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Last Words on Inequality and Overdotting: a Review of Stephen Hefling's Book

David Fuller

Stephen Hefling has written the book that I used to think I would write. He has done it well, and neither I nor anyone else need write another. This is not to say that the subject itself is exhausted—it can never be, since we can never really know the answers to the basic questions addressed; but the author's method, which can best be characterized as scriptural exegesis, has itself been pursued to exhaustion in thirty years of passionate argument, and failing the discovery of new scriptures, any more argument would be futile. I say this with the knowledge that indeed more has just appeared, more is yet to appear, and still more would have appeared but for the death of Frederick Neumann last March: his long and contentious review of Hefling's book in the spring issue of Historical Performance has elicited a response by Hefling to be published in the fall, and that response, which was seen by Mr. Neumann in manuscript, so exercised him that in his very last weeks he felt driven to answer it with further argument.

Perhaps this is the place to pay tribute to Frederick Neumann, who is present everywhere in Mr. Hefling's book. No more striking symbol of the debt that all of us who have written on this subject owe to his work could be imagined than the presence (as Hefling's Table One) of a list of source material that Neumann had assembled nearly thirty years ago. Since then, his fierce at-

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tacks on what has come to be known (with capital letters) as “Early Music” have aroused its many defenders to paroxysms of research, in the course of which every conceivable clue has been unearthed and subjected to minute analysis, and our knowledge of old rhythmic practices expanded seemingly to the limits of possibility.

As the subtitle says, Rhythmic Alteration is about notes inégaux and overdotting; other liberties—rubato, agogic nuance, retards, and (notably) the resolution of binary-ternary conflicts—are not addressed. “Alteration” means the departures from written rhythms that are introduced in the performance of music: here, the rendition of equal values as alternate longs and shorts and the exaggeration of the three-to-one contrast of written dotting. Both of these practices are assumed (by many) to have been widespread in baroque and pre-classic music and to have conformed to some commonly understood code whose key is to be found chiefly in the writings of theorists and composers.

The word “alteration” identifies and defines a view of the subject held by nearly everyone who has written about it, including the theorists of the periods when these practices were alive. According to this view, the problem lies (as François Couperin said in 1717) in the disparity between what is written down and what is meant to be heard: the scribe writes even notes and the performer renders them as uneven; the scribe writes a dotted figure and the performer lengthens the dotted note and shortens the one that follows. Research in this field (including Hefling’s) is entirely directed toward determining how performers of the past interpreted written music. The very concept of “rhythmic alteration,” therefore, is indissolubly linked with notation, and this notation is by definition to be rendered differently from its literal meaning (otherwise there would be no “alteration”).

But music, and the rhythm of music, is not indissolubly linked to notation: it leads a quite independent existence in a different realm—a realm of sound, not sight; many of its effects cannot be written down at all, and it can be (and probably is, more often than not in the total human experience) improvised, or even “composed,” without writing of any kind. Thus, to study “rhythmic alteration” turns the problem on its head: instead of concerning ourselves first with how a certain rhythmic style might have sounded (which is, in the end, what we really care about), and then with how it might have been notated by musicians of varying abilities with different (usually unknown) readers in mind, we begin with the notation, as if this were a stable base, and work backwards to rules for altering its literal meaning in performance.
The trouble is that notation was neither stable nor a reliable point of departure, but a crude means by which musicians who were not philosophers, who were sometimes barely literate, and for whom time and space were precious, tried to write down the subtle rhythmic effects that they sang or played, or wanted to hear sung or played by others. Clearly large numbers of them took a similar approach, otherwise there would have been no theory. But it is equally clear that some tried to notate their rhythms more precisely; I see much more notated inequality in the written dotted rhythms both in, and especially outside of France, than Hefling does. Sometimes composers did not want equal notes made unequal, even when the rules permitted it (or required it—the distinction is another problem). Unfortunately, although there were ways of directing that written rhythms were not to be altered, few composers took the trouble to use them, and those only sporadically.

The result is that although the theorists tried their best to invent rules by which performers with a score in front of them might arrive at the rhythmic effects intended by the composers, the chance that any score conformed to all the rules was slim. I have read virtually everything that exists on *notes inégales*, but I cannot think of a piece (outside of the awful works of Nicolas Gigault, who seems to have written out his inequality in full) in which I was sure how every passage was meant to be played. The situation is far worse for overdotting, since there was never any articulated theory. The modern player can take comfort, however, in the fact that the baroque musician could not be sure either. The best we can hope for (and it is, after all, a lot) is a performance that would be recognized as at least stylish by an early audience, even if not totally authentic.

The job that Hefling has done had to be done; we should never know anything if we did not read the treatises. But perhaps someone in the future, through some transcendent exercise of a profoundly instructed imagination, will write the book that Hefling did not, beginning with a description of the rhythms, then examining the attempts to write them down, and finishing with the attempts of theorists to describe the conventions of the resulting notation. Meanwhile, it is the imagination of the instructed musicians of today that is most likely to bring the early rhythms to life as they once were. Hefling is such a musician, and his musicianship combined with his thorough knowledge of theory must give him as good an understanding as anyone could have of *notes inégales* and overdotting. But his book is about theory, and it is as a survey of theoretical writings that it must be judged.

The breadth of reading that underlies this study is impressive; between one and two hundred treatises and other writings have been combed for mentions of inequality and overdotting. There may well be things the author has
not seen, but they would be unlikely to change his conclusions; certainly the few sources I know that are not listed would have added little. The quotations from early writings are often long enough to build up a context and convey a point of view, and so far as my checks indicate, they are very carefully transcribed, including peculiarities of spelling, capitalization, punctuation, and even errors (but not the error in gender imputed to Duval on p. 23). This literalness has a pedantic (and strangely American) effect, but one has only to try working out a consistent scheme of modernization to realize how misleading that could be—to say nothing of how irritating to the reader who wants to know what the source really said. Immediately following each passage is an English translation. It was a courageous decision to keep both original and translation together in the main text instead of relegating one or the other to notes. (In the notes themselves the same scheme is followed.) Thus at every point the reader is invited to test the author's understanding of his source material. I shall have a good deal to say about these translations later on, but with a few exceptions they are clear and reliable.

The book is organized in two main sections of about 60 pages on inequality and 80 on overdotting, each divided into three chapters. The first chapter on inequality surveys early sources of any nationality, then outlines the usual French rules as found between about 1690 and 1790. Chapter 2 deals with exceptions, disagreements between the sources, and other matters, and the third chapter with the sensitive question of inequality outside of France (sensitive because the notion has been so relentlessly attacked by Neumann, starting with his 1965 article and continuing to his review of the present book, which carries the sarcastic title, "Notes inégales for Bach, Overdotting for Everybody?"). Except for the early ones, no attempt has been made to present the citations chronologically (though dates are always given), nor, in general, is evolution in practice (if any) traced over the years. (It is hard to believe that fashions of performance did not change over the 125 years of so with which the book is chiefly concerned; I like to quote the observation in 1775 by Engramelle that the performing style of his day would "disgust" Lully, Corelli, Couperin, and Rameau.)

The first chapter on overdotting discusses French sources and the relation of overdotting to inequality, the second, "early" (that is to say, mid-eighteenth-century) German sources, and the third, later German ones and the "Handel tradition." Here, there is some feeling of chronology, since French inequality had entailed overdotting from the beginning (and in any case, the French occasionally wrote double dots in the seventeenth century), while the German practice is documented from the 1750s on. Chapter 7, the last, dis-
cusses music examples but presents only one theoretical passage (from Mattheson’s *Kern melodischer Wissenschaft*).

The interpretations that the author places upon his sources and the inferences he draws from them are, of course, the core and *raison-d’être* of his book, and at this point the general question must be asked whether these interpretations and inferences are even-handed or biased. Frederick Neumann’s assessment was unequivocal: Hefling “seems to have aimed principally at restoring Dolmetsch’s doctrines of Bachian *notes inégales* and of the ‘style’ (i.e., the overdotted French overture style) to their full former stature,” and a footnote adds, “Though Hefling hardly mentions Dolmetsch, he is, after nearly a century, the older man’s unquestioned disciple and spiritual heir.” Thus Hefling’s primary motive was not to discover historical truth, whatever it might turn out to be, but to use the mechanisms of scholarship to advance a particular point of view. This is a harsh accusation (against a musicologist, though not against a litigation lawyer), but it is an accusation that I have leveled at Neumann himself, on the evidence, indeed, of his own declarations.

Hefling himself defines his purpose as the provision of “an accurate and dispassionate account of what is known” about his subject, without pressing the viewpoints of the “right” (Neumann’s position, which would severely restrict both inequality and overdotting) or “left” (the more the better). Needless to say, I regard my own judgment of these matters as perfectly balanced and true; and from this Olympian position I would venture to place Hefling slightly to the right of center on inequality in France, and slightly to the left on inequality outside of France and on overdotting. I detect in his arguments a considerable sympathy for the idea of rhythmic alteration, but this sympathy is not to be compared quantitatively with Neumann’s implacable hostility.

What I do not detect in Hefling is any attempt to slant the source material, that is, to select only what supports a particular interpretation and to suppress or discredit what does not. This is in spectacular contrast to Neumann’s writings on these and other controversial subjects, and indeed to most others, including Donington’s (but always excepting my own, of course!).

A more delicate matter is what might be called “talking oneself into a conviction”—which conviction then appears to the reader as a conclusion from the evidence. Neumann is less kind to Hefling: he accuses him of *Erschleichung*. The word connotes something surreptitious or underhanded, and means slipping a desired (but unwarranted) interpretation into an argu-
ment, then treating it as proved and erecting further argument on it. Although I would not join in this accusation, it does seem to me that Hefling allows himself to be convinced of certain matters, seemingly by the sheer quantity of words he devotes to them.

The prime example of this is his elaborate development, mainly out of Quantz (and after Reilly, Quantz’s translator), of a Dresden performing tradition involving, among other things, Frenchified notes inégales, which he then extends to Berlin (pp. 47-48) and treats as if it were fact (“Thus, the Dresden ‘mixed’ manner of composition and performance became the official style in Berlin, and remained so throughout Frederick’s reign”) instead of taking care always to identify it as the hypothetical inference that it is. The principal basis seems to be Quantz’s stated preference for a “mixed” Franco-Italian style as taught him by Pisendel, combined with Quantz’s rules for inequality, which are unattributed.

Hefling evidently felt that Quantz’s presentation of inequality as a means of bringing out the distinction between metrically strong and weak notes, a distinction long established in German (as well as Italian and French) theory, but not normally connected with notes inégales by the French, weakened his thesis that Quantz was talking about true notes inégales, and he characterized this connection as “confusion” (p. 44). But perhaps Quantz wasn’t confused after all (normally he was the most lucid of writers); perhaps the resemblance of his rules to French ones is more apparent than real. Hefling may well be correct in his conviction that inequality as described by Quantz was practiced in Dresden (with all that that implies for Bach’s acquaintance with it) and Berlin, but he does not take care to point out that it is only a conviction, not a provable fact.

It is in the matter of evaluation of the French sources that Hefling falls short of what is ultimately needed, though I would not have wished on him the long delay and enormous expansion of his book that a full treatment would have occasioned. The subject really demands a doctoral dissertation. First of all, we need to know something about the authors. Five weeks before his death, Neumann wrote me to ask what I knew about Morel de Lescer, author of a particularly informative and well-written Science de la musique vocale of around 1760, which he had never seen. He was answering some point in Heffling’s response to his review that evidently rested upon Morel, and assumed—or rather hoped—that it was an obscure manuscript by someone of no importance that could be dismissed as support for Heffling’s point (which he did not specify to me).
Although I was familiar with the treatise and had copies of the relevant portions, I knew nothing about its author. I immediately telephoned the Baroque Music Center at Versailles (Neumann knew he had very little time), who were able to tell me only what the author said of himself in his treatise, which was, of course, printed, and figures in *RISM*. Morel turned out to have been a *maître de musique* (of some substance, apparently, since he claimed the rank of esquire, the bottom rung of the nobility) in the northeast of France, though he had also taught for some time in Toulouse (and therefore could not have been especially young when his book was printed). He lived in Charleville, in the Ardennes, and his book was to be had in Brussels, Liège, and Rheims, as well as Charleville and Paris. What especially piqued my interest was the possibility that some trace of an Italian cultural influence might have subsisted in Charleville, since it had been founded in 1607 by Charles Gonzaga, the embattled future duke of Mantua; in any case, Morel based his book on Italian as well as French authors, "both ancient and modern." I did not have to tell Neumann where Charleville was, since he had been stationed there as an American soldier during the war! He saw to his disappointment, however, that though Morel may have been only a provincial music master, he was not to be dismissed out of hand.

I recount all this to suggest why we need to know as much as possible about the authors of these treatises, and how difficult it can be to find out anything. (Hefling gives less information about Morel than he could easily have done, since both his notes and bibliography abbreviate the title and leave us to assume that he was a Parisian.) To do the job properly, one would have no choice but to carry out a full biographical investigation of each author, with all that that implies for travel and archival research. What were the influences on him? From what point of view was he writing? How competent was he? *How representative of the common practice of his time and place?* Who would have listened to him?

Much can be learned from the books themselves, of course, even apart from biographical data that the author might have included. For whom was it written? For children (as many books were)? For teachers? For connoisseurs? And how intelligently was it written?

It is especially important that plagiarism and recycling of out-of-date material should be spotted. For example, a certain Cleret fils, pupil of Grétry and author of a very large and very interesting manuscript treatise (cited only briefly by Hefling, though it contains the only explicit theoretical mention that I know of that duple-meter gigues could be rendered in triple meter) borrows without acknowledgment from L’Affilard, François Couperin, and Saint-Lambert, all of whom were positively ancient authorities in 1786,
when the treatise was written. How much of the rest was plagiarized? The writer of a treatise of 1733 with the charming name of Vague borrowed some, but not all, of his descriptions of musical genres from Corneille's dictionary of 1694. Vion (or Vyon; 1742 and 1744) used L'Affilard and Hotteterre. Even so brilliant a writer as Jean-Jacques Rousseau (cited extensively by Hefling) did not know that the rules for harpsichord playing that he ascribed to Duphly actually came from Rameau (Dictionnaire, art. "Doigter").

In one illuminating case, an author listed the authorities with whom he consulted in the preparation of his treatise (1737). The writer was François David, pupil of the important theorist and composer Bernier, and the list of his consultants is impressive enough to lend unusual weight to his pronouncements (cited only briefly by Hefling): Campra, Clérambault, Dornel, Rameau, Bertin, Niel, Campion, Forqueray, Grenet, and Daquin! Corrette wrote many performance manuals over more that forty years, in which he sometimes repeated himself and sometimes changed his mind (just when he changed his mind about inequality in Italian music is an interesting question whose answer would depend on a reliable date for his flute treatise); Hefling cites the discrepancies—indeed, accuses him of inconsistency—but does not attempt to explain them or propose a chronology. It would also have been useful to point out in connection with Corrette's recommendation of inequality in certain English popular songs (p. 40) that he had himself been in England (incidentally, it's "Hung the Squirrel," not the "Sanerel").

These examples are but a tiny fraction of what our hypothetical dissertation writer would discover, if after doing his biographical research he then systematically compared all the treatises for content. Perhaps the most interesting thing he would learn is who originated new ideas and when they appeared; in any case, he would have a solid basis on which to evaluate and weight each pronouncement.

The authors of the German treatises are much better known, and Hefling is generous with historical and biographical detail concerning them. Although he does not explicitly compare their reliability, the information given helps the reader to do so—and perhaps to regret the lack of similar background for the French writers, who seem more like a faceless mass of voters for or against some feature of performance than like individual authorities.

Something needs to be said about the translations. In general, as I have noted, they can be depended upon for their support of the author's arguments. But they are often marked by a certain literal-mindedness and
insensitivity to language, and sometimes by outright error. When there is an English cognate, it is chosen, whether or not it renders the sense in the idiomatic English of musicians. The most irritating example of this (because it appears so often) is "point" and "pointed" (pointé) for "dot" and "dotted." The English words mean something quite different, and are never used by musicians for dotting. After all, Hefling does not say his book is about "overpointing!" Some others: "pass" instead of "execute" or "take" for passer (p. 15); "inequalize" (not English at all) instead of "make unequal" (or possibly "unequalize") for inégaliser (pp. 17, 36); "elongated" instead of "at a distance" for esloigné (p. 66; fortunately ex. 4-1 makes it clear what Titelouze means); "touch" instead of "play" for toucher (p. 165); "earnest" and "earnestly" instead of "serious(ly)" or "gravely" for ernst(haft) (passim).

In other cases the first dictionary definition seems to have been chosen rather than the one that would be used in a similar situation in idiomatic English, for example, "taste" instead of "style" for goût (p. 28 and passim); "song" instead of "melody" for chant (p. 31 and passim); "does not address" instead of "does not stress" for nicht anspricht (p. 120). There are also other kinds of minor mistranslations, such as "leaps" (which in a musical context usually means disjunct melodic motion) instead of "hopping" or "skipping" for sautillemens, "if it is not" instead of "except" for si ce n'est, "similarly it is necessary to" instead of "one must even" for mesme il faut (all p. 6); "there you see why" instead of "that is why" for voilà pourquoi (p. 16); "does not have to be applied . . . except" instead of "should only be applied" for ne doit avoir lieu que (p. 19); "minuets of character" instead of "character-minuets" (i.e., genre-pieces) for menuets de caractère (p. 20); "course" instead of "movement" for marche (p. 28); "generally speaking" instead of "without that" (i.e., without the notation Marpurg is recommending) for ohne das (p. 106; Hefling seems to have misread this whole passage; Marpurg is not objecting to the irrationality of overdotting [line 5 of the main text] but to the irrationality of inexact notation); "others of his reputation" instead of "others bearing his name" (i.e., other Bachs) for andre seines Namens (p. 114). The translations of Ausdruck, "expression," and Vortrag, "performance," are reversed in a passage from Türk (p. 123).

In line 3 on p. 23, it is not clear that vive et piquée applies to the opening section of overtures only; the other kinds of piece listed are quick and over-dotted throughout (note that in line 12, overtures and marches are grave, not vif). On p. 69, Hefling misses a standard French grammatical turn that seriously throws off his translation: faire pointer exactement aux écoliers does not mean "making plain to students exactly" but "making the students dot
exactly”; when you make someone do something in French, “someone” is an indirect object.

Worse are the frequent mistranslations of *marquer* and its derivatives. In reference to the style of the piece, e.g., *air marqué* (pp. 166f), it means not “marked” but “forceful,” “accented,” “energetic.” It is certainly not Rousseau’s term for inequality (p. 22): Rousseau is saying that when playing (not touching!) evenly, one should not emphasize (*marquer*) “une,” meaning one of every two notes, as the rest of the sentence makes clear (p. 165). And Loulié’s use of *marqué* in the instance cited (p. 22) has nothing to do with rhythm; it means “as notated.” The attempt to link *marquer* with rhythm, to which this whole confused paragraph is devoted, rests on the misapprehension that because *marque*, applied to a series of notes, can mean “separately stressed,” and some writers say that such articulation cancels inequality, the word itself can *mean* equal. It cannot, and it is not used in that sense. (Incidentally, the statement from Böün on p. 22 that in marches and overtures the eighths are always *inégales & marquées* could have borne repeating in the overdotting section, since unequal eighths create overdotted quarters, and such statements are rare, explicitly applied to overtures.)

Another misunderstanding concerns the use of *articulé* in an anonymous but extremely interesting violin method of around 1760 (pp. 23f). Again, Hefling is spooked by the cognate. In fact, the term is used in its original meaning of “jointed,” and it is clearly set up as the opposite of *détaché*. That is, in ordinary playing, “articulated” notes are more connected than detached ones: they are more or less equivalent to a modern *détaché*, with a bow-change at each note but without the bow leaving the string. For a real *détaché*, the author seems to say, one actually lifts the bow at each note (p. 27 of the source). Unfortunately for consistency, as the passage quoted on p. 23 shows, one also lifts (“detaches”) the bow on *notes articulées* that have dots, while the short notes that follow them are “joined” to the following one, very closely, apparently, but not slurred. The author then says that this way of playing (he does not say whether he is talking about the whole dotted figure or just the connection of the short note with the following one) is called *piquer*. From this, Hefling concludes that for this author, *piquer* means detached articulation (p. 24), whereas I think it has something to do with exaggeration of the dotted effect.

But this is a small part of the problem with *piquer*, to which Hefling devotes nearly five pages, including notes. It would take far too much space to review all his arguments (he does not dispute the fact that the term was used both for [over?]dotting and for staccato), but I will only point out that most, if not all, the terminological puzzles he wrestles with would have disap-
peared if he had paid closer attention to Rousseau’s definition, which he
 cites on p. 172. Rousseau distinguishes the two meanings according to whe- ther the term is used adverbially or as an adjective: as an adverb (that is to say, if placed at the head of a piece of music as a performance direction), it means strongly (I would say, over-) dotted; as an adjective—for example, in notes piquées—it means staccato. In the same passage, Hefling mistranslates marquant fortement le pointé as “strongly marking the dotted one,” instead of “strongly emphasizing the dotting.” The signal should have been the gender of pointé, which does not agree with notes. In note 26 on p. 172, Hefling disputes my interpretation of a piece by Dandrieu marked grave et piqué, but this is a typical adverbial use of the word, and so far as I am concerned, it does indeed mean sharply dotted in this case (Hefling often corrects me, and sometimes, I must admit, he is right).

In general, enthusiastic as he seems to be about inequality and overdotting in mid- and late-eighteenth-century Germany, I find Hefling more cautious than he ought to be about the French. He takes too seriously the long lists of exceptions to inequality that one can piece together from different sources, and he does not take written dotting seriously enough as a clue to the performance of undotted passages. In this connection, it is not an “idiosyncracy” that Quantz seems to ask for inequality in disjunct passages (p. 44). Hefling also tends to take time signatures too literally; occasionally the theorists themselves warn us that they are often wrong; and how do we know that this or that composer was even aware of all the “rules” invented by theorists? There is some evidence that mid-seventeenth-century inequality could be very sharp, for example in gigue-rhythms and organ duos. Hefling cites Engramelle’s maximum ratio of 3:1, but he does not explain why a style of 1775 should govern playing in 1675.

He also greatly underestimates the incidence of short-long inequality, I think. Bad as Nicolas Gigault was as a composer, his organ music is a goldmine of information on this matter (I shall have an article about it in a memorial volume for Russell Saunders, to be published this fall by Pendragon, and there is a 1991 DMA thesis on inequality in Gigault by Daniel Pyle). It suggests that short, descending stepwise passages of notes eligible for normal inequality can just as well be short-long. I also suspect (along with many others) that Couperin’s pointé-coulé (Hefling, pp. 38-39) means the same thing, as I suggested in my article, “Lombard Rhythm” in the New Harvard Dictionary: it would account for the courante’s being labeled “Italian.” I used to write that slurs had no rhythmic significance; I now agree with some other writers (though not, apparently, Hefling) that on descending diatonic passages they may sometimes mean short-long dotting.
The book seems to me to be very thorough indeed on late German overdottting, and the arguments are the more convincing because we are told so much about the authors—the most convincing citation to me regarding overtures is from Schulz (p. 113), who was writing not as a pedagogue but as a neutral observer. I do not think, however, that Hefling makes sufficiently clear how very different were the dynamics of the apparently ubiquitous “galant” overdottting in the second half of the century and the much older, inequality-generated overdottting of French overtures. There seems to be a tendency to argue from one to the other. Doubtless there was interaction in the late examples (after all, most French overtures were by Germans), but if so, then it should be described explicitly. Also, if overdottting in overtures was a result of inequality (as it appears to have been), then overdottting in German overtures must be as hypothetical as German inequality was—unless French overdottting was imitated directly by the Germans rather than being generated by an underlying rhythmic style. Moreover, the whole overture question is strongly affected by questions of tempo, and tempo seems to have varied greatly (as the reference above suggests). In any case, the double-dots that are occasionally seen in seventeenth-century French scores are nearly always there for the purpose of synchronization, and only very rarely for independent rhythm (Hefling cites Raison, ex. 4–3, bar 10).

The apparatus of the book is serviceable, but uneven. The notes are extraordinarily generous, while the arrangement of the bibliography is misconceived. It is divided into no less than six different sections: early and modern writings on inequality, overdottting, and related issues; the arrangement of the early sources is chronological rather than alphabetical; and there is duplication between the different lists, with more information about a source in one list than in the other. The result is that it is very difficult to find anything. Also, the early titles are usually abbreviated, so that much useful information is missing. Different editions (many, for example, in the case of Dupont) are usually not listed, reprints not always, and the distribution of surviving copies never (this can sometimes suggest how well-known or influential a treatise might have been).

I only checked myself in the index, which listed but ten of at least 23 references I came across in text and notes. I did happen to notice that not every theorist’s name appears (e.g., Boëin).

I began this review by saying that any more argument on the subject matter of this book would be futile, and then went straight on to argue—or at least indicate that I might have argued—a number of points of disagreement. To say that I have done so simply to flesh out the description that the readers of
this journal have a right to expect would be disingenuous (Hefling takes “ingenious” to mean “disingenuous,” by the way, p. 131); the impulse to lay claim to Hefling’s territory certainly played a part. Also, as so many have found out—Borrel, Donington, Babitz, Collins, Pont, always Neumann, and many others—the subject is addictive, and as to an addictive drug, one finds oneself turning to it for its own sake, rather than for any good it might do. But although, as I said above, I think a comparative study of the treatises would be valuable and very interesting for both reader and researcher, I do hope Hefling’s will be the last book on inequality and overdotting as such; and I also hope that what may seem to be petty fault-finding in this review will be taken not as an effort to discredit the book, but as a contribution designed to reinforce its justifiable claim to be called “definitive.”