

Claremont Colleges

## Scholarship @ Claremont

---

CGU Theses & Dissertations

CGU Student Scholarship

---

Spring 1974

# An Interagency Approach to Reforming the Administration of Federal Grant-In-Aid Programs: A Case Study of the Indian Task Force of the Western Federal Regional Council

Barry Joseph Wishart  
*Claremont Graduate University*

Follow this and additional works at: [https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgu\\_etd](https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgu_etd)



Part of the [American Politics Commons](#), and the [Public Policy Commons](#)

---

### Recommended Citation

Wishart, Barry Joseph. (1974). *An Interagency Approach to Reforming the Administration of Federal Grant-In-Aid Programs: A Case Study of the Indian Task Force of the Western Federal Regional Council*. CGU Theses & Dissertations, 319. [https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgu\\_etd/319](https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgu_etd/319).

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the CGU Student Scholarship at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in CGU Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more information, please contact [scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu](mailto:scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu).



AN INTERAGENCY APPROACH TO REFORMING  
THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL  
GRANT-IN-AID PROGRAMS:  
A CASE STUDY OF THE INDIAN TASK FORCE  
OF THE WESTERN FEDERAL REGIONAL COUNCIL

Barry J. Wishart

The administration of public policy has always been a challenge in the United States because power is divided and dispersed on both an institutional and a regional basis. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the administration of the federal grant-in-aid programs which developed during the 1960's. Effective administration of these programs has been hampered at the inter-governmental level by the tremendous explosion in the number of grant-in-aid programs, the increasing reliance on categorical grant-in-aid programs, the confusing network of red tape, the development of a "function bureaucracy" which has alienated state and local officials, and the lack of a guiding philosophy or master plan. Many observers of these problems have called for a comprehensive restructuring of the administrative machinery. The Nixon

Administration made an initial attempt to reform the administrative machinery by an Executive Order in 1969, which reorganized those federal agencies most involved with the grant-in-aid programs, within common regional boundaries with Federal Regional Councils.

This study traces the historical development of grant-in-aid programs and describes the causes of the administrative and intergovernmental difficulties arising from the grant-in-aid programs established during the 1960's. However, the primary purpose of this study is to determine the potential of Federal Regional Councils to reform the administration of grant-in-aid programs by designing and implementing interagency and intergovernmental strategies to coordinate these programs with state and local communities. This potential was determined by observing the activities of the Indian Task Force of the Western Federal Regional Council located in San Francisco, California from 1970 to 1974.

Designing and implementing an interagency approach to intergovernmental relations has neither been swiftly arrived at, nor readily developed. In the case of coordinating federal grants-in-aid to Indian tribes, the Western Federal Regional Council was slow to respond and inept in its initial organizational efforts. These failures can be partially excused by the fact that councils suffer from the handicap of being unable to force their decisions

upon individual members. Such a handicap is the result of efforts on the part of the Executive Office to create an organization to coordinate the various federal agencies, without developing another autonomous bureaucracy.

Notwithstanding these initial shortcomings, the Indian Task Force subsequently coordinated the various federal agencies of the Western Federal Region to meet some of the needs of the Indians in this region. The most notable achievement was the development of an Integrated Grant Application (IGA) for the Salt-River Tribe.

This study concludes that the activities of the Indian Task Force not only demonstrate the importance of aggressive leadership, but they also demonstrate the ability of Federal Regional Councils to design and implement interagency and intergovernmental relations capable of correcting the most basic maladies plaguing the administration of grant-in-aid programs.



AN INTERAGENCY APPROACH TO  
REFORMING THE ADMINISTRATION OF  
FEDERAL GRANT-IN-AID PROGRAMS:  
A CASE STUDY OF THE INDIAN TASK FORCE  
OF THE WESTERN FEDERAL REGIONAL COUNCIL

By

BARRY J. WISHART

A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty  
of Claremont Graduate School in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the  
Graduate Faculty of Government

Supervisory Committee

Claremont

1974

Approved by:

George Blair  
George Blair

XC  
10.22  
1975  
W58

We, the undersigned, certify that we have read this  
dissertation and approve it as adequate in scope and  
quality for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

---

Visiting Examiner

---

Faculty Reader

*Grace Jordan*

---

Faculty Reader

-----

Supervisory Committee

*George S. Blain*

---

Chairman

*Mendel R. Goodall*

---

---

---

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to record my indebtedness to George Blair for recommending what has proven to be an exciting area of research; to Beau Carter for directing me toward the Indian Task Force activities; and to Hardy Pearce for providing the information and insights necessary to conduct this study.



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT. . . . .	i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT . . . . .	iv
INTRODUCTION . . . . .	1
Chapter	
I.    FEDERALISM AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN GRANT-IN-AID PROGRAMS . . . . .	14
II.   THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL REGIONAL COUNCILS . . . . .	75
III.  THE ACTIVITIES OF THE WFRC: A CASE STUDY OF THE INDIAN TASK FORCE . . . . .	99
IV.   CONCLUSION . . . . .	143
APPENDIX A . . . . .	149
APPENDIX B . . . . .	167
APPENDIX C . . . . .	176
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .	180

## INTRODUCTION

The administration of public policy has always been a challenge in the United States because political power is divided and dispersed on both an institutional and regional basis. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the administration of the federal grant-in-aid programs that developed during the 1960's. Effective administration of these programs has been hampered at the intergovernmental level by the tremendous explosion in the number of grants-in-aid, the increasing reliance on categorical grant-in-aid programs, the confusing network of bureaucratic red tape, the development of a "functional bureaucracy" that has alienated state and local officials, and the lack of a guiding philosophy or master plan. Many observers of these problems, including administrators, have called for a comprehensive restructuring of the administrative machinery. The Nixon Administration made an initial attempt to reform the administrative machinery by an Executive Order in 1969 which reorganized those federal agencies most involved with grant-in-aid programs within common regional boundaries with Federal Regional Councils (FRC's). Although very little is known about FRC's to date, the achievements



of one, the Indian Task Force of the Western Federal Regional Council has, during the past two years, resolved some of the most basic difficulties plaguing federal grants-in-aid, by providing an organizational framework for interagency and intergovernmental coordination.

#### Background

Such grant-in-aid programs have not always been seen as an impediment to the administration of public policy. Judging from the tremendous explosion in the number of grants during the 1960's, they would appear to have been a rather popular administrative device among congressmen and administrators alike. It was not that grant-in-aid programs had simply become fashionable -- after all, they were not exactly a novelty in either Washington or the state capitols and their beginnings had even predated the Constitution -- as much as they came to be viewed as a vehicle for programmatic leverage.<sup>1</sup> By offering the temptation of "free money," the grant-in-aid programs served as a device to entice the states to become involved in the administration of federal programs. As a result, by 1970, grant-in-aid programs became the proto-typical form of federal domestic

---

<sup>1</sup>Michael D. Reagan, *The New Federalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 75-76; Edward Banfield, "Revenue Sharing Theory and Practice," *Public Interest*, XXIII (Spring, 1971), 33-45. Banfield argues that Congressmen like grant programs, because they provide them with an opportunity to obtain special treatment for constituents.

involvement.<sup>2</sup>

However, as this proto-typical form of domestic involvement became more widespread, the cooperative atmosphere of the intergovernmental partnership deteriorated. By 1965, both state and local government became very critical of the grant-in-aid programs. Not only was the administrative process overly complex and confusing, it was virtually impossible to coordinate and control. By the end of the decade, federal politicians and administrators also became aware that the grant-in-aid administration was in trouble. To them, its most obvious affliction was the red tape that threatened to drown the system beneath a mass of paperwork.<sup>3</sup>

What factors contributed to the development of this situation? How did the grant-in-aid programs, which Michael Reagan regards as a "major social innovation of our time," become so bogged down?<sup>4</sup>

This rapid deterioration was the result of many factors. According to James L. Sundquist, it was the

---

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 57.

<sup>3</sup>Dwight A. Ink, "The Origins and Thrusts of the New Federalism," American Society for Public Administration, (September, 1973), 31; James L. Sundquist, Making Federalism Work, (Washington, D. C. : ~~Bx~~Brookings Institute, 1969), pp. 14-17; Edmund S. Muskie, "The Challenge to Creative Federalism," Saturday Review, June 25, 1966, pp. 12-14.

<sup>4</sup>Reagan, The New Federalism, p. 57.



result of changes in both the quantity and quality of grant-in-aid programs.<sup>5</sup> Changes in quantity are graphically portrayed by such statistics as the increase in the number of grant-in-aid programs from 160 in 1962 to over 12,200 by 1973. This, in turn, increased the financial commitment by the federal government from \$7.9 billion to \$43 billion during the same period. So great was the increase, that a catalog of catalogs was needed just to list all of the available programs.<sup>6</sup>

While this dramatic expansion in the number of grant-in-aid programs was probably sufficient to provide many administrative headaches, the most serious problems arose out of changes in the quality of the programs. Prior to 1960, grant-in-aid programs were seen as a way to help state and local government achieve their objectives.<sup>7</sup> The states were allowed to assert their authority over the grant-in-aid administration because the money was usually disbursed by the federal government on a formula basis, which emphasized eligibility rather than responsibility. These grant-in-aid programs also gave the states consider-

---

<sup>5</sup> Sundquist, Making Federalism Work, pp. 2-3.

<sup>6</sup> The exact number of grants is very difficult to determine because of different enumeration techniques. For a review of the various statistics, see Federal Grants: The Need for Reform (New York: Tax Foundation, Inc., 1973), pp. 7-30; A Fiscal Program for a Balanced Federalism (New York: The Committee for Economic Development, 1967), pp. 15-25; William H. Kolberg, "The New Federalism: Regional Councils and Program Coordination Efforts," American Society for Public Administration, (September, 1973), 51.

<sup>7</sup> Sundquist, Making Federalism Work, pp. 2-5.

able freedom, within broad statutory limits, to determine exactly how the money was actually spent. Notwithstanding efforts by the federal government to formally supervise these programs, the actual relationship between state and federal officers was one of collaboration with the federal officers playing a passive role.<sup>8</sup> Since such an unobtrusive relationship became the expectation of the states, it was not surprising that they were shaken when the federal government curtailed their freedom after 1960, by converting the grant-in-aid mechanism to achieve federal government objectives.

In order to achieve its objectives, the federal government began to control the purpose of grants-in-aid, by issuing highly specialized -- and highly confusing -- categorical grant-in-aid programs. For example, under one such program administered by the Farmers' Home Administration, only cities with populations of less than 5,500 could apply for financial assistance to develop sewage-collection systems. On the other hand, cities whose populations were larger than 5,500 were obliged to submit their sewer applications to yet another agency, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Moreover, when an "interceptor sewer" was needed, the community involved had to obtain permission from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In the event,

---

<sup>8</sup>V. O. Key, Jr., The Administration of Federal Grants to States (Indiana: R. R. Donnelley and Sons Company, 1937), pp. 369-373.



however, that financial assistance was needed to construct a sewer in a depressed area, only the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) could provide relief. By controlling the purposes of the grant in this manner, the federal government was able to centralize the policy-making in Washington.<sup>9</sup>

By 1973, 550 of these grants were "mainline" grants, i.e., money given directly to private agencies, special purpose districts, and so forth. The essential and significant aspects of such grants was that they bypassed the state and local executives who had become accustomed not only to the role of administrator, but also, because of the administrative discretion allowed by the old style programs, to that of policy-maker. While state and local governments were eligible for most of these grants, they were made ineligible recipients in twenty-three cases. The effect of this circumvention of state and local elected officials was to place them in the unenviable position of being responsible to citizens for programs over which they had no control; but most important of all, it kept them from coordinating the many diverse programs into a realistic administrative whole.<sup>10</sup>

Perhaps the greatest impediment to the administration of the grant-in-aid programs and the root cause of such maladies, was the initial failure of policy planners to

---

<sup>9</sup>Reagan, The New Federalism, pp. 59-61.

<sup>10</sup>Kolberg, "The New Federalism," p. 51.

consider each individual program from the perspective of a general policy framework. According to Jane Clark, these programs grew "in a hit-or-miss fashion, without chart or compass, blown by the winds of political exigency and administrative necessity."<sup>11</sup> As a result, there was little, if any consideration of either their intergovernmental impact or of whether the programs could even be administered according to established principles of management.<sup>12</sup> In his landmarked study of federal grant-in-aid programs, V. O. Key, Jr. concludes that neither Congress nor the groups seeking grant-in-aid legislation were primarily concerned with the impact of such programs on intergovernmental relations.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, many of the programs enacted in the 1960's were so broadly defined and so experimental, that none of the assumptions about their actual administration were openly challenged. In the case of the War on Poverty programs, the federal policy-makers assumed intergovernmental cooperation. And since, in theory, intergovernmental relations had been viewed by important scholars as basically cooperative, such an assumption was, theoretically, logical. Unfortunately, the practicalities of administering these programs told another story -- one of competition, confusion, frustration

---

<sup>11</sup>Jane P. Clark, The Rise of New Federalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), p. 139.

<sup>12</sup>Robert A. Levine, Public Planning: Failure and Re-direction (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1972), pp.1-2.

<sup>13</sup>V. O. Key, Jr., The Administration of Federal Grants, p. 1.



and failure.<sup>14</sup>

The intergovernmental tensions and conflicts that developed from these rapidly expanding, specifically designed and poorly planned grant-in-aid programs, generated considerable resentment and bitterness among the mayors and governors. In 1965, the U.S. Conference of Mayors publicly criticized the War on Poverty grant-in-aid programs as being virtually impossible to coordinate with many of the existing programs.<sup>15</sup> One reason for this coordination problem was the differing philosophical approaches of those administrators involved in War on Poverty programs and of the administrators of the established state agencies. Whereas the War on Poverty programs emphasized self-help and earning type programs, the existing state programs emphasized welfare. Consequently, the personnel of the two agencies were loath to work with each other.<sup>16</sup>

So great was the criticism, that both Congress and the Johnson Administration instituted reforms. In 1968, Congress passed the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act. While it was hailed as a major step toward bringing order

---

<sup>14</sup>Sanford Kravits, "The Community Action Program -- Past, Present, and its Future?" in On Fighting Poverty, ed. by James L. Sundquist (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1969), p. 60.

<sup>15</sup>Sundquist, Making Federalism Work, pp. 14-17.

<sup>16</sup>Advisory Commission of Intergovernmental Relations, Intergovernmental Relations and the Poverty Program (Washington, D. C. : United States Printing Office, 1966), pp. 23-39, 75-153.

to federal-state-local relations, a study in 1970 revealed that the full potential of this legislation was yet to be realized.<sup>17</sup> Primarily, the large number of categorical grant-in-aid programs (one of the major causes of confusion), remained intact. More fundamental than the shortcomings of this particular legislation, however, was subsequent Congressional reluctance to develop the additional legislation to complete the task they had only just begun. This reluctance was probably as much a result of the influence of interest groups, as of the fact that streamlining grant-in-aid administration involved "pick and shovel" work.<sup>18</sup>

The Johnson Administration also sought to remedy these intergovernmental problems by designating Vice President Humphrey as the federal liaison with state and local executives. The Bureau of the Budget was also ordered to consolidate overlapping programs. While several successes were recorded, reforms appeared to be little more than a token response to criticisms from the governors and mayors, rather than far-reaching reform.<sup>19</sup>

If the Johnson Administration was reluctant to

---

<sup>17</sup> Leigh E. Grosenick, "Institutional Change to Improve State and Local Competencies," American Society for Public Administration, (September, 1973), 97.

<sup>18</sup> ACIR Fourteenth Annual Report, January 31, 1973, p. 14.

<sup>19</sup> ACIR Eleventh Annual Report, January 31, 1970, p. 3-4.



institute far-reaching reforms, the Nixon Administration was not. Under the rubric of the New Federalism, which Dwight Ink describes as a return to traditional federalism, the Nixon Administration sought to change the "balance which presently exists between federal capacities and responsibilities and the capacities and responsibilities of state and local governments." Accordingly, the Nixon Administration sought to establish a new pattern of action that would not only explode the notion that Congress and the federal government could solve the people's problems, but would also help strengthen state and local capacities.<sup>20</sup> These new patterns were based on the following logic: since the federal government is largely effecting the erosion of state and local capacities by centralizing policy-making, the first steps toward reform must be made by the federal government.<sup>21</sup>

Achievement of this reform involves three basic approaches: general revenue sharing, special revenue sharing, and revamping the grant-in-aid administration. General revenue sharing was implemented in 1973, but special revenue sharing has yet to receive the necessary congressional support. While general revenue sharing may help correct the fiscal inequities that existed, and may

---

<sup>20</sup>James S. Dwight, Jr., "The Four 'D's' of the New Federalism," American Society for Public Administration, (September, 1973), 17.

<sup>21</sup>Grosenick, "Institutional Change," p. 97.

also prevent the further expansion of categorical grants-in-aid, it has done little to solve its present problems. Thus, the only remaining option was to reform the grant-in-aid administration.<sup>22</sup>

The Nixon Administration approached this task with the following objectives: emphasis on planning and review, decentralization, coordination, and elimination of categorical grants-in-aid. In order to implement this ambitious set of objectives, the Federal Assistance Review (FAR) program was established. FAR attempted to redesign the federal part of the grant-in-aid administration by organizing those federal agencies most involved with grant-in-aid programs, into ten standard federal regions with regional councils to serve as an organizational framework. The underlying assumption of FAR was essentially that this interagency reorganization would facilitate the development of more cooperative intergovernmental relations.

#### Nature and Purpose

In order to determine if there is any basis for such an assumption, this study will focus on the activities of the Indian Task Force in executing its primary task of assisting the tribes in the planning and finalizing aspect of the grant-in-aid process.

The specific purpose of this study is to determine whether the potential of FRC's to reform the grant-in-aid

---

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

administration has been achieved, by describing and analyzing the activities of the Indian Task Force, which was established by the Western Federal Regional Council (WFRC). This task force was established with the objective of providing technical assistance, to help Indians in the Western Federal Region obtain desired grant-in-aid programs. As such, it was seen as a specific approach to one of the explicit functions of the WFRC: "The development of long-term regional interagency and intergovernmental strategies for resource allocation to better respond to the needs of state and local communities."<sup>23</sup>

#### Sources of Data

The letters and memoranda of the Indian Task Force (ITFF), kept by the WFRC Secretariat, constitute the primary source of empirical data utilized by this study. Informal interviews with federal officials and representatives of Indian tribes are also utilized to "fill in" gaps in the ITFF, as well as to describe the informal activities of the task force. Hardy Pearce, Executive Secretary of the Indian Task Force, and Beau Carter, Executive Secretary of the WFRC, are the primary sources of interview data. Their strategic locations in the WFRC Secretariat and Indian Task Force afforded the best overview of the activities of the task force as it related to the Council, the Indians, and the other federal

---

<sup>23</sup>See Appendix B.



agencies in the Western Federal Region.

### Assumptions

This study assumes that the activities of the Indian Task Force -- its evolution into a viable inter-agency and intergovernmental organization, as well as its successes and failures -- reflect the activities of most of the other task forces in the WFRC. This study also assumes that federal-Indian relationships approximate federal-local and federal-state relationships involved in the administration of grant-in-aid programs.

The Indian Task Force was chosen from among the many task forces within the WFRC, because the extensive activities of the Council precluded studying every task force, and because this particular task force was recommended by Beau Carter as the "best example of inter-agency and intergovernmental coordination." Support is lent to this claim by the fact that Webb Otis, Chairman of the Indian Task Force, was just appointed the new WFRC Chairman for 1974-1975 by President Nixon. In any event, this is a case study designed to collect basic information which can serve as the substance for the development hypothesis which, in turn, will serve as the basis of empirical theory building.

Arthur Diamond, Winston H. Fisk and Robert Darlington, *The Democratic Republic* (2nd ed., Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1970).

David J. Garrow, *Party Politics in America* (2nd ed., Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972), pp. 55-57.

## CHAPTER I

### FEDERALISM AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN GRANT-IN-AID PROGRAMS

#### Introduction

It has been argued that the principle of federalism, as interpreted and applied by both the founding fathers and subsequent government officers, has been a primary determinant of many features of the American political system.<sup>24</sup> An often cited example of this hypothesis is the relatively undisciplined and often fractured nature of American political parties.<sup>25</sup> Assuming the validity of this hypothesis and the status of federalism as the independent (causal) variable, it could also be argued that the development of the many grant-in-aid programs during the 1960's was a consequence of the historical developments of federalism. Such a hypothesis, however, is altogether too simple. While federalism may have initially facilitated the development of the grant-in-aid device, its increasing role in domestic policy during the twentieth century -- especially

---

<sup>24</sup>Martin Diamond, Winston M. Fisk and Herbert Garfinkel, The Democratic Republic (2nd ed.; Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1970).

<sup>25</sup>Frank J. Srouf, Party Politics in America (2nd ed.; Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972), pp. 65-85.

during the 1960's -- placed it in a position of modifying federalism. How and why did this modification take place? What are the implications of this change?

The Historical Development of  
American Federalism

The Constitution and the  
federal principle

One reason for this modification is the lack of a clear, concise definition of federalism. Actually, there are as many definitions of federalism as there are writers on the subject. According to one widely shared definition, the federal principle is "the method of dividing powers so that the general and regional governments are each within their own sphere, coordinate and independent."<sup>26</sup> Another writer defines federalism as "a device for dividing decisions and functions of government."<sup>27</sup> Still another writer defines federalism" as the mode of political organization that . . . (distributes) power among general and constituent governments in a manner designed to protect the existence and authority of both."<sup>28</sup> According to all of these definitions, the essential federal characteristic is the division of governing power between the national govern-

---

<sup>26</sup> Kenneth C. Wheare, Federal Government (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 11.

<sup>27</sup> The President's Commission on National Goals, Report of the Commission, The Federal System (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960), p. 265.

<sup>28</sup> Daniel Elazar, American Federalism (New York: Thomas H. Crowell Company, 1972), p. 2.



ment and the member states.<sup>29</sup>

In the United States, the concept of federalism has been associated with the constitutional division of powers and functions between the national and state governments. When the framers of the Constitution met in Pennsylvania in 1787 to seek remedies to the chaos of the Confederation of states, none of the delegates came armed with a clearly conceptualized definition of federalism, let alone prepared resolutions or even loose notions that could be called federal. Instead of arising out of the process of rational debate, the principle of federalism embodied in the Constitution was the outgrowth of conflict and compromise.<sup>30</sup>

The most basic issue faced by the framers was the question of how to divide the powers and functions among the national and state governments. With the support of the larger states, the delegation from Virginia provided its answer to this fundamental political question, in the form of the Virginia Plan. The basis of this plan was an indictment of the Confederation as both impotent and inept. According to their assessment, the Confederation was in-

capabl

<sup>29</sup> Diamond, et al., The Democratic Republic, p. 131.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., pp. 52-62; Robert E. Merriam, "Federalism in Transition," in Federalism Today, ed. by William A. Jump and I. Thomas McKillop (Washington, D. C. : U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1969), pp. 5-17.

capable of providing for either the security of liberty or the general welfare. Because of these substantial shortcomings, the delegation was reluctant to recommend a mere modification of the Articles of Confederation. A new approach to governing was needed. Therefore, the Virginia Plan advocated scrapping the whole "merely federal" system<sup>31</sup> and replacing it with a strong, national government.<sup>32</sup>

Although the Virginia Plan received widespread support during the initial stages of the convention, it became the basis of a bitter controversy. Opposition to the plan came mostly from the small states. There was, however, some support from the larger states. The delegation from New York, for example, was split over the issue. The opposition to the Virginia Plan was based on the fear that large republics would undermine cherished liberties and freedoms. While this opposition was united in its

---

<sup>31</sup>The term "merely federal" has been a source of confusion for many students of American government. According to Martin Diamond, when the framers used the term "merely federal," they meant confederal. At this point in the convention, the framers had no intention of establishing what we in the twentieth century call "federalism." Moreover, when Madison described the Constitution, he argued that it was "neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both," Federalist 39, p. 250. For a further explanation see Martin Diamond, "The Federalist's Federalism," in Essays in Federalism, ed. by George C. S. Benson (Claremont: Institute for the Study of Federalism, 1961), pp. 21-66.

<sup>32</sup>Benson, Essays, pp. 52-62; The Democratic Republic, pp. 40-41.



criticisms, it was not united in its support for an alternate plan. Notwithstanding this lack of total unanimity on all issues, the opposition was sufficiently cohesive to present an alternative plan in the form of the New Jersey Plan. However, it proved unacceptable to most of the framers, and was voted down by a 7-3 margin.<sup>33</sup>

The framers finally found a reasonable resolution to this conflict through the Connecticut Compromise, which provided for a two chamber Congress, one based on population, and the other on the states. From this compromise emerged a peculiar brand of federalism which Martin Diamond calls a "mixed government," to be distinguished from unitary and confederal governments. According to Diamond, the framers altered the traditional federal form by eliminating the decisively federal features of state sovereignty over all internal function, by adding decisively national features. Now, for example, the national government could also collect taxes and post levies. This was "a new form of government, neither federal nor national, but an admixture of both characters."<sup>34</sup> William Riker correctly refers to this admixture by the more descriptive term of "centralized federalism."<sup>35</sup>

Although the framers were sufficiently able to

---

<sup>33</sup>Diamond, The Federalist's View, pp. 52-66.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., pp. 40-41.

<sup>35</sup>William Riker, Federalism (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964), p. xii.

— resolve the conflicts of how to distribute the powers of government to deliver the Constitution for state approval, it does not necessarily mean that they clearly described this new brand of federalism. The framers significantly refused to adopt a once-and-for-all disposition of the distribution of government power. Neither were their intentions regarding this new brand of federalism entirely clear. The language of the Constitution is sufficiently general and vague to require on-going interpretation, in the light of current issues and problems.<sup>36</sup> As a result, the evolution of federalism in America has been accompanied by changes in the distribution of government power. "Thus any attempt to argue for a particular relation between the national government and the states -- in particular the precise divisions between them -- must fall flat for the lack of constitutional corroboration."<sup>37</sup>

#### The emergence of modern federalism

Since the founding fathers "bequeathed us an open-ended system,"<sup>38</sup> it is unrealistic to view American government in terms of neatly divisible levels -- national, state and local -- each possessing its own clearly delineated political jurisdictions. Moreover, the most important

---

<sup>36</sup> Roscoe C. Martin, The Cities and the Federal System (New York: Atherton Press, 1965), p. 24.

<sup>37</sup> Richard H. Leach, American Federalism (New York: W. N. Norton and Company, 1970), p. 9.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., p. 24.

"government functions needed by the American people can be performed only by exertions of power at two or even three levels of government simultaneously."<sup>39</sup> This point is clearly demonstrated by the intergovernmental approach to solving the problems of both the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. During the nineteenth century, the four major problems were: the disposition of the public domain, internal improvements, education and slavery. The major problems of this century, to date, are: resource conservation and utilization, education, civil rights and race relations. Grant-in-aid programs provided a significant intergovernmental approach to the first three problems on both lists.<sup>40</sup>

The genius of the grant-in-aid device, according to Michael D. Reagan, is that it avoids the formal resurrection of the debate about the federal division of authority, which proved impossible to resolve to the satisfaction of every delegate at the Constitutional Convention. Reagan explains:

. . . by using grants, one doesn't have to face the question: At which level of government does this function belong? If the activity is traditionally a local one, its direct operation can remain there, while the financial problems are solved with federal aid. If the federal govern-

---

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., p. 26. Italics added.

<sup>40</sup> W. Brookes Graves, American Intergovernmental Relations: Their Development and Current Status (New York: Charles Scribner Sons, 1966), p. 478.



ment wants to inject its sense of values and priorities into the shaping of a program, that grant provides a vehicle for programmatic leverage without it being necessary to take over the whole function and remove it from local hands.<sup>41</sup>

These advantages, Reagan argues, have made grant-in-aid programs "a major social innovation of our time and the proto-typical . . . form of federal domestic involvement."<sup>42</sup> The importance of grant-in-aid programs was noted by V. O. Key, Jr., as early as 1935, when he observed that it had profoundly modified the federal system.<sup>43</sup>

This modification can be seen in the demise of the old-style federalism with its emphasis on state sovereignty, and its replacement by the "new style federalism," better known and identified as "intergovernmental relations."<sup>44</sup>

---

<sup>41</sup>Reagan, The New Federalism, p. 58.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid. According to Sharkansky, grant-in-aid programs are the single most prominent feature of federalism; Ira Sharkansky, Public Administration (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 241-257; also see Jane P. Clark, New Federalism, p. 137; Carl W. Stenborg, State Involvement in Federal-Local Programs: A Case Study of the "Buying-In" Approach (Washington, D. C.: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1970).

<sup>43</sup>V. O. Key, Jr., Administration of Federal Grants, p. xv.

<sup>44</sup>Reagan, The New Federalism, p. 3. Reagan argues that the new federalism is better referred to as intergovernmental relations because the cutting edge of federalism is the actual administrative relationships between governments. The term "intergovernmental relations" has been in popular use among scholars and administrators in the United States for only about thirty years. This popular usage seems to have developed from reports of the Committee on Public Administration of the Social Science Research Council, which was active from 1928 to 1932 and from 1936 to 1945. However, the original concept and idea had its genesis during the colonial period. For the purposes of this paper, the term "intergovernmental relations" will be used to refer

While intergovernmental relations obviously involve more than the part played by administration of grant-in-aid programs in domestic policy, the pre-eminent role of these programs makes them the "cutting edge" of federal relationships. This is so, precisely because they influence the ebb and flow of political power among the various units of the political structure which, in turn, determine the policies which will be used to resolve the nation's problems. Thus, while the development of the grant-in-aid device was facilitated by the malleable characteristics of American federalism, the grant-in-aid device wrought a profound impact on the nature of American federalism.

In order to determine the consequences of the interplay of federalism and the grant-in-aid device, it is necessary to seek answers to the following questions: What is a grant-in-aid? How did the modern grant-in-aid system develop? What are the important characteristics of this system? What impact have these developments had on the making and administering of public policy?

---

to vertical relationships between national, state and local governments. William Anderson, Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations (New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1972), preface; William Anderson, Intergovernmental Relations in Review (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1960), pp. 3-4; Graves, American Intergovernmental Relations, pp. 3-31.



## The Development of Modern Grants-In-Aid

### Definition

The modern concept of "grant-in-aid" is a rather technical one. The term seems to have originated in England, where it was used to describe funds provided by Parliament to assist local units, such as counties and boroughs. In the United States, such grants to state and local governments are identified by the term "federal aids." The term "federal aids" also covers additional kinds of federal outlays such as loans, payments to individuals and corporations in the form of subsidies, and emergency grants-in-aid to states. The grant-in-aid must also be distinguished from shared revenues, which refer to general outlays from federal to state and local governments with few, if any conditions attached. Given these distinctions, "grant-in-aid may be defined as money payments furnished by a higher to a lower level of government to be used for specific purposes and subject to conditions spelled out in law or administrative regulation."<sup>45</sup>

### The historical basis of the modern grant

The early forerunners of the modern grant, replete

---

<sup>45</sup>Reagan, The New Federalism, p. 55. In this study, the term "grant" will be used as a substitute for the more accurate though cumbersome "grants-in-aid." For a discussion of the origin and development of grants, see Clark, New Federalism, pp. 137-258; William Anderson, The Nation and the States, Rivals or Partners? (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955), pp. 175-190.

with its complex criteria and administrative regulations, revolved around the disposition of the public domain and federal aids to the states. In a resolution adopted on October 10, 1780, the Continental Congress declared its intention to financially assist the states in the development and protection of vast tracts of western lands. The Land Ordinance of 1785 subsequently required that all townships established on public lands allocate lots for public schools. "There shall be reserved for the United States out of every township . . . lot No. 16 . . . for the maintenance of public schools." This legislation significantly established the precedent of providing aid to states, and providing it conditionally.<sup>46</sup> The subsequent history of grant programs in the United States reflects not only the proliferation of such grants, especially in the 1960's, but also an expansion of its horizons and conditions.

The precedent of combining the disposition of the public domain with educational policy was extended by the Morrill Act of 1862, which established land-grant agricultural colleges. This legislation established another important precedent. Not only was the grant given for a specific purpose, the governors of the recipient states were required to report annually to Congress regarding

---

<sup>46</sup> Graves, Intergovernmental Relations, pp. 478-483.

the disposition of the funds. Also, for a state to benefit from the minimum endowment of 90,000 acres, it must channel its revenues to provide for the construction of buildings. "Thus, implicitly, this specific grant became for all practical purposes a conditional grant . . . forerunners of the later 'matching' grants."<sup>47</sup>

The federal government also provided assistance to state governments by the assumption of state debts in 1790; the development of state militias; internal improvements such as roads, canals, and railroads; and the disposition of surplus funds in 1838. Although these forms of assistance do not qualify as grants, as rigidly defined in this study, they did establish important patterns for future action.<sup>48</sup>

However, the intricate categorical and conditional features which have wrought such a profound impact on intergovernmental relations, is a twentieth century phenomenon. As the United States entered the twentieth century, it faced many social and economic changes. No longer was it a nation where men pursued simple agrarian life styles. The growing cities and the complex forces of urbanization

---

<sup>47</sup>Michael E. Levy and Juan de Torres, Federal Revenue Sharing with the States: Problems and Promises (Illinois: National Industries Conference Board, 1970), p. 4.

<sup>48</sup>Graves, Intergovernmental Relations, p. 483.



rendered inadequate the Jeffersonian visions of self-reliance.<sup>49</sup> The political leaders faced the complexities of the new and changing environment by passing two far-reaching enactments. In 1913, they broadened the base of the federal financial system by instituting income taxes, thereby assuring a substantial annual income.<sup>50</sup> In 1914, Congress passed the first major grant program, in the form of the Smith-Lever Act. This legislation established the Agricultural Extension Service and "represented an initial cash grant of unprecedented size from the national government to establish a continuing state aid program."<sup>51</sup> This legislation also incorporated the three basic features of most subsequent grant programs:

(1) an apportionment formula for distribution of funds

---

<sup>49</sup>Urbanization is a difficult concept to define. It refers to both where and how people choose to live. Scholars of urban affairs are by no means in agreement on either the definition or theory of urbanism, nor its impact on urban dwellers. The best known efforts at this definition and theory came out of the "Chicago School." See Robert E. Park, et al., The City (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1925); Louis Wirth, "Urbanism as a Way of Life," American Journal of Sociology, XLIV (July, 1938), 1-24. For a critique of the Chicago School's perspective, see Gideon Sjoberg, "Comparative Urban Sociology," in Sociology Today, ed. by Robert K. Merton (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1959), pp. 334-359. For a challenging analysis of the impact of urbanism on the family structure, see Michael Harrington, The Other America (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962). For a response, see Marvin B. Sussman, "The Isolated Nuclear Family: Fact or Fiction," Social Problems, VI (1959), 333-340.

<sup>50</sup>Deil S. Wright, Federal Grants-in-Aid: Perspectives and Alternatives (Washington, D. C.: Public Policy Research, 1968), p. 5.

<sup>51</sup>Daniel J. Elazar, ed., The American System (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), p. 43.

among the states, (2) state matching requirements, and (3) advance federal approval of state plans.<sup>52</sup>

Such conditional features were written into grant programs to ensure the implementation of congressional policy. Although both money grants and the early land grants had conditions attached to them, albeit very general conditions in the case of general purpose grants, even the Morrill Act of 1862 which was considered one of the most capably administered of the land grants, suffered from the lack of administrative supervision. An inquiry in 1912 into the various grants, revealed gross maladministration in the form of obscure records, delays by states in matching federal money, and the use of federal income for other than stipulated purposes.<sup>53</sup>

In order to secure national guidance of state agencies and effect national policies, various mechanisms and devices were subsequently employed. The device of advanced approval of contemplated state action provided the dual benefits of assuring the national government that state plans were in accordance with the goals of the

---

<sup>52</sup>Wright, Federal Grants, p. 26. Various scholars have traced the origins of the modern grant system to various points; some to the Smith-Lever Act of 1914, others to the Morrill Act of 1862, and yet others to the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. However, it was not until the 1920's that the scholars recognized the "grant system" as a "regularized mode of conducting national business." Martha Derthick, The Influence of Federal Grants (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 5.

<sup>53</sup>Key, Administration of Federal Grants to States, pp. 27-28.



legislation as well as compelling a planning attitude which, in turn, "permitted federal technical advice and assistance to be offered at a time it may exert the greatest influence."<sup>54</sup> The audit and a system of reports provided the information which could serve Congress and the public as the basis for further action. Unfortunately, many of the reports were simply "filed," without analysis. The most potent of all controls was the merit system imposed by the United States Employment Service, requiring minimum qualifications for state employees. Matching requirements and state legislation imposing mandatory expenditures for counties and other local units, also contributed to the administrative structure designed to effectuate national policy. The ultimate device, however, was the power of the federal government to discontinue payments to the states. While rarely invoked, it was the "shotgun behind the door," and served potentially as a very potent threat.<sup>55</sup> V. O. Key, Jr. concludes, however that while,

The relationship may be in the form of control . . . the actual operations tend to be in the form of collaboration. Nor are federal administrators grasping for power. If a state agency is operating smoothly and competently within the broad framework of the federal legislation, the federal administrators are inclined to play a passive role . . . they dislike to intervene to correct an unsatisfactory situation.<sup>56</sup>

---

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., pp. 369-370.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., p. 373.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.



More direct supervision of grant programs did occur briefly during the 1930's when the economic problems created urgent financial needs, especially in the nation's cities. With the financial plight of the cities as a pretext, the federal government short-circuited the states and dealt directly with the cities through such federal agencies as the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), the Civil Works Administration (CWA), and the Public Works Administration (PWA), to mention a few examples. Such incursions into areas of state jurisdiction, however, were the result of the severe economic conditions of the times, rather than the explicit desire of federal officials to increase federal control over grant programs.<sup>57</sup>

In all, the Roosevelt Administration established only fourteen additional grant programs. While most of the grants established during the depression were in the form of emergency aids, the most well-known addition by the Roosevelt Administration involved a reform of the welfare system. The Social Security Act of 1935 included three public assistance titles providing matching grants for Old Age Assistance, Aid to Dependent Children, and Aid to the Blind, according to a sliding scale. The objective of these grants was to "strengthen the existing state programs and to encourage the States to establish

---

<sup>57</sup>Paul K. Conkin, The New Deal (New York: Thomas H. Crowell, 1967).

categorical programs where they did not exist."<sup>58</sup>

As the welfare expenditures for state and local governments rose during the 1950's, the size of the grants was also expanded. In addition, about thirty new grant programs were inaugurated. With the exception of grants for community renewal, beach erosion control and water quality control, which were "mainline" grants of money flowing directly from the federal government to the grant recipient, most of the grants were channeled through the states which enhanced the state financial policy-making role.<sup>59</sup>

Beginning in 1961, however, the number of grant programs increased dramatically as the federal government sought to remedy the many problems generated by the impact of urbanization, especially in the large metropolitan areas. The number of grant-in-aid programs increased from 160 in 1962 to over 1,200 in 1973. Federal disbursements increased from \$7.9 billion to \$43 billion during that same period. More significant than this tremendous quantitative increase was the growing dependency of state and local governments on the federal government for financial assistance. In 1962, grant-in-aid programs constituted only 12.3 percent of all state and local revenues. By

---

<sup>58</sup>U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, The Role of Equalization of Fiscal Grants (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 9. ACIR, Eleventh Annual Report, pp. 1-2.

<sup>59</sup>Stenberg, State Involvement, p. 11.



1973, federal assistance represented twenty-two percent of all state and local revenues. Administration of these programs involved 150 agencies and bureaus, and over 400 federal offices in the field -- all supported by the triple alliance of pressure groups, congressional subcommittees and federal agencies. In the light of these quantities, it seems inconceivable that prior to 1930, federal aid was available in only ten major program areas and amounted to only \$0.1 billion, about 1.5 percent of the total state and local revenues. The Eighty-ninth Congress (1965-1966) alone passed twenty-one new health programs, seventeen new education programs, fifteen new economic programs, twelve new programs for cities, seventeen new resource development programs, and four new manpower training programs.<sup>60</sup>

The pace of "direct federalism" also increased during the 1960's. Of the twelve hundred or so grant programs that existed in 1973, 550 of these were "main-line" grants. This involved an enormous amount of money bypassing state governments. In fact, twenty-three of these grant programs explicitly made states ineligible

---

<sup>60</sup> For a review of the various statistics describing the growth of federal grants, see Federal Grants: The Need for Reform (New York: Tax Foundation, Inc., 1973), pp. 7-30; A Fiscal Program for a Balanced Federalism (New York: The Committee for Economic Development, 1967), pp. 15-25; Deil S. Wright, Federal Grants-in-Aid, pp. 51-72; Levy and de Torres, Federal Revenue Sharing with the States: Problems and Promises, pp. 1-10; Richard H. Leach, American Federalism, p. 165.



recipients. Some of these programs even circumvented local governments and were given directly to special purpose districts.<sup>61</sup>

The range of activities covered by grant programs also increased during the 1960's to include such activities as water and sewer facilities, urban beautification, and community health services for the aged and the poor. Although most of these grant programs were targeted for urban areas, the most notable development was the unprecedented federal intrusion into areas such as law enforcement and education, previously considered the private domain of state and local governments.<sup>62</sup>

Another important change in grants during the 1960's was the development of "private federalism." Non-governmental units such as universities, private institutions, non-profit groups, and even individuals were eligible for some of the grants administered by HEW and the National Institute of Health. The most well known of these grants is the Community Action Program of the OEO.<sup>63</sup>

While federal control over the administration of grant programs was obviously increased by the growth of direct federalism, private federalism, and the proliferation of grant programs, additional federal control was also

---

<sup>61</sup> William H. Kolberg, "New Federalism," p. 51; Stenberg, State Involvement, p. 11.

<sup>62</sup> Sundquist, Making Federalism Work, p. 1.

<sup>63</sup> Stenberg, State Involvement, p. 11.

achieved by the development of categorical grants and project grants. While these two types of grants should not be considered mutually exclusive forms, they do provide the analytic distinctions necessary to describe the increased federal control and further erosion of state discretion in the implementation of grant programs.<sup>64</sup>

A categorical grant is a specifically and narrowly defined grant which leaves the recipient government with little discretion in administering the grant. For example, under one such program administered by the Farmers' Home Administration, only cities with populations of less than 5,500 could apply for financial assistance to develop sewage collection systems. On the other hand, cities with populations larger than 5,500 were obliged to submit their sewer applications to yet another agency, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Moreover, when an "interceptor sewer" was needed, the community involved had to obtain permission from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In the event, however, financial assistance is needed to construct a sewer in a depressed area, only the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) could provide relief. Thus, by narrowly defining the categories

---

<sup>64</sup>Reagan, The New Federalism, p. 60. Categorical grants are often described in contrast to bloc grants. For a discussion of the origin and development of bloc grants, see E. Douglas Harman, "The Bloc Grant: Readings from a First Experiment," Public Administration Review (March/April, 1970), 141-152.



of activity covered by a grant, the federal government effectively changed the location of policy-making from the state and local to the national level.<sup>65</sup>

This shift in the location of policy-making gained momentum by the increased reliance on project grants. Whereas categorical grants contributed to this shift by specifically and narrowly defining the purposes of grant money, project grants narrowly defined the criteria for the distribution of grant money. Project grants were developed as an alternative to formula grants which were widely used prior to 1960. Formula grants were issued to the states on the basis of such criteria as total population, number of low income residents, fiscal capacity of recipient governments, tax effort, and so forth. The primary role of the federal government in the administration of these grants was to determine the exact financial eligibility of each state. The actual administration of the grant was left to state and local officials.<sup>66</sup>

Project grants, on the other hand, required special approval by the officials of the awarding agency. Rather than providing the grant on the basis of eligibility according to fixed criteria, project grants were designed to meet specific problems such as mental health in urban areas. Although all urban communities, in theory, had access to funds to develop mental health centers, the limited size of

---

<sup>65</sup>Reagan, The New Federalism, p. 59.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., pp. 59-66.



the fund naturally limited the number of urban communities that could be aided. As a result, the grant was often awarded to that community "whose proposal most nearly satisfied the definitions of appropriate action in the minds of federal officials administering the grant program."<sup>67</sup>

In summary, the foregoing historical overview of grants reveals the ongoing effort on the part of the federal government to ensure that grant programs achieved federal objectives. While the money has always been given to the states conditionally, little effort was made to ensure that these conditions were met in the nineteenth century. However, as the size and number of grants increased during the twentieth century, the federal government made an effort at supervision through such devices as the merit system and audits. Moreover, it was not until the federal government concentrated on refining the conditional features of grants, rather than relying upon supervision, that it could guarantee that grants were being used to satisfy federal objectives.

#### The problems

Reagan lists four problems plaguing such grant programs: (1) project grants run counter to the need to equalize resources among jurisdictions, (2) in spite of the large number of grants, there are still areas of

---

<sup>67</sup>Ibid., p. 64.

state services such as fire protection, which fall outside the aided categories, (3) the entire grant system, and project grants specifically, tend to skew state and local budgets; and most important of all, (4) the proliferation of categorical grants has created substantial coordination problems.<sup>68</sup> While the first two problems existed to some degree before 1960, the last two problems should be seen as an outgrowth of the grant system that developed after 1960.

Project grants prevent the equalization of resources among jurisdictions, argues Reagan, because "those state and local governments which have the best professional staffs are likely to prepare the best proposals and thus receive the most project aid."<sup>69</sup> There is some evidence to support this claim. It appears that in order to obtain a "fair share" of available money, at least eighteen states and an unknown number of cities have maintained offices in Washington, D. C. to "help those governments grapple with the maze of Federal aid programs and to reduce chances that they might 'miss out' on some available 'Federal' dollars."<sup>70</sup> Some states and cities have even sought help from private consultation firms. This has led to the development of the art of "grantsmanship." Mayor Joseph Doorley describes this art as "the

---

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., pp. 86-88.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Wright, Federal Grants, p. 20.

practical aspects of getting things done."<sup>71</sup> Aside from the technical skill required to fill out all of the desired application forms "correctly," Doorley unabashedly confesses, "I am unalterably committed to exert every possible bit of political muscle I have to secure federal aid for my city."<sup>72</sup> This involved cultivating relationships with Congressmen and Senators. Thus, "with the assistance of Congressman Fernand St. Germain . . . I had the first demolition project in the country funded."<sup>73</sup>

Although such "grantsmanship" techniques may have maintained the inequity of resources, it is important to recognize that it certainly did not produce the inequity. The first efforts to equalize resources came in the 1930's. They proved, even then, overly generous to the more affluent states. Also, since the equalization provisions were restricted to welfare grants, the effort must be considered a mere token. Besides, the provisions were often based on complex and confusing formulas that rarely reflected state needs.<sup>74</sup>

The charge that project grants skew state and

---

<sup>71</sup>Joseph A. Doorley, "The Art of Grantsmanship," in The New Urban Politics, ed. by Douglas M. Fox (California: Goodyear Publishing Company, Inc., 1972), pp. 90-92.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid.

<sup>74</sup>For a comprehensive analysis of the role of equalization of federal grants, see ACIR, The Role of Equalization of Federal Grants (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1955).



local budgets by forcing state governments and city councils to put their money where the grants are, if they desire to maximize the use of their dollars, is both true and false. Actually, the entire grant system skews the budgets of these recipient governments, enticed by generous matching provisions to invest significant portions of their budget into federally defined and controlled projects. This enticement stems from the dire financial problems facing most state and local governments. The importance of the federal grant money to state and local budgets can be seen in the rapid growth of the simple percentage statistics. Whereas various forms of federal "grants" in 1902 amounted to only one percent of state-local revenues, it had increased in 1962 to 13.5 percent and in 1971 to 21.1 percent. As a result, grants "induce state and local governments to adopt a pattern of expenditure in which the emphasis is somewhat different from that which would prevail in the absence of grants."<sup>75</sup> This rapid expansion of grant monies as a percentage of state-local revenues can create serious financial difficulties when the federal government decides to adopt a restrictive budgetary policy.

The problems of coordinating the many categorical grant programs that emerged during the 1960's, were basically political in origin rather than administrative. Indeed, there were and still are administrative problems, but they are symptomatic. The reported conflict between an urban

---

<sup>75</sup>Ibid.

renewal project approved by one agency for a location through which another agency planned a freeway does not belie this claim. Nor does the duplication, overlapping and inconsistent provisions of categorical grants disprove the claim that the most basic causes preventing coordination are political. All of these administrative difficulties arose out of the political decision to bypass state and local executives by the use of main-line grants. These executives were replaced by a "functional bureaucracy"<sup>76</sup> which is described by William H. Kolberg in the following selection:

The red tape generated by this type of organization is beyond belief. Every one of the 550 programs has been operated by specialists. Responsibility for their administration has run from the top specialist in Washington right down to the specialist at the state or local level. Each group of functional specialists has its own procedures and its own methods of communication. In some respects this is good, because specialists are required to operate complicated programs. They are concerned first and foremost with their immediate program responsibilities, and secondly with some coordination of related programs within the agency. Outside the agency's responsibilities there is little or no interest in coordination.<sup>77</sup>

By establishing functional relationships between federal agencies and their state, or local, or private counterparts, the program not only escaped the control of governors and mayors, it allowed a complex of other interests such as middle-management program administrators,

---

<sup>76</sup>ACIR, Tenth Annual Report (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 8; ACIR, Eleventh Annual Report, pp. 2-3.

<sup>77</sup>Kolberg, "Regional Councils," p. 51.



Congressional subcommittees and pressure groups to determine the direction of the grant programs rather than top policy makers. Twenty-three of the grant programs enacted after 1960 completely bypassed the states. Where the states could not be avoided, the "delivery system" of the grant was emphasized by "hardening the categories" of the grant. Controlling the delivery system was also facilitated by project grants which, it was assumed, would assure the poor and the blacks a "fair shake" from state governments. However, while it may have thwarted discriminatory practices -- especially in the South toward the blacks -- it also undermined efforts to achieve a simplified and flexible federalism.<sup>78</sup>

So great was the power of the functional bureaucracies that they became "vertical autocracies." The power that supported these vertical autocracies was a result of balkanization: each agency and even each grant program had its own bureaucracy, congressional sponsorship, and supporting interest group. This support produced an interesting contradiction: specialist administrators, according to attitude studies, were "quite satisfied" with the operation of the system, while governors and mayors have "fumed at procedures which have created administrative fiefdoms that are quite impervious to any type of central management

---

<sup>78</sup>Fox, The New Urban Politics, p. 35; ACIR, Tenth Annual Report, p. 8; ACIR, Eleventh Annual Report, pp. 2-3.



control and coordination."<sup>79</sup>

This lack of coordination was primarily a result of a decision on the part of federal policy-makers to bypass the elected officials at the state and local level. This decision placed these officials under the unenviable handicap of being responsible to the citizens for the results of programs over which they have no control. More important, bypassing the local executives precludes a close intergovernmental structural relationship necessary to "develop the kind of coordinate relationship required to make the system a realistic whole."<sup>80</sup>

As serious and debilitating as these problems may be, there is an even more basic impediment to the administration of the grant-in-aid programs: the grant program was not developed according to a master plan.<sup>81</sup> Examination of the entire system will not reveal a clear pattern of development. It appears to have grown in what Jane Clark calls "a hit or miss fashion, without chart or compass, blown by the winds of political exigency and administrative necessity."<sup>82</sup> As a result, little consideration was given either to its intergovernmental impact or whether the pro-

---

<sup>79</sup>Grosenick, "Institutional Change," p. 95.

<sup>80</sup>Kolberg, "Regional Councils," p. 51.

<sup>81</sup>Sundquist, Making Federalism Work, p. 13.

<sup>82</sup>Clark, New Federalism, p. 139.

grams' objectives could even be achieved within the current administrative structure. There appears to be nothing new about this tendency, however, for according to V. O. Key, Jr., neither interest groups nor Congress have ever been preoccupied with the impact of grant programs on intergovernmental relations.<sup>83</sup>

While the potential impact of grant programs on intergovernmental relations has never been a primary consideration of either Congress or groups seeking passage of legislation, an administrative apparatus which provided guidelines for federal-state relationships in administering the grants had evolved.<sup>84</sup> This does not mean, however, that there was a superior-subordinate relationship between these two governments with a stream of orders flowing from federal to state agencies. Rather, the relationship was one of collaboration and "consultation concerning, and approval of, prospective action to be undertaken within the broad limits of legislation, coupled with a review of past actions through inspections, reports and audits."<sup>85</sup> While such an apparatus may have provided state and local governments with too much influence in planning and too much freedom in administration, it nevertheless provided a reasonably intimate structure,

---

<sup>83</sup>Key, The Administration of Federal Grants, p. 1.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid., pp. 1-3.

<sup>85</sup>Ibid., p. 369.

together with procedural guidelines for intergovernmental relations.

As the policy-making process was centralized during the 1960's, however, this collaborative structure was undermined. This collaboration was further undermined by the highly experimental nature of such programs as community action programs.<sup>86</sup> Their potential impact on intergovernmental relations received little attention. In fact, many of the grant programs were developed and launched in such a euphoric atmosphere that their administrative impact was not openly discussed.<sup>87</sup>

The development and administration of certain aspects of the War on Poverty demonstrates the experimental nature of many of the project grants and their implications for intergovernmental relations. According to the 1966 report by the Commission of Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), the Economic Opportunity Act prescribed an intergovernmental attack on poverty by creating new approaches such as Community Action Programs (CAP), Job Corps and VISTA. The major focus of CAP was a direct federal-private and federal-local relationship. This relationship emphasized involvement of private non-governmental groups. States were

<sup>86</sup> Sundquist, Making Federalism Work, p. 13.

<sup>87</sup> Sanford Kravits, "The Community Action Program -- Past, Present and Its Future?," p. 60.



virtually bypassed and local governments avoided.<sup>88</sup>

The following case study demonstrates the lack of consideration of intergovernmental relations by the policy-makers of the War on Poverty.

### Community Action: An Approach to Social Reform

#### Introduction

Occasionally the public's peace of mind has been elbowed by descriptions of poverty in America. For the most part, however, Americans believed in the miracle that nobody starves in America, and that no adult is broke for long. This belief in widespread prosperity was not a myth held by the layman alone.<sup>89</sup> It seemed that even those individuals one would expect to be aware of poverty -- the scholars, journalists and politicians -- also believed that the American dream had been realized. Though there were a few prominent individuals who dissented from this optimistic view during the 1950's, their references to poverty were either laughed at or brushed aside as too insignificant to warrant the attention of the national

---

<sup>88</sup>ACIR, Intergovernmental Relations and the Poverty Program (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 2.

<sup>89</sup>Herman Miller, Rich Man, Poor Man (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1964), p. 37. Miller argues that the conventional wisdom promulgated by the economists, editors, journalists and politicians, contributed to the myth that incomes in the United States were becoming more evenly distributed.

government.<sup>90</sup>

However, when President Johnson declared an "unconditional war on poverty" in his 1964 State of the Union Address, it was evident that the attitude toward poverty had changed. While the public was yet to be captured by this new mood, government officials now conceded the widespread and pernicious aspects of poverty. Within a year, the War on Poverty became the most publicized component of President Johnson's Great Society Program. The following three years were to see it become one of the most motly debated policies in the country.

What brought about these changes?

Various interpretations have sought to explain the timing in launching the War on Poverty in 1964. Most interpretations offer other than clear, concise, or readily quantifiable explanations. In fact, as one attempts to account for the climatic nuances that made it respectable to talk about poverty as an aspect of public policy, it becomes obvious that it was the result of an interweaving of various subtle threads. It is the objective of this part of the study to identify these threads, account for their origins and trace their interweaving into the fabric of public policy.

---

<sup>90</sup> John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society (New York: The New American Library, 1958), Chapter XXIII. Also see Sar A. Levitan, The Design of Federal Antipoverty Strategy (Ann Arbor: Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, 1969), pp. 11-12.



Since the term "War on Poverty" has been used to designate the veritable arsenal of legislative weaponry developed by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to fight poverty,<sup>91</sup> the subject is obviously too broad for the purposes of this study. For that matter, the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, considered the most significant weapon of this arsenal, is also too extensive a subject for the scope of this study. Besides, and most important, all of this legislation with the exception of Title II of the Economic Opportunity Act can be considered as "fundamentally conservative."<sup>92</sup> Not only did the major bulk of the poverty program emphasize the American virtues of education, training and character building, it was also based on the experience of past programs. The distinctive element of the War on Poverty was the inclusion of the "Community Action Program" under Title II. CAP constituted a "new departure in public policy and program."<sup>93</sup> Since it was this aspect of the War on Poverty that caused such turbulence in local, state and national politics, an accounting of its development will constitute an important part of this study.

---

<sup>91</sup>Other measures include: The Area Redevelopment Act of 1961, the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, The Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Appalachian Regional Development Act of 1965.

<sup>92</sup>Christopher Jenks, "Johnson vs. Poverty," New Republic, March 28, 1964.

<sup>93</sup>Margaret S. Gordon, ed., Poverty in America: Proceedings of a National Conference (San Francisco: 1965), p. 43.



The government discovers  
community action

President Kennedy initiated the process which was to develop the CAP. While reviewing the economic condition of the nation during December, 1962, it became obvious to him that the bulk of his legislative program was ineffective in eliminating poverty. Perceiving a need for an innovative strategy to symbolize his New Frontier, the President asked Walter Heller to provide him with the "facts and figures . . . about the poverty problem in the United States." Heller, in turn, assigned Robert Jampman to the task. By May, 1963, Lampman presented data which revealed a drastic slowdown in the rate at which the economy was taking people out of poverty. On the basis of this information, an article in the New York Herald Tribune reporting a rival antipoverty program, and encouragement from the President, Heller asked Lampman and others for ideas that might constitute a Kennedy antipoverty program. The upshot of this request was the formation of an informal interagency group known as the "Saturday Club."<sup>94</sup>

The formative stages

When Kennedy finally revealed his intentions on November 19, 1963, to include antipoverty measures as a

<sup>94</sup>James L. Sundquist, Politics and Policy (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institute, 1968), pp. 135-136. Also see Robert E. Will and Harold G. Vatter, eds., Politics in Affluence (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1965), pp. 1-33.

part of the 1964 legislative program, the "Club" developed the initial framework called "Widening Participation in Prosperity." The Club was in the midst of reviewing this framework with the Bureau of the Budget, the Council of Economic Advisors and the White House staff when the news of President Kennedy's death arrived from Dallas. In spite of the fact that President Johnson quickly assured the Club of his support and assigned the Bureau of the Budget to coordinate the program, progress halted for the lack of a clear rationale which would distinguish it from previous programs.<sup>95</sup>

While the Bureau of the Budget was "floundering" for a rationale, Heller received an idea from David Hacket and Richard Boone, who had experience with community action programs sponsored by the Ford Foundation and the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime. They suggested that community organizations similar to the ones they had used be utilized in the antipoverty program. When Heller presented this idea at a Budget-C.E.A. meeting, William Cannon of the Bureau of the Budget saw it as an answer to his problem. Cannon attached the label "Development Corporation" and suggested that ten demonstration areas be established as prototypes for experimental purposes, similar to those conducted by Hacket and Boone. During meetings of the next week, Charles

---

<sup>95</sup>Sundquist, Politics and Policy, p.137.



Schultze proposed the name of "Action Program;"<sup>96</sup>  
 Frank Mankiewicz suggested "Community" be put in front;  
 and the result was "Community Action Program."<sup>97</sup>

While this discussion explains how the informal process set in motion by President Kennedy generated the term "Community Action Program," it fails to explain why it was accepted as a feasible approach and rationale for an antipoverty program. As seasoned members of the Administration, these men knew they would eventually be required to explain and justify the community action concept to inquiring and often skeptical legislators. It must be assumed, therefore, that Heller, Cannon and the others had a reasonable basis for accepting the community action approach to an antipoverty program.

What was this reasonable basis?

Social innovation and the development  
 of the community action approach  
 to social problems

During the formative stages of antiproverty planning, Heller, Lampman, Cannon and the others were influenced by the most recent innovative developments and intellectual opinions in four basic areas of public policy: urban renewal, juvenile delinquency, manpower training and public welfare. Not only had new theories and perspectives

---

<sup>96</sup>Ibid., p. 138.

<sup>97</sup>Daniel P. Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding: Community Action in the War on Poverty (New York: The Free Press, 1969), preface.



emerged, but practical applications in the form of experiments and prototype agencies had been developed to apply the theories. These theories and experiences were brought to the attention of Heller and the others during 1963. By 1964, many of the men who were responsible for these innovations were contacted and incorporated into both the planning and administration of what was to become the War on Poverty.

Urban renewal. -- Like many of the government efforts to improve the conditions of living in America, urban renewal has been subjected to widespread criticism from both conservatives and liberals alike. Although Congress enacted the Housing Act of 1937, it was designed to stimulate the building industry, rather than clear the slums. The severe housing shortage following the second world war prodded the Congress into passing the more comprehensive Housing Act in 1949. Unfortunately, its explicit goal of "a decent house . . . for every American" was never realized. The Housing Act of 1949 was amended in 1954 with the specific object of focusing local as well as national forces on slum clearance. In spite of the legislation, the slums were not cleared, the poor were not affected, and many Americans lacked decent housing.<sup>98</sup>

Although the legislation failed to produce major changes, there were some significant efforts at reform by

---

<sup>98</sup> John C. Bollens and Henry J. Schmandt, The Metropolis (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1970), pp. 202-210.

Richard Lee, the mayor of New Haven and Paul Ylvisaker of the Ford Foundation, which led to the conceptualization of community action programs. Under Lee's leadership, New Haven's Redevelopment Agency established a ten-year plan to eliminate slums. As a result of Lee's unmatched ability to obtain federal funds made available under the 1949 and 1954 housing legislation, combined with Edward Logue's administrative skills as the program director, the first slums were cleared by 1956. However, when faced with the task of relocating displaced individuals, it became obvious to Logue that urban renewal involved more than the physical process of clearing slums. A necessary prerequisite to a successful program was convincing displaced persons (either as displaced persons, or as members of ethnic groups) that urban renewal was for their benefit. Fortunately for New Haven's urban renewal program, Mayor Lee's leadership skills provided the confidence necessary to forestall the crisis. So as to prevent a recurrence of a similar crisis, Logue set about organizing a coordinated program which would provide a comprehensive effort to deal with the social problems of slums.<sup>99</sup>

Meanwhile, Paul Ylvisaker, head of the Ford

---

<sup>99</sup> Peter Morris and Martin Rein, Dilemmas of Social Reform: Poverty and Community Action in the United States (London: Rutledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), pp. 13-15, 124-125, 180-182. Also see James L. Sundquist, ed., On Fighting Poverty (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1969), pp. 12-13.

Foundation's Public Affairs Program had arrived at a similar, though not so precise, conclusion. Having become disillusioned with the efforts of the Foundation during the 1950's, he and his fellow workers began to look for a new approach. Hearing of Ylvisaker's interest in a broader approach to social reform, Logue met with him in December, 1959, and revealed his experiences of the past five years in New Haven. This contact could not help but inspire Ylvisaker toward implementing a program. Ylvisaker thought he had found the appropriate challenge in the form of a request from the superintendent of the Chicago schools, to help the "culturally handicapped." He discovered, however, that working within an educational framework was impractical, given the limited scope of institutions. An effective program required a new and more encompassing agency. So, with the objective of developing an umbrella type agency which would coordinate government and civic agencies in tackling "the human problems in gray areas," Ylvisaker and his colleagues developed the Foundation's "Community Development Program." Beginning in 1961, the Foundation made its first grant of \$2 million for the development of such a program to the City of Oakland. During the next two years, five additional grants were made which comprised the CDP, more commonly known as the Gray Areas Project.<sup>100</sup>

---

<sup>100</sup> Morris and Rein, Dilemmas of Social Reform, pp. 13-15, 124-125, 180-182.



As director of urban renewal in Boston during 1962-63, Edward Logue was in contact with Paul Ylvisaker and his Gray Areas Project. Perceiving the more complex and conflict-ridden nature of Boston's community, Logue set about to establish a community organization through the Gray Areas Project as a way of coordinating and reconciling the differences between the Yankee business elite, the Irish Catholics and minority groups. This community organization was to contribute and consequently support the Redevelopment Authorities' plans which Logue saw as the primary means of social reform. Ylvisaker, however, was unwilling to tie the Boston Gray Areas Project exclusively to Logue's urban renewal goals. Thus, as the Gray Areas Project established its own goals and methods, Logue felt increasingly betrayed, and for good reason. His interest in the Gray Areas Project was more than simply instrumental; for he felt he had initiated the idea of community action in New Haven.<sup>101</sup>

Juvenile delinquency. -- Neither Logue nor Ylvisaker were the first to conceive of, or to implement community action programs. Similar broad-based organizations had been employed in Chicago during the 1930's as a method of mobilizing community resources to combat juvenile delinquency.<sup>102</sup> However, what proved to be the most significant

---

<sup>101</sup>Ibid.

<sup>102</sup>Lillian Rubin, "Maximum Feasibility Participation," Poverty and Human Resources Abstracts (December, 1967), 7-8.

program in influencing public policy was begun in 1957 when J. M. Kaplan, a businessman-philanthropist, together with the Board of Directors of the Henry Street Settlement, sought to develop a program to meet the delinquency problems that arose with the immigration of Puerto Ricans and Southern Negroes into New York City. With the aid of private and public agencies, the program developed into the Mobilization for Youth, Inc. (MFY).<sup>103</sup>

Since two of the men on the Board of Directors were the Dean and Assistant Dean of the New York School of Social Work of Columbia University and the New York School of Social Work provided substantial financial support, it would be reasonable to assume that from its inception MFY would be heavily influenced by the ideas, opinions and theories of the intellectuals. This assumption acquired an almost irrefutable credence when MFY submitted its planning proposals in the form of a request for funding from the National Institute of Mental Health in December, 1961. The 617-page "request" entitled, A Proposal for the Prevention and Control of Delinquency by Expanding Opportunities, while interested in juvenile delinquency, planned to organize the whole community.<sup>104</sup> Thus, whereas broad-based community organizations had been conceived as an approach to combat the social problems of

<sup>103</sup> Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding, pp. 38-45.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid., pp. 45-59.

juvenile delinquency and urban renewal, it was now directed toward more comprehensive changes.<sup>105</sup> More importantly, whereas it was loosely conceived, it now had the support of a more sophisticated framework and rationale.

The theme of opportunity was based on a theory of juvenile delinquency developed by Lloyd Ohlin and Richard Cloward of the New York School of Social Work. Presenting the opportunity theory of delinquent behavior, they argued that delinquency was the result of the lack of opportunity to achieve socially acceptable goals through socially acceptable means. Thus, rather than develop a program to rehabilitate a "sick" individual, a broader-focused program is required which will change the "sick" institutions that influence and shape the character of the individual.<sup>106</sup>

Prodded by an embarrassing question at his first press conference in March, 1961, President Kennedy appointed David Hacket as a special assistant to the Attorney General and asked him to develop a program to combat juvenile delinquency. Having no experience in this subject, Hacket set about collecting ideas. Almost immediately he was contacted by the Ford Foundation executives, who presented Cloward and Ohlin's theory. These ideas were, in

---

<sup>105</sup> Sundquist, Public Policy, pp. 140-141.

<sup>106</sup> Richard A. Cloward and Lloyd E. Ohlin, Delinquency and Opportunity: A Theory of Delinquent Gangs (New York: The Free Press, 1960).



turn, relayed back to the President, who responded in May by establishing the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime which was to be constituted by the Attorney General, the Secretary of H.E.W., the Secretary of Labor, with the objective of coordinating communities to enhance opportunities for youth.<sup>107</sup>

In September, 1961, Congress passed the Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act which appropriated \$10 million to be distributed to states and communities for the purpose of developing programs which would lead to "intensive and coordinated efforts on the part of private and governmental interests" to prevent and control delinquency. Although the Secretary of H.E.W. was authorized to make the grants, his power was abridged by the requirement that he consult and consider recommendations of the PCJD.<sup>108</sup>

Such a specific grant of authority necessitated the more continuous aspects of bureaucratic organizations. The Committee consequently appointed David Hacket as its Executive Director. Hacket immediately set about developing and promoting programs in the areas of delinquency, education, employment, etc., as well as announcing the provisions of the legislation and inviting applications for funds.<sup>109</sup>

---

<sup>107</sup> Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding, pp. 64-65.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

<sup>109</sup> Morris and Rein, Dilemmas of Social Reform, p. 23.

Since both the PCJD and the Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act were based on the same theoretical principles as some of the recent innovative theories and experiments, it is not surprising that Hacket collected an energetic and distinguished group of men around him. The most notable men of this group were Richard Boone of the Public Affairs Department of the Ford Foundation and Lloyd Ohlin of MFY. Also, by virtue of the fact that PCJD provided sixteen percent of the funding for MFY and co-sponsored many projects with other public and private agencies, Hacket, as a confidant of Robert F. Kennedy, was exposed to the implications of these most recent innovations. The PCJD differed from the foundations by emphasizing elaborate planning and a conceptual framework. However, despite the varying approaches, they were all motivated by a common philosophy. Most significant, however, was the fact that they emphasized changing the environment, coordinating agencies, and incorporating individuals to be affected by the program into aspects of its administration.<sup>110</sup>

Manpower training programs. -- Prior to the declaration of the War on Poverty in 1964, most economists and politicians saw poverty in terms of unemployment. Although the New Deal policies were a tacit recognition by the government of its responsibility to ensure full employment and economic growth, it was not until the passage of the

---

<sup>110</sup> Ibid.



1946 Employment Act that recognition of this responsibility was formalized.

The high unemployment rates of the late 1950's and the early 1960's would indicate that the Eisenhower Administration did little to meet this responsibility. In fact, when Congress presented the President with employment legislation, he responded on both occasions with the veto. The legislation, having languished in Congressional committees for six years, was finally passed in 1961 as the Area Redevelopment Act. Its goal was to attract industry to depressed areas which, it was assumed, would automatically create jobs. However, due to its unrealistic expectations, the pittance of the appropriation and the general slack in the economy, the program floundered.<sup>111</sup>

In 1962, the Manpower Development Training Act was passed after a few hasty months of planning and legislative hearings. MDTA emphasized training the unemployed. According to Sar Levitan, the shift in emphasis was due to the persistently high level of unemployment, especially obvious among negroes. Though Kennedy hailed the MDTA as "perhaps the most significant legislation in the area of employment since the historic Employment Act of 1946," it was of questionable success.<sup>112</sup> Besides, there was a

---

<sup>111</sup>Sar A. Levitan and Garth L. Mangum, Federal Training and Works Programs in the Sixties (Ann Arbor: Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, 1969), p. 10. Also see Sundquist, Policies and Politics, pp. 77-85.

<sup>112</sup>Levitan and Mangum, Federal Training, pp. 6-7.



growing realization that unemployment, poverty, crime and other social ills were so inextricably related that piecemeal programs such as the ARA and MDTA could hardly be relied upon to produce the desired changes.

Welfare:-- When the public assistance of "welfare" system was established in the 1930's, it was directed toward specific categories of people who could not work because of old age or disability, and were not covered by social insurance. It was anticipated that as the economy recovered and more people were covered by social insurance, that the need for public assistance would decline. Rather than wither away, public assistance payments continued to increase. Also, the composition of the public assistance roles have changed to include additional categories such as Aid to Dependent Children (ADC). By the 1960's, the public assistance program had developed to a point where neither taxpayers, nor administrators, nor recipients were satisfied with it.<sup>113</sup>

Seeing the need for an overhaul, the Kennedy Administration presented Congress with a set of proposals which passed as the Amendments to the Social Security Act in 1962. By providing a larger grant to the States and by allowing federal money to aid families with unemployed fathers, it was assumed that the states would take the

---

<sup>113</sup>Sundquist, Politics and Policy, p. 91. It seems that the training programs rarely included the hard-core unemployed. However, when reached and trained, most of these hard-core unemployed were in fact employed.

initiative to reform and rehabilitate their programs. Little reform was forthcoming. In fact, by 1970 only twenty-three states had chosen to take advantage of the ADC provisions of the Amendment. Thus, though the Kennedy Administration hailed the Amendment as a "landmark" and representative of a "new spirit," it should be obvious from the previous discussion that the private view of the Administration was somewhat less optimistic.<sup>114</sup>

#### Conclusion

President Kennedy entered the Office of the Presidency with the awareness of growing social ills, but lacked a program for their solution. In search of a replacement for the worn-out patchwork of impotent programs, Kennedy demonstrated his willingness to innovate. The initial processes of innovation in the four areas discussed above forged links with similar and, in some cases, more advanced innovative efforts. Contact and interaction with these additional and more experienced efforts led to the refinement of ideas which, in turn, served as the basis for launching community action programs as a feasible public policy.

#### The war is declared

Having decided on the rationale for the anti-

<sup>114</sup>Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1969), pp. 226-231; Sundquist, Politics and Policy, pp. 129-131.

poverty program, the matter was turned over to Kermit Gordon (Director of the Bureau of the Budget). Since Gordon had been somewhat skeptical about the idea of community action, its advocates called on Paul Ylvisaker to convince him. Ylvisaker presented a convincing argument based on his own experiences. In order to reinforce his argument, he brought in several administrators from community action programs to meet with Gordon, Cannon and the others over breakfast. The testimonies of these administrators, together with the arguments from Ylvisaker, Boone, Hackett and the others, proved decisive.<sup>115</sup> Gordon, with the aid of Heller, proceeded to convince President Johnson that the concept was a solid one, based on time-tested methods. So, on the basis of this advice, the President declared "an unconditional war on poverty."<sup>116</sup>

However, while the antipoverty rationale had been decided upon and the war declared, the exact strategy of the community action program was yet to be developed.

### Three interpretations of community action

Even before the president announced the War on Poverty, the Budget Bureau, and CEA and the White House staff labored to refine the concept of community action.

<sup>115</sup> Charles L. Schultze, et al., Setting National Priorities: the 1972 Budget (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institute, 1971), pp. 172-174.

<sup>116</sup> Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding, p. 79.



The fact that the concept was both unique in its present context and subject to a variety of interpretations did not help matters. Morris has identified three conflicting strategies arising from the different interpretations.<sup>117</sup>

The first view rose out of Ford's Gray Areas projects. It emphasizes planning, working through traditional institutions and incremental change. The strategy of these projects assumed the urban society was a benevolent anarchy constituted by ambitious and highly competitive groups and individuals. In order for justice to be achieved, every individual must have an equal chance to be competitive. To achieve this view of justice, institutions must be made relevant by turning outward to consider the needs of those they ought to serve. Such a goal required an independent agency that can reorient and reintegrate institutions. On the basis of experimentation, the effectiveness of the various programs on those it serves can be determined. And on the basis of these determinations, the agencies can appropriately stimulate the institutions. The underlying assumption is that this community agency can produce coalitions and a consensus within a highly competitive, if not conflicting context.<sup>118</sup>

The second view is usually identified with Richard Cloward and his work with MFY. It emphasizes services and

---

<sup>117</sup> Sundquist, Politics and Policy, pp. 138-139.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid., p. 140.

opportunities for the poor. It assumes that the lack of opportunities for the poor is the direct outgrowth of a lack of power. Thus, in order to remedy the injustice, it is necessary to get behind the "power structure" -- to mobilize the poor to assert and defend their own interests. The key to social reform, therefore, was participation by the poor.<sup>119</sup>

The third perspective was characteristic of the approach used by the PCJD. It relied on the power of knowledge. It assumed that through careful research, experimentation with prototypes and rigorous evaluation, new approaches that were at once scientifically sound, administratively feasible and politically acceptable would be developed. It was also assumed that such information would prove irresistible and would be incorporated into public policy.<sup>120</sup>

While the planners of the antipoverty program appeared to some researchers to choose the Ford approach, a more realistic conclusion is that, given the vague nature of Title II of the Economic Opportunity Act and the way the program was finally administered, no real choice was made at all. Also, there is little evidence to support the view that the planners, to be distinguished from its advo-

---

<sup>119</sup> Morris and Rein, Dilemmas of Social Reform, pp. 52-55.

<sup>120</sup> Sundquist, Politics and Policy, p. 140.

cates, perceived these views as divergent.<sup>121</sup> Besides, the planners were primarily interested in developing a rationale. It is not surprising, therefore, that after the rationale was generally agreed upon, the attention of the planners was redirected toward the issue of administrative jurisdiction. While there were sorties by those disposed to community action for primarily intellectual reasons, the major battle was over who would administer the community action program.<sup>122</sup>

The program is reassembled:  
the Shriver task force

Perceiving the inertia resulting from the jurisdictional squabbles and anxious to take advantage of the symbolic value of the program for his 1964 campaign, President Johnson appointed Sargent Shriver on February 1, to set up a task force. Drawing from various departments, Shriver quickly organized his task force. It included such prominent individuals as Daniel Moynihan, Harold Horowitz, James Sundquist and Hymen Bookbinder, together with several other representatives, his unofficial advisors and resident intellectuals.<sup>123</sup>

Having been quickly briefed concerning the develop-

---

<sup>121</sup>Kravitz, "The Community Action Program," pp. 52-70.

<sup>122</sup>Adam Yarmolinsky, "The Beginnings of O.E.C.," in On Fighting Poverty, ed. by J. L. Sundquist (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1969), pp. 34-51.

<sup>123</sup>Ibid.



ments of the program under the direction of the Bureau of the Budget, two things became obvious to Shriver:

(1) little, if any planning had occurred since December, when Cannon and the other planners adopted the rationale of community action for the anti-poverty program, and (2) a genuine anti-poverty program needed more than community action programs. So, within one week after his appointment, Shriver began to resurrect the old proposals shelved by the Bureau of the Budget. He also canvassed, as best he could, for suggestions from leaders of the business and educational communities, together with state governments, local governments and private agencies.<sup>124</sup>

This reevaluation was to have an effect on the final proposal. Labor Secretary Wirtz, for example, lost little time in bringing to Shriver's attention the fact that prototype community action programs such as those employed by MFY, Ford and the PCJD provided few jobs for the poor.<sup>125</sup> Shriver was also made aware of the congressional criticism of the PCJD as long on research and short on concrete results.<sup>126</sup> On the basis of such criticisms, Shriver was quick to dismiss the previously held approach that community action programs begin slowly

---

<sup>124</sup> Sundquist, Politics and Policy, p. 142.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid., p. 143. Also see Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding, pp. 82-83.

<sup>126</sup> James L. Sundquist, "Origins of the War on Poverty," in On Fighting Poverty, pp. 6-33.

with a few experimental projects and proceed cautiously.<sup>127</sup> In fact, there were several days during which Shriver considered eliminating community action from the proposal altogether, on the grounds that he could not see how it could be operative. However, during the next fortnight, the program was reassembled such that while community action was retained as the central theme, it was not to constitute a major program in the antipoverty proposal. Not only was it to become merely one of the five titles of the antipoverty legislation, but community action programs were to be made community options.<sup>128</sup>

#### The CAP proposal

The community action concept was first presented in operational terms in a report prepared by Fred Hayes and Sanford Kravitz during the first week of briefings. According to Kravitz, the outline of how community action would work went something like this: A community would carefully study its poverty problems, locate the most severe pockets of need and identify them as target areas which would affect all relevant institutions, that is, the schools, social services, job opportunities, etc. It would enhance its ability to implement its program objectives by inclusion of political leadership. It would

---

<sup>127</sup> Don R. Broyles, "Poverty and Social Reform" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1971), p. 86.

<sup>128</sup> Sundquist, Politics and Policy, p. 142.

"remain honest" to its purposes by inclusion of voices representing the poor, residents of the target neighborhoods.<sup>129</sup>

This model assumed local government at the city and county levels had the capacity to organize itself for cooperative action in the War on Poverty. It assumed that there was an agreed-upon definition of poverty. It also assumed the poor would play the pivotal role of keeping the program "honest." Above all, it also assumed a "consensus structure," based on the power of persuasion. While both Kravitz and Hayes were aware that these assumptions were by no means self-evident, they were so captured by the euphoric prospects of launching a nationwide program, that none of these assumptions were openly challenged.<sup>130</sup>

It was because of the gnawing questions posed by these assumptions that the advocates of community action (Ylvisaker, Boone, Hacket and Kravitz) initially suggested the cautious approach so that the program could be developed by trial and error. However, because the reaction of other members of the task force and the anticipated criticisms from Congress, already mentioned, the "building block" approach was adopted. In effect, this approach meant that funds would be available to each "block" or community.

---

<sup>129</sup> Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding, pp. 84-87.

<sup>130</sup> Kravitz, "The Community Action Program," p. 60.



which could be funded and developed without waiting for results of other projects or the development of a "conceptual framework" to guide the program.<sup>131</sup>

Presidential approval:  
key decisions

As Shriver assembled the program, he was guided by the Presidential rhetoric of an "unconditional war" on poverty. It is not surprising, therefore, that he saw the adult employment program as the major item of his first task force proposal. Upon presentation to the cabinet on February 18, he suggested that adult employment be appropriated \$1.25 billion to be financed by a five percent cigarette tax. Though Wirtz and other members of the cabinet spoke in favor of the program, the President quickly dismissed the idea as incompatible with his objective of cutting taxes. Had the President accepted Shriver's proposal, the central theme of the War on Poverty would have been "employment strategy." However, the initial theme of community action was reattached.<sup>132</sup>

On February 23, Norbert Schlei, Harold Horowitz, Boone, Ylvisaker and Hacket produced the first task force draft of the "Human Resources Development Act of 1964." During the next three weeks, while the bill was discussed further, Shriver managed to convince the President that

---

<sup>131</sup> Ibid.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid., p. 61.

the new agency should be placed in the Executive Office. Finally, on March 16, the draft was presented to Congress as the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964.<sup>133</sup>

Conclusion: the  
impact of CAP

Some of the specific intergovernmental problems arising out of such an approach to poverty were discussed in a report on poverty by the ACIR in 1966. To begin with, local government felt that the OEO had failed to provide clear guidelines describing the form of organization of the various CAA's or their program substance. The states were similarly critical. Not only were they virtually ignored, their cooperation or neutrality was assumed. Because of the lack of administrative coordination, CAP's could not get necessary lists of welfare recipients from the State Welfare Department so as to develop a case list from which to work.<sup>134</sup> Also, their philosophical approaches to poverty differed; State Welfare agencies emphasized a welfare approach to poverty rather than self-help or earning type programs. As a result, many persons lost state welfare benefits when they made exploratory moves to try job training.<sup>135</sup> The ACIR report on poverty concluded that, among other things:

<sup>133</sup> Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding, pp. 98-99.

<sup>134</sup> Sar A. Levitan, The Great Society's Poor Law (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), pp. 37-38.

<sup>135</sup> ACIR, Intergovernmental Relations, pp. 23-30.

The Community Action program adds one more layer to the growing number of federally aided programs and agencies at the local and regional level concerned with physical and human resource planning and development. It also adds one more agency with which effective coordination and planning ties must be established. Aside from the problems of confusion, friction, duplication, and coordination, this impact increases the strain on community leadership resources, particularly in rural areas, and makes countrywide leadership more difficult.<sup>136</sup>

Following such conclusions the report proceeded to outline fourteen recommendations, nine of which were specifically designed to help improve the administrative coordination of the federal and state governments. For example, Recommendation No. 7 "recommends that the Economic Opportunity Council establish the necessary machinery to assure integrated planning at the state and federal levels, to assure integrated planning."<sup>137</sup> The Commission also recommended that local government units rather than private non-profit groups organize CAP's. Other recommendations included improving information, providing the Governor's veto, and establishing uniform procedures.<sup>138</sup>

The basic issues raised by the criticism from state and local officials centered around the lack of formal guidelines for intergovernmental relations: To what degree should CAP's at the local level be subordinate to or independent of local government? Should state governments act

---

<sup>136</sup> Ibid., pp. 75-153.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid., p. 161.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid., p. 174.



as political and administrative "brokers" between Washington and local CAP's? How should existing welfare agencies relate to the newer poverty programs? Should established programs be modified to give the newer programs "elbow room" to innovate and experiment?<sup>139</sup> Lack of planning on the part of national policy-makers simply precluded systematic consideration of these possibilities. Thus, if CAP can be considered as an accurate sample of other grant programs of the 1960's, it would suggest that they were also made in the face of similar uncertainty as to results and impact, and were based on assumptions of the problems, far more than from available data.

### Conclusions

The failure of the policy-makers to consider and plan for the intergovernmental impact of the grant programs enacted in the 1960's was the primary cause of the many administrative problems which developed. The significance of this development has been discussed by several noted authors. Charles Adrian and Charles Press argued that the lack of detailed planning was the result of the failure of policy-makers to account for Opportunity Costs, which is "what we pay in a way of giving up on a desirable thing in order to gain the opportunity to choose

---

<sup>139</sup>Ibid., pp. 174-189; ACIR, Eighth Annual Report (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 13-15.

an even more desirable thing."<sup>140</sup> In other words, politics is not only "who gets what, when and how," it is also what gets left undone. However, public officials have all too often fallen prey to the tendency of the typical citizen to think that achieving goals is a function of wishing and commitment without facing the sobering question of whether or not a particular set of policies is feasible within the current context of the political culture.<sup>141</sup>

Theodore Lowi argues that the lack of planning by policymakers is an outgrowth of "interest group liberalism" which is hostile to rational and responsible administration which requires law, choice, priorities and moralities. Interest group liberalism interferes with the political process and changes the basic rules of political behavior. As such, it undermines democracy as a formal political system of norms which answers the basic political questions of how political decisions are made, who makes them, and what limits are placed on government authority. To the degree which lack of planning undermines clear

---

<sup>140</sup> Charles R. Adrian and Charles Press, American Politics Reappraised (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1974), p. 3. While it would be difficult to quantify the relative degree of planning that went into the pre-1960 grants, it appears that the policies of these grants were formulated after discussion and consultation with states and/or interest groups. See Henry J. Bitterman, State and Federal Grants-In-Aid (New York: Mentzer, Bush, and Company, 1938), pp. 430-432.

<sup>141</sup> Adrian and Press, American Politics, p. 11.

answers to these basic questions, it poses a threat to the legitimacy of the American political system.<sup>142</sup>

Whether or not the consequences of the lack of planning are as dire as Lowi claims, other scholars support his contention that planning is impossible in the American governmental system. According to Thad L. Beyle and George T. Lathrop, planning is impossible because of: (1) the fragmented nature of the government system -- both in structure and power, (2) the basic dichotomy between those who make the policy and those who administer it, (3) the lower levels have insufficient funds to make long-term commitments, and (4) there is no continuity of leadership in either the legislative or executive branches. Yet, in spite of all of these impediments, planning has been carried out. However, it has been at the state and local levels and has involved such things as planning the World Fair, and planning to build "beautiful cities." Events of the 1960's however, changed all of this, making

---

<sup>142</sup>Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism. Michael Reagan also laments the tendency of journalists and scholars to be concerned with the how of administrative processes and government activity, rather than the what. Systematic policy-making requires a connection between the two. See Michael Reagan, ed., The Administration of Public Policy (Illinois: Scott Foresman and Company, 1969), preface. Gore argues that the fragmentation between planning and implementation of public policy points out the inadequacy of current models in explaining decision making as a pattern of interactions and a collective response to perceived problems. See William J. Gore, "Decision Theory Fragment," in The Administration of Public Policy, pp. 22-25. Also see Michael Reagan, "Toward Improving National Policy Planning," Public Administration Review, XXIII (March, 1963), pp. 10-19.



planning "the captive of the bureaucracy, with its reports and data reflecting biases of past decisions and protection for the agency and the program in the future."<sup>143</sup>

Robert Levine also indicts the policy-making process in the United States. He argues "that most public programs in the United States have not worked well; some have not worked at all." The primary cause of this state of affairs is that while planning and implementation are usually closely intertwined, public planners to date are demanding implementation of a sort that cannot be delivered. Before programs can be delivered by administrators, both planners and administrators must understand each other's limitations and motivations, as well as the political context in which they are to operate.<sup>144</sup> This lack of an integrated and intergovernmental planning attitude is the root of the problem of CAP and probably many other grant programs instituted in the 1960's.

---

<sup>143</sup>Key, The Administration of Federal Grants, p. 1.

<sup>144</sup>Levine, Public Planning: Failure and Redirection, pp. 1-2. Richard Leach argues that "planning has been a suspect word in the United States" and policy is developed pragmatically without analysis of future trends or possible problems. Leach, American Federalism, p. 49.

## CHAPTER II

### THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL REGIONAL COUNCILS

#### Introduction

All presidents have been harried with the difficulties of controlling the administrative apparatus. Some have almost despaired at the challenge of exercising effective administrative control over what appears to be a "bureaucratic wilderness."<sup>145</sup> It is no wonder that all recent presidents have come to rely more heavily on members of the Executive Office whose loyalty is easier to insure. Presidents, however, have not been alone in their concern for effective administration. In 1798, the Fifth Congress conducted its first reorganization of administrative procedures. While a superficial glance at the history of reorganization efforts would tend to emphasize the periodic purges, it is important to recognize that administrative reform has been an ongoing feature of American government, even though it has not been formally stamped with the label of "reorganization." The Constitution itself could be considered the result of the first effort to achieve administrative reform.

---

<sup>145</sup> John C. Livingston and Robert S. Thompson, Consent of the Governed (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967), p. 443.

Although the Constitution certainly provided more than that, its great appeal, as well as source of ongoing controversy, was its executive provisions which were notably non-existent in the Articles of Confederation.<sup>146</sup>

### Recent Efforts to Reform the Grant System

#### The Johnson Administration

President Johnson sought to remedy the inefficiencies and confusion of the transformed grant system by designating the Vice President as the federal liaison with state and local executives. He also ordered the Bureau of the Budget to consolidate overlapping grant programs.<sup>147</sup> In 1966, a number of federal agencies with the help of the Eighty-ninth Congress made several efforts to achieve this objective. The Comprehensive Health Planning and Public Health Services Amendments replaced over a dozen separate grant authorizations for categorical health programs in such fields as communicable diseases, cancer, and venereal disease, into a single program. The Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act permitted greater flexibility by providing funds to be used by local agencies for purposes determined by local agencies.<sup>148</sup>

---

<sup>146</sup> Herbert Emmerich, Federal Organization and Executive Management (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1971), pp. 8-9.

<sup>147</sup> Leach, American Federalism, p. 78.

<sup>148</sup> In 1967, President Johnson also proposed a "joint funding bill," but Congress failed to act on it. ACIR, Eighth Annual Report, p. 7.



In 1967, the Bureau of the Budget issued Circular A-85, which attempted to resolve the conflict between the functional autocracies and the state local executive officers, by requiring that grants be submitted for reaction and comments by governors, mayors and county officials. While this new procedure received a cool welcome from federal program administrators, as well as some of their functional counterparts at the state and local levels, it showed some promise of success by the end of 1968.<sup>149</sup> Also, in 1967, Congress added the "Green Amendment" to the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act. This amendment gave local governments the "first option" over private organizations in administering CAP's. However, since few local governments took advantage of this option, it would seem that the amendment was designed as a token response to the "grass roots revolt" rather than as a far-reaching reform.<sup>150</sup>

The most important Congressional effort to reform the grant system came on October 16, 1968, with the passage of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act. This act was implemented through the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circulars A-95, A-96, A-97 and A-98. Circular A-95 served as the heart of the management system by providing for project notification and review as well as

---

<sup>149</sup>ACIR, Tenth Annual Report, pp. 8-9.

<sup>150</sup>ACIR, Eleventh Annual Report, pp. 3-4.

consultation with state and local officials. Circular A-96 provided state administrators with more flexibility in administering grants. For example, no longer did federal agencies require states to deposit grant funds in bank accounts separate from other state funds. Circular A-97 directs federal agencies to make technical expertise available to states and localities. Circular A-98 directs federal agencies to provide the State Central Information Agency (SCIR) information regarding each grant awarded the state and for its political subdivisions.<sup>151</sup>

A study conducted in 1970 concluded that the potential impact of this act was yet to be realized. Rather than reform what state and local officers saw as the "functional tyranny" of the categorical grant system, the act simply transferred it to the federal and regional clearinghouses established by Circular A-95. States played a lethargic role and failed to take advantage of the "services" aspects of the act. Besides, it left intact many basic impediments such as the sheer size of the categorical grant system.<sup>152</sup>

In order to remedy the problems arising out of the

---

<sup>151</sup>"The Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968: Survey of Federal and State Implementation," in Coming Together (Washington: The Council of State Governments, 1971), pp. 6-9.

<sup>152</sup>Grosenick, "Institutional Change," p. 97. It is interesting to note that in 1971 President Nixon began vetoing all additional grant legislation. In 1972, he vetoed sixteen grant programs.

large number of grant programs, President Nixon recommended the passage of a grant consolidation act. However, after 1968, Congress gave little support to this and subsequent reform efforts. Although the proposed amendments to the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act (S3140) received full bipartisan support in the Senate, they failed in the House. Had the Amendments been adopted, they would have provided for, among other things, the President submitting grant consolidation plans to Congress which would have become effective if not vetoed by either house within sixty days. The failure of Congress to support this recommendation specifically, and further reform of the grant system generally, stems from the fact that streamlining the many categorical grants is arduous "pick and shovel" work. "Perhaps the largest part of the problem, however, is rooted in the continuing strength of the program specialists, their interest groups and legislative allies at all levels."<sup>153</sup>

#### The Nixon Administration

If Congress was reluctant to further reform the grant system, the Nixon Administration was not. After all, most of the problems that existed before the passage of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act remained intact. Besides, not only was the Nixon Administration besieged by a "literal torrent" of criticism of the grant administration system, it was becoming clearly apparent that no

---

<sup>153</sup> ACIR, Fourteenth Annual Report, p. 14.



matter how hard the federal bureaucrats were trying, many grant programs were being drowned in tons of paperwork. The awareness and desire of the Nixon Administration to remedy these problems brought about the New Federalism which Dwight Ink, the Assistant Director of OMP, responsible for intergovernmental relations, describes below:<sup>154</sup>

In order to properly define New Federalism, we must examine patterns of action rather than seek comprehensive definitions. Basic to the New Federalism is a feeling that although a joint federal-state-local effort is important and essential, all three levels cannot expect to have a lead role in each action. One level should have the lead or initiative for one particular task. It should be in a position to take the necessary initiative that triggers the involvement of the other partners. For most of the tasks of the nation the burden of proof must be in the direction of the state and local governments as triggering devices. The closer to a citizen it can be handled, the better. If it must be done by the federal government, then move it out of Washington to the federal regional or area office level.<sup>155</sup>

However, since the primary factor hindering effective management of intergovernmental relations at the state and local level is the grant system, which has become primarily a national program, then it is the federal government that must take the first steps toward reform. In providing these initial remedies, the Nixon Administration pursued three options: general revenue sharing, special revenue sharing, and reforming the existing grant system. Revenue sharing was implemented in 1973, but

---

<sup>154</sup> Ink, "The Origins and Thrusts of the New Federalism," p. 31.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid.

special revenue sharing has yet to receive the necessary congressional support. The greatest potential, however, lies in reforming the grant administration system. The approaches can be categorized as: (1) an emphasis on planning and review, (2) decentralization, (3) coordination, and (4) elimination of categorical grants.<sup>156</sup>

These approaches to reform were embodied in the establishment of the Federal Assistance Review (FAR) program.

Basically, FAR is attempting to redesign the federal part of the system through the establishment of standard federal regions and regional councils, decentralization of programs, simplification of federal grant processes, standardization of administrative requirements, integrated grants administration, more reliance on state and local government, and the A-95 process.<sup>157</sup>

President Nixon launched the FAR program on March 27, 1969, when he directed the Bureau of the Budget and all ten Urban Affairs Council agencies "to mobilize a three-year interagency program to cut red tape and streamline the delivery of federal assistance."<sup>158</sup> The President specifically ordered: (1) the establishment of eight uniform regions, (2) an expansion of the regional council concept, and (3) the "systematic restructuring

---

<sup>156</sup>Grosenick, "Institutional Change," p. 97.

<sup>157</sup>Ink, "The Origin and Thrusts of the New Federalism," p. 31.

<sup>158</sup>U.S. Bureau of the Budget, First Annual Report to the President on an Inter-Agency Program, Simplifying Federal Aid to States and Communities (March, 1970), p. 3.

of domestic programs."<sup>159</sup>

Under the Bureau of the Budget chairmanship, representatives from the various agencies and departments affected by the President's directive drafted a work program designed to achieve the President's goals within three years. This work program included nine specific elements: (1) common regional boundaries, (2) regional councils, (3) cutting red tape, (4) reduction in processing time, (5) greater reliance on state and local government, (6) decentralization, (7) consistency of procedures, (8) joint funding simplification, and (9) grant consolidation and coordination.<sup>160</sup>

Significant steps were taken during the first year to effectuate each of these nine points:

1. Common regional boundaries were established. By September, 1970, HEW, HUD, DOL, OEO, and SBA had realigned their regional boundaries and moved their regional offices to those cities designated as headquarters for each region.

2. Federal Regional Councils (FRC's) were established at the headquarters of each region to facilitate greater coordination of federal programs, as well as to provide for a more consistent relationship between federal agencies and state and local governments.

3. In order to cut the red tape and the voluminous amount of paperwork involved in the grant machinery.

---

<sup>159</sup> U.S. Office of the White House Press Secretary, Statement by the President on Restructuring of Government Services (March 27, 1969), pp. 103.

<sup>160</sup> Simplifying Federal Aid to States and Communities, p. 5. Note: The term "Federal Regional Council" was not formally used at this point. Its use appeared officially for the first time on February 11, 1972. See U.S. Office of the White House Press Secretary, Executive Order 11647 (February 11, 1972).



various departments and agencies conducted reviews and instituted remedies. HEW reformed twenty-two of thirty-nine formula grant programs which required state plans that ranged from 100 to 2,000 pages each by a contract-like document of five to ten pages. HEW also made a forty percent reduction in its required reports. OEO, HUD and other departments and agencies made similar efforts.

4. Various departments and agencies reduced the processing time for grants. HEW streamlined twenty project grant programs. Health Service grants, for example, were reduced from 171 days to seventy days.

5. A few agencies also made measureable progress in the direction of greater reliance on state and local governments. DOT, for example, authorized State Highway Departments to approve state public utility agreements up to \$25,000 which were previously subject to prior federal review.

6. HEW fully decentralized Head Start, Short Term Training, Air Pollution Control Planning, Development and Health Services, and Migrant Health.

7. A number of long-range interagency programs were established to create greater consistency of procedures such as application forms, audit standards, and reporting requirements. An experimental project in this area was established in the Seattle region.

8. In order to achieve joint funding simplification four pilot projects were established in 1969. On one project HUD acted on behalf of six other participating agencies.

9. HUD was initially the most active in grant consolidation. It consolidated four of its programs into two programs.<sup>161</sup>

The FAR program reported even more successes during its second year. Administrative routines were overhauled, and wasteful procedures were dropped. In HEW alone, over 400,000 pages of state plans had been eliminated from twenty-eight grant programs. DOT reduced the entire state application process from seventy to thirty days. The role

---

<sup>161</sup>Ibid.

of FRC's was further clarified and councils began to consider such diverse things as the problems of urban and rural Indians in California, the economy in Seattle, and consolidated planning applications from Indianapolis. Similar gains were made in the other areas of FAR.<sup>162</sup>

One particular malady which FAR attempted to reform was the circuitous route generally traversed by grants from application to approval and then to implementation. Instead of going from regional offices to Washington, where they were subsequently passed on to functional specialists for time consuming review, FAR located approval and coordinating authority with agency regional directors. The result has been not only speedier grant approval, but it has also eliminated another link in the chain of functional autocracies. By mid-1973, ninety-nine grant programs totalling approximately \$15 billion, had been decentralized.<sup>163</sup>

In addition, the OMB established the Integrated Grant Administration (IGA) by issuing Circular A-102. IGA was designed to allow state and local governments to apply for various grants from different federal agencies through a single application. Not only was IGA designed

---

162

U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Restoring the Balance of Federalism: Second Annual Report to the President on the Federal Assistance Review (June, 1971).

163

Ibid.; ACIR, Fourteenth Annual Report, p. 15; Grosenick, "Institutional Change," p. 97.

to remedy the complexity and confusion in filling out reams of applications, it was also designed to reform the most basic problems of the categorical grant system by allowing state and local governments to set their own priorities, maintain a single account, and be audited by only one agency. By the end of 1973. there were twenty-seven pilot IGA projects and full implementation is expected by June, 1974.<sup>164</sup>

While FAR has by no means totally resolved the problems plaguing the grant system, it has established a cooperative administrative mechanism to allow federal, state and local governments to work together. Although there is still plenty of red tape, administrative processes yet to be simplified, and examples of delay persist, the simplification of the federal grant process is no longer a chief item on the agendas of most state and local meetings or national conferences. Neither do Washington bureaucrats nor congressmen receive the large number of complaints about this subject that they did four years ago.<sup>165</sup>

Despite such glowing statistical reports of specific improvements, the success of FAR and President Nixon's New Federalism depends on how successfully the grant system as a whole is decentralized and coordinated. It also depends on both the compliance of federal agencies

---

<sup>164</sup>Ink, "The Origin and Thrusts of the New Federalism."

<sup>165</sup>Ibid.



and the initiative of state and local governments. Unfortunately many federal agencies are not abiding by the A-85 procedures for direct consultations with state and local governments.<sup>166</sup> Also, if the Inter-governmental Cooperation Act can be used as an accurate sample of state and local response to a potential reformed delivery system, it could reasonably be expected that FAR is doomed to a similar fate. However, since the task and authority for implementing FAR was given to the Federal Regional Councils (FRC's), observing their activity would provide the best source of information as to the relative success or failure of the FAR approach.

#### Development of Federal Regional Councils (FRC's)

The regional council concept had its beginnings in the Johnson Administration. In response to the numerous complaints and indictments of the grant administration system, President Johnson appointed Ben W. Heineman, one of the nation's most successful railroad executives, to head a secret task force. This task force was manned by noted academic experts and high-powered individuals such as Mayor Richard L. Lee, McGeorge Bundy, and Robert S. McNamara. On September 15, 1967, the task force submitted its report stamped "Administratively Confidential" and never released to the public. However, John Fischer of Harpers Magazine managed to obtain a copy

---

<sup>166</sup> Ibid.

and reports:

. . . it was crammed with shrewd analysis of the country's woes, and recommends bold surgery to cure them. It told the President how to reorganize his Cabinet and the White House staff, and how to get a grip on the runaway bureaucracy. Among other things, it urged him to divide the country into ten federal regions, each with a single headquarters to replace the 'haphazard location of regional boundaries and locations.'<sup>167</sup>

The report also built a case for decentralization by administrative discretion. Instead of Washington issuing specific and categorical policies which hamper effective administration, general policies should be provided allowing responsible federal officials in the state and local communities the discretion to make day-to-day decisions and to "make them stick." Although management experts from the Bureau of the Budget presented eloquent arguments on behalf of these proposals, President Johnson was obviously preoccupied with Vietnam and other more pressing problems to give the report his full attention.<sup>168</sup> Despite such distractions, a pilot program was established in four cities: San Francisco, Chicago, Atlanta and New York.<sup>169</sup>

The Heineman report was resurrected from the archives when Mr. Nixon assumed the Presidency in 1969.

---

<sup>167</sup> John Fischer, "Can the Nixon Administration Be Doing Anything Right?" Harper's Magazine, October, 1969, pp. 31-32.

<sup>168</sup> Ibid.

<sup>169</sup> Western Federal Regional Council, Concepts and Operations (October, 1972). See Appendix B.

On March 27, 1969, the President issued a Directive establishing eight standard federal regions to be headquartered in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Denver and San Francisco. These standard federal regions were designed to streamline "the field operations of five agencies by establishing -- for the first time -- common regional boundaries and regional office locations."<sup>170</sup> The five agencies concerned were the DOL, HEW, HUD, OEO, and SBA. The fact that these agencies were so closely related to serving the disadvantaged areas of society provided the logic for this choice.<sup>171</sup>

The Directive also ordered "an expansion of the regional council concept from the four cities where it presently operates . . . to all eight new regional centers" while the regional council was described as "a coordinating body on which each of the involved agencies is represented," the Directive notably failed to provide explicit guidelines for the implementation of the coordination. In fact, it even limited the power of councils by barring them from enforcing their decisions upon their individual members. Rather, the Directive merely outlined the council's potential for coordination -- "it offers an excellent means through which the various

---

<sup>170</sup> Office of the White House Press Secretary, Statement by the President on the Restructuring of Government Service Systems.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid.



arms of the federal government can work closely together in defining problems, devising strategies to meet them, eliminating friction and duplication, and evaluating results." The Directive continued to explain that these potential services would allow the federal government to relate to states, localities, private organizations, and the public at large with a "single voice."<sup>172</sup>

Such loose guidelines, it appears, were the result of efforts on the part of the Bureau of the Budget to create a coordinating structure without developing another autonomous bureaucratic unit. This paradox and its effect is described by Melvin B. Mogulof:

If the Bureau of the Budget memorandum bars the Council from enforcing collective decisions on its members, the memorandum also rejects centralism on the Washington level by failing to establish authority to push for coordinated interagency behavior by either the Bureau of the Budget or other groups within the Executive Office of the President. The net result is that the Council in theory establishes an interagency arena in which member agencies can identify conflicting policies and practices which ought to be coordinated. But under the current system the Council is authorized to go no further. The affected agencies must then choose to accommodate their behavior to that which has been determined as being more rational by the Council.<sup>173</sup>

Because this dilemma produced, at least initially, such a vague grant of authority, FRC's were seen as potential "tea-and-crumpet" social organizations characterized by

---

<sup>172</sup> Ibid.

<sup>173</sup> Melvin B. Mogulof, "Federal Interagency Action and Inaction: The Federal Regional Council Experience," Public Administration Review (May/June, 1972), 236.

pleasant social banter rather than substantive reforms in the administration of grant programs. As a result, many administrative planners considered FRC's as largely experimental. The basic operational approach by the planners was for the Bureau of the Budget to indicate problems to regional directors who would try to solve the problems through the FRC in their regions. However, since neither the Presidential Directive nor the Bureau of the Budget provided guidelines as to how each FRC was to approach problems, for that would contravene the objective of decentralization, each FRC was left to develop its own style.<sup>174</sup>

The dilemma posed by the desire of council members to effectuate the President's directive and the lack of clear guidelines and authority, led them to complain to the Bureau of the Budget. The basic issue stemmed from the fact that the various council members represented five different, independent agencies whose operations were directed by law. Thus, what authority did each council member have to involve his agency in FRC activities? The BOB responded by issuing a memorandum more fully clarifying the role of FRC's, on January 14, 1970. Unfortunately, this memorandum added little to the concept of FRC's. It simply began by restating parts of the original directive of March, 1969. It also tacitly recognized the experimental nature of the FRC concept by

---

<sup>174</sup> Kolberg, "The New Federalism," pp. 52-53.

reminding council members that "the councils are an evolving approach to improving federal interagency coordination." The memorandum went on to explain:

(1) The function of the Undersecretaries Group in Washington is to provide help and support. It is the councils that must take the initiative. (2) Membership is limited to those five agencies named in the March, 1969 directive. All other agencies participating in the councils do so on an ad hoc basis. (3) Councils have no prescribed pattern of organization. They must meet at least once a month and may select their own chairman. Councils were again reminded of the potential of FRC's and exhorted to use the framework -- such as it was. Thus, for now, the dilemma of council members remained intact.

However, the one redeeming feature of this memorandum which indicated progress in the "evolutionary" process, was the concise statement of the FRC's "three basic objectives."<sup>175</sup>

1. Identification of conflicting agency policy and program operating practices which limit the effectiveness of federal assistance to states, localities and individuals;

2. Designing coordinated and consistent agency actions to improve the effectiveness of federal programs;

3. Directing as individual program managers the necessary actions within their respective agencies to strengthen program coordination, and

---

<sup>175</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Budget, The Federal Regional Councils (January 14, 1970).



monitoring and evaluating implementation.<sup>176</sup>

By September 30, 1970, the field operations of the five concerned agencies had been realigned within the ten standard federal regions. Despite this progress, FRC's continued to suffer from the dilemma. In a memorandum from OMB on January 25, 1971, FRC's were again recognized as "an evolving mechanism." The memorandum also attempted to resolve the dilemma by providing additional guidelines in the form of six specific functions:

1. Monitor existing coordinating mechanisms.
2. Design and initiate new coordination approaches where some exist or where current arrangements are inadequate.
3. Solve ad hoc special problems that involve more than one council agency.
4. Develop and strengthen a real partnership with state and local government, especially with governors and mayors.
5. Identify potential and existing interagency conflicts in policies, priorities, or operating procedures, and where possible to develop solutions.
6. Improve coordination, cooperation and information exchange between agencies in day-to-day operations, and develop systematic information exchange devices.<sup>177</sup>

The memorandum also clarified FRC's relationship with OMB, the Regional Council Working Group, and the Undersecretaries of the various agencies. The memorandum further clarified the lack of authority of FRC's. Because they are composed of individuals who are primarily respon-

---

<sup>176</sup> Ibid.

<sup>177</sup> U.S. Office of Management and Budget, The Regional Council Concept (January 25, 1971).

sible to their own agency, a majority of council members cannot impose actions on a minority. The most important aspect of this memorandum, however, was in the area of staffing. Because the Chairman of an FRC was primarily responsible for tasks within his own agency, the overload tasks involved in chairing the council suffered. As a result, a senior staff member (GS-14 or 15) was assigned to each council to prepare and allocate staff resources. Also, each member agency was required to "make available to its regional director \$50,000 which the regional director can commit to council activities." Councils were also reminded to meet regularly "usually every two weeks" and advised them to obtain letterhead stationary to facilitate identification by other agencies.<sup>178</sup> Thus, if an institution can be defined as "an organized way of getting things done," it would appear that FRC's had begun the formal process of institutionalizing.

The experimental status of FRC's came to an end on February 11, 1972, when President Nixon issued Executive Order 11647.<sup>179</sup> This Order resolved the dilemma by granting the "council member agencies authority to cooperate in grant-making activities."<sup>180</sup> The Order contained three sections:

---

<sup>178</sup> Ibid.

<sup>179</sup> Office of the White House Press Secretary, Executive Order 11647 (February 22, 1972).

<sup>180</sup> Frank C. Carlucci, Memorandum to Chairman of Federal Executive Board, March 4, 1972, Indian Task Force File, Western Federal Regional Council, San Francisco, California. Hereafter this file will be referred to by the abbreviation "ITTF."

(1) Section 1 established a Federal Regional Council for each of the standard federal regions. The membership of each FRC was enlarged by the addition of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and the Environment Protection Agency. The Chairman of each council was to be appointed and serve at the pleasure of the President. Regional directors from non-member agencies could be invited by the FRC chairman to attend and participate in council meetings and programs that involved their agencies.

(2) Section 2 outlined eight functions of the councils.

(3) Section 3 established the Under Secretaries Group (USG). USG was made up of the Under Secretaries of member agencies with the Associate Director of OMB serving as Chairman. USG was charged with the specific responsibility "for the proper functioning of the system established by this Order."<sup>181</sup>

Less than one month later, on March 10, 1972, Frank Calluci (Chairman of USG) issued a memorandum containing the "Ground Rules and Guidelines for Federal Regional Councils on Implementation of Executive Order 11647."<sup>182</sup> The reason for the issuance of these ground rules was that:

the functions as laid out in Section 2 of the Executive Order require further definition to serve

---

<sup>181</sup> Ibid.

<sup>182</sup> Frank C. Carlucci, Memorandum to Regional Council Members, outlining the implementation of Executive Order 11647, March 10, 1972, Office of Management and Budget. ITTF.



as the basis for implementing action in Washington and in the field during the first year of the strengthened council system.<sup>183</sup>

The memorandum outlines the structure and duties of FRC's under the general headings of "operating procedures" and "functional guidelines." Operating procedures included the role and responsibility of FRC chairman, staffing, resolution of conflict and the development and review of work plans. This procedure was especially significant since the deadline for submitting work plans to USG was May 1, which forced each FRC to make decisions concerning their initial thrust of activity. Functional guidelines included such things as the development of short-term interagency strategies, integrated program and funding plans with governors and local chief executives, IGA and related programs. Again, each FRC was charged with accomplishing a specific task by a deadline: each FRC was required to submit two IGA programs by the end of the year.<sup>184</sup>

---

<sup>183</sup> Ibid.

<sup>184</sup> Ibid. Note: The lack of organized opposition to this reform can be attributed to the speed with which it was adopted after President Nixon's inauguration. The opposition had little time to get organized before it was a fait accompli. There was, however, some opposition on the exact alignment of two of the biggest regions, Region VII and Region VIII. Senator Warren Magnuson of Washington opposed the inclusion of his home state in Region VIII, to be headquartered in San Francisco. Not only was this region extremely large (containing the Pacific Coast States, as well as Arizona, Nevada, Alaska, Hawaii and Guam), but it posed, in Magnuson's view, the threat of the subordination of his home state to California. He protested the alignment and had Region VIII split into two separate regions with Seattle serving as the headquarters for the new region. Politicians

The Response of the Western  
Federal Regional Council,  
Region IX in San Francisco

FRC IX immediately began work to develop its Annual Work Plan which was submitted to USG in May and amended in August. The Work Plan was divided into three categories: Activity Plan No. I, No. II, and No. III. Activity Plan I addressed itself to "devising inter-agency strategies to assist states and localities to achieve a greater opportunity and ability to plan, manage and direct public resources." This strategy involved such things as IGA programs and flexible funding grants for state and local government. HUD and DOL, for example, were given the "lead agency" responsibility of developing two pilot IGA programs according to an established timetable. Activity Plan No. II addresses itself to developing a delivery system to help special clientele groups whose problems require special approaches and resources if their quality of life is to parallel the opportunities and benefits available to the general population. The specific activities included in this work plan are: Equal Opportunity Action Plan, Urban Indian Affairs, Reservation Acceleration

---

and businessmen from Missouri similarly protested Denver as the regional headquarters for Region VII. Kansas City, they argued, had long been the location for regional offices of many federal departments and agencies, and therefore was the logical site for a regional headquarters. Besides, the eleven inter-mountain and plans states made Region VII somewhat large and unwieldy. Again the Bureau of the Budget responded by taking four of the states and establishing an additional region with its headquarters in Kansas City. Fischer, "The Nixon Administration," 33.

Program, and Demonstration Project on Aging. Activity Plan No. III involved the development of administrative procedures. This category was added in a revision on August, 1972.<sup>185</sup>

In order to achieve the goals included in this Work Plan, the FRC Secretariat under the direction of the council outlined the functions, policies and procedures of the FRC. Of the eight functions of FRC's listed in this outline, the sixth is the primary concern of this study.<sup>186</sup>

Under Executive Order No. 11647, the Council constitutes a body within which member agencies, to the maximum extent feasible, conduct their grant-making activities in concert through . . . the development of long-term regional interagency and intergovernmental strategies for resource allocations to better respond to the needs of state and local communities.<sup>187</sup>

The "nuts and bolts" work of the Council was assigned to task forces which were organized on an inter-agency basis and served at the pleasure of the council.<sup>188</sup>

On May 1, 1973, FRC published its Annual Report of Work Plan Activities in accordance with USG guidelines.<sup>189</sup>

---

<sup>185</sup> Western Federal Regional Council, Annual Report of Work Plan Activities, 1972-1973 (May 1, 1973), see Appendix A.

<sup>186</sup> WFRC, Concepts and Operations, Appendix B.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid., italics added.

<sup>188</sup> WFRC, Policies and Procedures for Regional Council Task Forces (October, 1972), see Appendix C.

<sup>189</sup> Frank C. Carlucci, Memorandum to Regional Council Members, March 10, 1972.



While the report generally described the status of each activity and thereby met the USG requirements, it failed to provide sufficient specific data to facilitate the type of analysis that would indicate specific causes of successes or failures of WERC. In order to obtain such data, a more intimate review of specific activities is necessary.

### Introduction

The primary responsibility of WERC is to administratively manage the international grant system. While nobody expects WERC to achieve this objective overnight, interested observers are uncertain about the progress of WERC to date. What exactly have they done? For what progress have they made? What problems have they encountered? Since WERC has been asked to play such an important role in the administration of grants, these and other questions should not remain the subject of mere speculation.

Ironically, while administration has been recognized for over a decade as the heart of the international grant system, there have been very few in-depth analyses of the nature and complexities of international grant administration. Since the likelihood of international grant administration to the administrative side, it is no wonder that there is a general feeling of uncertainty about the nature of grant administration. This uncertainty is reflected in the development of WERC, which is a direct result of the

### CHAPTER III

#### THE ACTIVITIES OF THE WERC: A CASE STUDY OF THE INDIAN TASK FORCE

##### Introduction

The primary responsibility of FRC's is to administratively pragmatize the categorical grant system. While nobody expects FRC's to achieve this objective overnight, interested observers are uncertain about the progress of FRC's to date. What exactly have they done? How much progress have they made? What problems have they experienced? Since FRC's have been asked to play such an important role in the administration of grants, these and other questions should not remain the subject of mere speculation.

Ironically, while administration has been recognized for over a decade as "the heart of the modern problem of government," there have been very few in-depth analyses into the nature and complexities of intergovernmental relations. Even the literature on federalism has paid little attention to the administrative side. It is no wonder that there is precious little theory building in the discipline of public administration. Therefore, the following study is designed not only to provide some information about the development of FRC's to date, it is also anticipated

that the information will help to remedy the research gap and contribute to empirical theory building about inter-governmental relations.

The research design for this dissertation will be the case study method which is an "in depth" study of a particular phenomenon. Case studies have the advantage of permitting exploration into the causal factors of a phenomenon about which there is too little knowledge to form causal hypotheses which presuppose sufficient information to develop independent and dependent variables as well as operational definitions. Since so little is known about the WFRC, a logical place to begin is with one of its task forces. The particular task force chosen by this study is the Reservation Acceleration Program (RAP) Task Force, later called the Indian Task Force, created by the WFRC with the objective of providing technical assistance to help Indians in the Western Federal Region obtain desired grant programs.

It is important to note the limitations of case studies. Case studies can lead to the precarious assumption that many of the problems, difficulties, and successes are shared by other task forces. Such inductive logic may be acceptable under experimental conditions which feature controls. Conditions in case studies are not controlled and the data collected may be the most readily available rather than the most significant. The investigator must also remember that the findings and



conclusions of case studies are based on a relatively small number of observations. Thus, the ability of the investigator to generalize from his findings are severely limited. However, if case studies were made of all FRC task forces, and they provided similar findings, it would allow generalization. This case study, therefore, can be considered as a beginning.

The Formative Stage of the Reservation  
Acceleration Program (RAP)

The first glimpse

The first exposure of WFRC to Indian affairs came on March 8, 1970 when Robert H. Baida received a request from the Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) that the WFRC invite the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Community Council of Arizona to make a presentation of its comprehensive plans. The BIA Office Director cited the Zuni Reservation presentation to the Dallas-Fort Worth FRC as a precedent. The Council initially agreed to meet with the Indians, but since the BIA was an agency of the Department of the Interior (DOI) which was not an FRC member, they decided to inform the tribe that a meeting would be postponed until February, 1972.<sup>190</sup>

---

<sup>190</sup> Robert H. Baida, Memorandum to Kenneth Kugel on Regional Councils and Indian Communities, December 21, 1971, Indian Task Force File (ITFF), Western Federal Regional Council, San Francisco, California.

### The Zuni Plan

The development of a comprehensive planning approach was not a recent innovation among many Indian tribes. Since the mid-1960's, HUD had provided project grants to Indian communities under the provisions of Section 701 of the 1954 Housing Act. By 1972, these 701 grants involved the expenditure of more than \$1 billion on almost 500 projects involving states, metropolitan regions, and Indian reservations.<sup>191</sup> Most of the 701 grants involving Indian reservations were used for the development of comprehensive planning for land use management.<sup>192</sup>

The Zuni Plan, however, was not funded by a 701 grant. It was the result of the personal initiative of the newly elected Governor of the Zuni Pueblo in 1965. Upon assuming office, he set about establishing community priorities. With the approval and assistance of the Zuni council he surveyed a sample of the pueblo residents to determine what the community expected of him during his tenure, and the goals they had for the community as a whole. Drawing from over 500 responses, the Governor and council established ten priorities. The Governor then approached BIA for technical assistance and support. The result was a plan which called for the expenditure of \$55 million in community development during the next five

---

<sup>191</sup>Public Law 33-560, Stat. 590, 640; 40 USC. 461.

<sup>192</sup>Interview with Bruce Daniels, HUD representative to Indian Task Force, Los Angeles, California, May 9, 1974.

years. From the vantage point of the Indians, the Zuni Plan was significant because it was the first systematic effort of the Zuni Pueblo at determining their own community priorities and planning. Under the 701 grants, consultants and appropriate "experts" were usually brought in to determine community needs.<sup>193</sup> However, from the vantage point of this study, the significance of the Zuni Plan was its comprehensive nature.

Because the Zuni plan was so much more comprehensive than previous plans generally initiated by the BIA, it forced the BIA to look beyond the normal range of programs for assistance. The necessity of tapping all possible resources did not go unrecognized in Washington. In a special message to Congress on July 8, 1970, the President said:

Economic planning is another area where our efforts can be significantly improved. The comprehensive economic development plans that have been created by both the Pima-Maricopa and Zuni Tribes provide outstanding examples of interagency and cooperation in fostering Indian economic growth. The Zuni Plan, for example, extends for at least five years and involves a total of \$55 million from the Departments of Interior, Housing and Urban Development, and Health Education and Welfare and from the Office of Economic Opportunity, and the Economic Development Administration. I am directing the Secretary of the Interior to play an active role in coordinating additional projects of this kind.<sup>194</sup>

---

<sup>193</sup> Interview with John Gray, Director of Planning for Zuni Pueblo, May 10, 1974.

<sup>194</sup> Frank C. Carlucci, Memorandum to Regional Council Chairmen on Indian Reversation Development, March 15, 1972, ITFF.



OMB becomes involved

Meanwhile, other FRC's had become involved unilaterally in Indian Affairs. In April 1970, the Northwest FRC located in Seattle had established an Urban Indian Task Force. It was not until September, 1971, that they informed USWG that the Task Force Charter was "amended to include an interagency mechanism for the coordination of services on Indian reservations as well as in urban areas." The memo also included a Task Force work plan and a request that funds be decentralized to FRC's "to mount a coordinated and effective Regional Council effort to meet the needs of the Indian people in the Northwest."<sup>195</sup>

Kugel immediately informed each member of the USWG of this request and asked them to prepare to consider the request at their next meeting by identifying any urban Indian programs in their various departments and agencies which could be decentralized.<sup>196</sup>

By December, a tentative, if incomplete, program approach had been developed. All FRC's were informed that USWG together with BIA and the National Council of Indian Opportunity (NCIO) was exploring "what councils can and should be doing about Federal activities of interest

---

<sup>195</sup> Jesse C. Ramaker, Memorandum to Ken Kugel on Regional Authority for Indian Programs, October 21, 1971, ITFF.

<sup>196</sup> K. Kugel, Memorandum to The Working Group, on Regional Authority for Indian Programs, October 26, 1971, ITFF.

to Indian communities." Meanwhile, FRC's were encouraged to make contact unilaterally with BIA offices "to look for productive models of council-Indian community relations."<sup>197</sup>

Robert H. Baida responded to Kugel's directive by informing him that the WFRC "first learned of OMB's interest in Indian affairs when the Phoenix BIA director asked them to invite the Pima-Maricopa Community Council to make presentations of comprehensive plans citing as a precedent the Zuni presentation to the Dallas-Fort Worth Regional Council. Baida continued by reproving OMB for not informing him sooner of OMB-BIA discussions. He also observed that the Zuni request which Washington apparently considered the model to follow, was replete with unfulfillable expectations and that FRC's should be involved with Indian Tribes as they begin to formulate comprehensive plans. Baida concluded that, "Hopefully, we can contribute some expertise in the direction of tailoring the plans to a realistic expectation of the federal agencies' ability to deliver."<sup>198</sup>

#### The BIA takes the initiative

On January 10, 1972, Louis R. Bruce, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs (CIA) informed thirty-five

<sup>197</sup> K. Kugel, Memorandum to FRC members on Regional Councils and Indian Communities, December 9, 1971, ITFF.

<sup>198</sup> R. Baida, Memorandum to K. Kugel, December 21, 1971.

tribes<sup>199</sup> that they had been chosen to apply to participate in the Reservation Acceleration Program (RAP). These tribes were told that they would receive help from BIA "in getting the comprehensive planning activities implemented." Attached to this formal announcement was additional information about RAP under the heading of "Questions and Answers about RAP," a prospective timetable for implementation by October 2, 1973, and a questionnaire seeking information about the relative progress of each tribe in developing comprehensive plans. A RAP questionnaire to determine which of the thirty-five tribes were most prepared for RAP was also attached. Each tribe was informed that only eleven of the thirty-five tribes were to be selected.<sup>200</sup> All BIA area directors and superintendents received the same information, including the notice that James Hena, Bruce's Executive Assistant, was charged with directing RAP.<sup>201</sup>

The attached "Questions and Answers about RAP" followed the Zuni Plan precedent of allowing the tribes to develop their own priorities, which would be presented

---

<sup>199</sup>The tribes were chosen by The Economic Development Administration because of their considerable experience with comprehensive planning. Of the thirty-six tribes invited to participate in RAP, only twenty-eight responded. See K. Kugel, Memorandum to FRC Chairman on Guidelines for Regional Council Participation in RAP, June 27, 1972, ITFF.

<sup>200</sup>Louis R. Bruce, to Thirty-Six Tribes appearing in the 1968 EDA Selected Reservation Program List, January 10, 1972, ITFF.

<sup>201</sup>L. Bruce, Memorandum to All Area Directors and Superintendents, on RAP, January 14, 1972, ITFF.



for negotiation (or "rapping") on three levels: agency (BIA), area, and Washington. It was assumed that this negotiation would facilitate the following functions: (1) allow the "fullest possible backing of the Bureau of Indian Affairs," (2) afford participating tribes the opportunity to familiarize themselves totally with the BIA budget and to negotiate changes in that budget, such as "changing emphasis of social service programs to stress rehabilitation of welfare clients," (3) to assist tribes in obtaining financial, technical and staff assistance of other government agencies.<sup>202</sup>

#### WFRC learns of RAP

Baida first learned of RAP within a fortnight of its announcement to applicant tribes. After briefly explaining the RAP concept and objectives, Bruce described the role of FRC's as one of helping review the plans of RAP tribes. However, other than assuring Baida that the tribes selected in Region IX would contact him, he was given no information of a substantive nature. What exactly did Bruce mean by the statement that FRC's would "be of particular help in reviewing the plans of RAP tribes?" Did this simply mean the council would tell chosen tribes if their plans were feasible and where to go for assistance, or would the council get involved in

---

<sup>202</sup> L. Bruce, Memorandum to Thirty-six Tribes, Questions and Answers About RAP, January 10, 1972, ITFF.

the "rapping" on behalf of the tribes -- pleading their cause to the concerned agencies and departments, or serve as discreet intermediaries -- a sort of "goods offices" for the rappers? These and other nagging questions were responded to when the council met with three BIA Directors on January 28, to get a briefing on RAP and discuss procedures.<sup>203</sup>

Notwithstanding these questions, the primary concern of the council at the time was the inability of the member agencies to respond to the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Tribe's request for assistance. OMB was subsequently informed of this problem. Meanwhile, the council deleted the RAP Work Plan and informed the tribe it was postponing its meeting until further clarification was received from OMB.<sup>204</sup> However, while additional clarification from headquarters of BIA and OMB were forthcoming, the nagging questions concerning the council's role always seemed to remain a problem throughout the life of RAP.

#### WFRC becomes involved in RAP

The actual development of the program was further retarded by the failure of the USG to provide clear admin-

<sup>203</sup> L. Bruce to R. Baida, Letter describing RAP, January 25, 1972, ITFF.

<sup>204</sup> Western Federal Regional Council Secretariat, Memorandum to Regional Council, on RAP, March 24, 1972, ITFF.

istrative guidelines. It was assumed by USG and BIA that since the FRC's had been informed of the problem, they would somehow automatically initiate involvement. Although the council members were far from antagonistic to RAP involvement, the fact that it included the BIA, an agency of the Department of the Interior (DOI) which itself was not a member of the council, posed an administrative problem which only the USG or OMB could resolve. Also, the involvement of FRC's in Indian affairs at this point was strictly informal. Kugal's memorandum to FRC's on December 9, 1971, simply "encouraged councils to develop contacts." It was as though someone at OMB suggested that "maybe FRC's could help," and before long everyone at OMB assumed that the FRC's would help.<sup>205</sup>

Frank Carlucci, chairman of the Under Secretaries Group for Regional Operations took several steps toward resolving these difficulties in his March 15 memorandum to the FRC with instructions to review Indian plans with two objectives in mind:

1. providing guidance and technical assistance to tribes on regulations, standards, criteria or other requirements of the member agencies, and
2. considering how existing and available funds within each program area can be better related to tribal priorities.<sup>206</sup>

---

<sup>205</sup> Interview with Hardy Pearce, Indian Task Force Executive Secretary, San Francisco, California, April 9, 1974.

<sup>206</sup> F. Carlucci, Memorandum to FRC Chairman, on Indian Reservation Development, March 15, 1972, ITFF.



Additional directions were also attached to the memorandum guiding FRC's review of tribal plans. In order to implement the above mentioned objectives, each FRC was required to designate "a task force of other liaison point for contact with RAP tribes." The Department of the Interior was also made an ad hoc member of the council and the BIA Area Directors were instructed to serve as ex-officio members on the task force. The Area Directors were responsible for assisting tribes in maintaining liaison with the council.<sup>208</sup>

In response to these instructions, the WFRC Secretariat set out to clarify the guidelines received from OMB and the history of RAP to date, to each council member. It also recommended that a meeting be arranged with the Area Directors of BIA to discuss problems and procedures.<sup>208</sup>

On April 6, BIA released the names of thirteen tribes chosen for RAP, together with the BIA manual for RAP procedures. The Western Federal Region was given four tribes: Gila River, Hoopa, Salt River and San Carlos. The manual was intended as an "initial guidance to its field offices on RAP."<sup>209</sup> Kugel of USWG further clarified the role of the four regions involved in RAP in a memorandum on April 20. Although the primary involvement was BIA's,

---

<sup>207</sup> Ibid.

<sup>208</sup> Secretariat to Regional Council, March 24, 1974.

<sup>209</sup> L. Bruce, Memorandum to Holders of Bureau of Indian Affairs Manual BIAM, on RAP, April 6, 1972, ITFF.

tribes were directed by use of Form 5-0603 and with the assistance of FRC's to identify on a project-by-project basis potential sources for non-BIA input. BIA estimated FRC's would receive Form 5-0603 from designated tribes by mid-May, but no deadline was imposed so that tribes would have sufficient time to negotiate with BIA.<sup>210</sup>

### The Formalization of RAP

#### A task force is created

On June 19, the council established the RAP Task Force. Since DOI was the lead agency, Bill Monroe of DOI was assigned the chairmanship of the Task Force and each council member was instructed by Aquirre to assign a representative. Although the council did not provide the task force with formal guidelines until July 25, the Secretariat proceeded immediately to establish informal contacts with Bill Monroe and other agency representatives.<sup>211</sup> The first meeting was held June 30, and there were numerous "behind-the-scenes" contacts between the Secretariat staff and the task force members in an effort to get each agency representative fully involved. While most of the members attended the meetings, they paid little attention to the briefings. After all, most of them were already burdened

---

<sup>210</sup> K. Kugel, Memorandum of FRC Chairman, on FRC Participation in RAP, April 20, 1972, ITFF.

<sup>211</sup> Western Federal Regional Council, Minutes of the Regional Council Meeting, June 19, 1972. Also, interview with H. Pearce, April 9, 1974.

with responsibilities within their own agencies, and this was merely an experimental program. Besides, most members expected the chairman to assume the primary responsibility since BIA was the lead agency.<sup>212</sup>

#### Administrative difficulties

However, some of the task force members did respond formally to the behind-the-scenes contacts from the Secretariat. Those who did respond expressed their misgivings about RAP in general and the council's expectations of their particular agency's commitments specifically. Leonard Johnson of DOT, for example, felt that the August 13 deadline for submitting a work plan was unrealistic in light of the fact that only one of the four tribes was ready to develop comprehensive plans. He reminded the Secretariat that DOT anticipated a limited amount of support for RAP, generally in the form of highway engineering expertise, rather than grants of money as had been suggested. He also expressed his misgivings about the capacity of the Indians to participate in sophisticated negotiations.<sup>213</sup>

This conflict of expectations was also reflected within the task force itself. Bill Monroe rarely attended the task force meetings. He was notably absent during the first meeting on June 30, as well as the second meeting several weeks later.<sup>214</sup>

<sup>212</sup> Interview with Hardy Pearce, April 9, 1974.

<sup>213</sup> Leonard W. Johnson, Letter to Karen Christianson, discussing RAP, July 10, 1972.



several weeks later.<sup>214</sup> Instead of assuming personal leadership, Monroe appointed Don Rodeen, a retired salesman with three months government "experience" as his Executive Director. Since many of the task force members were members by order rather than desire, the lack of lead agency commitment served to undermine any potential commitment on their part. Although informal reports from the task force were received by HEW and other member agencies, fewer than fifty percent of the task force attended its meetings and little was done during the meetings aside from "warming the chairs."<sup>215</sup>

This condition became so intolerable that several task force members openly called for the removal of Bill Monroe under the pretext that DOI was only an ad hoc member of the council and unfamiliar with the type of work involved in heading an FRC task force. Others saw Bill Monroe as a thorough-going incompetent. Whatever the reason, he had "been unable to meet the commitments required of the Chairman of the RAP Task Force."<sup>216</sup> No immediate action was taken on this proposal, however, and the initial commitment of the members of the task force -- such as they were -- deteriorated further. Given this state of affairs, it is no

---

<sup>214</sup> Edward Aquirre, Memorandum to K. Kugal, Status Report on RAP, September 25, 1972, ITFF.

<sup>215</sup> Interview with Don Rodeen, Assistant to RAP Task Force Chairman, San Francisco, California, April 9, 1974.

<sup>216</sup> Hal Coleman, Memorandum to De Baca, Staff Request, July 19, 1972, ITFF.

wonder that both the task force members and supporting staff began to view the whole endeavour as a "giant comedy."<sup>217</sup>

In spite of these problems, however, the task force succeeded in contacting the four pilot tribes and arranged for visits early in September.<sup>218</sup> The Indians, however, were somewhat suspicious of the task force. Although they were by no means enamoured of the performance and record of the BIA, it was a known quantity and it did provide access to Washington. The task force, on the other hand, was not only a new structure, it was viewed as a potential obstacle to direct contact with Washington. While it is true that the Indians had initiated contact with the council in October, 1971, it was with the hope of additional sources of assistance rather than a substitute.<sup>219</sup>

These fears were expressed to Chuck Hughes, OMB staff assigned to RAP, when he met with BIA officials and Salt River Tribe representatives in the middle of July. According to the Indians, the operating procedures of the task force were unbelievably confusing. While working with a task force was a new experience for the Indians, the structure and operations of this task force was an

---

<sup>217</sup>Don Rodeen, April 9, 1974.

<sup>218</sup>E. Aguirre to K. Kugel, Memorandum: Status Report on RAP; Paul J. Smith, President of Salt River Tribal Council, interview by telephone, April 12, 1974.

<sup>219</sup>Interview with Frank Archambault, Special Projects Officer for Pyramid Lake Piute Tribe, San Francisco, California, April 9, 1974.

enigma. Who, for example, was the authoritative figure? The answer was in theory, of course, the chairman. But since Monroe was unavailable, the responsibility of answering questions and inquiries fell upon individual task force members who could only speak for their respective agencies. As a result, their responses were always hedged with so many "ifs," "buts," and "dependings," that the Indians became suspicious of RAP promises and doubted its ability to deliver.<sup>220</sup>

The Indians, Hughes also discovered in the course of the meeting, were "more interested in getting access to specific project information than in meetings."<sup>221</sup> They wanted to know where the money was and how they could get it. They also wanted to use the council to achieve their goals and proposed that it serve as a "clearinghouse for proposals," rather than a board of review. Also, because of the confusion arising from trying to work with each member of the task force, the Salt River Tribe wanted a liaison with the council who could provide them with "proper answers." This request was communicated to the council Secretariat which, with Aquirre's approval, informed Bob Lykke of LEAA that he was designated as the RAP liaison person. This organizational reform proved of

---

<sup>220</sup> Ibid.; this point was confirmed during interviews with Hardy Pearce and Don Rodeen, April 9, 1974

<sup>221</sup> Ibid.; also see Elaine Handy, Memorandum to Bob Lykke, on RAP, July 27, 1972, ITFF; Charles Hughes, Memorandum to K. Kugel, on the Status of RAP, September 28, 1972, ITFF.



little consequence, however, since the task force as a cohesive unit ceased to function and lapsed into inactivity.<sup>222</sup>

Forceful leadership in a task force type organization such as that employed by the council is a necessary ingredient for success, precisely because the leader alone has the authority to perform the primary function of coordination. Because of the obvious lack of leadership, the task force suffered from the lack of communication "between OMB and the council, between D/Interior and the council and between the council, the task force and the Tribes."<sup>223</sup>

Had Monroe delegated the leadership function to a practiced and skilled administrator, the task force may have been able to function according to council/OMB expectations. However, the retired salesman with three months government service was unacquainted with the workings of large administrative machinery, confused by the complexity of the regional structure, and impatient with the formalities of interpersonal relationships.<sup>224</sup>

In search of a remedy to this condition, the task force recommended that the council ask Webb Otis, the new Regional Director of DOI, to personally chair the task

---

<sup>222</sup> Secretariat, Memorandum to Regional Council, on RAP, October 12, 1972.

<sup>223</sup> Ibid.

<sup>224</sup> Interview with Don Rodeen, April 9, 1974.

force. Otis declined the chairmanship, arguing that the workload of his present new assignment alone provided a grueling schedule. He did indicate, however, that DOI wanted to continue to chair the task force. At the request of the Secretariat staff, Aquirre personally contacted Otis and prevailed upon him to assume the chairmanship with the promise that the council would provide him with "full support."<sup>225</sup>

OMB responds to RAP's  
administrative difficulties

Evidently all four FRC's participating in RAP had encountered similar coordinating difficulties. Upon learning of this problem, Kugel of USWG dispatched a memorandum to William Rogers, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs, informing him of the difficulties encountered by FRC's in administering RAP and proposing remedies.

FRC's working with and through a lead agency, as BIA is in RAP, will look to that agency for initiatives, counsel, policy signals, staff support, and, perhaps most important of all, a feeling or atmosphere concerning the project to determine the lead agency's sense of urgency. Chairmen will almost never want to "get out in front" of the lead agency. This would particularly be true in an area considered policy-sensitive, such as Indian affairs. A feeling of mutual involvement and working relationship on a daily basis are necessary to assure the FRC that its services are needed and its efforts are on the right track. Lack of lead agency initiatives and working contracts will almost always result in hesitant FRC action.

It is suggested that BIA contact FRC's frequently without being asked, request FRC meeting time for status reports on RAP or even criticism of FRC response,

---

<sup>225</sup> Interview with Hardy Pearce, April 9, 1974. Also see Secretariat, Memorandum to Regional Council, October 12, 1972.

invite FRC personnel to RAP meetings whether on-reservation or in area offices, come forward with specific suggestions for FRC involvement, brief the tribes on the FRC's and assist tribes in initiatives to the FRC, or perform whatever functions might be helpful to FRC's in crystallizing their role in specific reservation situations. It is very difficult to issue an "S.O.P." on this sort of working partnership. It can only be achieved by BIA and the FRC's in the field, not by any of us in Washington. I believe that once a normalized working relation is established between BIA and the FRC's on the details of individual reservation programs, FRC assurance and initiatives will pick up markedly.<sup>226</sup>

As this letter indicates, OMB was clearly aware of the problems involved in effectuating the FRC concept, yet it remained steadfast in its belief that it should not order BIA -- the designated lead agency -- to initiate a particular course of action. Rather, it merely suggested a course of action, thereby reaffirming its dedication to the idea of decentralization. It was up to the agencies to determine exactly how the general objectives of RAP were to be achieved. Thus, the dilemma of the FRC concept -- the councils ~~lack~~ the authority to enforce decisions upon their members, yet they are assigned tasks which require authority to effectuate -- is reflected in the initial activities of the RAP task force.

#### Early accomplishments of the task force

Despite the breakdown in communications and the failure of the task force to meet the initial expectations of either the council or the Indians, some progress was

---

<sup>226</sup> K. Kugel to William L. Rogers, Letter requesting DOI support for RAP, September 20, 1972, ITTF.



made during the last months of 1972. The RAP plan submitted by the Salt River Tribe in July, was resurrected for review and response.<sup>227</sup> Each task force member was assigned those request affecting his agency. Since many of the government agencies such as HEW are complex bureaucracies involving many semi-autonomous functional agencies, a review and response of tribal requests required intra-departmental coordination. In order to coordinate these agencies, after reviewing the Salt River requests, De Baca, the Regional Director of HEW, identified thirteen individuals from four different agencies within HEW as "necessary resource personnel."<sup>228</sup> They were from the Office of Education, Health Services and Mental Health Administration, Office of Child Development, and Social and Rehabilitation Services.<sup>229</sup> On the basis of such intra-departmental efforts, the task force had consolidated the initial responses of the involved agencies into a rough draft by December. These responses were subsequently submitted to each agency and tribe for a critique prior to developing the final

---

<sup>227</sup> Edward Aquirre to Paul J. Smith, Letter concerning RAP negotiations, September 28, 1972, ITFF.

<sup>228</sup> See Appendix for samples from the Salt River Plan.

<sup>229</sup> F. De Baca, HEW Regional Director, to Regional Commissioner of the Office of Education, Regional Commissioner of Social and Rehabilitation Services, Regional Health Director and Assistant Regional Director of the Office of Child Development, Memorandum on Agency participation in RAP, November 28, 1972, ITFF.

draft which was submitted for council approval on January 9, 1973.<sup>230</sup>

Bill Monroe submitted the final report of the task force to Aquirre on December 29, 1972. This report however, was not at all optimistic on the subject of IGA's. While it was considered as "the ultimate and ideal mechanism of Federal service delivery" it was also considered impractical and unworkable because "much of the federal funding is channeled through state agencies, without much involvement at the federal level for expenditure of funds."<sup>231</sup> The report proceeded to provide recommendations on the viability of the RAP task force concept and the comprehensive plans of the Salt River Tribe.

#### Recommendations Concerning the RAP Concept

1. The name of the RAP Task Force be changed to Federal Agencies Coordinating Team (FACT) to reflect the responsibility of the team and the importance of its activities.

2. The Federal Regional Council should explore the possibility of establishment of a top-level (possibly as high as cabinet under officer) group to facilitate funding from general or special funds with fund direction and action responsibility directed to appropriate agencies.

#### Recommendations Concerning the Salt River Pima Comprehensive Plan

1. To be eligible for certain HEW education monies such as 815 construction funds (school assistance to Federally affected areas) a recipient agency must be

<sup>230</sup> E. Aquirre to W. Monroe, Letter on the progress of RAP, December 8, 1972, ITFF; also see Monroe to Aquirre, Letter providing a general summation of task force activity, December 29, 1972, ITFF.

<sup>231</sup> Ibid.

recognized as a Local Education Agency (LEA). However, the new Emergency School Assistance Act does stipulate that Federally recognized tribal councils shall be eligible as Local Education Agencies. The Federal Regional Council should ask the General Counsel for a waiver on all other USOE programs that require applicants be an LEA so as to be consistent with the most recent Federal legislation and to put tribal councils in a position to favorably compete with LEA's to bring about improvements in the reservation school systems.

2. The Task Force recommends all agencies touching upon the educational delivery system of the Salt River Pima Reservation meet to decide a more effective means of utilizing educational monies to be compatible with the Salt River Pima Community's educational desires. Affected Federal agencies would include the Bureau of Indian Affairs program people.

3. The Task Force recommends that the Federal Regional Council determine whether or not there will be earmarked RAP funds for the Salt River Pima Tribe. If not, then negotiations with agency heads are in order to assist agencies in rearranging their funds and priorities to meet the needs identified in the Salt River Pima plan. Proper coordination and planning would assure timing of available funds be commensurate with the tribe's ability to utilize programs. Premature awarding of programs could be avoided until facilities exist to accommodate them if the above procedure is implemented.<sup>232</sup>

This report was submitted to the Secretariat which would pass it on to the council. However, upon reviewing the report, the Secretariat staff detected problems which had the potential of creating sufficient confusion during the council meeting with the Indians that it could undermine this RAP review: "The Reservation Indian Task Force report addresses the Salt River RAP plan and the federal interagency problems at the same time." In order to prevent concern for interagency issues from

---

<sup>232</sup> Ibid.



overshadowing the council's response to the Salt River requests, the Secretariat sent a lengthy, detailed memorandum to the council noting this problem, It also analyzed the report, carefully explained each issue separately, and recommended a format for the July 9 meeting of the council.<sup>233</sup>

Separating Salt River from Task Force Issues:

The Council should focus on responding to Salt River funding requests and follow one of the alternative methods for dealing with task force problems.

1. Hold brief (15 minute or less) executive session with Task Force prior to meeting with Salt River officials, to ensure a consistent Federal position.

2. Deal with pertinent task force issues in the presence of Salt River officials, who are reasonable and sophisticated.

3. Avoid Task Force issues during meeting, and raise Council concerns through a memorandum to the Task Force.

Secretariat Recommendation:

The Secretariat recommends the third alternative and proposes the following scenario:

- Opening remarks by Chairman on overview of RAP; FRC role in RAP; and welcome Salt River representatives.
- Brief remarks by Task Force Chairman on RAP process used by Task Force.
- Chairman invites Paul Smith to make any opening remarks.
- Discussion of Salt River funding requests and Federal responses between Paul Smith and appropriate Regional Director/Administrator.

---

<sup>233</sup> Secretariat to FRC, Memorandum on RAP, January 4, 1973, ITFF.

- Chairman invites Paul Smith to give his evaluation of RAP process.
- Chairman concludes meeting.<sup>234</sup>

The council meeting on July 9 followed this recommended format. Mr. Smith, President of the Salt River Indian Community Council, was informed that the Regional Council would prepare a coordinated response to the tribe within one month.<sup>235</sup>

The council response came during the second week of March. After reminding the tribe that "the FRC had no funds" and that extensive changes in the Executive Branch of the federal government had affected the programs of a number of FRC agencies, the acting chairman of the council reported that several responses such as HUD's had been completed. However, most of the responses were in the form of offers of technical assistance, rather than new grants.<sup>236</sup>

The Salt River Tribe received the council's response with guarded enthusiasm. The amount of grant money was not as great as they would have liked and their relationship with the council was often vague and confusing. Nevertheless, Mr. Smith saw potential in the FRC concept and conveyed the following recommendations to the council:

---

<sup>234</sup> Ibid.

<sup>235</sup> Western Federal Regional Council, Minutes of Regional Council Meeting, January 9, 1973; also see Aguirre to Smith, Letter, January 17, 1973, ITFF.

<sup>236</sup> De Baca to Smith, Letter describing FRC response to Salt River Community Plan, March 9, 1973, ITFF.

1. The Indian Task Force established to act as a permanent coordinating body to both the Regional Council and applicant tribes should continue to function. Without the Indian Task Force, applicant tribes have no one to contact for specific recommendations or answers to specific questions.

2. The Chairman of the Indian Task Force should be given enough authority to be a source that all federal agencies will respect and respond to.

3. In order for the Federal Councils to be of any benefit to Indian tribes, each federal office should request in their annual budgets, funds sufficient to meet Indian needs. One way this might be accomplished is through the integrated grant or block funding concept to Indian communities.

4. While I recognize that present legislation in most of the federal agencies requires state planning, coordination, and review for federal applications; I recommend that Indian tribes have the authority to work through this method, as well as, direct contact with Washington offices, even more so, we can maintain Indian Desks in the Washington office with special funding for Indian programs.

5. Where many of the agencies can provide technical assistance and very worthwhile programs, it has been our experience to find that while we might be able to obtain worthwhile programs within our community -- we do not have the proper facilities in which these programs can be administered and delivered to our community. With the phase out of the Office of Economic Opportunity and the Economic Development Administration, the only agencies that provided any funding of any type for what might be termed "brick and mortar money," leaves a gaping whole in our efforts to progress. We must find a means in which federal agencies can provide construction monies or ask that agencies such as EDA and OEO continue to function.<sup>237</sup>

#### An Evaluation of the first year

As soon as Webb Otis assumed the chairmanship of the task force, he proceeded to more fully organize it.

---

<sup>237</sup>Smith to De Baca, Letter, April 26, 1973, ITFF.



He appointed Hardy Pearce as Executive Secretary of the task force and clarified agency representation as one representative per agency. Agency representation had become somewhat of a problem as certain agencies such as HEW had become more involved in RAP than other agencies such as OEO, and had developed a pattern of sending more than one representative to task force meetings. Also, in response to an OMB request conveyed through Aquirre, Otis organized a subcommittee to evaluate the effectiveness of the task force to date.<sup>238</sup>

This evaluation provided Otis with a formal exposure to the problems that had confronted the task force during its first year of operation, as well as a basis to plan his own approach to effectuating RAP. This evaluation revealed that while the vast majority of the task force members felt that the various lines of communication to conduct task force business had improved to the point that they were "working effectively," most members also felt that the task force was not "operating as an effective contact point." This apparent paradox can be explained by the fact that all except one respondent to the evaluation questionnaire indicated the lack of necessary authority "to

---

<sup>238</sup> Webster Otis, RAP Task Force Chairman, to task force members, Memorandum on task force evaluation, February 16, 1973, ITFF; also see Robert Overacker to De Baca, Memorandum on participation in RAP, February 12, 1973, ITFF. The "problem" of membership has remained unsolved since BIA and DOI both have their own representatives, even though they are one and the same department.

negotiate for technical assistance and program commitments with other agencies and with tribal representatives." Task force members also felt constrained in their negotiations with the Indians because of poor state and county relationships with the Indians. They all felt that state and local governments should be involved in the task force even if only in a liaison capacity. In spite of these misgivings, however, most of the members felt that the task force was generally worthwhile and had made significant contributions.<sup>239</sup>

Webb Otis submitted the Task Force Evaluation to the council Secretariat on April 24. Three days later he also submitted "suggested resolutions for consideration by the Federal Regional Council . . . based on the Salt River - Pima Maricopa RAP review."<sup>240</sup>

Suggested Resolution 1 - Whereas it is the policy of this current Administration to emphasize the integrated grant approach in the Federal grant-making process, therefore

BE IT RESOLVED THAT the Federal Regional Council urges the Office of Management and Budget and the Under Secretaries Group to make available block grant and loan monies for reservation Indians.

Suggested Resolution 2 - Whereas it is the policy of this current Administration to allocate certain Federal funds according to various revenue sharing formulae, therefore

BE IT RESOLVED THAT the Federal Regional Council urges the Office of Management and Budget and the

Under

<sup>239</sup> Western Federal Regional Council RAP Task Force Evaluation, Total Tabulation, March 14, 1973, ITFF; Otis to Secretariat, Memorandum evaluating RAP Evaluation, April 24, 1973.

<sup>240</sup> Secretariat to FRC, Memorandum on RAP Evaluation, April 27, 1973, ITFF.

Under Secretaries Group to revise revenue sharing formulae to reallocate additional funds to reservation Indians.

Suggested Resolution 3 - Whereas the Reservation Indian Task Force experienced difficulty in dealing with various State agencies involved with Indians, therefore

BE IT RESOLVED THAT the Federal Regional Council will work closely with State legislative bodies and Governors' offices in a technical capacity to assist the states in defining the official legal status of Indian organizations within their political jurisdiction.

Suggested Resolution 4 - Whereas the Reservation Indian Task Force has discovered that the need definitely exists for a permanent Federal contact point for Indian peoples in the Pacific Southwest Region, therefore

BE IT RESOLVED THAT the Federal Regional Council will study the possibility of establishing a permanent Indian Desk in Region IX.<sup>241</sup>

As usual, the Secretariat evaluated the Task Force Evaluation together with subsequent resolutions and made its own recommendations to the council. It recommended the extension of the task force, but opposed the establishment of a permanent Indian Desk in the Region because "it would appear to negate interagency approach which is what the council and its task force are all about."<sup>242</sup> On Resolution 2, the Secretariat recommended that the task force be more specific in identifying recommended changes. On Resolution 3, the Secretariat recommended that the task force draft the letters to the Governors for the council Chairman's signature.<sup>243</sup> When the council

---

<sup>241</sup> Ibid.

<sup>242</sup> Ibid.

<sup>243</sup> Ibid.



held its monthly meeting on May 1, the recommendations of the Secretariat were adopted.<sup>244</sup>

Acting upon the Secretariat's recommendations and in an effort to get the task force going, the council requested that the task force "reconsider its structure and scope of work."<sup>245</sup> It was no secret that the council had not been unduly impressed by the accomplishments of the task force during its formative stages. Neither was the council enamoured of the behavior of those task force members who were becoming advocates on behalf of the Indians. As a result, Council Chairman Aquirre called a special meeting in February to restate the council's charge to the task force.

He stressed that the task force, as an arm of the federal government, was not to identify with a constituent group. The group is an independent task force, capable of forming its own decisions. Since the task force had appeared to be recommending a cause, it has begun to lose the confidence of the Regional Council. Essentially, the task force is to assist the Indian tribes in planning and finalizing the grants process.<sup>246</sup>

The task force members were also reminded that they were charged with the goal of seeking better utilization of already available federal funds. No special grant funds had been allocated for responding to requests in RAP plans.

---

<sup>244</sup> Western Federal Regional Council, Minutes of Regional Council Meeting, May 1, 1974, ITFF.

<sup>245</sup> Otis to FRC, Memorandum, June 11, 1973, ITFF.

<sup>246</sup> Otis to Task Force Members, Memorandum, February 16, 1973, ITFF.

Rather, the FRC is committed to providing "technical assistance regarding both better usage and coordination of existing funds and possible sources for expanded funding, either through direct federal grants or through funds administered by state agencies under formula programs."<sup>247</sup>

During the next week, Webb Otis developed and submitted a brief work plan for Fiscal Year (FY) 1974, describing how the task force was going to meet the charge of the council.<sup>248</sup>

#### The Task Force Takes the Initiative

During the next six months, the morale and effectiveness of the task force improved considerably.<sup>249</sup> Under the new title of Reservation Indian Task Force (RITF) and under the direction of the new chairman, the task force took the initiative in contacting the remaining three RAP tribes to set up meetings for the discussion and negotiation of their plans. The governors of the states of Nevada, Arizona and California were also contacted.<sup>250</sup> Moreover, efforts were made to form the task force into a coherent group whose members had a sense of identification and a

---

<sup>247</sup> De Baca to HEW agencies, Memorandum on NEW response to RAP, February 12, 1973, ITFF.

<sup>248</sup> Otis to FRC, Memorandum, June 11, 1973, ITFF.

<sup>249</sup> Interview with Hardy Pearce, April 9, 1974.

<sup>250</sup> On June 28, letters were dispatched to the governors of the Western Federal Region.

consciousness of joint interaction with one another. Each member was kept abreast of all activities by Hardy Pearce, the Task Force Executive Secretary. Each member was also given definite deadlines for assigned duties such as submitting their agency's response to Indian plans. Reminders in the form of "blue envelopes"<sup>251</sup> were used to motivate tardy members. This sense of identification as a viable task force was further fostered, though indirectly, by a series of meetings, symposiums and retreats which were held with the objective of developing future thrusts for the task force.<sup>252</sup>

Such activities enabled the various task force members to meet as a task force for significant periods of time away from a competitive environment. It must be remembered that each task force member had basic responsibilities which assumed a priority status within their respective agencies. Task force membership was therefore additional work, and was consequently accorded a low priority. Retreats to such places as the Western White House in San Clemente also afforded the task force members an opportunity to get to know each other on a more personal basis. Such an intimate non-competitive environment enabled the task force members to concentrate on developing plans to implement the council's charge. The result was

---

<sup>251</sup>Blue envelopes are used to designate urgency.

<sup>252</sup>Interview with Hardy Pearce, April 9, 1974.



not only an increased commitment by most task force members to program implementation, but also increased concern with the actual formulation of Indian policy.<sup>253</sup>

The outgrowth of all this activity was the refinement of task force operating procedures. Webb Otis sought council approval of these procedures in the form of two proposals: (1) The establishment of standing subcommittees for each Indian community to be composed of local line-level program people on the reservation, who would report to the RITF chairman. The sub-committee was given the responsibility of pursuing "the commitments made in the Council response." (2) "That the FRC select five additional Indian communities for consideration by the task force during FY 1974." These tribes had been identified from among seventy possible tribes as the most deserving of council consideration. Without the "benefit" of the Secretariat's interpretation and recommendation, the council acted unanimously to pass both proposals -- a sign of improved confidence.<sup>254</sup>

Task force activity:  
May 1973-July 1974

Armed with more viable administrative machinery and

<sup>253</sup>Western Federal Regional Council, Minutes of Regional Council Meeting, June 19, 1973. Also interviews with members of Indian Task Force, San Clemente Retreat, California, May 16, 1974.

<sup>254</sup>Ibid.; the council members also asked the Secretariat to present "options" rather than "recommendations" to the council. Interview with Beau Carter, FRC Executive Secretary, May 29, 1974.

a sense of purpose, the task force proceeded to work toward the accomplishment of these proposals. The primary activities of the task force was the assistance and negotiation of comprehensive plans with the Gila River, Hoopa, and Papago Tribes, and getting the various agencies to implement the programs they had agreed to during the negotiating process. By February, 1974, the task force was able to boast of the following accomplishments:

Salt River

1. \$150,000 from LEAA for construction of public courts complex
2. 120 units of public housing from HUD
3. Assurance of continued funding for Salt River Indian Action Team (\$110,000)
4. EPA Solid Waste Demonstration Grant (\$40,000)
5. Urban Systems Engineering Grant from HUD (\$35,000)
6. Talent Search Grant from HEW (\$20,000)
7. IGA Application

Gila River

1. \$60,000 of HEW money released for hospital study.
2. IPA of 1970 brought to attention of OMB
3. \$1.3 million BIA funds released for Casa Blanca School
4. \$200,000 LEAA grant for correctional center

Hoopa

1. \$20,250 HUD grant for tennis courts at Community Building
2. \$371,000 HUD grant for water distribution system

Other

1. Beneficial impact on tribal government operations (Salt River IGA, Papago)
2. Impact on BIA headquarters (Salt River Indian Action Team)
3. Bringing Indian problems to attention in Washington and getting results (Manpower Revenue Sharing, IPA)
4. Education of federal employees (RITF retreat, HUD 701 Conference)
5. Interagency approach to urban/rural issues (ITCC, Region IX American Indian Council)<sup>255</sup>

Select examples from this list of accomplishments will demonstrate the role played by the task force in effectuating the interagency and intergovernmental coordination necessary to achieve these goals. The role played by the task force in bringing the inequities of the Intergovernmental Personnel Act of 1970 to the attention of OMB as well as the Salt River IGA, provides key insights into the administrative processes of such coordination.

The task force influence in  
Washington: the IPA of 1970

On September 7, 1972, the Navajo Tribe in Arizona requested an opinion from the Civil Service Commission (CSC) "as to the eligibility of the Navajo Tribe of Indians for the programs and benefits of the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) of 1970."<sup>256</sup> The CSC responded that the tribe was

<sup>255</sup> Western Federal Regional Council, RITF Accomplishments, February, 1974, ITFF.

<sup>256</sup> F. Browning Pipestem to Ron Bradley, Grants Manager CSC, letter requesting opinion on Navajo Tribe's eligibility for benefits of the IPA 1970, September 7, 1972, ITFF.



eligible "only if the State of Arizona recognized the Navajo Tribe as a local government, that is, a general purpose political sub-division of the state."<sup>257</sup> Upon further consideration, the General Counsel of the CSC decided "that nothing in the IPA permits the conclusion that it was the intent of Congress to include Indian Tribal Councils within the scope of the Act."<sup>258</sup> In search of a remedy for this inequity, short of becoming a political sub-division of the state of Arizona, the Navajos sought assistance and advice from a variety of government contacts. As a result, information concerning the inequities of the IPA became widely circulated among the Indians in the Western Federal Region.<sup>259</sup>

The task force first learned of the Indian's concern for a remedy to the IPA exclusion of Indians during negotiations with the Gila River tribal council during May-June, 1973.<sup>260</sup> Harry Kennedy, HEW's representative on the task force, was given the responsibility for investigating the problem and reporting his findings and recommendations. Kennedy began his investigation by contacting the BIA who, he assumed, would want to be apprised of the problem and

---

<sup>257</sup> Sally Williams to Pipestem, Letter of response, October 2, 1972, ITFF.

<sup>258</sup> De Baca to Frank Zarb, OMB, Letter, January 21, 1974, ITFF.

<sup>259</sup> Hardy Pearce, telephone interview, June 3, 1974, San Francisco, California.

<sup>260</sup> Ibid.

involved in prospective remedial action. BIA responded, however, that it simply was not interested.<sup>261</sup> Turning to more familiar resources, Kennedy contacted HEW's General Counsel and the CSC for advice and assistance. All contacts agreed that the exclusion of Indians from the IPA was an inequity that should be remedied as soon as possible. In fact, Kennedy's contacts at the CSC assured him that CSC was in the process of developing a remedy. These initial contacts were, unfortunately, "low" status contacts within the CSC and were not in a position to inform Kennedy of the exact nature of the proposed remedy. However, these contacts did inform him in November that the CSC had developed a "general awareness of the personnel management needs of the Indian Tribal Councils,"<sup>262</sup> and prepared a "tentative legislative package for the Second Session of the Ninety-third Congress that includes a recommendation that the IPA be amended to provide 'full coverage' for Indian Tribal Councils."<sup>263</sup>

On the basis of this information, the task force submitted a report to the council recommending that it solicit OMB's support on behalf of the Indians. The task force, through the council, specifically recommended that OMB "fully endorse and support CSC's proposed legislative

---

<sup>261</sup> Interview with Harry Kennedy, San Francisco, California, June 4, 1974.

<sup>262</sup> Andrew Boesel to Kennedy, Letter, November 26, 1973, ITFF.

<sup>263</sup> Ibid.

amendment of the IPA of 1970."<sup>264</sup> However, when OMB proceeded to act on this recommendation and actually contacted CSC to offer support for the "proposed legislative amendment," it was informed that the amendment had not been submitted to Congress. Instead, the CSC was attempting to obtain an additional grant of money from Congress for the Indians. The "proposed legislative amendment" had merely been developed for possible use as a "bargaining point" in the event Congress proved reluctant to provide additional money. This disclosure embarrassed both CSC and OMB. CSC was apparently using Indian dissatisfaction to acquire additional funds for its budget and OMB should have been better informed of all these developments.<sup>265</sup>

At the monthly FRC chairman's meeting with OMB, De Baca was informed of this bungle and rebuked on the grounds that the miscue would not have occurred "had the WFRC staff done its homework." De Baca defended his staff by arguing that he and his staff had proceeded on the assumption the CSC's proposed remedy would be in the form of an amendment to the IPA. Not only had CSC's communiques fostered such an assumption, but an amendment seemed the most logical and practical remedy.<sup>266</sup> The result

---

<sup>264</sup> Harry Kennedy to Webb Otis, Memorandum, December 21, 1973, ITFF.

<sup>265</sup> Interview with Hardy Pearce in San Francisco, California, June 3, 1974.

<sup>266</sup> Ibid.



of this scenario was that, on the recommendation of OMB, CSC withdrew efforts to obtain additional money and instead presented the amendment to the IPA of 1970.<sup>267</sup>

From the vantage point of the involved task force members, the miscue was not the result of a deliberate effort on the part of CSC to mislead them, but a "failure" on their part to make contact with "higher" ranking members within CSC who, apparently, were the only ones aware of the Commission's legislative strategy. They also feel that the fact that CSC sought a remedy for the Indians in any form, as well as its final resolution, was a result of the type of activity facilitated by the interagency framework provided by FRC's.<sup>268</sup>

The interagency process: Integrated grant application

The most ambitious interagency program attempted by the task force was assisting the Salt River Tribe to develop and obtain FRC approval of an IGA program. The Indians interest in an IGA program was the result of the suggestion, encouragement and work of Jim Trent, a grantsman hired by Paul Smith to maximize the tribe's chances of acquiring all available monies. Jim Trent had first learned of the IGA concept while working as a grantsman in the Northwest. Hearing that it was a "miracle-type

---

<sup>267</sup>Telephone interview with Hardy Pearce, San Francisco, California, June 20, 1974.

<sup>268</sup>Interview with Hardy Pearce, San Francisco, California, May 29, 1974.

program," he wrote to OMB requesting additional information. OMB responded by forwarding a standard "Information Packet." However, it was not until the informal discussions during the RAP negotiations that the topic of IGA's was raised for serious consideration. Those agency representatives familiar with IGA's mentioned that it "had possibilities."<sup>269</sup> After subsequent discussion among tribal leaders, Paul Smith asked for council "assistance and consideration of the Salt River Community's program under the IGA Program."<sup>270</sup>

The Council drafted a letter of response to the Salt River Tribe's request for assistance. However, upon review of the letter, it was felt that it was "too optimistic" and may only serve to create unreal expectations on the part of the Indians. While the council tried to decide exactly how to respond to the Salt River request, the task force staff encouraged Jim Trent to begin work on the development of an IGA. It was not until after Christmas that the council finally informed the tribe, informally through the task force staff, that it would be willing to review an IGA.<sup>271</sup>

In order to prepare a preliminary IGA for presentation at the January 15 meeting of the council, Jim Trent and the Salt River Tribal staff "worked around the clock

---

<sup>269</sup>Telephone interview with Jim Trent, Scottsdale, Arizona, June 20, 1974.

<sup>270</sup>De Baca to Otis, Memorandum on Salt River IGA, January 17, 1974, ITFF.

<sup>271</sup>De Baca to Smith, Letter, January 21, 1974, ITFF

for about two weeks." Obtaining approval of the council by that date was seen as crucial for two reasons: (1) It was estimated that the IGA review and negotiations would take about six months and the Fiscal Year for both the federal government and the tribe began on July 1, which was the proposed "launch" date.<sup>272</sup> Also, Paul Smith was running for reelection as president of the Salt River Tribal Council and the acquisition of additional funds would be a tremendous asset to his campaign.<sup>273</sup>

At its meeting on January 15, 1974, the FRC agreed to review the submitted IGA. The application was turned over to the task force which, in turn, delivered it to the Salt River Tribal Subcommittee established by the task force for the initial review.<sup>274</sup> HEW was given the "lead agency" responsibility for both proceeding with the negotiation as well as implementation in the event that the IGA was finally approved.<sup>275</sup>

However, while Otis was visiting the Salt River Community during the last week in March, he was informed of HEW's lethargy in leading the review and negotiations process, by an anxious tribal staff. This lack of initiative by HEW stemmed from the failure of De Baca, who was simul-

---

<sup>272</sup> Otis to De Baca, Blue Envelope Letter, March 25, 1974, ITFF.

<sup>273</sup> Telephone interview with Hardy Pearce, San Francisco, California, June 24, 1974.

<sup>274</sup> Ibid.

<sup>275</sup> Ibid.



taneously HEW Regional Director and FRC Chairman, to appoint a coordinator. Upon returning to San Francisco, Otis dispatched a "blue envelope" to De Baca and the council apprising them of the Indians' anxiety and urged the appointment of a coordinator. De Baca was also reminded that OMB was "very interested in awarding an IGA to an Indian Community."<sup>276</sup> De Baca responded immediately by appointing Harry Kennedy as HEW's coordinator during the review stage of IGA.<sup>277</sup> He also began a search for a man familiar with very technical aspects of grant management in general and IGA's in particular to implement the IGA if and when adopted by the council.<sup>278</sup>

As the task force agencies proceeded to review the preliminary IGA, they discovered that it suffered from one major flaw: it was unrealistic! Rather than applying for money already received through various grant programs, the IGA emphasized applications for new money. The Salt River Tribe was apparently working on the assumption that an IGA could be used to apply for all possibly available money without even investigating such factors as eligibility beforehand. Unfortunately much of the money they applied for was administered by the BIA which worked through con-

---

<sup>276</sup> Otis to De Baca, Blue Envelope Letter, March 25, 1974.

<sup>277</sup> De Baca to Thomas A. Purvis, Memorandum, May 20, 1974, ITFF.

<sup>278</sup> De Baca to Sheridan Weinstein, Memorandum, May 21, 1974, ITFF.

tracts and were not included in IGA's. Also, other funds required state involvement -- a prospect totally unacceptable to the Indians. Needless to say, these discoveries were the source of considerable disenchantment with the IGA process on the part of both the Indians and the task force members.<sup>279</sup>

Notwithstanding the problems of this preliminary IGA, the task force proceeded with its review. On April 19, the initial task force review of the IGA was sent to the Salt River Tribe. However, the responses of only five agencies (HUD, DOT, HEW, LEAA, and DOI) were included in the review. Also, the comments of these agencies were so brief, general and non-committal, that the administrators of the Salt River Tribe were unable to determine what was needed to revise the IGA into a viable and acceptable document.<sup>280</sup> The frustration of the Indians with this review was also shared by the task force staff.<sup>281</sup> Webb Otis expressed his dissatisfaction to the task force members along with a request for another more substantial review. On June 4, Webb Otis was able to deliver an "in-depth" response to the tribe.

---

<sup>279</sup> Beau Carter, interview in San Francisco, California, May 29, 1974.

<sup>280</sup> Otis to Smith, Letter describing the task force review of the tribe's IGA, April 19, 1974, ITFF.

<sup>281</sup> Interview with Hardy Pearce, June 24, 1974; interview with Jim Trent, June 20, 1974.

<sup>282</sup> Otis to Smith, Letter describing in-depth review of tribe's IGA, June 4, 1974, ITFF.

The tribal leaders were elated with this review, as it provided them with both clear ideas of funding feasibility, suggested alternatives, and key contacts. While they proceeded to revise their IGA on the basis of this review, the FRC informally decided to adopt the IGA formally in their meeting in July, and to include it in the WERC Work Plan for FY 1974-75.<sup>283</sup>

---

<sup>283</sup>Interview with Hardy Pearce, June 24, 1974.



## CHAPTER IV

### CONCLUSION

While this approval of the Salt River IGA should be considered a major accomplishment of the task force, it should not overshadow the more significant organizational development of the task force: the collection of middle management administrators into a cohesive administrative group capable of interagency coordinating of intergovernmental programs. This capacity, however, has been neither swiftly arrived at, nor readily developed. In fact, the WFERC was reluctant to get involved in Indian affairs, slow to respond to OMB encouragement, and inept in its initial organizational efforts. Notwithstanding these initial shortcomings, the subsequent achievements of the Indian Task Force in coordinating the various federal agencies of the Western Federal Region to meet the needs of the Indians in the Western Federal Region -- especially the Salt River Tribe -- demonstrates the ability of FRC's to design and implement an organizational framework for interagency and intergovernmental coordination of federal grant programs.

This coordination however, was not achieved by the RAP task force because of the widespread feeling among its

members that they lacked the authority to perform the task assigned by OMB. OMB was nevertheless reluctant to grant councils the authority to force member agencies, who were represented on the task force, to meet RAP objectives. While OMB urged and encouraged the lead agency to be more aggressive in its requests for cooperation from other federal agencies, OMB remained steadfast to its commitment of decentralized coordination. As a result, most task force members saw the task force as little more than a frivolous experiment of little consequence for either the Indians or their individual agencies.

This attitude was changed by reorganizing the task force. This most significant part of the reorganization was the appointment of Webb Otis as the new task force chairman. Under his leadership, the task force members were molded into a relatively cohesive group. This was accomplished by such innovations as a series of retreats that removed the task force members from the competitive environment in San Francisco where they were reminded that they were employed, evaluated and promoted by HEW, OEO, EPA or some other agency, but not by the council. Otis also encouraged, coaxed and indirectly threatened both task force and council members to cooperate with task force goals. As a result of such aggressive leadership, the task force evolved into an organization capable of interagency and intergovernmental coordination.

This is not to say that aggressive leadership has proven sufficient to provide the interagency coordination re-

quired of FRC's. It simply argues that it is a necessary feature, precisely because it was the only mechanism that could reckon with the tendency of federal agencies to be preoccupied with their own programs. Aggressive leadership, in this case, was not only able to pull these autonomous agencies closer together structurally, in the form of a task force whose members became conscious of the joint interaction for a common purpose, it was also able to foster the type of intergovernmental planning that V. O. Key, Jr. suggests is necessary for rational policy-making, i.e., policy-making that is based on the needs and abilities of all governmental units involved in the administration of specific policies. As such, the Indian Task Force has served as an organizational framework for the intergovernmental relationships necessary to coordinate the many diverse grant programs.

Such a conclusion, however, may appear somewhat simplistic. After all, it may be argued, the Indians played an important role in the development of RAP, as well as bringing the IPA 1970 inequities and the IGA possibilities to the attention of federal authorities. The importance of the Salt River Indians' initiatives was also demonstrated by the Indians' obvious desire to work with the council and their technical skill in the form of a grantsman to effectuate that desire. Such desire and skill was inconsequential however, when combined with the obvious lack of leadership in the RAP Task Force. Moreover, although the desire and



skill of these and similar local governments to work with the federal government are necessary ingredients for any meaningful intergovernmental relationship, they cannot facilitate the kind of intergovernmental relationship that could coordinate the many autonomous grant-giving agencies. This coordination, it has already been argued, must occur at the federal level. And since, as the Indian Task Force demonstrated, an aggressive leader such as Webb Otis is capable of producing such interagency coordination -- albeit a precarious coordination--it must be considered the primary determinant of the successes of the task force.

This aggressive leadership was most important, however, as a force for more viable intergovernmental relationships. This point was perhaps best demonstrated by the task force activities involving the Salt River IGA. While the Salt River Indians were led to believe that IGA's were a "miracle type program," and that the WERC was anxious to help them develop and implement an IGA, the actual response of the task force member agencies to the initial IGA proposal was less than enthusiastic. This initial IGA proposal admittedly had its problems, but it was a beginning and it could be salvaged. However, the responses of the reviewing agencies were either negative or so general and vague that it was virtually impossible for either the task force staff or the Salt River Indians to identify those parts of the document that needed to be added to, deleted from, or otherwise embellished to obtain council approval.

While Webb Otis encouraged and coaxed the task force members to encourage their agencies to provide a more substantial review of the Salt River IGA, little was done until he resorted to the more combative tactic of issuing the "blue envelope" letter to council members, reminding them of the importance of the IGA process to OMB, and the importance of this specific IGA to the Council's reputation. Responding to this letter, the agencies proceeded to more thoroughly study and review the Salt River IGA. The task force staff organized these independent reviews into a single document to be passed on to the Salt River Tribe. This in-depth review not only specifically responded to the funding feasibility of each desired grant, it also specifically suggested alternatives and the individuals to contact in the event the alternative appealed to the tribe.

Although such a response elated the Indians and again demonstrated the importance of aggressive leadership, it also indicated another important, though perhaps more subtle accomplishment of the task force: it forced the federal agencies to consider their programs in the context of local needs. By the same token, it also forced the Salt River Tribe to consider and reconsider its priorities in terms of federal resources. Such considerations are important because they require federal-local deliberations which serve as the basis for a form of intergovernmental planning.

The most basic shortcoming of 1960-1970 grant pro-

grams was the failure of federal policy-makers to consider the intergovernmental impact of their grant programs. This form of intergovernmental planning acts as an antidote to the tendency to use grants to achieve exclusively federal or local purposes.

The basis of a more viable intergovernmental relationship would be further strengthened by continuing and enlarging federal contacts and deliberations with the Salt River Indians during the actual delivery of the IGA. However, determining the possibility of such contacts would require a study during or after delivery. Pending this, this study concludes that the activities of the Indian Task Force not only demonstrate the importance of aggressive leadership, they also demonstrate the ability of FRC's to design and implement intergovernmental relationships capable of correcting the most basic maladies plaguing the administration of grant-in-aid programs.



## Appendix A

## Federal Regional Council, Region IX

## of Work Plan Activities

(Selective Sample)

April 30, 1973

1. Activity Title/Objective: Relationships with Chief Executives, Legislative Bodies and Public Interest Groups. (Page 6, August 1, 1972 Work Plan).

2. Planned Target - May 1, 1973. Develop follow-up plans for response to identified problems; plan Council visits public officials; establish mechanisms for continuing relationships.

3. Actual Accomplishments. Council met with a number of public interest groups, Mayors and Governors, its latest activity (in March 1973) having been the meetings with state and local officials on the President's budget. In addition, the council met with the Mayors and their staffs, and with state officials on Planned Variations, with the Governor of Guam on possible annual arrangement; with California State officials on a number of issues and continued to attend meetings of the California Council on Intergovernmental Relations. Conferences were held with state officials on OMB Circular A-95 and with Councils of Government on a planning study in which the Council has been engaged. As indicated in the Council's FY 1974 work plan, the Council determined last October that this activity should not be considered a separate activity, but treated as an integral part of virtually everything the Council does.

4. Problems/Issues. The biggest problem is finding the time and resources to properly address the questions raised by state/local officials and to carry out the necessary information exchange and liaison roles.

5. Organizational/Resource Highlights. As stated, we plan to develop these contacts through our regular task forces and committees and to engender state/local interest and support through working with officials at all levels in specific program areas such as A-95, planning requirements, annual arrangements, aging, etc.

6. Remarks/Comments. Council members have substantially increased their contacts with chief executives, legislators and public interest groups; the work plan activities for FY 1974 should increase opportunity to develop meaningful working relationships.

2. Planned Target - April 30, 1974. Chief Executive Review and Comment (CERC) operational; Federal agencies granting city requests for waiver of administrative and procedural requirements; Council review of Planned Variation submissions; Council support for requests from state and local forces and planned variations citing requests for technical assistance and citizen participation.

3. Actual Accomplishments. All activities are on schedule. CERC is operational. (a) An interagency group was formed to advise consultants; consultants and Council defined policy issues for future study and action and the consultants' evaluation report on Federal support has led to internal monitoring systems. The Council held day-long on-site reviews with all three F.V. cities. The state-city task force is active in Arizona, and inactive in California. Council supports the office of Intergovernmental Affairs, recently established in San Jose and Tucson in response to local CERC issues, thereby strengthening other efforts. The Council has taken action on consultants' findings regarding CERC, Federal and state support. Future consultants' reports will deal with local responses and citizen participation. The Council decided to extend the consultants' contract until June.

4. Problems/Issues: Some local F.V. officials continue to be skeptical of Federal support, and have requested for requests for waivers of Federal administrative requirements and technical assistance, in spite of the Council's efforts to reduce this problem. As an additional effort, the Council is disseminating a F.V. information digest, and sending citywide letters on the subjects of administration, planning and public-interesting Federal support.

CERC, as designed, may not be suitable in San Jose and Tucson. (1) The city and the county have equally important responsibilities, and (2) the Council's efforts have been limited by the fact that the state does not have a clear role in the CERC process.

## Annual Activity Report

## FRC Region IX

April 30, 1973

1. Activity Title/Objective: Planned Variations. Provide Federal support to demonstration of what cities can do about their own problems when given more authority, more resources and less Federal direction (page 7, Revised Work Plan of August 1, 1972).
  2. Planned Target - April 30, 1973. Chief Executive Review and Comment (CERC) operational; Federal agencies granting city requests for waiver of administrative and procedural requirements; Council review of Planned Variation submissions; Council support for requests from state-city task forces and planned variations cities' requests for technical assistance and citizen participation.
  3. Actual Accomplishments. All activities are on schedule. CERC is operational. (a) An interagency group was formed to advise consultants; consultants and Council defined policy issues for future study and action and the consultants' evaluation report on Federal support has led to internal monitoring systems. The Council held day-long on-site reviews with all three P.V. cities. (b) State-city task force is active in Arizona, and inactive in California. Council supports the offices of Intergovernmental Affairs, recently established in San Jose and Tucson in response to local CERC issues, thereby strengthening chief executive. The Council has taken action on consultants' findings regarding CERC, Federal and state support. Future consultants' reports will deal with local response and citizen participation. The Council decided to extend the consultants' contract until June.
  4. Problems/Issues. Some local P.V. officials continue to be skeptical of Federal support, and have generated few requests for waivers of Federal administrative requirements and technical assistance, in spite of the Council site visits strategy to relieve this problem. As an additional effort, the Council is establishing a P.V. information clearinghouse, and sending clarifying letters on the subjects of minimization/waivers and non-interfering Federal support.
- CERC, as designed, may not be workable in San Jose because: (1) the city and the county have equally significant responsibilities; and (2) the Council/City Manager (weak mayor) form of government does not lend itself to Chief Executive sign off.



5. Organizational/Resources Highlights. At local government's initiative, a group composed of representatives from all affected governments is following CERC implementation and meeting periodically to resolve issues jointly.

6. Remarks/Comments. CERC has been instrumental in bringing a closer city-county working relationship (particularly in San Jose-Santa Clara County) and in stimulating grant inventories and identification of policy gaps at the local level.

2. Planned Target - May 1, 1973 and June 28, 1973  
Development of FY 1974 application and Awarding of Grant

3. Actual Accomplishments. The first and second grant applications for the continuing application have been reviewed and commented upon by participating agencies. Following the DOE Intermodal Planning Group has met with the San Jose and Planning Commission staff to discuss current DOT requirements for an Integrated Work Plan. It is expected that the modified final application will be submitted to the DOT approximately May 1.

Completion time for several of the elements has been changed from June 30, 1973, to September 30, 1973. Participating Federal agencies have forwarded their approval of this modification to the original application.

4. Problems/Issues. Not all Federal agencies are able to respond in a timely fashion to the DOT continuing application. This was in part due to the relatively short lead time for comments and to internal operational problems within the Federal agencies. CETA (DOT) has been a helpful problem.

A continuing problem has been disagreement among the various members as to the amount of information to be included in the application and the amount of information to be included in the supporting documents.

5. Organizational/Resources Highlights. Progress of the continuing application has not required significant time from any.

6. Remarks/Comments. The task force and the Council are working to involve other Council agencies in participation in the CETA FY 1974. Identification of potential problems related to the CETA FY 1974 application is being discussed with the Secretaries and will be included in the CETA FY 1974 application. The task force is able to resolve CETA FY 1974.

## Annual Activity Report

## FRC Region IX

April 30, 1973

1. Activity Title/Objective. Implementation of an IGA planning grant for the greater Sacramento area. (Page 14, August 1, 1972, Work Plan).

2. Planned Target - May 1, 1973 and June 20, 1973. Development of FY 1974 application and Awarding of Grant.

3. Actual Accomplishments. The first and second draft submissions for the continuing application have been reviewed and commented upon by participating agencies. Additionally, the DOT Intermodal Planning Group has met with the Task Force and Planning Commission staff to discuss current DOT requirement for an Integrated Work Plan. It is expected that the modified final application will be submitted to the FRC approximately May 1.

Completion time for several of the elements has been changed from June 30, 1973, to September 30, 1973. Participating Federal agencies have forwarded their approval of this modification to the original application.

4. Problems/Issues. Not all Federal agencies were able to respond in a timely fashion to the SRAPC continuing application. This was in part due to the relatively short lead time for comments and to internal operating obstacles within the Federal agencies. UMTA (DOT) has been a particular problem.

A continuing problem has been disagreement among task force members as to the amount of information to be furnished by the applicant in response to individual agency requirements.

5. Organizational/Resources Highlights. Processing of the continuing application has not required significant task force time.

6. Remarks/Comments. The task force and the Council are now working to involve other Council agencies in participation in the IGA for FY 1974. Resolution of conceptual problems referred to in (4) above have been reviewed with the Secretariat and will be escalated to the Council level if the task force is unable to resolve them shortly.





## Annual Activity Report

## FRC Region IX

April 30, 1974

1. Activity Title/Objective: Task Force on Mammoth Monoplan. Support the development of a community master plan, and develop mechanisms for coordinating Federal, State and local programs and policies as they pertain to heavily used Federal recreation areas. (Page 17 of August 1, 1972 Work Plan).

2. Planned Target - April 30, 1973. Task Force to: recommend possible FRC participation in integrated grant to local sponsors. FRC to: award and monitor project, if feasible.

3. Actual Accomplishments. The Task Force met twice with the local sponsors and their consultants at Mammoth, and twice made presentations to the FRC. The FRC decided at its November 21 meeting that the existing Monoplan effort was structured in a manner that made FRC participation impossible. The local sponsors were notified of the decision and the reasons behind it. They were told that the Council would reconsider, at any time the sponsors and the State solicited further FRC participation and were willing to restructure the planning effort to accomodate FRC agency concerns with the present design. The Task Force was disbanded in January.

4. Problems/Issues. The plan contained insufficient understanding of the social implications of the alternative plans available to the community. The FRC concluded that this lack of comprehensiveness, and the too narrow geographical area of the planning effort, precluded further Council participation.

5. Organizational/Resources Highlights. The Task Force, with a USDA (Forest Service) lead and composed of both Council and non-Council agency members, fulfilled the assigned charges in a commendable and, from an interagency standpoint, highly cooperative manner.

6. Remarks/Comments. Although the local sponsors have not formally brought a petition for rehearing before the Council, they have informed us that: a broader geographical area has been included in a newly created APO; and the consultants are attempting to recruit social scientists for investigations into the broader social implications. It is possible this is being done for a re-presentation to the FRC.

# Annual Activity Report

156

## FRC Region IX

April 30, 1973

1. Activity Title/Objective: Study Group on COGs. Prepare a report to the Regional Council on the organization and function of councils of government (COGs) in Region IX, the impact which certain Federal policies and planning programs have upon COG roles, and significant new trends or developments which have a bearing on future COG activities. (Page 24 of August 1, 1972 Work Plan).

2. Planned Target - April 30, 1973. According to revised change (see Problems/Issues below), submission of final report to Regional Council to have been accomplished by March 1973.

3. Actual Accomplishments. Report is in its final stages of development and will be submitted to the Council in early May. Members of the Study Group attended the conference on "Progress in Regionalism" sponsored by the Arizona Council on Intergovernmental Relations in December 1972 and focusing on Arizona's COGs; local Bay Area hearings of the California Task Force on Local Government Reform in March 1973; and the conference on IGA in Sacramento on April 26, sponsored by HUD, the California Council on Intergovernmental Relations and the Sacramento Regional Area Planning Commission.

4. Problems/Issues. As indicated in the December 1 quarterly report, the Council shifted the focus of this activity from an Arizona-oriented task force to a region-wide study group at its August 15 meeting. The revised timetable for the study group projected the submission of a final report in March 1973. The study group has encountered difficulties in verifying data on COG organization, staffing, and budget provided by the COGs themselves, as well as information from Federal agencies regarding direct and indirect funding to COGs in the region. As a result, the report has fallen behind schedule.

5. Organizational/Resources Highlights. The study group encountered some problems with travel demands placed upon members who were stationed in Los Angeles. As indicated in the previous section, some members also found that obtaining information on Federal funding of COGs from several different line agencies of their department, and in some cases from State counterpart agencies, to be a much more time-consuming process than was originally anticipated.

6. Remarks/Comments. The results of this study group activity will be used as an element of a new planning requirements activity of the FRC projected for FY 1974.

## Annual Activity Report

FRC Region IX

April 30, 1973

1. Activity Title/Objective: San Francisco Flexible Funding Project, to enable the City to:

a. Establish new procedures and administrative arrangements for setting priorities within and among key policy areas (housing, transportation, community services, education, economic development);

b. Broaden coordination among essential local programs with key metropolitan agencies; and

c. Develop more effective citizen involvement in determining priorities.

2. Planned Target - April 30, 1973.

a. Identification of Federal Funding - complete report.

b. Draft of Recommendations, summary of findings, description of the Annual Development Program, roles of Mayor's office and Chief Administrative Officer's office - complete report and circulate for comment.

c. Development of an Annual Development Program Prototype - complete report.

3. Actual Accomplishments. (refer to items in #2 above.

a. This report is delayed by one month due to difficulty in obtaining up-to-date, accurate data.

b. This item has been completed and circulated, as scheduled.

c. The prototype is now intended to be submitted as part of the final draft recommendations in June.

4. Problems/Issues. The project did not begin until August 28, 1972 due to delays in funding transfers from the various FRC member agencies. Consequently, the project schedule was begun in late August rather than May. There have been no serious delays since that time.



5. Organizational/Resource Highlights. The primary resources required include the time of the project officer, and a three-man interagency evaluation team, and participation by FRC member agency responsible program officials.

6. Remarks/Comments. As the FY 74 work plan indicates, the GRC plans to complete its evaluation of the SF Flexible Funding Project by June 15; concurrently the City will develop its list of concerns and issues which will be held in July to discuss the above and future plans and activities.

## Annual Activity Report

## FRC Region IX

April 30, 1973

1. Activity Title/Objective: California Federal Aid Control System (FACS) Grant. Enable the Office of Inter-governmental Management to continue developing FACS potential through employment of consultant assistance. (Page 34 of August 1, 1972, Work Plan).

2. Planned Target - April 30, 1973. (a) Develop reports for state government offices from a survey of needs; (b) develop reports for local governments, state-wide, based upon experience with the P.V. cities; (c) evaluate the OMB RMIS development and establish with the California FACS.

3. Problems/Issues. (a) The Schedule for issuing the Quarterly Reports on Federal Grant Awards has slipped because of extensive format changes which were instituted based upon comments solicited from Federal/State/local governments; (b) the largest concern of this project has been the fear that the RGIS pilot projects might bring considerable change to the California FACS. Because of this a great deal of the consultant's time was spent coordinating with the Dallas FRC to the detriment of other objectives (developing reports for P.V. cities, other local governments and state offices).

5. Organizational/Resource Highlights. In sum, the consultant spent the amount of time anticipated on FACS maintenance, less than anticipated on developing a range of reports and more than anticipated on developing one report and liaison with the RMIS project.

6. Remarks/Comments. (a) The time spent improving the Quarterly Report of Federal Grant Awards was necessary; it represents a spirit of cooperation among governments which will be reflected in a very useful product; (b) the consultant's contact with the RGIS project in Dallas is an even more valuable example of intergovernmental cooperation, in that: all FRCs will have the advantage of the improved FACS software, HEW will be able to use its mechanized SF 240 system for A-98 reporting, and the Region IX FRC has been provided a working link with nationwide RMIS project development; (c) as reaffirmed by the Council at its April 20th meeting, the OEO project manager will submit an evaluation of the project. The prior requirement for submission of evaluation criteria has been dropped.

## Annual Activity Report

## FRC Region IX

April 30, 1973

1. Activity Title/Objective: Urban Indian Affairs.  
To promote opportunities for non-reservation Native Americans to integrate successfully into the mainstream of society.  
(Page 41 of August 1972 Work Plan).
2. Planned Target: April 30, 1973. Had this project been successfully launched, an interagency committee would now be in the midst of conducting an evaluation based on objectives which were to have been established in November 1972.
3. Actual Accomplishments. Following OEO's assumption of responsibility for BANAC in September, OEO prepared a status report which recommended developing a strategy for increasing local government awareness of non-reservation Indians within their jurisdictions, promoting selected pilot efforts at economic development, and building mutual technical assistance among Indian organizations. Council action was withheld at OEO's request on account of events which demonstrated a need to re-evaluate all non-reservation Indian programs at Regional and National levels.
4. Problems/Issues. Because of uncertainty regarding OEO's status and role since November, no further action has been recommended to the Council. HEW is independently exploring options for support to non-reservation Indian programs. A basic issue is how to reconcile Council activities for non-reservation Indians with the FRC's intergovernmental purpose.
5. Organizational/Resources Highlights. None.
6. Remarks/Comments. Further FRC action in this area awaits Washington or HEW Regional. It is a projected activity in the FY 1974 Work Plan.



## Annual Activity Report

## FRC Region IX

April 30, 1973

1. Activity Title/Objective: To review plans of selected Indian tribes to provide guidance on regulations, standards, criteria or other requirements of FRC member agencies' programs and to consider how existing and available funds within each program area can also be better related to tribal priorities. (Pages 43-44, August 1, 1972, Work Plan).

2. Planned Target: April 30, 1973. On-going review and specific responses to identified needs of four Indian tribes in Region IX.

3. Actual Accomplishments.

a. Salt River Indian Community: An on-site visit to the Reservation was made on July 17, 1972. Meetings with Tribal representatives were held on September 27, November 15, 1972, and January 9, 1973. The task force report on the Salt River Community was presented to the Council on December 29, 1972. The FRC response to the Tribe was signed on March 9, 1973. Reaction of the Tribe to the Council involvement has been enthusiastic.

b. Gila River Indian Community: Meetings with Tribal representatives were held on January 10 and February 28, 1973. An on-site visit was conducted March 22-23, 1973. The task force began preparation of its report to the Council on April 11, 1973.

c. Hoopa Valley Tribe: The task force has met twice with Tribal representatives, January 10 and February 28, 1973.

d. San Carlos Apache Tribe: The Tribe presented an initial report to the task force on April 11, 1973.

4. Problems/Issues. Initial difficulties in working with tribal representatives have been overcome. Task force members are often not given the necessary authority to adequately respond to identified Indian needs.

5. Organizational/Resources Highlights. Contacts with the Indian tribes have been very successful. Problems associated with the task force chairman not being a member

of the FRC will be alleviated once Interior becomes an official member.

6. Remarks/Comments. The task force is due to terminate at the end of the Fiscal Year 1973; the task force members recommend that its existence be allowed to continue. Based on the assumption the Council will agree to this as its May 1 meeting, a work plan has been prepared for the FY 1974 Work Plan.

1. Assessment of the FRC's Role and Mechanisms. Develop a set of Regional Functions for FRAC, RMC and FRC which also fulfill nationally mandated programs; determine nature and extent of and mechanisms for, exercise of FRC supervision. (Page 48, August 1972 Work Plan.)

2. Planned Target - April 30, 1973. Work plan indicates that evaluations of all FRCs by ad hoc teams were to have been accomplished and changes implemented by mid-October 1972.

### 3. Actual Accomplishments.

a. FRAC - Study team evaluation submitted to the Council March 2, and recommendations adopted re RMC and FRAC roles and next steps. FRAC committee is presently devising specific action recommendations to Council regarding critical operational issues.

b. RMC - FRC has assumed de facto responsibility through responding to RMC request for input regarding FRAC/RMC roles in proposed Comprehensive Management Planning process, and through acceptance of appeal from a Council of Governments regarding RMC's denial of RMC status (April 22 meeting).

c. FRC - FRC has replaced the RMC as advisory mechanism to RMC & AI on all P.V. activities and on consultant contract to evaluate P.V. experience in region (RMC performed staff work as request of Council Secretary).

d. Sub-Regional Council - See separate report.

4. Problems/Issues. Conflicting agency priorities, unclear signals regarding national direction, and finally the uncertain status of the lead agency, DHEW, delayed the start of the evaluation process until February, when the FRAC study was undertaken. Subsequently, the Council has amended the process for gathering data on other RMCs. Inclusion of DHEW and EPA representatives as study team members resulted in loss of time owing to lack of familiarity with social programs and other factors.

## Annual Activity Report

## FRC Region IX

April 30, 1973

1. Activity Title/Objective: Evaluation/Supervision of Interagency Program Coordination Mechanisms (ICMs). Develop a set of Regional functions for FR4C, RMCC and RICC which also fulfill nationally mandated purposes; determine nature and extent of and mechanisms for, exercise of FRC supervision. (Page 48, August 1972 Work Plan).

2. Planned Target - April 30, 1973. Work plan indicates that evaluations of all ICMs by ad hoc teams were to have been accomplished and changes implemented by mid October 1972.

3. Actual Accomplishments.

a. FR4C - Study team evaluation submitted to the Council March 6, and recommendations adopted re HEW and FR4C roles and next steps. FR4C committee is presently drafting specific action recommendations to Council regarding critical operational issues.

b. RMCC - FRC has assumed de facto responsibility through responding to DOL request for input regarding FRC/RMCC roles in proposed Comprehensive Manpower Planning process, and through acceptance of appeal from a Council of Governments regarding RMCC denial of MAPC status (April 20 meeting).

c. RICC - FRC has replaced the RICC as advisory mechanism (to HUD R/A) on all P.V. submissions and on consultant contract to evaluate P.V. experiment in Region IX; RICC performs staff work at request of Council Secretariat.

d. Sub-Regional Council - See separate report.

4. Problems/Issues. Conflicting agency priorities, unclear signals regarding national direction, and finally the uncertain status of the lead agency, OEO, delayed the start of the evaluation process until February, when the FR4C study was undertaken. Subsequently, the Council has amended the process for gathering data on other ICMs. (Inclusion of DOT and EPA representatives as study team members resulted in loss of time owing to lack of familiarity with social programs, and other factors).



5. Organizational/Resource Highlights. The FR4C study generated a high level of interest among 4C members and has resulted in Council-mandated follow-up activity which is producing major changes in member agency involvement and commitment.

6. Remarks/Comments. Delays partially reflect unrealistic time frames for accomplishing objectives. FY 74 Work Plan will project achievable milestones, growing out of this year's experience.

#### Section IV. Major Changes and Initiatives.

As a result of the Council's Work Management Project, substantial changes have been made in the Council's approach to selection of activities. Some of these changes, the new initiatives resulting from the Management by Objective approach, and those undertaken to respond to national directives are summarized below:

##### Major Changes.

1. The Equal Opportunity Plan is being dropped from the work plan as an independent activity and its components subsumed under the appropriate goal, and implemented by existing interagency mechanisms or the lead agency. This realignment of responsibility should save staff time without diminishing the Council's effectiveness.

2. The following activities are being eliminated either because they have been completed, or because the Council can no longer have a meaningful role: Phoenix flexible funding project, Mammoth Monoplan, San Diego IGA.

3. The following activities are being continued in the work plan, but under a different activity title: Relationships with Chief Executives, legislative bodies and public interest groups will be folded into other activities; Development of a More Effective Federal Response to Guam will be encompassed in a more comprehensive activity which will embrace Annual Arrangements and a new component, Consolidation of Federal Contract/Grant Recipients; the various Planning activities (Planning and Environmental Impact Requirements and COG Study Group) will be incorporated into one Planning activity and expanded.

4. The following activities are in transitional stages. It is intended that they be developed farther and included in the Council's final work plan on July 1: Urban Indians, additional pilot IGA's, Public Information Management, Southern California Sub-regional Council.

## New Initiatives.

Involvement of Council agency program staff in various areas of expertise was one of the beneficial effects of several new initiatives during the past year. In addition to project officer and program analyst participation, legal counsels, auditors, information specialists and economists formed special committees in response to Council related problems. Furthermore, a number of non-Council agencies, as well as state and local officials, served on task forces or otherwise participated in the Council's activities. Major initiatives reported below include some on which substantial work was done but which the Council or its staff decided to hold in abeyance pending further developments.

1. Regional Management Information System. Council and staff have devoted considerable time to a proposal for a regional management information system at the request of the Council and the Policy and Review Group in Washington. Concurrently the Council asked its task force to prepare a work plan to relate to a regional grant information system, and to the pending socio-demographic system. This effort will continue to involve substantial Federal, state and local staff time.

2. Meetings with State/Local Officials. No activity undertaken by the Council has resulted in such wide exposure to state and local officials, legislators and public interest groups. During this series of seven meetings, the Council met with three of the four Governors in the Region, the Governor of American Samoa and the High Commissioner of the Trust Territories and with state, city, county and regional officials. The Council furnished material on the Council and member agencies' programs to all participants. Assisting the Council were the three FEBs in the Region, the Arizona and California Councils on Intergovernmental Relations, the California League of Cities, and state and local officials in all the states.

3. President's Veterans Program. Early this fiscal year, the Council agreed that each member agency would appoint PVP coordinators to assess policy and procedures adopted to implement the PVP within their own agencies and among their contractors, provide technical assistance and report to the Council on progress. This activity will be included in the FY 1974 work plan.

4. Disaster Response. In recognition of the role played by Councils in other Regions, particularly after Hurricane Agnes, and mindful of the vulnerability of California to earthquakes, this Council conducted a pilot investigation in cooperation with OEP, in one disaster area, to attempt to determine its role in long term disaster recovery. This exercise, was useful in coordinating response in the particular emergency and preparing for further study, and a



recommended work plan under the new lead agency in FY 1974.

5. Public Safety. The Council formally established a Public Safety Task Force in November 1972, with LEAA as lead agency. Since then LEAA officials have done substantial internal staff work regarding a proposed task force project with the City of Compton, working closely with State and regional criminal justice planning staffs. This proposal will be discussed at a full task force meeting in early May, and a final work plan for FY 1974 task force activity will be approved before the end of the current fiscal year.

6. Public Information Management. A task force of public affairs officers was also established by the Council in November 1972. This group has been investigating ways in which FRC activities can be better communicated to both FRC "clients" and the general public, with initial work focussing on the design of a Council brochure and alternative communication devices. In addition, the task force received a charge to continue work begun elsewhere on the need for, and availability of, multi-lingual informational materials. Final decisions regarding the operation of the task force and specific FY 1974 activities will be made before June 30.

## II. Membership

Council membership is composed of the Regional Directors/Administrators of the Departments of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW); Housing and Urban Development (HUD); Labor (DOL); Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO); the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); the Department of Justice; and the Regional Representative of the Secretary of Transportation (DOT).

The Regional Director or other appropriate representative of other Federal agencies and departments may be invited to participate as guests. The Council will define and develop inter-agency policy and provide for coordination of activities involving the interests of these agencies. Under these circumstances, they will attend Council meetings and participate in Council deliberations regarding their areas of responsibility. They also provide support staff as necessary. When a specific policy or program problem arises, the Council will invite the affected agency or department to present its views and for the period during which the problem is being discussed, also supply support staff as necessary.



## Appendix B

### Federal Regional Council, Region IX

#### Council Operating Procedures

October 1972

#### 1. Background

Following a year-long pilot experiment in four regions (San Francisco, Chicago, Atlanta, and New York) a Presidential directive of March 27, 1969, established 10 common Regional boundaries and extended the Federal Regional Council concept to all 10 regions. By September, 1970, the realignment of boundaries was complete for the five human resource agencies which then made up the Council, and Regional Councils were functioning as a national pattern of interagency cooperation. On February 11, 1972 the President issued Executive Order No. 11647 strengthening the Councils and adding two new agencies.

#### 11. Membership

Council membership is composed of the Regional Directors/Administrators of the Departments of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW); Housing and Urban Development (HUD); Labor (DOL); Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO); the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) of the Department of Justice; and the Regional Representative of the Secretary of Transportation (DOT).

The Regional Director or other appropriate representative of other Federal agencies and departments may be invited to participate as associate members to define and solve inter-agency policy and program problems significantly involving the interests of their agencies. Under these circumstances, they will attend Council meetings and participate in Council deliberations regarding their areas of responsibility. They also provide support staff as necessary. When a specific policy or program problem arises, the Council will invite the affected agency or department to become an ad hoc member for the period during which the problem is before the Council, also supplying support staff as necessary.

### 111. Council Direction

The Under Secretaries' Group for Regional Operations (USG) establishes policy with regard to Regional Council matters, provides guidance to the Councils, responds to their initiatives, and seeks to resolve policy matters referred to it by the Councils. In addition to the Associate Director of the Office of Management and Budget, who serves as Chairman, the Under Secretaries' Group is composed of the Under Secretaries of Labor, Health, Education and Welfare, Housing and Urban Development, and Transportation, the Administrator of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, the Deputy Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity and the Deputy Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.

When the USG Chairman determines that matters which significantly affect the interest of Federal agencies not represented on the USG are to be considered, he will invite an appropriate representative of the involved agency to participate in the deliberations of the group.

A representative from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and from the staff of the Under Secretaries' Group attend Council and staff meetings to provide liaison between the Council and authorities in Washington.

### IV. Functions and Implementation

A. Functions. Under Presidential Executive Order No. 11647, the Council constitutes a body within which member agencies, to the maximum extent feasible, conduct their grant-making activities in concert through:

1. The development of short-term regional interagency strategies and mechanisms for program delivery;
2. The development of integrated program and funding plans with Governors and local chief executives;
3. The encouragement of joint and complementary grant applications for related programs;
4. The expeditious resolution of interagency conflicts and coordination problems;
5. The evaluation of programs in which two or more member agencies participate;
6. The development of long-term regional interagency and intergovernmental strategies for resource allocations to better respond to the needs of states and local communities;



7. The supervision of regional interagency program coordination mechanisms; and

8. The development of administrative procedures to facilitate day-to-day interagency and inter-governmental cooperation.

B. Implementation Actions. Council members are to direct the necessary actions within their own agencies to support coordinated strategies and management. Where authority or resources are not available in the regions, the Councils refer issues to Washington. Similarly, policies or strategies developed in Washington may be referred to Councils for implementation. Within the framework of Washington policy, Councils are expected to initiate actions and determine their areas of concentration. Councils do not assume any responsibilities of other levels of government; they are supportive of, and responsive to, state and local government.

#### V. Resolution of Conflict

The principal means for the resolution of problems will be through the efforts of individual agencies working together. This may occur without necessarily involving the Council. In fact, Council members will attempt to solve any problems informally through agency discussions before bringing them to the Council.

When problems arise that cannot be resolved either informally or by Council action, the members concerned will advise their respective Under Secretaries. In turn, (if the Chairman determines that a significant issue cannot be resolved in the region, and that the issue involved has been brought to the attention of the Under Secretaries concerned, he may transmit the issue to the Under Secretaries' Group). If any agency feels that the delay caused by such referral will prevent it from carrying out activities which are indispensable to its stewardship responsibilities, it will provide the Council with an explanatory statement and proceed with the necessary activities.

#### VI. Relationships to Other Coordinating Bodies

A. Federal Executive Boards (FEBs). FEBs are associations of the top Federal executives in the metropolitan area in which they are located. They work together to implement Presidential policies and initiatives, to improve the management of their respective agencies, and to make their community a better place in which to live through a variety of FEB-sponsored service activities. Within this region there are FEBs in San Francisco, Honolulu and Los Angeles with Chairmen elected by the membership. Council members in San Francisco are also FEB members.



B. Southern California Sub-Regional Council (SRC).

The chairman of the Sub-Regional Council is designated by the Regional Council Chairman and the group is composed of Council agency representatives. The chairman of the SRC serves as a non-voting member of the Council. Functions of the Sub-Regional Council are to:

1. Develop recommendations for and implement Council-directed responses to interagency problems.
2. Identify potential or existing interagency problems of a significant nature.
3. Serve as a local coordinating body for Council agency activities to prevent overlapping and duplication of efforts and to promote improved communication and coordination among Council agency programs.
4. Serve as on-the-spot representatives of the Council in crisis or emergency situations, where time or circumstances require immediate interagency response.
5. Serve in a liaison capacity between the Council and Los Angeles FEB on interagency matters in which the Council becomes involved.

C. Regional Program Coordinating Mechanisms. Executive Order No. 11647 gives Councils responsibility for supervision of regional coordinating program mechanisms. The Council has adopted principles governing referral to it of problems from other regional coordinating groups, such as the Federal Regional Committee of the Community Coordinated Child Care (4C) Program; the Regional Interagency Coordinating Committee (RICC), the Regional Manpower Coordinating Committee (RMCC) and the Southern California Sub-Regional Council. These principles are:

1. Problems of coordination should be resolved whenever possible at the regional level rather than referred to the Washington level of respective coordinating groups.
2. Members of coordinating groups should advise their respective Regional Directors promptly of any coordination problem requiring attention of a higher authority. The Regional Director will then decide whether agency action or Council action is required.
3. When a matter is accepted by the Council, it will invite in for deliberation and for participation any other agencies involved which are not Council members.
4. When a matter cannot be resolved, either by the Regional Director/Administrator or through Council deliberations, the issue may be referred to the Under

Secretaries in accordance with Part V Resolution of Conflicts.

5. Each organization is expected to file with the Council the group's recommendations for their resolution. The Council may assign a member of the Secretariat to monitor one or more groups, and to bring to the Council, through the Secretariat, any unresolved problems.

Vll. Relationship to State and Local Government.

The Council will maintain continuing relationships with state and local officials and will encourage use of Council mechanisms to resolve interagency problems identified by state and local chief executives. Under Executive Order No. 11647 Council agencies will, to the maximum extent possible, conduct their grant-making activities in concert through the development of integrated program and funding plans with Governors and local chief executives.

Vlll. Relationship to Special Clientele Groups

Special clientele groups which have problems requiring inter-agency response and for which no established channels exist may refer such problems to the Council.

lX. Operating Procedures

The following operating procedures govern the present organization, relationship, and practices of the Federal Regional Council in Region lX.

A. Organization:

1. Chairman. One member of the Council is designated by the President to serve as Chairman at the pleasure of the President. In addition to providing leadership to the Council and presiding at Council meetings, the Chairman:
  - a. Mediates unresolved issues among member agencies;
  - b. Is responsible for the performance of effective staff support;
  - c. Represents the Council in day-to-day contacts with other levels of government, non-member Federal agencies, the press, the public, and national interagency groups; and



- d. Represents the Council at quarterly meetings of Regional Council Chairmen and before the Under Secretaries Group when required.
2. Vice Chairman. The Chairman appoints another member of the Council to serve as Vice Chairman and to act in his place when he is absent.
3. Alternates. Each member of the Council may designate an alternate who shall serve as a member of the Council and be empowered to speak for him whenever the regular member is unable to attend any meeting of the Council. Secretariat members may not serve as alternates.
4. \*Staff. Each Council member agency assigns one full-time senior level staff member to the Council Secretariat, exclusive of staff assigned to Regional Council task forces. Compensation, travel and other expenses shall be paid by his/her parent organization. Such a staff member serves in the dual capacities of staff to the Regional Council Secretariat and his/her regional director's special assistant on Council matters. In his/her Secretariat function he/she must meet the Staff Director's needs for assistance in planning and monitoring the implementation of all Council activities including problem identification, issues formulation, fixing accountability, and progress reporting. Each such staff member shall have direct access to, and frequent consultation with his/her own Council members.
5. Staff Director. In addition to the above, the agency of the Council Chairman provides one full-time senior level staff member to serve as Staff Director. Under the direction of the Regional Council Chairman, the Staff Director supervises and directs the activities of the Secretariat in the implementation of Regional Council objectives.

Three support staff are provided on a one-year basis by the Council Chairman's agency. Clerical support for other Council members and their Secretariat members is furnished by their individual agencies.

---

\*See Part 11, Secretariat Operating Procedures for more detailed description of the Council Secretariat.



6. \*\*Task Forces and Committees. Committees and task forces will be named from time to time in order to identify and resolve differences and work on specific projects. They are designated by the Council for a specific purpose and serve for a specified time or until assignment is completed. Upon establishment of such committees or task forces, the Council chairman issues a statement representing the committee or task force charter. This charter will include designation of lead agency, membership, objectives, functions, reporting and coordination requirements, and target dates for completion of the assignment. The committee/task force will then develop a plan of action, work schedule, and reporting procedure for submission to the Council. The Council Secretariat may designate one of its staff as Council liaison. to the task force or committee. When a member agency is designated as the lead agency for a Council activity, the Chairman of the task force or committee will be designated from that agency and be responsible to his/her Council member for carrying out the Council assignment. When an ad hoc agency is designated as the lead agency and accepts such designation, the Chairman of the Task Force designated by the lead agency shall be responsible to his/her Regional Director/Administrator for carrying out the Council assignment.

B. Meetings:

1. Meeting Dates. Regular meetings of the Council are held on the 1st and 3rd Tuesdays of each month. Special meetings may be called at the Chairman's discretion or upon request of a Council member.
2. Quorum. A quorum, which shall consist of four regular Council members, is required for Council action. For the purpose of determining the existence of a quorum, alternates or other persons other than the regular Council members may not be counted. In the event of prolonged absence on the part of a regular member, however, the Council will consider the request of the agency concerned that an alternate member of that agency be counted in determining a quorum.

---

\*\*See Part III, Operating Procedures for Task Forces for more detailed description.

3. Executive Sessions. At the discretion of the Chairman, or upon request of any regular Council member, the Council may go into executive session, for discussion of items on the agenda or other matters which the Council wishes to discuss. Whenever the Council goes into Executive session, the Chairman will rule on whether the Council staff remains.
4. Voting. Council decisions will be determined by a majority vote, and votes will be recorded. No such vote can bind a member with respect to a programmatic decision within the purview of his agency. The Chairman will vote as a member of the Council, and alternates who are substituting for regular Council members may also vote.
5. Agendas. Agendas for Council meetings are developed by the Staff Director and Secretariat under the guidance of the Chairman. Council members may propose agenda items to the Chairman directly or through their Secretariat representative. Ad hoc members from other federal agencies, state and local organizations, groups or individuals desiring to place items on the agenda should present a statement of purpose and probable implication to the Staff Director.
6. Staff Papers. The Secretariat is responsible for the preparation or collection of appropriate materials for the Council meetings, to be supplied to members in advance of the meeting. On items requiring Council action, the Secretariat makes recommendations on the substance of the issue as well as procedure.
7. Minutes. Minutes of Council meetings are drafted by the Secretariat for the approval of the Council. Approved minutes are distributed by the Chairman's office to Council members, ad hoc members, the Under Secretaries Group and other agencies, groups and individuals concerned. Further distribution within Council agencies may be made by the individual Council members as appropriate.

X. Council Planning, Reporting, and Evaluating

- A. Work Plan. Each year the Council develops a comprehensive work plan. The plan addresses the objectives of the Council outlined in Executive Order 11647 and is submitted to the Under Secretariat Group



for review and comment. The work plan is revised as needed, and revisions are submitted to the Under Secretaries Group for review. Annual work plans are the primary basis for workload planning and evaluation of results achieved by the Council.

B. Progress Reports. During the year, quarterly progress reports will be submitted to the Under Secretaries Group. In addition, the Chairman will submit a final report assessing the results of the Council's efforts for the year.

C. Priorities. To the extent interagency problems and projects are presented to the Council, those projects which relate to Council priorities will receive preferential consideration; however, the Council expects to be flexible and responsive and to adjust its priorities, based on the nature of emerging issues.

## I. General

Interagency project task forces of Federal program specialists are the principal means available to the Federal National Council for implementing its objectives and/or responding to directions for action from the national level. A project task force may be an ad hoc group established by Council action to carry out a specific task within a short period of time, or a long-standing task force with ongoing responsibilities. The group may be composed of staff representing all or some of the Council's agencies and may include staff of related agencies and/or State or local governments, agencies, groups or individuals. In agreeing to establish a task force, Council members commit themselves to supply as much staff as that task force at the required level and for the time needed to accomplish Council goals.

## II. Task Force Charge

The written charge to the task force, signed by the National Council Chairman, will be its charter and will include, as the main body of the charge, or as attachments, the following data:

A. Mission of task force, and any background required.

B. Designation of lead agency, if any.

C. Whether any Council members are directly involved in the task force, and if so, their names and titles.

D. Whether the Chairman is to be appointed or elected. If appointed, his/her name, title, agency, location, phone number.

E. Other members, names, titles, agencies, locations, phone numbers.



## Appendix C

## Federal Regional Council, Region IX

Policy and Procedures For  
Regional Council Task Forces

October 1972

I. General

Interagency project task forces of Federal program specialists are the principal means available to the Federal Regional Council for implementing its objectives and/or responding to directions for action from the national level. A project task force may be an ad hoc group established to complete a specific task within a short period of time, or a long-standing task force with ongoing responsibilities. The group may be composed of staff representing all or some of the Council agencies and may include staff of related agencies and/or State or local governments, agencies, groups or individuals. In agreeing to establish a task force, Council members commit themselves to supplying staff to that task force at the required level and for the time needed to accomplish Council goals.

II. Task Force Charge

The written charge to the task force, signed by the Regional Council Chairman, will be its charter and will include, in the main body of the charge, or as attachments, the following data:

- A. Mission of task force, and any background required.
- B. Designation of lead agency, if any.
- C. Whether any Council members are directly involved and the nature of their involvement.
- D. Whether the Chairman is to be appointed or elected. If appointed, his/her name, title, agency, location, phone number.
- E. Other members, names, title, agencies, locations, phone numbers.

F. Name of Council Secretariat liaison.

G. Date or target date for first meeting of task force.

H. Time frame for accomplishment of mission, to the extent possible.

I. Reporting requirements.

J. Content of reports, e.g. dates of meetings and those present, procedures being followed, organization, any sub-committees appointed, progress, assignments to individual members and their completion, recommendations for action, e.g. continuation or dissolution of task force, change in functions, Council action required, etc.

K. Other relevant information, including this statement of policy.

### III. Selection of Members

Within one week of a request by the Secretariat member assigned as liaison to the task force, each agency will name the person who will serve for his agency. Communication of the assignment to supervisors of task force members and others within Council member agencies will be the responsibility of individual Council members. The Council Chairman will, on behalf of the Council, send a copy of the task force charge to each member of the task force, through his Council member.

### IV. Functions of Members

An individual serving on a Regional Council Task Force and representing a Federal agency is deemed to represent that agency as a whole. This individual is responsible for securing information, coordinating activities, and insuring that the Task Force objectives are carried out in his/her agency. Commitments under any federally supported programs are to be made, however, only under established procedures and through appropriate channels of the agency directly concerned.

A Federal agency representative serving on a task force will be responsible to his/her Council member for work performed on the task force. Task Force members will keep their Council members advised of progress, any policy or funding implications for their agency, problems encountered as a result of insufficient authority to speak for the agency, etc. Task Force members will not delegate task force membership without clearance through their Council member. Although they may call upon other staff within their agencies to participate in task force assignments, they have the ultimate responsibility for providing input until and unless relieved by their Council member.



## V. Duties of Chairman

The Task Force Chairman may be selected by the Council or elected by the task force, as specified in the Council's charge to the task force. The task force chairman's duties are:

1. Setting regular meeting dates and times, notifying Council/Secretariat liaison of regular task force meeting schedule, and providing advance notice of any schedule changes or special meetings.
2. Assigning responsibility for keeping minutes of meetings and furnishing the task force members and the Secretariat liaison with minutes of each meeting. An attendance list should accompany each report. Secretariat liaison will provide a copy to the Council Staff Director.
3. Providing advice to the Council on issues or problems necessitating the attention of the Council and submitting reports and recommendations to the Council in accordance with instructions from the Council Chairman, or as necessary to carry out task force objectives.
4. Submitting periodic reports and a final report as directed in the task force charter. Reports will state the task force problems considered, the objectives accomplished during the period and those which will require a longer time period, the actions planned for achieving other objectives, and the dates on which accomplishments are expected. Special reports may be requested in advance of the Council's quarterly progress report to assist the Council in filing its report and/or amending its work plan.

## VI. \*Secretariat Liaison with Task Force

Secretariat liaison will be selected by the Staff Director. The Secretariat liaison will provide advice on Council-related activities and facilitate communication with the Council Secretariat and Council Chairman. The Secretariat member will not be responsible for scheduling meetings of the task force, except the initial meeting. He/she will not prepare work plans, progress reports, or minutes for the task forces, or carry out any of the other duties of the chairman. He/she will:

1. Prepare draft of the task force charge and transmittal memo for clearance with Secretariat and Council Chairman.

---

\*\*For more complete description of the role of the Council Secretariat, see Part II of the "Secretariat Operating Procedures."



2. Secure names and identification of Council agency representatives designated by their Regional Directors/Administrators to serve on the task force.

3. Provide liaison between Council (Secretariat) and task force, when appropriate or requested.

4. Interpret charge as needed.

5. Arrange for any non-Council representation or technical assistance (other than that secured by the Task Force members within their own agencies) needed on an ad hoc basis.

6. Keep task force informed of any matters relating to the work of the task force emanating from the Under Secretaries Group or the Council and respond to specific task force requests for Council-related information.

7. Attend task force meetings as needed and receive all minutes and reports from the task force chairman for circulation to the Secretariat and/or Council with any additional comments on task force progress that may be appropriate.

8. Monitor the overall progress of the task force against the Council charge and insure that any problems affecting the successful completion of the task force mission are brought to the immediate attention of the Staff Director for referral to the Council Chairman so that corrective action can be taken.

Cloward, Richard A., and J. Edgar Hoover. *Dealing with the Opportunity: A Study of Management Change*. New York: The Free Press, 1966.

Conkin, Paul A. *The New Deal*. New York: Thomas A. Crowell, 1967.

Gerthick, Martha. *The Influence of Federal Grants*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970.

Diamond, Martin. "The Federalist's View of Federalism." *Essays on Federalism*. Edited by George C. Shuman. Cleveland: Institute for the Study of Federalism, 1967.

Diamond, Martin; Fisk, Winston S.; and Gritzinger, Barbara. *The Democratic Crucible*. 2nd ed. Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1978.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Books

- Adrian, Charles R., and Press, Charles. American Politics Reappraised. New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1974.
- Anderson, William. Intergovernmental Relations in Review. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1960.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The Nation and the States, Rivals or Partners? Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955.
- Bitterman, Henry J. State and Federal Grants-in-Aid. New York: Mentzer, Bush and Company, 1938.
- Bollens, John C., and Schmandt, Henry J. The Metropolis. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1970.
- Broyles, Don R. "Poverty and Social Reform." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1971.
- Clark, Jane P. The Rise of New Federalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1938.
- Cloward, Richard A., and Ohlin, Lloyd E. Delinquency and Opportunity: A Theory of Delinquent Gangs. New York: The Free Press, 1960.
- Conkin, Paul K. The New Deal. New York: Thomas H. Crowell, 1967.
- Derthick, Martha. The Influence of Federal Grants. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970.
- Diamond, Martin. "The Federalist's View of Federalism." Essays on Federalism. Edited by George C. Benson. Claremont: Institute for the Study of Federalism, 1961.
- Diamond, Martin; Fisk, Winston M.; and Garfinkel, Herbert. The Democratic Republic. 2nd ed. Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1970.

- Doorly, Joseph A. "The Art of Grantsmanship." The New Urban Politics. Edited by Douglas M. Fox. California: Goodyear Publishing Company, Inc., 1972.
- Elazar, Daniel J. American Federalism. New York: Thomas H. Crowell Company, 1972.
- \_\_\_\_\_, ed. The American System. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966.
- Emmerich, Herbert. Federal Organization and Executive Management. Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1971.
- Federal Grants: The Need for Reform. New York: Tax Foundation, Inc., 1973.
- A Fiscal Program for a Balanced Federalism. New York: The Committee for Economic Development, 1967.
- Galbraith, John Kenneth. The Affluent Society. New York: The New American Library, 1968.
- Gordon, Margaret S., ed. Poverty In America: Proceedings of a National Conference. San Francisco, 1965.
- Gore, William J. "Decision Theory Fragment." The Administration of Public Policy. Edited by Michael Reagan. Illinois: Scott Foresman and Company, 1969.
- Graves, W. Brookes. American Intergovernmental Relations: Their Development and Current Status. New York: Charles Scribner Sons, 1964.
- Grodzins, Morton. The Federal System. Report of the President's Commission on National Goals. New York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1960.
- Harrington, Michael. The Other America. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962.
- "The Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968: Survey of Federal and State Implementation." Coming Together. Washington, D. C.: Council of State Governments 1971.
- Key, V. O. The Administration of Federal Grants to States. Indiana: R. R. Donnelley and Sons Company, 1937.



- Kravitz, Sanford. "The Community Action Program -- Past, Present, and Its Future?" On Fighting Poverty. Edited by James L. Sundquist. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1969.
- Leach, Richard H. American Federalism. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1970.
- Levine, Robert H. Public Planning: Failure and Re-direction. New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1972.
- Levitan, Sar A. The Design of Federal Antipoverty Strategy. Ann Arbor: Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, 1969.
- \_\_\_\_\_, and Mangum, Garth L. Federal Training and Works Programs in the Sixties. Ann Arbor: Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, 1969.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The Great Society's Poor Law. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969.
- Levy, Michael E., and Torres, Juan. Federal Revenue Sharing with the States: Problems and Promises. Illinois: National Industries Conference Board, 1970.
- Livingston, John L., and Thompson, Robert S. Consent of the Governed. New York: Macmillan Company, 1967.
- Lowi, Theodore J. The End of Liberalism. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1969.
- Martin, Roscoe C. The Cities and the Federal System. New York: Atherton Press, 1965.
- Merriam, Robert E. "Federalism in Transition. Federalism Today. Edited by William A. Jump and I. Thomas McKillop. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Department of Agriculture, 1969.
- Miller, Herman. Rich Man, Poor Man. New York: Thomas Y. Crowl Co., 1964.
- Morris, Peter, and Rein, Martin. Dilemmas of Social Reform: Poverty and Community Action in the United States. London: Rutledge and Kegal Paul, 1967.
- Moynihan, Daniel P. Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding: Community Action in the War on Poverty. New York: The Free Press, 1969.

- Park, Robert E.; Burgess, Ernest W.; McKenzie, Robert D.; and Wirth, Louis. The City. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1925.
- Reagan, Michael, ed. The Administration of Public Policy. Illinois: Scott Foresman and Company, 1969.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The New Federalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1972.
- Riker, William. Federalism. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964.
- Schultze, Charles L.; Fried, Edward R.; Rivlin, Alice M.; and Teeters, Nancy H. Setting National Priorities: The 1972 Budget. Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institute, 1971.
- Sharkansky, Ira. Public Administration. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970.
- Sjoberg, Gideon. "Comparative Urban Sociology." Sociology Today. Edited by Robert K. Merton. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1959.
- Sorouf, Frank J. Party Politics in America. 2nd ed. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972.
- Stenberg, Carl W. State Involvement in Federal-Local Programs: A Case Study of the "Buying-In" Approach. Washington, D. C.: U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1970.
- Sundquist, James L. Making Federalism Work. Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institute, 1969.
- \_\_\_\_\_, ed. On Fighting Poverty. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1969.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Politics and Policy. Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institute, 1968.
- Wheare, Kenneth C. Federal Government. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964.
- Will, Robert E., and Vatter, Harold B., eds. Politics in Affluence. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1965.



Wright, Deil S. Federal Grants-in-Aid: Perspectives and Alternatives. Washington, D. C.: Public Policy Research, 1968.

Yarmolinsky, Adam. "The Beginning of O.E.D." On Fighting Poverty. Edited by James L. Sundquist. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1969.

#### Articles

Banfield, Edward. "Revenue Sharing Theory and Practice." Public Interest, XXIII (Spring, 1973), 33-44.

Dwight, James S., Jr. "The Four D's of the New Federalism." American Society for Public Administration (September, 1973).

Fischer, John. "Can the Nixon Administration be Doing Anything Right?" Harper's Magazine, October, 1969, pp. 31-40.

Grosenick, Leigh E. "Institutional Change to Improve State and Local Competencies." American Society for Public Administration (September, 1973), 91-110.

Harman, Douglas E. "The Bloc Grant: Readings from a First Experiment." Public Administration Review (March/April, 1970), 141-152.

Ink, Dwight. "The Origin and Thrusts of the New Federalism." American Society for Public Administration (September, 1973), 29-33.

Jenks, Christopher. "Johnson vs. Poverty." New Republic, March 28, 1964.

Kolberg, William H. "The New Federalism: Regional Councils and Program Coordination Efforts." American Society for Public Administration (September, 1973), 51-64.

Mogulof, Melvin B. "Federal Interagency Action and Inaction: The Federal Regional Council Experience." Public Administration Review (May/June, 1972), 232-240.

Muskie, Edmond S. "The Challenge to Creative Federalism" Saturday Review, June 25, 1966, pp. 12-14.

Reagan, Michael. "Toward Improving National Policy Planning." Public Administration Review, XXIII (March, 1963), 1049.



- Rubin, Lillian. "Maximum Feasibility Participation." Poverty and Human Resources Abstracts (December, 1967), 7-8.
- Sussman, Marvin B. "The Isolated Nuclear Family: Fact or Fiction." Social Problems, VI (1959), 333-340.
- Wirth, Louis. "Urbanism as a Way of Life." American Journal of Sociology, XLIV (July, 1938), 1-24.

#### U. S. Government Documents

- Memoranda, Reports and Letters from the Indian Task Force File, March 8, 1970 to July 4, 1974. Western Federal Regional Council, San Francisco, California.
- Public Law 33-560, Stat. 599, 640; 40 USC. 461.
- U. S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. Eighth Annual Report. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Tenth Annual Report. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1969.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Eleventh Annual Report. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, January 31, 1970.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Fourteenth Annual Report. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, January 31, 1973.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Intergovernmental Relations and the Poverty Program. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1966.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The Role of Equalization of Fiscal Grants. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1964.
- U. S. Bureau of the Budget. Federal Regional Councils. January, 1970.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Simplifying Federal Aid to States and Communities. First Annual Report to the President on an Inter-agency Program. March, 1970.
- U. S. Office of Management and Budget. The Regional Council Concept. January 25, 1971.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Restoring the Balance of Federalism: Second Annual Report to the President on the Federal Assistance Review. June, 1971.

U. S. Office of the White House Press Secretary. Executive Order 11647. February 11, 1972.

\_\_\_\_\_. Statement by the President on Restructuring of Government Services. March 27, 1974.

Western Federal Regional Council. Annual Report of Work Activities. May 1, 1973.

\_\_\_\_\_. Concepts and Operations. October, 1972.

\_\_\_\_\_. Minutes of Regional Council Meeting, June 19, 1972.

\_\_\_\_\_. Minutes of Regional Council Meeting, January 9, 1973.

\_\_\_\_\_. Minutes of Regional Council Meeting, June 19, 1973.

\_\_\_\_\_. Minutes of Regional Council Meeting, May 1, 1974.

\_\_\_\_\_. Policies and Procedures for Regional Council Task Forces. October, 1972.

#### Interviews

Archambault, Frank, Special Projects Officer for Pyramid Lake Piute Tribe, San Francisco, California, May 9, 1974.

Carter, Beau, Executive Secretary for WFRC, San Francisco, California, May 29, 1974.

Daniels, Bruce, HUD Representative to Indian Task Force, Los Angeles, California, May 9, 1974.

Gray, John, Director of Planning for Zuni Pueblo, New Mexico, by telephone, May 10, 1974.

Kennedy, Harry, HEW Representative on Indian Task Force, San Francisco, California, by telephone, June 4, 1974.

Pearce, Hardy, Indian Task Force Executive Secretary, San Francisco, California, May 9, 1974.

\_\_\_\_\_, May 29, 1974.

\_\_\_\_\_, June 20, 1974.

\_\_\_\_\_, June 24, 1974.

Rodeen, Don, Assistant to RAP Task Force Chairman, San Francisco, California, May 9, 1974.

Trent, Jim, Grantsman for Salt-River Tribal Council, Scottsdale, Arizona, by telephone, June 20, 1974.