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Pomona College

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**The Politics of Belonging:
How Migration Affects Social Democratic Welfare States**

Kari Siegenthaler



Dr. Pierre Englebert, Advisor

Politics Department
Pomona College

*Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Bachelor of Arts in Politics*

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Abstract

The refugee crisis of 2015 sparked a new era of migration politics in Europe, with waves of immigrants altering the expectations for integration and assimilation policies in many states. Social democratic welfare states, that is, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, while far north of many of the arrival destinations of these migrants, were not immune to these changes. However, as social-democratic welfare states, much of their legitimacy rests on their ability to provide for their citizens, which is in turn supported by a pervasive sense of solidarity amongst their communities, so that extensive tax systems can continue to flourish. Migration, however, particularly migration of dependents or individuals who can be seen as a “drain” on the resources of the state, may threaten redistributive efforts. When citizens of the state feel that resources are allocated to people they deem “undeserving”, whether due to their race, citizenship status... etc, or that the welfare state is unnecessarily economically strained, perceptions of governmental institutions may be affected. My thesis seeks to understand the effect of migration, specifically before and after the 2015 refugee crisis, on social democratic welfare states, with specific reference to the rise of xenophobic and nativist ideologies, historical migration policies, and current government performance. Overall, it tests the idea that the movement of “the Other” (migrants) into European welfare states encourages the “Americanization” of European politics, that is, the use of racial divisions to undermine the legitimacy of redistribution practices. My thesis is an analysis of welfare state decay. It grapples with the notion that solidarity is more difficult to establish in heterogeneous societies, and any threat to homogeneity threatens institutional strength and perception.

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Introduction

The United States has a history riddled with racist reasoning, permeating into arguments against welfare spending based on the existence of a visibly different minority. Conversely, many European welfare states have maintained fairly homogenous populations, preventing racist arguments from de-legitimizing their redistributive policies. However, as migration increases to such states, the ability of political leaders to exploit changing demographics increases. With the ability to reduce individuals reliant on welfare state policies to an “Other,” the legitimacy of redistribution practices is threatened.

I am operating from a standard definition of welfare states as involving “state responsibility for securing some basic modicum of welfare for its citizens” (Esping-Anderson 1989, 36). The congruence of this responsibility with the definition of the state implies that these states legitimize themselves based on their ability to provide welfare or benefits to their citizens. Who, exactly, embodies this class of citizens, of beneficiaries, is dependent on the type of welfare state.

As delineated by Esping-Anderson (1989), welfare states can be broken into three categories: liberal, conservative, and social-democratic. Liberal welfare states tend to have means-tested assistance, modest universal transfers and social insurance plans, benefits for low-income, working-class individuals, and stigma associated with entitlements. According to Esping-Anderson, examples of liberal welfare states are the United States, Canada, and Australia. Conservative welfare states attempt to preserve status differentials, so their redistribution efforts are tied to class, and are only pervasive when the traditional family unit is unable to provide for

its members. Examples of conservative welfare states are Austria, France, Germany, and Italy. Finally, social-democratic welfare states are defined by a fusion of liberalism and socialism, in which universal solidarity in favor of the welfare state is constructed. These states tend to have the most extensive redistribution policies, in which equality is promoted and the middle-class benefits. Examples of social-democratic welfare states are Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. Generally employing the most liberal, widespread welfare and redistribution policies, these states have the most to “lose” from migration, as they already enjoy the most pervasive notion of solidarity.

Even without direct benefit from welfare policies, immigration may erode the ability of the state to provide welfare for its citizens. Of course, if immigrants do increase reliance on welfare benefits, the growing number of beneficiaries puts an obvious strain on the state and its ability to provide for its citizens. Redistributive systems meant to support a certain number of individuals will be resistant to growing pressures from previously external groups. Additionally, with a growing minority, xenophobic political parties may prey on obvious divisions that permeate past citizenship or migration status. Overall, an increase in heterogeneity means that the type of people who benefit from the state could be in flux, and any change has the possibility of sparking multitudes of backlash. Therefore, there is an intersection of movements at play. The literal migration of human beings into the welfare state may incite xenophobic and nationalist social movements, which may in turn degrade public opinion and support for the welfare state. This is coupled by a general theme of scarcity determining welfare policies, legitimizing wariness from states towards growing numbers of beneficiaries.

The refugee crisis of 2015 spurred waves of immigration north towards Europe. For many countries, refugees and migrants were arriving at unprecedented levels, sparking political debate and discussion on policies of integration and assimilation. The social-democratic welfare states of Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden were no exception. As their welfare institutions were stretched by pressures from immense increases in immigration, the ability of the states to provide for their citizens was threatened. My thesis focuses on the relationship between these differing variables, as I hope to point towards an understanding of how welfare states might be able to reconcile important aspects of their promotion of equality with the threat of heterogeneity. Overall, I wonder, how does increases of migration, particularly over the last ten years, affect public opinion towards foreign-born individuals, and the strength of governmental institutions in social democratic welfare states? What other factors are at play that may have confounding effects on public opinion and institutional strength?

Literature Review

The derivations of legitimacy of welfare states are multi-dimensional and reliant on the socio-economic status and ideological views of the individuals assessing it. In the Netherlands, specifically, one view of governmental responsibility pertained to the idea of protecting weaker social groups, through mechanisms such as redistribution or unemployment benefits (Oorschot 2006). Redistribution, however, relies on the notion of solidarity and nationhood, that is, that there is a collective identity for individuals living within the state that compels them to support and protect “weaker” groups. Welfare policies and practices are possible only with community support and willingness to participate.

In that sense, welfare states are necessarily inwardly focused, with an “in-group” (their citizens who are able to benefit from and participate in the state’s liberal policies and benefits) and the “out-group” (essentially, everyone else). Garnering legitimacy from a sense of collectivism and solidarity, the welfare state is uniquely vulnerable to an influx of migration. The recent rise of migration to various welfare states oftentimes leads to increasingly xenophobic nativist sentiment. Freeman coined this the “Americanization of welfare politics”, but it is better characterized simply as an “us versus them” mentality (Freeman 1986). Regardless, as long as the legitimacy of the welfare state rests on this sense of solidarity, migration may threaten such unity.

A nascent question of Esping-Andersen’s work was “can the welfare state fundamentally transform capitalist society?” (Esping-Andersen 1989, 21). As welfare-states, particularly social-democratic welfare states, in Esping-Andersen’s terms, seek to establish varying levels of equality through redistributive policies, they also fight against the natural qualities of a capitalist, free-market system, in which laborers are profited individually for their sole labor. While capitalism relies on the commodification of people as products (“the mainsprings of modern social policy lie in the process by which both human needs and labor power became commodities and, hence, our well-being came to depend on our relation to the cash nexus”), Esping-Anderson emphasizes the “de-commodifying” nature of welfare states. However, welfare state de-commodification garners success only with the necessary condition that it is able to “emancipate individuals from market dependence” (Esping-Andersen 1989, 41). Such emancipation depends on a pervasive sense of solidarity, strong enough to garner enough legitimacy to incentivize citizens to give liberally to the state, which in turn redistributes its

wealth as it deems necessary. Migration, however, particularly migration of dependents or individuals who can be seen as a “drain” on the resources of the state, may threaten redistributive efforts. When citizens of the state feel that resources are allocated to people they deem “undeserving,” whether due to their race, citizenship status, or other factors, perceptions of governmental institutions may be affected.

A Stranger in Paradise (2016) captures this sentiment hauntingly. Captured in three acts, it follows a “teacher” (the only actor in the film), as he patronizingly explains to groups of immigrants the context of their arrival in Europe. To the first group he addresses, he painstakingly describes his father’s story of growing up amidst the World Wars; the father, unlike the migrants, chose to stay in his home country, and work towards the creation of a welfare state (the welfare state in which the migrants are now seeking refuge). The teacher’s utter naivety in regard to the dissimilarities of the two situations is compounded with his final line of the first act: “fix your own country, don’t come here, we don’t want you here” (Hendrikx 2016). While jarring on screen, the reality of this reaction is extremely pertinent in many welfare states. As Esping-Andersen argued, “the risks of welfare-state backlash depend not on spending, but on the class character of welfare states” (Esping-Andersen 1989, 59). In this light, Sainsbury’s finding that “immigration status influences the likelihood of being poor” in all three classifications of welfare states indicates a possible risk to welfare state functionality (Sainsbury 2012, 130).

In a study included in chapter six of her book, Sainsbury seeks to answer how the quality of social rights compares between citizens and non-citizens in six different welfare states. Basing

her study on three indicators, “decommodification, the utilization of rights in relation to needs, and the stratification of rights,” Sainsbury again borrows from Esping-Andersen’s previously established metrics, referencing his definition of decommodification as “the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market participation” (Sainsbury 2012, 113; Esping-Andersen 1989, 66). She points out a crucial failure of the applicability of his type of decommodification, as “many immigrants have a weak attachment to the labor market” (Sainsbury 2012, 114). The teacher in *A Stranger in Paradise* presents a similar idea more simply: he states, “55% of people from Africa will never work... you will simply take,” offering no source for his statistic (Hendrikx 2016). However, to account for this inapplicability of the decommodification metric, Sainsbury refines Esping-Andersen’s definition to encompass a standard of living above the poverty line. From this metric, she finds that “non-citizen and ethnic minority immigrant households are usually even more vulnerable to poverty” (Sainsbury 2012, 129). Even with this division in wealth, Sainsbury also finds that “a larger proportion of citizens consistently receive unemployment benefits than immigrants, despite the higher unemployment rates of immigrants” (Sainsbury 2012, 126). As Esping-Andersen’s original definition of a welfare state was that it simply involved “state responsibility for securing some basic modicum of welfare for its citizens,” this finding is in line with welfare states’ supposed functionality (Esping-Andersen 1989, 36). Welfare states do not have to secure equal amounts of welfare for their citizens, or even welfare that is proportionate to need. Immigrants may get the short end of the stick.

The reasons why immigrants may be treated differently, both by their surrounding peers and by the government, have been long discussed by scholars in the field. Will Kymlicka (2015) points

to two explanations: “one rooted in perceptions of economic threat or economic burden... and the other in perceptions of cultural threat,” but later clarifies that “the cultural threat is the more powerful factor” (Kymlicka 2015, 10-11). As always, an adherent to the themes of welfare state literature, the teacher in *A Stranger in Paradise* asks every immigrant if they believe in God. In Europe, “we don’t believe in God,” he states, mentioning explicitly the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, attributing it to Muslim influence (Hendrikx 2016). This religious division touched on by the teacher is wholly representative of the issue that Kymlicka presents. While immigrants may not take any more, or even an equal amount, of resources from the state as compared to citizens, their cultural differences still threaten the solidarity that legitimizes much of the welfare state’s concerns. While Kymlicka is correct in stating that there is “no reason to assume in advance that immigrants form a ‘they,’” Sainsbury’s findings indicate that some such division does exist (Kymlicka 2016, 2).

Of course, every country, city, and neighborhood present unique challenges for immigrants, and an overarching analysis of welfare states as a whole fails to indicate location-specific intricacies. As previously described, Esping-Anderson’s delineation of welfare state categories plays into the ability of migration to affect institutional perception and performance. The varying levels of stigma associated with recipients of welfare, as well as how welfare is distributed, affects the type of political rhetoric that is popularized within the state. In welfare states with means-tested benefits, for example, (which tend to be liberal welfare states) immigration may lead to “deservingness judgements” about the beneficiaries of welfare. Therefore, the makeup of the state and context of the redistributive policies affects migration’s impact immensely and cannot be ignored. However, the country of focus in *A Stranger in Paradise* is the Netherlands, which is

classified as a social-democratic welfare state under Esping-Andersen's metrics, and therefore, is expected to have the most extensive redistribution policies. Specifically for this category of welfare states, Sainsbury found that "social democratic regime countries have the highest levels of decommodification, that is, their policies have been more effective in reducing poverty and assuring that immigrants enjoy a socially acceptable standard of living" (Sainsbury 2012, 280).

As emphasized by the film, gaining access to such redistribution is a lengthy, and in many instances, impossible quest. The teacher goes through a series of interviews with immigrants, posing as an immigration officer of sorts, trying to gain their backstories and discern whether or not they would be able to obtain a permit of residence in the Netherlands. A group well over thirty to begin with, less than a handful pass his painful interrogation. While the Netherlands, like many social democratic welfare states, may boast radical, equalizing policies, becoming the beneficiaries of such policies is a feat in and of itself. In order to adequately provide for its citizens, while maintaining its legitimacy, welfare states must either learn to embrace diversity, or fight a losing battle against the global trend towards increased migration, in an effort to preserve homogeneity.

However, ethnic diversity does not necessarily cause the erosion of national solidarity, so this embrace of diversity is possible. In some instances, greater heterogeneity is positively related to interethnic contact and interethnic trust (Van der Meer 2014). Ideally, then, a multi-cultural welfare state is possible, with increasing ethnic diversity strengthening its legitimacy as the state is able to protect and provide for diverse groups. Additionally, welfare states are uniquely attractive to and reliant on migrant labor. Temporary migration, in particular, is ideal for the

welfare state. Temporary migrants are typically young and healthy, and given their citizenship status, unable to utilize the most liberal benefits of the welfare state (Freeman 1986). However, the lure of the perks of citizenship turns many temporary migrants into permanent immigrants. This, coupled with family reunification, is where the strain on the welfare state begins, and, possibly, the erosion of solidarity intensifies.

This loss of solidarity is furthered by a reduction of state capacity to determine citizenship. As the world order develops toward an internationally prescribed set of conditions from which citizenship status stems, the “solidarities on which state capacities may depend” could be undermined, and “citizenship may come to be worth less” (Spiro 2011, 696). The state must be weakened in order for the right to citizenship to be strengthened, according to Spiro. Jurisdiction previously ascribed to internal territories is beginning to be externalized, as “whereas earlier international law constrained states only by telling them whom they could not include as nationals... more recently evolving norms tell states whom they must include as citizens” (Spiro 2011, 718). From this shift in jurisdiction, a new norm has arisen, suggesting that “habitual residents, from birth or not, may not be arbitrarily denied access to citizenship” (Spiro 2011, 721). Indeed, this norm carries such weight that “when citizenship—and with it, full equality—is denied to habitual residents, especially from birth or early childhood, democratic values are compromised” (Spiro 2011, 722). This is life-altering news for immigrants, who face uphill battles gaining citizenship in the vast majority of states to which they immigrate. However, Spiro warns of unwanted effects of these budding rights, stating not only that “governance defined on a territorial basis may lose authority” but also that “protecting that dual [citizenship] status will tend to dilute the categorical importance of identity defined in citizenship terms” (Spiro 2011,

741-742). He attributes this loss to the idea that “community cohesion and identity may be contingent on a group’s ability to discriminate, to demand singular membership, and to set the terms for admission and expulsion,” unable to fathom the idea of a state that operates without exclusionary practices (Spiro 2011, 743).

Debunking seven common arguments against such an idea, Bregman attempts to respond to criticisms from scholars such as Spiro. To the claim that more immigrants will undermine social cohesion, which Spiro said may depend on a community’s ability to discriminate, Bregman tries to debunk Putnam’s famous conclusion that diversity undermines cohesion. Bregman cites the study by Van der Meer that indicated that African Americans and Latinos “report lower levels of trust, regardless of where they live” (Bregman 2017, 224). “It is not the diversity of a community that undermines trust,” Bregman concludes, “but rather the disadvantages that people in diverse communities face” (Bregman 2017, 224). The addition of a migrant workforce would mean “more consumption, more demand, more jobs,” compounding with his argument that “hardworking immigrants boost productivity, which brings paycheck payoffs to everyone” (Bregman 2017, 225). Allowing more migration would ease economic disadvantages, therefore alleviating poverty worldwide (explicitly: “in a world of insane inequality, migration is the most powerful tool for fighting poverty” (Bregman 2017, 228)).

Even with a reduction of global poverty and boost to local economies, migration to welfare states may still be met with hostility. Oftentimes, the strain on the welfare state is coupled with growing welfare populism and welfare chauvinism ideologies. Specifically in the Netherlands, individuals have argued for a more particularistic redistribution policy, excluding “non-native”

citizens (de Koster 2013). Additionally, heterogeneity in the United States allows for arguments based on racial and ethnic divisions to erode the validity of their redistribution efforts (Alesina 2004). These arguments are not unique to the United States, as illustrated by growing anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe. As the ability to reduce individuals reliant on welfare state policies to an “other” increases in European welfare states, the legitimacy of redistribution practices is threatened.

Therefore, ethnic diversity, wholly, does not seem to be a threat to welfare state legitimacy. Rather, immigration in which the new migrants become dependent on the state’s resources and redistribution efforts has the potential of changing public perception of the “lower” class and threatens to reduce the amount of government-sanctioned support to which native-born individuals are accustomed. Immigration that furthers the creation of a visibly different minority may threaten notions of solidarity and nationhood. The issue is not so much the number of immigrants or the level of ethnic diversity present within society, but more so the type of migration, the dependency of the new migrants on welfare state policies, and the existence of parties or ideologies that capitalize on such obvious ethnic divisions. While previous studies have emphasized the cultural and economic threat of migrants on welfare-states generally, the actual causal link between growing migration and public sentiment and government functionality is less understood. By focusing solely on social democratic welfare-states, I hope to illuminate these supposed consequences, furthering the conversation on how these pervasively generous states grapple with changing demographics of their beneficiaries.

Research Design

To work towards an answer to how increasing, and different types of, migration affect welfare state performance and popularity, I began by outlining the history of migration in each of my five case studies. As I am most interested in understanding migration's effect on social democratic welfare states, all of my analysis is focused on Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, which are delineated into the social-democratic category by Esping-Anderson (Esping-Anderson 1989). For each country, I summarized the main emigration origins of migrants to the country in the 20th century, contextualizing modern day immigration and integration policies. The different justifications for immigrants' arrivals, including labor opportunities, family reunification, and free movement are included in this section, to illuminate differing trends among the countries. Finally, an analysis of the current political climate regarding xenophobia and nativist policies and ideologies is contrasted with contemporary policies of migrant and refugee benefits and assimilation requirements.

From the context of these countries' history and current climate, I moved into a quantitative analysis of my research question. I began by analyzing the trends of migration in each country, specifically looking at the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs metric for the percentage of the population that is 'foreign-born,' and the World Bank's quantification of refugee populations. For both variables, I calculated the average from 2010 to 2014, and the average from 2015 to 2020, so that I could control for year-specific noise. Then, the difference between the two averages was calculated, so that an understanding of how the refugee crisis of 2015 affected both the foreign-born and refugee populations in the countries can be gained.

I compared the changes in these populations to changes in public opinion in my case studies. All public opinion questions are from the European Values Survey, which released data in 2008 and 2017, so before and after the 2015 refugee crisis. Specifically, the questions analyzed pertained to national pride, anti-immigrant sentiment, and the importance of birthplace. I then compared indicators of governmental strength to these public perceptions and migration data. My governmental indicators are from the Fragile State Index, and pertain to State Legitimacy, and Factionalized Elites. These two metrics point towards citizen confidence in institutions, integrity of elections, fragmentation of state and institutions along ethnic, class, clan, racial or religious lines, as well as many other variables pertaining to the strength of governmental institutions. Both indicators have data published yearly from 2010 to 2020, so I similarly averaged the data from 2010 to 2014 and from 2015 to 2020, to illuminate the change between the two time periods.

Finally, I analyzed demographic data for my five case studies. My first two metrics are from OECD data and show the percentage of migrants who migrated for reasons pertaining to labor opportunities, and the difference between the foreign-born and native-born unemployment rates. The first metric, the percentage of labor migrants, is only drawn from 2019, so that an understanding of the current makeup of migrants in the countries can be compared to their historical contexts, as delineated in a previous section. The foreign-born unemployment rate metric has data yearly from 2010 to 2019, so I took the average from 2010 to 2014 and compared that to the average from 2015 to 2019, to understand how changes in migration over that time period affected the variable. My final indicator pertains to “fractionalization,” for the countries,

specifically religious, linguistic, and ethnic fractionalization. The data for this variable exists only in 2003, so it points towards a historical perspective of diversity in the countries.

I summarized all of these metrics in a single table, indicating whether each country experienced a decrease, increase, or no change in the variable, and whether they were ranked low, mid, or high, compared to the other countries. From here, conclusions were able to be made, comparing the quantitative data to the qualitative policies and histories each country experienced.

A Historical Look at Migration Policy

Denmark

Until Denmark experienced significant increases of migration in the 1960s, to feed a growing manufacturing economy, the country was remarkably homogenous. These early migrants came largely with guest worker status, and hailed mainly from Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Pakistan.

However, due to the first oil crises effect on the Danish economy, immigration was limited to workers from Europe in the early 1970s. However, a policy allowing family reunification for immigrants already in Denmark allowed for migration from outside of Europe to continue.


Additionally, immigrants from outside of Europe were able to claim asylum status in line with the Geneva Conventions, presenting another avenue of circumventing Denmark's strict policies.

As Denmark experienced a negative birthrate and population growth until 1984, it was partially reliant on immigration to fill labor shortages (Hedetoft 2006).

Given Denmark's classification as a social-democratic welfare state (Esping-Anderson 1989), most social rights "depend only on legal residence in the country, not, for example, on labor market participation or citizenship" (Nannestad 2004). Migrants in the 1960s, then, who immediately contributed to the labor market, and thus, through taxes, to the welfare state, presented no real threat to welfare state functionality. In subsequent years, however, refugees or dependents (women, children, or anyone dependent on others for financial support) became "financial liabilities" for the Danish welfare state (Nannestad 2004). Exacerbated by high transfer payments weakening economic incentives for labor market participation and high minimum wages limiting low-skilled jobs, "the Danish welfare state may be most attractive to immigrants with a relatively low market value" (Nannestad 2004).

In the 2010s, Denmark further tightened their immigration laws, reducing social welfare programs for asylum grantees, among other policy changes (Ziaee 2018). Even with their allowance of family reunification and asylum status, "Danish immigration policies are openly the strictest in the European Union according to the Government" (A 2011). Denmark's "ethno-national approach," then, can be explained by its inexperience with heterogeneity, and the financial restraints that define the welfare state. This lack of experience manifests itself in political rhetoric against immigration, which in turn influences policy. In 2016, Denmark approved a policy that allowed for the confiscation of valuables from migrants by authorities, to off-set the cost of the migrants' accommodations (Tanner 2016). Asylum seekers in Denmark are similarly given accommodations in asylum centers, and cash allowances from the Danish Immigration Service.

As shown in the graph below, from the OECD’s “International Migration Outlook,” the majority of immigrants to Denmark in 2018 were from Romania, Poland, and Germany. The number of migrants from India seems to have increased in 2018 compared to the average number over the time period from 2008 to 2017. Yet, every other country listed on the graph is European, and while there is some variation in Eastern versus Western origins, an indication of the general homogeneity of Denmark’s migrants can be understood.



OECD International Migration Outlook 2020

Finland

Finland first experienced a wave of migration from 1917 to 1922, when thousands of Russians escaped to Finland, fleeing from the Russian Revolution (Leitzinger 2008). Immigration from Eastern Europe continued during World War II, as Ingrians and Estonians, mainly, sought refuge in Finland. Following World War II, immigration largely came to a standstill, due to the economic and geopolitical instability of the country. Finland’s first official refugees did not come until the 1970s, fleeing from the 1973 Chilean coup d’état. While only 200 refugees came from Chile, they were largely the first non-European migrants to the country (Rinta-Tassi 2015).

However, in the 1980s, Finland experienced a second wave of migration from Vietnam, following the end of the Vietnamese War (Harju 2015). The Vietnamese community in Finland has grown considerably since the initial arrival of refugees forty years ago, and today constitute a large minority group in the country. The breakup of Yugoslavia induced another wave of migration in the 1990s, with migrants from Eastern Europe continuing to pour in. Over the period from 1990-2015, immigrants from Russia and Estonia made up the largest portion of the Finnish foreign-born population. However, in the last decade, migration from the Middle East and North Africa has been steadily increasing (Farchy 2017). In 2018, Estonia, Iraq, and Russia were the top three nationalities of newcomers, indicating the continuation of Finland's attractiveness to Eastern Europeans. Additionally, from 1990 to 2009, the foreign citizen population in Finland increased six-fold, indicating the recentness of this phenomenon of immigration (Tanner 2011).


As compared to other developed countries, Finland has not made labor migration a priority, despite its aging population. According to a report published in 2017 by the OECD, "over the past ten years, excluding free movement migrants only 13% of Finland's migrants have arrived as labor migrants," (Farchy 2017, 6). Rather than rely on migration to counteract labor shortages, Finland has instead automated and mechanized much of its labor processes. Additionally, Finland is described as performing "particularly poorly when it comes to integrating some of those migrants who face the most significant barriers to labor market entry" (Farchy 2017, 7). However, for many migrants, full-scale integration into Finnish life is not necessary. In 2009, student migrants made up the highest portion of all immigrants in Finland, often-times with

temporary residence permits that do not anticipate a future life spent in the country (Tanner 2011).

Conversely, Finland remains an attractive destination for asylum seekers, providing some of the largest stipends to migrants awaiting the outcome of their claims (Tanner 2016). This contributes to the increased migration of individuals from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan to Finland. Asylum seekers in Finland are given cash allowances, free accommodations and health and social services, and the right to work. Additionally, if their refugee status is approved, these particular immigrants are given access to welfare networks, language classes, and aid for finding jobs (Tanner 2016).

In 2016, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment published the “Government Integration Programme for 2016–2019,” to aid this integration of immigrants (*Governance of migrant integration in Finland* n.d). This program includes mandatory participation from immigrants in language courses, civic education, and vocational training (*Governance of migrant integration in Finland* n.d). However, the actual implementation of these trainings is left up to individual municipalities, so their application is not uniform nationwide.

The following graph, from the OECD’s “International Migration Outlook,” indicates the main countries of origin for migrants to Finland in 2018. Estonia, the main origin country, significantly declined in 2018, as compared to the average between 2008 to 2017, while Iraq increased as a country of origin. The list is very diverse in the geographic regions represented, with countries from Europe, the Middle East, and Asia all shown.



OECD International Migration Outlook 2020

The Netherlands

A former colonial power, the Netherlands' historic ties with its colonial territories (Belgium, Brazil, the Ivory Coast, French Guinea, Ghana, Guyana, Indonesia, Luxembourg, Mauritius, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Suriname) influences its migration policies, even today. Migrants from Indonesia (formerly the “Dutch East Indies”), Surinam, and the Netherlands Antilles have taken up residence in the Netherlands, beginning as early as 1945 (Van Selm 2019). The colonial empire of the Netherlands lasted until the end of the Second World War, after which the Netherlands' economy was in shambles, with high unemployment rates, and immense destruction of infrastructure. With a shortage of labor, individual companies, and later the Dutch government, recruited workers from Southern Europe to gain employment within the Netherlands (“History of immigration in the Netherlands” n.y.). Following a boom in the Dutch


economy in the 1960s, guest workers from Turkey and Morocco began to compose a more significant portion of the immigration pool.

Labor migration was stopped, however, in 1973, due to the oil crisis affecting, and damaging, all aspects of the Dutch economy. However, the allowance of family reunification still facilitated migration, mainly of women and children of Moroccan or Turkish descent. Refugees did not substantially begin coming to the Netherlands until around 1998, with the majority of asylum seekers fleeing from the Yugoslav wars. In 2015 and 2016 the number of migrants and asylum seekers broadly in Europe peaked, and migration to the Netherlands was no exception to this trend. However, despite this increase in asylum seekers, “labor migration has overtaken family reunification as the main pathway for newcomers” (Van Selm 2019). The vast majority of the labor migrants to the Netherlands are EU nationals.

The immense population density of the Netherlands impacts its integration and tolerance of migrants, across its history. The Netherlands is the “most crowded EU Member State, other than the island nation of Malta,” indicating the uniqueness of this density (Van Selm 2019). Such density leads to a paradoxical relationship with diversity: on the one hand “close proximity to others can lead to a high level of tolerance and compromise among groups,” yet, “any behavior outside the generous realms of what is considered ‘normal’ is immediately visible and can give rise to strong reactions” (Van Selm 2019). Far-right political parties in the Netherlands have capitalized on these obvious differences, to highlight perceived threats of migration from Islamic countries. Fears stemming from the 9/11 fallout, the assassination of notorious anti-immigrant Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn in 2003, and the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a Dutch-

born Muslim of Moroccan descent in 2004 have contributed to this political shift. Pim Fortuyn, specifically, was a prominent politician in the Netherlands who was openly gay and against the migration of Muslim immigrants into the Netherlands because he deemed Islam a “backward culture.” His assassination was exemplary for many of the threat of diversity and acceptance of cultural differences. In regard to welfare policies in the Netherlands, individuals have argued for a more particularistic redistribution policy, excluding “non-native” citizens (de Koster 2013). Additionally, in 2017 the far-right Freedom Party gained the second-largest number of seats in the Dutch Parliament, indicating the popularity of these, arguably, populist, and xenophobic views. However, the Freedom Party has been unable to join any governing coalition, and the mainstream of Dutch politics remains open and accepting of migration. Tolerance and equality are long-standing ideals of the Netherlands and continue to influence migration policy.

From the OECD’s “International Migration Outlook,” the following graph shows the countries of origin for migrants to the Netherlands in 2018. Other than India, China, and the United States, all countries listed are European. India, Romania, and Italy all increased as countries of origin for migrants in 2018, as compared to their average from 2008 to 2017, while Poland and Germany experienced decreases. This may point to a greater diversification of migrants, as India is the top non-European country on the list, but generally the Netherlands appeared to experience a fairly European-heavy migration flow in 2018.



OECD International Migration Outlook 2020

Norway

The only case study that is not an E.U. member state, Norway may be expected to diverge from the general migration policy of the other countries described. Yet its proximity to the other Scandinavian countries is highly influential, not just in policy formation, but also in the number and composition of migrants to the country.

Norway did not receive independence from Sweden until 1905, from which it was known as a country of emigration, not as a destination country for immigrants. From 1825 to 1945, around 850,000 Norwegians left Norway to move to another country, making it second only to Ireland for its percentage of emigrants compared to its overall population (Cooper 2005). In 1921 diplomat Fridtjof Nansen became the first High Commissioner for Refugees for the League of

Nations, awarding Norway an international reputation for humanitarian assistance. Following World War II, Norway created the Norwegian Refugee Council to aid with displacement, which further amplified this reputation. However, despite their work with asylum seekers, Norway remained fairly homogenous until the 1970s, with the majority of their immigrants hailing from Scandinavia (Cooper 2005).


In the 1960s Norway experienced an economic boom coupled with a population shortage that led them to accept labor migrants from Morocco, Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Pakistan. As with the other case studies, many of these migrants, though intentionally temporary, remained in the country, and were later able to bring their families to Norway through family reunification programs. Even with Norway's "immigration stop" in 1975, the ability of these migrants to remain in the country, whether through work permits or other avenues, contributed to Norway's overall diversity (Cooper 2005).

In 1987 Norway's number of asylum seekers peaked, as it gained international notoriety as a favorable destination for refugees, which was followed by public protests in support of reducing immigration and increased public support for the Progress Party, which was notoriously anti-immigration. These xenophobic tendencies continue to occupy space within the Norwegian political sphere, even today. Despite not having membership in the European Union, Norway is still party to the Schengen Agreement, which "facilitates the free movement of persons by abolishing checks at common borders of EU Member States" (Cooper 2005). Additionally, policies from other Scandinavian countries have substantial impacts on the condition of

immigration in Norway, as limits to one neighbor country may increase migrant flows to Norway, or vice versa.

More modern conceptions of migration policy in Norway are characterized by the idea that the welfare state operates in an arena of finite resources. Therefore, immigration must be limited, but also all migrants admitted into Norway must have access to “legal and practical opportunities in society” (Cooper 2005). Norway’s asylum seekers are able to live in free housing, access healthcare, participate in the domestic schooling and labor system, and are given monetary stipends for basic necessities. Should they be granted refugee protection, these migrants are given a renewable residence permit. Yet, Norway has still passed legislation focused on easing the deportation of “asylum seekers and migrants without valid claims,” most directly in response to the refugee crisis of 2015 (Tanner 2016). Common rhetoric within Norway focuses on the idea that the ability to promote a high form of equality for immigrants is possible only with restrictions on who is legally allowed within the country. This is used as justification for Norway’s intensification of “its practice of revoking migrants’ residence permits and citizenships” (Brekke 2021). The refugee crisis led to the publication of the ‘Suggestive Restrictive Policy Changes that Will Make Norway Less Attractive to Asylum Seekers’ from a broad alliance of political parties in 2015, indicating the popularity of such fear of immigration and fiscal strain on the state (Brekke 2021). However, Norway is not alone in its practice of cessation. Rather the 2016 EU Commission Proposal that “included an obligation for member states to routinely review protection permits in light of possible improvements in home countries” is exemplary of the greater trend towards increasing deportations.

The following graph, from the OECD’s “International Migration Outlook,” includes the top 10 nationalities of migrants to Norway in 2018. While the majority of the countries on the list are European, Syria, India, and the Philippines stand out as the non-European origin countries. Syria, specifically, seems to have increased greatly as a country of origin in 2018, as compared to its average from 2008 to 2017, mostly likely due to continuing effects from the Syrian refugee crisis. Poland, Lithuania, and Sweden, conversely, decreased as countries of origin in 2018, while India increased, possibly indicating a greater diversification in Norway’s migrant flow in 2018.



OECD International Migration Outlook 2020

Sweden

Historically, Sweden has been known as “refugee-friendly,” accepting refugees through the United Nations since 1950 (Tanner 2016). However, from 1850-1930, Sweden experienced a major occurrence of emigration, stemming from a significant population increase and a widespread famine. Denmark and the United States were the major destinations for Swedish

emigrants. However, by the 1930s, Sweden realized net immigration, despite its first immigration law, the restrictive Aliens Act, passed in 1927 (Skodo 2018). The act sought to protect domestic labor from foreign competition, and “control” foreign populations, with the wording influenced heavily by racial and eugenic theories. Swedish demand for foreign workers grew, however, following World War II. From 1950 to 1970 the vast majority of immigrants to Sweden were labor migrants, and the number of foreign-born individuals in Sweden tripled over this period. The number of refugees admitted to Sweden similarly increased over this time period, mainly following the Hungarian Uprising of 1956, the 1968 Prague Spring, and the 1967 Greek military coup.

The majority of labor migrants until 1960 were from Scandinavia, until growing labor demand led to the recruitment of workers from Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, Hungary, Austria, and Italy. However, the 1970s economic crisis ended such demand, and the era of labor immigration in Sweden ceased (Skodo 2018). Since the 1970s, family reunification has comprised one of the two largest immigrant categories. The acceptance of family reunification and asylum seekers birthed Sweden’s status as a humanitarian haven (Skodo 2018). However, the rise of non-European migration spurred increasing differences between foreign-born and native unemployment rates in the country, with foreign-born rates rising above native rates by the 1970s. In 2006, Sweden’s coalition government assigned the expansion of labor migration from non-EU countries as a top priority, creating a distinction between temporary and permanent labor migrants. This gave rise to a “new labor immigration era,” in which the government encouraged companies to hire non-EU, foreign workers through a transformation of historic labor migration regulations (Skodo 2018).


Integration of migrants in Sweden is unique in that a political consensus that “the acquisition of citizenship fosters integration, while the introduction of citizenship requirements stifles it” dictates policy (Skodo 2018). Economic assistance and benefits for migrants, then, are generally obtainable without specific requirements dictating their applicability, treating migrants similarly to native-born populations. In 1975 Sweden “became one of the first countries to officially adopt a policy of multiculturalism,” and continues to fund minority cultural organizations and diverse language classes in schools (Skodo 2018).

In 2015, Sweden “took in more asylum seekers per capita than any other European Union Member State” (Tanner 2016). The majority of these refugees are from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq, with a portion hailing from Iran, Somalia, and Eritrea, as well (Skodo 2018). Sweden’s attractiveness as a destination in 2015 is prefaced by their decision in 2013 to offer immediate permanent residence to all Syrian asylum applicants (Tanner 2016). However, recently Sweden has rescinded this program for Syrian refugees, in an attempt to “reduce [its] desirability as [a] destination” (Tanner 2016). Still, asylum seekers in Sweden are granted access to free health services, financial benefits, and cash stipends for food and necessities. Additionally, should the asylum seeker be accepted, the beneficiary is “entitled to participate in a two-year integration program that offers language classes, help finding a job, and a monthly stipend” (Tanner 2016).

Yet, xenophobia, specifically towards Muslim immigrants, is still prevalent in Swedish politics. Hate crimes against immigrants, specifically against men from Muslim countries, have increased, and ethnic and religious discrimination clouds labor recruitment. The Sweden Democrats party, founded in 1988 as a white supremacist group and known to be nationalist and anti-immigration,

received 17.6% of the vote in the September 2018 election (Guibourg 2014, Skodo 2018). Their popularity in Swedish politics was non-existent until around 2010 yet has only increased with the growing numbers of asylum seekers and non-European migrants in the country. The rhetoric of the Sweden Democrats has pushed the major political parties to the right, calling for border closures and deportations. While Swedish integration policy is arguably among the most liberal in the world, it has taken on a more restrictive aura, fueled in part by the increasing prevalence of these far-right political parties.

From the OECD's "International Migration Outlook," the table below summarizes the top nationalities of immigrants to Sweden in 2018. Notably, the top five countries are non-European. In fact, across the ten countries, only Poland and Finland are European, with the other 8 located in the Middle East, Asia, or Africa. Syria is the top origin country of migrants to Sweden, yet the number of migrants from Syria decreased in 2018, as compared to the average from 2008 to 2017. Conversely, Afghanistan and India increased as origin countries in 2018, while every other country on the list decreased or stayed the same.



OECD International Migration Outlook 2020

Summary

With all five case studies located in a similar geographic region, all of their policies of migration and integration are linked. For example, Denmark drastically reduced its numbers of asylum seekers in 2003, causing a large increase in the number of refugees seeking haven in Sweden and Norway (Brekke 2021). However, differences and similarities in the histories of migration for the five emerge. All of the five allowed family reunification policies to dictate a large portion of migration justifications, creating a large portion of foreign-born dependents (women, children, individuals not in the labor force) in the populations. Yet, Finland stands out as the only country not historically and currently reliant on immigration for its labor force. Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden all emphasized labor migration following labor shortages in the mid twentieth century, and labor migration is reported to be the main pathway for migrants in the Netherlands as of 2017. Denmark, specifically, is characterized as having the strictest


immigration policies, while Sweden is unique in its allowance of benefits for migrants regardless of their performance on various integration metrics. Additionally, Sweden and Finland are the only case studies to have the majority of the countries of origin of their migrants be non-European in 2018. Immigrants to Denmark, conversely, came almost exclusively from Europe in 2018. However, all five countries have witnessed the growing popularity and prevalence of xenophobic, populist political parties and rhetoric in the last two decades. While the emergence of diversity and immigration peaks differ across the case studies, none are unique in the public backlash against such heterogeneity.

The Quantitative Story

Foreign Born Population 2010-2018

The first two charts and tables seek to establish general trends in my case studies' proportion of immigrants generally, and refugees specifically. As higher percentages of both may have increased effects on public sentiment and government functionality, these variables are important when analyzing heterogeneity's effect on social democratic welfare states.

Overall Migration 2010-2018




| | % of pop 2010-14 | % of pop 2015-18 | % difference | raw difference |
|-------------|------------------|------------------|--------------|----------------|
| Denmark | 9.58 | 11.28 | 1.70 | 112,076 |
| Finland | 5.04 | 6.17 | 1.13 | 66,235 |
| Netherlands | 11.16 | 12.30 | 1.14 | 232,327 |
| Norway | 12.02 | 14.96 | 2.93 | 182,619 |
| Sweden | 15.01 | 17.36 | 2.35 | 303,585 |

This first graph shows the percentage of each country's population that is 'foreign-born,' according to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Sweden, as evidenced by both the graph and tables, had the second largest positive percent change from the average of 2010 to 2014 to the average of 2015 to 2018. Their raw change from these two time periods is also the biggest, indicating that Sweden admitted the highest number of foreign-born individuals during this time period. The three other countries, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Finland all experienced similar trends, with percent changes between 1-2 percent. Finland

noticeably has the lowest percent change, and lowest raw difference in the number of foreign-born persons in their community, comparatively.

Refugee Migration 2010-2020



| | % of pop 2010-14 | % of pop 2015-20 | % difference | raw difference |
|-------------|------------------|------------------|--------------|----------------|
| Denmark | 0.26 | 0.60 | 0.33 | 19,730 |
| Finland | 0.19 | 0.37 | 0.18 | 10,040 |
| Netherlands | 0.45 | 0.55 | 0.10 | 19,130 |
| Norway | 0.86 | 1.04 | 0.17 | 11,590 |
| Sweden | 1.09 | 2.30 | 1.21 | 128,149 |

The above graph shows how the refugee populations in each of my case studies have changed from 2010-2020. All data is from the World Bank. As the refugee crisis of 2015 famously sent waves of refugees north, I broke this ten-year time period into *before* the refugee crisis and *after*


the refugee crisis, analyzing averages from 2010-2014, and from 2015-2020. The table below the graph shows the average percentage of the population that was a refugee for both of these time periods, and then the percent change and raw difference that these averages constituted.

Sweden most obviously underwent the biggest percent change over this period. The second biggest country, population wise, of these five, Sweden also very clearly had the greatest raw difference in the number of refugees in the country from 2010-2014 to 2015-2020. The Netherlands and Finland similarly underwent very little change, with the average percentage of refugees in the population changing by less than .2 percent. Denmark had slightly more of a difference, of .33 percent, yet this still looks fairly flat on the graph. Norway, while it had the second highest percentage of refugees in their population over the period, similarly experienced little change, with a percent change very similar to Finland.

Public Opinion Surveys

All public opinion data is from the European Values Survey, which produced data both in 2008 and 2017 that is easily comparable. These three questions selected were included in both waves of the survey.

National Pride 2008-2017



2017

| | very proud | quite proud | not very proud | not at all proud |
|----------------|------------|-------------|----------------|------------------|
| Country | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| Denmark | 49.6 | 42.8 | 6.8 | 0.8 |
| Finland | 68.6 | 27.9 | 3.1 | 0.4 |
| Netherlands | 33.1 | 53.5 | 10.8 | 2.6 |
| Norway | 67.8 | 27.6 | 4.3 | 0.3 |
| Sweden | 56.4 | 35.7 | 6.8 | 1.1 |

2008


| | very proud | quite proud | not very proud | not at all proud |
|----------------|------------|-------------|----------------|------------------|
| Country | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| Denmark | 49.2 | 41.6 | 8.4 | 0.8 |

| | | | | |
|-------------|------|------|------|-----|
| Finland | 56.2 | 37 | 6.3 | 0.5 |
| Netherlands | 28.3 | 57.8 | 11.3 | 2.6 |
| Norway | 59.9 | 31.4 | 7.4 | 1.3 |
| Sweden | 45.5 | 41.9 | 11.5 | 1.1 |

The question “How proud are you to be a... [country] citizen” can help elucidate changes in feelings of nationalism and country-specific pride from 2008 to 2017. Question respondents were asked to respond on a scale from 1 to 4, with 1 equating to “very proud” feelings in relation to citizenship, and 4 equating to feeling “not proud at all.” As evidenced by the chart, Denmark experienced very little percent change in any of the categories from 2008 to 2017. Finland experienced the highest increase in respondents who declared they were “very proud” to be Finnish citizens from 2008 to 2017, indicating a possible rise in nationalism. The decline in the percentage of respondents who picked both 2 and 3 in Finland further corroborates this idea that respondents are shifting from a moderate pride to the highest indicator of pride. The Netherlands similarly underwent an increase in the percentage of respondents who indicated they were ‘very proud’ to be Dutch citizens. The decline in the Dutch respondents who picked ‘2’ indicates a similar shift to Finland, in which the moderate pride is replaced by strong pride of citizenship. Norway and Sweden experienced a similar shift to both Finland and the Netherlands, in which the percentage of respondents who selected ‘2’ or ‘3,’ both referring to moderate pride, declined, while the respondents who selected ‘1’ increased. Overall, this implies that feelings of national pride increased from 2008 to 2017 in Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. As indicated by the tables, Finland and Norway had the highest percentage of respondents pick ‘1,’ in both 2008 and 2017. The Netherlands, conversely, had the highest percentage of respondents

pick '3' or '4' in both 2008 or 2017, indicating a continuing deficiency of nationalism, when compared to the other case studies.

Anti-Immigrant Sentiment 2008-2017



Do not like as neighbors: immigrants/foreign workers (Q6I)

2008

| | not mentioned | mentioned |
|----------------|---------------|-----------|
| Country | | |
| Denmark | 93.2 | 6.8 |
| Finland | 84 | 16 |
| Netherlands | 84.6 | 15.4 |
| Norway | 94 | 6 |
| Sweden | 93.6 | 6.4 |


2017

| | not mentioned | mentioned |
|----------------|----------------------|------------------|
| Country | | |
| Denmark | 91.6 | 8.4 |
| Finland | 87.2 | 12.8 |
| Netherlands | 85 | 15 |
| Norway | 95.4 | 4.6 |
| Sweden | 96.6 | 3.4 |

In both 2008 and 2017, the European Values Survey asked respondents “On this list are various groups of people. Could you identify any that you would not like to have as neighbours?” The percent change in people who picked out ‘immigrants or foreign workers’ from 2008 to 2017 is shown in the graph above. The percent change of this question can indicate how feelings of xenophobia changed over this nine-year period. Denmark appears to be the only country that had a positive percent change from 2008 to 2019, indicating that more people implied a dislike for immigrants or foreign workers as neighbors in 2019, or xenophobic sentiment grew. The other four countries experienced declines in the number of respondents who selected that they would not want immigrants or foreign workers as neighbors, with Sweden experiencing the biggest decline. However, looking at the table with the raw data from each year, it is clear that Finland and the Netherlands had a greater percentage of respondents indicate a dislike for immigrants and foreign workers as neighbors in both years compared to the other countries. Denmark’s positive percent change may be indicative of growing xenophobic sentiment, but that sentiment pales in comparison to the sentiment against immigrants that exists, and has existed, in Finland

and the Netherlands. Sweden had the lowest percentage of respondents mention that they did not want immigrants or foreign workers as neighbors in 2017, indicating the lowest appearance of xenophobia across the cases.

Importance of Birthplace 2008-2017



important: to have been born in [country] (Q80A)

2008

| | 1 (very) | 2 | 3 | 4 (not at all) |
|-------------|----------|------|------|----------------|
| Denmark | 19.3 | 26.2 | 37.8 | 16.7 |
| Finland | 30.4 | 32.3 | 26.4 | 10.8 |
| Netherlands | 16.6 | 31.3 | 42.4 | 9.7 |
| Norway | 17.1 | 35.1 | 37.5 | 10.3 |
| Sweden | 22.4 | 27.1 | 32.1 | 18.4 |

2017

| | 1 (very) | 2 | 3 | 4 (not at all) |
|-------------|----------|------|------|----------------|
| Denmark | 17.2 | 26.7 | 41.9 | 14.2 |
| Finland | 25.6 | 38 | 27.8 | 8.7 |
| Netherlands | 15.2 | 29.8 | 40.7 | 14.3 |
| Norway | 15.1 | 29.5 | 39.6 | 15.8 |
| Sweden | 6.5 | 16.4 | 41.2 | 35.9 |


Both iterations of the European Values Survey featured the question: “Some people say the following things are important for being truly [NATIONALITY]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is?” Respondents ranked from 1 (very) to 4 (not at all) the importance of being born in the country. All five countries experienced a decline in the number of respondents who chose ‘1,’ or ‘very’ important, and three out of the five countries experienced increases in the number of respondents who chose ‘4,’ or ‘not at all’ important. This suggests some sort of decline in the tie of national identity with birthplace for these case studies. Sweden, in particular, had by far the largest decrease in the percentage of respondents who selected ‘very’ important, and the largest increase in the percentage of respondents who selected ‘not at all’ important.

Governmental Indicators

The first two indicators are from the Fragile States Index and are both ranked on a scale of 1-10.

A score of zero equates to the most stability in the indicator, and a score of ten equates to lowest intensity, or least stability, of the indicator.

State Legitimacy 2010-2020




| | Avg. 2010-14 | Avg. 2015-20 | Difference |
|-------------|--------------|--------------|------------|
| Denmark | 1.0 | 0.7 | -0.2 |
| Finland | 0.9 | 0.7 | -0.1 |
| Netherlands | 1.1 | 1.1 | 0.0 |
| Norway | 0.7 | 0.6 | -0.2 |
| Sweden | 0.7 | 0.9 | 0.1 |

The State Legitimacy Indicator analyzes “the representativeness and openness of government and its relationship with its citizenry” (Messner 2020). Some evaluation of confidence in

institutions, presence of mass demonstrations, civil disobedience, and integrity of elections is included as well. As evidenced by the graph above, no obvious trend exists for this variable for any of the five countries. Once again, I averaged the data from 2010 to 2014 and 2015 to 2020 to account for this cross-year noise. Denmark, Finland, and Norway experienced a negative change in their rank for state legitimacy, indicating a growth in the strength of their state legitimacy. The Netherlands experienced no difference in this variable, while Sweden was the only country to undergo a positive change. This implies that Sweden was the only one of the five countries to have a reduction in state legitimacy. However, the ambiguity presented by the year-by-year graph implies that even with these differences amongst five-year averages, any conclusion is tenuous. Additionally, the consistency with which all five countries are at the very bottom of the ten-point scale indicates that all five remain strong on this factor.

Factionalized Elites 2010-2020



| | Avg. 2010-14 | Avg. 2015-20 | Difference |
|---------|--------------|--------------|------------|
| Denmark | 1.2 | 1.4 | 0.2 |


| | | | |
|-------------|-----|-----|-----|
| Finland | 1.1 | 1.3 | 0.1 |
| Netherlands | 2.3 | 3.2 | 0.8 |
| Norway | 1.1 | 1.1 | 0.0 |
| Sweden | 1.7 | 1.8 | 0.1 |

The Factionalized Elites indicator “considers the fragmentation of state and institutions along ethnic, class, clan, racial or religious lines, as well as brinksmanship and gridlock between ruling elites” (Messner 2020). An analysis of nationalistic, xenophobic, or communal solidarity-based rhetoric by ruling elites is factored in, as well. The Fragile States Index attributes this variable to the perceived legitimacy of the ruling class, and credibility of electoral processes. This indicator, in contrast to State Legitimacy, has positive differences for four of the five countries. This implies that these four—Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden—all experienced a decline in the legitimacy of the ruling class and electoral credibility. The Netherlands, in particular, had a difference of .8, which is compounded by their raw averages from 2010-2014 and 2015-2020. The Netherlands began the 2010s with the highest score on this indicator, and by the late 2010s, still held the highest score among the five countries. This suggests that the Netherlands has the most fragmentation of the state and institutions among these lines, as compared to the other case studies. Norway, on the other hand, experienced no change from these two time periods. Already on the low end of raw numbers, Norway may have less fragmentation.

Demographic Data

Considering the reliance of the welfare state on its class and racial makeup, these next variables consider economic and racial diversity of the case studies.

Labor Migrants 2019




% of labor migrants 2019

| | |
|-------------|------|
| Denmark | 16.6 |
| Finland | 9.2 |
| Netherlands | 15.4 |
| Norway | 10.6 |
| Sweden | 16.4 |

From the International Migration Outlook, published by the OECD, the above graph details the percent of migrants who immigrated specifically to join the labor force. So, out of all migrants

who came to the respective countries in 2019, between 9% to 17% immigrated for reasons pertaining to labor. As evidenced by the graph and chart, Sweden and Denmark had the highest rates of labor immigrants in 2019. The Netherlands was slightly beneath these two countries, but labor migrants still made a significant percentage of all immigration. Norway and Finland obviously had the least immigrants arrive for the purpose of joining the labor force. However, for all five countries, labor migrants are a clear minority of migrants. According to the same data source, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway had around 50% of migrants in 2019 benefit simply from “free mobility,” while Sweden and Finland had the highest percent of their immigrants migrate for family reunification (OECD 2020).

Foreign Born Unemployment Rates 2010-2019




| | Avg. 2010-14 | Avg. 2015-19 | Difference |
|-------------|--------------|--------------|------------|
| Denmark | 6.92 | 5.48 | -1.44 |
| Finland | 6.78 | 7.42 | 0.64 |
| Netherlands | 5.86 | 4.46 | -1.4 |

| | | | |
|--------|------|-------|------|
| Norway | 4.88 | 5.62 | 0.74 |
| Sweden | 9.76 | 11.08 | 1.32 |

Taken from OECD data, the above graph and table indicate the difference between foreign-born and native-born unemployment rates in the five case studies from 2010 to 2019. Similar to my other metrics, I averaged the data for this variable from 2010 to 2014 and from 2015 to 2019, to reduce cross-year noise. Sweden most obviously has a positive trend for this metric, beginning with the highest difference in unemployment rates, and increasing in the discrepancy between the percentage of foreign-born individuals unemployed versus native by 2019. Denmark, conversely, began with the second highest difference in unemployment rates in 2010, yet by 2019, was near the bottom of the graph for the difference. However, it must be remembered that over these two periods, Sweden very obviously took in the most refugees than the other four countries, and the most immigrants, generally. The fact that their unemployment gap has widened may be more a result of the increased number of foreign-born individuals counted in this statistic, rather than a result of policy or integration practices. Additionally, it is easier to gain access to unemployment benefits in Sweden, as compared to the other countries. Therefore, the incentive for migrants to participate in the labor force may simply be less drastic in Sweden.

Fractionalization 2003



| | Ethnic | Linguistic | Religious |
|-------------|---------------|-------------------|------------------|
| Denmark | 0.08 | 0.10 | 0.23 |
| Finland | 0.13 | 0.14 | 0.25 |
| Netherlands | 0.11 | 0.51 | 0.72 |
| Norway | 0.06 | 0.07 | 0.20 |
| Sweden | 0.06 | 0.20 | 0.23 |

Based on a 2003 study by James Fearon, published in the *Journal of Economic Growth*, the above graph and table quantify ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization for the case studies. In order to determine ethnic diversity, Fearon first analyzed data from the *CIA World Factbook*, compared to *Encyclopedia Britannica*, and the Library of Congress Country Studies (Fearon 202). This data was cross-checked against the Minorities at Risk dataset. Other scholar's work categorizing ethnic groups was relied on, as well. Ethnic fractionalization, as opposed simply to ethnic diversity, is defined as "the probability that two individuals selected at random from a country will be from different ethnic groups" (Fearon 208). Linguistic and religious

fractionalization are easier to calculate, because “linguistic” and “religious” groups are easier to define than “ethnic groups.” Together, these three metrics of fractionalization can point to diversity within the country, but not how this diversity is interpreted or felt amongst the communities.

As evidenced by the table and graph, the Netherlands stands out among the five countries in terms of its rate of religious and linguistic fractionalization. Their ethnic fractionalization rate, however, is about average compared to the other countries. In terms of ethnic fractionalization, Finland ranks the highest, but all of the five countries score relatively low on this metric, regardless.

Data Summary

To summarize the data, I assigned each country a low, mid, or high evaluation for each variable.

The below chart indicates the colors associated with each evaluation.

| |
|-----------------|
| Low, dec |
| Low, no change |
| Low, inc |
| Mid, dec |
| Mid, no change |
| Mid, inc |
| High, dec |
| High, no change |
| High, inc |

| | Denmark | Finland | Netherlands | Norway | Sweden |
|------------------------------|----------------|-----------------|--------------------|----------------|---------------|
| Migrant % | Mid | Low | Mid | High | High |
| Refugee % | Low | Low | Low | Mid | High |
| National Pride | Mid, no change | High, inc. | Low, inc. | High, inc. | High, inc. |
| Neighbors | Mid, inc. | High, dec. | High, dec. | Low, dec. | Low, dec. |
| Born in Country | Mid, no change | High, no change | Mid, dec. | Mid, dec. | Low, dec. |
| State Legit. Faction. | Mid, dec. | Mid, dec. | High, no change | Low, dec. | Mid, inc. |
| Elites | Mid, inc. | Mid, inc. | High, inc. | Low, no change | Mid, inc. |
| Labor Migr. | High | Low | Mid | Low | High |
| Unemploy. | Mid, dec. | Mid, inc. | Low, dec. | Mid, inc. | High, inc. |
| Reli. Fract. | Mid | Mid | High | Mid | Mid |
| Ling. Fract. | Low | Mid | High | Low | Mid |
| Ethnic Fract. | Mid | High | Mid | Low | Mid |

The above table and subsequent legend summarize the eleven variables for my five case studies.

For both metrics of migrant percentage and refugee percentage in the population, all five countries experienced increases, so no specification was needed, as no comparison could be made about the direction of the variable. Beginning with immigration rates, Sweden stands out as having a high percentage generally of migrants, and specifically of refugees, as compared to their

country's overall population. Finland, oppositely, is on the low end for both metrics, indicating their rates of immigration pale in comparison to the other five countries.

In terms of public opinion metrics, Finland conversely ranks highly on all three variables: national pride, not wanting immigrants as neighbors, and placing importance on birthplace. In line with the previous division, Sweden ranks low both on not wanting immigrants as neighbors and the importance of birthplace. Even with high national pride, these two metrics seems to correlate to public opinion more closely regarding attitudes about immigration. Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway are more convoluted on these five variables, with no strong patterns emerging.

The governmental indicators, referred to as "State Legit." (State Legitimacy) and "Faction. Elites" (Factionalized Elites), paint a different picture. Looking at these metrics, the Netherlands stands out as having the highest rank for state legitimacy, but also the highest rank of factionalized elites. Sweden was the only country to experience an increase in the quantification of their state legitimacy. However, similar to Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands, Sweden's Factionalized Elites metric increased from 2010-14 to 2015-20. Only Norway experienced no change in their already low score for Factionalized Elites. Yet, Norway also underwent a decrease in their State Legitimacy over this period. Overall, no strong conclusions can be made from the governmental indicator section.

Finally, the demographic data section summarizes the variables "Labor Migr." (the percentage of migrants who immigrated for reasons pertaining to labor), "Unemploy." (the unemployment rate

difference between foreign born and native born populations), “Reli. Fract.” (religious fractionalization), “Ling. Fract.” (linguistic fractionalization), and “Ethnic Fract.” (ethnic fractionalization). In line with the case study analysis, Finland and Norway have the lowest rates of labor migration, while Denmark and Sweden have the highest rates. Interestingly, even though Sweden has near the highest rate of labor migration, the country also experiences the highest difference between foreign-born and native-born unemployment rates. While the Netherlands has medium levels of labor migration, although they are much more similar to Sweden and Denmark (the countries with high levels of labor migration) than to Finland and Norway, they have the lowest, and a decreasing, difference between foreign-born and native-born unemployment rates.

In terms of fractionalization, the Netherlands stands out as having the highest value both for religious fractionalization and linguistic fractionalization. Finland has the highest quantification of ethnic fractionalization, although the Netherlands and Denmark are not far behind. However, all of these metrics are from 2003, and can only point towards the history of these countries, not the current condition.

The Possibility of a Diverse Social Democratic Welfare State

Sweden and Finland emerge as opposites quantitatively, with Sweden housing the largest percentage of both migrants and refugees, and Finland housing the lowest percentage of both in its population. Sweden’s average foreign-born population from 2015-2018 comprised over 17% of the population, which is large not only compared to these five other countries, but also compared to global trends of migrant integration. Sweden was also the only country of the five to obviously undergo increased refugee migration following 2015. The other four countries either

experienced decreasing migration of refugees, or extremely slight increases. This possibly indicates that the locational proximity of Sweden to the other case studies influenced public opinion regarding refugee migration past its borders, or that the refugee crisis had more of an effect on attitudes rather than calculable migration and refugee trends.

Further emphasizing the contrast between Sweden and Finland, while Finland had among the highest results of xenophobic sentiment (not wanting immigrants as neighbors and the importance of birthplace), both in 2008 and 2017, Sweden had the lowest. Finland also ranked highly for national pride, with the Netherlands standing out for its continuing deficiency of nationalism. The Netherlands is also unique in its rank on the ‘factionalized elites’ indicator, as it had the highest score on the variable across the time period analyzed. This fragmentation of state and institutions along ethnic, class, racial, or religious lines may influence the public’s perception of increasing diversity. While no other obvious conclusions regarding government strength can be made for the case studies, this finding is in line with the Netherlands’ history of particularistic redistribution and domestic rise of the far-right Freedom Party.

Sweden’s policies of refugee and migrant assimilation and benefits similarly may influence the public opinion metrics and acceptance of diversity. Sweden affords migrants the same social rights as citizens, and generally employs inclusive residence and citizenship policies. As economic assistance and benefits for migrants operate largely without eligibility requirements in Sweden, less ‘deservingness’ judgements may be made towards migrant’s reliance on the state. Even with the highest difference between foreign-born and native employment rates, the majority of the Swedish public does not seem to harbor dislike or resentment towards migrants.

However, the emergence and recent popularity of the Sweden Democrats party threatens this acceptance. As the most recent public opinion surveys are from 2017, they may not capture current reactions toward migration in the countries.

Interestingly, while Denmark is globally known to be harsh on migration, with strict migration and integration policies, it did not emerge as harboring the most extreme xenophobic or nativist sentiment. However, Denmark, opposed to Finland and Sweden, experiences migration almost exclusively from Europe. Finland and Sweden, despite all their differences, are similar in that they had the most diverse list of top origin countries for migrants in 2018. Yet, Finland has the lowest percentage of labor migrants, and has never made labor migration a priority, unlike the other four countries. This lack of an association between immigration and positive economic benefits in Finland may contribute to the levels of nativism and xenophobia.

All social-democratic welfare states, these five countries were presumed to have the most extensive redistribution policies and decommodification, offering migrants numerous avenues to economic stability, and even prosperity. Yet, the differing experiences with migration and public attitudes paint a different picture. Sweden's ability to house the highest percentage and raw number of migrants, while experiencing the lowest rates of xenophobia and nativism from the public opinion surveys, suggests that a multi-cultural welfare state is possible. While the exact justification for why Sweden is able to marry heterogeneity and tolerance cannot be pin pointed, possibly their granting of social rights and welfare benefits, regardless of pre-determined 'eligibility' requirements, contributes. Increases in diversity do not necessarily increase public sentiment against migration, rather histories, contexts, and policies regarding such migration

seem to play larger roles in the correlation. I remain hopeful that the general success of Sweden, even with more recent political ideology mirroring the global trend towards xenophobia and populism, can serve as an example for other states grappling with the stress that migration places upon economic structures and cultural homogeneity.

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