed education to unite under strong national identities. The sub-Saharan African state of Tanzania also has an ethnically heterogeneous population, but its education system has been praised for its successful promotion of national identity and peaceful interethnic relations. In each case, History education

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[95] Ibid., 131.
[96] Meyer, 69.

functioned as a part of the educational apparatus to enhance the saliency of national identity over other identities.

The cases of France and Japan demonstrate how schools introduce, build, and reinforce national identity through History teaching, while the case of Prussia illustrates how a shift in state control changed the boundaries of national identity. Andy Green argues that these countries used mass schooling as a vehicle for intensive state formation in response to internal or external threats to stability.[97] Formerly a collection of massively fragmented ethnolinguistic groups, France embarked upon the path to nationhood through education during the French Revolution. To unify the citizens under its rule, the revolutionary government established the Paris Normal School, which trained teachers to teach a new France-centered curriculum including French History.[98] During the post-revolutionary period, Napoleon made more headway in controlling schools by centralizing the educational bureaucracy and placing it under state control to support the state's nation-building goals.[99]

Though often described as ethnically homogeneous, Japan historically began as an ethnically diverse population of people who spoke different dialects and strongly identified with their region of inhabitance. Samurai warriors maintained their own fiefdoms called *kuni*, the Japanese word for "nation." After Japan opened itself up to western influence in the 1840s, some regional groups formed new coalitions in order to protect themselves against the common threat of foreign invasion and domination.[100] These internal and external changes led to the Meiji Restoration of 1868, during which the Japanese government used education to integrate formerly

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[97] Andy Green, *Education, Globalization and the Nation State* (London: MacMillan, 1997), 36.
[98] H. Barnard, *Education and the French Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 154.
[99] Green, 27.
[100] Ibid.

separate feudal units.[101] Youth throughout the nation spent a required four years in education to learn the basic principles of national morality based upon the teachings of their "Imperial Ancestors."[102] Through expanding nationalized education, the governments of France and Japan fostered the development of well-defined national identities and reduced their citizens' allegiances to previously strong ethnic groupings.

Prussia had also been "a state without a nation."[103] In 1716, the Prussian state required compulsory education for all children, and became the first to do so, as part of its endeavor to unite its citizens into a nation.[104] A century later, the Prussians tasted the bitterness of military defeat and occupation by Napoleon, and the influential Prussian Junker class emerged from the end of the Napoleonic wars with strong nationalistic sentiments against the French. Yearning to reestablish Prussian power and influence, the Junkers employed compulsory education to transform Prussian society from one based on serfdom and royal absolutism to one centered on the reformed Junker state.[105] Nazi Germany's dissolution of the Prussian state and nation elucidates the impermanent nature of each national identity. The continual reinforcement of national identity through education is necessary for ensuring the identity's survival. Since new states and even new regimes can alter the boundaries of the nation, state-sponsored nationalized education can replace previous national identities with new ones. The postcolonial African state also struggles to merge its ethnically diverse population into one nation.

Although the notion of the nation-state in Europe is associated with war, Tanzania is often hailed as a model state for preventing ethnic conflict while forging national unity. Tanzania

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[101] William Cummings, *Education and Equality in Japan*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 17.
[102] Ibid., 18-19.
[103] Hans Rosenberg, *Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy: The Prussian Experience, 1660-1815* (Boston: Beacon, 1958).
[104] Francisco O. Ramirez and John Boli, "The Political Construction of Mass Schooling: European Origins and Worldwide Institutionalization," *Sociology of Education* 60, no. 1 (1987): 4.
[105] Green, 36.

has enjoyed exceptional successes in welding together over one hundred different ethnicities into one Tanzanian identity. First Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere lent strong support to providing nationalized education for the unification of the country. [106] Nyerere harshly criticized the instrumentalization of colonial education to meet the objectives of the colonial state. He enacted widespread educational reforms to promote economic development and to foster the social goals of cooperation for the common good of the country.

Tanzanian education also aimed to promote modernization, self-reliance, and Tanzanian socialism. Kiswahili was aggressively promoted as the language of instruction in primary schools. [107] In the Arusha Declaration, Nyerere declared his government's commitment to *ujamaa* socialism. Under his leadership, the regime implemented free and compulsory primary education for citizens to understand and create *ujamaa* ("extended family" in Kiswahili). In addition to inculcating a strong sense of Pan-African identity, the national curriculum placed an emphasis upon common Tanzanian history, culture, and values. [108] Students had studied British and European history under colonial rule, but after Tanzania gained independence, they began to study the History of Africa based on information gathered by researchers at domestic educational institutions. Scholars often juxtapose Tanzania to neighboring Kenya: both countries are ethnically diverse, East African, and former British colonies. Despite their similarities, some research suggests that interethnic cooperation is greater in Tanzania than in Kenya because Tanzanian people identify with the nation over the ethnic group. [109] A comparison of an ethnically diverse region in Tanzania and a similarly ethnically heterogeneous region in Kenya

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[106] Julius Nyerere, *Education for Self-Reliance* (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1967).

[107] Martin Carnoy and Joel Samoff, *Education and Social Transition in the Third World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 232.

[108] David Court, "The Education System as a Response to Inequality," in *Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania*, ed. Joel D. Barkan (New York: Praeger, 1984), 661-90.

[109] Edward Miguel, "Tribe or Nation?: Nation Building and Public Goods in Kenya versus Tanzania," *World Politics* 56, no. 3 (2004): 338.

found that region in Tanzania experienced fewer inequalities along ethnic lines in the provision of public goods.[110] Education is a key explanatory factor. While students in Tanzania developed a strong sense of Tanzanian and African identity, Kenyan students focused on local geography and History until their fifth year of primary school.[111]

The Manipulation of Identity through History Education

As a component of its duty to provide mass education, the state creates and promotes a national narrative. Because of the subjective nature of history, political elite can manipulate History education to enhance certain identities over others. States use History education to antagonize their citizens against other nations. The retelling of the past can contrast dramatically on different sides of the border. After independence, India and Pakistan created their own History curricula that provided conflicting explanations for the partition of India.[112] Pakistan's Islamcentric national History textbooks paint India as a Hindu state that perpetually threatens Pakistan's existence.[113] North Korea and South Korea define themselves against each other in their national History curricula while at the same time promoting an ethnocultural nationalism and Korean unity.[114]

In this process of standardizing the definition of the nation, state-sponsored education also suppresses the voices of marginalized people living within state borders. Nazi Germany employed education as a tool to indoctrinate students in the necessity of securing the future of the Aryan race. History textbooks represented Jews as the "antithesis of everything German"

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[110] Ibid., 360.
[111] Ibid., 336.
[112] Dorschner and Sherlock, 284.
[113] Ibid., 287.
[114] Chris Wilson, Danton Ford, and Alisa Jones, "The History Text: Framing Ethno-cultural and Civic nationalism in the Divided Koreas," in *History Education and National Identity in East Asia*, eds. Edward Vickers and Alisa Jones (New York: Routledge, 2005), 249.

even though Jews had lived alongside other Germans for centuries.[115] In nineteenth century America, Indian boarding schools sought to "kill the Indian…and save the man": they had operated to wipe out students' ethnic identities and to replace them with mainstream American identities.[116] One fixed definition of national identity could smother other forms of identity.

On the other hand, History teaching has the power to promote reconciliation, tolerance, and inclusiveness by incorporating new representations of former enemies.[117] Nationalized education has helped heal countries suffering from the legacy of ethnic conflict. By changing the national narrative, states created new, more inclusive definitions of nation. Witness the role of History education in Northern Ireland, where teachers teach History with an enquiry-based approach and encourage pupils to learn History from various different perspectives.[118] The government of Northern Ireland has attempted to address the roots of ethnic conflict in Northern Ireland through the incorporation of Irish history within the context of Europe and the United Kingdom.[119]

Subnational and supranational perspectives can also dominate History education. History teaching can center on an ethnicity's past and encourage ethnic solidarity. For example, the state of Arizona banned classes designed for students of a certain ethnicity on the grounds that such classes promote divisiveness among its ethnically diverse population.[120] The state has threatened to impose a penalty on Tucson schools if the district does not end its Mexican-American studies

[115] Gilmer W. Blackburn, *Education in the Third Reich: a study of race and history in Nazi textbooks* (New York: SUNY Press, 1985), 183.
[116] Charla Bear, "American Indian Boarding Schools Haunt Many," *National Public Radio*, May 12, 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=16516865.
[117] Cole, 2.
[118] Alison Kitson, "History Teaching and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland," in *Teaching the Violent Past*, ed. Elizabeth A. Cole (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 123.
[119] Ibid., 124.
[120] Nicole Santa Cruz, "Arizona bill targeting ethnic studies signed into law," *Los Angeles Times*, May 12, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/may/12/nation/la-na-ethnic-studies-20100512.

classes.[121] Proponents of the new law argue that teaching United States History from a Mexican-American perspective increases Mexican-American resentment toward the dominant Caucasian-Americans. Some countries also include History teaching from supranational regional perspectives. The Council of Europe recognizes the importance of History teaching as a method of bridging people of different countries together with a common regional narrative and has recommended the promotion of European awareness in secondary schools.[122]

As globalization increasingly reveals the interconnectedness of people throughout the world, some support History teaching for global citizenship. According to these advocates of global citizenship, schools should raise students' awareness of world issues and expose them to international perspectives on past and current events. Proponents of John Dewey's progressivist educational philosophy assert that schools should provide education for global citizenship in order for students to gain the knowledge and skills needed for civic participation at the local, national, and global level.[123] A strong advocate for human-centered education, Daisaku Ikeda emphasizes that education must encourage students to recognize how deeply their lives are intertwined with those of people throughout the world.[124]

History teaching is thus a powerful tool for creating and reinforcing ethnic, national, regional, and global identities. Since identity guides political behavior, the privileging of certain identities over others in History education has important behavioral ramifications. A case study of Uganda reveals how education and History teaching have been deliberately manipulated by various actors in pursuit of different objectives.

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[121] Ibid.

[122] Council of Europe, "Education and Languages: History Teaching," January 17, 2011, http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/education/historyteaching/default_EN.asp?.

[123] Julie Andrzejewski and John Alessio, Education for Global Citizenship and Social Responsibility, *Progressive Perspectives* 1, no. 2 (1999), http://www.uvm.edu/~dewey/monographs/glomono.html.

[124] Daisaku Ikeda, *Thoughts on Education for Global Citizenship*, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, 13 June 1996, http://mod.daisakuikeda.org/sub/resources/works/lect/lect-08.html.

CHAPTER III: HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN UGANDA

Te okono obur bong' luputu

"The pumpkin in the old homestead must not be uprooted"

- Acholi proverb[125]

This well-known saying admonishes the Acholi people to protect their cultural identity from destruction by foreign influences. The pumpkin symbolizes the wealth of traditions that root the Acholi to their past. Through proverbs such as this one, Acholi elders traditionally passed down their knowledge and wisdom to the youth during daily family gatherings around the evening fire. Although some children in present-day Uganda still learn about the history of their clan and ethnic group during the fireside stories of their elders, more and more children attend schools in the nationalized education system and study the History of Uganda as a nation. A century ago, this was not the case. During the pre-colonial (before 1894), colonial (1894-1962), and postcolonial (after 1962) periods of their history, the inhabitants of the region now recognized as Uganda acquired education through different means. Different actors during each time period have wielded three distinct forms of education – traditional, missionary, and state-sponsored nationalized education – to contribute to the formation of Ugandans' identities. In contemporary Uganda, all three forms of education continue, but the influence of each one over the general population has fluctuated over time and varies by region. All three types of education have played a significant role in shaping the changing perceptions among the people of Uganda about their own ethnic, national, regional, and global identity.

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[125] Okot P'Bitek, *Song of Lawino* (Dar es Salaam: East Africa Publishing, 1972), 41. This famous epic poem describes how a woman laments the Westernization of her husband and includes various Acholi proverbs and wisdom.

The Roots of Traditional Education: The Precolonial Period

In precolonial Uganda, traditional education[126] socialized children to develop strong ethnic and clan identities. Prior to the arrival of Christian missionaries and European explorers, indigenous ethnic groups emerged as people formed social and political organizations with varying degrees of centralization. Some Ugandan ethnic groups[127], such as the Baganda and Banyoro, ruled through hierarchical kingdoms, whereas others, such as the Langi and Karimajong, governed themselves through decentralized clan networks and cycling age-set systems. Composed of families descending from a common ancestor, the clan acted as the main social unit under the umbrella of the ethnic group. In general, under both highly centralized and decentralized organizations, older members of the ethnic groups educated the younger members. The family, as a part of the clan and the overarching ethnic group, played a central role in the traditional education of children.[128] In some respects, traditional education was a very fluid concept. The indigenous people of Uganda traditionally taught their youth using methods that greatly differed from the classroom instructional methods imported by the Europeans. Unlike

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[126] "Traditional education" and "informal education" are widely used terms in order to describe this form of education. "Traditional education" may not be the most appropriate term here because children continue to receive this form of education throughout contemporary Uganda, but this term is employed here for the sake of differentiating between missionary European-style education and a form of education that existed in Uganda before the arrival of Europeans. Although the descriptions about traditional education explain how people were educated in the past, the same descriptions continue to remain fairly accurate today to describe how many present-day Ugandans are educated.

[127] When referring to Ugandan ethnic groups, this thesis conforms to the terms Ugandans use to describe a member of an ethnic group, multiple members of an ethnic group, and the ethnic group. These terms can vary by ethnic group (see Appendix C for a map of major ethnic groups in Uganda and their traditional regions of inhabitance). Bantu language-speaking ethnic groups, who traditionally inhabit southern Uganda, usually have different terms for each of these. The singular term for a person always begins with "Mu-" while the plural form has the prefix "Ba-". For the Buganda ethnic group, Muganda means one person, while Baganda means several members of the ethnic group. Nilotic or Nilotic-Saharan speaking ethnic groups, who traditionally live in the northern region, employ the same term to mean all three (e.g. Acholi can mean one person of the Acholi ethnicity, multiple people of the Acholi ethnicity, or the Acholi ethnic group). The thesis utilizes the appropriate terms in the context of each sentence.

[128] The author gathered information about traditional education from interviews with several Ugandans of different ethnic groups. The Acholi, Kakwa, and Baganda (all from different language families) all have a tradition of learning about history from the elders in the family and community. Each ethnic group provides traditional education in surprisingly similar ways. The author also had an opportunity to experience this traditional education and fireside storytelling during a rural homestay with an Acholi family in Gulu district of northern Uganda.

missionary and state-sponsored mass education, traditional education was not restricted to the walls of the classroom. Teaching was inherent in the way people lived their lives. Students were educated through everyday experiences as they learned observing the behavior and listening to the words of the more experienced members of the society. All adult members of the society, especially the parents and elders, were responsible for teaching the children about how to live as and appreciate their roles as members of the family, clan, and ethnic group.

Oral poetry and literature played a significant role in preserving the history of the clan and ethnic group. No uniform History curriculum guided the teachers: historical information varied across and within different ethnic groups. Each storyteller did not follow a predetermined script when giving an oral history, and storytelling was a two-way interaction between the teacher and the student. In the evening, the elders sat around a fire with the children and passed on their moral and cultural knowledge through the telling of riddles, proverbs, and songs to inculcate the values and norms of the clan and ethnic group. The elders told stories that explain the history of their ethnic group and encouraged the children to develop confidence in their ethnic identity. For example, the Acholi people take pride in their many different traditional dances, and all Acholi children once learned how to dance for various occasions such as courtship and burial. These cultural traditions, practiced by previous generations, contribute to reinforcing youth's ethnic identity and pride, and some Acholi today blame mass education for preventing children from learning about these traditions.[129] Among the first generations of Acholi to attend a missionary school, Ugandan writer Okot p'Bitek describes how colonial European education erased indigenous identity:

> "Overdressed in his dark suit he walks out of the University
> gate, out into the world, materially comfortable, but
> culturally castrated, dead. A lost victim of the school

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[129] Harriet Anena, "Acholi Traditional Dance Attire Faces Extinction," *The Monitor*, June 26, 2009.

system, he cannot dance the dance or play the music of
his own people…"[130]

Traditional education also created gender identities. Children learned different skills according to their gender: females learned how to cook and clean, while males learned how to herd cattle and to farm. Mothers and aunts groomed girls for marriage and wifehood. Fathers and uncles taught boys how to grow up to become strong men, who can protect and provide for the needs of the family. Specialists with particular knowledge and skills, such as expertise on performing religious ceremonies or administering law, transferred their knowledge to select members of the younger generation. In the Buganda kingdom, for example, young pages from certain families trained to become chiefs at the Buganda king's palace.[131] The age-set system also created wider social cohesion among local communities sharing a common ethnic identity; boys from different communities participated in a series of challenging rites that cemented their relationship as age-mates to each other. [132] Expected to reciprocally exhibit loyalty and hospitality, the age-mates supported the survival and continuation of the greater ethnic group even after they returned to their remote homes.

These ethnic groupings also underwent continual transformations through time as some ethnic groups conquered and assimilated others. Maintaining a coherent group identity was crucial for each ethnic group in its struggle for survival and expansion. The Buganda kingdom was particularly successful in attacking and defeating neighboring ethnic groups and extended the Buganda identity to the newly conquered peoples, replacing their previous identities.[133] Thus,

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[130] Okot p'Bitek, *Africa's Cultural Revolution* (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1973), 13.
[131] John A. Rowe, "Historical setting," in *A Country Study: Uganda*. ed. Rita M. Byrnes (Washington: Government Printing Office for the Library of Congress, 1991).
[132] Christopher Ehret, *The Civilizations of Africa: A History to 1900* (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 2002), 133.
[133] Rowe.

during the precolonial period, traditional education, as the dominant form of education, enhanced the ethnic and clan identity of the people.

The Advent of Missionary Education in the Precolonial Period

Christian missionary education began to change these ethnic identities by introducing European and Christian values to the indigenous people. Despite the existence of the well-established institutions of traditional education, and over a decade before the imposition of British protectorate status, some indigenous leaders encouraged the introduction of European missionary education into their society in order to pursue their objectives of ensuring the continued existence and even expansion of their ethnic group.

Much of the history of the establishment of missionary education revolves around the history of the Buganda kingdom, which itself was a colonizing empire that conquered and subordinated other ethnic groups to its rule. Before his kingdom gained British protectorate status, the Buganda king, or Kabaka, had welcomed Muslim Arab traders, Protestant missionaries, and Catholic missionaries into the kingdom. By building relationships with the powerful foreign powers associated with each group, the Kabaka protected his kingdom against foreign invasion. These religious groups spread their ideology and influence through the education of the indigenous population, beginning with the Baganda, the people of the Buganda kingdom. The first of the foreigners to initiate a relationship with the Buganda kingdom, Arab and Swahili traders from Zanzibar were encouraged to stay near the palace of Kabaka Muteesa I.[134] In 1868, the Kabaka converted to Islam, and from this privileged position, the Arabs taught the Baganda about their religion and how to read the Qur'an.[135]

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[134] J. C. Ssekamwa, *History and Development of Education in Uganda* (Kampala: Fountain Publishers Ltd., 1997), 25.

[135] Timothy Kalyegira, "The Uganda Almanac," 1997, http://www.ugandarecord.co.ug/index.php?ts=ugandan%20history&icon=46.

Seeking to connect himself to the powerful governments of Britain and France and to overpower neighboring ethnic groups with European knowledge and technology, Muteesa I later invited European missionary teachers to his kingdom.[136] Indeed, even though they were invited to serve the Kabaka's aims, Christian missionaries arrived and introduced European-style schooling with the principal aim of evangelism.[137] In 1877, the Protestant teachers of the Christian Missionary Society arrived from Britain, and in 1879, the White Fathers Society composed of French Roman Catholics were also welcomed into the kingdom.[138] The Protestant and Catholic missionaries instructed the Buganda chiefs and servants primarily on Christianity, reading, writing, arithmetic, and agriculture, and they taught history through a religious and European lens. Believing that they were leading a civilizing mission to convert the Baganda to Christianity, the Christian missionaries educated them to change their beliefs and thus the nature of their identities. Tensions rose among the Muslims, Catholics, and Protestants as they competed to gain political influence over the Baganda.[139] The Buganda kings also became increasingly suspicious of the missionaries' activities because the newly-converted Baganda refused to follow some of the kings' orders on religious grounds.[140]

Sensing the identity-changing effects of the foreigners' teachings on the Buganda people, Kabaka Mwanga, who succeeded Muteesa I, had over thirty Baganda converts killed and planned to remove the British, French, and Arab teachers from his kingdom's domain.[141] However, the Christian and Muslim foreign teachers and their followers deposed Mwanga and

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[136] Donald Anthony Low, The Mind of Buganda: documents of the modern history of an African kingdom (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971), 201.
[137] Omateseye and Omateseye, 186.
[138] Low, 201.
[139] Ssekamwa, 29.
[140] Ssekamwa, 34.
[141] Ibid.

placed his brother into kabakaship.[142] Even after this collective effort, Christian and Muslim Baganda began to fight each other for influence, and the Christians triumphed over the Muslims in 1888 and returned Kabaka Mwanga to his throne.[143] Soon afterward, war broke out between the Protestants and the Catholics, and with British military intervention, the Protestants, and thus the British, gained the upper hand in the Buganda kingdom.[144] Just as the Buganda kingdom had acted to gain more power in its own region, the British, pursuing their national interests, intervened to prevent the French and Germans from expanding their influence in Africa. Despite their defeat, the Muslims and Catholics continued to establish their own schools throughout the region. Missionary education introduced schisms into the previously more unified Buganda identity, but with the victory of the British Protestants, a different kind of Buganda identity developed that included aspects of British and Christian identity. Although the missionaries sought to fulfill their own proselytizing objective, the Baganda used them and their education to elevate their status in relation to their neighbors. In so doing, they deliberately changed the nature of their own identity.

Missionary Teachers as Colonial Partners: Changing Buganda Identity

Protestant missionary teachers had laid the groundwork in the Buganda kingdom for British colonialism by Christianizing and westernizing Buganda identity. The establishment of the Uganda Protectorate in 1894 raised the Buganda Kingdom's standing relative to other ethnic groups in the area. The first to sign a treaty with the British to gain protectorate status, the Buganda kingdom assisted the British in conquering the other ethnic groups in the region as the British expanded its control by signing more treaties with the leaders of other ethnic groups.[145]

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[142] Ibid.
[143] Ibid., 35.
[144] Rowe.
[145] Thomas P. Ofcansky, *Uganda: Tarnished Pearl of Africa* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 21-22.

The name of the protectorate was derived from the Kiswahili name of Buganda, "Uganda," which the British mistook as the kingdom's name.[146] This choice of name clearly demonstrates the central role of the Buganda kingdom in the eyes of the protectorate government. Through Protestant missionary education, Buganda identity had become more imbued with British and Christian values. The Baganda were thus able to use the power and influence associated with the "white man" to bolster the prestige of their ethnic identity even after the British assumed control of their territory.

The Buganda identity began to be tied to "civilization" as the British praised and favored them for their receptiveness to Christianity and westernization.[147] Many British colonizers believed that the presence of Buganda would civilize other ethnic groups.[148] Offering to act as colonial administrators, the Buganda imposed their culture onto other ethnic groups from their positions of British-backed power. Buganda chiefs, who were sent to rule over other ethnic groups, insisted that all of the people speak Luganda, the language of the Baganda, and regarded the traditional clothing of the local people as barbarian.[149] Although some Baganda adopted Christianity and chose to wear western clothing, they managed to maintain a cohesive Buganda identity.[150] After attending the schools of missionaries, some Baganda wrote literature emphasizing their pride in their own culture, including their own accounts of the history of the Baganda people.[151] Furthermore, the Baganda imitated the British by creating their own

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[146] Low, 76.
[147] Thomas Fuller, "British Images and Attitudes in Colonial Uganda," *Historian* 38, no. 2 (1976): 313-314.
[148] Ibid., 314.
[149] Rowe.
[150] Lloyd A. Fallers, "Ideology and Culture in Uganda Nationalism," *American Anthropologist, New Series* 63, no. 4 (1961): 682.
[151] Ibid.

Parliament and government with ministries of justice, health, and education, thereby changing the structure of their political institution.[152]

Christian missionary schooling spread quickly as the demand for European education grew among the indigenous people, who perceived the benefits associated with obtaining a European education. These benefits included the enhanced economic and social status that was accorded to westernized, literate Africans. People of other indigenous ethnicities saw how the Baganda had profited from these advantages because educated Baganda gained access to clerical positions in the protectorate government. Kenyan writer Ngugi wa Thiong'o explains the elitism and power associated with literacy in Africa: "the privileging of the written over the oral had roots in the relationship of power in society and history…The dominant social forces had become identified with the civilized and the written."[153] Africans increasingly perceived missionary education as more valuable than traditional education, and the missionaries trained many of the indigenous people to propagate Christianity and missionary schooling throughout various parts of the protectorate.

Centralized but Separate: Education in the Later Colonial Period

The protectorate government initially did not support the missionaries' education of indigenous people because the colonial officials had feared that the Africans would use the knowledge they gain through schooling to stage an uprising against the British. But, as it expanded its administration and economic activities, the colonial regime reconsidered this policy. The government decided to use education as a tool to teach the indigenous population the necessary skills for working in the lower echelons of the colonial bureaucracy and enterprises. Trained Africans could replace the comparatively more expensive Indians, who the British had

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[152] Fallers, 680.

[153] Ngugi wa Thiong'o, *Penpoints, Gunpoints and Dreams: Towards a Critical Theory of the Arts and the State in Africa* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 108.

brought as railroad laborers from their colony in India. In 1925, the government established the Department of Education in order to coordinate and provide financial support to the churches' educational activities while increasing state control over education.[154] The government supported the missionaries' work while seeking to change the focus of education provision: it encouraged primary schools to emphasize technical training over literacy education and set up its own technical schools in order to serve its economic interests.[155] Even though it identified closely with the British Protestant missionaries and encouraged the promotion of Christian values, the Uganda Protectorate government later endeavored to reduce religious groups' influence on education in order to avoid the resurgence of interreligious conflict. Nevertheless, by 1960, out of Uganda's 28 secondary schools, only 8 were run by the government, while 20 were run by missionaries.[156] The missionaries remained the foremost providers of European education to the indigenous people.

As a part of their divide-and-rule policy, the British implemented policies to increase the influence of local ethnic groups on missionary schooling. Encouraging the indigenous people to remain as fragmented ethnic groups, the colonial regime implemented education policies to prevent the Africans from identifying and collaborating with each other to oust the colonizers. Thus, the regime's educational policy deliberately discouraged the formation of a unified national identity among the indigenous people. The government also supported missionary education to alter aspects of ethnic identities in order to bring them in line with British and Christian values. Schools taught British History but did not teach African History, thus placing a further hindrance to the development of a collective memory among the African ethnic groups.

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[154] Roland Hindmarsh, "Uganda," in *Church, State, and Education in Africa*, ed. David G. Scanlon (New York: Teachers College Press, 1966), 145.
[155] Ssekamwa, 85.
[156] Ibid., 125.

An essential part of the British civilizing mission, education helped justify the subordination of the local people to British colonial rule. In 1925, the British colonies developed a blueprint for education in British colonial Africa called *Education policy in British tropical Africa*.[157] The memorandum affirmed the British's policy preference of adapting education to local traditions in order to "strengthen the feeling of responsibility to the tribal community" while at the same time stressing the importance of Christian religious and moral instruction.[158] In addition, the Thomas Education Committee of 1940 reviewed Uganda's education system and made recommendations which eventually led to the adoption of policies that increased local control of education. A system of Board of Governors was established in order to promote local involvement in school administration, and local governments, which were usually controlled by the leaders of indigenous ethnic groups, were given the responsibility of financing primary education.[159]

This support for the enhancement of ethnic identity aligns with the colonial regime's other policies that heightened hostilities among the different ethnic groups of Uganda. The colonial regime divided Uganda up into administrative districts, each representing the dominant ethnic group of the region that would act as the local government and extension of colonial rule. The district encompassing the Buganda kingdom's geographical domain of rule became the instrument of colonial administration, while the other districts were brought under colonial control through the Baganda chiefs.[160] Because of their reputation as skilled warriors, members of ethnic groups in the northern region, such as the Acholi and Langi, were recruited for positions in the police and army.[161] Through this blatant division of labor, the British also

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[157] "Advisory committee on native education in the British tropical African dependencies," in *Education Policy in British Tropical Africa* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1925), 3-8.
[158] Ibid.
[159] Ssekamwa, 143-144.
[160] Ibid., 21.
[161] Nelson Kasfir, *The Shrinking Political Arena: Participation and Ethnicity in African Politics, with a Case Study of Uganda* (Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1976), 109.

increased differentiation between ethnic groups in the North and South and encouraged ethnicities in each region to identify against the other region. In addition to providing the Baganda people with the most access to European education, the colonial policy of indirect rule boosted the status of Baganda chiefs and generated anti-Buganda resentment from other ethnic groups.

Although few colonial records describe indigenous people's perceptions about their identities, some describe the Baganda as extremely prideful of their own identity and resistant to the idea of a Ugandan nation beyond Buganda.[162] Despite the emphasis of educational policy on local identity, Kabaka Daudi Cwa warned against the "foreignization" of the Buganda people and the loss of Buganda culture and traditions through European education.[163] African students at the state-run Makerere University mobilized to demand the independence of Uganda but worked to influence the progression towards decolonization through university associations tied to their ethnic origins.[164] Overall, people retained strong identification with their ethnic group since the vast majority of the people continued to learn history at the family and clan level, and even those who attended the missionary and government schools remained loyal to their ethnic roots because of the British policy of divide-and-rule. This trend was reversed with independence.

Education after Independence: National in Fact and Focus

Although there was opposition to British rule, Uganda did not gain its independence through a nation-wide movement that unified the indigenous people against their common oppressor. After signing the Atlantic Charter, which enshrined all peoples' right to self-determination, and facing increasing pressure from the United States to decolonize their imperial

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[162] Fallers, 685.

[163] Kabaka Daudi Cwa, "Obuyigirize, Obulabufu n'Okwezaya mu Buganda," in *Kabaka Daudi Cwa, Obulamu, Omulembe n'Ebirowoozo Bye,* ed. M. Kaizi (Kampala: Baganda C. S. Press, 1947).

[164] Hugh Dinwiddy and Michael Twaddle, "The crisis at Makerere," in *Uganda Now*, eds. Holger Hansen and Michael Twaddle (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1988): 201.

possessions, the British prepared its colonies, including Uganda, for independence.[165] During this process of planned decolonization, the protectorate government provided education to Ugandans in order to teach them the skills and knowledge deemed necessary to eventually govern the new nation. Some scholars argue that the British acted to ensure their neocolonial influence by placing European-educated indigenous people, who would remain loyal to the British, into positions of political power in the newly independent regime.[166] Cambridge-educated Kabaka Muteesa II became the first President of Uganda, and Milton Obote I, who attended the government-run Makerere University of Uganda, became the first Prime Minister.[167]

After gaining independence in 1962, the new Ugandan government pursued the Africanization and the nationalization of school curriculum, especially the subject of History, in order to promote Ugandan and African identity. Traditional education continued to reinforce ethnic identity at the family level, and missionary education continued to promote the Christianization and westernization of local identities, but the post-colonial state sought to bring Ugandan and African identity to the fore by revamping the Anglocentric curriculum. Under the colonial regime, students had studied the History of Britain and its empire; the history of the Ugandan and African people were ignored.[168] Moreover, with the destruction of oral traditions to tie them to their own past and the long steeping in History told from the colonizer's perspective, Ugandans' understanding of themselves and their place in the world arguably had been skewed.[169] Schooling was racially divided: Europeans, Asians, and Africans attended separate institutions, and each group was also split into different religions. Among the Indian population,

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[165] John Flint, "Planned Decolonization and Its Failure in British Africa," *African Affairs* 82, no. 328 (1983):408.
[166] Flint, 100.
[167] Kenneth Ingham, *Obote: A political biography* (New York: Psychology Press, 1994), 30.
[168] Ssekamwa, 169.
[169] Ngugi wa Thiong'o, *Something torn and new: An African renaissance* (New York: Basic Civitas Books, 2009).

the Hindus, Muslim Ismailis, Sikhs, and Roman Catholic Goanese had each created their own schools.[170]

The new Ugandan government took numerous steps in order to promote the integration of its ethnically diverse population and to revive the people's pride in African identity. In 1963, the government appointed the Castle Education Commission to review the education system and to provide policy recommendations to meet the objectives of the new government.[171] The Commission created a new structure of education, which has largely remained the same until today, and it nationalized the school curriculum for the first time.[172] In addition, the 1963 Education Act placed all grant-aided schools under the control of the government to loosen the grip of racial and religious groups on education and to pave the way for greater unity under an African identity.[173] Once under government control, the schools were prohibited from barring children, who were not of the same race or religion, from local areas to attend their school.

The government also devised a new national curriculum in 1964 in order to increase the people's confidence in their Ugandan national identity and African regional identity.[174] In conjunction with new policies to Africanize the staffing of schools and to reduce the influence of expatriate teachers, the syllabi for the curriculum was slowly revised to in order to center it on African identity and history.[175] Under President Milton Obote, Uganda also underwent a period of expansion of access to education from 1962 to 1970.[176] New primary schools were built, and existing schools were enlarged.[177] From 1962 to 1970, the number of secondary schools rose by

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[170] Ssekamwa, 198.
[171] Ibid., 165.
[172] J. C. Ssekamwa, telephone interview by author, March 24 2011.
[173] Ssekamwa, 199.
[174] Ibid., 170.
[175] Oliver Furley, "Education in post-independent Uganda: change amidst strife," in *Uganda Now*, eds. Holger Hansen and Michael Twaddle (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1988), 194.
[176] Ssekamwa, 166.
[177] Ibid., 166.

260 percent.[178] The Ugandan government established the National Curriculum Development Center in 1973 to carry out curriculum reform in order to change the way students were taught in schools throughout the entire nation.[179] While these measures were taken to encourage the formation of national identity, the nationalization and Africanization of education did not impact large portions of the population: most Ugandans still did not gain access to nationalized education and faced challenges in attending school in the midst of post-independence instability.

One way to measure the relative strength of national identity relative to ethnic identity is to examine the occurrences of ethnic conflict in different periods of post-colonial Uganda. Although several different Ugandans have thus far served as president, only Obote, Amin, and Museveni were able to remain in the position for at least a year. A comparison of interethnic and international relations in Uganda during the Obote (1966-1971, 1980-1985) and Amin (1971-1979) years and under current President Museveni's regime (1986-present) illustrates how the Museveni regime's strong commitment to national unity along with the promotion of universal education has enhanced Ugandans' national identity and reduced the occurrence of ethnic conflict in the country.

Obote and Amin Regimes: Little Education and Ethnic Conflict

A continual struggle for control of the government between the non-Bantu speaking north and the Bantu-speaking south – a legacy of divide-and-rule under the colonial regime – underlies much of Uganda's violent political history.[180] Ethnic divisions were greatly pronounced under the rule of Milton Obote and Idi Amin. The instability and conflict of these years hindered the expansion of education throughout Uganda.

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[178] Ibid.
[179] Ibid., 59.
[180] Note: The Bantu languages are a family of languages originating from Nigeria/Cameroon and are spoken by ethnic groups in southern Uganda.

Milton Obote sought to gloss over ethnic differences by significantly weakening traditional political institutions. A struggle for power between the Baganda, the former agents of British indirect rule, and all of the other ethnic groups of Uganda characterized post-independence politics. In 1966, then-Prime Minister Obote, a Langi from the North, deposed Kabaka Muteesa II, a Muganda, to become the second President of Uganda. In order to shrink the power of the traditional leaders of ethnic groups, Obote removed the autonomous powers of all kingdoms, reduced the Kabaka's powers to a ceremonial position, and expanded the powers of the central government.[181] While his government Africanized the school curricula and sought to remove ethnicity from politics, Obote's regime forged disunity by favoring the Acholi and Langi, generating resentment from other ethnic groups. The army, led by Idi Amin, a Kakwa from the Northwest, eventually staged a successful coup against Obote.

Amin's rule accentuated ethnic differences with exclusive policies that patently favored some ethnic groups over others. In contrast with highly school-educated Obote, Amin had only attended an Islamic school for four years.[182] Education was not a priority under his rule. Amin's regime elevated the status of certain ethnic groups over others and institutionalized the unequal treatment of Ugandan citizens of different ethnicities. Amin once stated, "In any country there must be people who have to die. They are the sacrifices any nation has to make to achieve law and order."[183] These words encapsulate Amin's infamous method of dealing with hostile ethnic groups: eradication. Under Amin, the state apparatus was employed to crush ethnic groups who posed a threat to his rule. Since he considered the Acholi and Langi, who were favored under

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[181] Kasfir, *Shrinking*, 200.
[182] Fred Guweddeko, "Rejected then taken in by dad; a timeline," *The Monitor*, August 18, 2003, http://www.monitor.co.ug/SpecialReports/Amin/-/859112/859962/-/s8xlyjz/-/index.html.
[183] "Idi Amin in quotes," *BBC News*, August 16, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3082349.stm.

Obote's rule, as menaces to his power, he purged the army of Acholi and Langi military personnel and enlisted more Kakwa and Nubians.[184]

Uganda's international relations with neighboring East African countries also soured under Amin. Although he adopted some nationalist and Pan-African rhetoric, his lack of steeping in nationalized and Africanized education was clear. Amin attempted to annex the Kagera region of Tanzania, claiming it as a part of Uganda. After he ordered his battalions to invade Tanzania, then-President of Tanzania Nyerere responded by driving Amin's forces out and eventually ousting him in 1979 with the Uganda National Liberation Army, a rebel group composed of pro-Obote Ugandans. Amin's enhancement of ethnic tensions and instigation of insurgency by marginalized groups eventually led to his demise.

Meanwhile, school attendance rates dipped even lower, and the Ugandan government gradually lost its ability to fund education because Britain and the United States cut off their aid to Amin's regime.[185] After several interim leaders, elections brought former president Obote to power again. However, his rule again provoked armed resistance, and an Acholi from the North called Tito Okello deposed him. In 1986, the National Resistance Army (NRA), composed of southerners, succeeded in waging a guerilla war to oust Okello and declared its leader Yoweri Museveni the new president of Uganda. As warfare raged between government forces and rebel groups in each of these conflicts, many schools in Uganda were destroyed, and insecurity hindered the continuation of education.

Under the Umbrella of the NRM: Education for National Unity

Nationalized education in conjunction with other nation-building policies under current President Museveni has helped build a Ugandan national identity among the population. In

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[184] Ofcansky, 44.
[185] Ssekamwa, telephone interview.

contrast to the Obote and Amin regimes, the current government has taken significant steps to increase access to education with the enhancement of national identity as a central objective. After attending primary and secondary school in colonial western Uganda, Museveni obtained his Bachelor of Arts from the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. A Muyankole from the Ankole ethnic group of southwest Uganda, Museveni came to power supported by a narrow social base of mostly Baganda and Banyankole, who made up the bulk of the National Resistance Movement (NRM)[186]. He advocated for a policy of broad-basedness to encourage the inclusion of all Ugandans, regardless of ethnicity, ideology, or previous political affiliation.[187] *The Ten Point Program of the NRM*, the defining document of Museveni's regime, includes the consolidation of national unity through the elimination of all forms of sectarianism.[188] The NRM claimed that it sought to forge unity among Ugandans of different ethnicities.

Even before it took control of the government, the National Resistance Army (NRA) devoted significant efforts to the political education of the local people as a means of spreading its political ideology.[189] While waging guerilla warfare against Obote and later Okello and gaining control of more Ugandan territory, the NRA brought *chaka-mchaka* education to the local people in tandem with organizing them into Resistance Councils. Designed to politically educate local populations to function as a part of the NRA, *chaka-mchaka* education included self-defense training and political education. The NRA thus taught their version of the history of Uganda.[190] Until 1998, the government required *chacka-mchaka* for students graduating from

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[186] The group called itself the NRA while fighting against Obote, but later changed the name to NRM after coming to power.

[187] Joshua B. Rubongoya, *Regime Hegemony in Museveni's Uganda* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 71.

[188] Yoweri Museveni, *What is Africa's problem?* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 257-261.

[189] Nelson Kasfir, "Guerrillas and civilian participation: the National Resistance Army in Uganda, 1981–86," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 43, no. 2 (2005): 271–296.

[190] Peter Bouckaert, *Hostile to Democracy: The Movement System and Political Repression in Uganda* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), 66. The words *chaka-mchaka* imitates the sounds of military boots.

Senior 6 of secondary school.[191] Although criticized by opponents of the NRM as a tool of political indoctrination, *chaka-mchaka* education helped raise national consciousness and facilitate the formation of a coalition among various ethnic groups in southern Uganda against northerner rule. Currently, elements of this political education have been incorporated into primary schools' Social Studies curriculum. In the fourth year of primary school, for instance, the students learn about the leadership in the local government, and in the fifth year, they learn about the government of Uganda. Education has remained a cornerstone of the NRM's efforts for national integration.

Museveni's regime focuses on two primary goals in providing mass education: economic growth and national unity. Both are emphasized, the former more than the latter, in the MoES's Education Sector Strategic Plan 2004-2015. The document explains the essential role of education in "Uganda's development as a proud nation, a strong government, and a vibrant economy" and assumes that education will lead to poverty eradication, industrialization, and the reduction of interethnic hostilities.[192] Towards these ends, the Ugandan government, supported by international donors, has made tremendous strides towards achieving universal primary and secondary education. The government has taken responsibility for providing and administering a standardized nationalized education for Ugandans throughout the country.

Trends in History of Education in Uganda

Throughout precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial Uganda, different actors had deliberately used education to promote the construction of different identities. After independence, state-sponsored nationalized education has gained greater influence over the youth while the influence of community-based traditional education has waned. Chapter Four

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[191] Ismael Kasooha, "Government to reintroduce Senior six chakamchaka," *New Vision*, August 9, 2009.
[192] MoES, 7.

explains how History teaching in primary schools has cultivated national and regional identities, which, as discussed in Chapter One, influences people's political behavior. Nationalized education has succeeded to an extent in uprooting the pumpkin of indigenous traditions and planting new identities by gradually changing the way Ugandans perceive themselves in relation to others.

CHAPTER IV: HISTORY EDUCATION IN CONTEMPORARY UGANDA

The teaching of a nationalized History in Uganda has contributed to the formation of national identity among the ethnically diverse people of Uganda. Nationalized History education gradually changes people's perspectives towards others within their nation and fostered relatively more peaceful interethnic relations and international relations with East African countries. However, this emphasis on schooling and greater national integration deepened the decline of traditional culture and the marginalization of non-school attending populations.

Uganda's History Curriculum: Fostering National and Regional Identity

Even though Uganda's Ministry of Education and Sports emphasizes the development of national unity in its objectives for education, History education in Uganda lacks a strong national leaning. Unlike the nation-centered History curricula of countries such as the United States, France, and Japan, the national History curriculum of Ugandan schools does not solely focus on providing a national narrative. Among other objectives, the national curriculum of Uganda aims to help students understand their world and the cultural heritage of the different people within the nation *and* region (see Appendix D for the full list of objectives of History education in Uganda). In alignment with these goals, primary school teachers teach their students the History of the subnational local district and of the supranational region in addition to that of the nation. Since most Ugandan students do not continue on to secondary school, this analysis focuses on the content of the History curriculum in primary education.

In their fourth year of primary education, students in Uganda begin to study History as a component of the Social Studies (SST) curriculum (see Appendix E for a syllabus of topic areas covered in each year of SST). Integrating social, economic, and political issues, SST is an interdisciplinary study of the people and their environment. Students commence, in Primary 4

(P4), with the History of their district. The district is the highest administrative unit of local governance and is no longer demarcated along ethnic lines as it had been during the colonial period.[193] Thus, teachers lecture on the History of the major ethnic groups living in the local district instead of only teaching the History of a specific ethnic group. Nevertheless, the P4 SST curriculum mostly focuses the current characteristics of the people, environment, and government in the district. In the next three years of primary school, students devote each year to studying the History of Uganda, East Africa, and Africa in that order.

The History of Uganda takes precedence in Primary 5 (P5), when students learn about the nation of Uganda.[194] Almost two-thirds of the P5 SST syllabus is dedicated to History. P5 students study precolonial Uganda, the influence of foreign actors, the formation of the Ugandan nation, the road to Uganda's independence, and postcolonial Uganda. During their study of the precolonial period, students learn about the origins of different ethnic groups in Uganda. The SST curriculum specialist of the National Curriculum Development Center in Uganda explained that SST encourages students of all different ethnicities to feel as if they are all Ugandan.[195] Despite the prominence accorded to national unity in the curricular objectives, Ugandan schools do not provide a glorious national narrative about the unification of the different ethnic groups under one nation in a joint struggle against colonialism. Students are taught that the Ugandan nation was a product of colonial rule. The History of how Uganda became a nation is surprisingly Eurocentric: students examine how the British gradually took control of the territory which constitutes contemporary Uganda by battling against and signing treaties with the leaders

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[193] There are 111 districts in Uganda, and the number of districts continues to grow. For more information about the number of districts, see: Ministry of Local Government, "Status of Local Govts," 2 August 2010, http://molg.go.ug/2010/08/02/status-of-local-govts/.

[194] P5 SST teacher, telephone interview by author, March 24 2011. Curricular information about P5 SST was obtained through interviews with this teacher.

[195] SST Curriculum Specialist for National Curriculum Development Center of MoES, telephone interview by author, February 25 2011.

of indigenous kingdoms.[196] Essentially, students learn that the British had created Uganda. Thus, pupils' understanding of Ugandan identity is closely linked to a colonial past. Nevertheless, young Ugandans do not necessarily identify against the British. Teachers encourage students to debate the benefits and costs of colonialism to the African people. Surprisingly, the curriculum barely touches on the History of postcolonial Uganda beyond independence. Amin's brutal rule is virtually left untaught. Additionally, teachers do not detail current President Museveni's rise to power through guerilla warfare against Obote and Okello, but they highlight his role in encouraging the revival of the East African Community.

The Primary 6 (P6) and Primary 7 (P7) SST curricula serve to provide the foundations for two kinds of supranational identities: East African and African.[197] In P6, students are taught the history of East Africa, comprised of Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania. Pupils learn that East Africa is the birthplace of humankind. They gain knowledge about the common past of the major ethnic groups in the region: they study the ethnic groups' origins, their migration to different parts of East Africa, and their ways of life. They also learn about the common colonial experiences of the three nations. People in Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania have very similar origins, but the colonizers had split them up to create their own spheres of influence. Through agreements made in Europe, Britain and Germany drew imaginary lines to divide East Africa into three colonies. The Europeans created new states along these new lines, ignoring the existence of precolonial organizations. Therefore, the P6 SST curriculum encourages students to identify with other people in East Africa by teaching their shared past. Their final year of primary school expands this conception of regional identity beyond East Africa.

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[196] P5 SST teacher.

[197] P7 SST teacher, telephone interview by author, April 4 2011. Information about curricula for P6 and P7 were obtained from interviews with this teacher.

SST in P7 teaches the History of Africa. The study of African History mainly centers on Africans' common experiences under European colonialism. Although teachers briefly teach students about the leaders of African nationalist movements, they spend a significant portion of time teaching the History of South Africa. Students learn about the apartheid regime and the struggles of Nelson Mandela against the racially segregated society. History teaching in P7 thus reinforces a sense of Black African identity among Ugandan students.

History is compulsory for all students in Ordinary level during the first four years of secondary school. Ordinary level students study the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth century History of Uganda and East Africa. In line with the general objectives of education, the objectives of History education for secondary school students include the promotion of understanding and appreciating the value of national unity, patriotism, and the cultural heritage of East Africa and Africa (see Appendix D for the full list of objectives for both Ordinary and Advanced level). The themes of national and supranational collective histories introduced in primary school continue to weave themselves throughout secondary school studies of History.

Primary school students in Uganda learn about History mainly from three different geographical frameworks: Uganda, East Africa, and Africa. Three distinctive qualities of History education in Uganda impact the nature of identity formation fostered by the nationalized education system. First, the three identities reinforced by the curriculum are closely related to each other. Chapter One had discussed how some identities are closely intertwined with other identities. Although national and regional identities are distinct concepts, they can overlap in certain cases. Regardless of their different ethnic identities, indigenous Ugandans all perceive each other as Africans. Moreover, many ethnic groups straddle two or all three of the East African nations. This notion of a shared African identity strengthens the ties among the people of

Uganda and of the larger East Africa. Along the same lines of thinking, Ugandans identify with other Africans on the continent. One interviewee explained that, to a Ugandan, having an African identity means behaving in a friendly and non-discriminatory way toward other Africans.[198] This conception of a very inclusive national identity is significantly different from the limited national identity of nation-states such as Japan. The History curriculum of Uganda in fact recognizes the artificial nature of the boundaries created by the colonizers.

Second, because of its relatively inclusive nature, Uganda's History curriculum does not promote identification against a clear "Other." Even if the "Other" may potentially be the Western European nations that had colonized most of Africa, the relationship with the "Other" is not hostile but often rooted in admiration. Instead of encouraging distancing from the "Other", nationalized education, by promoting economic development, seems to encourage Ugandans to become more like the "Other." Ugandan leaders have advocated for the modernization of Uganda in order to follow Western countries' trajectory of development. President Museveni has declared that Uganda can industrialize by giving everyone an education.[199] Just as the European-educated Baganda became associated with civilization and prestige during the colonial period, the lack of education and Westernization is now associated with backwardness and the barbarism. Thus, nationalized education, with its strong European roots, encourages students to become more like the European "Other" and to dissociate themselves from the uneducated "Other" in Uganda. By providing a fairly Eurocentric narrative of Ugandan, East African, and African History, the national History curriculum also perpetuates this general trend in education.

Third, the History teaching does not tie each identity to its own distinct set of values. Ugandan, East African, and African identities carry different meanings to every Ugandan. The

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[198] Ssekamwa, telephone interview.

[199] Murray Oliver, "Interview with President Lt. General Yoweri Kaguta Museveni," *CTV News*, August 30, 2002, http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/CTVNewsAt11/20020830/oliver_uganda_museveni_020830/.

American identity taught in United States' schools is linked to notions of individual freedom and democracy. In contrast, aside from the experience of a common colonial past under the British protectorate, the national identity of Ugandans does not exude a core set of fundamental values. Neither does East African identity. The Pan-African identity conveys the importance of unity and was built on a communal African struggle against the oppression of Europeans. The History curriculum alludes to these values through the discussion of the South African revolution against apartheid, but the ideas of Pan-Africanism seem to have hollowed out since all formerly colonized African nations have gained independence. As a further note, out of the different levels of identification explored in Chapter One, global citizenship education by far plays the least significant role in the nationalized History curriculum of Uganda. This is similar to the curricula of the vast majority of nationalized education systems throughout the world. Even though the identities promoted by the Ugandan government are less clearly defined and less exclusive compared to other national and regional identities, these identities are promoted over the notions of a common bond shared by all human beings.

The History curriculum of Uganda will continue to undergo change. Every five to seven years, the Ugandan government revises the curriculum in order to meet the needs of the population. In 2011, the Ministry of Education and Sports, with financial support from the World Bank, began the process of procuring and advising publishers to produce new textbooks for all subjects.[200] Although much of the historical information for the curriculum is based upon British written accounts, Ugandan university scholars have also carried out field research to develop Ugandan narratives of their past.[201] The National Curriculum Development Centre of the Ministry of Education and Sports has endeavored to make the curriculum-building process more

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[200] History Curriculum Specialist for National Curriculum Development Center of MoES, telephone interview by author, December 17, 2010.
[201] Ssekwamwa, telephone interview.

inclusive: teachers from different regions of Uganda participate in curriculum building.[202] As progress is made towards a new curriculum, a History curriculum that emphasizes Ugandan, East African, and African identity has become more and more accessible to people throughout Uganda. Even though Uganda's national History curriculum is not solely centered on the nation, it still provides the basis for national identity, albeit one without the exuberant pride and glory associated with many other national identities. Referring back to Chapter One, the construction of a sense of group identity depends upon a belief in the common past, present, and future of the group members. As Chapter Two detailed, historical knowledge serves as the foundation for collective identity, and schools in the nationalized education system fulfill the function of socializing students in order to add and enhance the saliency of their national and supranational identities. Shaping the identities of youth is especially significant in Uganda, where 77 percent of the population is below the age of 30.[203]

Trends of the Expansion of Nationalized History Education

Decline of Traditional Education and Oral History

The traditional education, missionary education, and nationalized education described in Chapter Three all play influential roles in contemporary Uganda. In present day Uganda, traditional education has not been completely displaced by European-style schooling. It continues to thrive in isolated rural areas that have experienced less Western influence. People in rural areas generally have less access to nationalized education than people in urban areas. While 66 percent of the rural population aged 10 years and above are literate, 86 percent of their

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[202] History Curriculum Specialist.
[203] Beatrice Daumerie and Elizabeth Leahy Madsen, "The Effects of a Very Young Age Structure in Uganda," *Population Action International* (2010), http://www.populationaction.org/Publications/Reports/The_Shape_of_Things_to_Come_Uganda/SOTC_Uganda.pdf.

counterparts in the urban population are literate.[204] Even though most school-aged children today in Uganda attend some school, they continue to obtain a traditional education from their families when they return home.

Aiming to achieve Education For All and the UN Millennium Development Goals, the Ugandan government has significantly expanded access to schooling in the past decade through its implementation of Universal Primary Education (UPE) and Universal Secondary Education (USE) (see Table 1 for current net enrollment rates). After the introduction of the UPE in 1997, primary school enrollment rose from 2.3 million in 1996[205] to 8.3 million in 2009.[206] In the same period, the net enrollment rate, or the ratio of the primary school-age population attending school, nearly doubled, jumping from 57 percent[207] to 108 percent.[208] Nevertheless, the pupil retention rates remain low: less than half of the pupils who had enrolled in Primary 3 continue on to Primary 7, so many do not remain for all four years of SST.[209] School enrollment rates decrease as students reach higher levels of education, and only a small portion of the population completes secondary school. Since the implementation of USE in 2007, the net enrollment rate for secondary school education increased from 19 percent in 2006 to 24 percent in 2009.[210] An even smaller portion of the population – around 4 percent – attends tertiary institutions.[211]

Most young Ugandans are at least exposed to the historical information taught in SST at the primary level of education. As a result of this rapid expansion, schools have gained a

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[204] Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS), "Statistical Abstract 2010," http://www.ubos.org/onlinefiles/uploads/ubos/pdf%20documents/2010StatAbstract.pdf, 12.
[205] UNESCO, "The EFA 2000 Assessment: Country Reports: Uganda," 2000, http://www.unesco.org/education/wef/countryreports/uganda/rapport_1.html.
[206]UBOS, "2010," 8. All of these statistics need to be evaluated with some skepticism because of the lack of reliability of collected data.
[207] UNESCO, "EFA 2000."
[208] UBOS, "2010," 8.
[209] UBOS, "Primary school enrollment by class and sex (2005- 2009)," http://www.ubos.org/onlinefiles/uploads/ubos/pdf%20documents/TED82010.pdf.
[210] UBOS, "2010," 10.
[211] UNESCO, "Table 5: Enrollment rates by International Standard Classification of Education level," 2010, http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=182.

relatively stronger influence over the youth of Uganda. As more children go to school and obtain more years of schooling, youth spend a larger amount of their time in school than at home. This is especially true for boarding school students, who only return home for the holidays. More time at school means less time acquiring the knowledge of one's clan and ethnic group through traditional education.

Table 1: Nationalized Education in Uganda

Stage of schooling	Years at stage	Classes[212]	Net enrollment rate of school-age population[213]
Pre-Primary School	3 years	nursery/kindergarten	10% (2008)[214]
Primary School	7 years	Primary 1 (P1) until Primary 6 (P7)	107.9% (2009)[215]
Secondary School Ordinary Level	4 years	Senior 1 (S1) to Senior 4 (S4)	33% (2009)[216]
Secondary School Advanced Level	2 years	Senior 5 (S5) to Senior 6 (S6)	14% (2008)[217]
University and other tertiary institutions	Varies	N/A	4% (2009)[218]

Missionary education retains considerable influence over the Ugandan population. The government controls the majority of primary and secondary schools – 76 percent and 50 percent respectively – but most had been established by religious institutions, which continue to exercise influence over school policies and support the proselytization of the students.[219] Furthermore, the government schools continue the educational practices introduced by the European-style

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[212] In Uganda, the term "class" describes the level of schooling, or what is referred to as a "grade" in the United States; e.g. the 1st year of primary school is the "class" of Primary 1, or, in its abbreviated form, P1.

[213] The ratio of school-aged pupils in school to the country's total school-aged population

[214] UNESCO, "Enrollment."

[215] Ministry of Education and Sports, cited by Uganda Bureau of Statistics, "2010," 8. Since there is an over 100 percent net enrollment rate, some of the students who are attending primary school are below or above primary school age population. The statistics do not indicate what percentage these students constitute of enrolled primary students. At the primary level, enrollment rates decrease as students reach higher classes. According to study by the Uganda Government, on average at primary school level, half the pupils who enroll in Primary 1 do not complete Primary 7 in the set time-frame. See: "Uganda has the highest school dropout rate," *New Vision*, April 9, 2010, http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/9/183/715724.

[216] UNESCO, "Enrollment."

[217] Ibid.

[218] Ibid.

[219] UBOS, "Uganda National Household Survey 2009/2010," http://www.ubos.org/UNHS0910/unhs200910.pdf, 28.

schooling brought by the missionaries. Thus, even though teachers teach the History of Uganda, East Africa, and Africa, instead of the History of Britain, they employ largely the same instructional methods used by European missionary teachers in the colonial period.

The expansion of nationalized and Africanized education has also meant the expansion of European-style schooling. As discussed in Chapter Three, while European education is placed in a separate sphere from other aspects of one's life, traditional education in Uganda is deeply integrated into people's lives. Consequently, the rising prevalence of European-style schooling has fundamentally changed the nature of Ugandans' ethnic and national identity. The increase in prestige associated with obtaining a nationalized education has reduced the status of indigenous means of education. For instance, the most school-educated ethnic group, the Baganda have progressively lost touch with their traditional culture in the process of attending missionary and government-controlled schools. In the precolonial and colonial period, leaders could dismiss individuals who did not satisfactorily answer questions about the traditions and history of the ethnic group.[220] Traditional knowledge was a prerequisite for claiming Buganda identity. In contemporary Uganda, a Muganda gains the respect of other Baganda by attending school instead of staying at home and learning from his/her elders. In order to revitalize Buganda culture in the lives of the people and to reconnect them to the way their ancestors had lived, the Buganda queen launched a camp for Baganda children to learn about the culture, traditions, and morals of their ethnic group. Camp participants learn how to engage in the traditional activities of the Buganda, such as preparing groundnut sauce and *matooke* (steamed plantain).[221]

Despite the increasing influence of state-sponsored mass education, traditional education remains an important contributor to the identity formation of those who continue to return home

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[220] Ssekamwa, 9.
[221] The Nnabagereka, "Ekisaakaate (Royal Enclosure)," 2011, http://www.nabagereka.org/?jc=Ekisaakaate.

and learn from their elders. One degree-holding Ugandan interviewee explained that traditional education has had a larger impact on her life than her primary and secondary school education. In the former, she learned about things that were useful and relevant to her life. In the latter, she often learned impractical information and memorized large amounts of information taught in class before examinations, only to forget what she learned soon after the exams.[222] She claims that she hardly remembers what she learned in primary and secondary school, but she has internalized what her parents and elders taught her during the evening fireside stories in the village. As her experiences demonstrate, the instructional methods employed by the teacher also determine how well the students are socialized to adopt a certain identity. The Ugandan national curriculum includes national and regional History, but, without effective reinforcement, the information remains generally irrelevant and unimportant to the individual.

The quality of education in Uganda has not improved as rapidly as the increase in the access to schooling. Young people face a number of impediments to internalizing the knowledge they learn in school. The government distributes textbooks to schools to meet set student-to-textbook ratios, but because of various obstacles preventing the efficient and fair distribution of resources, the ratio is at times one book for every fifteen or more students.[223] Even if students do have access to textbooks, they are often out of date. The national curriculum is revised every five to seven years, but most teachers do not immediately receive training or textbooks to assist them in teaching the new syllabus.[224] Furthermore, most secondary school students are overwhelmed by the amount of content they must memorize. Ordinary level students take History along with as many as 18 other subjects, depending upon the school. Only a few of the many challenges in education in Uganda are discussed here, but each illuminates the obstacles standing between the

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[222] Acholi woman.
[223] SST Curriculum Specialist.
[224] Ibid.

student and teacher in the transmission of information. Even though all schools are expected to teach the same national curriculum, students often do not learn the content of the History curriculum well. Nevertheless, school-goers still experience a form of education radically different from traditional education.

Regional Disparities: North versus South

Nationalized education has not spread equally throughout Uganda. Specifically, the North has lower enrollment rates than the South. Some ethnic groups in particular have had extremely low exposure to schooling, which has marginalized them from the rest of the nation. In the Karamoja region of northeast Uganda, where the Karimojong people live, traditional education remains the most influential form of education.[225] Tenaciously rejecting Christian missionary activity and nationalized education, the people of the Karimojong ethnic group remain among some of the least school-educated people in Uganda. While 89 percent of the Baganda and 70 percent of the Ugandan population is literate, only 13 percent of the Karimojong are literate.[226] In addition, the net enrollment rate of the primary school-age population of Moroto district in the Karamoja region is 35 percent, in contrast to the national enrollment rate of 108 percent.[227] While 24 percent of the nation's secondary school age-population is enrolled in secondary school, a scant 5 percent in Moroto are enrolled.[228] These enormous gaps in educational attainment also reflect the social distance between the Karimojong and other ethnic groups in Uganda. One Karimojong interviewee expresses the extent of the marginalization of the Karimojong by other Ugandans: "People in Uganda feel that Karamoja is not in Uganda." This widespread belief is

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[225] Forum for African Women Educationalists Program Coordinator for Karamoja, telephone interview by author, March 6, 2011. Information not cited about education in Karamoja is derived from this interview.
[226] UBOS, "2002 Uganda Population and Housing Census Analytical Report: Education and Literacy," http://www.ubos.org/onlinefiles/uploads/ubos/pdf%20documents/2002%20CensusEducAnalyticalReport.pdf , 80-81.
[227] UBOS, "Primary education accessibility indicators by district, 2008 – 2009," http://www.ubos.org/onlinefiles/uploads/ubos/pdf%20documents/TED102010.pdf.
[228] UBOS, "Secondary education accessibility indicators by district (2008– 2009)," http://www.ubos.org/onlinefiles/uploads/ubos/pdf%20documents/TED112010.pdf . The cited statistic is the NER.

further confirmed by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics categorization of the Karimojong as "non-Ugandan."[229] Many Ugandans view the Karimojong as unwilling to embrace "development," especially because the Karimojong carry out cattle-raiding in order to sustain their pastoralist livelihoods. Other Ugandans' disassociation from the Karimojong also stems from perceiving the Karimojong's hostility to non-traditional education and lack of assimilation into the rest of Ugandan society.

In the 1930s, the Karimojong elders had buried a pen to symbolize their defiance against foreign education.[230] Taking "the pen is mightier than the sword"[231] to a literal level, the burial of the pen demonstrated Karimojongs' perception of European education as a threat to the survival of their culture and identity. During a UNICEF-supported government campaign for education in the Karamoja region, the pen was recently unearthed as a gesture emblematic of their acceptance of nationalized education. Gradually, the school enrollment rates of Karimojong children have risen as the provision of education has also been adjusted to fit the lifestyle of the Karimojong people. The Alternative Basic Education for Karamoja program enables children to continue to assist their families in pastoralist activities while attending classes taught by local teachers for a few days a week under trees. The Karimojong who attend school have gained greater awareness of their position as a member of the nation of Uganda. At school, they study the History of the country and the region, whereas those who remain at home learn the history of their clan and ethnic group from their parents and elders.

The distribution of education in Uganda has also been influenced by rebel activities in certain regions of the country. Because of the destruction and instability in northern Uganda

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[229] UBOS, "2002," 81.

[230] Conan Businge, "Karimojong exhume pen to foster development," *New Vision*, January 15, 2008, http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/9/35/606778.

[231] Edward Bulwer-Lytton, "Act II. Scene II," in *Richelieu; Or the Conspiracy: A Play in Five Acts* (London: Saunders and Otley, 1839).

caused by the devastating conflict between the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rebel group and the government, the North has generally had less access to education than the South. Since the LRA abandoned northern Uganda in 2007, these regional differences have gradually narrowed, and the government has carried out its commitment to the equal access to nationalized education through UPE and USE. Nevertheless, clear regional inequalities in the levels of education persist: 59 percent of northern Uganda is literate, while 80 percent of central Uganda, as part of the South, is literate.[232] The lack of education also has an impact upon poverty rates because schools teach skills and knowledge necessary for employment in various fields. Because of war and the reduced access to education, the North also ranks the lowest of all regions in most social indicators. In 2005/2006, the North had the highest poverty rate at 61 percent when the national poverty rate was 31 percent.[233] The regional disparities in access to education along with gaps in various social indicators deepen the North-South divide. Many northerners harbor resentment toward the southerners because they have not reaped equal benefits as southerners from the country's economic prosperity and the improvement in the delivery of public services. Because the economic and political elite are predominantly from western Uganda, Ugandans of other ethnic groups also feel that there is a bias toward members of President Museveni's ethnic group, the Banyankole of western Uganda.

Despite the spread of education and the teaching of History centered on the nation and the greater region, the North-South split remains fairly clear during elections.[234] Although this seems to indicate ethnic polarization, it actually demonstrates how Ugandans expect politicians to serve the entire nation, rather than only a certain ethnic group. Despite its emphasis on

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[232] UBOS, "2010,"12.
[233] UBOS, "2008 Statistical Abstract," 2008, 13.
[234] Nelson Kasfir, "'Movement' Democracy, Legitimacy and Power in Uganda," in *No Party Democracy in Uganda: Myths and Realities*, ed. Justus Mugaju and J. Oloka-Onyango, 60-78 (Kampala, Uganda: Fountain Publishers, 2000), 67.

national unity, Museveni's political party, the National Resistance Movement (NRM), has not adequately bridged the regional divide between the North and the South. The NRM fared badly in the northern districts during the 1994 Constituent Assembly election. During the first national presidential elections in 1996, Museveni won overall with 74 percent of the vote, but his opponent Ssemwogerere won most of the districts in the North.[235] In the 2001 general elections, Museveni's rival, Besigye, won in all of the northern districts but lost the national election.[236] The NRM thus faces a large legitimacy deficit in the North because it had built its coalition among the southerners during its rebellion against the northerner President Okello. These voting patterns show that people in the North tend to vote against Museveni, but they do not necessarily demonstrate that ethnic interests are driving the votes in northern Uganda. Rather, northerners had voted against Museveni's regime because they feel that it has failed to cater for the improvement of the lives of people throughout the whole nation. The expansion of nationalized education has not erased the memory of ethnic groups and ethnic identity. Instead, it has added national identity to the complicated mix of an individual's self-conception.

Ugandan Parliament: Highly Educated Leaders for a Poorly Educated Populace

The inconsistent spread of nationalized education throughout Uganda is reflected in regional disparities in political representation at the national level. The requirements for political participation are strongly linked to educational attainment in two major ways. First, the official language of Uganda is English, so English fluency is required for working in the central government, reading and writing government policy, and communicating with other Ugandans. Without attending school, Ugandans encounter difficulties acquiring oral and written English fluency. Second, Ugandans must complete a high level of education in order to serve in the

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[235] Rubongoya, 84.
[236] Ibid.

central government. In order to become a Member of Parliament (MP), a Ugandan citizen must have at least completed Advanced level, or upper secondary education (see section 80.1.c. of Constitution).[237] But these qualifications are usually insufficient in reality: the majority of current MPs are degree-holders.[238] Hence, highly educated individuals represent and make critical decisions on governing a nation that has a 70 percent literacy rate – and not necessarily English literacy. These two requirements reflect the greater value accorded to nationalized education above other forms of education in Ugandan society.

Because of the educational requirements for central government positions, lower educational attainment has hindered the political involvement of northerners at the national level. Although each constituency[239] is represented by an MP in Parliament, northerners do not have as many positions in the central government as southern ethnic groups. Andrew Mwenda of *The Independent* news magazine in Uganda reports that ethnic groups from the South hold a disproportionate number of appointed positions in the government.[240] Westerners, who make up 26 percent of the national population, and the Baganda, who make up 17 percent, hold 44 percent and 30 percent of all top public appointments respectively.[241] Northerners are almost completely absent from top public offices.[242] Less political participation at the national level means less of a voice in important decision-making processes that impact the entire nation. Thus, the lack of

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[237] *Constitution of Uganda, 1995*, http://www.ugandaembassy.com/Constitution_of_Uganda.pdf.

[238] John-Mary Kauzya (expert on Ugandan Parliament), telephone interview by author, March 25, 2011.

[239] A constituency is an administrative unit of local governance under the district. Most constituencies are counties or municipalities.

[240] The distinction between the North and South is primarily a linguistic difference. The South is generally composed of Bantu ethnic groups: Baganda, Basoga, Banyankole, Bagisu, Bahima, Bakiga, Batooro (note how they all begin with Ba-). The North is composed of Nilotic and Nilotic-Saharan groups: Acholi, Langi, Iteso, Karimojong, Alur, Lugbara, Kakwa, Jie, Madi. For the traditional geographical location of ethnic groups in Uganda, see Appendix C.

[241] Andrew Mwenda, "National cake: who eats the chunk, who picks the crumbs?" *The Independent*, 8 February 2008, quoted in International Crisis Group, "Northern Uganda: The Road to Peace, with or without Kony," Africa Report N°146, December 10, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/uganda/Northern%20Uganda%20The%20Road%20to%20Peace%20with%20or%20without%20Kony.ashx.

[242] Andrew Mwenda, "The beast of tribalism," *The Independent*, January 25, 2008, quoted in International Crisis Group.

education has helped perpetuate the marginalization of ethnic groups like the Karimojong in government policy.

All the MPs have developed their identifications as Ugandan nationals and can appreciate the collective interests of Uganda as a whole. History education played an important role in their identity formation: they have gained the foundation for their own national identities while studying national and regional History in primary and secondary school. The saliency of national Ugandan identity relative to their ethnic identity is reflected in their voting behavior. According to Kauzya, a Ugandan expert on managing ethnic diversity in Parliament, MPs do not vote along ethnic lines but along party lines.[243] The parties are also not formed along ethnic lines. Although some political parties may be more popular with some ethnic groups over others, none of them are formed on a platform advocating for the interests of a specific ethnic group. Kauzya reasons that although there are around 48 ethnic groups in Uganda, there are 112 districts, each of which is represented by an MP, so the districts are not drawn clearly along ethnic lines. This political structure obstructs MPs from voting to benefit their ethnic group. Even MPs of the same ethnicity who belong to different parties often vote against each other.

Moreover, along with favoring school-educated over traditionally-educated individuals, the 1995 Ugandan Constitution minimizes the role of the ethnic socio-political organizations, such as the Buganda kingdom, in national politics. Traditional leaders within these organizations cannot become members of Parliament (see section 80.2.c.).[244] Thus, they are effectively removed from the political system, except as ordinary citizens and voters, even if their sociopolitical organizations are allowed to continue to exist.

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[243] Kauzya.
[244] *Constitution of Uganda, 1995*.

Changing Perceptions about Ethnicity

The rise of national consciousness has not only affected the highly educated politicians at the national level but also ordinary citizens throughout Uganda who have gained exposure to the idea of the Ugandan nation through schooling. Although ethnicity remains highly salient among the general population, people now additionally engage in political behavior that is guided by national identity.[245] Even if they act on behalf of their ethnic group and supposedly pursue the interests of their ethnic group, people recognize that they must operate within a national framework. National and regional identity has been added in addition to ethnic identity to people's self-conception. As the importance of national identity is enhanced through various circumstances, citizens adopt nationalist rhetoric and operate within national rules. The discourse of dissident groups such as the Lord's Resistance Army has centered on gaining control of the national apparatus as opposed to seceding to create a new nation. Even though people of Acholi ethnicity make up most of its leadership, the LRA fought to take control of the Ugandan government and have actually wreaked the most pain and destruction on the Acholi people.

Cultivating East African identity through the teaching of East African History in schools has nurtured peaceful international relations and increased regional cooperation with members of the East African Community (EAC). As discussed in Chapter One, the saliency of national identity also influences the way that people decide to behave toward nonnationals. The strong ties between Ugandan and East African identity facilitate the adoption of East African identity by the people of Uganda. Although Rwandan and Burundian History is not yet taught in schools, the National Curriculum Development Centre endeavors to include them into the SST curriculum. Many of the Ugandan interviewees expressed their identification with the rest of East Africa

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[245] Based upon the author's interviews with several different Ugandans of different ethnicities, almost all of them replied that their ethnic identity was more important to them than national identity while they were in Uganda.

despite Uganda's geographical location in the heart of Africa. But these developments mask Uganda's hostile relations with neighboring countries excluded from the EAC (see Appendix B for a map of the EAC and its neighboring states). Uganda's predominantly rural population is generally not well aware of their government's foreign policy decisions and place a greater priority on domestic issues in their voting decisions. For example, in a survey taken in 2010, none of the respondents stated that international war was one of the most important problems facing the country in the 2011 elections.[246] However, like any other country, Uganda struggles with many foreign affairs issues. Uganda has 5000 troops deployed in Somalia, and in 2010, its capital was bombed allegedly by the Al Shabab terrorist group based in Somalia.[247] Uganda and Sudan had also fought proxy wars against each other by supporting rebellions within the other's territory and in the Democratic Republic of Congo.[248] Largely ignoring neighboring Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda's SST curriculum teaches students to see Uganda as a part of East Africa, not Central Africa. What is left out of the curriculum is also left out of the formation of collective identity. A History teaching only going as far as the end of colonization leaves students in the dark about the importance of international relations to Uganda's history as an independent state.

With rising national consciousness and school enrollment rates, catering to ethnic interests is becoming less acceptable to the general Ugandan population. This shift in perspective is reflected in their responses to recent Afrobarometer surveys about elections.[249] 68 percent of Ugandans polled in 2011 said that the ethnicity of the leader of a political party mattered "a little

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[246] Afrobarometer, "Summary of Results: Round 4.5 (2) Afrobarometer Pre-election survey in Uganda 2011," http://www.afrobarometer.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=774, 33.

[247] Matthew Stein, "Somali war claims more Ugandan lives," *The Independent*, March 14, 2011.

[248] Gérard Prunier, "Rebel movements and proxy warfare: Uganda, Sudan and the Congo (1986–99)," *African Affairs* 103, no. 402 (2004): 359-383.

[249] For more details about these surveys, please visit afrobarometer.org. The Afrobarometer is an independent, non-partisan research instrument that measures the social, political and economic atmosphere in Africa.

or not at all" in their support for a party.[250] 46 percent claimed that the leadership skills of a presidential candidate were the most important factor in their vote while only 2 percent responded that the candidate's ethnic origin was the most important quality.[251] They responded in similar proportions in regards to their decisions about candidates for Members of Parliament.[252] Furthermore, when asked to choose between identifying as Ugandan or by ethnicity, 57 percent responded that they feel equally Ugandan and their ethnicity.[253] National identity has not submerged ethnic identity but rather, added itself to each individual's realm of possible identities. These trends indicate the relative lack of political saliency of ethnicity among the general population when it comes to votes. J. C. Ssekamwa, an expert on the history of education in Uganda, claims that nationalized education has helped raise national consciousness, which has led to better relations among ethnic groups in Uganda.[254] In comparison to the brutal conflict and terror of the Obote and Amin years, Uganda has experienced a relatively peaceful coexistence of different ethnic groups, especially after the departure of the LRA from northern Uganda. Framing their past in terms of the nation and region in the History curriculum has contributed to the development of a sense of national unity.

It is important to emphasize that nationalized education is but one factor, albeit a very powerful one, in the nation-building process of Uganda. While the government expanded nationalized education, technological innovations have increased contact and communications among people of different ethnicities. People of different ethnic groups are more aware of each other than they have ever been. The construction of infrastructure links distant regions together, and the introduction of new, inexpensive technology such as cell phones facilitate

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[250] Afrobarometer, "Round 4.5 (2)," 71.
[251] Ibid., 80.
[252] Ibid.
[253] Ibid., 84.
[254] Ssekamwa, telephone interview.

communication among people of different ethnic groups throughout the country. These trends have raised awareness about occurrences in other parts of the country and enabled more exposure to nationally framed issues. Greater rural-to-urban migration has increased the ethnic diversity of urban areas, and migrants from other regions learn to communicate to each other through commonly spoken languages. Newspapers and radio programs communicate news about national-level politics and disseminate government rhetoric for national economic development. Religious institutions also support the idea of national identity. For example, the Anglicans in Uganda are organized under the Church of Uganda, not the Church of Buganda or any other specific ethnic group. Although 65 percent of Ugandans have regular access to information from the radio, education remains an especially influential agent in transmitting the idea of the nation.[255] Virtually all of the current primary school-aged population attend some school, while many do not have access to information from television[256] or newspapers[257] and have never traveled to the capital city.

Improving and expanding nationalized education remains among the most important priorities for Ugandans. The largest portion of the respondents to the 2010 Afrobarometer survey answered that education was the most important issue in the 2011 elections.[258] Ugandans also recognize that education greatly impacts their access to political and economic power. This case study of Uganda has shed light on the theoretical concepts developed in the first two chapters about the relationship between History education, identity, and behavior. Even though political scientists tend to characterize sub-Saharan African politics as "tribal," the Ugandan case study demonstrates that this is not necessarily the case. A quiet revolution in identity is occurring as

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[255] Afrobarometer, "Round 4.5 (2)," 8. 13 percent of Ugandans have never gotten news from radio.
[256] Ibid. 71 percent of Ugandans have never gotten news from television.
[257] Ibid. 60 percent of Ugandans have never gotten news from newspapers.
[258] Ibid., 33.

nationalized education systems provide the foundations for raising consciousness about a national and regional identity through History teaching. Nationalized education, promoting national and regional identity defined by the state, has significantly shifted the way that people perceive themselves and the way that people behave towards each other in Uganda.

CONCLUSION: EDUCATING FOR THE FUTURE

States promote national integration through the provision and support of nationalized education. Teaching a national History provides a foundation for the development of national identity and reduces the saliency of ethnic identity fostered by local forms of education. Changes in identity lead to shifts in behavior. As schools homogenize people's identities to join under the banner of the nation, unity deepens within the nation while division widens between nations.

The history of History education in Uganda demonstrates how ethnic communities, foreign missionaries, the colonial regime, and the independent Ugandan government deliberately manipulated education and the History curricula in order to promote and shape identity tied to different social groups. With the rise of nationalized education, traditional education has lost its influence. As a result, indigenous culture and oral history have slowly eroded. Ethnic identity has also experienced a similar decline. Scholars often focus on the "tribal" nature of African politics, but the Uganda case study shows that this is a mischaracterization: with the expansion of nationalized History education, more Ugandans have developed national identities and gradually perceive each other as members of the same national community with strong ties to the greater regional East African and African community.

Filling holes: Where this belongs in existing literature

This analysis of education in Uganda is one of a few case studies of History education in sub-Saharan Africa. However, it is one of many on History education throughout the world. Within this topic area, many scholars have examined the politics of History curriculum building in specific countries.[259] Although those who study these phenomena implicitly assume that

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[259] Edward Vickers and Alisa Jones, eds., *History Education and National Identity in East Asia* (New York: Routledge, 2005).; Elizabeth A. Cole, ed., *Teaching the Violent Past* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).; Linda Symcox, *Whose History?: The Struggle for National Standards in American Classrooms* (New York:

teaching any version of History has important societal ramifications, few have evaluated the effect of teaching History upon the identity and political behavior of individuals. Furthermore, a clear theory has not been developed to explain why History education makes an impact upon identity and behavior. This thesis attempts to fill this theoretical and empirical gap: it has developed a theory to explain the process of how History education impacts identity and how identity guides political behavior, and it has presented a case study of a country in sub-Saharan Africa – a region that has received significant amounts of aid for education but comparatively less scrutiny on the content of their school History curricula.

Some research has been done on the role of nationalized education on national identity formation in Africa, but this literature focuses on language policies and scarcely expands on the impact of the History curriculum on identity. This case study also fits into the literature on nation-building. Like other postcolonial societies, Ugandan national identity was fabricated by the British instead of forged from within. This distinction makes nation-building in places like Uganda very different from the experiences of other countries such as France. Nevertheless, this study has found that education plays an important role in these very different contexts. Even though conditional factors vary across countries, Uganda's example can inform analyses of other postcolonial experiences in education. Like Uganda, other sub-Saharan African states also face challenges of significant regional disparities in access to education.[260] Scholars should undertake more case studies of History education in sub-Saharan Africa to deepen their understanding of these powerful trends in identity.

Teacher's College Press, 2002).; Yoshiko Nozaki, Roger Openshaw, and Allan Luke, eds., *Struggles over Difference: Curriculum, Texts, and Pedagogy in the Asia-Pacific* (Albany, NY: State University of NY Press, 2005).
[260] Joel D. Sherman, "Regional disparities in primary school participation in developing countries," UNESCO IBE, 12 March 2009, http://www.springerlink.com/content/l33015w385581345/fulltext.pdf.

Leaving some gaps: Limitations of study

Although it makes unique contributions, this paper has several limitations and gaps. On the whole, it is wanting of more empirical evidence. Specifically, there needs to be more statistical information collected on shifts in identity before and after students begin schooling. The logistics of conducting research on Uganda from the United States created obstacles to gathering survey information from primary school students in Uganda. An analysis of the content presented in the History textbooks promoted by the Ministry of Education and Sports would have also helped to bolster this paper's empirical evidence. Furthermore, because of the complexity of determining causal relationships in general, the thesis did not measure the importance of History education in relation to other socializing agents that affect identity. The shift in the political behavior of Ugandans as a result of the addition of national identity was also loosely described. Once again, behavior cannot be explained by a single factor, and since identity is conditional, it is difficult to make definitive claims about changes in political behavior. More field research in Uganda can address many of these limitations.

Questions for future research

This study raises questions for future research that are applicable to all countries. First, how do the instructional methods used in teaching History affect identity? This thesis briefly mentioned that the vast majority of schools in Uganda employ teaching methods used by Christian missionaries in the colonial period, but it is not clear how a change in teaching methods affects the identities and the understanding of historical information by students. One of the interviewees had explained that she did not internalize school knowledge as well as the traditional knowledge passed down from her elders during the fireside stories. Furthermore, research can determine whether the way History is presented to the students influences the nature

of their identity. For instance, does History presented as hard facts versus History presented as interpretations of the past affect the nature of an identity? Does an enquiry-based approach to History education encourage students to develop less rigid conceptions of national identity?

Second, what is the impact of History education on other salient subnational identities other than ethnic identity? For instance, how does teaching the national narrative influence religious and gender identities? Research focused on these other identities will shed light upon how changes in behavior between religious groups and different genders occur when people are taught History from a religious slant or gender-biased perspective.

Third, this case study raises many questions about the influence of people's perceptions of reality. Despite the constructed and temporary nature of ethnic, national, and regional identity, why do these identities remain highly salient to most people across the globe? The study of History education clearly shows how things that may have been imagined become real because of the power of people's beliefs.

Education, broadly speaking, is inherent through any human communication. Although contemporary literature tends to concentrate on its role in economic growth, education inevitably produces different impacts by reaching deep into populations and transforming the way that people think, something that the most powerful weapons in the world cannot do. Because of its profoundly significant effects upon the minds and identities of people, there should be more critical analysis of education in general.

Implications of study: Educating the future

The findings of this thesis have some important policy implications. First, the nation-building or nation-dividing effects of the expansion of nationalized education have implications for international aid for education. Education For All and the UN Millennium Development

Goals affirm the international commitment to expanding access to education. History curricula have not passed under much scrutiny. If, as this thesis suggests, education has a considerable impact upon national identity formation, how does this fit in with international donors' objectives? If the rise of national consciousness within countries is not part of their aims, the international community must reevaluate their reasons for supporting state-sponsored education in low-income countries.

Second, the Ugandan government must seriously take into consideration the relationship between History teaching and identity while revising their History curriculum. It can investigate how other states have developed inclusive national narratives. Education has been used in many countries to heal the wounds of violent conflict. For post-conflict nations such as Uganda, it is important to understand how previously antagonistic groups can create a national narrative together in order to promote unity. Since past injustices are used as fuel for conflict, the History curriculum is an especially important component of the reconciliation process. In 2006, Rwanda lifted a post-genocide ban on teaching History and has engaged in the process of developing a new collective memory including the voices of both genocide victims and perpetrators.[261]

Uganda's History curricula do not cover its conflict-ridden post-independence history in depth. Although studying the recent past can evoke painful memories, it is important for Ugandan students to understand the experiences of people throughout the nation in order to learn how to move beyond their horrific collective past. The National Curriculum Development Centre should collect the oral histories of ethnic groups throughout the country in order to develop a multi-faceted national History. Indigenous voices and the perspectives of marginalized groups such as the Karimojong must be added to the official historical knowledge taught in schools in

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[261] Sarah W. Freedman, Harvey M. Weinstein, Karen Murphy, and Timothy Longman, "Teaching History after Identity-Based Conflicts: The Rwandan Experience," *Comparative Education Review* 52, no. 4 (2008): 663-690.

order to foster greater mutual understanding among students of different ethnicities. The Ugandan government should also consider incorporating elements of traditional education into teacher's teaching methods. The instructional methods of traditional education can offer more democratic means of teaching History because of its lack of centralization and uniformity.

Third, all countries can learn from the Ugandan case because virtually all – with the exception of the United States, which has a decentralized education system – have nationally-directed education systems. The theoretical explorations of this thesis highlight the constructed nature of ethnic, national, and regional identity and the processes that created each of these identities. Ultimately, all human beings are citizens of the world, so designating the state as the generator of the national narrative and privileging the national narrative over other interpretations of the past are not fitting for building a future of global peaceful international relations. The development of national identity has helped forge unity among nationals, but it also has pitted people against each other at the global level. Education for global citizenship is increasingly being discussed in the field of education and should be considered as a preferable alternative for the future of the human family. A shift to human-centered education from nation-centered education, however, does not mean ignoring local identity and local frames of understanding. Japanese educator and philosopher Tsunesaburo Makiguchi describes the community as the site of learning to understand global citizenship: "The community, in short, is the world in miniature. If we encourage children to observe directly the complex relations between people and the land, between nature and society, they will grasp the realities of their homes, their school, the town, village or city, and will be able to understand the wider world."[262]

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[262] Takehisa Tsuji, ed., *An Anthology of Tsunesaburo Makiguchi's Works* (in Japanese) (Tokyo: Daisan Bunmeisha, 1994), 40.

Students can study local, national, regional, and international History to develop their understanding of the global community at different levels.

People can thus maintain their ties to local communities while appreciating their membership in a global community and understanding the perspectives of others. Global citizenship education also entails a global narrative of the human past. As more young people in sub-Saharan Africa attend higher levels of schooling, the lions, or those who had been previously silenced at the international level, are learning how to speak and to tell their stories to the global community. These trends will also have important implications in changing the way that people in wealthy countries view formerly colonized countries such as Uganda. The hunter can no longer bask in his glory when the lion learns to speak like the hunter. But the lion can also teach the hunter to understand the language of the lions and to interpret the past from their viewpoint. The youth of sub-Saharan Africa will rewrite the History curricula of their countries and help reclaim African voice at the world stage to assist the human community in developing an inclusive narrative of human history.

Appendix A: Education For All Goals

Source: UNESCO, "Education for all,"

http://www.unesco.org/new/en/education/themes/leading-the-international-agenda/education-for-all/efa-goals/.

Goal 1: Expanding and improving comprehensive early childhood care and education, especially for the most vulnerable and disadvantaged children.

Goal 2: Ensuring that by 2015 all children, particularly girls, children in difficult circumstances and those belonging to ethnic minorities, have access to, and complete, free and compulsory primary education of good quality.

Goal 3: Ensuring that the learning needs of all young people and adults are met through equitable access to appropriate learning and life-skills programmes.

Goal 4: Achieving a 50 per cent improvement in levels of adult literacy by 2015, especially for women, and equitable access to basic and continuing education for all adults.

Goal 5: Eliminating gender disparities in primary and secondary education by 2005, and achieving gender equality in education by 2015, with a focus on ensuring girls' full and equal access to and achievement in basic education of good quality.

Goal 6: Improving all aspects of the quality of education and ensuring excellence of all so that recognized and measurable learning outcomes are achieved by all, especially in literacy, numeracy and essential life skills.

Appendix B: Map of East African Community

Source: "An East African Federation: Big ambitions, big question-marks," *The Economist*,

September 3, 2009, http://www.economist.com/node/14376512?story_id=E1_TQPSGVTN.

Appendix C: Map of Uganda with Major Ethnic Groups

Source: Reliefweb, "Ethnographic Uganda," http://reliefweb.int/node/19286.

Appendix D: Curricular Objectives for Social Studies and History Education in Uganda

I. Objectives for Social Studies - Primary 4 to 7 (Source: SST Curriculum Specialist)

1. To help learners to understand forces that have shaped their society.

2. To understand the social and physical environment factors that shape the world in which pupils live.

3. To foster an awareness of the cultural and physical rich heritage of their country and region.

4. To develop an appreciation of the different cultural identities of the people of Uganda.

5. To develop an understanding of the relationships among institutions in their complex society.

6. To develop an understanding of the relationship among the people, natural resources and the quality of life of people lead.

7. To develop awareness of injustices and hypocrisies in society and the necessary safeguards to resist them.

8. To understand and appreciate the rule of law.

9. To develop ability to read and interpret sources of information: from textbooks, charts, tables, and graphic materials.

10. To develop skills of forming generations and hypothesis from collected data.

II. Objectives of History - Senior 1 to 4 (Source: History Curriculum Specialist)

1. To promote understanding and appreciation of the value of national Unity, patriotism and cultural heritage in East Africa and Africa in general.

2. To help learners develop the ability to weigh information and make judgments on historical events.

3. To help learners develop and practice skills of gathering information and express historical ideas in a coherent and logical manner.

4. To broaden the learners understanding of the social, political and economic developments in different regions of Africa.

5. To promote scientific, technical, cultural knowledge, skills and attitudes needed to promote development in Uganda.

6. To inculcate a sense of service, duty and leadership for participation in civic, social and national affairs through group activities in Educational institutions and the community.

7. To instill moral, ethical and spiritual values in the individual to develop self discipline, integrity, tolerance and sense of leadership.

8. To eradicate illiteracy and to equip the individual with basic skills and knowledge of history to exploit the environment for development.

9. To contribute to the building of an integrated, self-sustaining and independent national economy.

10. To lay a foundation for further studies.

III. Objectives of History education - Senior 5 to 6 (Source: History Curriculum Specialist)

1. To broaden the learners understanding of the political, social and economic development of African history from the earliest times to present.

2. To stimulate thought and discussion by use of historical case studies.

3. To help students develop ability to relate historical events to the present situation.

4. To prepare learners for career professional growth as lawyers, teachers, community development officers etc.

5. To prepare learners for further studies as undergraduate students, diploma courses among others.

6. To impart and promote a sense of self-discipline, ethical and spiritual values, personal responsibility and initiatives.

7. To encourage historical research and use of a wide variety of source of historical materials.

8. To enable the individual to acquire and develop knowledge and understanding of emerging needs of social and the economy of the world.

9. To instill and promote the national unity and an understanding of social and civic responsibilities.

10. To understand and appreciate the cultural heritage of Uganda and rest of the world.

Appendix E: Syllabi for Social Studies (Primary 4 to Primary 7)

Source: P4 SST Teacher, telephone interview with author, March 18, 2011.

I. Primary 4 - District

1st term: 1) geography of district 2) physical features in district

2nd term: 1) vegetation of district 2) people of district

3rd term: 1) leadership in district (different positions in local government) 2) how to meet people's needs in the district

II. Primary 5 - Uganda

1st term: 1) location of Uganda 2) physical features of Uganda 3) climate of Uganda 4) vegetation of Uganda

2nd term: 1) people of precolonial Uganda 2) foreign influence in Uganda 3) how Uganda became a nation (before independence)

3rd term: 1) the road to independence 2) Uganda as an independent country 3) government of Uganda 4) people, tribes, and distribution, and their relationship to economy, planning, and development

III. Primary 6 – East Africa

1st term: 1) location and physical features of East Africa (Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania) 2) vegetation 3) climate of East Africa

2nd term: 1) people of East Africa 2) population change and distribution in E. Africa 3) foreign influence in East Africa

3rd term: 1) establishment of colonial rule in East Africa 2) development of social services in East Africa

IV. Primary 7 - Africa

1st term: 1) location and physical features of Africa 2) natural vegetation of Africa 3) climate of

Africa

2nd term: 1) people of Africa 2) foreign influence on African continent 3) post-independence

Africa

3rd term: 1) neocolonialism 2) African economic development (mining, agriculture)

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