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Putting Bilateral Aid Where Their Mouths Are: Evaluating Democratic Coalition Commitment in the Russo-Ukrainian War

Alexander A. Aghdaei
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ABSTRACT
The European Union (EU)’s response to the 2022 outbreak of open armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine is a notable example of democratic coalition involvement—where several democracies elect to involve themselves (either directly or indirectly) in conflict as part of a multinational force. However, in terms of aid as a percentage of GDP, there are significant variations in bilateral commitments. This article accounts for the difference in coalition commitment between EU states by evaluating a set of conditions across different phases of the conflict. Pulling from notable literature using qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to explain variances in coalition behavior, I develop a model which shows the “pathways” to high coalition commitment for states in the EU. My model uses four conditions: leftist partisanship, recent elections, upcoming elections, and high Ukrainian refugee intake. I find four notable configurations of conditions which explain the outcome.

KEYWORDS
qualitative comparative analysis, coalitions, Russo-Ukrainian War, international relations

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Thank you to Dr. Craig Parsons for his continual support in the research and writing of this paper, as well as for the extensive mentorship and advice provided to me.
1. **INTRODUCTION**

The expansion of the Russo-Ukrainian war from a proxy war in the Donbas into a full-scale invasion of Ukraine has been deeply destructive and traumatic to the global community. With 141 members of the United Nations (UN) general assembly voting in favor of condemning Russia's war, the war's illegality and unpopularity are no secret (United Nations, 2023). However, the drawing together of a divided European Union (EU) into a coalition of aid senders to Ukraine has been a complex and confusing endeavor. A strong, unified response from these otherwise very divergent states has, in some scholars' eyes, pointed to hopeful signs of a reborn liberal world order (Jakobson & Kasekamp, 2023). To evaluate those prospects, we must take a deeper look at who has contributed and understand why they have chosen to partake in this coalition.

Simply put, there is no clear understanding of the conditions that led to the rise of a strong EU coalition that hopes to empower Ukraine enough to fend off a Russian attack. A majority of literature around wartime coalitions operates under the assumption that participants are providing military aid and deploying troops, when in the case at hand the former is only true for some states and the latter is only true for Ukraine. Understanding the conditions, political realities, and theory behind the assembling of multi-national coalitions—especially ones which distribute aid in defense of international law—is essential in comprehending and evaluating the validity of a new “liberal world order.”

When reflecting on the year 2022, a wide variety of levels of commitment can be seen within the EU’s Ukrainian aid coalition. 14 states have sent above-median amounts of aid (in terms of aid as a percentage of GDP), while 7 states have sent nearly no aid whatsoever (Antezza et al., 2023). How can this difference in levels of support be explained?

Upon reviewing literature related to coalition commitment in democratic states, it is clear that past studies focused almost exclusively on answering how stable democratic coalitions are, rather than what context is necessary for these coalitions to rise (Capoccia, 2001; Choi, 2012). Additionally, there are very few integrative studies that create a comparative framework to analyze government decision-making under coalitions—an essential form of analysis to effectively answer why democracies join coalitions. Yet at the same time, coalitions as a whole are on the rise as a significant mechanism in international politics (Weitsman, 2014). Finally, I look to expand on the work undertaken by Patrick Mello in his 2020 article, “Paths towards coalition defection: Democracies and withdrawal from the Iraq War,” where he develops a Qualitative Comparative Analysis framework to analyze military coalition withdrawal. I apply conditions that are largely similar to those applied by Mello in order to expand the precedent around integrative frameworks for understanding coalition commitment.

My study showcases pathways of conditions that result in high coalition commitment from EU member states. In looking at the 37 governments which existed during 2022 among the 27 member states, I find that: (1) refugee influx is a consistently significant factor in a democracy’s decision to commit highly to aid coalitions; (2) the presence of elections—whether recent or upcoming—notably influences a democracy’s decision to commit to aid coalitions; and (3) leftist partisanship plays a complex and critical role in a democracy’s decision to involve itself in aid coalitions.

To build this framework, I employ Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). QCA allows for the creation of pathways to the desired outcome, enabling causal inferences about what composition of conditions and absence of conditions results in high coalition commit-
ment. In applying this unique form of integrative study, the benefits are twofold: the existing literature on democratic leaders and wartime coalitions is expanded, and the groundwork for studying EU member states’ coalition commitment is laid. This integrative study is the first of its kind to examine the coalition commitment of EU members during the expanded Russo-Ukraine war.

To conduct this analysis, I begin by introducing my hypotheses and consulting relevant literature as to why each condition was chosen. I then introduce the methodology and specific implementation of each condition. After this, the QCA results are displayed and the empirical results are explained. Finally, I conclude by providing three key takeaways and pointing to areas for future study.

1.1. **Why QCA?**

Among the few papers looking to identify why democratic states commit to coalitions, most focus on large-N quantitative analysis spanning multiple conflicts or offer a qualitative study of states with similar characteristics. However, my analysis specifically targets a medium-N (37 cases) which is diverse in both societal and governmental composition. Thus, a more novel methodology is necessary.

QCA is primarily intended for studies such as this. Considering the relatively early state of the war and lack of comprehensive literature on this topic, engaging in a preliminary, outcome-centered approach was needed. Additionally, QCA provides a method to perform comparative process tracing and qualitative study based on “deviant” or atypical cases from the initial study’s findings. Finally, QCA provides a flexible approach to causal inference which is centered on the truth table; meaning that all claims can easily be benchmarked against similar cases which are consistent among different rows on this table.

However, acknowledging QCA’s shortcomings is necessary. All conditions are treated with equal weight and the results are sensitive to calibration and condition selection. For these reasons, I have provided extensive justification for my conditions and calibration methods as well as robustness tests for the most cited alternative conditions. The static nature of QCA requires that this study be treated as an early look at basic causal relationships. Further qualitative case analyses and quantitative robustness checks are necessary to make more specific claims and answer questions around specific cases.

1.2. **Coalition commitment in the EU**

Despite extensive research that has worked to create models of EU states’ involvement in military and peacetime coalitions, few have focused entirely on aid and reflected our modern political reality (Kaeding & Selck, 2005; Mello, 2022). These studies have primarily focused on identifying the incentives for EU states to engage in military deployments abroad or determining whether participation in multi-national coalitions is an inherent component of democratic states. Considering the response to the invasion of Ukraine formulated by the EU—a multi-billion-dollar macro-aid package of support—it is especially notable that nearly all individual EU members have elected to pledge individual bilateral aid as part of a “Team Europe” coalition (European Union, n.d.). This unified response includes members holding other states accountable for their rhetoric and pledges and amounts to a strong coalition worth investigating. To begin this investigation, I offer four conditions that are likely to have a high impact on a state’s decision to be highly committed to the Ukraine coalition. My hypotheses around these conditions largely stem from those drafted (and proven) by Mello in his 2019 paper on the Iraq war. The only exception to this is my “refugees” condition—
which operates logically like Mello’s “fatalities” condition—but has a hypothesis generated around a preponderance of literature which suggests nations most directly affected by the Ukraine war are more likely to want to contribute to supporting Ukraine.

1.3. Recent elections

The first of proposed conditions are recent elections. Reorganization of government following elections of any type often includes a re-evaluation of policy goals. Following the reasoning of Mello’s study, recent elections are likely to increase the chance of early withdrawal from an aid-focused coalition. Mello cites four key reasons: new leaders from opposition parties often revise pre-existing policies; ‘culpable’ leaders responsible for coalition involvement will want to continue their efforts to protect themselves from domestic punishment; new leadership often includes new partisanship of office, which would also likely incur a policy shift; and policy choices of leaders are often informed by personal beliefs and political experiences (Gartzke & Gleditsch, 2004; Leeds et al., 2009). While I find these descriptions of the importance of the condition largely agreeable, my study diverges by scoping in all recent elections, not just the ones where leadership change occurred. I do this for two primary reasons. One is that in the limited timeframe of the Russo-Ukrainian war, there have been relatively few elections to include in the dataset. As such, more meaningful results can be achieved by focusing on all elections. Additionally, elections tend to force incumbents to double-down on major policies to bolster electoral outcomes. In Hungary, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party rose by 10 points in public popularity following its April re-election. Since then, Orbán has strengthened his staunchly anti-coalition rhetoric, even going as far as to accuse the EU of prolonging the war in Ukraine (Spike, 2023). I believe that the engagement in the electoral process can generate the outcome when recent elections occur and the partisanship is either re-affirmed to be leftist, or changes to be leftist through these elections.

For these reasons, I anticipate this hypothesis:

H₁: Recent elections combined with leftist partisanship are sufficient conditions for high coalition commitment.

1.4. Upcoming elections

When considering participation in expensive multi-state coalitions, public support is often at the top of leaders’ minds. During the Iraq war, evidence was clear that nations would withdraw from the warfighting coalition when national elections were upcoming to boost public support (Davidson, 2014). Mello’s initial study accounts for this and hypothesizes that upcoming elections are part of a collection of conditions leading to early withdrawal, so for my study, I extrapolate that upcoming elections would have a similar effect on a state’s decision around how much aid to dedicate to the coalition, if any at all. I do not anticipate that upcoming elections will be independently sufficient due to the wide variety of views on what would be positively received by the public. In Latvia, total coalition commitment is the most politically viable option due to the public’s strong feelings on independence from Russia, despite the relatively right-wing government (Norstat Eesti AS, 2020). However, in other right-leaning nations such as Hungary, the most electorally popular position was full withdrawal from the coalition (Ipsos, 2022). I predict that the presence of upcoming elections would encourage states to act in the best interest of public support, with "public support" to be defined by the data I collect.

To account for the number of ways in which upcoming elections can causally link to the outcome, I propose that upcoming elections are an insufficient but necessary part of a
condition, which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result (Mackie, 1965). Conditions with this type of causal relationship are referred to as INUS conditions. Essentially, I am anticipating that upcoming elections will not be independently sufficient nor necessary but instead a non-redundant component among a configuration of conditions sufficient for the outcome.

For these reasons, I anticipate the following hypothesis:

**H₂:** Upcoming elections are an INUS for high coalition commitment.

### 1.5. **Leftist Partisanship**

Since the escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian war into a full-scale Russian invasion, the EU coalition has taken on a staunchly leftist view of how best to respond. Leftist parties tend to prefer avoiding military confrontation and instead focus on directed foreign aid (Thérien & Noel, 2000; Rathbun, 2004). The EU’s condemnation of Russia’s violation of the UN charter and its year-long persistence that the only resolution is the return of all Russian-held Ukrainian territories have only solidified the appearance of a newly strengthened liberal world order—with this sentiment notably being echoed by left-wing governments (European Union, 2023). Bearing this in mind, the political context for this coalition is completely different than in many prior studies, notably Mello’s study focusing on the Iraq war coalition, where left-wing parties were overwhelmingly reluctant to partake in the coalition (Mello, 2019). Under the current hawkish conceptions of liberalism and maintaining the same assumptions around partisan influence in matters of security that Mello affirmed, it can be inferred that adherence to leftist partisanship would influence a state’s alignment with hawkish policy around aid to Ukraine (Thérien & Noel, 2000; Rathbun, 2004).

As such, I do not anticipate leftist partisanship to be independently sufficient. Rather, I consider leftist partisanship under the following hypothesis:

**H₃:** Leftist partisanship is an INUS condition for high coalition commitment.

### 1.6. **Refugees**

One of the most notable externalities of the Russia-Ukraine war has been the 8 million plus refugees recorded across Europe (United Nations, n.d.). An influx of refugees into regions noted for their previously high intolerance for refugees and the subsequent reversal in the case of Ukrainian refugees, begs the question if this influx played a role in states’ decision to engage in a high level of commitment to the aid coalition (Pepinsky et al., 2022). Countries that have a large number of Ukrainian refugees not only have an incentive to aid and support these refugees for the health of their own nation, but they are also more often than not nations exposed to the same harms of Russian aggression as Ukraine is. Poland has reminded the public continuously of its right to invoke Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) founding treaty, which would allow the invoker to host a discussion between nations around a threat to their security (Crowley, 2022). Large populations of Ukrainian refugees create targets on the backs of states who host them in a war about seeking ethnic unity, as put by the invader (Putin, 2021). However, a state’s response to such a risk is entirely dependent on its political situation and views on the best method to achieve peace in Ukraine. As such, I predict that the most plausible way for refugees to play a role in a state’s decision to maintain a high level of aid is only when that is also met with leftist partisanship. The decision of nations such as Poland—certainly non-leftist and encountering high refugee intake—to commit to the Ukraine coalition is better explained by qualitative factors such as popular support and historical relations with Russia; two factors which my
study cannot account for. As such, I have based my hypothesis on the mental model which suits a sufficient number of cases.

Considering these factors, I anticipate the following hypothesis:

H₄: Refugees combined with leftist partisanship are sufficient conditions for high coalition commitment.

1.7. ACCOUNTING FOR ALTERNATIVE CONDITIONS

During peer-review, a few alternative conditions were recommended to me to consider for my model. These conditions were: geographic proximity to Russia, historical relations with Russia, and popular support for Ukraine.

Addressing geographic proximity is important as without understanding if proximity explains coalition commitment, it is impossible to distinguish between commitment explained by high refugee numbers and commitment simply a result of security concerns due to proximity to the current conflict. To account for this alternative condition, I performed a Pearson correlation test.

Figure 1. Pearson correlation plot between geographic proximity to Russia and coalition commitment

![Pearson correlation plot](https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2023/iss1/5)

\[ r (35) = -0.58, p < 0.01 \]

The result was a moderate negative correlation of -0.55 that was statistically significant (p < 0.01). While this does indicate that there is a level of correlation between geographic proximity and coalition commitment, the relationship is weak and explains the outcome significantly worse than the refugees condition does when the same test is conducted. Additionally, this correlation metric obviously does not account for important cases such as Finland, Romania, Hungary, and Portugal, and as such, a more complex causal model is
needed to explore these cases.

Secondly, examining historical relations between states and Russia was a suggested condition. The logic behind this condition was that historically tense relations with Russia or a history of being occupied by Russia would influence the relevant states’ decision to provide aid to Ukraine. However, I did not include this condition as I could not find a sensible way to operationalize it. Looking at past occupation by Russia only scopes in a handful of states and runs into the same issues as geographic proximity. Analyzing historical relations is similarly difficult as those are hard to quantify and are much better suited for qualitative case studies as a follow-up to the pathways generated by my study.

Finally, popular support for Ukraine was a suggested alternative condition. I declined to include this condition largely due to a lack of consistent data. While there are a handful of studies that document public perception of the Russo-Ukrainian war, these studies often omit important smaller nations relevant to my analysis or are simply too sparse to document a full timeline for 2022. There are no polls documenting public perception for each nation before and after each election, and as such, I cannot reasonably infer public opinion on the war as it relates to the elections timeline my study is based around. Additionally, these studies all differ in whether they deal with EU aid, NATO aid, or each individual nation’s aid—making them non-comparable.

2. METHODS

2.1. CASE SELECTION

This article analyzes 37 cases from the 27 EU member states across the full year of 2022. Each case represents a “governmental term” and each time a new government was formed after an election, a new case began. 20 of the 37 cases span the full year, and the remaining 17 are states with two government terms in 2022.

2.2. OUTCOME: HIGH COALITION COMMITMENT

The outcome explained is a high level of Ukrainian aid coalition commitment. Aid is monitored from January 24th, 2022 through December 31st, 2022—reflecting the full span of the conflict, including the immediate pretext (Antezza et al., 2023). These dates were chosen largely based on the limits of the Ukraine support tracker, where this span of dates within 2022 allowed for the most comprehensive data analysis.

Coalition commitment is considered to be high when the amount of aid committed as a percentage of GDP falls at or above the median number, at 0.13% of GDP committed. This condition does not factor in the temporal component of aid, as the timeframe is simply too short to effectively distinguish between governments’ decisions to commit aid. In many cases, governments put together aid packages at the beginning of the invasion that were only sent out in May or June—regardless of whether that same government was still in power at the time (Antezza et al., 2023). Because of this, I chose to evaluate separate terms as components of the total aid distributed across the entire year; even if two terms of government took office across 2022, they are considered at the same level of overall commitment.

Evaluating coalition commitment in this way was also necessary, as it is currently the only effective way to compare commitment in an empirical way. Even the states that have provided little to no aid refuse to announce their withdrawal from the coalition of support for Ukraine, instead choosing to purport that they are neutral but supportive (Than, 2023). As such, the only way to distinguish between rhetoric and action is by evaluating the tangible aid they provide to Ukraine. Aid is monitored as a percentage of GDP to contex-
tualize it within each state’s individual means, as this study seeks to explore causal pathways to individual commitment, not objectively large portions of aid. States that contribute an above-median percentage of their GDP to aid for Ukraine can confidently be considered strong coalition members.

2.3. EXPLANATORY CONDITIONS

*Recent Elections* is a condition that seeks to represent whether the current government was formed from an election in 2022. Out of 37 total cases, 10 represented terms emerging from recent elections. This condition was represented using crisp-set analysis, where the presence of recent elections was coded as a crisp score of 1.0 and the absence of recent elections as a crisp score of 0.

*Upcoming Elections* indicates if a state is anticipating an election in 2022 or 2023. 18 cases represented terms with elections of any kind on the horizon, and to indicate this, a crisp score of 1.0 was assigned. Cases with no upcoming elections were represented with a crisp score of 0.

*Leftist Partisanship* is a comprehensive analysis of the presiding government’s level of leftist partisanship, primarily hinging on Comparative Political Data Set (CPDS) data (Armingeon et al., 2022). For government terms beginning in 2020, CPDS data was used to classify each party in the ruling coalition as left, center, or right. These values were then coded into 1, 0.5, and 0 respectively to refer to proximity to being “left leaning.” In the parliament, a weighted average of partisanship was computed utilizing these partisanship scores and weights derived from parliamentary seat shares. The executive’s partisanship was coded as either 1, 0.5, or 0 based on their respective party’s coding. Finally, an average of the parliament’s and executive’s partisanship was taken to represent the government’s overall leftist partisanship. The condition was analyzed using fuzzy-set direct calibration; the scores were calibrated into a range from 0 to 1 (1 being “fully in”), with 0.5 being the crossover point for set membership. 14 out of the 37 cases were classified as having leftist partisanship under these conditions.

*Refugees* is a condition indicative of cases with significant influxes of Ukrainian refugees. Data is drawn from the UNHCR and entered in the Ukraine support tracker as a percentage of each state’s total population. Countries with 0.056% (the median value of this datapoint) or more of their population comprised of Ukrainian refugees were considered “in” for this fuzzy condition, with the max of the dataset, 0.496% considered “fully in.” For states with two cases representing two governmental terms, this datapoint remained the same in both cases.

3. EXPLAINING HIGH COALITION COMMITMENT

3.1. TEST FOR NECESSITY

The first step in finding a QCA solution is checking for necessary conditions. Conditions are evaluated by looking at consistency, coverage, and the relevance of necessity (RoN). Consistency evaluates the level of necessity for the condition, coverage is the level of coverage a condition has for all the cases, and RoN displays how relevant the finding is. Table 1 shows the analysis of all conditions and of the absence (~) of all conditions. No conditions or negations of conditions meet the commonly accepted threshold of 0.90 consistency to be considered necessary for high coalition commitment (Schneider & Wagemann, 2013).
Table 1. Analysis of conditions necessary for high Ukrainian aid coalition commitment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
<th>RoN</th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
<th>RoN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>0.547</td>
<td>0.555</td>
<td>0.680</td>
<td>~U</td>
<td>0.453</td>
<td>0.486</td>
<td>0.673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>0.277</td>
<td>0.535</td>
<td>0.853</td>
<td>~E</td>
<td>0.723</td>
<td>0.517</td>
<td>0.434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>0.775</td>
<td>0.820</td>
<td>0.851</td>
<td>~R</td>
<td>0.514</td>
<td>0.528</td>
<td>0.673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>0.548</td>
<td>0.661</td>
<td>0.795</td>
<td>~P</td>
<td>0.630</td>
<td>0.579</td>
<td>0.644</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: U = Upcoming Elections, E = Recent Elections, R = Refugees, P = Leftist Partisanship, the tilde symbol refers to the absence of a condition, RoN = Relevance of Necessity

Regardless, two results are noteworthy from this table. The relatively high value in the absence of recent elections (~E) indicates a significant number of cases that presented high coalition commitment but did not have recent elections. This is especially notable as it begins to suggest a contradiction with the predicted pathway for high coalition commitment as suggested in H2, going against the theory that recent elections might lead to strong commitments. Additionally, a high refugee population (R) appears even more notably as a highly present condition for the desired outcome. To explore this finding more, I conducted a Pearson correlation test.

Figure 2. Pearson correlation plot between refugee population and coalition commitment

Note: r (35) = .74, p = < 0.01

The result shows a statistically significant (p < 0.01) strong positive correlation of .74 which accounts for many of the provided cases. This suggests that the high refugee population should be considered an important condition when analyzing its role in causal pathways for the outcome.
3.2. Truth Table Analysis

The central piece of QCA analysis is identifying sufficient conditions or sufficient causal pathways that always result in the desired outcome. Table 2 is the truth table for the outcome (C) of high coalition commitment and the explanatory conditions of upcoming elections (U), recent elections (E), refugees (R), and leftist partisanship (P). This table contains all rows with empirical cases and omits all logical remainders, which are combinations without any empirical cases. Consistency and ‘proportional reduction in inconsistency’ (PRI) are the key measurements for this model. Consistency is the level of sufficiency for the row it is present for; with sufficiency meaning that whenever this configuration of cases is present, the outcome is achieved. PRI is a measurement used to avoid simultaneous subset relations of both the outcome and non-outcome. This score is used to identify whether cases are sufficient for the outcome or the non-outcome. High scores of PRI are required as they indicate a high level of consistency in sufficiency for the outcome, while low PRI scores indicate consistency with the negation of the outcome. In order to generate a solution from the truth table, I took the top 5 rows, which were above the commonly accepted threshold of 0.75 (Greckhamer et al., 2018).

Table 2. Truth table for high Ukrainian aid coalition commitment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditions</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>PRI</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U E R P C N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 1 1 0 1 2</td>
<td>0.942</td>
<td>0.907</td>
<td>BG2, LV2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 1 1 1 1 1</td>
<td>0.941</td>
<td>0.889</td>
<td>DK2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 0 1 1 1 3</td>
<td>0.927</td>
<td>0.842</td>
<td>DK1, FI, SK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 0 1 0 1 7</td>
<td>0.859</td>
<td>0.811</td>
<td>BG1, CY, CZ, EE, LV1, LU, PL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 0 1 1 1 2</td>
<td>0.808</td>
<td>0.600</td>
<td>AT, DE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 0 1 1 1 2</td>
<td>0.701</td>
<td>0.464</td>
<td>MT1, PT1, ES, SE1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 1 0 1 0 4</td>
<td>0.643</td>
<td>0.447</td>
<td>FR2, MT2, PT2, SI2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 0 1 0 0 4</td>
<td>0.561</td>
<td>0.347</td>
<td>BE, IE, LT, RO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 1 0 0 0 3</td>
<td>0.542</td>
<td>0.314</td>
<td>HU2, IT2, SE2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 0 0 0 0 2</td>
<td>0.541</td>
<td>0.244</td>
<td>HR, NL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 0 0 0 0 5</td>
<td>0.513</td>
<td>0.187</td>
<td>FR1, EL, HU1, IT1, SI1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: U = Upcoming Elections, E = Recent Elections, R = Refugees, P = Leftist Partisanship, logical remainders omitted (see appendix for full truth table)

Finally, I employed the minimization procedure provided by the QCA package in R (Duşa, 2018). Table 3 displays the parsimonious solution’s two models derived from this. I utilized the parsimonious solution as it provides the maximally simple solution, fit for causal inference (Baumgartner, 2014). A condition’s presence is indicated by a full circle (●) and its absence is represented by an empty circle (○).
Table 3. Paths to high Ukrainian aid coalition commitment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Path 1</td>
<td>Path 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upcoming Elections</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent Elections</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Refugee Influx</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leftist Partisanship</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistency</td>
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<td>0.927</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRI</td>
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<td>0.887</td>
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<tr>
<td>Raw Coverage</td>
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<td>0.193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unique Coverage</td>
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<td>0.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covered Cases</td>
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<td>BG2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CY</td>
<td>LV2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>DK2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LV1</td>
<td>FI</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LU</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>DK1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FI</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SK</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Solution Consistency | 0.872  | 0.861  |
Solution PRI         | 0.806  | 0.792  |
Solution Coverage    | 0.731  | 0.737  |

Note: Full circles indicate a condition’s presence, empty circles indicate absence.

Path 1 of Model 1 represents cases where elections were upcoming and a high Ukrainian refugee population existed (U*R). This is a notable configuration as it accounts for cases where hawkish attitudes towards the Russian invasion have been particularly prominent—especially in Finland, a nation currently scrambling to join the NATO (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, n.d.). This pathway has a high degree of raw coverage, being present in nearly half of all cases where the outcome was present. Additionally, this configuration confirms my anticipated effect of upcoming elections (H2), proving that the political pressure of upcoming elections and domestic pressure of refugee influx create the sufficient conditions for a high degree of coalition participation.

Path 2 of Model 1 is a combination of cases with a high influx of Ukrainian refugees and recent elections (E*R). This configuration has a lower (though still significant) raw coverage than the previous pathway and accounts uniquely for important cases where the political follow-through of high coalition commitment was necessary to achieve the outcome. During Bulgaria’s second term (which was uniquely accounted for under this pathway), the country made its first military aid commitment to Ukraine (Antezza et al., 2023). This configuration affirms the importance of refugees and recent elections in determining coalition commitment, though in a different configuration than anticipated in their respective hypotheses (H1, H4).
Path 1 of Model 2 offers another configuration featuring a high influx of Ukrainian refugees, yet this time in conjunction with leftist partisanship (R*P). Considering this configuration accounts for a large portion of the cases where high coalition commitment was achieved, many interesting conclusions can be drawn from this configuration. The idea of leftist democracies, large influxes of refugees, and a response of high bilateral aid to the afflicted nation appears to be affirming a continuously repeating story in nations such as Germany. This configuration affirms my hypothesis around the condition of refugees and leftist partisanship (H₂, H₃).

Path 2 of Model 2 shows a very different view, instead representing that the absence of upcoming elections combined with the absence of recent elections and the presence of leftist partisanship (~U*~R*P) leads to the outcome of high coalition commitment. While this configuration should be analyzed with caution as it barely passes the consistency metric required for inclusion of 0.75, it nevertheless offers an interesting perspective on what I had previously anticipated to be a more consequential condition of leftist partisanship. In that way, it suggests a level of validity to my presumption about leftist partisanship’s importance to high coalition commitment (H₃) but does little to suggest much else.

3.3. CASE-LEVEL ANALYSIS

To conduct case-level analysis, I created an XY plot also from the QCA package (Duşa, 2018). I use this plot to display set membership for each model and the outcome. From this visualization, greater understanding of typical and atypical or “deviant” cases can be achieved.

*Figure 3. XY plot of Model 1 sufficiency*

Note: Cases are labelled with just ISO country codes and no term identifier due to overlap.

https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2023/iss1/5
Figure 4. XY plot of Model 2 sufficiency

Note: Cases are labelled with just ISO country codes and no term identifier due to overlap.

Dark-filled points indicate typical cases. The cross indicates the most typical case. Light-filled points indicate deviant cases. Square cases are typical in outcome, but deviant in their non-membership with the model. Triangle cases in the lower left quadrant of the plot are individually irrelevant as they are neither members of the model nor the outcome. Finally, diamond cases in the lower right are deviant cases which are members of the model but absent from the outcome.

With these plots devised, relationships for further analysis and case-level study can now be identified. There are two main principles for identifying cases for further study: choose the two typical cases which have maximum membership within the outcome and maximum difference in membership in the model (Schneider & Rohlfing, 2013). Using this method, the two typical cases most worth comparing are Austria and Estonia. Depending on the model used, both may be considered the most typical case, but there is a significant gulf in model membership between the two cases that is worth investigating. These two cases differ on two conditions in the truth table: upcoming elections and leftist partisanship. Looking now at deviant cases and applying the same method, we can look to compare Estonia and Cyprus. Both cases have membership within the model—Estonia significantly so—but are opposites in outcome membership. Additionally, both cases inhabit the same row on the truth table, suggesting their differences are not captured by my model. Future case studies looking to explain the outcome in these four cases may help shed light on the robustness of my model. For now, these plots help outline the limitations and strengths of the model as I attempt to draw conclusions from the results.
4. CONCLUSION

This article tries to determine the conditions under which EU governments set out to become highly involved in a coalition that sought to counter Russian aggression by implementing bilateral aid for Ukraine. All EU members voted to condemn the Russian invasion, but a year later, participation in establishing a “liberal world order” appears divided. This article builds upon the framework developed in Mello (2019), seeking to answer why democracies coalesce around an issue, rather than addressing whether coalitions are an inherent feature of democracy. I elected to employ a similarly principled set-theoretic approach, analyzing the presence of upcoming elections, recent elections, refugee influx, and leftist partisanship to determine if there was interplay leading to high coalition commitment.

My analysis arrived at three key findings that point to conditions that can be considered influential on democratic governments’ commitment to coalitions. Firstly, a large influx of Ukrainian refugees proved to be a significant condition for the majority of cases and many notable cases as well. While not independently sufficient, the condition had a large coverage of cases presenting the outcome, and was present in the three most significant models, again with a large coverage. Considering growing concerns over liberalism’s ability to respond to migrant crises and the wide variety of sentiments towards open borders in the EU, it is especially worth noting this condition's presence in solutions (Hafner, 2016). The fact that nations involved in political battles such as upcoming elections and recent elections, which are also responding to high levels of Ukrainian refugees, inevitably decide to maintain a high level of bilateral aid to Ukraine, implies that the political reality of responding to migrant crises is more complex than previously conceived.

The second key finding concerns the prevalence or absence of elections—whether upcoming or recent—in 3 of the 4 computed pathways. As discussed above, the presence of elections of any kind leading to high coalition commitment implies the presumptions around confronting (or affirming) political realities in my initial hypothesis were largely correct. Furthermore, this affirms a portion of the claims made by Mello (2019) in his study of the Iraq war. Mello’s paper found that leadership change alone was not sufficient for coalition defection in the Iraq war’s military coalition, and instead most countries maintained their commitment after experiencing a change in leadership (Mello, 2019). In my study, recent elections (including those that retained the same leaders) often occurred in countries with strong commitments to bilateral aid. Within the context of the Russo-Ukrainian war, it can be largely assumed that elections have played a role in providing the political pressure for states to engage or embolden their involvement in an aid-based coalition.

The third and final key finding is that while leftist partisanship was a notable determining condition for the causal pathways it was present in—especially in Path 1 of Model 2, where it indicated that leftist governments responding to high refugee influxes are in a sufficient configuration to engage in an aid-based coalition—partisanship was not nearly as strongly a sole determinant as believed to be in my initial hypothesis. Notable outliers are Estonia and Latvia (both terms), which scored close to 0 in terms of partisanship, yet were first and second in terms of coalition commitment (each committing around 1% of their total GDP to Ukrainian aid). This suggests that while leftist partisan states may be more likely to contribute aid in the EU’s Ukrainian aid coalition, other conditions not accounted for within my study also cause this outcome. Comparative process tracing from the pairs of cases identified for further case-level research could lead to more profound findings for these deviant cases.
In conclusion, QCA provides a preliminary map of cases that will ultimately build the theoretical framework for qualitative studies. Investigating the domestic politics for deviant cases will invariably lead to a better understanding of these cases, which my model is unable to explain. As more information is released and the conflict matures to have more distinct phases, better data can be collected which will allow for crisper conditions and clearer boundaries on coalition membership. All of this is to acknowledge the shortcomings of these relatively early findings and encourage further study to generate more accurate models.

REFERENCES


Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. (n.d.). Finland is applying for NATO membership. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland. https://um.fi/finland-is-applying-for-nato-membership


## Appendix

### Appendix A. Full truth table for high Ukrainian aid coalition commitment

<table>
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<th>Conditions</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>PRI</th>
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<td>1  1  1  1</td>
<td>?  0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Note: U = Upcoming Elections, E = Recent Elections, R = Refugees, P = Leftist Partisanship*