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# Implications of Individualism and Collectivism on the Individual's Social Identity

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**CLAREMONT MCKENNA COLLEGE**

**IMPLICATIONS OF INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM ON THE  
INDIVIDUAL'S SOCIAL IDENTITY**

SUBMITTED TO

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AND

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BY

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Implications of Individualism and Collectivism on the Individual's Social Identity

Sarah B. Powers

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### Abstract

Social Identity Theory attempts to explain why individuals can act primarily as group members and secondarily as individuals and predict how individuals maintain positive social identities. Individuals are motivated to establish social identities to increase self-esteem and reduce uncertainty, and do so by using prototypes to cognitively represent, categorize, and compare in-groups from out-groups. Although Social Identity Theory explains the processes individuals undergo to develop social identities and situate themselves in society, it lacks the framework to explain how culture impacts an individual's identity and the consequences associated with the contextual nature of a social identity. Individualism and collectivism are two cultural syndromes that can be prototyped by the individual, and when incorporated into a social identity, prescribe distinct cognitions, emotions, values, and self-concepts. As the frame of reference in which social identities are constructed expands and contracts, there are different cultural implications for social identities. This paper will extend Social Identity Theory and evaluate the different cultural implications concerning individual, social, and national levels of identity. We will explain fundamental differences in the way people perceive themselves and their realities, and predict how individualism and collectivism affect social identities as the situation context of changes.

### **Social Identity Theory**

After the completion of WWII, there was widespread curiosity among social psychologists about the cognitive processes individuals use in rationalizing irrational behaviors. Henri Tajfel first proposed the concept of social identity in the 1970's after completing a series of "minimal group experiments," which established the basic conditions necessary for individuals to demonstrate in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). These basic conditions were established by not allowing participants to see or interact with other participants and arbitrarily assigning them to two groups. Participants were then instructed to distribute points between in-group and out-group members. Instead of dividing points equally, individuals distributed more points to members of their in-group than to members of the out-group. These findings not only suggest people behave first as group members and secondarily as individuals (Ellemers & Haslam, 2012), but they also began the development of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Social Identity Theory explains the cognitive process through which individuals develop and conform to social identities. According to Tajfel, social identities are the "part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel, 1974). The underlying motivation for individuals to establish a social identity is self enhancement which increases an individual's self-esteem

(Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Abrams & Hogg, 2006). Abrams and Hogg (2006) explain that “self-esteem is both a dependent and an independent variable in relation to intergroup behavior: it is a product of specific forms of intergroup behavior, as well as the motivating force for those behaviors.” Individuals seek to establish a positive self-esteem by constructing a positive social identity achieved through three cognitive processes: social categorization (when the individual categorizes individuals into groups), social comparison (when the individual evaluates group membership), and social identity (when the individual identifies themselves with a social group in society).

### **Social Categorization**

Turner continued Tajfel's research on Social Identity Theory by developing the Self Categorization Theory. The Self Categorization Theory evaluates how individuals use prototypes to categorize others and identify themselves within society. Prototypes are sets of related attributes, such as attitudes and feelings, and are used by individuals to represent a group's identity and distinguish groups from other groups (Hogg, 2004). For example, Tajfel and Turner (1979) define social categorizations (prototypes) as, “cognitive tools that segment, classify, and order the social environment, and thus enable the individual to undertake many forms of social action. They create and define the individual's place in society.” Prototypes are constructed through the cognitive process of social categorization, and vary between contexts as a function of the frame of reference a social comparison is made in (Hogg, 2004). Although prototypes help situate the individual within society, they are equally important in influencing an individual's self-esteem and reducing uncertainty. However, the success of a prototype in positively

increasing an individual's self-esteem and significantly reducing uncertainty is contingent on a prototype's degree of salience (Oakes, 1987).

In order to increase self-esteem, individuals accentuate in-group similarities and out-group differences, which can be described by the Accentuation Principle. The Accentuation Principle characterizes individual strategies used to increase self-esteem when organizing prototypes: "differences between categories (interclass differences) are accentuated and differences between members within the same category (intra-class differences) are underestimated" (Treppe, 2006). Building off of Tajfel's research on minimal group experiments, the Accentuation Principle explains how prototypes are used to reveal similarities and differences between groups, which allow individuals to positively discriminate in favor of their group to increase self-esteem.

In addition to using prototypes in order to increase self-esteem, individuals also use them in an effort to minimize uncertainty (Hogg & Terry, 2000). Uncertainty reduction is a fundamental human motivation and is attainable through the use of social categorizations (Hogg & Terry, 2000). Since prototypes describe, explain, and justify behavior of relevant group members, individuals are also able to predict others' behavior based on their prototypical behavior to reduce uncertainty (Treppe, 2006; Hogg & Terry, 2000). By generalizing individuals into groups, individuals not only increase self-esteem by assimilating with positive in-groups, but it also reduces uncertainty because they can accurately predict attitudes, feelings, and behaviors (Hogg & Terry, 2000). Individuals use prototypes in order to satisfy the need for a positive self-esteem and to reduce uncertainty, but the influence of a prototype on an individual is dependent on a prototype's salience within a group (Oakes, 1987).

A prototype's degree of salience influences an individual's emotional attachment to a group's identity and determines the degree to which individuals adopt group behaviors (Oakes, 1987). When a prototype is salient, it becomes the basis of perception, inference, and behavior (Hogg, 2004). Oakes (1987) suggested that salience depends on accessibility and fit of a prototype. A prototype is accessible when it is valued by others, integral in one's self concept, and can be applied in many situations (Hogg, 2003). According to Oakes (1987), "Accessibility refers to the relative readiness of a given category to become activated; the more accessible the category, the less input is required to invoke the relevant categorization." When a prototype is accessible, it must also provide the best fit between the prototype of a group and that group's actual identity in order to be used to explain group behavior generally. A prototype's accuracy depends on the comparative fit (how well a prototype accounts for similarities and differences among people) and normative fit (how well prototypical characteristics account for behavior) (Hogg, 2003). The prototype that best fits the collective group acts as the foundation for social comparison and social identity (Hogg, 2003).

An example of social categorization is when individuals identify with a specific sports team. For instance, if an individual closely identifies with Los Angeles Dodgers fans based on a shared enthusiasm for the team, then they will increase their self-esteem by positively distinguishing themselves from the San Francisco Giants by attributing positive characteristics (i.e., strong players) to themselves, and attributing negative characteristics (bad coaches) to the Giants. This positive distinction increases the individual's self-esteem. In order to reduce uncertainty, individuals will use the attributes of their prototypical group (Dodgers) to predict and rationalize the future (even if we lose

this game, we have an overall stronger team and will most likely have a better season record). Additionally, the salience of being a Dodgers fan is different for an individual living in LA their whole life than for an individual who has never left Alaska; it is easier for someone from L.A. to identify with the Dodgers because the prototype is more readily available to them than to someone from Alaska. On game day, the fit of being a Dodgers fan is optimal because the prototype can more accurately account for a fan's actions than on an off-day where the individual identifies less as a fan and more with their profession. However, not all prototypes are strictly positive or negative influences on self-esteem and uncertainty, but are a mix of positive and negative attributes. Individuals use social comparisons in order to distinguish the relative status of groups in societies, which ultimately affects the individual's self-esteem (Trepte, 2006).

### **Social Comparison**

Social categorizations induce individuals to make intergroup and intragroup comparisons in order to establish their social identity (Trepte, 2006). Intergroup comparisons require the individual to make distinctions between the in-group and out-group, whereas intragroup comparisons require the individual to make distinctions between themselves and other group members. In order for an individual to make an intergroup comparison, the individual must internalize their group membership, identify with their group, the situation must allow social comparisons, and the out-group must be similar enough to the in-group to require a comparison (Hinkle & Brown, 1990).

For example, an American must internalize their nationality (a prototype) in order to distinguish themselves from other nationalities (Europeans). Because Europeans have comparable values to Americans (westernized, urbanized, and industrialized), Americans

need to make comparisons in order to be distinct from Europeans. In addition to making comparisons in order to be distinct, individuals need to make positive comparisons in order to construct a positive self-esteem. An individual (i.e., an American) makes biased comparisons between their in-group (Americans) and out-groups (Europeans) in order to positively affirm aspects of their social identity. When individuals make positive comparisons (i.e., Americans are better than Europeans because Americans are entitled to the pursuit of happiness), it confirms a positive self-esteem and tightens the relationship between the individual's identity and the group's identity.

However, when only negative intergroup comparisons are available, a person's social identity suffers. If social comparisons between groups contribute to a negative self-esteem then individuals won't internalize or identify with their in-group but instead try to change their group membership. Individuals employ three strategies, individual mobility, social creativity, or social competition when intergroup comparisons contribute to a negative self-esteem. These strategies are used by the individual to directly change group membership, change their perspective of group membership, or to objectively change the social status of their group in order to increase self-esteem (Ellemers & Haslam, 2012).

**Social mobility.** When individuals are members of a devalued group, they try to avoid their group membership by joining another higher status group (Trentham, 2006), which requires the individual to emphasize intragroup differences (Ellemers & Haslam, 2012). Intragroup differences highlight how the individual is different from other group members. If individuals view group boundaries as permeable, they are more likely to employ an individual mobility strategy and change group membership to a higher status

group. However, if individuals view group boundaries as static, they are likely to improve their status through a group effort (Ellemers & Haslam, 2012).

**Social creativity.** Social creativity reconstructs group membership by projecting a positive identity that was previously negative. The individual can exercise social creativity with three techniques: focusing on other dimensions of intergroup comparisons (changing what is used in comparison), including other groups in comparison (expanding spectrum of groups included), and changing the perception of low-group membership (e.g. black is beautiful) (Ellemers & Haslam, 2012). This strategy allows the individual to adjust their perception of their group to be more positive, but does not change the status quo (Ellemers & Haslam, 2012). For example, after the end of Apartheid in South Africa, a political regime that enforced rigid segregation between races, social group boundaries were reconstructed to be all inclusive such that the entire nation was given the prototype "Rainbow Nation." This term expanded group boundaries to be all encompassing such that desegregation addressed diversity as a positive aspect (Dickow & Moller, 2002).

**Social competition.** Social competition requires the individual, usually with their group's cooperation, to explicitly change the status of a group within society, such as increasing women rights in the work place or gay marriage (Ellemers & Haslam, 2012). Unlike other social strategies, social competition requires a collective effort not just a single individual's effort. Through social competition, the individual is able to remain a member of their group, while also able to work towards making changes to objective and/or material outcomes enjoyed by their group (Ellemers & Haslam, 2012).

### **Social Identification**

After an individual is able to categorize and compare themselves in terms of their in-group identity, their internalization of group membership and its implications is necessary for social identification. Social Identification, “not only refers to the *cognitive awareness* that one can be included in a particular group, but also incorporates the *emotional significance* of that group membership for the self” (Tajfel, 1974). Once the individual identifies themselves within society, either as a distinct individual or as a subunit of a group, they can begin to categorize and compare other groups within society in order to organize their realities (Trepte, 2006; Turner, 1994).

Although Social Identity Theory explains the cognitive processes used by individuals to establish a social identity, Social Identity Theory fails to explain group phenomena. Social groups are collections of more than two people who share the same social identity and consequently share the same attributes, such as cognitions, norms, emotions, values, and self-concepts. Social groups are characterized by prototypes; however, these prototypes change as the frame of reference a social comparison is made in changes (Hogg, 2004; Brewer, 1991). According to Turner (1994), “self-categories [prototypes] are reflexive judgments in which the perceiver is defined in terms of his or her changing relationship to others within the frame of reference, presumably to enable the individual to regulate himself or herself in relation to an ever-changing social reality.” Brewer (1991) proposed a schematic representation of Social Identity Theory with concentric circles representing the expandable and contractible frame of reference individuals derive their social identities from.




Figure 1 Personal and social identities.

*“Personal identity* is the individuated self—those characteristics that differentiate one individual from others within a given social context. *Social identities* are categorizations of the self into more inclusive social units that depersonalize the self-concept, where *I* becomes *we*.” (Brewer, 1991)

These concentric circles represent the contextual nature of Social Identity Theory, however, within each level, there are different cultural consequences affecting identity (Brewer, 1991).

In order to assess how identity is influenced by culture, two cultures must first be identified and explained. Individualism and collectivism are two cultural phenomena that occur within the context of social identities (Hogg, 2004; Brewer, 1991; Hofstede, 1988), and have been described as two cultural syndromes (Triandis, 1993) and as the anchors along one cultural dimension (Hofstede, 1988). Certain individual antecedent conditions increase the likelihood an individual will adopt either individualistic or collectivistic cultural tendencies (Triandis, 1995) as well as cultural antecedent variables that increase the likelihood a culture will develop around individualistic or collectivistic tendencies (Triandis, 1995; Triandis, 1989; Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 2012). Consequently, there are different attributes exhibited by individuals within a cultural context that are important to understand in order to evaluate the cultural implications of social identities on the individual, social and national levels of identity (Triandis, 1995). Before exploring the

different levels of identity, we must first establish individualism and collectivism as group and cultural phenomena that regulate social identities.

### **Individualism and Collectivism**

Throughout history, the survival of mankind has been contingent on group formation and the establishment of culture. Group formation allows tasks to be divided amongst many individuals instead of just one, and cultures allow individuals to identify how things are and should be done (Triandis, 2012). Harry Triandis (1993) defines culture as “shared attitudes, beliefs, categorizations, expectations, norms, roles, self-definitions, values, and other such elements of subjective culture found among individuals whose interactions were facilitated by shared language, historical period, and geographic region.” Culture helps individuals act in accordance with socially acceptable prototypical practice and values (Triandis, 2012), which decreases uncertainty and increases predictability of behavior (Hogg, 2003). The practices and values associated with a culture aggregate into cultural syndromes (Triandis, 1993).

Individualism and collectivism have been discussed in many contexts in the social sciences, such as social systems (Parsons & Shils, 1951), economic development and modernity (Inkeles & Smith, 1974), cultural patterns (Hsu, 1983), values (Hofstede, 1980), and self-concepts (Markus & Kitayama). Since the discussion of individualism and collectivism has been presented in various contexts, it must be noted that research on individualism and collectivism is like “the parable of the blind men, each touching a different side of an elephant” (Triandis, 1993), such that each of these writers touches on different aspects of individualism and collectivism. For example, relevant to our

discussion, Triandis and Hofstede both reference individualism and collectivism as a phenomenon of culture and seek to address how it influences the individual and society. However, both use different terms to address it. Triandis identifies individualism and collectivism as cultural syndromes (Triandis, 1993), whereas Hofstede identifies individualism and collectivism as a cultural dimension (Individualism-Collectivism) (Hofstede, 1988). Both social scientists are addressing the same phenomena, but address it differently.

According to Triandis (1993), cultural syndromes are established if “the elements of a culture are organized around a central theme, the elements of a culture are more static within the culture than between cultures, and there is co-variation between cultural antecedents and cultures.” In order to organize around a central theme, shared beliefs, values, and emotions need to be identified by the individual and are organized in terms of prototypes. By organizing elements of culture into prototypes, in-group members have more in common within other in-group members than between groups. This group distinction enables the analysis of particular antecedent variables and conditions that influence the development of specific cultures, such as Individualism and Collectivism.

Individualism and Collectivism satisfy the three establishing principles of cultural syndromes: Individualism's central theme is the autonomous individual whereas Collectivism's central theme is the collective; Individualism and Collectivism are more static within cultures that exhibit individualistic or collectivistic tendencies; certain cultural antecedents, individual antecedents and levels of optimal distinctiveness vary with either individualistic or collectivistic cultures (Triandis, 1993; Brewer, 1991).

Individualism and Collectivism can exist within an individual or culture simultaneously. The intensity of individualistic and collectivistic values fluctuates between cultures along a spectrum developed by Geert Hofstede. Hofstede developed a quantitative ranking system in which countries are organized based on the persistence of Individualism and Collectivism within their national culture. For instance, the United States ranked #1 out of 50 countries for Individualism, with a score of 91 on the Individualism-Collectivism index; South Africa ranked # 16 out of 50 countries for Individualism, with a score of 65 on the Individualism-Collectivism index reflecting a mix between Individualism and Collectivism; China (Hong Kong) ranked #35 out of 50 countries for Individualism, with a score of 25 on the Individualism-Collectivism index reflecting low levels of Individualism and high levels of Collectivism (Matsumoto & Juang, 2008). These scores reflect how countries can embody both Individualism and Collectivism, or primarily Individualism, or primarily Collectivism along a spectrum (Triandis, 1995) (See Figure 1 in Appendix). However, in order to interpret the implications of these scores, we must first consider the antecedent conditions, variables, attributes, and levels of optimal distinctiveness that distinguish individualistic cultures from collectivistic cultures.

### **Individual Antecedent Conditions**

There are four antecedent conditions that increase the probability an individual will adopt individualistic or collectivistic tendencies, respectively. For individualistic cultures, the probability of an individualistic cognitive system being adopted by an individual increases when, "(a) the others in the situation are individualists, (b) the person focuses on what makes him or her distinct from other groups, (c) the task is

individualistically competitive, and (d) the situation is public (e.g., the marketplace)” (Triandis, 1993). For example, in the United States, which fosters an individualistic culture, an individual would likely be surrounded by individualistically oriented individuals (Matsumoto & Juang, 2008). Since the U.S. is founded on the idea of the individual's right to the pursuit of happiness, an aspect of its subjective culture, there is more focus on individuality than conformity. Additionally, the capitalist economy in the United States facilitates competition between individuals, not collective groups. Finally, the likelihood an individual will adopt individualistic tendencies also increases when situations are made public, which is reinforced by American media and news (Triandis, 1993; Triandis, 1995).

For collectivistic cultures, the probability of a collectivistic cognitive system being adopted by an individual increases when, “(a) the individual knows that the other people in the particular situation are collectivists, (b) the individual is in a collective (e.g. in the family), (c) the emphasis is on what people have in common or what makes them the same as the collective, and (d) the task is cooperative” (Triandis, 1993). An example of a collectivist country in which each of these conditions is present is China. On Hofstede's Individualism-Collectivism index, China ranked #35, indicating higher levels of Collectivism (Matsumoto & Juang, 2008), which increases the likelihood an individual would be surrounded by collectivistic individuals. China has historically been a family-run country, and children and adults do mostly everything together. When Mao Ze Dong came into power in China, he forced everyone to work in collective communes; individuals were not able to individually pursue work (Triandis, 1995).

**Individualistic and Collectivistic Cultural Antecedent Variables**

Just as the individual's exposure to certain conditions can increase the likelihood they exhibit individualistic or collectivistic tendencies, a society's exposure to certain conditions such as ecology, family structure, distribution of wealth, and demographics can increase the likelihood that it will foster individualistic or collectivistic cultures.

**Ecology.** The relationship between people and the environment varies between cultures. Historically, individualistic cultures have been associated with complex hunter-gather tendencies in which individuals rely less on the land and more on individual ambitions. Mobility also increases the likelihood of Individualism "given that it allows people to separate and live at a distance from other people" (Triandis, 1995). In comparison, Collectivism is usually associated with agricultural societies in which obedience and conformity are required (Triandis & Gelfand, 2012). Since agricultural societies are typically isolated from other societies, it is difficult to make a living independently from the group. When individuals cannot survive independently and have limited access to resources, group cooperation becomes more important (Triandis & Gelfand, 2012). Additionally, agricultural societies have predominately been characterized as collectivistic because of low mobility (limited resources and isolation) and more pressure to be accepted by the in-group (less social diversity) (Realo et al., 1997).

**Family structure.** The typical size of families within a culture can also indicate whether a culture is individualistic or collectivistic. Large, extended families that promote embeddedness are associated with collectivistic cultures because of increased interdependence (Triandis, 1989). According to Hofstede (1980), collectivism relates to

“societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout people's lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.” Conversely, small families that permit separation are individualistic in nature, such that “individualism pertains to societies in which the ties between individuals are loose; everyone is expected to look after himself or herself and his or her immediate family” (Hofstede, 1980).

**Distribution of wealth.** Wealth facilitates separation and independence, and in 1980, Hofstede “found a positive correlation between Individualism and wealth, with industrialized wealthy countries scoring higher on Individualism than developing countries” (Triandis, 2012). Hofstede concluded that increases in national wealth cause an increase in Individualism, but not vice versa. When people within a country experience an increase in affluence, they consequently have an increase in personal discretion to spend their money, which creates an increase in Individualism (Triandis, 2012).

**Demographics.** Demographics within a culture can refer to age, education, income, gender, and race. In 1997, Smith and Schwartz (1997) proposed that younger, educated individuals typically act more individualistically than older, less educated individuals. Gender differences between Individualism and Collectivism have not been statistically significant (Kashima et al., 1995). Racial groups, such as people of color and Caucasians in the United States, have also demonstrated differences in individualistic and collectivistic tendencies (Triandis, 2012). For instance, people of color in the United States have scored higher on collectivism and familism compared to Caucasians in the United States (Triandis, 2012 referenced Gaines et al., 1997).

**Attributes of Individuals within Individualistic and Collectivistic Cultures**

Within each cultural syndrome, individuals exhibit unique cognitions, norms, emotions and values. Having explained the environmental and individual conditions necessary for individualistic or collectivistic cultures to exist, it is equally important to explain how individualistic and collectivistic cultures persist through individual attributes.

**Cognitions.** Cognitive processes within individualistic cultures require individuals to focus on personal needs, rights, capacities, and contracts, and assume complete responsibility for their actions (Triandis, 1995). In addition, individualistic cognitions are motivated by individually oriented goals. For example, in the United States' Constitution, the promotion of, and primary focus on, the individual's rights, liberties, and pursuit of happiness promotes individualistic cognitions (Triandis & Gelfand, 2012). In contrast, within collectivistic cultures, individuals focus primarily on the needs of the group, are motivated by socially oriented goals, and identify the collective as responsible for outcomes (Triandis, 1995). For example, the Law of Moses is collectivistic in that it restricts the individual from independently determining right and wrong, which is predetermined by the collective group (Triandis & Gelfand, 2012).

**Norms.** Norms within a culture relate to patterns of behaviors within a given context. Norms within individualistic cultures are less consistent because individuals act as independent agents (Triandis, 1995). In comparison, social behavior is less evident within collectivistic cultures because there is a tendency to shift behavior depending on the context (Triandis, 1995), such that individuals act differently to each in-group

member but uniformly with out-group members (Triandis 1995 referenced Hui, 1984; Chiu, 1990).

**Emotions.** Individuals who operate within an individualistic culture have egocentric emotions where they primarily are concerned about themselves; in contrast, individuals who operate within a collectivistic culture are concerned about others (Triandis, 1995). The emotions of collectivists may incorporate the conditions of others, such as empathy, but the emotions of individualists may only incorporate the individual's condition, such as anger (Triandis, 1995). Emotions concerning privacy also fluctuate between Individualism and Collectivism; individualistic cultures protect privacy, whereas collectivistic cultures believe people should be concerned and involved with other people's business (Triandis, 1995).

**Values.** Within individualistic cultures, curiosity, creativity, having an exciting life, and pleasure are valued. In comparison, collectivistic cultures value security, social relationships, in-group harmony and personalized relationships (Triandis, McCusker, and Hui, 1990; S.H. Schwartz, 1994).

**Self-concepts.** Self-concepts differ between cultures and are the product of social factors. One way self-concepts vary is between the individual's belief "about the relationship between the self and *others* and, especially, the degree to which they see themselves as *separate* from others or as *connected* with others" (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Between individualistic and collectivistic cultures, self-concepts vary in terms of the individual's perceived relationship with others, which is illustrated in the figure below.




Figure 1. Conceptual representations of the self. (A: Independent construal. B: Interdependent construal.)

(Markus & Kitayama, 1991)

Individualistic and collectivistic cultures have two diverging self-concepts that describe the individual's relationship with others; independent self-concepts believe in the wholeness and uniqueness of each individual with respect to others ( individualistic) whereas interdependent self-concepts believe in the interconnectedness of individuals with respect to others (collectivistic). Independent self-concepts require the individual to view themselves an autonomous and independent individual. When an individual establishes an interdependent self-concept, others become “an integral part of the setting, situation, or context to which the self is connected, fitted, or assimilated” (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). These two opposing self-concepts are critical distinctions between individualistic and collectivistic cultures, and will be discussed in further detail in the following chapter (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995).

**Individualistic and Collectivistic levels of Optimal Distinctiveness**


Consistent with the ability to draw distinctions between individualistic and collectivistic antecedent conditions, variables, and attitudes, we are also able to determine

unique levels of optimal distinctiveness for an individual within each culture. Optimal Distinctiveness Theory describes the way in which individuals manage levels of inclusiveness, which vary between cultures, and the individuals' need for differentiation and assimilation. Individualism and Collectivism foster distinct levels of inclusiveness, and individuals operating within them have different needs to be different from, and similar to, others.

**Optimal distinctiveness theory.** Social identities are derived from the tension between the individuals need to be similar and different at the same time. Optimal Distinctiveness Theory posits that the individual works to sustain equal levels of differentiation and assimilation within a social context such that “the need for deindividuation [assimilation] is satisfied within in-groups, while the need for distinctiveness [differentiation] is met through intergroup comparison” (Brewer, 1991). Brewer's Optimal Distinctiveness Theory builds on the Uniqueness Theory, proposed by Snyder and Fromkin in 1980, which suggested that individuals who believe their identity overlaps too much or too little with others' identities experience negative emotions (Snyder & Fromkin, 1980). In order to avoid these negative emotions, individuals seek to maintain a level a degree of similarity and distinctiveness between the self and relevant others (Brewer, 1991). For example, teenagers assimilate to their cliques by adopting shared styles and behavior allowing them to blend in. However, their distinctiveness is achieved by separating themselves from other cliques or groups, such as their parents (Brewer, 1991).

A model for Optimal Distinctiveness Theory represents the need for assimilation and differentiation as opposing forces within a given frame of reference. These forces

work along a spectrum of inclusion; at one end, the frame of reference only includes small groups (low inclusion) and at the other, the individual is deindividuated within large groups (high inclusion). The relationship along the inclusiveness spectrum suggests that “the higher the level of inclusiveness at which self-categorization is made, the more depersonalized the self-concept becomes” (Brewer, 1991). As the individual's frame of reference becomes individuated, the need for assimilation to a collective identity increases, whereas the need for differentiation is low. However, as the frame of reference becomes more inclusive, the individual needs less assimilation to a collective identity but has an increasing need for differentiation. When the individual is able to equate their need for differentiation and assimilation, the strength of an individual's social identity is maximized (Brewer, 1991). This model of opposing forces is represented in the figure below.




(Brewer, 1991)

Although optimal distinctiveness isn't a function of a group's positive or negative social identity, it is a function of a group's culture. The level of optimal distinctiveness is

different for individuals within each respective culture because each culture has distinct cognitions, norms, emotions, values, and self-concepts. Within individualistic cultures, the individual, who has an independent self-concept, needs low levels of inclusion to identify with their group and their level of optimal distinctiveness is met when the individual's relatively high need for differentiation is equal to their relatively low need for assimilation. Within collectivistic cultures, the individual, who has an interdependent self-concept, needs higher levels of inclusion, and is optimally distinct at lower levels of differentiation and higher levels of assimilation with their group (Triandis, 1995).

Having identified two social identities, one individualistic and the other collectivistic, it follows that there are distinct cultural implications for each identity. In order to holistically evaluate these implications, we must expand the context of a social group from low levels of inclusion to high levels of inclusions and consequently evaluate how individualism and collectivism affect individual, social, and national levels of identity. Since Brewer's concentric circles only represent one universal self-concept (page 14), the representation has been updated to include both independent and interdependent self-concepts below. Within individualistic cultures, the individual's self-concept is independent in relation to others, and the individual's self-concept in relation to others remains independent as the frame of reference expands. In contrast, a collectivistic individual's self-concept is interdependent in relation to others, such that as the frame of reference expands, the individual's self-concept remains interdependent with the social context (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).



Brewer's (1991) original diagram explained how the "self-concept is expandable and contractible across different levels of social identity with associated transformations in the definition of the self and the basis for self-evaluation. When the definition of self changes, the meaning of self-interest and self-serving motivation also changes accordingly." In order to evaluate the implications of independent and interdependent self-concepts in relation to social identities, it is necessary to consider the implications of these two self-concepts as social identities shift between the individual, social, and national levels of identity. It is on each level of identity that we can observe unique ways in which the social identities associated with individualism and collectivism affect the individual's reality (Markus & Kitayama, 2003; Brewer, 1991).

For instance, on the individual level of identity, the independent and interdependent self-concepts both have different implications for an individual's wellbeing. Independent and Interdependent self-concepts both give rise to unique ways in which individuals maintain their social identity, and consequently self-esteem, through cognitions, emotions and motivations. By determining how these self-concepts affect an individual's identity, we can evaluate the culturally distinct ways in which one maintains their well-being (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).

On the social level, the difference between the independent and interdependent self-concepts give rise to culturally different ways of maintaining cooperation. Cooperation is a necessary function of a group to maintain its survival (Chen et al., 1998). The survival of a social unit enables individuals to make social comparisons, and consequently establish and update their self-esteem (Hogg, 2004). Groups use group identity, trust, communication, accountability, superordinate goals, and rewards structures as mechanisms to foster cooperation. However, individualistic and collectivistic groups use these mechanisms in culturally different ways to foster cooperation (Chen et al., 1998). It is important to evaluate how independent and interdependent self-concepts materialize on the social level in order to gain a better understanding of how social identities, and consequently self-esteem, are maintained through group cooperation.

On the national level of analysis, the independent and interdependent self-concepts are associated with Individualism-Collectivism, a cultural dimension. Our national level of analysis explains Individualism-Collectivism as just one aspect of a national identity contributing to national outcomes, such as growth in GDP (Tang &

Koveos, 2008). Considering independent and interdependent self-concepts on the national level of identity gives light to how Individualism-Collectivism prescribes just one aspect of a national identity. On the national level of analysis, it becomes evident that countries can overlap on some aspects of culture and remain distinct regarding others. It is important to evaluate the national level of identity in order to identify other ways in which social identities may be influenced by group phenomena related to cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 1988). By evaluating individualism and collectivism on the individual, social, and national levels of identity, we are able to extend Social Identity Theory to include group phenomena, evaluate the implications associated with them, and determine how individual realities vary between social identities.

**Individual Level of Analysis: Applying Social Identity Theory to explain how Individualism and Collectivism affect Individual Happiness**

Happiness, measured by the Subjective Well Being (SWB) of individuals, is contingent on the frequency of positive emotions, absence of negative emotions, and cognition of overall life satisfaction. Consequently, an individual's overall life satisfaction is closely linked to their self-esteem (Ahuvia, 2002). By examining the condition of an individual's Subjective Well Being in terms of cultural syndromes and socio economic conditions, we can observe how individuals maintain their self-esteem within a cultural context.

**Socio-Economic Conditions on Individual Happiness**

Upon first evaluating factors of individual happiness, social psychologists hypothesized that the level of one's consumption of material goods could impact an individual's Subjective Well Being (Ahuvia, 2002). The correlation between income and SWB for individuals within developed countries was low, accounting for less than 5% and leaving 95% of SWB unexplained (Mullis, 1992). Additionally, this explanation of an increase in wealth as a contributing factor to an individual's SWB decreases to about 1% once individuals are lifted out of poverty (Ahuvia and Friedman, 1998). Aaron Ahuvia (2002) explains that "increased income among the poor shows fairly powerful effects on SWB, yet increased income among the non-poor shows only negligible effects." Although income can explain some variations in individual happiness, once an

individual's basic needs (such as housing, food, and water) are met, additional income makes little difference in an individual's overall level of happiness.

Using economic measurements to indicate individual happiness levels is flawed. Studies have consistently found a correlation of .60-.70 between a nation's wealth and average levels of SWB (Schyns, 1998), which suggests a stronger relationship between national wealth and average levels of SWB than the relationship between individual income and average levels of SWB. The validity and comprehensiveness of these studies is compromised because they represent the *average* individual, and does not accurately reflect the SWB of a particular individual. This attempt to represent the individual's happiness using national statistics only partially helps us explain how the individual's self-esteem is maintained. In 2000, Schyns clarified the effect of national wealth on aggregate levels of SWB and found "that living in a rich country had positive effects on SWB over and above the effects of raising one's individual income (Ahuvia, 2002)." This suggests that the environment in which an individual lives has a greater effect on happiness than income.

Aaron Ahuvia argues that increasing the economic wealth of a nation, and consequently consumption, does not account for the correlating increase in SWB. However, economic development requires a *cultural environment* that fosters Individualism. As countries diverge from traditional obligations and occupations, individuals are more inclined to act as independent agents, experience increases in wealth, and reconstruct social values. The individual becomes increasingly detached from the collective because of increases in wealth (which erodes familial dependence), increases in social mobility (marriages are based less on social status), and physical

mobility (jobs frequently require traveling) (Ahuvia, 2002). Quantitative evidence supports this sentiment such that the gross national product per capita has .80 correlation with national levels of individualistic values (Hofstede, 1980), which erodes societal social groups (Taylor, 1989), but increases the average level of individual SWB (Veenhoven, 1999).

If income and GDP operate as limited explanations of individual happiness, perhaps the cultural environment can give a more comprehensive explanation. First, higher levels of income and GDP are generally associated with higher levels of happiness. For example, the U.S. had a mean S.W.B. score of 3.55 and \$14 trillion GDP in 2007 whereas South Africa had a mean S.W.B. score of 1.39 and \$277 billion GDP in 2007 (Matsumoto & Juang, 2008; World Values Survey; Geohive.com). Secondly, higher levels of income and GDP are fostered by individualistic cultures (U.S. is more individualistic than South Africa and also has a higher GDP (Matsumoto & Juang, 2008; World Values Survey; Geohive.com). These two correlations suggest that Individualism leads to higher levels of happiness. However, this is not so; among poor countries Individualism is negatively associated with happiness, whereas richer countries positively associate Individualism with happiness (Veenhoven, 1999). Additionally, the S.W.B. index for China, a traditionally collectivistic society, is 1.64, which is higher than South Africa's, a more individualistic society (World Values Survey). This finding suggests that Individualism cannot simply be introduced into a country's cultural repertoire and be expected to increase individual SWB, but instead suggests the individual's internalization, assimilation to, and embodiment of cultural cognitions, emotions, and motivations determines their overall happiness, or positive self-esteem. Further, it is the

distinct self-concepts unique to individualistic and collectivistic cultures that not only orient individuals' perception of happiness but also determine how they achieve happiness.

### **Individualism and Collectivism on Individual Happiness**

Universally, individuals make comparisons to understand themselves as distinct and separable from others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). By making external comparisons, individuals establish a physical sense of self in relation to others. In order to establish a self-concept in relation to others emotionally, individuals make distinctions regarding how connected with others and separate from others they are, which affects individuals' emotional satisfaction, or happiness (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Just as culture can be divided into two distinct syndromes, Individualism and Collectivism, individuals' concept of the self can be divided into two distinct self-construals, independent and interdependent, which consequently give rise to two distinct interpretations of happiness (Lu & Gilmour, 2004).

The degree to which individuals perceive themselves as interdependent or independent exists along a mutually exclusive continuum; individuals can adjust their perception of the self from one extreme (i.e., an independent self-construal) to the other (i.e., an interdependent self-construal). If individuals adopt an independent view of the self, they view themselves as unique from others. If individuals adopt an interdependent view of the self, they view themselves as interconnected with others. However, every individual works to maintain an optimally distinct social identity by aligning themselves with prototypes of groups they wish to belong (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Brewer 1991).

Individuals operating within individualistic and collectivistic cultures have unique ways of identifying the self as independent or interdependent, respectively. Although cultures can be characterized by general tendencies, not all individuals conform to them. For instance, Western cultures, such as American culture, can be generally described as individualistic, but subcultures within it, such as the Quakers, can promote interdependence (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Consequently, in order to objectively determine the condition of individual happiness, we must look to the individual as the basic unit of analysis to assess how they use cognitions to perceive the world, express emotions, and honor motivations. By evaluating the consequences of independent and interdependent self-construals, we can predict how individuals in individualistic and collectivistic cultures maintain a positive social identity and maximize happiness.

**Independent vs. interdependent self.** The distinct self-views, independent self and interdependent self, are regulatory mechanisms the individual uses when evaluating their well-being. According to Lu and Gilmour (2004), “these self-regulatory mechanisms guide the individual to attend to and process information pertaining to certain aspects of the environment emphasized by culture. Such mechanisms also determine how people think, feel and behave in pursuit of SWB.” Thus culture is a major force that influences the individual's concept of happiness such that individuals within individualistic and collectivistic cultures hold different views on what happiness is.

For individualistic cultures, which are predominately western, individuals maintain their well-being through an independent self-concept. The independent self-concept implies that individuals are unique from others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Embedded in the cultural foundation of Individualism, individuals maintain their S.W.B.

by holding themselves personally accountable for their pursuit of happiness (Lu & Gilmour, 2004). When an individual internalizes an independent self-concept, they consequently hold themselves personally responsible for their well-being, which is maintained through independent cognitions, emotions, and motivations (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Lu & Gilmour, 2004).

Alternatively, the interdependent self-construal emphasizes the central connectedness of people to each other, which is imbedded in collectivistic cultures. For example, within Chinese culture, individuals are viewed holistically; by separating from the larger community, individuals cannot be fully understood (Sheweder, 1984). An individual within a collectivistic culture is able to maintain their S.W.B. by fulfilling role obligations in “interdependent social relationships, the creation and maintenance of interpersonal harmony, the striving to promote the welfare and prosperity of the collective” (Lu & Gilmour, 2004). Once an individual internalizes their interdependent self-concept, their cognitions, emotions, and motivations are monitored by their motivation to fulfill social obligations. In turn, by meeting extrinsic expectations, the individual is able to maintain their well-being within collectivistic cultures (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Lu & Gilmour, 2004). Well-being is therefore maintained in culturally distinct ways. Since concepts of well-being vary between cultures, the cognitions, emotions, and motivations employed in maintaining one's well-being also diverge between cultures (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Lu & Gilmour, 2004).

*Cognitions.* The divergence between the independent and interdependent self-concepts gives rise to distinct levels of cognitive attentiveness to others and varied importance of situational context. Individuals with an independent self-concept have a

more extensive knowledge concerning themselves. In 1990, Kitayama, Markus, Tummala, Kurokawa, and Kato conducted a study on judgments made by Americans (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Their research found that Americans perceive the self as more dissimilar to others because their knowledge concerning the self is more extensive than their knowledge concerning others. The implications of their study suggests that independently oriented individuals, such as Americans, know more about themselves than others, whereas, interdependently oriented individuals, such as Asians, know more about others than themselves (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Conversely, Individuals with an interdependent self-concept work to be sensitive to others in order to ensure harmony (which is a priority within collectivistic cultures in order to maintain S.W.B.). As a result, individuals develop a more extensive knowledge concerning others when employing an interdependent self-concept than employing an independent self-concept (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).

This distinction between knowledge of the self and others confirms Lu and Gilmour's (2004) hypothesis concerning S.W.B: individuals operating within individualistic cultures should know more about themselves in order to pursue happiness because the individual is personally accountable for their actions, whereas, individuals operating within collectivistic cultures should know more about others in order to pursue happiness because awareness of others facilitates the success of fulfilling role obligations. The cognitive variation within individualistic and collectivistic cultures points to different cognition tendencies influencing happiness, however the way in which individuals navigate emotions, between being self-focused and other focused, also acts as a determinant of happiness.

**Emotions.** In Markus and Kitayama's research (1991), self-systems, or self-frameworks, are inherently affected by an individual's self-knowledge. Individual's emotional tendencies have the power to transform situations because emotions elicit reactions and initiate actions. Since individuals perceive the self as either independent or interdependent, emotional experiences are not universal and should vary with self-concepts (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).

The cultural conditions established in individualistic cultures give rise to *ego-focused* emotions and the conditions established in collectivistic cultures give rise to *other-focused* emotions. Ego-focused emotions, such as anger or pride, refer primarily to the individual's personal attributes. This tendency to experience emotions related to the individual's experience is reinforced by individualistic cultures because they foster individuality. Other-focused emotions, such as sympathy or shame, refer primarily to another person and result from being sensitive and aware of others. This tendency is reinforced by collectivistic cultures because experiencing other-focused emotions highlights the interconnectedness and interdependence of the individual with others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).

Individuals within individualistic cultures operate as independent individuals and consequently attend more to ego-focused emotions rather than other-focused emotions. By focusing on egotistical emotions, the individual is able to act on the basis of their personal feelings in pursuit of happiness. On the other hand, individuals within collectivistic cultures operate as interdependent individuals and attend to other-focused emotions, enabling them to pay closer attention to the emotional state of others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).

***Motivations.*** Individuals are universally motivated by achievement, which can be characterized by the motivation to overcome obstacles, exert power, complete tasks to the best of ability, or become proficient in some subject (Markus & Kitayama, 1991 referenced Hall & Lindzey, 1957; Hilgard, 1987). However, the relationship between the individual and their motivations depends on the individual's self-system, whether they orient themselves as independent selves or as interdependent selves.

Individuals that embody independent self-systems, such as Westerners, are motivated by internal ambitions, such as internal needs, personal rights, capacities, and ability to withstand social pressures. Americans, and Westerners in general, are motivated to gain control over situations, achieve internalized standards of excellence, rather than fulfilling the expectations of others, and maintaining cognitive consistency (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). According to Bond (1986), "individually oriented achievement motivation is viewed as a functionally autonomous desire in which the individual strives to achieve some internalized standard of excellence." Individualists establish self-systems that are based on individual standards of achievement, enabling them to maintain their individual focused well-being (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Lu & Gilmour, 2004).

However, collectivists establish self-systems that are based on socially oriented achievements (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In contrast to individually oriented achievement motivations within independent individualistic individuals, "socially oriented achievement motivation is not functionally autonomous; rather individuals persevere to fulfill expectations of significant others" (Bond, 1986). Individuals that embody interdependent self-systems are motivated by other-focused tasks, such as being receptive of others, ability to adjust needs and demands to accommodate others, and

restrain inner needs. In 1986, Bond found that interdependent motivations reflect collectivistic traditions because Chinese respondents showed high levels of need for abasement, socially oriented achievement, change, endurance, nurturance, and order and low levels of individually oriented achievement. Individual motivations within collectivistic cultures are characterized by the individual's motivation to fulfill the expectations of others, which contributes to the maintenance of their perception of well-being in terms of role-obligations (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Lu & Gilmour, 2004).

The individual's S.W.B. is contingent on the orientation of their self-concept as independent or interdependent, which depends on the individual's identification with individualistic or collectivistic cultures, respectively. Since the self is uniquely oriented within each culture, so too are their conceptions of happiness. Happiness is not a product of economic development or stability, but rather how cultures prescribe conditions of SWB for its members. By evaluating the cognitions, emotions, and motivations within individualistic and collectivistic cultures, the different ways in which the independent-self and interdependent-self are able to maintain SWB are established.

It is important to extend our analysis to include the culturally distinct ways in which cooperation can be fostered at the social level of identity. Just as there are distinct ways in which the independent and interdependent self-concepts give rise to different perceptions of happiness (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), so too are there distinct ways in which the independent and interdependent self-concepts give rise to different ways cooperation mechanisms are used on the social level (Chen et al., 1998). Group cooperation is important to consider because it enables groups to accomplish shared goals and consequently work towards positive self-enhancement. Without cooperation, the

survival of social units, which is necessary for individuals to undergo the cognitive processes included in Social Identity Theory, would deteriorate (Chen et al., 1998; Hogg, 2004).

**Social Level of Analysis: Applying Social Identity Theory to explain how  
Individualism and Collectivism affect Group Cooperation**

Cooperation within a group is dependent on the interdependent cognitions, emotions, and motivations within a culturally specific context. As an individual expands their contextual frame of reference concerning their social identity, cooperation becomes a mechanism for “the survival of a social unit” (Wagner, 1995). The survival of a social unit ultimately determines the source of an individual's self-esteem. In order for a social unit to persist, an optimal level of cooperation is necessary; however, ways in which social units cooperate vary between cultures. In order to distinguish culture specific cooperation tendencies, two assumptions must be explained. First, cooperation exists within all societies, and it is the individual's choice to cooperate. Second, if an individual decides to cooperate within an in group, culture specific strategies will be used to foster cooperation (Chen et al., 1998). Since cooperation is necessary for any social unit to exist and is culture specific, it is important to assess specific strategies that are unique to individualistic and collectivistic cultures.

**Cooperation Mechanisms**

Cultural values underlie the nature of cooperative behavior, and give rise to six culture-specific cooperation mechanisms: group identity, trust, accountability, superordinate goals, communication, and reward structure. Following that cultural values underlie the nature of cooperation, individualistic groups and collectivistic groups foster cooperation in distinct ways.

**Group identity.** Social identities are culture specific (Triandis, 1995), and as such, there are specific ways in which individualistic and collectivistic groups orient themselves in order to effectively cooperate. The cognitive awareness of a group identity allows the individual operating within it to not only identify and categorize themselves within society, but it also outlines context specific behaviors expected by the in-group and out-groups.

Group identities are contingent on their members' self-definition; individualistic individuals are independent and in pursuit of individual gain, and collectivistic individuals are interdependent and in pursuit of social gain (Wagner, 1995). Within individualistic cultures, cooperation is attractive when there are perceived benefits for the individual that cannot be attained independently. For example individualistic individuals are inclined to cooperate with a sports team because without group participation the individual would not be able to win and receive benefits, such as enhanced self-esteem. Within collectivistic cultures, cooperation is attractive when there are perceived benefits to the in-group, regardless of the immediate personal implications. For instance, volunteering time to local shelters within a community has benefits for the in-group and unclear immediate personal implications (Wagner 1995 referenced Spence, 1985; Wagner, 1982).

Another aspect of group identity that affects individualistic and collectivistic groups is the salience of a group identity. Since individualistic individuals value their personal identity above their social identity, when group interests and individual interests are conflicting, individuals will honor their personal identity above the group's identity. However, collectivistic individuals value their social identity above their personal

identity, and will cooperate to maintain their group identity before their personal identity (Wagner, 1995; Chen et al., 1998).

**Trust.** Trust requires the individual to know the implications of a situation and the ability to rationalize risks when they are uncertain (McAllister, 1995). Trust facilitates group cooperation because the individual must have confidence in other group members to align with their group identity. The forms of trust within cultures vary; individualistic group identities employ cognitive based trust whereas collectivistic group identities employ affect based trust (Chen et al., 1998).

Cognitive based trust is contingent on the professionalism expressed by others. Individuals are able to establish trust based on cues suggesting an individual's reliability, credentials, and cultural similarities (McAllister, 1995). Cognitive based trust relates to the displayed competence of individuals when acting on responsibilities. This display of competence allows the observing individual to become knowledgeable of the actor's credentials and values, and enables them accurately trust others (Chen et al, 1998). For example, when an individual has been certified as a surgeon and has impressive work experience, others may cognitively trust the individual with their medical needs.

Although both cognitive and affect based trust can exist within collectivistic cultures, affect based trust is more prevalent because it supplements naturally occurring cultural tendencies (Chen et al, 1998). Affect based trust is built on the emotional bonds between partners that goes beyond professional bonds, such as familial trust, and emotional bonds are what tie collectivist groups together (McAllister, 1995). Further, role expectations within collectivistic cultures go beyond task performance as a result of the

interdependence between group members (Chen et al., 1998). The individual's awareness of interdependence and emotional bonds minimizes the perceived riskiness in trusting other group members, such that affect based trust is more important in collectivistic cultures than individualistic cultures (Chen et al., 1998).

**Communication.** Previous research has shown communication enhances cooperation, and individualistic and collectivistic cultures use communication to cooperate in distinct ways. The major cultural difference between individualistic and collectivistic forms of communication is between partial and full channel communication. Partial communication refers to communicating by constrained means, such as audio only, visual only, or written only communications, whereas full channel communication is not restricted to one mode. Further, partial and full forms of communication have different implications for context; partial communication decontextualizes the situation by leaving out sources of social meaning included in full communication. Since collectivistic cultures require more social and emotional cues, and context is more important for collectivists, collectivistic cultures use full channel modes of communication more frequently than individualistic cultures. In contrast, individualistic cultures are more concerned with efficiency, completing tasks quickly, and are consequently more direct and prefer mediated channels of communication (Chen et al., 1998).

**Accountability.** Accountability can be defined as the "extent to which representatives [individuals] are required to justify their actions, and are going to be evaluated and rewarded by their constituents" (Gelfand & Realo, 1999). Group cooperation is contingent on collective group actions; however, the nature of the

individual's accountability for their actions, and how accountability is enforced, fluctuates between cultures.

Within individualistic cultures, individuals are responsible for their own behavior, but within collectivistic cultures, individuals are responsible for group behavior. Since individualistic individuals act out of self-interest, individualistic groups hold the individual responsible for their actions through formal contracts (Chen et al., 1998). For instance, contracts are used a lot in the United States to hold professionals accountable for their work. Individuals operating within collectivistic groups act primarily in the interest of the group; accountability for actions is distributed throughout the group. Since collectivistic group activities are less focused on the individual, collectivists rely on social controls to ensure a collective group outcome (Chen et al., 1998).

**Superordinate goals.** Within the in-group, cooperation is driven by superordinate goals, which are goals that are shared amongst a group of individuals. Individualistic and collectivistic groups have distinct superordinate goals such that superordinate goals that “appeal to the instrumentality of cooperation for self-interest, will be more effective for gaining cooperation in an individualistic culture, whereas goal sharing, which appeals to the self-sacrificial contribution for the collective good, will be more effective for gaining cooperation in a collectivist culture” (Chen et al., 1998).

Within individualistic cultures, individuals are driven by self-interest (Markus and Kitayama, 1991), such that cooperation is also driven by self-interest (Chen et al., 1998). When the group's goals align with the individual's goal, the individual will cooperate. However, when the individual recognizes their cooperation with their in-group will not

benefit their self-interest, they will avoid cooperation through social loafing (Wagner, 1995). Social loafing is affected by the individual's ability to identify themselves within the in-group and their perception of responsibility. When individuals are able to identify themselves within the in-group they are also able to identify how much their effort contributes to the overall outcome, and how responsible they personally are for that outcome. If an individual perceives their efforts to be wasted or responsibility small, they will avoid group cooperation (Wagner, 1995). Further, the achievement of subordinate goals within individualistic groups is more dependent on satisfying the individual's self-interest than within collectivistic groups (Chen et al., 1998).

In contrast, individuals within collectivistic cultures have an "organic" view of the self in which a collective is more than the sum of its parts. Collectivists are motivated by goals that emphasize the common fate of the collective. In the case of a collectivist culture, group cooperation is consistent with individual goals, which are in the interest of the group above the interest of the individual (Wagner, 1995). Comparatively, "individualists who feel independent and self-reliant are less apt to engage in cooperative behavior, and collectivists who feel interdependent and reliant on groups are more likely to behave cooperatively," which suggests that collectivists are more likely to cooperate than individualists because of the alignment between the individual's goals and their group's goals (Wagner, 1995).

**Reward structure.** There are two comparable but distinct reward systems social groups use: equity-based and equality-based. Equity based reward systems distribute resources fairly, such as dividing resources based on effort. In contrast, equality based reward systems distribute resources equally among group members (Chen et al., 1998).

Equity based and equality based reward systems vary between individualistic and collectivistic cultures because of the nature of relationships within each.

According to Chen, Chen and Meindl (1998), the equity principle is an important part of an individualist's self-concept "because the equity principle is believed to be consistent with both individual rationality and the self-image of being fair, it can simultaneously satisfy the instrumental and expressive motives of the individualists." Individualistic cultures are motivated by an equity based reward system because the individual acting out of self-interest is primarily concerned with receiving rewards reflecting their personal efforts (Chen et al., 1998).

The equality principle is employed by collectivistic groups because they do not value differentiating between individual group members, and instead like to conceptualize the group in harmony. By increasing rewards based on increasing individual efforts, individuals are encouraged to operate out of self-interest, which conflicts with collectivistic values. From these considerations, Chen, Chen and Meindl (1998) posited that equity based reward structures will be used amongst short term relationships, but equality based reward structures will be used amongst long term relationships in a collectivist culture (Chen et al., 1998).

By expanding our frame of reference from the individual level to the social level, it becomes evident that cooperation is necessary for the survival of social units. The survival of social units enables individuals to make social comparisons that influence their self-esteems, which confirm aspects of their social identities (Hogg, 2004). Through the use of cooperation mechanisms, groups are able to remain cohesive social

units and work towards shared goals. Cooperation is fostered by six culture-specific mechanisms: group identity, trust, accountability, superordinate goals, communication, and reward structure, which are used in different ways to foster cooperation within individualistic and collectivistic cultures (Chen et al., 1998). For instance, group identities fluctuate between independent and interdependent self-concepts; trust fluctuates between cognitive based and affect based; communication fluctuates between full channel and partial channel; accountability fluctuates between being individual focused and group focused; superordinate goals fluctuate between being driven by self-interests or group-interests; and reward structure fluctuates between equity based and equality based. Having identified and described the implications of each mechanism with respect to individualistic and collectivistic cultures, it becomes evident that cooperation is fostered in unique ways within different cultures, which consequently contributes to different ways in which social identities are maintained (Chen et al., 1998).

Considering the distinct ways in which individualism and collectivism influence individual and social identities, it is necessary to extend our analysis to determine how individualism and collectivism affect the national level of identity. In doing so, we will be able to holistically understand how Social Identity Theory can explain group phenomena. However, by expanding the frame of reference to include national levels of identity, other cultural aspects come into consideration. Hofstede and his colleagues have identified six cultural dimensions that characterize national identities: Individualism-Collectivism, Masculinity, Uncertainty Avoidance, Confucian Dynamism, and Indulgence versus Restraint. Each of these dimensions effect national identities in unique ways. In order to assess how Individualism-Collectivism influences national identities, it

must be considered in relation to other cultural dimensions. It is through this broad analysis that the implications of Individualism-Collectivism can be explained for national levels of social identities (Hofstede, 1988).

**National Level of Analysis: Applying Social Identity Theory to explain how Individualism and Collectivism affect National Identity**

As the individual's personal identity expands to include a national identity, their social identity becomes increasingly depersonalized. This depersonalization can be characterized by the individual shifting their self-perception from being a unique person to an interchangeable representation of a national identity (Hofstede & Bond, 1988). Since the national level of identity requires the individual to depersonalize perception, feelings, and actions, national identities provide less of a comparative base for individuals to make social comparisons (Hogg & Terry, 2000; Brewer, 1991). However, national identities are important to consider because they satisfy the individual's need for deindividuation (Brewer, 1991). In order to understand the general nature of national identities in relation to individualism and collectivism, individualism and collectivism must be considered as opposing anchors along a cultural dimension.

Cultural dimensions provide a framework for comparing how cultures vary in terms of self-concepts, power relations, and dealing with dilemmas (Inkeles & Levinson, 1954). Geerte Hofstede has been a leader in identifying cultural dimensions since the 1960's when he began studying IBM's extensive employee attitude surveys in an effort to identify how cultures relate to each other. These surveys provided a way for cultural analyses to be made on a national level since IBM employees are well matched subsets (they work for the same company and have relatively similar occupations and educations, but different nationalities) (Hofstede & Bond, 1988). The IBM surveys were distributed

to employees in 53 countries and the survey responses indicated different patterns of values and beliefs between countries.

Hofstede originally identified four cultural dimensions: Masculinity (related to the emotional roles between women and men), Individualism-Collectivism (related to the integration of individuals into groups), Power Distance (related to the nature of relationships between superiors and subordinates), and Uncertainty Avoidance (related to dealing with the unknown). A second survey distributed to 10 countries, the Rockeach Value Survey, confirmed the four cultural dimensions found in the IBM studies and confirmed that people in different cultures think differently (Hofstede & Bond 1988).

However, the influence of the researcher's own culture on the study's results posed a threat to the validity of the research. Since the IBM studies and Rockeach Value Surveys were conducted by Western researchers, it was also necessary to conduct and distribute a study designed by Eastern researchers, which lead to the development of the Chinese Value Survey (CVS), a 40 item questionnaire that was translated into native languages of 22 countries. Interestingly, results from 20 out of the 22 countries overlapped with the IBM studies on three of the four dimensions: Individualism-Collectivism, Masculinity, and Power Distance. However, another dimension was recognized in the Chinese Value Survey, Confucian Dynamism, which is related to how people focus their efforts in terms of the past, present, or future. This dimension is also called "Long Term-Short Term Orientation" (Hofstede & Bond, 1988; Hofstede 2011).

In 2010 a sixth dimension was identified, Indulgence versus Restraint, as a result of Michael Minkov's analysis of World Value Surveys (Minkov & Hofstede, 2011). The

sixth dimension was applicable to Hofstede's cultural dimensions theory because it is related to gratification and control of human desires, which had not been previously addressed (Minkov & Hofstede, 2011). However, the Indulgent versus Restraint scores have not been added to the Hofstede Centre online resource. Having identified the six cultural dimensions proposed by Hofstede and his Colleagues, it is important to describe them in order to gain a better understanding of how Individualism-Collectivism influences national identities. It is necessary to consider Individualism-Collectivism in conjunction with the other five dimensions, because it is too limiting to describe national identities in terms of Individualism-Collectivism alone.

### **Cultural Dimensions**

The cultural dimensions identified by Hofstede and his colleagues (see Figure 1 in Appendix) provide a framework for assessing the similarities and differences between national cultures, and consequently national identities. By knowing and understanding where a country ranks along the spectrum of a cultural dimension, we are able to appreciate how an individual's identity is influenced by general tendencies. Countries have been ranked and given scores along each spectrum reflecting how much the particular dimension is displayed in society.

**Individualism-collectivism.** As previously discussed, Individualism and Collectivism describe the degree to which an individual's self-concept is integrated into groups. Within individualistic cultures, individuals maintain an independent self-concept, whereas within collectivistic cultures, individuals maintain an interdependent self-concept. In psychological literature, the Masculinity dimension has been incorrectly confused with the Individualism-Collectivism dimension such that masculine cultures

were considered individualistic and feminine cultures collectivistic. However, the Masculinity dimension is wholly independent from the Individualism-Collectivism dimension because “they are based on orthogonal factors” (Hofstede, 1998). Similar to Masculinity, Individualism-Collectivism influences an individual's self-concept; Masculinity influences the individual's self-concept in terms of their emotional roles in society, whereas Individualism-Collectivism influences the individual's self-concept in terms of values, cognitions, and beliefs. As a result, these two self-concepts give rise to two different types of behavior; Masculinity refers to behavior according to one's sex, whereas Individualism-Collectivism refers to behavior towards the group (Hofstede & Bond, 1988).

**Masculinity.** According to Hofstede, “Masculinity is defined as ‘a situation in which the dominant values in society are success, money, and things,’ whereas its opposite pole, Femininity, is defined as a ‘situation in which the dominant values in society are caring for others and the quality of life” (Hofstede & Bond, 1984). Results from the IBM study suggested that women's values differ between cultures less than men's, such that gender roles are addressed in terms of men's values within a culture. On one end of the Masculinity dimension men's values are assertive, competitive, and maximally different from women's values. For example, Austria, which ranked #2 on the Masculinity index, has a masculine culture because it values power, strength, and individual achievements. On the low end of the Masculinity pole, men's values are more nurturing and similar to women's values. For example, Sweden ranked #52 on the Masculinity index because its culture is modest and caring. A nation's position on the

Masculinity dimension describes the country's balance between emotional goals within a social group (Hofstede & Bond, 1988).

**Power distance.** Unlike Individualism-Collectivism and Masculinity, Power Distance does not concern an individual's self-concept but is instead concerned with relationships with authority. Since societies are universally unequal, Hofstede identified Power Distance as one explanation for how social identities across national cultures vary in terms of relationships between individuals from higher or lower ranks. Cultures vary along the Power Distance dimensions in terms of the degree to which individuals accept or reject unequal distributions of power (Hofstede & Bond, 1988). In high Power Distance social groups, respect and formal deference for higher status group members are valued. For instance, the United States ranked 38 out of 53 countries and had an index score of 40, whereas China (Hong Kong) ranked 15 out of 53 countries and had an index score of 68 on the Power Distance dimension (Hofstede & Bond, 1988). Nations that score high on the power dimension are more autocratic and individuals more easily accept differences in power and wealth; they are generally found within East European, Latin, Asian and African countries. Nations that score low on the Power Distance dimension are more democratic and individuals have a harder time accepting differences in power and wealth; they are generally found within Germanic and English Speaking Western Countries (Rinne, 2012).

**Uncertainty avoidance.** The IBM, Rockeach Value and Chinese Value Surveys each suggest four cultural dimensions, however, only three of the four dimensions identified in Western surveys overlapped with Eastern surveys. Uncertainty Avoidance was one dimension identified in Western surveys that was not in the Chinese Value

Survey. The IBM and Rockeach Value Survey, conducted by Western psychologists, suggested Masculinity, Individualism-Collectivism, Power Distance, and Uncertainty Avoidance as four cultural dimensions. The findings from the Chinese Value Survey overlapped with the western surveys with respect to three cultural dimensions, Masculinity, Individualism-Collectivism, and Power Distance, but did not detect mechanisms of Uncertainty Avoidance. Instead, the Chinese Value Surveys, conducted by Eastern psychologists suggested an alternative fourth dimension, Confucian Dynamism (Hofstede & Bond, 1988).

Uncertainty Avoidance concerns man's search for truth; it is not the same as risk avoidance. Individuals high in Uncertainty Avoidance try to avoid unstructured situations, which are novel or unknown, by minimizing the possibility of unstructured situations through adhering to laws, rules, safety, and security measures (Hofstede, 1985). Cultures that seek to avoid uncertainty do so through searching for "absolute truth," whereas cultures that are more accepting of uncertainty are more tolerant of behavior and opinions that are different from their own. Uncertainty Avoidance scores tend to be high in East and Central European countries, Latin countries, Japan and in German speaking countries, and lower for English speaking countries, Nordic countries, and China (Hofstede, 2011). Uncertainty Avoidance can be grouped in a similar category with Confucian Dynamism because both address ways in which cultures address primary dilemmas, such as the concept of time or knowledge (Inkeles & Levinson, 1954).

**Confucian dynamism.** The Chinese Value Survey found that Chinese individuals do not value uncertainty as a central issue to their national identity. Instead, the analysis of CVS determined another dimension, Confucian Dynamism (also called long term

orientation). Along the Confucian Dynamism dimension, the teachings of Confucius are described. The principles of Confucius' teachings identify how "the stability of society is based on unequal relationships between people...the family is the prototype of all social organizations...virtuous behavior towards others consists of treating others as one would like to be treated oneself: a basic human benevolence—which, however, does not extend as far as the Christian injunction to love thy enemies... virtue with regard to one's task in life consists of trying to acquire skills and education, working hard, not spending more than necessary, being patient and persevering" (Hofstede & Bond, 1988). At one end of the dimension, represented by high scores, persistence, ordering relationships by status and observing order, thrift, and having a sense of shame (which are future oriented) are relatively more important than personal steadiness and stability, protecting face, respect for tradition, and reciprocating greetings, favors, and gifts (which are oriented towards the past and present). At the other end of the dimension, aspects pertaining to the past and present are relatively more important than aspects pertaining to the future. On the Confucian Dynamism index, China ranked 1 out of 20, suggesting a high cultural value on being future oriented, whereas the United States ranked 16 out of 20, suggesting a low cultural value on being future oriented and higher cultural value on being past and present oriented. Interestingly, 4 out of the Five Dragons, China (Hong Kong), Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, scored the highest on the Confucian Dynamism index, whereas the western countries scored the lowest on the Confucian Dynamism index (Hofstede & Bond, 1988).

**Indulgence versus restraint.** Minkov's label, Indulgence versus Restraint, was generated from his analysis of World Value Surveys and was introduced to the field as a

cultural dimension in 2010. Indulgence versus Restraint is complementary to Confucian Dynamism (Long-Term versus Short-Term Orientation) and is weakly negatively correlated with it. Indulgence refers to “relatively free gratification of basic and natural human desires related to enjoying life and having fun. Restraint stands for a society that controls gratification of needs and regulates it by means of strict social norms” (Hofstede, 2011). Conveniently, 93 countries have been scored on this dimension; Indulgence is high in South and North America, Western Europe, and Sub-Sahara Africa, whereas Restraint is higher in Eastern European, Asian, and Muslim countries (Hofstede 2011).

**Individualism-Collectivism on National Identity**

Having identified six dimensions of culture on a national level, it is evident that Individualism-Collectivism is only one aspect of a national identity and cannot explain a national identity alone. It is necessary to consider Individualism-Collectivism in conjunction with other cultural dimensions to fully understand a national identity. For instance, the United States and China scored differently along the Individualism-Collectivism dimension, but similarly along others (reference table below).

	Individualism-Collectivism		Masculinity		Power Distance		Uncertainty Avoidance		Confucian Dynamism	
	Rank (1-53)	Index	Rank (1-53)	Index	Rank (1-53)	Index	Rank (1-53)	Index	Rank (1-20)	Index
United States	1	91	15	62	38	40	43	46	14	29
China (Hong Kong)	37	25	18-19	57	15-16	68	49-50	29	1	96

(Hofstede & Bond, 1988)

The table above contrasts the United States' cultural dimension scores with China's cultural dimension scores, from which we can identify relative differences in national identities. For instance, The United States ranks high for Individualism whereas China ranks low for Individualism, suggesting that individuals within the United States have independent self-concepts and individuals within China have interdependent self-concepts (Hofstede & Bond, 1988). The United States and China both rank relatively high for Masculinity suggesting that individuals within the United States and China have similar emotional goals within a social group, such that individuals in both countries value success, assertiveness, and money (Hofstede & Bond, 1988). With respect to Power Distance, the United States has a low score whereas China has a high score. This implies that individuals within the United States value democracy and have difficulty accepting differences in power and wealth, whereas within China, individuals value autocracy and have an easier time accepting differences in power and wealth (Hofstede & Bond, 1988). The United States and China both rank relatively low for Uncertainty Avoidance implying that individuals within both countries are relatively comfortable with unstructured situations, uncertainty, and ambiguity as compared to Greece (#1 out of 53 countries for Uncertainty Avoidance) (Hofstede & Bond, 1988). Along the Confucian Dynamism index, the United States ranks relatively low for Confucian Dynamism whereas China ranks the highest for Confucian Dynamism. This implies that Americans value personal steadiness, stability, protecting face, respect for tradition, and reciprocating greetings more than persistence, ordering relationships by status, thrift, and having a sense of shame. However, Chinese culture values the opposite; Chinese value persistence, ordering relationships by status, thrift, and having sense of shame more than

personal steadiness, stability, protecting face, respect for tradition, and reciprocating greeting (Hofstede & Bond, 1988).

Having identified the similarities and differences between American and Chinese national identities in terms of cultural dimensions, it is evident that Individualism-Collectivism is only one factor that describes a national identity. The six cultural dimensions Hofstede and his colleagues have identified provide a means to compare and contrast how different aspects of culture contribute to an overall national identity. National identities arise from distinct philosophical ideals (Hofstede, 1985) and lead to material outcomes, such as wars, economic development or economic growth (Tang & Koveos, 2008), however, we have primarily been concerned with how independent and interdependent self-concepts affect a social identity. It is through the evaluation of Individualism-Collectivism in conjunction with other cultural dimension that the effect of Individualism-Collectivism on the national level can be detected; individualism and collectivism govern how individuals orient their self-concept concerning relationships with others in terms of an independent and interdependent self-concept. The implications of these self-concepts, although vague on the national level, have been previously evaluated on the individual and social levels of identity.

Our analysis of social identities on the national level not only enabled us to reference quantitative scores and relatively compare national identities, but also provided insight on how we can continue our analysis of Social Identity Theory in the future. On the national level of analysis, we identified other ways in which culture can affect social identities. For instance other group phenomena such as Masculinity, Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, and Confucian Dynamism affect social identities with respect to

gender roles, power distribution, dealing with uncertainty, and long term/short term orientations. In order to continue extending Social Identity Theory to explain group phenomena, it is necessary to evaluate each of these cultural dimensions on the individual, social, and national levels of identity, like we did with individualism and collectivism. Evaluating other cultural dimensions identified by Hofstede and his colleagues on each level of identity would provide a comprehensive description of how individuals maintain, perceive, and behave within reality.

### **Conclusion**

Social Identity Theory explains the cognitive processes individuals use to identify and conform to in-groups, but is parsimonious in explaining group phenomena. The cognitive processes described by Social Identity Theory, social categorization, social comparison, and social identification, are contingent on the individual's use of prototypes to cognitively represent group norms, emotions, values, and self-concepts (Trepte, 2006). By representing groups with prototypes, individuals are able to enhance their self-esteem and reduce uncertainty (Trepte, 2006; Hogg & Terry, 2000). However, it is a prototype's degree of salience that influences whether or not an individual conforms to group norms. When a prototype is emotionally salient, it becomes the individual's basis of perception, inference, and behavior (Hogg, 2004).

The development of Social Identity Theory resulted from the desire to understand why individuals rationalize seemingly irrational behaviors. For instance, during WWII, Nazis rationalized extinguishing entire populations of individuals who were associated with a Jewish social identity, despite the fact that individuals belonging to the two social groups had previously been friends, colleagues, and neighbors. The cognitive processes identified by Tajfel and his colleagues can explain how people condone unreasonable actions, such as the Holocaust, however, they fail to explain the ways in which social identities are influenced by culture, in particularly individualistic and collectivistic cultures.

Culture can take many forms and exists within the individual and groups at varying degrees. It is important to consider how an individual's social identity is influenced by culture, in particular individualism and collectivism, to explain who an individual is and the reality they operate within. The fundamental difference between individualism and collectivism concerns the individual's self-concept, which varies between an independent self-construal and an interdependent self-construal, respectively. However, there are individual and cultural antecedent conditions that increase the salience of individualistic and collectivistic social identities, such as ecology, family structure, distribution of wealth, and demographics. When individualistic and collectivistic social identities are salient, individuals operating within each cultural context demonstrate culture specific attributes, such as cognitions, norms, emotions, values, and self-concepts (Triandis, 1995).

In order to determine the implications of individualistic and collectivistic cultures on social identities, it is necessary to evaluate social identities across contexts. According to Brewer (1991), individuals can expand and contract their social identities to include only themselves or them as members of different sized groups. As individuals expand and contract their social identities to be more inclusive or exclusive, the frame of reference in which social identities are constructed changes (Brewer, 1991). Consequently, social identities change as the context in which they are derived changes. Evaluating individualism and collectivism on the individual, social, and national levels of identity, gives light to how social identities are affected by culture and the implications of cultural identities.

For instance, on the individual level, individualism and collectivism prescribe different self-concepts for the individual. Individuals within individualistic cultures develop independent self-concepts whereas individuals within collectivistic cultures develop interdependent self-concepts (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Self-concepts act as regulatory mechanisms for an individual's well-being. Consequently, each cultural syndrome provides a distinct framework for individuals to maintain their well-being and maximize their self-esteem; individuals within individualistic cultures hold themselves personally accountable for their well-being, whereas individuals within collectivistic cultures fulfill role obligations by fostering interdependent relationships, maintaining interpersonal harmony, and promoting the welfare of the collective (Lu & Golmour, 2004).

Expanding the frame of reference to include social groups reveals how individualism and collectivism influence the ways in which cooperation is maintained. In order for individuals to be able to make social comparisons and maintain their self-esteem, cooperation is necessary and achieved through six cultural mechanisms: group identity, trust, communication, accountability, superordinate goals, and reward structure (Wagner, 1995). These cultural mechanisms are used in distinct ways within individualistic and collectivistic cultures. Within individualistic cultures, cooperation is fostered through an independent group identity, cognitive based trust, partial channel communication, individually holding people accountable for outcomes, individual motivated superordinate goals, and an equity based reward structure. In contrast, collectivistic cultures foster cooperation through an interdependent group identity, affect based trust, full channel communication, collectively holding people accountable for

outcomes, group motivated superordinate goals, and an equality based reward structure. (Wagner, 1995; Triandis, 1995; Chen et al, 1998; McAllister, 1995).

As the individual's social identity expands to the national level, individualism and collectivism are represented at either end of the Individualism-Collectivism cultural dimension, one of six cultural dimensions identified by Hofstede and his colleagues (Hofstede, 1988). By evaluating social identities on the national level, different cultural aspects of identity are detected. Individualism and collectivism are unique aspects of national identities because they prescribe how individuals relate with others. However, national identities must be evaluated holistically; individualism and collectivism influence national identities in conjunction with other cultural dimensions, such as Masculinity, Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Confucian Dynamism, and Indulgence versus Restraint. Each of these dimensions addresses different aspects of group culture: Masculinity addresses the emotional roles within groups, Power Distance addresses the individual's acceptance or rejection of unequal distributions of power, Uncertainty Avoidance addresses the individual's quest for truth and how comfortable they feel in unstructured situations, Confucian Dynamism addresses if individuals are long term orientated or past and present oriented, and Indulgence versus Restraint addresses gratification and desires. On the national level of analysis, it is necessary to consider other group phenomena in order to understand the unique way in which individualism and collectivism affect national identities.

According to Markus and Kitayama (2003), the differences between individualism and collectivism are "not just differences in values; they were most strikingly differences in the theories of being and reality." These realities are assumed

through Social Identity Theory and mediated by culture. It is important to appreciate the explanatory power of Social Identity Theory, for it describes how individuals orient their reality. However, it is our extension of Social Identity Theory that explains the cultural consequences of individualism and collectivism in terms of individual, social, and national identities and highlights the culturally different ways individual's perceive and respond to reality.

**Appendix**

Ranks and Indices by country for Individualism-Collectivism, Masculinity, Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, and Confucian Dynamism

	Individualism-Collectivism		Masculinity		Power Distance		Uncertainty Avoidance		Confucian Dynamism	
	Rank (1-53)	Index	Rank (1-53)	Index	Rank (1-53)	Index	Rank (1-53)	Index	Rank (1-20)	Index
United States	1	91	15	62	38	40	43	46	14	29
Australia	2	90	16	61	41	36	37	51	11-12	31
Great Britain	3	89	9-10	66	42-44	35	47-48	35	15-16	25
Canada	4-5	80	24	52	39	39	41-42	48	17	23
Netherlands	4-5	80	51	14	40	38	35	53	9	44
New Zealand	6	79	17	58	50	22	39-40	49	13	30
Italy	7	76	4-5	70	34	50	23	75		
Belgium	8	75	22	54	20	65	5-6	94		
Denmark	9	74	50	16	51	18	51	23		
France	10-11	71	35-36	43	15-16	68	10-15	86		
Sweden	10-11	71	52	5	47-48	31	49-50	29	10	33
Ireland	12	70	7-8	68	49	28	47-48	35		
Norway	13	69	52	8	47-48	31	38	50		
Switzerland	14	68	4-5	70	45	34	33	58		
Germany	15	67	9-10	66	42-44	35	29	65	11-12	31
South Africa	16	65	13-14	63	36-37	49	39-40	49		
Finland	17	63	47	26	46	33	31-32	59		
Austria	18	55	2	79	53	11	24-25	70		
Israel	19	54	29	47	52	13	19	81		
Spain	20	51	37-38	42	31	57	10-15	86		

India	21	48	20-21	56	10-11	77	45	40	6	61
Argentina	22-23	46	20-21	56	35-36	49	10-15	86		
Japan	22-23	46	1	95	33	54	7	92	3	80
Iran	24	41	35-36	43	19-20	58	31-32	59		
Jamaica	25	39	7-8	68	37	45	52	13		
Brazil	26-27	38	27	49	14	69	21-22	76	5	65
Arab Countries	26-27	38	23	53	7	80	27	68		
Turkey	28	37	31-33	45	18-19	66	16-17	85		
Uruguay	29	36	42	38	26	61	4	100		
Greece	30	35	18-19	57	27-28	60	1	112		
Philippines	31	32	11-12	64	4	94	44	44	18	19
Mexico	32	30	6	69	5-6	81	18	82		
Portugal	33-35	27	45	31	24-25	63	2	104		
Yugoslavia	33-35	27	48-48	21	12	76	8	88		
East Africa	33-35	27	39	41	21-23	64	36	52	15-16	25
Malaysia	36	26	25-26	50	27-28	60	16-17	85	4	75
China (Hong Kong)	37	25	18-19	57	15-16	68	49-50	29	1	96
Chile	38	23	46	28	24-25	63	10-15	86		
Singapore	39-41	20	28	48	13	74	53	8	8	48
West Africa	39-41	20	30-31	46	10-11	77	34	54	19	16
Thailand	39-41	20	44	34	21-23	64	30	64	7	56
Salvador	42	19	40	40	18-19	66	5-6	94		
S. Korea	43	18	41	39	27-28	60	16-17	85	4	75
Taiwan	44	17	32-33	45	29-30	58	26	69	2	87
Peru	45	16	37-38	42	21-23	64	9	87		
Costa Rica	46	15	48-49	21	42-44	35	10-15	86		

Indonesia	47-48	14	30-31	46	8-9	78	41-42	48		
Pakistan	47-48	14	25-26	50	32	55	24-25	70	20	0
Colombia	49	13	11-12	64	17	67	20	80		
Venezuela	50	12	3	73	5-6	81	21-22	76		
Panama	51	11	34	44	2-3	95	10-15	86		
Ecuador	52	8	13-14	63	8-9	78	28	67		
Guatemala	53	6	43	37	2-3	95	3	101		

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