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Non-Lethal Weapons Conference

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he nor anyone else could readily overcome.⁶

Although it appears trite, the fundamental lesson of the Marshall Mission is that one cannot compel two parties bent on destroying one another to make peace. Before embarking on a peacekeeping operation, policymakers must ascertain through cold, hard analysis whether conflicting parties are genuinely committed to peacefully resolving their differences. If they are not,

then peacekeeping efforts, no matter how well organized or executed, will fail. **MR**

NOTES

1. A. Dee Willis, "Peiping Executive Headquarters, 1946-47," Senior thesis, Vanderbilt University, 1970, 22.
2. Wesley Wilson, "The United States Army's Contribution to the Marshall Mission in China, 1 January 1946 to 1 March 1947," M.A. thesis, University of Maryland, 1957, 30. Wilson was a member of the Executive Headquarters.
3. "Operations Report, The Executive Headquarters, Peiping, China, 1946-47, Section I, The United States Branch," 5, Record Group 319, P&O, 091 China, box 62.
4. Willis, 126.
5. Forrest Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Statesman, 1945-49* (New York: Viking, 1987), 142.
6. Wilson, 90-91.

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MR Conference Report

Non-Lethal Weapons Conferences

by Robert J. Bunker

Several worldwide conferences are or have been considering the future of non-lethal weapons (NLW). NLW proliferation and practicality continue to offer intriguing possibilities for "bloodless" warfare.

The NDIA Conference

The National Defense Industrial Association's Non-Lethal Defense III Conference was held at the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel, Maryland, in February 1998. Several themes emerged. For example, NLW are now generally recognized for utility in military operations in urban terrain (MOUT), which principally occur in failed- and failing-state environments. NLW proved their worth in Haiti, Somalia and Bosnia, offering US soldiers options between applying lethal force or none. NLW will become increasingly important in rapidly changing security environments where anarchy and societal warfare occur and where nonstate groups actively challenge the legitimate political authority of nation-states.

Some military and law-enforcement groups are interested in "rheostatic" or tunable weapons that can be made lethal or non-lethal by pushing a button or turning a dial. If a stability and support operation (SASO) devolves into a shooting

conflict, lethal force could still be used almost immediately. Another promising system demonstrated at the conference was the "Laser Dazzler," a dual-technology device for both military and law-enforcement use.¹ Resembling a slightly oversized flashlight, its eye-safe laser produces an intense beam of green light programmed to create a "strobe" effect. The device could be used to project an "optical wall" beyond 50 meters as a defensive cybershield in front of US forces in MOUT or SASO. Such a wall would turn away most individuals or provide an extra time cushion for US forces.

The publication *Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program, 1997—A Year in Review* candidly discusses the Joint NLW Directorate's progress during its first year.² A joint, non-lethal weapons CD ROM database and a bimonthly newsletter also support the NLW community. For information, call 703-784-1997 or visit <<http://iis.marcoarsyscom.usmc.mil/jnlwd/>>.³

A Joint Concept for Non-Lethal Weapons, a paper read at the conference, directly supports the operational concept in *Joint Vision 2010* based on the need for full-dimensional protection. This document specifies that NLW should leverage high technology, enhance opera-

tions, augment deadly force, provide rheostatic capability, focus on tactical applications, facilitate expeditionary operations, maintain policy acceptability, provide reversibility in counterpersonnel effects and apply across the range of military operations. Core capabilities are based on a counterpersonnel and counter-materiel focus. The document also has an annex that contains scenarios for NLW employment. The paper can be accessed at the Joint NLW Program web site.⁴

A number of representatives from the new Institute for Non-Lethal Defense Technologies, Applied Research Lab, Pennsylvania State University, attended this conference. The Joint NLW Program has established a relationship with the Institute. The group's goal is to establish evaluation criteria and standards for NLW testing. Such criteria are important because no definition of "incapacitation" or other terms currently exists. The Institute can be reached at 814-865-3911 or E-mail <rrm11@psu.edu>.⁵

Conference proceedings can be downloaded from the Defense Technical Information Center's web site at <www.dtic.mil/stinet/ndia/nld3.html>.⁶ This conference series traditionally occurs every other year. Non-Lethal Defense Conference IV

will meet on 21-22 March 2000, in Tysons Corner, Virginia.

Jane's Information Group Conference

The Jane's Information Group Conference on "Fielding Non-Lethal Weapons in the New Millennium" was held in London, 1-2 November 1999.⁷ Several discussions centered on the paradigm shift in US enemies. Nonstate actors such as political and religious factions or terrorists were viewed as viable, modern-day threats. When nonstate forces are armed with weapons of mass destruction, conventional military tactics will be less effective against them. As a result, NLW will be critical in any struggle.

The International Committee of the Red Cross has initiated the "SirUS (or SfrUS) Project," which attempts to define the legal phrase "superfluous or unnecessary suffering" in regard to weapons.⁸ This project concerns NLW by attempting to mandate which weapons Western governments can or cannot use. While this is a well-intentioned nongovernment initiative, legal reviews of these weapons already occur, so this project represents a redundant and potentially burdensome development in fielding NLW.

One study casts doubt on using acoustics as NLW. Specifically, the alleged effects of infrasound and strong-sound were questioned because they contradicted scientific evidence obtained in a detailed study supported by the Peace Studies Program, Cornell University; the MacArthur Foundation; and the State of Nordrhein-Westfalen, Germany.⁹ If this study is accurate, then acoustic weapons are not currently viable.

Two forms of NLW-targeting schemes were discussed. The first concerned "functions targeting." Macro-level function targeting focuses on the enemy's processes: command and control, communications, analysis, everything necessary to build, transport or employ a weapon system. Function targeting centers on the ability to intrude, interfere, deceive, disrupt, delay, deny, disorient, incapacitate, simulate and

manipulate the enemy. The second form concerned "bond-relationship targeting," focusing on degrading, severing and altering the bonds or relationships that allow an enemy to conduct war. Disrupting an enemy and sending him into chaos is the desired end state.

NLW sets, fielded by the US Marine Corps, provide a 200-man company with equipment and four categories of munitions: personnel protectors, personnel effectors, mission enhancers and ammunition. All weapons are acceptable from legal, ethical and political perspectives. They produce reversible effects against personnel, are expeditionary and provide options in situations where lethal force might not be appropriate. These weapons are to augment lethal force, not replace it.

The question of a "silver bullet" antipersonnel NLW was discussed. If one were to exist, it would be based on nerve stimulation using electrical impulses. The weapon would cause little or no physical trauma and would affect the largest human target—touch—derived from the skin organ with 21 square feet of receptor surface. The holdup on development is not the nerve-stimulation effects but the delivery to the target. Some form of electromagnetic carrier beam would be the most efficient means of impulse-disruption delivery.

Current US military missions encounter three force models: traditional warfighting, military operations other than war and law enforcement. Facing terrorists is best done using the traditional military force model when generating rules of engagement.

Miscellaneous discussion topics included the nature of future conflicts, operational requirements, science and technology and culture and law. Also discussed were the criminalization of national governments, the ambiguous nature of conflicts, the proliferation of NLW technology and the need to revise international law.

Conference Conclusions

While nongovernment operations raise important issues, inflexible or dogmatic interpretation of international law is counterproductive, as

are unrealistic perceptions of future warfighting. For example, attendees readily advocated the use of lethal force against combatants hiding behind "human shields," rather than using NLW, which would temporarily incapacitate innocents and combatants alike so combatants could subsequently be captured.

The argument that some states might misuse NLW and, therefore, such weapons should be banned, is not persuasive. Following this logic, car batteries should be outlawed because they can be used for torture. Non-lethal weapons represent new forms of weaponry, like the crossbow and firearm before them, which will continue to proliferate and evolve. Any attempt to ban them, especially directed-energy devices, will ultimately fail. Military forces who do not master these weapons and develop the proper force structures and concepts to use them will find themselves ineffective and irrelevant in future conflicts. **MR**

NOTES

1. For more information, visit LE Systems, Inc., Glastonbury, CT, at <www.laurin.com/Directory/LPHTML/nal/13489600.htm>.
2. NLW Directorate, *Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program, 1997—A Year in Review*, February 1998.
3. US Department of Defense, Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program, <<http://lis.marcoisyscom.usmc.mil/jnlw/>>, updated 20 October 1999.
4. *Ibid.*
5. Note: To access this E-mail address, be sure to use the numeral "one", not the letter "ell."
6. US Department of Defense, Defense Information Systems Agency, Arlington, VA.
7. For information concerning conference transcripts and/or booklets, contact Jane's at <oni.taha@janes.co.uk>.
8. For more information, visit <www.wma.net/press/98_18b.html>.
9. For more information, visit <ainaudi.cornell.edu/PeaceProgram/>.

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