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# Terrorism, since 1945

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## Terrorism, since 1945

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Postwar terrorism presents a bewildering fusion of crime, social conflict, political violence, state-sponsored covert activities, and private war. A very useful overview is provided by CRENSHAW & PIMLOTT in their three-volume encyclopedia which contains essays by more than 70 scholars. Volume one provides historical and general background of the topic; the second volume focuses on terrorist groups and campaigns; and volume three covers terrorism in the industrialized world and responses to terrorism. With regard to traditional terrorism, ALEXANDER & O'DAY provide an international focus in their five-volume set published in 1994. Political terrorism in British, Irish, European, African, and Middle Eastern regions are focused upon. The series is meant to bring together high-quality essays which would normally be inaccessible to most readers. These essays are gathered from a number of refereed journals, many of which have only very limited circulation. Another traditional work on terrorism which should be consulted is by ALEXANDER. Alexander's edited collection of the writings of 11 authors analyses ideological and political terrorism at the national, regional, and global levels. Its coverage of terrorism in relationship to North and South America, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations is not found in the Alexander & O'Day series of volumes.

STERLING is representative of the category of 1980s works that focused on Soviet links to international terrorism. The main argument of these works was that the Soviets were training and supporting a network of terrorist groups to wage a proxy war against the West. Sterling's work is singled out because her hard-hitting and detailed journalistic exposé predated more scholarly works on this topic by three to four years, and in hindsight probably helped to precipitate their publication. The

journal edited by RAPOPORT & WILKINSON bridges the gap between studies focusing on either traditional or newer forms of terrorism. In publication since 1989, it has become the pre-eminent journal of terrorism studies. While many contemporary issues are focused upon, its historical essays, chronologies of terrorist incidents, research findings, and book reviews make for strong coverage across the discipline. The only weakness of this journal is that it still tends to underrepresent the contributions of defence analysts and military historians who have a more warfare-oriented view of terrorism than traditional terrorism scholars.

HOFFMAN's recent work currently provides the best synthesis of the study of terrorism in the discipline as well as one of the better projections on future patterns and potentials based on trend analysis. With over 20 years of research, he has an intimate knowledge of the subject. Of great interest is his discussion of later trends relating to religious and state-sponsored terrorism and "guns for hire" (mercenary) and "amateur" (non-aligned with an existing group) terrorists. This work suggests that the initial wave of traditional terrorists has been augmented by a newer generation which is less compromising, more diffuse in structure, and more lethal in their pursuits. The discussion of terrorist weapons of mass destruction (WMD) potentials is disquieting and makes the newer extremist groups appear more warlike in their orientation than the earlier generation of terrorists.

The argument that terrorism is a component of future war was developed by JENKINS, an internationally known terrorism expert, in his important but little-recognized work prepared for the US Defense Nuclear Agency in the early 1980s. It suggests that terrorism will coexist with conventional and guerrilla warfare to create new modes of conflict which will be conducted not only by regular armies but also by guerrillas, private militias, and terrorist groups. War and peace will dissolve and warfare may revert back to an Italian Renaissance model or an early 17th-century one prior to the foundation of the Westphalian state and national armies. VAN CREVELD, a respected military historian, took a more pronounced position concerning the importance of terrorism in future warfare in his seminal book published less than a decade after Jenkins' work. Van Creveld argues that conventional warfare will decline in importance to become inconsequential and that terrorism and low-intensity conflict will dominate future warfare. As a consequence, the Westphalian state will come to an end and terrorists and guerrillas will eventually win the mantle of legitimacy. In the process, they will give themselves more formal titles.

The weakness of van Creveld's approach is that, at an operational level, it does not provide a clear weaponry, battlespace, or organizational edge to terrorist and guerrilla groups in a struggle against the military and law-enforcement institutions of the Westphalian state. The basis of this edge may be found in two other works. FALKENRATH, NEWMAN, & THAYER discuss the potential of covert nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons use by terrorists. All three of these forms of weaponry are viewed as having mass lethality capabilities, great portability (which makes them easily deliverable against civilian populations and military targets), and high accessibility for terrorist groups looking to acquire them. While covert NBC attacks are currently viewed as being low in probability, they are not seen as improbable and their likelihood is increasing

with time. ARQUILLA & RONFELDT focus on cyber-terrorism and information warfare being waged by non-state, paramilitary, and other similar types of force. The blanket term for this new mixture of social conflict and crime is "netwar". In an emergent cyberspace conflict environment, terrorists are considered to currently have an edge over the agents and institutions of the state. The impression that terrorists are evolving more towards a networked form of organization while the Westphalian state is built upon a hierarchical form of organization only serves to exacerbate the problem. These authors argue that whosoever masters the network form first and best, be it state agencies or their adversaries, will gain major operational advantages over the other.

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See also Cold War; Lebanon, 1975–2000; Northern Ireland, 1956–

### Third Dutch War, 1672–1679

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- Sonnino, Paul, *Louis XIV and the Origins of the Dutch War*, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988
- Wolf, John B., *Louis XIV*, London: Gollancz, and New York: Norton: 1968

The origins of the Dutch War have been a contentious issue among French historians for more than 300 years. In the last 50 years, the debate has reached across the Atlantic and inspired a number of contributions from American scholars. SONNINO is the most recent historian to tackle this important question. Sonnino provides a detailed account of the diplomatic manoeuvrings that took place in the years preceding the Dutch War, but his work is more than a simple diplomatic history of the period. Sonnino suggests that to properly understand the origins of the Dutch War, one should examine the personalities of the individuals surrounding Louis XIV and their interactions and rivalries with one another. Taking a critical approach to the memoirs of the period and armed with an impressive array of archival material, Sonnino demonstrates the lack of consensus among some of the French monarch's key advisors concerning the war. Scholars have long suggested that Louis XIV's controller-general of finances, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, supported the war as a means to further his mercantilist ambitions. Soninno, to the contrary, argues that Colbert opposed a war he knew would prove disastrous for his economic reforms. Fearful

of losing the king's affection, however, Colbert chose to bury his head in the sand until it was too late. Francois-Michel Le Tellier, marquis de Louvois, minister of war and great rival of Colbert, supported the war, seizing the opportunity to increase his influence with the king and to diminish that of Colbert. As for Louis XIV, Sonnino's often acerbic pen portrays a monarch possessed of a "plentiful capacity for self-delusion", impatient for renown, incessantly searching for some grand "Herculean" undertaking. Louis XIV wanted a war and a war he would have, regardless of the reservations of some of his key advisors.

Sonnino's conclusions are similar to those put forth by EKBERG nearly ten years earlier. But while Sonnino examines the influence of individual personalities on the course of events leading up to the war, Ekberg analyses the role of these personalities in the failure of French policy in 1673, a year that saw the war transformed into a Europe-wide conflict. Ekberg examines the gradual exclusion of the ministers of state from foreign policy decisions and concludes that the failure of the war's initial objectives and the subsequent expansion of hostilities can be directly attributed to Louis XIV and the bellicose counsels of Louvois. Ekberg describes Louis XIV's foreign policy as shallow, manipulative, and destined for failure. According to Ekberg, the Dutch War was a consequence of the French monarch's "puerile desire for self-aggrandizement".

WOLF portrays a different Louis XIV. Wolf questions Louis XIV's independence of spirit and suggests that he may have been easily swayed by the hawkish counsels of his advisors. Perhaps, says Wolf, Louis XIV was simply "an accomplished actor who played out a role which may have been written by others". Unlike Ekberg and Sonnino, Wolf argues that Louis' advisors were unanimous in their support for the Dutch War. They all agreed that the acquisition of the Spanish Netherlands was key importance for the political, military, and economic well-being of France. A short, successful war against the Dutch was necessary before France could proceed with its designs on the Spanish Netherlands. Wolf dismisses the idea that Colbert desired to maintain the peace in order to safeguard his economic reforms. On the contrary, his mercantilist policies required that the commercial power of the Dutch Republic be crushed by any means, including war. Wolf suggests that the king's desire for *gloire*, best translated as reputation or renown, has been overstated and misunderstood. Louis XIV's quest for *gloire* did play a role in the decision to go to war, but this can be characterized as a personal *gloire* only insofar as Louis XIV identified himself as the "living symbol" of the French state. All actions that showered renown upon Louis XIV were feathers in the cap of the French state as well. Reasons of state, and not a puerile desire for personal renown, were the key factors that brought war in 1672.

LYNN has written a general military history covering all of the wars of Louis XIV. In his discussion of the Dutch War, he makes a number of interesting observations. He stresses Louis XIV's aggressive pursuit of *gloire* as a causal factor in bringing about the war. But after the failure of the initial campaigns, Lynn suggests that Louis XIV adopted a defensive strategy and, from that moment on, identified his personal *gloire* with the protection of his lands rather than with further armed conquest. Lynn points out that during the Dutch War, styles of campaigning varied widely according to the situation. Siege warfare dominated in the Netherlands, while along the Rhine and the