The XX Factor: The Influence of Legislative Gender Parity on Migrant Integration Policy in the EU Member States

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Policy in the EU Member States

Cover Page Footnote
Author Note Katherine Y. Kramer Gaines is now enrolled in the master’s program for Sustainable Development Practice at the Center of Latin American Studies at the University of Florida. Special thanks to BYU Professors Dr. Valerie Hegstrom, Dr. Stacey Shaw, and Dr. Wade Jacoby (now deceased) for offering their professional expertise through edits and revisions. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Katherine Y. Kramer Gaines, University of Florida, 470 Grinter Hall – PO Box 115560 Gainesville, FL 32611-5560. Phone: 503-881-1197. Email: katherine13gaines@gmail.com

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Katherine Y. Kramer Gaines
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ABSTRACT

Many European states have been affected by the so-called European migrant crisis of the 2010s. The UNHCR has said that focusing on integrating migrants is “the most relevant durable solution” for European Union member states. Policies can help pave the road to success for refugees and migrants alike in new, unfamiliar lands. Such policies are associated with migrants’ abilities to reunite with family, find jobs, receive healthcare and education, gain permanent residence and nationality, politically participate, evade discrimination, and fully integrate into the new society they reside in. Using a gender parity lens with cross-sectional, quantitative analysis, this research shows that an increase in female representation in legislative chambers improves the quality scores of migrant integration policy in EU member states. This research expands upon the literature regarding substantive female representation and offers relevant solutions on how the absorption of migrants in Europe can be improved upon.

KEYWORDS

gender parity, female representation, migrant integration policy, migration crisis

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Special thanks to BYU Professors Dr. Valerie Hegstrom, Dr. Stacey Shaw, and Dr. Wade Jacoby (now deceased) for offering their professional expertise through edits and revisions.
1. **INTRODUCTION**

Many European states have been affected by what is referred to as the *European migrant crisis*—a period of a significant increase in irregular arrivals of migrants and refugees from the Middle East and Africa during the 2010s. The heat of the crisis fell between 2015 and 2016. “More than 487,000 people arrived at Europe’s Mediterranean shores in the first nine months of 2015, double all of 2014 and the highest number since record-keeping began” (Banulescu-Bogdan & Frazke, 2015). 1.3 million migrants applied for asylum status in Europe in 2015, the most significant recorded spike of immigrants during the crisis (Pew Research Center, 2016). The vast majority—over 75%—of those seeking refuge in Europe were individuals from Syria, Iraq, or Afghanistan (Spindler, 2015). These individuals and families fled from conflict or persecution, looking for a safe place to live in peace.

While not all countries experienced the same level of immigration spikes, all EU states were affected by it at some level. Italy and Greece, for example, particularly struggled due to their geographic location, as they initially received the majority of migrants coming by boat. Other European countries also experienced shock waves that still show their ripple effects today. During immigration spikes, host countries tend to become apprehensive as they attempt to solve the political, cultural, economic, and security concerns that come with high immigration numbers (Hochschild, 2009). European host countries also experienced such apprehensiveness during the years of the crisis. EU member states looked to international bodies for guidance, including the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as they sought to overcome these obstacles while still taking care of vulnerable asylum-seekers.

The UNHCR is an international institution that is “dedicated to saving lives, protecting rights and building a better future for refugees, forcibly displaced communities and stateless people” (2020). While this organization focuses on refugee-specific solutions and not on responding to migrations in general, the migration crisis has included a large number of refugees among the migrants. In 2015, over half of the migrants arriving in Europe were first-time asylum applicants (see Infographic 1).

**Infographic 1. Migration and Refugee Numbers From 2008 to 2015**

![Infographic](https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2021/iss1/8)
The UNHCR offers three potential solutions to refugees as they attempt to rebuild their lives after displacement (United Nations, 2020). These solutions include voluntary repatriation (the decision to return to the country of origin if it is safe to do so), resettlement (temporarily relocate to another country), and integration (take the necessary steps to fully integrate into a host country). The best solution can differ depending on the circumstance of the refugee’s country of origin, place of resettlement, and personal experiences.

Upon observation, the UNHCR (2013) wrote that focusing on the integration of migrants is “the most relevant durable solution” for the European Union member states (p. 8). Integration is a two-way process between the host country and the migrant. The host country must put forth adequate effort to welcome migrants into their society. The migrant must also take necessary measures to adapt to their new place of residence (p. 14). It can be challenging to measure migrants’ level of effort to adapt; however, it is not as difficult to measure the steps taken by host countries. A country’s policies for migrants can cultivate a space of welcoming and belonging. It is through favorable integration policy that full integration is encouraged and more easily accomplished by migrants.

To increase the likelihood of effective integration policy, the exploration of what determines such policy is imperative. Many factors can impact policy (see Theoretical Framework: Control Variables), but this study focuses on the influence of legislators. While policymakers and legislators are different in their roles and positions, there is overlap in their output. Legislation sets out the guidelines for a country’s goals. Policy implements legislative goals through further specificity and application. Legislators that push for migrant-friendly laws will consequently promote migrant-friendly policies. In order to investigate what may affect the tendency for such pro-migrant legislative behavior, the impact of gender will be explored. Previous studies offer observational evidence for female legislators improving policy by providing new perspectives and prioritizing the needs of the vulnerable. The question this paper will attempt to answer is quantitative: does a greater ratio of female representation in legislative chambers make a difference on migrant integration policy scores they receive for their country?

2. **Research Question**

This study uses a gender parity lens to explore the notion that a higher incidence of female representation in legislative chambers can make an impact on public policy. Specifically, this research tests the idea that an increase in female representation in the lower legislative chamber improves migrant integration policy (as seen in its quality score given by the Migrant Integration Policy Index). This investigation is explicitly done within a European Union context, meaning that the countries compared are those that hold European Union membership. Overall, the question this study attempts to answer is: *What is the relationship between legislative gender parity as measured through female representation and quality of migrant integration policy as measured through given scores in EU member states?*

3. **Definitions**

*Female Representation:* The percentage of women with positions in decision-making bodies, specifically the lower legislative chamber.

*Gender Parity:* The balance of gender through their contributions and ratio (European Institute for Gender Equality & United Nations, 2020).
**Migrant Integration Policy**: A host country’s policies that direct the integration of migrants within their borders.

**Quality of Migrant Integration Policy**: The effectiveness of a policy to successfully promote objectives through specific and operational instruction.

### 4. Hypotheses

**H1**: Gender parity (female representation) has a positive relationship on the quality of migrant integration policy (scores).

**H2**: Gender parity (female representation) requires a certain threshold for its impact on migrant integration policy (scores) to exist statistically.

### 5. Significance

With individuals and families continuing to be displaced and seeking refuge worldwide, this research is quite relevant. Since the UNHCR proposes migrant integration to be the best solution for host countries that are European Union member states, this research attempts to showcase creative ways on how integration policies can be improved. Another purpose of this research is to offer potential evidence for the benefits of favorable gender parity—in this case, measured through female representation in decision-making bodies.

### 6. Theoretical Framework

#### 6.1. Independent Variable: Gender Parity

Numerous scholars have researched the impacts women can have on a country’s policy. Not only can they offer a new perspective, but they can push for long-needed change. “Women’s distinctive legislative priorities are understandable given gender differences in life experiences—ranging from differences in educational and occupational background to differences in caregiving experiences and experiences with gender inequality and discrimination” (Sanbonmatsu, n.d.). It is possible that women’s inherent life differences make them more interested in certain policy issues compared to men. However, the majority of literature regarding legislative gender parity rarely lays out causal mechanisms and more often simply provides scholarly analytical observations.

For one, Brysk and Mehta (2014) found that female policymakers initiate better human rights initiatives than male policymakers. There is also evidence that female policymakers make more women-friendly policies than male policymakers (Caiazza, 2002). One professor referenced seven different peer-reviewed studies when she wrote the following in a Unicef report: “Women are more likely than men to place priority on women’s issues and children/family issues both in their self-stated preferences and in the legislation they sponsor” (Schwindt-Bayer, 2007). In an observational study in Arizona, roughly 66% of female legislators pushed to increase child-care service or support by the government. In comparison, 50% of male legislators wanted to change nothing in the current policy, and 33% of male legislators desired to decrease the support or care provided at the time (Reingold, 2000). It is not just family-related or women-focused issues where differences appear between male and female legislators. One study found a significant difference in the suggested and supported public policy regarding crime among male and female legislators (Sanbonmatsu, n.d.). These examples are just a few of the many observational studies regarding gender differences in legislative behavior. Most relevant studies arrive at the same conclusion: women

[https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2021/iss1/8](https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2021/iss1/8)
and men have different tendencies in their legislative behavior. Female legislators tend to focus more on certain policy issues, just like men do with others.

A common term used to describe one aspect of this difference in behavior is *substantive representation*. This form of representation can be described as the trend for a demographic of representatives to advocate for groups they identify with or relate to. For example, more female officials tend to prioritize women’s issues (as mentioned in the above paragraph). This theory has been challenged with the argument that not every female will automatically advocate for other females. For example, female legislators that are out of touch with the average working-class female’s experience will not advocate for them. Another opinion is that females who support such issues are committing political suicide, resulting in many women in power neglecting such issues (Trembley, 2006). There is controversy in the literature on whether female representation in decision-making bodies really makes a difference for vulnerable demographics.

Many argue that “women must constitute a ‘critical mass’ of legislators—sometimes described as 25% to 35%—for women to overcome their minority status in the legislature and advocate for women as a group” (Sanbonmatsu, n.d.). The typical percentage promoted by advocacy groups for female representation is 30% (Dahlerup & Freidenvall, 2003). An international development professor discussed the theory of 30% female representation being the percentage where females start to significantly make an impact (Romeri-Lewis, personal communication, 2015). While 50% representation would be ideal since women make up roughly half the population, 30% is enough to where women’s voices start being heard. Countries that value female representation will often create a 30% quota for their political offices. The three main types of quotas that are used are: 1) constitutionally and/or legislatively reserved seats, 2) constitutional and/or legislative candidate quotas, and 3) voluntary political party quotas (International IDEA, 2009). Albania, Haiti, Argentina, and the Netherlands are all examples of countries that have implemented different 30% quotas to promote gender parity through female representation (WomanStats, 2020). Even businesses are attempting to reach a 30% gender parity to better their profits and infrastructure (Morrissey, 2020). It is not necessary for all legislative chambers to be made up entirely of women to initiate more inclusive policy, but there does need to be enough to start seeing the impact of female representation.

Despite 30% being commonly used for advocacy, it may not be the so-called “magic number” where female impact is suddenly experienced. Perhaps, 30% is just a starting point—an attainable goal with a high probability for benefits when reached. There may be another number (e.g., 50%) where female influence is best achieved. However, such a high female representation is rarely seen and therefore unable to be properly observed. It should also be mentioned that many studies argue that there is not one specific threshold that must be reached to see “gender differences in legislative behavior” (Sanbonmatsu, n.d.). Countries can differ in their experiences with female representation impacts, and the influence of individual women should not be undervalued. Since a required threshold is still controversial but prominently present in the literature, this study will observe at what percentage female representation starts making the most impact.

In conclusion, women are observed to offer different solutions for public policy. Often, they are more likely to prioritize the rights and opportunities of the marginalized and vulnerable. Perhaps this is because they connect with this demographic as some have experienced some level of discrimination or inequality themselves. Perhaps not. Whatever the
reason may be, this tendency in legislative behavior clearly exists. As refugees and other migrants fall under the category of “the vulnerable,” the question that follows is whether women in power would have a higher likelihood of advocating for this demographic than male legislators. Previous literature gives the expectation that a difference in legislative behavior should exist between the genders and, in this study, would be observed through comparing the quality of migrant integration policy between countries with higher and lower female counts in their legislative chambers.

6.2. **DEPENDENT VARIABLE: MIGRANT INTEGRATION POLICY SCORES**

Migration Policy Institute (2020) sees migrant integration policies as essential to migrants’ success. They describe their meaning and application with the following paragraph:

Immigrant integration is the process by which immigrants and their children come to feel and become participants in the life of their country of destination and in its schools, workplaces, and communities. Governments’ policies, initiatives, and programs help determine immigrants’ opportunities to participate in society, as well as their guarantees to the same rights and responsibilities as those of the native-born.

The quality level of such integration policies can be assessed differently by researchers or organizations based on the specific goals, theories, or agendas they have. The Institute for Government (Hallsworth & Rutter, 2011) in the United Kingdom, for example, states that the following fundamentals must be observed for a good policy to take place: “clarity on goals, open and evidence-based idea generation, rigorous policy design, responsive external engagement, thorough appraisal, clarity on the role of central government and accountabilities, [and] the establishment of effective mechanisms for feedback and evaluation.” Other possible metrics are the specificity of the policy, whether the action outlined in the policy is required or suggested (e.g., using verbiage like “will” instead of “should” in the policy), or the probability of the policy’s success. Further, in evaluating integration policies, some may assess them by looking at only a few indicators, while others take a broader approach, combining the scores of many indicators. The scores utilized in this study come from the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), which was created by Barcelona Centre for International Affairs and the Migration Policy Group.

MIPEX breaks down policies addressing migrant integration into eight main categories: 1) Labor Market Mobility, 2) Family Reunion, 3) Education, 4) Health, 5) Political Participation, 6) Permanent Residence, 7) Access to Nationality, and 8) Anti-Discrimination. It then uses as many as 167 different indicators to analyze the quality of various policy measures in those key areas. Examples of policy indicators include: “immediate access to labor market”, “teacher training to reflect migrants’ learning needs”, “availability of qualified interpretation [in health] services”, and the “right to vote in national elections.” MIPEX’s thorough way of assessing integration policies is recognized by the Joint Research Center of the European Commission as the most comprehensive policy index in the field of migrant integration, and it is therefore the policy scoring method of choice in this study.

6.3. **CONTROL VARIABLES: DEMOCRACY, UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, GDP, DIVERSITY, TERRORISM**

While this study focuses on the relationship between female representation in legislative bodies and the quality of migrant integration policies, other important factors that can affect gender parity and migrant policies also need to be considered. One of them is democracy, which is often viewed as indispensable to gender equality and to the ability of female
legislators to have impact on policy. Trembley (2007), for example, says that true democracy requires women to be equal citizens “and therefore (...) share equally with men in public decision-making.” Brysk and Mehta (2014) conclude from their research that democracy and gender equality work together to promote human rights and eliminate discrimination. Democracy can also impact migration policies, as “[w]estern liberal democracies enthusiastically promote free or only slightly restricted movement of information, capital, and goods and services—but not of people” (Hochschild, 2009). These democracies tend to place higher importance on possessiveness over their country’s membership. Whether democracy tends to help or hurt migrant integration policy in the European Union is considered in this study by treating democracy score as a control variable.

Another factor that is assumed to influence migrant policy is economic security. For example, anti-immigration rhetoric is more often supported in times of domestic economic struggles (Eichengreen, 2018). A country with high unemployment may result in citizens feeling threatened by migrants – they may either blame migrants for taking their jobs or fear that migrants will only make their economic situation worse if they integrate near them. A low unemployment rate might have the opposite effect, as would a high GDP. If a country is wealthy with more resources and security, its citizens may feel more welcoming to migrants. They are not threatened and may feel they have a surplus to offer others. To capture both of these economy-related factors, the unemployment rate and GDP per capita are two control variables considered in this study.

Other perspectives suggest that cultural implications actually weigh the heaviest on the public—people are more concerned about the cultural divide than an economic disaster in their attitudes towards immigration (Hopkins, 2014). Culture is closely tied with the level and origin of diversity existing in a place. The level of diversity can be linked to the probability of how welcoming a country is to furthering diversity. This naturally connects to attitudes held by the public on immigration. Legislators feel the pressure from their constituents to present bills that reflect the public’s interests. Such bills may be associated with migrant integration. Because of this, ethnic diversity scores will be included as a control variable in this study.

Another common concern widely discussed by politicians and citizens relates to the security risks associated with migrants. Minorities and foreigners are sometimes stereotyped as potential threats or terrorists. Research shows that immigration policy is not created without also considering terrorism policy simultaneously (Tumlin, 2004). Legislators and their constituents can be influenced by the level of terrorism their country has experienced thus far. A higher incidence of terrorism may lead to a decrease in the inclination to welcome more migrants. Therefore, the impact of terrorism on a given country will also be used as a control.

The complications that migrants are said to cause concerning politics, economics, culture, and security will all be accounted for in this study. It is possible that policy score indicators are linked to one or many of these variables. In order to have a holistic understanding of the issue, all of these potential factors will be considered.

6.4. VARIABLE LIMITATION: POLITICAL SKEWNESS

Another variable that presumably impacts immigration policy is political skewness. It seems clear through their rhetoric and legislation efforts that leftist legislators tend to support migration more than their rightist counterparts. These social democrats (more often referred to as “liberals” in the United States) tend to “sympathize with the desire to escape poverty
and oppression that drives many to emigrate from their home country,” while conservatives “tend to be unenthusiastic about immigration” and “more inclined to rely on international markets than on migration to alleviate worldwide poverty” (Hochschild, 2009). Yet, there is a problem with this generalization. A published work by the Migration Institute states that their studies consistently find no clear relationship between political orientation and migration policy restrictiveness: “Instead, we find that the restrictiveness of migration policies is mainly driven by factors such as economic growth and unemployment, recent immigration levels and political system factors” (Haas & Natter, 2015). Trusting in the Migration Institute’s conclusions and following the statistical recommendation to not exceed five control variables, this study will disregard political skewness as a control was made. Nonetheless, this exclusion should be recognized as a limitation to this study.

7. **Methodology**

7.1. **Data Sources**

The percentages for female representation (IV) were taken from Inter-Parliamentary Union’s Women in National Parliaments. The percentages taken for each year were those found in the month of December. These numbers represented the percentage of women in the lower house legislative chambers. This is also known as the House of Commons in Great Britain or the House of Representatives in the United States. Despite being termed the lower house, this legislative chamber often has more power than the upper house. In some countries like Great Britain, the term “parliament” is used to reference this chamber alone (Encyclopedia Britannica). This legislative body has the authority to influence the direction of policy and oversee its implementation, thus making it a good fit for observing the influence of female representation over migrant integration policy.

The Migrant Integration Policy Index provides nine different policy scores (DV) for every EU member state between the years 2010 and 2015. There are scores for every category of integration policy (labor market mobility, family reunion, education, health, political participation, permanent residence, access to nationality, and anti-discrimination). After taking into account all of these segregated scores, an overall score is given to the country for each given year. The aggregate score provides a holistic representation of the country’s integration policy quality. The scores for each individual category are helpful in determining where the influence of female representation is most prevalent. After reviewing all 167 indicators used by the MIPEX, there was only one sub-indicator to be found that could intertwine with the independent variable: the sub-indicator (one-half of one indicator) looked for both genders to be present in consultative bodies. This sub-indicator made up of one-half of one indicator, making it only represent .05% (half of one percent) of the overall policy score, which is not large enough to discount this study. There were no other indicators that looked at female representation in legislative bodies.

The necessary data for the control variables were extracted from the following sources: The Economist Intelligence Unit, the World Bank, Harvard Institute for Economic Research, and the Institute for Economics and Peace. The Economist Intelligence Unit provided a report that included democracy scores for every EU member state. The World Bank offered the GDP per capita and unemployment rates for each of these countries. The Harvard Institute for Economic Research sourced a color-coded diversity map. Numerical values were given to each country using the affiliated color key. Finally, the Institute for Economics and Peace supplied the Global Terrorism Index, which provides a similar color-
A coded map of the impact of terrorism on each country. Numerical values were assigned here based on the color key as well. All data for control variables came from credible sources for the year 2013.

### 7.2. Statistical Testing

Correlation graphs were created to look at the data and observe how the independent and dependent variables correlate with one another. The graphs were created using the overall score with each year, with the years 2013 and 2015 being showcased (see Graph 1 and 2). There were also trend graphs created for each policy category (see examples in Graphs 3-6). These graphs help to offer an initial insight into the patterns of variation found in gender parity and policy scores.

**Graph 1. Correlation Graph of Gender Parity and Policy Scores, 2013**

![Graph 1](image1.png)

**Graph 2. Correlation Graph of Gender Parity and Policy Scores, 2015**

![Graph 2](image2.png)
Graph 3. Correlation Graph of Gender Parity and Family Reunion Policy Scores, 2013

Graph 4. Correlation Graph of Gender Parity and Labor Market Policy Scores, 2013

Graph 5. Correlation Graph of Gender Parity and Permanent Residence Policy Scores, 2013
Three robust regression sets were used to test the relationship between gender parity and migrant integration policy. The first robust regression set tested the relationship without controls for each year, 2010-2015 (see Regression 1). The second robust regression set utilized all the controls, starting with only one and ending with all five (see Regression 2). The third robust regression set was disaggregated by categorized policy scores, and all five controls were used each time (see Regression 3). Once the regressions were complete, other statistical tests were conducted.

Regression 1. Regression of Gender Parity and Policy Scores, 2010-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender Parity 2010</td>
<td>0.920*** (0.135)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender Parity 2011</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.887*** (0.137)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender Parity 2012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.727*** (0.157)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender Parity 2013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.969*** (0.146)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Parity 2014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.960*** (0.137)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Parity 2015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.958*** (0.146)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>29.91*** (3.369)</td>
<td>29.98*** (3.423)</td>
<td>33.23*** (3.931)</td>
<td>26.47*** (4.030)</td>
<td>27.13*** (3.702)</td>
<td>25.74*** (3.916)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.526</td>
<td>0.511</td>
<td>0.452</td>
<td>0.581</td>
<td>0.602</td>
<td>0.629</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Regression 2. Regression of Gender Parity and Policy Score With Control Variables, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(Model 1) No Controls</th>
<th>(Model 2) 1 Control</th>
<th>(Model 3) 2 Controls</th>
<th>(Model 4) 3 Controls</th>
<th>(Model 5) 4 Controls</th>
<th>(Model 6) 5 Controls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender Parity 2013</td>
<td>0.969***</td>
<td>0.843***</td>
<td>0.835***</td>
<td>0.820***</td>
<td>0.850**</td>
<td>0.955**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP 2013</td>
<td>(0.146)</td>
<td>(0.170)</td>
<td>(0.280)</td>
<td>(0.277)</td>
<td>(0.305)</td>
<td>(0.358)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism 2013</td>
<td>2.658</td>
<td>2.771</td>
<td>2.509</td>
<td>3.616</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy 2013</td>
<td>1.666</td>
<td>0.880</td>
<td>2.805</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Diversity 2013</td>
<td>-0.886</td>
<td>-0.589</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployment 2013</td>
<td>-0.0579</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>24</td>
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<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.581</td>
<td>0.609</td>
<td>0.590</td>
<td>0.592</td>
<td>0.599</td>
<td>0.608</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Robust standard errors in parentheses</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>*** p&lt;0.01, ** p&lt;0.05, * p&lt;0.1</td>
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Regression 3. Regression of Gender Parity and Disaggregated Policy Scores, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) Labor Market Mobility</th>
<th>(2) Family Reunion</th>
<th>(3) Education</th>
<th>(4) Political Participation</th>
<th>(5) Permanent Residence</th>
<th>(6) Access to Nationality</th>
<th>(7) Anti-Discrimination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender Parity 2013</td>
<td>1.764***</td>
<td>1.555***</td>
<td>0.960***</td>
<td>0.483</td>
<td>0.668*</td>
<td>1.193</td>
<td>0.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP 2013</td>
<td>-0.000024</td>
<td>-0.0000840**</td>
<td>-0.0009188**</td>
<td>2.976-05</td>
<td>-9.36-45</td>
<td>0.000444</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism 2013</td>
<td>8.528**</td>
<td>-0.548</td>
<td>3.314**</td>
<td>2.565</td>
<td>-1.306</td>
<td>6.188</td>
<td>0.644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy 2013</td>
<td>1.490</td>
<td>1.121</td>
<td>17.90**</td>
<td>-1.159</td>
<td>-0.429</td>
<td>-2.768</td>
<td>-9.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity 2013</td>
<td>2.262</td>
<td>0.0638</td>
<td>3.141</td>
<td>-2.007</td>
<td>2.112</td>
<td>-4.278</td>
<td>-5.487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment 2013</td>
<td>-0.717</td>
<td>0.531</td>
<td>-0.950</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.0307</td>
<td>-0.293</td>
<td>0.0130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-93.56</td>
<td>29.80</td>
<td>-128.0**</td>
<td>-4.703</td>
<td>43.86</td>
<td>38.40</td>
<td>128.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.694</td>
<td>0.647</td>
<td>0.663</td>
<td>0.698</td>
<td>0.423</td>
<td>0.481</td>
<td>0.297</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Robust standard errors in parentheses**

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2021/iss1/8
The need to analyze the potential threshold theory become apparent upon seeing the line of best fit for gender parity and migrant integration policy scores (Graph 7 below).

Graph 7. Line of Best Fit: Relationship Between Gender Parity Policy Scores, 2013

After categorizing each country’s gender parity level into three groups (low, medium, and high female representation), a Bonferroni test was utilized to test the differences between these groupings. Countries in Group 1 had gender parity rates in the 25th percentile and under; countries in Group 2 had gender parity rates between the 25th and 75th percentile; countries in Group 3 had gender parity rates in the 75th percentile and above (see Graph 8 & 9).

Graph 8. Graph From Bonferroni Test, 2011
The difference in policy scores was tested between the three groups using a Bonferroni test. This helped distinguish if a threshold existed for gender parity to really make a difference on policy scores.

7.3. LIMITATIONS

Since MIPEX’s accessible data stops in 2015, there is a limitation in the data considered in this paper, with no analysis existing between the years 2016–2020. The spike of the migration numbers in 2015–2016 is somewhat accounted for, with the year 2015 being included in the study. The legislative decisions regarding migrant integration policy are accounted for before and at the beginning of the migration spike. Another limitation from the MIPEX is the policy score under the health category was absent from the year 2013, which resulted in no analysis on the relationship between gender parity and migrant integration policy affiliated with health.

8. RESULTS

8.1. AGGREGATED RESULTS

There is a visible correlation between legislative gender parity and the overall migrant integration policy score given to EU member states (see Graphs 1 & 2). The basic robust regression found gender parity to have a significant impact on policy scores for each year from 2010 to 2015 (see Regression 1). The 2013 robust regression with control variables found gender parity to be the only significant variable influencing policy scores; none of the control variables (GDP per capita, democracy score, unemployment rate, diversity level, or terrorism impact) had any significant impact on migrant integration policy scores. The p-value for gender parity influence was less than 0.01 in each model except for one, which was less than 0.05. The robust regression found that as female representation increased by one percent, the migrant policy score also increased by approximately one level (see Regression 2). Overall, this study finds that female representation in legislative gender parity has a significant, positive relationship on the quality of migrant integration policy produced in that country.
8.2. Disaggregated Results

After disaggregating policy scores into the eight categories (labor market mobility, family reunion, education, health, political participation, permanent residence, access to nationality, and anti-discrimination), the study found that gender parity does not have a significant impact on each section of migrant integration policy. The disaggregated policy trend graphs do not show as close of a correlation between gender parity and policy scores (see examples in Graphs 3-6). The four graphs that show potential correlation are for policy scores under education, family reunion, permanent residence, and labor market mobility (Graphs 3-5). These four categories are the policy scores that had a significant relationship with gender parity in the robust regression with control variables. Gender parity has the largest impact with the most significance on the migrant policy regarding labor market mobility, then family reunion, then education, and lastly, permanent residence (see Regression 3). There was no significant impact found with policies regarding political participation, access to nationality, and anti-discrimination. The relationship of gender parity with migrant integration policy involving health is unknown due to inaccessible policy scores. Overall, gender parity influences certain aspects of migrant integration policy more than others; female representation has a significant impact on integration policy dealing with labor market mobility, family reunion, education, and permanent residence.

8.3. Threshold Results

The more female representation increases, the more policy scores are positively impacted – the relationship between gender parity and policy scores becomes steeper as gender parity increases (see Graph 7). Upon comparing the differences in policy scores among countries with low female representation (Group 1), medium female representation (Group 2), and high female representation (Group 3), the study found no significant difference to exist between Group 1 and Group 2. However, there was a significant difference in policy scores between Group 1 and Group 3 as well as Group 2 and Group 3 (see Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Significant Difference in Policy Scores between Group 1 and Group 2</th>
<th>Significant Difference in Policy Scores between Group 1 and Group 3</th>
<th>Significant Difference in Policy Scores between Group 2 and Group 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>No / p-value: 0.571</td>
<td>Yes / p-value: 0.002</td>
<td>Yes / p-value: 0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>No / p-value: 0.459</td>
<td>Yes / p-value: 0.001</td>
<td>Yes / p-value: 0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>No / p-value: 0.385</td>
<td>Yes / p-value: 0.001</td>
<td>Yes / p-value: 0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>No / p-value: 0.235</td>
<td>Yes / p-value: 0.000</td>
<td>Yes / p-value: 0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>No / p-value: 0.071</td>
<td>Yes / p-value: 0.000</td>
<td>Yes / p-value: 0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>No / p-value: 0.197</td>
<td>Yes / p-value: 0.002</td>
<td>Yes / p-value: 0.049</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: Group 1 = Countries with Gender Parity in 25th Percentile and Under; Group 2 = Countries with Gender Parity between the 25th and 75th Percentile; Group 3 = Countries with Gender Parity in 75th Percentile and Above

This can be interpreted to mean that a high level of female representation is required for a significant influence of gender parity to be seen in the quality of migrant policy produced. In other words, gender parity does not make a significant difference in migrant policy until the percentage of female representation in an EU member state’s parliament is
ranked in the top quarter. Countries that made it into the top quarter, or Group 3, had a range of 30.35%–58% female representation, depending on the year. The minimum percentage required for a country to be placed in Group 3 was approximately 30% in 2010 and 36% in 2015, with each year in between slightly increasing (see Table 2).

Table 2. Female Representation Threshold for 75th Percentiles, 2010-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Female Representation in Group 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>30.35% ≥</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>32.55% ≥</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>32.55% ≥</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>34.65% ≥</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>36.05% ≥</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>36.60% ≥</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These findings somewhat support the 30% female representation theory as the representation threshold required in 2010 was 30.35%. After comparing Group 3’s minimum representation threshold of all the years, the average female representation percentage required equaled 33.79%. Overall, this testing provides evidence that it takes roughly 1/3rd of female representation for gender parity to make a significant difference in the policy influenced by the lower legislative chamber.

9. Conclusion

This study concludes that gender parity in lower house legislative chambers influences migrant integration policy. In other words, an increase in female representation in legislative chambers has a probability of increasing the quality of policy for migrant integration. It is important to note that this impact on policy increases as female representation increases; the influence of gender parity is most visible in the countries that have the highest female representation.

Female legislators have a greater influence on certain aspects of migrant policy, including education, family reunion, permanent residence, and labor market mobility. No gender parity impact was found on the following migrant integration policy categories: political participation, access to nationality, and anti-discrimination. The health scores were not provided by the Migrant Integration Policy Index and thus cannot be assessed regarding the impact of female representation on it. There is little to no evidence in my study that supports the effects of democracy, unemployment, GDP, diversity, or terrorism on migrant integration policy.

Moving forward, further research should explore the impact of other demographics’ representation on policy, specifically the influence of migrant representation. After all, “immigrants will be successfully incorporated into their host countries only after they have enough involvement and influence in decision making that they can help shape relevant policies” (Hochschild, 2009). Integration of migrants will both be achieved and further promoted when migrants are able to share their voices through adequate representation. While this study does not have the evidence to back this theory due to a lack of analysis thereof, it does have the ability to recommend such an investigation as it can build upon the research disclosed in this paper, with the overarching theme being that intersectional representation improves the quality of work produced by decision-making bodies.
Since this study specifically provides evidence for a significant, positive relationship between legislative gender parity and the quality of migrant integration policy, countries and political parties may start considering how to encourage more female candidates in their elections. By investing in more female legislative candidates who are well informed on the issues and willing to take affirmative action, migrants will have a higher likelihood of benefiting from better policy for their integration journey. With such an initiative, both gender parity and migrant integration can be encouraged.

REFERENCES


Dahlerup, D., Freidenvall, L. (2003). Quotas as a “fast track” to equal political representation for women: Why Scandinavia is no longer the model. Stockholm University.


