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Examining Tanzania's Development Landscape

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Examining Tanzania's Development Landscape

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ABSTRACT

This thesis will examine Tanzania's development landscape through Amartya Sen's perspective, as per his conception of development that is put forth in *Development as Freedom*. Applying Sen's conception of development to the case of Tanzania reinforces his view that development is an intricate process that is dependent on the expansion of various freedoms. It also yields unique insights about the most pressing issues that are currently impeding progress in the country. I will first clarify Sen's framework and provide an explanation of development that corresponds with his ideals. Next, I will assess Tanzania's state of affairs in terms of Sen's five freedoms. I will then consider the impact of the recent expansion of technology in Tanzania, as well as discuss the question of inequality, which is a topic that Sen does not adequately address in his book. Finally, I will conclude with a discussion of the most pressing challenges that the country is facing and suggest what implications these challenges might have for Tanzania's future.

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INTRODUCTION

250 billion dollars per year is the price tag that Jeffrey Sachs, the author of *The End of Poverty*, associates with eradicating poverty by the year 2025.¹ If only the western world were to be more generous with their monetary assistance, Sachs argues, poverty, malnutrition and disease in the developing world could be completely eliminated. However, Amartya Sen's conception of development in *Development as Freedom* demonstrates that this oversimplification of development proposes an ineffective method of tackling the problems at hand, and could inadvertently exacerbate them.

Development is not simple. This thesis will demonstrate why solutions to poverty, malnutrition and disease are highly complex and can often have unintended consequences. Sen acknowledges that development is not one-dimensional, and the way in which to achieve it is not as straightforward as Sachs proposes. In fact, he contends that there are five crucial capabilities that must be secured in order for a society to progress. These capabilities, or freedoms, are have complex interconnections and can serve to positively reinforce one another if they are present.

This thesis uses the country example of Tanzania to exemplify Sen's underpinning that development is not one-dimensional; there are highly complex interconnections among freedoms that can influence one another, and these interconnections must be recognized in order to devise effective development strategies.

¹ Munk, Nina. *The Idealist: Jeffrey Sachs and the Quest to End Poverty*. New York: Anchor Books. 2013.

Tanzania is a particularly interesting case to examine for a number of reasons: it remains one of the most underdeveloped countries in the world, it attempted and failed to implement socialist economic policies after achieving independence from Britain, and it is heavily dependent on foreign aid and international assistance. Furthermore, assessing Tanzania's progress according to the five freedoms that Sen outlines in his book can yield insights about the country's development landscape. It will help to reveal the most pressing sources of unfreedom in the country today, which are crucial to recognize in order to devise effective and sustainable solutions to pressing problems in the country.

Part One of this thesis delves into the question of what development is, and what constitutes an effective development strategy. It provides the necessary foundation for the analytical progression of this thesis. Chapter One outlines Sen's conception of development, as well as William Easterly's account in *The White Man's Burden* which compliments and reinforces Sen's arguments. Chapter Two assesses the accuracies and inaccuracies of a number of development metrics. These measurements are often used as evidence of progress or the lack thereof in a country over a period of time; this chapter argues that it is important to recognize the particular methodology behind each measurement in order to understand what it is truly able to indicate. This chapter also argues that some metrics are more aligned with Sen's conception of development than others. Chapter Three examines nation building in Tanzania, providing key historical background that will help to examine the country's current status.

Part Two shifts gears to an analysis of Tanzania's progress over time according to the five freedoms that Sen outlines in his book. Chapter Four discusses social opportunities in Tanzania with a focus on education and health care, which corresponds

with Sen's focus on these two aspects in his account. It uses a case study approach to delve deeper into the implications of the presence or absence of this freedom for other freedoms in the country. Chapter Five assesses Tanzania's political freedoms and the ways in which they have changed over time, culminating in a discussion of the proposed constitution and the implications that it might have for the expansion of political and other freedoms. Chapter Six discusses economic facilities in Tanzania, which is particularly interesting in light of Tanzania's socialist past. This chapter reveals why restricting economic facilities can inhibit development; in the same vein, it discusses how expanding economic facilities can have a positive consequence for the expansion of other freedoms, focusing particularly on the benefits of investing in infrastructure. Chapter Seven reveals one of the most pressing sources of unfreedom in the country today, which is a lack of transparency guarantees. It analyzes how deep-rooted corruption is plaguing the country, restricting capabilities, and inhibiting development. Chapter Eight concludes Part Two of this thesis with an assessment of Tanzania's progress according to Sen's fifth and final freedom, protective security. This analysis reveals how this freedom is highly correlated with the others; a low level of social opportunities, political freedoms, economic facilities and transparency guarantees can all inhibit the extent to which the poorest and most vulnerable members of the population receive protection from government programs.

Part Three considers two aspects of development that are underdeveloped under Sen's conception: the implications of a rapid expansion of technology and the question of how capabilities should be distributed, or how inequality should be addressed in development. Chapter Nine considers how new technological innovations in East Africa

and in the developing world can have an impact on development under Sen's framework of interconnected freedoms. From this analysis, it is clear that technology has the capacity to circumvent many problems associated with a lack of capabilities in a society, and perhaps serve as a potential solution to them. Chapter Ten, the final chapter of this thesis, considers a contentious topic that Sen acknowledges but neglects to incorporate into his conception of development: the distribution of capabilities. It challenges the view of inequality in a traditional, monetary sense, and places it in accordance with the framework that Sen provides. In *Creating Capabilities*, Martha Nussbaum puts forth a strong argument about how inequality should be viewed in development, which will be considered in this chapter, and the topic of inequality will be discussed within the context of Tanzania. Finally, the conclusion of this thesis will summarize the findings of the entire analysis and discuss potential solutions to some of the most pressing sources of unfreedom in the country today.

PART ONE:

WHAT IS DEVELOPMENT?

Give a man a fish and he will eat for a day, teach a man to fish and he will eat for a lifetime. But, if you had asked him first, he would have told you that he lives in a desert.

~ Adapted from a Chinese Proverb

CHAPTER ONE: Development Strategies

Amartya Sen's *Development as Freedom* provides a comprehensive framework through which a country's stage of development and progress can be examined. In this chapter, I will examine Sen's framework in order to effectively apply it to the Tanzanian context in subsequent chapters. Sen's central argument is that the expansion of freedoms and the consequent elimination of unfreedoms are both the ends and means of development. This view is unique because it "directs attention to the ends that make development important, rather than merely to some of the means."² In the context of Sen's account of development, a freedom is the ability to achieve an end without societal or cultural constraints, and an unfreedom is the deprivation of this freedom. In his framework, development is viewed as "an inherently ethical phenomenon, a set of value judgments about what constitutes the good society and about the institutions and processes through which the good society can be achieved."³ Under this view, alleviating poverty and improving quality of life can help to support development. Thus, "the basic foundational issues force us toward understanding poverty and deprivation in terms of lives people can actually lead and the freedoms they do actually have."⁴ It is important to note that in Sen's view, poverty is not necessarily regarded in the traditional monetary

² Sen, Amartya. *Development as Freedom*. New York: Anchor, 1999. Print. p. 3.

³ Barkan, Joel D. *Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania*. New York: Praeger Publishers. 1984. Print. p. 4.

⁴ Sen, p. 92.

sense, but more so as a deprivation of capabilities. As Sen states, “capability deprivation is more important as a criterion of disadvantage than is the lowness of income, since income is only instrumentally important and its derivative value is contingent on many social and economic circumstances.”⁵ It is also important to understand the distinction between a freedom and a capability under Sen’s view: if one is free to do something, then one is *capable* of doing it, but it does not necessarily mean that one *will* do it. Thus, a freedom is not defined by what is actually accomplished or attained, but rather, it is what one is *able* to accomplish or attain given the construct of the society in which one lives.⁶

Sen’s explanation of the interconnectedness of freedoms indicates that certain elements that may seem unconnected on the surface are actually interdependent and thus, fundamentally important. These frequently overlooked connections can have vital implications for the planning and execution of effective development strategies. Attempting to foresee the unintended consequences of particular policy initiatives or projects undertaken by governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is imperative in order to avoid exacerbating the problem at hand, and also in order to achieve success. Applying Sen’s conception to the case of Tanzania underscores the fact that development is not straightforward; the intricate interconnections among freedoms play an integral role in facilitating development.

There are five distinct but complementary freedoms that Sen outlines in his book. One is social opportunities, such as access to education and health care facilities, “which influence the individual’s substantive freedom to live better.”⁷ Another is political

⁵ Ibid., p. 131.

⁶ Ibid., p. 36.

⁷ Ibid., p. 39.

freedoms, under which civil liberties, free and fair elections, and government accountability come in to play. There are also economic facilities, which are the ability to participate in the market and acquire desired goods and services. Additionally, with successful transparency guarantees, people feel comfortable entering into relationships or transactions with others in their society under a basic presumption of trust, lucidity and disclosure.⁸ Corruption occurs in the absence of transparency guarantees, where people seek to take advantage of others and gain through others' misfortune. The fifth is protective security, in which a society invests in programs such as unemployment benefits and famine relief to assist the most vulnerable and deprived individuals in their community.⁹

All five of these freedoms “directly enhance the capabilities of people, but they also supplement one another, and can furthermore reinforce one another.”¹⁰ For example, improving social opportunities such as education, especially for women, can yield many positive consequences in other areas of life. Interestingly, when female literacy rates improve, a decline in infant mortality rates can be seen at the same time.¹¹ This can be partially explained by the fact that educated women can make more informed decisions when they take care of their young. Even something as simple as being able to read the directions on a medicine container can have an enormous impact on a woman's ability to care for her child's health.¹² However, just as freedoms can be complimentary, unfreedoms can also be complementary. For example, economic poverty, the lack of

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 40.

¹¹ Ijaz, Zainab. *Impact of Female Literacy Rate and Health Facilities on Infant Mortality Rate in Pakistan*. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science. Vol. 2 No. 13. July 2012. Print. p. 138.

¹² Sen, p. 41.

public facilities, and the denial of political and civil liberties can serve to inhibit one another. Sen elaborates on these intricate interconnections among freedoms:

“Political freedoms (in the form of free speech and elections) help to promote economic security. Social opportunities (in the form of education and health facilities) facilitate economic participation. Economic facilities (in the form of opportunities for participation in trade and production) can help to generate personal abundance as well as public resources for social facilities.”¹³

In addition, transparency guarantees are a necessary prerequisite for economic facilities and political freedoms, and protective security serves to reinforce social opportunities. Thus, “Freedoms of different kinds can strengthen one another.”¹⁴ For example, democratic voice through political freedoms can also facilitate economic freedoms to participate in the market. It comes as no surprise to Sen that “no famine has ever taken place in the history of the world in a functioning democracy,” including less developed countries such as India, Botswana and Zimbabwe.¹⁵ Sen considers a “functioning democracy” as one that has “to win elections and face public criticism” and accordingly has “strong incentives to undertake measures to avert famines and other such catastrophes.”¹⁶ None of these countries has experienced a famine because of the interplay among democracy, transparency, and the expansion of economic freedoms that they enjoy.

¹³ Ibid., p. 11.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 11.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 16.

¹⁶ Ibid.

While the interconnections and reinforcements among freedoms and unfreedoms are important to take note of, it is also important to recognize that the deprivation of only one freedom is significant on its own, regardless of the negative consequences it may have for other types of freedoms. For instance, when people have the economic freedoms to actively participate in the market but experience limitations in the realm of political freedoms, “their denial is a handicap in itself [because] political and civil freedoms are constitutive elements of human freedom.” As Sen demonstrates, the ability of citizens to participate in the political system and voice opinions about public affairs is imperative to the success of any society.¹⁷

All of the freedoms that Sen discusses are important to secure in achieving development; however, analyzing the salience of economic freedoms is particularly relevant, especially given the context of Tanzania's socialist past and gradual steps towards market liberalization in recent years. Economic freedoms include the ability to participate in a free market system and acquire desired goods and services at a reasonable cost. According to Sen, “markets typically work to expand income and wealth and economic opportunities that people have.”¹⁸ Economic unfreedoms can keep the standard of living in a society at very low levels and inhibit a meritocracy from forming; thus, they are inimical to development.

Sen acknowledges that the market system is imperfect, but nevertheless insists that economic freedoms are crucial in order for a society to develop effectively. According to him, active participation in the market is important in itself, but it is also necessary to secure other important freedoms. Economic freedoms help to facilitate

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 16, 17.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 25, 26.

prosperity and wealth, which is one reason why they are so integral to development. Sen's emphasis on economic freedoms reveals that he champions individual agency in development; securing economic freedoms allows people to participate in the market and assume responsibility for achieving their own financial success.¹⁹ In a socialist society such as Tanzania soon after independence, political unfreedoms can inhibit the development of economic capabilities, which is especially problematic when one considers how a lack of economic capabilities can also have negative consequences for other freedoms. State control of the market can inhibit the development of infrastructure and constrain the overall development of the society. It should also be noted that in order to reap the benefits of an expansion in economic capabilities, similar advancements in social opportunities would be necessary in order to generate skilled labor to fuel the economy.

Sen emphasizes that everyone, especially the beneficiaries of development programs, should be seen "as agents rather than as motionless patients."²⁰ In his view, political freedoms include the ability of agents to decide democratically what aspects of their society to devote more resources towards, such as infrastructure, education, healthcare, or another area. As Sen states,

"This freedom-centered understanding of economics and of the process of development is very much an agent-oriented view. With adequate social opportunities, individuals can effectively shape their own destiny and help

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 26.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 137.

each other. They need not be seen as passive recipients of the benefits of cunning development programs.”²¹

Sen explains how his views can be applied to the macro level of development, where the people of a nation exercise their political freedoms to decide democratically on which aspect of their society to place more emphasis. However, he does not clarify how his argument can extend to development strategies on a micro level, where non-governmental organizations or government agencies that aspire to facilitate development can attempt to tackle specific problems within the state.

William Easterly's account in *The White Man's Burden* can complement and reinforce Sen's agent-oriented view of development by putting Sen's theory in to practice. According to Easterly, the best way to tackle poverty on the micro level is by being a “searcher” and not a “planner.”²² Planners make assumptions about what developing nations need, and implement programs, provide assistance, or donate resources to address this assumed need. The proverb at the beginning of Part One of this thesis depicts a planner who assumed that the man would benefit from learning how to fish. The planner was unsuccessful in leaving a lasting, positive effect on the man's life since he or she did not first seek to understand the man's environment, culture, or the unique challenges that he faces in his life before attempting to help him.

On the other hand, searchers will ideally try to understand the larger, pre-existing problems, work to analyze and understand them in the unique local context, often in collaboration with local people, and devise feasible and sustainable solutions to address

²¹ Ibid., p. 11.

²² Easterly, William. *The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good*. London: Penguin Books. 2006. Print. p. 11.

them, which is very much in accord with Sen's agent-oriented conception of development. For example, instead of blindly donating funds or resources, searchers should first consult the people living within the community in order to truly understand the problems that they face in their everyday lives. Searchers would then devise a sustainable solution, often in conjunction with local community members, and embark on a project such as a microfinance program or enable local merchants to sell a highly valued commodity to the community. However, it is conceivable that searchers would sometimes act in a manner to pursue their own agendas, which can have a negative impact on the developing community. Thus, it is important to recognize that to a certain extent, Easterly's depiction of searchers idealizes how rational agents act in market environments.

Regardless, it is clear that adverse consequences can arise when development programs are implemented without regard for the unique social, cultural and economic environment in which they operate. Easterly believes that "the right plan is to have no plan" when it comes to development initiatives, and that "searchers ask the question the right way around: What can foreign aid do for poor people?"²³ Even if planners have good intentions, their initiatives frequently result in adverse consequences in development; the outcome may not ameliorate the problem at hand – it could even intensify it.

The proverb at the beginning of Part One also demonstrates the danger of embarking on temporary or "Band-Aid" solutions to the problem at hand. If you give a man a fish, he will only eat for a day. But if you take the time to teach him how to fend

²³ Ibid., p. 5, 11.

for himself, he will eat for a lifetime. Thus, even if the searchers are able to determine what the people living in a developing community are truly in need of, they should be wary of providing it to them in the form of a handout or a charitable donation. If they do, the developing community can become dependent on their assistance, and it may hinder their motivation and ability to devise solutions for themselves. Instead, the searchers should enable the community members to find solutions that are enduring, tackle the root of the problem at hand, and empower the locals to take ownership of these solutions. This development strategy is very much in line with Sen's beliefs about the importance of individual agency in development; Sen provides the theory on a macro-level while Easterly explores it on a micro-level. The two accounts are complementary and reinforce one another effectively.

Amartya Sen's outlook on development can provide an excellent framework for approaching questions related to Tanzania and examining the country's development landscape. In order to holistically address issues of development, "an integrated and multifaceted approach is needed, with the object of making simultaneous progress on different fronts."²⁴ Sen's conception of development provides this kind of approach, and in combination with Easterly's views, it demonstrates how development initiatives in Tanzania can be approached. Sen's model proposes that multiple freedoms must be secured in order for society to flourish, and that these freedoms are heavily interconnected. It will thus be interesting to consider how Sen's ideals relate to the methodology behind a few development indicators, and will help to assess what insights they can reasonably yield. The next chapter deals exclusively with this topic.

²⁴ Sen, p. 127.

CHAPTER TWO: Development Metrics

Different development metrics employ different conceptions of development. For example, some champion certain factors like equality and others choose to neglect it altogether. As such, these indicators can yield contrasting results based on what philosophy lies behind them. As this chapter will demonstrate, multi-faceted measures of development are more aligned with Sen's conception of development than assessments that are purely economic in nature. Holistic assessments underscore the fact that development is not one-dimensional and has numerous components that can serve to reinforce one another.

GDP, GNP, and GDP Per Capita

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is a purely economic indicator that measures the market value of all officially recognized final goods and services produced within a country in a given period of time. The GDP of Tanzania was \$33.23 billion USD in 2013.²⁵ GDP Per Capita is the GDP of a country divided by its population. The GDP Per Capita of Tanzania was \$694.80 USD in 2013.²⁶ GDP Per Capita aims to provide a more accurate understanding of the average standard of living (in purely economic terms) than GDP alone. However, it can only provide a general idea rather than an exact measure; it

²⁵ "Tanzania." *The World Bank*. Web. 19 Feb. 2015.

²⁶ "GDP per Capita (current US\$)." *Data*. The World Bank, 2015. Web. 23 Feb. 2015.

gives an impression of what an average Tanzanian's income would be if it were a perfectly egalitarian state. In reality, inequalities exist, and income is not distributed equally among Tanzanian citizens. As purely economic indicators, GDP and GDP Per Capita reflect improvements in other capabilities only in terms of their impact on economic facilities. Sen explains this relationship: "Life expectancy does indeed have a significantly positive correlation with GNP [Gross National Product] per head, but this relationship works mainly through the impact of GNP on the incomes specifically of the poor and public expenditure particularly in health care."²⁷ While the GDP only includes goods and services that are produced within a country's borders, GNP encompasses goods and services produced by a country's residents, even if they live abroad.²⁸ For the purpose of this discussion, they can be viewed similarly: both are purely economic measures and only encompass the other freedoms insofar as they impact economic facilities. Thus, these measurements do not correlate very strongly with Sen's views about development due to their one-dimensional nature.

Gini Index

The Gini Index is a measure of the inequality of income distribution in a nation, where a Gini Index of zero expresses perfect equality and a Gini Index of 100 represents maximal inequality. In 2012, Tanzania had a Gini Index of 37.8, which signifies higher equality than countries like the United States and neighboring Kenya with Gini Indexes of 45 in 2011 and 47.7 in 2012, respectively.²⁹ Equality is an underrated factor; despite

²⁷ Sen, p. 44.

²⁸ "GNP." *Investopedia*. Web. 6 Mar. 2015.

²⁹ "Gini Index," *The World Bank*. Web. 23 Feb. 2015.

the fact that only a handful of development indicators take it into account, it is a favorable feature to have in a society because it reduces the chances of hostility and disputes among citizens, which can become intense especially if income inequality coincides with ethnic and religious cleavages. However, in order for a society to truly experience the benefits of equality, it must be coupled with economic prosperity. Furthermore, the Gini Index measures inequality only in terms of discrepancies in income levels, and does not directly assess other kinds of inequalities, such as the extent to which different people have access to healthcare facilities or quality education. Sen does not directly address the question of how inequality can impact development in his conception of development, but it will be discussed in further detail in Chapter Ten of this thesis.

The Human Development Index

While purely economic measures such as GDP can provide a general idea of the standard of living in a country, Sen reminds us that “freedoms depend also on other determinants, such as social arrangements as well as political and civil rights.”³⁰ In conjunction with Mahbub ul Haq, he developed the Human Development Index (HDI) in 1990.³¹ Sen believed that the HDI would offer a much more comprehensive analysis of development in comparison to the GDP and its narrow scope, particularly because the HDI encompasses the “deprivation of elementary capabilities [reflected in] premature mortality, significant undernourishment (especially in children), persistent morbidity,

³⁰ Sen, p. 3.

³¹ Stanton, Elizabeth A. “The Human Development Index: A History,” *Political Economy Research Institute* 2007. Print. p. 11.

widespread illiteracy and other failures.”³² Specifically, the HDI focuses on three facets of development: quality of life, access to knowledge, and standard of living.³³ Quality of life is measured by life expectancy. Access to knowledge is measured by both the expected years of schooling that a child can expect to receive if current patterns of enrollment rates stay the same throughout his or her lifetime, as well as the mean years of schooling for the adult population.³⁴ The standard of living is determined by Gross National Income (GNI), converted using purchasing power parity rates. The data used to calculate the HDI is based on information from the United Nations Population Division, UNESCO, and the World Bank.³⁵

In measuring the HDI, countries are ranked into four tiers of human development (very high, high, medium and low), and are assigned a HDI value in between 0 and 1, where a lower value represents a lower level of development. Tanzania's HDI value was 0.476 in 2012, and was placed in the “low human development” category, ranking 152 of 187 countries and territories.³⁶ However, Tanzania performs much better in terms of GDP, ranking 93rd out of 194 countries across the globe.³⁷ This demonstrates how a purely economic measure can give the illusion of a higher quality of life in a country, overlooking the fact that a notable portion of the population experiences capability deprivations. The HDI is accepted as a useful tool to measure development because it is recognized as a better indication of the quality of life in a country than other one-

³² Sen, p. 20.

³³ “Tanzania HDI Values and Rank Changes in the 2013 Human Development Report.” *UNDP Human Development Report 2013*. United Nations Development Program. Web. 28 Feb. 2015.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ “United Nations Statistics Division – National Accounts.” *United Nations*. Web. 28 Feb. 2015.

dimensional measures. However, it is not widely used; strictly economic measures such as GDP and GDP Per Capita are among the most common measures of development.

The Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index

As an addition to the HDI, the Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI) is a useful tool that reduces the HDI of a country according to the amount of income inequality that is experienced. It was also developed by Amartya Sen and Mahbub ul Haq, and was first introduced in the 2010 Human Development Report by the United Nations Development Program. The IHDI can be understood as follows: “Under perfect equality, the IHDI is equal to the HDI, but falls below the HDI when inequality rises. The HDI can be viewed as an index of the potential human development that could be achieved if there is no inequality.”³⁸ The IHDI is not as widely recognized as the HDI, but provides an interesting perspective on development by taking into account the negative impact that income inequality can have on one’s standard of living. The measure “[discounts] each dimension’s average value according to its level of inequality.”³⁹ The IHDI lies in stark contrast with measures like GDP Per Capita, which assume perfect equality in a society. Although the IHDI takes inequality into account, it is important to recognize that the measure is still limited to income inequality and does not directly incorporate measurements of other forms of inequality.

In 2012, Tanzania’s IHDI value was 0.346, meaning that its HDI value of 0.476 was discounted significantly in areas such as life expectancy and years of education

³⁸ “Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI),” *United Nations Development Program: UNDP Reports*. Web. 28 Feb. 2015.

³⁹ “Tanzania HDI Values and Rank Changes in the 2013 Human Development Report.” *United Nations Development Programme*. Web. 27 Feb. 2015.

based on the amount of income inequality in the country. Since Sen worked to develop this measure of development, it is understandable that the IHDI aligns with his views on development. Although the impact of inequality in development is not explicitly addressed in his book, the formulation of the IHDI demonstrates that Sen believes that inequality can pose considerable challenge for development.

Multidimensional Poverty Index

In the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), first introduced in the 2010 United Nations Human Development Report, capabilities are seen in three ways: in terms of health, education, and standard of living. This measure attempts to take a holistic view of poverty by including these different dimensions, other than assessing poverty in terms of the traditional monetary indicators. This is precisely the conception of poverty that Sen argues for when he states: "Poverty must be seen as the deprivation of basic capabilities rather than merely as a lowness of incomes, which is the standard criterion of identification of poverty."⁴⁰ An example of this conception is as follows: even if a woman is wealthy in the traditional sense of the word, she may actually be poor in terms of her inability to participate in the local economy if she lives in a society with strong gender norms that limit the roles she can play. The MPI measures all three capabilities in terms of households, which helps to account for the burden that some family members may place on others due to health problems or disabilities. However, by measuring poverty in this way, the Index loses certain insights such as discrepancies in gender deprivations, or any changes that may be seen across generations. In 2010, the MPI

⁴⁰ Sen, p. 87.

assessed that 65.6 percent of the Tanzanian population lived in multidimensional poverty.⁴¹

While Sen does not advocate for one particular development metric over another in *Development as Freedom*, he insists that they are different and must be regarded as such. It is clear that indices that recognize that there are multiple capabilities that play a role in development are more in line with his theory of development. With an understanding of Sen's conception of development and how it relates to commonly used development metrics, this thesis now turns to the example of Tanzania in order to demonstrate that development is an intricate process that is dependent on the expansion of various freedoms. The next chapter concludes Part One of this thesis by discussing some of the steps that Tanzania has taken to secure a national identity after independence. This is a key component in the legitimacy that serves as the basis of the country's government, and as the foundation of its political freedoms.

⁴¹ Ibid.

CHAPTER THREE: Nation Building in Tanzania

Tanganyika⁴² was a colony of the German Reich in 1891. It changed hands to the British after the First World War according to a League of Nations Mandate in 1919, and achieved independence on December 9, 1961 under the leadership of Julius Nyerere, who is also referred to as *Mwalimu* (teacher in Swahili) or the *father of the nation*. Tanzania is unique among other African countries for the strength of its national identity as well as its political stability in the post-colonial period. It can be argued that Nyerere's focus on building a strong Tanzanian national identity through policies related to ethnic inclusion, Swahili language, and economic equality are largely responsible for the successful nation building that took place in Tanzania after independence.⁴³ Under his leadership, the state survived as a unified, independent entity and experienced minimal political turbulence and unrest in the post-colonial period.

As outlined, a key strategy that Nyerere employed to avoid political turbulence was to unite Tanzanians under a common national identity. Especially in light of the stark divisions among indigenous tribal groups, Europeans, Asians, and other immigrants, he saw this as a necessary step to unite the country after independence. Nyerere's attitude towards racial inclusion and his corresponding policies meant that Tanzania grew into a

⁴² The name for mainland Tanzania before the country merged with the island of Zanzibar in 1964. In this thesis, the country will be referred to as Tanganyika in historical references that are prior to 1964.

⁴³ Mazrui, Ali A. and Lindah L. Mhando. *Julius Nyerere: Africa's Titan on a Global Stage*. Durham: Carolina Academic Press. 2013. Print. p. 28.

stable and ethnically diverse society, “whereas many other African nations have experienced violent conflicts.”⁴⁴ In East Africa, there was a fair amount of hostility towards Asian immigrants, particularly those of Indian descent, because of the dominant role they played in the local economy. In contrast to Idi Amin of Uganda who pursued policies that segregated the population and eventually expelled Asian immigrants from the country, “Nyerere vehemently denounced racial discrimination.”⁴⁵ Nyerere’s commitment to racial inclusion led him to “forcefully downplay the role of ethnic affiliation in public life and instead emphasize a single Tanzanian identity.”⁴⁶ This helped Tanzanians, regardless of their race or ethnicity, to develop a strong sense of nationhood.

During the pre-colonial and colonial era, the people of Tanzania belonged to various tribes and ethnic groups and had unique cultures, customs, traditions and languages. Their differences led to minimal efforts to cooperate and interact with one another. However, in order to materialize his vision where all Tanzanians of different tribes and races would be united under a common national identity, Nyerere took the following steps: he promoted Swahili as a common language with which Tanzanians could all interact, “moved the national capital [from the coastal city of Dar es Salaam] to the more central location of Dodoma, [restricted] tribal unions and the mention of ethnic groups in newspapers, and stopped collecting information on ethnic identity in national

⁴⁴ Aminzade, Ronald. *Race, Nation and Citizenship in Post-Colonial Africa: The Case of Tanzania*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2013. Print. p. 5.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁴⁶ Miguel, Edward. *Tribe or Nation? Nation Building and Public Goods in Kenya versus Tanzania*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2004. Print. p. 337.

censuses.”⁴⁷ The success of these policies can help to explain why Tanzanians have formed a strong national identity.

The success of Nyerere's policies can also be attributed to the fact that he did not denounce or ban ethnic affiliations, but rather, he downplayed them, and encouraged Tanzanians to adopt a national sense of belonging instead. “When asked the survey question of ‘which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost’ by the Afrobarometer group in 2001, only 3% of Tanzanians answered with their ethnic group, compared to 31% in Nigeria, 40% in Mali, 42% in South Africa and 62% in Namibia.”⁴⁸ After independence, Nyerere's government established the National Swahili Council to promote the use of the language in both public and private settings.⁴⁹ Swahili became a lingua franca and effectively facilitated commerce and interactions with other countries. However, the most significant impact the national Swahili language was experienced within the country itself; the language united the country, since “language policies gave citizens speaking more than 100 ethnic languages the ability to communicate with one another in Swahili and [be] included in the nation-building project.”⁵⁰ The use of the language became so prevalent that Tanzanians of different races, tribal groups and ethnicities began to “acquire Swahili, even in areas where it [was] not the first language, simply as an aspect of growing up.”⁵¹ In politics, “Swahili was [the leading political party's] sole official language, enabling leaders to speak directly to each other and to

⁴⁷ Green, Elliott. *The Political Economy of Nation Formation in Modern Tanzania*. London School of Economics. 2009. Print. p. 15.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁵⁰ Aminzade, p. 4.

⁵¹ Lofchie, Michael F. *The Political Economy of Tanzania: Decline and Recovery*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2014. Print. p. 13.

people almost everywhere, permitting a transferable party bureaucracy.”⁵² The language was also promoted in “administration, education and the media. It became a major instrument of nation building – and nation building became the most lasting of Nyerere’s legacies.”⁵³ Even today, “Tanzania possesses a national Swahili culture, as seen in the countrywide popularity of Swahili press, Swahili poetry and literature, Swahili humor and Swahili music.”⁵⁴ The way in which Nyerere implemented Swahili as a national language was not forceful and did not restrict the use of indigenous languages. Many tribal groups regarded their language as an important part of their culture and still spoke them in unofficial contexts; the indigenous languages “coexisted with Swahili homes and markets.”⁵⁵ In addition, some foreign languages transformed to include elements of Swahili.

For example, the Kutchi language was spoken among the Asian population of Indian origin in Tanzania, and over time, many Kutchi words were replaced with Swahili words in the everyday use of the language. The result was a hybrid language that is still spoken today. The language policies that Nyerere implemented were imperative for nation building and created a common thread among the diverse groups that coexisted in Tanzania at the time. Uniting the country with a common language helped to decrease the amount of conflicts in Tanzania that were along the lines of race or ethnicity, and helped to secure political stability in the future.

⁵² Iliffe, John. *A Modern History of Tanganyika*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1979. Print. p. 530.

⁵³ Mazrui, p. 28.

⁵⁴ Lofchie, p. 13.

⁵⁵ Miguel, p. 261.

With a good understanding of the country's history and the foundations of the government's legitimacy, we can now examine the state of various freedoms in Tanzania. Part Two of this thesis assesses Tanzania's progress since independence according to the five freedoms that Sen outlines in *Development as Freedom*: social opportunities, political freedoms, economic facilities, transparency guarantees, and protective security. Applying Sen's model to assess the development landscape in Tanzania underscores the fact that development is multi-faceted and various components of it are interconnected. It can also help to reveal some of the most pressing sources of unfreedom in the country today, which will be discussed in the conclusion of this thesis.

PART TWO:

FREEDOMS AND UNFREEDOMS IN TANZANIA

“What people can positively achieve is influenced by economic opportunities, political liberties, social powers, and the enabling conditions of good health, basic education, and the encouragement and cultivation of initiatives.”

~ Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom

CHAPTER FOUR: Social Opportunities

Social opportunities are one of five complementary freedoms that Sen outlines in *Development as Freedom*. According to him, social opportunities such as education and health care are integral for improving the quality of life for individuals in a given community. Social opportunities can heavily influence the development of all four of the other freedoms, and have a particularly strong impact on expanding economic facilities and alleviating poverty. As Sen states: “It is not only the case that, say, better basic education and health care improve the quality of life directly; they also increase a person’s ability to earn an income and be free of income-poverty as well.”⁵⁶ This chapter will explore the state of education and health care in Tanzania, and two case studies will demonstrate the interconnections that social opportunities have with the other freedoms. This analysis will also help to yield insights about the most pressing sources of unfreedom in the country today, and on which areas it would be advantageous to focus development efforts in Tanzania.

⁵⁶ Sen, p. 90.

Education Policies Over Time

Just after independence, “there were only nine African veterinarians, two lawyers and one civil engineer” in Tanzania.⁵⁷ Evidently, there was a pressing need for a more educated populace. In 1967, Nyerere wrote the Arusha Declaration, which outlined his vision for Tanzania to become both democratic and socialist. In the Declaration, he called for the country to strengthen the agrarian sector in order to fuel the economy and finance the nation, and attempted to downplay any aspect of the nation that could lead to inequality. The agrarian and egalitarian goals of the Declaration were largely communicated through changes to the country's education system. For instance, in a related policy statement entitled “Education for Self-Reliance,” Nyerere proposed that Tanzania's education program be focused almost exclusively on teaching young citizens to work in agriculture. In his view, the previous educational system had paved the way for inequality to develop among the population, which could be avoided if all students were to focus almost exclusively on farming, and other educational paths were eliminated.

Further, Nyerere believed that the education system would better serve the country if it had a more practical focus. In *Education for Self Reliance*, Nyerere said: “Our young and poor nation is taking out of productive work some of its healthiest and strongest young men and women. There are almost 25,000 students in secondary schools now; they do not learn as they work, they simply learn.”⁵⁸ The new educational system under Nyerere was a vocational one that focused on teaching effective farming methods

⁵⁷ Stabler, Ernest. *Kenya and Tanzania: Strategies and Realities in Education and Development*. Oxford University Press, 1979. Print. p. 39.

⁵⁸ Nyerere, Julius. *Education for Self Reliance*. Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1967. Print.

to young Tanzanians in hopes that they would grow up to become productive workers in agriculture. Thus, instead of focusing on traditional subjects like math and science, “children [were] engaged in the maintenance of the school and its *shamba* (garden plot) and [were] taught farming methods, building techniques, and science related to the local environment.”⁵⁹ In addition to a shift in the curriculum, the racially segregated schools of the colonial period were replaced with an integrated educational system in an attempt to tackle inequality.⁶⁰

The agrarian-focused education system under Nyerere was phased out near the end of his presidency in 1985. Although “Tanzania [currently] has one of the highest net enrollment ratios in Africa,” there are still many problems associated with the quality of the education programs.⁶¹ A number of indicators can demonstrate the fallbacks of the education program such as low retention and completion rates, the fact that few students transition to secondary school (the enrollment rate for lower secondary education is 30.8 percent and 1.9 percent for upper secondary), poor learning outcomes, and the “inapplicability of the skills that graduates can bring to the economy.”⁶² Furthermore, data from the World Bank data indicates that in 2013, for every 100 males enrolled in secondary school, there were only 92 females.⁶³ Although this is an improvement from the previous year in which there were only 88 females for every 100 males, it reveals that gender inequalities in Tanzania are still apparent in terms of education.⁶⁴ The fact that there are fewer females than males enrolled in secondary school could be a consequence

⁵⁹ Stabler, p. 47.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁶¹ “Tanzania – Education.” *USAID*. Web. 22 Feb. 2015.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ “Ratio of Female to Male Secondary Enrollment.” *The World Bank*. Web. 14 Apr. 2015.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

of the increased likelihood for females to drop out of primary school in Tanzania.⁶⁵ As mentioned in Chapter One, an increase in female literacy rates and education levels can reduce infant mortality and have other positive developmental impacts for society at large. This is therefore an area in which development efforts would have broad impacts and should be focused.

Even though there is still much progress to be made in Tanzania's education system, secondary school enrollment has increased by 54 percent over the past five years, although overall enrollment rates still remain low. Despite the increase in enrollment rates, a report by the African Economic Outlook notes that it "has not been matched with the requisite resources in terms of adequately qualified teachers, learning materials and quality infrastructure, leading to declines in pass rates in recent years."⁶⁶ Clearly, Tanzania still needs to make significant strides in its education program in order to effectively secure social opportunities. As Sen argues, social opportunities such as education and health care can complement other freedoms and are crucial in facilitating development.

Education Case Study

As part of the Tanzanian government's aspiration to attain its Vision 2025 development goals by the year 2025, the country plans to implement Swahili as the language of instruction in secondary schools. With English as the current language of instruction, many Tanzanian students are struggling to grasp concepts that are not being

⁶⁵ "Tanzania – Education." *USAID*. Web. 22 Feb. 2015.

⁶⁶ Charle, Prosper, Rogers Dhliwayo, and Josef Loening. "Tanzania 2014." *African Economic Outlook (2014): AfDB, OECD, UNDP*. Web. 22 Feb. 2015.

taught in their mother tongue. In addition to a change in the language of instruction, Tanzania also plans to make both primary and secondary school free of charge at state-run schools in order to increase enrollment rates.⁶⁷ The goals of these policy changes are to be able to better educate the country's youth, and prepare them to participate in the local economy.⁶⁸ Sifuni Mchome, the permanent secretary of the Tanzanian Ministry of Education and Vocational Training, said: "We need a critical mass of skilled labor for the country's development. This cannot be achieved within the current policy."⁶⁹ He hopes that the proposed policy changes will allow more students to succeed in their education, increase their vocational prospects, and create better economic conditions for the country as a whole.

This case study is particularly interesting in light of its ability to demonstrate Sen's concept of interrelated freedoms. Politics, by means of the education policies that the government is choosing to implement, are greatly influencing how other freedoms, namely social opportunities and economic facilities, will be prioritized and facilitated by the government. The political freedoms that people possess enable them to influence the direction of the government's policies. Thus, this case demonstrates the importance of political freedoms since they have the potential to prioritize other freedoms and shape the future of the country.

Moreover, education is essential for improving quality of life as well as expanding capabilities, including but not limited to economic facilities, transparency guarantees and political freedoms. A better educated populace will be able to provide

⁶⁷ "Tanzania Drops English as the Language of Instruction in Secondary Schools." Citi FM Online, 17 Feb. 2015. Web. 27 Feb. 2015.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

greater contributions to their country's economic development for many reasons, including an improved ability to own and manage businesses more effectively. As a result, effective education policies can increase economic facilities. Additionally, educated citizens can better understand their political rights, demand transparency in the government, and keep officials accountable for their actions. Further, when people are educated and literate, they can actively participate in the electoral process, thereby strengthening political freedoms. The interconnections of these freedoms are intricate and endless, and improvements in education can undoubtedly put the country on a positive development trajectory.

While it may be true that the Swahili language could be an asset to the learning process, it could inadvertently serve as a barrier for many students down the road. In our increasingly interconnected and highly globalized world, it is reasonable to predict that future employment prospects will require a fair amount of interaction with foreign entities and individuals. Most likely, these jobs will require competency in the English language, which could be an impediment for students who have undergone Swahili education under the proposed system in Tanzania. While Swahili is widely spoken in East Africa, it is hardly spoken outside of the region, and is unlikely to facilitate communication with international companies, agencies or individuals.

On the other hand, Kenya has a strong history of favoring school instruction in the English language, but has experienced a notable brain drain, whereby masses of educated students with great potential emigrate in search of better prospects abroad.⁷⁰ The brain drain has hindered Kenya's economic development; when students with the greatest

⁷⁰ Siringi, Samuel and Mwaura Kimani. "Kenya: Leading in Brain Drain." *Norwegian Council for Africa*. 8 Dec. 2005. Web. 31 Mar. 2015.

potential tend to leave the country, they take their entrepreneurial spirit, innovative ideas, and work ethic with them, leaving the local economy below its potential. It is possible that Swahili instruction might prevent Tanzania from experiencing this phenomenon as strongly as other countries.

Regardless of whether the language of instruction in Tanzania is English or Swahili, there are pressing structural improvements that still need to be made to the education system. An article in Citi FM Online stated: “The new system might take decades to take root [...] because extensive preparations would need to be made for English to be ditched.”⁷¹ As previously explored, Tanzania's education system still faces pressing challenges. Instead of focusing efforts on changing the language of instruction, perhaps the country would be better off if it were to invest its time and resources in ameliorating the existing system. The proposition to change the language of instruction is part of the Vision 2025 development plans, which currently leaves the country with one decade to achieve its goals according to the timeline. As it stands, it seems unlikely that Tanzania would be capable of executing the language change in a timely and effective manner, unless significant strides are made in the coming years.

Public Health Challenges

In addition to a lagging education system, Tanzania has significant public health concerns. For instance, the maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births) in 2012 was 410, much higher than the global average of 210.⁷² In addition, in 2012 the prevalence of HIV (per 100,000 people) in Tanzania was also higher than the global average at 3,082

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² “United Republic of Tanzania: Health Profile.” *World Health Organization*. Web. 22 Feb. 2015.

versus 511.⁷³ Malaria is also a problem that is worthy of concern, with 17,318 Tanzanians infected per 100,000 people in 2012, compared to a global average of 3,752.⁷⁴ Despite these troubling statistics, public health in Tanzania has seen some progress in recent years, as shown by the following indicators: life expectancy at birth has increased from 51 in the 1990s to 58 in 2011, and under-five mortality rates have declined almost 50 percent from 128 per 1,000 live births in 2000 to 68 in 2011. The infant mortality rate has also seen a similar, but less dramatic decline.⁷⁵ Tanzania has also made some progress in reducing the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in society. The 2010 Demographic and Health Survey and the 2011/12 HIV and Malaria Indicator Survey found that 5.1 percent of the population aged 15-49 is HIV positive, compared to 5.7 percent in 2007/08.⁷⁶ This can likely be attributed to the success of newly implemented education programs for HIV/AIDS prevention, in addition to increasing the accessibility of treatment options such as antiretroviral therapy.⁷⁷

Between the fiscal year of 2009/2010 to 2010/2011, the Tanzanian government increased the amount of the national budget that was allocated for the health sector by 25.2 percent.⁷⁸ The government also increased the amount allocated for water and sanitation projects by 14.5 percent in the same year.⁷⁹ The concrete steps that the government planned to take with this budget increase, as outlined in the national budget, included: increasing HIV/AIDS service centers; making medicine, maternity and family

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Charle, et. al.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ "The Citizen's Budget: A Simplified Version of the National Budget 2010/11." *Policy Forum Tanzania*. 2010. Web. 27 Feb. 2015.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

planning equipment readily available; distributing mosquito nets to every household for malaria prevention; and improving water sanitation programs in rural areas.⁸⁰

In light of these ambitious plans, it is important to recognize that it is not uncommon for plans to go awry in Tanzania. Also, corruption is pervasive in government agencies, and oftentimes, large portions of the national budget are lost to corrupt ends.⁸¹ It would be interesting to assess whether the plans that were outlined in this budget were completed; however, due to low transparency in the country, an assessment of these plans is inaccessible to the public on the Internet. It is even difficult to find a published form of the national budget for the following fiscal year, 2011/2012. However, the statistics above do indicate that Tanzania has made strides in public health in recent years, and it is reasonable to assume that the increased government budget allocation has been contributing to the success. Even so, there still remain many pressing concerns related to prevention and treatment of illnesses as well as the accessibility of health care in the country. According to Sen, “health care improve[s] the quality of life directly; [it] also increase[s] a person’s ability to earn an income.”⁸² Thus, comprehensive health care is a fundamental component of social opportunities, and can serve as a positive reinforcement for other freedoms.

Public Health Case Study

The Seva Canada Foundation is a non-profit organization whose mission is to restore sight and prevent blindness in the developing world.⁸³ Seva also has a chapter

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Kabendra, Erick and Mark Anderson. “Tanzanian PM Under Pressure to Resign Over Alleged Fraudulent Payments.” *The Guardian*. 28 Nov. 2014. Web. 30 Mar. 2015.

⁸² Sen, p. 90.

⁸³ “Who We Are.” *Seva Canada Foundation*. Web. 2 Mar. 2015.

based in the United States called the Seva Foundation. The organization operates in Tanzania as well as in eight other developing countries across the globe, focusing its efforts on preventing blindness through health education and restoring sight through cataract surgeries. Seva works with local communities to educate people about proper eye health, build medical facilities, train doctors, and find other sustainable solutions to preventable and treatable eye problems. By concentrating specifically on alleviating this disability, Seva is able to transform the lives of many individuals who were previously unable to actively participate in their societies. Consequently, the organization transforms the lives of disabled individuals' families who were previously burdened with the responsibility of caring for their loved ones.

The Seva model embodies Sen's beliefs about the ability to achieve development by alleviating unfreedoms. As Sen notes, "social opportunities of education and health care [...] complement individual opportunities of economic and political participation."⁸⁴ Preventing and treating blindness increases an individual's social opportunities, which thereby increases his or her economic facilities by allowing him or her to be a more active participant in the society. It also increases his or her political freedoms by allowing him or her to participate in the electoral process, and even provides him or her with the potential to work as a government official, which is something that would have otherwise been a limited option. Furthermore, Sen states: "Handicaps such as age or disability or illness reduce one's ability to earn an income. They also make it harder to convert income into capability, since an older, or more disabled, or more seriously ill person may need

⁸⁴ Sen, p. xii.

more income to achieve the same functionings.”⁸⁵ Thus, organizations that aspire to achieve similar goals as Seva Canada can have a wide-reaching impact on the societies in which they operate. This case study has demonstrated one way in which the expansion of social opportunities can have positive consequences for political freedoms and economic facilities. The next chapter deals exclusively with the topic of political freedoms in Tanzania, which are heavily interconnected with other freedoms and are imperative to secure in order for development to take place.

⁸⁵ Sen, p. 88.

CHAPTER FIVE: Political Freedoms

Chapter Three discussed nation building in Tanzania after independence and touched on the success of Nyerere's policies in maintaining political stability in the post-colonial era. This chapter will build upon the background information that was provided in Chapter Three to examine the state of political freedoms in Tanzania. Political freedoms have the unique ability to influence the extent to which the other freedoms will be expanded by implementing particular policies. The expansion of political freedoms by means of participation and engagement in the electoral system and government are integral components of development, and can have a positive impact on the expansion of other freedoms.

Politics at the Time of Independence

A common sentiment in Tanganyika during the pre-colonial era was that the “immigrant Asian population [had] received monopolies and privileges from the colonial administration,” leaving the indigenous Africans in an inferior social status.⁸⁶ This frustration was one of the key motivations for the indigenous peoples to work towards independence from Britain. Many interest groups began to form at this time, including the Tanganyika African Association, which later transformed into the Tanganyika

⁸⁶ Berg-Schlosser, Dirk and Rainer Siegler. *Political Stability and Development: A Comparative Analysis of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda*. Chicago: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1990. Print., p. 68.

African National Union (TANU), which was the main political party that engaged in the struggle for independence. TANU exists today as the incumbent Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), which translates to Party of the Revolution in English. It was formed in 1977 when the key ruling party in Zanzibar, the Afro-Shirazi Party, and TANU merged. On December 9, 1961, Tanganyika became independent, and Julius Nyerere, the leader of TANU, became Prime Minister and was later elected as the president. Nyerere took action to unite Tanganyika with the island of Zanzibar in 1964, forming the country of Tanzania as we know it today. Although united with Tanganyika, Zanzibar had devolved powers and still maintained its own government. Today, Zanzibar still has a semi-autonomous government and legislature.⁸⁷ Among other reasons, Nyerere's strong leadership capabilities, the lack of any dominant tribal group, and the promotion and acceptance of the national language of Swahili assisted Tanzania to achieve "a sense of national identity sooner and more thoroughly than almost any other African state."⁸⁸ Indeed, as previously mentioned, Tanzania has a uniquely peaceful history compared to the ethnic strife, coups, and tribal conflicts that are common in many countries in the region.⁸⁹

From Single-Party to Multi-Party Politics

Upon achieving independence, multi-party elections were abolished, and TANU candidates ran against one another in the election of 1965. In the Arusha Declaration of 1967, President Nyerere declared that the country would be a one-party, democratic, and

⁸⁷ "Tanzania Overview." The World Bank. Web. 23 Feb. 2015.

⁸⁸ St. John, Christopher. "Toward 'Uhuru' in Tanzania: The Politics of Participation by G. Andrew Maguire." *The Journal of African History* 11.4 (1970): 616-618. JSTOR. 20 Feb. 2015.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

socialist state. As Michael Lofchie notes in *The Political Economy of Tanzania*, “The major step in Tanzania’s authoritarian drift was the creation of a constitutionally mandated single-party state in 1965. [...] An open, multi-party democracy, which would empower the rural majority to oppose this policy, would place the [incumbent party’s] strategy at risk.”⁹⁰ The era of single-party rule was marked with “the continuation of a number of colonial-era laws combined with a set of new laws [which] gave the Tanzanian government a high degree of coercive authority over the lives of individuals and the activities of civil society associations.”⁹¹ For example, the Preventive Detention Act enabled the police to imprison anyone who was suspected of dissident political activity without trial. Further, entire villages and towns could be held responsible for the political behavior of a few of their members.⁹²

Although Tanzania was not a totalitarian state, policies that favored greater state control, tended towards authoritarianism, and limited the freedom of the individual citizens existed for many years. In 1991, concerns about the country’s single-party democracy heightened to a point where they could no longer be disregarded. Many Tanzanians, including Nyerere himself who had left office in 1985, felt that the CCM had “lost touch with the people.”⁹³ Further, the belief that good governance was a necessary prerequisite to development became a common ideology among many influential donors and organizations like the World Bank, which had a significant influence on aid-dependent Tanzania.

⁹⁰ Lofchie, p. 45.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 52-53.

⁹³ “Tanzania’s Road to Multi-Party Democracy; Focus on a Single Mission’s Efforts.” *A Diplomat’s Handbook: For Democracy Development Support*. Web. 20 Feb. 2015.

The Tanzanian government appointed a commission to investigate whether Tanzania should change over to a multi-party political system; the Nyalali Commission “recommended that Tanzania indeed establish a multi-party democracy, and identified 40 pieces of ‘repressive’ legislation, together with the establishment of a body to oversee the transition process, which would include a redrafting of the constitution.”⁹⁴ Thus, as part of widespread political and economic reforms in 1992, Tanzania returned to a multi-party electoral process with thirteen registered political parties.⁹⁵ Since then, the number of participating political parties has ranged from eleven to nineteen, “although only six of these has been able to achieve representation in Parliament where they are considerably vocal on issues such as transparency and accountability.”⁹⁶ Despite the transition to a multi-party democracy, the CCM has maintained power throughout Tanzania’s history.

The Proposed Constitution

In 2012, Tanzania began a process to review and rewrite the country’s Constitution; the existing Constitution was passed in 1977 when the country was under single-party rule.⁹⁷ Despite the fact that a law requires a new Constitution to be adopted one year prior to the October 2015 elections, Attorney General Frederick Werma has confirmed that the referendum will be held on April 30, 2015.⁹⁸ To begin the process, the government travelled the country to speak to Tanzanian citizens to gather ideas for elements to include in the new constitution. However, the opposition lawmakers led by

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ “Tanzania: A Country Analysis.” United Nations University. Web. 20 Feb. 2015.

⁹⁶ “Tanzania Overview.” The World Bank. Web. 23 Feb. 2015.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ “Tanzania to Vote on New Constitution.” News24, 23 Oct 2014. Web. 20 Feb 2015.

the Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA) party, which translates to the Party for Democracy and Progress in English, argued that the citizens' views were not adequately represented in the proposed draft. In fact, the CHADEMA representatives stormed out during a related debate with the ruling CCM party.⁹⁹ The drafting process is ongoing; some proposed changes include: allowing women equal land ownership rights, requiring equal representation of men and women in parliament, setting a limit on the number of cabinet ministers the president can appoint, and altering the relationship between the government of mainland Tanzania and the autonomous government of Zanzibar.¹⁰⁰

In light of the plans in the proposed Constitution, it is important to recognize the implications of changing the role of women in society. Despite the fact that “Tanzania has been at the forefront of creating a positive legal framework and political context for gender equality,” women’s economic freedoms are still limited due to societal and cultural constraints.¹⁰¹ Taking steps to increase various kinds of capabilities for women can be a crucial factor in bringing about effective development. Allowing women to enjoy economic freedoms will undoubtedly result in overall economic growth, since half of the population, which was previously limited from doing so, will now be able to make contributions to the economy as both owners and consumers. This is a prime example of how political and economic freedoms are interconnected: policy changes can directly influence economic capabilities.

⁹⁹ “Tanzania Announces Constitution Referendum for April 2015” *Constitution Net*. Web. 10 Apr. 2015.

¹⁰⁰ Ng’wanakilala, Fumbuka. “Tanzania to Hold Referendum on New Constitution in April 2015.” Yahoo! News, 22 Oct 2014. Web. 20 Feb. 2015.

¹⁰¹ Ellis, Amanda, Mark Blackden, Jozefina Cutura, Fiona MacCullough and Holger Seebens. *Gender and Economic Growth in Tanzania: Creating Opportunities for Women*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. 2007. Print. p. 4.

In addition, political freedoms and social opportunities are also interrelated; while the proposal to have an equal representation of men and women in the government is laudable, if the elected or appointed women have not undergone sufficient education, they may be unprepared to make knowledgeable decisions in their positions, which could dilute the quality of the government, and could lead to adverse consequences in various capacities for the entire country. As previously noted in Chapter Four, levels of enrollment in school are higher for males than for females in Tanzania. Thus, it may be advantageous to invest in social opportunities in conjunction with implementing equal gender representation in the government, and ensure that both men and women have access to quality education programs in the country so that they are equally prepared to represent their country in the political process if they so choose.

Another proposition in the constitution was for Tanzania to implement a system of federalism, which would be similar to the system that is in place in neighboring Kenya, and would entail devolving powers to smaller regions within the country. However, this idea was rejected on the grounds that it “would create [a] separate sense of nationality hence divide [the country].”¹⁰² Given that Tanzanians tend to identify strongly with their country, largely thanks to Nyerere's post-independence policies, it is understandable that a proposition to have federal governments would be met with resistance.¹⁰³ A previous draft of the constitution, which accepted the proposed idea of federalism, also proposed that the number of Members of Parliament (MPs) who are appointed by the President should be limited to 75. However, a more recent version that

¹⁰² “Tanzania: Final Draft of Proposed New Constitution Tabled.” *Constitution Net*. Web. 10 Apr. 2015.

¹⁰³ Robinson, Amanda L. “National Versus Ethnic Identification in Africa: Modernization, Colonial Legacy, and the Origins of Territorial Nationalism.” *World Politics* 66.04 (2014): 709-46. *Cambridge Journals*. Web. 10 Apr. 2015.

rejects federalism has contentiously changed the presidential limit to 360, arguing that it is in better accordance with a centralized system of government.¹⁰⁴

The idea of federalism in Tanzania originated from Zanzibar's expressed desire for greater autonomy from the mainland. Recall that under Julius Nyerere's leadership, Zanzibar merged with mainland Tanganyika to form Tanzania soon after independence from Britain. The two have been united for 51 years while Zanzibar has still maintained its own semi-autonomous government, but many Zanzibaris argue that this degree of autonomy is not sufficient and the mainland has too much power. In fact, the Constitutional Review Commission "found that 60% of Zanzibaris were unhappy with the terms of the union [and] proposed more autonomy" as a solution.¹⁰⁵ The final draft of the Constitution has attempted to address some of Zanzibar's expressed aggravations while still maintaining the union. For example, Tanzania's national debt would no longer impact Zanzibar's "mandate to borrow money within and outside the United Republic to bankroll activities under its authority."¹⁰⁶ However, it is unclear as to whether this would placate the majority of Zanzibaris who feel that the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar does not have enough autonomy.

Sen's conception of development can demonstrate why political freedoms are far-reaching, crucial for almost every aspect of the state to operate efficiently, and have important implications for how best to plan for Tanzania's future. Additionally, political freedoms have a unique power to influence which other freedoms are prioritized through the political process: "Indeed, one of the strongest arguments in favor of political

¹⁰⁴ "Tanzania: Final Draft of Proposed New Constitution Tabled." *Constitution Net*. Web. 10 Apr. 2015.

¹⁰⁵ "The Status of Zanzibar – Imperfect Union: Tanzania's Constitutional Crisis." *The Economist*. 22 Nov. 2014 Web. 27 Feb. 2015.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

freedom lies precisely in the opportunity it gives citizens to discuss and debate – and to participate in the selection of – values in the choice of priorities.”¹⁰⁷ This underscores the sheer importance of the proposed Constitution: much of the development trajectory is dependent on the political process.

Assessing Political Freedoms in Tanzania

As a single-party and somewhat oppressive state soon after independence, Tanzania lacked many of the political freedoms that Sen exalts in his conception of development. According to Sen, “unfreedom can arise either through inadequate processes (such as the violation of voting privileges or other political or civil rights) or through inadequate opportunities that some people have for achieving what they minimally would like to achieve.”¹⁰⁸ The lack of political choice in the electoral process was a pressing unfreedom in Tanzania at the time, in combination with a number of repressive laws that constrained the citizens’ everyday activities.

The repressive laws also elicited a considerable amount of fear of the state rather than enabling citizens to actively question or participate in the government. The political unfreedoms restricted the ability of an active civil society to operate freely, and also inhibited other capabilities that are related to political freedoms, such as economic facilities and transparency guarantees. Since “greater freedom enhances the ability of people to help themselves and also to influence the world, and these matters are central to the process of development,” it is clear that political freedoms are central to

¹⁰⁷ Sen, p. 30.

¹⁰⁸ Sen, p. 17.

socioeconomic development and poverty alleviation in Tanzania.¹⁰⁹ The attempt to redraft the Tanzanian Constitution demonstrates that there is increasing pressure on the government to protect the capabilities and freedoms of the Tanzanian people. Attempting to equate the representation of men and women in government and granting women equal property rights indicates a step in the right direction for gender equality and for political and economic freedoms. However, other freedoms, such as social opportunities, should also be secured in the process.

Timeline

Key political and related economic developments that have occurred in Tanzania from independence to the present day are summarized in a table, which is provided below. As discussed in Chapter One, the interconnections between political and economic freedoms are particularly strong, especially because politics can determine the economic policies that are implemented in a society. Tanzanian economic development will be described in further detail in the next chapter.

Table 1: Key Political and Economic Events in Tanzania

Year	Event
1961	Tanganyika achieves independence from Britain with Julius Nyerere as President; multi-party politics are abolished with Nyerere's party (CCM) as the only legal political party ¹¹⁰
1964	Nyerere takes action to merge mainland Tanganyika with the island of Zanzibar, forming the country of Tanzania

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ "Tanzania Economic Development Timeline," *The Public Broadcasting Service*. Web. 20 Feb. 2015.

1967	Arusha Declaration and implementation of Ujamaa socialism
1974-76	Forced relocation to Ujamaa villages; Imports increase and exports decrease
1980	Nyerere is re-elected; Tanzania borrows heavily from the IMF; Small-scale private enterprise is allowed
1981-84	Nyerere holds strong to tenets of Arusha Declaration despite economic struggles; rejects IMF demands to liberalize economy as a prerequisite for additional aid
1985	Nyerere resigns; Ali Mwinyi elected as President; Facing a potential default, Mwinyi agrees to IMF and World Bank demands; Price controls and import restrictions are eliminated
1987-90	IMF supports Mwinyi's reform program with additional aid
1990	High growth in agriculture and other industries; Foreign direct investment increases dramatically
1992	Constitutional amendment to allow multi-party elections and implement widespread economic reforms including a free market economy
1995	Benjamin Mkapa elected as President; Renews commitment to market reforms and secures aid inflow; Reforms in monetary and financial sector unify exchange rates and attract foreign banks
2000	Economic growth at an average of 4% per year; Tanzania becomes eligible for debt relief from IMF; Tanzania forms East African Community (EAC), an EU-style common market, with Kenya and Uganda
2001-02	United States cancels \$15 million of debt in 2001; Cancels remaining \$21.3 million in 2002
2005	Jakaya Kikwete elected as President
2006	France donates \$60 million for Tanzanian development projects; EAC expands to include Rwanda and Burundi
2007	EU offers EAC duty free and quota free access to most EU products

2008	United States signs \$700 million development grant for Tanzania; Tanganyika Oil acquired by subsidiary of China for \$2 billion
2009	China signs cooperation agreement with Tanzania worth millions of dollars
2010	Standard Bank of Africa allocates \$100 million for small-scale farmers in Tanzania and other African countries; Kikwete re-elected for a second Presidential term, ending in October 2015
2015	Referendum on new constitution to be held in April 2015; General election to be held on October 25, 2015: President, Members of Parliament and local government will be elected, incumbent president Kikwete is ineligible to be re-elected due to term limits

CHAPTER SIX: Economic Facilities

This chapter examines how economic freedoms in Tanzania have changed over time and assesses the current state of economic freedoms in the country. It also highlights the importance of infrastructure in securing development and concludes with a discussion of the role of foreign direct investment in the economy. The analysis of economic freedoms in Tanzania will reveal their over-arching importance in development and their strong relationship with other freedoms.

A History of Economics in Tanzania

In the pre-colonial period, Tanganyika was comprised of numerous tribal groups, which were centered on pre-capitalist modes of production in the village community. There were “working ‘owners’ of land [and] small peasant cultivators. [...] Their independence was regulated by their mutual relationships as members of a community, by the need to safeguard common land for common needs.”¹¹¹ The notion of equality among all members was central to the tribal structure, and there was no pervasive social hierarchy.¹¹² Social relations and interactions, rather than the accumulation of benefits or wealth, were the driving force for this societal arrangement.¹¹³

¹¹¹ Rweyemamu, Justinian. *Underdevelopment and Industrialization in Tanzania*. Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1973. Print. p. 4.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

The communal pre-colonial societal structures were put to a test when Tanganyika became a German colony. Despite their disinterest in engaging in projects to develop the country, the Germans still attempted to implement a harsh system of taxation in Tanganyika. However, the taxation was perceived as exploitative and was met with strong resistance from the indigenous peoples. In 1905, a rebel group took control of the entire southern part of Tanganyika; the Germans were not successful in ending the persistent movement for two years. The Germans faced great difficulty in ruling the country, which meant that the amount of influence that they were able to exert on the colony was limited. The limited amount of economic change experienced in Tanganyika during the colonial period is particularly evident in comparison to the dramatic changes seen in other African colonies, such as Kenya under British rule.¹¹⁴ Thus, the Tanganyikan pre-colonial economic structures remained largely in tact throughout the period of German rule.

When Tanganyika became a British colony at the end of the First World War, “the British colonial administration did not attempt to develop the infrastructure any further” because they were uncertain as to whether they would keep the colony as a part of their Empire.¹¹⁵ Neighboring Kenya became a part of the British East Africa Company in 1888, and was regarded as a crucial colony for British economic affairs. Much more concerned about their affairs in Kenya, the British did not invest heavily in the economic development of Kenya's southern neighbor. While the British effectively transported their system of capitalism and private property to Kenya, their efforts to do so in Tanganyika were limited. Thus, the pre-colonial egalitarian economic structures in

¹¹⁴ Berg-Schlosser and Siegler, p. 67.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

Tanganyika persisted throughout the colonial era and provided a basis for socialism to take hold in the years following independence.¹¹⁶

Although the economic changes that took place in Tanganyika during the colonial period are negligible compared to those experienced in Kenya and in other African colonies, it is important to take note of a few important legacies that the German and British colonial powers left behind. During the colonial period, Tanganyika experienced significant advancements in technological innovation, particularly in the form of transportation and agricultural machinery.¹¹⁷ Further, one of the most important legacies of colonialism was the fact that the Europeans set the pace for development and undermined the confidence and ability of the Tanzanian people to embark on it on their own accord.¹¹⁸ As Julius Nyerere expressed, “Years of European domination had caused our people to have grave doubts about their own abilities. [...] Indeed it can be argued that the biggest crime of oppression and foreign domination in Tanganyika and elsewhere is the psychological effect it has on the people who experience it.”¹¹⁹ This relates strongly to the idea that empowering the local community can be a precursor to effective development, which was discussed in Chapter One. Here, Nyerere argues that the colonial powers hindered the country's ability to progress by enforcing their authority over local Tanganyikans and disenfranchising them. Further, the fact that the British favored certain ethnic groups, such as the Asians during colonial rule, also had a damaging impact on the indigenous peoples and other populations, and limited the extent to which they were involved in the local economy.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Rweyemamu, p. 6.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Nyerere, Julius K. *Freedom and Unity: Uhuru na Umoja*. Oxford University Press. 1967. Print. p. 3.

Economics after Independence

After independence, most sectors were set aside for public enterprise, and only some remained open to private investors. Private property, which had become an integral component of the economy, was abolished; and “the nationalization of all land at the beginning of the 1960s made it impossible to accumulate private holdings in the future.”¹²⁰ Since the traditional, communal structures in the country had largely persisted throughout the colonial period, it paved the way for Nyerere to nationalize industries and implement other socialist policies after independence. In fact, Nyerere claimed: “African society prior to European colonization was essentially socialistic, [and] our first step, therefore, must be to re-educate ourselves; to regain our former attitude of mind.”¹²¹ The fact that Nyerere argued for this notion of “re-education” meant that socialism was not to be viewed as a radical change, but rather, as a return to what Tanzanians had experienced prior to colonial rule. With this notion, Nyerere attempted to bring legitimacy to his implementation of socialism.

In 1967, Nyerere outlined a new development plan for Tanzania in the Arusha Declaration. The tenets of the Declaration stemmed from Nyerere's belief that “the nation was in fact drifting without any sense of direction [...] drifting away from our basic socialist goals of human equality, human dignity and government by the whole people.”¹²² It officially proclaimed the socialist direction that the country would take in the years following independence, and stated that Tanzania would be a democratic as well as a socialist country. It enforced “egalitarian structures, collective production in

¹²⁰ Berg-Schlosser and Siegler, p. 69.

¹²¹ Clark, W. Edmund. *Socialist Development and Public Investment in Tanzania 1964-73*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1978. Print. p. 42.

¹²² Stabler, p. 35.

villages [also known as Ujamaa], state control of central industries, [...] and using one's own abilities and resources as far as possible."¹²³ Ujamaa socialism was seen as the country's ultimate objective during this period. There was a forced relocation of the population to live in Ujamaa villages, and by 1976, 80 percent of Tanzania's population was living in rural areas.¹²⁴ This kind of socialism emphasized "the restitution of the egalitarian and humanistic principles of traditional African life within the context of a modern technical society, [ideally] serving the welfare needs of all its people."¹²⁵ In this way, socialism could be seen as a return to the egalitarian system of societal organization that Tanzania had experienced in the pre-colonial period.

In order for Tanzania to be self-reliant and lessen its dependence on foreign aid, Nyerere planned to expand the country's agrarian sector. Prior to the Declaration, "all foreign aid was accepted whatever the terms, [under the] belief that a temporary sacrifice of economic independence would produce a quicker rate of economic development which would ultimately lead to [economic] independence."¹²⁶ True economic development, Nyerere believed, would only occur if the state avoided the interference of foreign aid organizations and corporations at all costs. Nyerere also believed that economic development through traditional means, such as through industry and production, did not need to be a central focus of the state, and would come naturally if Tanzanians were self-reliant and developed a strong agricultural sector. In the Declaration, Nyerere stated: "Industries will come and money will come but their foundation is the people and their

¹²³ Berg-Schlosser and Siegler, p. 36.

¹²⁴ "Tanzania Economic Development Timeline," *The Public Broadcasting Service*. Web. 20 Feb. 2015.

¹²⁵ Rweyemamu, p. 70.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

hard work especially in agriculture.”¹²⁷ Thus, Nyerere believed that agriculture would serve as the basis of the economy, but measures to protect and enhance it were not developed, nor were steps taken to diversify the economy following its initial success. Nyerere's goals of economic development were hardly realized, and the struggles “during this period of radical reform [caused] Tanzanian economic growth rates [to lag] far behind [those of] Kenya” and other African countries.¹²⁸

The Failure of the Arusha Declaration

Although Nyerere had attempted to restrict foreign aid and investment, Tanzania's inability to successfully provide for itself through its policies of socialism and self-reliance inadvertently forced the country to accept more foreign aid, which soon became an integral component of the national economy: “The proportion of development aid in the investment budget, which had dropped to 20 percent in the late 1960s, rose to 60 percent in 1972 owing to multilateral donors such as the World Bank and states sympathetic to Tanzania's development policies.”¹²⁹ The goals of the Arusha Declaration were not realized, in part because TANU “did not develop either the discipline or the depth of support to really organize the people for a transformation to socialism,” and also because Tanzania's ailing economy could not support the socialist ideals that Nyerere had proposed.¹³⁰

¹²⁷ Nyerere, Julius. *The Arusha Declaration and TANU's Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance*. 1967. Print.

¹²⁸ Miguel, p. 347.

¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 347.

¹³⁰ Clark, p. 27.

Nationalization meant that many industries “suffered from mismanagement, embezzlements, and widespread inefficiency from the very start.”¹³¹ Furthermore, Nyerere’s focus on building the state with agriculture as the basis of the economy meant that “the distribution of economic activity – and hence of population and purchasing power – [was] almost entirely determined by agricultural and climatic conditions,” which made the Tanzanian economy extremely vulnerable to droughts and poor weather conditions.¹³² Consequently, “agricultural export decline manifested itself in scarcities of such consumer items as clothing, medicines, automobile tires, soap, chemical products, plastic goods and even soft drinks.”¹³³ Not only were consumer goods scarce, “evidence of the country’s dismal economic performance [also] manifested itself in the deterioration of the roads, schools, and medical facilities and the unreliability of public utilities such as water and electricity.”¹³⁴ Under Sen’s model, the inability of Tanzanian citizens to acquire desired goods and services at this time is a prime example of a lack of economic freedoms in the country. In fact, Sen argues: “The freedom to participate in economic interchange has a basic role in social living.”¹³⁵ The fact that there was a lack of economic freedoms in Tanzania at this time was particularly problematic because “economic unfreedom can breed social unfreedom, just as social or political unfreedom can also foster economic unfreedom [since] economic unfreedom, in the form of extreme poverty, can make a person a helpless prey in the violation of other kinds of freedom.”¹³⁶

¹³¹ Berg-Schlosser and Siegler, p. 71.

¹³² Rweyemamu, p. 3.

¹³³ Lofchie, p. 32.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

¹³⁵ Sen, p. 7.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

Thus, the economic unfreedoms that were a result of the socialist economic policies likely destabilized other kinds of freedoms for Tanzanian citizens.

It soon became clear that Tanzania's economy and society were suffering greatly and that the continuation of his socialist ideals would only exacerbate these dire conditions. Nyerere had little choice but to ease some of the restrictions that he had placed on the economy; he opened investment to private entities and foreign corporations, permitted an increased inflow of foreign aid, and agreed to the demands of the lenders in order to prevent the country's economy from collapsing. Nyerere took these steps reluctantly; he was unwilling to completely overlook the tenets of the Arusha Declaration, and still held strong to many of the socialist policies that he had originally implemented. Thus, it can be argued that true economic liberalization did not take place until Ali Mwinyi replaced him as President in 1985. It is reasonable to infer that "the principal reason for Tanzania's economic decline lay in its poor choice of economic policies during the post-independence period," and that Nyerere's attempt at socialism left a legacy of economic underdevelopment in the country, from which it never fully recovered.¹³⁷

Economic Reform and Growth

There were three main pillars to Tanzania's reform-oriented policies, which began in 1985. The first was large-scale privatization, where virtually all state-owned enterprises were privatized beginning in 1992. The second was liberalization, where "current account transactions, the exchange market, agricultural prices, and marketing

¹³⁷ Lofchie, p. 19.

boards were gradually liberalized, as the state increasingly retreated from dominating economic activities.”¹³⁸ The third was macroeconomic stabilization, where tight fiscal and monetary policies helped to reduce inflation. In addition to a shift in domestic policies, an increase in foreign aid also spurred economic and social development, although it was on the donor's terms. The Tanzanian government had initially been “pessimistic about the growth benefits of free markets as the best economic model,” but Sen notes that “the freedom to enter markets can itself be a significant contribution to development, quite aside from whatever the market mechanism may or may not do to promote economic growth or industrialization.”¹³⁹ Thus, Tanzania's transition from a centrally planned to an open market economy was a step toward greater economic freedoms for the country's citizens.

Today, Tanzania continues to be heavily reliant on foreign aid. In the 1980s, “Tanzania was among the most aid-dependent countries in sub-Saharan Africa [and] World Bank economists considered Tanzania the most aid-dependent of African countries.”¹⁴⁰ Everything from the country's civil servant salaries, to infrastructure support, to basic public services such as education, healthcare, public transportation, disease control and agricultural research were all dependent on funds provided by donor organizations and countries.¹⁴¹ As Lofchie notes, “without donor support, aid-dependent governments such as Tanzania's might have ceased to exist in any meaningful sense of

¹³⁸ Treichel, Volker. “IMF Working Paper: Tanzania's Growth Process and Success in Reducing Poverty,” International Monetary Fund, 2005. Print. p. 12.

¹³⁹ Sen, p. 7.

¹⁴⁰ Lofchie, p. 105.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

the term.”¹⁴² It is thus important to take note of Tanzania's history of dependence on aid, and acknowledge that this has greatly shaped the kind of development that has taken place in Tanzania after the tenets of the Arusha Declaration were abandoned.

Tanzania's economy has been growing steadily in recent years. Current growth is around seven percent, driven primarily by developments in communications, transportation, financial intermediation, construction, agriculture and manufacturing.¹⁴³ Table 2, provided below, indicates the percentage change in GDP of each industry in Tanzania from 2008 to 2012. It demonstrates that over the four year period, there was a slight decrease in agriculture, the hotel and restaurant industries, and public administration, a significant decrease in finance, real estate and business services, a slight increase in fishing, mining, electricity, construction, and wholesale and retail trade, and a significant increase in manufacturing. The slight decrease in agriculture and significant increase in manufacturing can indicate that the country's economy is advancing.

*Table 2: GDP by sector in 2008 and 2012 (percentage)*¹⁴⁴

Sector	2008	2012
Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing	29.7	28.7
Mining	3.7	3.8
Manufacturing	8.6	9.2
Electricity, gas, water	2.3	2.4
Construction	8.5	8.9

¹⁴² Ibid., p. 106.

¹⁴³ Charle, et. al.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

Wholesale and retail trade, hotels, restaurants	15.7	16.0
Transport, storage, communication	7.3	8.3
Finance, real estate, business services	11.2	10.1
Public administration, education, health, social work, community, social and personal services	9.0	8.6
Other services	3.8	4.0

The Importance of Infrastructure

A study undertaken by the African Economic Outlook in conjunction with the African Development Bank, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and the United Nations Development Program predicts that future economic growth in Tanzania will be supported by ongoing investments in infrastructure, among other factors. For example, growth projections are supported by “continued investments in the recently discovered natural gas reserves in Tanzania and the expansion in public investments, including the ongoing construction of a USD 1.2 billion gas pipeline from Mtwara to Dar es Salaam.”¹⁴⁵ In fact, “companies from at least ten different countries have staked their claims” in the development of Tanzania’s reserves.¹⁴⁶

In the 2013-2014 Competitive World Index of the World Economic Forum, Tanzania was given a low score of 3.2 out of 7 in an assessment of the country’s overall infrastructure.¹⁴⁷ In addition to other areas for improvement, major sectors such as transportation, energy, water, and port facilities are “still very poor and in urgent need of

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Mampitty, Zachariah. “Accursed by Man, Not God: The Fight for Tanzania’s Gas Lands.” 20 Aug. 2013. Web. 10 Apr. 2015.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

government action.”¹⁴⁸ Currently, only 24 percent of the population has access to electricity, which is not only a hindrance in the personal lives of Tanzanian citizens, but is also an obstacle for businesses.¹⁴⁹ In a report entitled “Mobile Phones and Economic Development in Africa,” Jenny Aker notes: “Merely 29 percent of roads are paved, barely a quarter of the population [of sub-Saharan Africa] has access to electricity, and there are fewer than three landlines available per 100 people.”¹⁵⁰ Clearly, poor infrastructure is not something that is unique to Tanzania; it is something that is common across the continent.

However, this should not discourage the country from embarking on initiatives to improve infrastructure in the country. In fact, it can be an integral component of effective development. Especially since “empirical evidence has shown that there is a positive relationship between improvements in infrastructure quality and economic growth,” it is not surprising that a simulation by the African Economic Outlook stated: “If Tanzania’s infrastructure platform were improved to the level of Mauritius, for instance, the country’s annual per capita growth would increase by 3.4 percent.”¹⁵¹ In the same vein, the World Bank estimates: “Across the continent, improved infrastructure of all sorts may increase economic growth by 2 percentage points a year.”¹⁵² From these figures, it is clear that investments in infrastructure would yield high returns in terms of economic development. These benefits would not only be seen in terms of the expansion of

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Aker, Jenny C. and Isaac M. Mbiti. “Mobile Phones and Economic Development in Africa.” *Center for Global Development*. Jun. 2010. Print. p. 3.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² “African Roads and Rails – All Aboard: A Boom in Building Roads and Railways Should Unclog Economic Bottlenecks, but is it Sustainable?” *The Economist*. 28 Feb. 2015. Web. 2 Mar. 2015.

economic facilities; as Sen argues, economic freedoms can serve to facilitate other freedoms.

The increase in GDP from improvements in infrastructure would only indicate a small portion of the far-reaching positive effects that would be experienced in other facets of life in Tanzania. For example, social opportunities can be expanded if paved roads increase access to schools and hospitals. In addition, political freedoms can be expanded if people who live in rural areas are able to access the city centers and participate in the electoral process. With reference to the development metrics that were analyzed in Chapter Two, an observed increase in holistic measures, such as the HDI, would be a more accurate reflection of the multi-faceted improvements that Tanzania could experience from improvements in infrastructure, while an increase in GDP would only demonstrate the related gains in economic facilities. Overall, it is clear that improvements in infrastructure can ameliorate the quality of life for Tanzanians through expanding a multitude of freedoms.

While infrastructure may not be the most attractive investment for governmental or non-governmental agencies, it could very likely have the most wide-reaching results. An article in the Economist states: “The question many poor countries face is whether to give priority to improving their roads or investing in other vital projects, such as hospitals, schools or power lines. Yet access to markets, schools, and hospitals often depend on paved roads to distant towns and cities.”¹⁵³ This emphasizes the fact that improvements in infrastructure can serve as the basis for the expansion of other freedoms.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

Moreover, building or paving roads may actually facilitate the kind of agent-centered development that both Sen and Easterly champion.

For example, consider two scenarios: in one, a non-governmental organization embarks on a wide-reaching project to vaccinate underprivileged Tanzanian children to protect them from preventable diseases. In the second scenario, the same organization invests in paving roads and connecting previously isolated villages to the main city centers. In the second case, the new roads facilitate economic interactions and enable the villagers to participate in the economy, and the villagers eventually earn enough money to be able to afford to vaccinate their own children. While the outcomes of the two scenarios are the same in terms of immunizations, in the second, the villagers are empowered to take charge of their own development efforts, gain economic facilities, and feel pride in being able to provide for their own children. These outcomes could inspire them to embark on further development initiatives on their own accord. In addition, the effects of the roads are much more wide reaching for the country as a whole. As the article in the Economist article states, the roads can enable children to attend school, increase access to public health facilities such as hospitals, and increase interactions with people in the surrounding areas.¹⁵⁴ It is for this reason that the Economist argues that instead of the current \$6.8 billion that sub-Saharan Africa is investing in roads, it should be spending closer to \$10 billion.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁴ Adapted from a discussion with Professor Paul Hurley at Claremont McKenna College.

¹⁵⁵ "African Roads and Rails – All Aboard: A Boom in Building Roads and Railways Should Unclog Economic Bottlenecks, but is it Sustainable?" *The Economist*. 28 Feb. 2015. Web. 2 Mar. 2015.

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)

Another reason why economic growth is predicted to continue to take place in Tanzania is because the country remains a very popular destination for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In fact, the entire continent has experienced a significant increase in FDI from \$27 billion USD in 2000 to \$122 billion USD in 2010.¹⁵⁶ In 2013, FDI was a significant 6.4 percent of Tanzania's GDP. As stated in an economic report by the African Development Bank,

“Tanzania remains a major FDI destination, with mostly greenfield investments in the extractive and tourism sectors. Its potential [...] lies in the successful exploitation of trade linkages with regional trading partners, as well as careful exploitation of natural resources, including minerals and natural gas, to ensure economic spinoffs and employment creation.”¹⁵⁷

Among other reasons, foreign countries engage in FDI in order to expand their domestic businesses to a larger global market and take advantage of other opportunities for growth. Five out of ten of the world's fastest growing economies are in Africa; the continent's potential for economic growth has resulted in a shift in the world's relations with Africa from a predominantly aid-driven agenda to one that now prioritizes investment as well.¹⁵⁸

In particular, China has capitalized on Africa's recent economic growth by allocating a significant portion of its global FDI to the continent. For example, China has invested in the construction of the TAZARA (Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority)

¹⁵⁶ Yonazi, Enock, Tim Kelly, Naomi, Halewood and Colin Blackman. “The Transformational Use of Information and Communication Technologies in Africa.” *The World Bank, The African Development Bank, The African Union*. 28 May 2012. Print. p. 23.

¹⁵⁷ “Tanzania Economic Outlook.” *African Development Bank*. Web. 27 Feb. 2015.

¹⁵⁸ Bergen, Peter. “Obama's goal in Africa: Counter China.” *CNN*. 26 Jun. 2013.

railway line from Zambia to Tanzania, and also focuses on investing in trade and extracting raw materials.¹⁵⁹ The United States and France are the two highest sources of FDI in Africa in dollar amounts. However, China invested 3.4 percent of its international FDI stock in Africa in 2012, while the United States only invested 0.7 percent.¹⁶⁰ The United States chooses to invest a higher percentage of its FDI in Europe, Latin America and Canada, but China sees a greater advantage from investing in Africa and chooses to invest accordingly. China has many state-owned, small, and medium-sized enterprises that can benefit from FDI in Africa. The majority of Chinese FDI involves small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), while the rest is due to larger, state-owned enterprises (SEOs). SMEs are drawn to investment in Africa because they see an opportunity to gain from being involved in the African market, especially if their domestic market is already saturated.¹⁶¹ Also, Chinese SMEs are also known to be highly adaptable and flexible, which makes them well suited to reap the benefits from the conditions in the African market.

Recent growth and the projection of continued economic growth provide reasons to look to the future of the Tanzanian economy with optimism. However, corruption is so deeply engrained into Tanzanian society, to the extent that it greatly affects the development of the economy and the expansion of economic facilities for the majority of the population. The following chapter assesses Tanzania according to the fourth freedom that Sen outlines in his book: transparency guarantees.

¹⁵⁹ Van Dijk, Meine Pieter. "The Role of China in Africa, In Particular Chinese Foreign Direct Investment." *Africa Studies Center* (2007). *Panel 76 AEGIS European Conference on African Studies*. Print.

¹⁶⁰ Copley, Amy. "The U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit: A Focus on Foreign Direct Investment." Brookings Institution. 11 Jul. 2014. Web. 10 Feb. 2015.

¹⁶¹ Gu, Jing. "China's Private Enterprises in Africa and the Implications for African Development." *European Journal of Development Research*. 2009. Print.

CHAPTER SEVEN: Transparency Guarantees

For Tanzanians, corruption is an inescapable part of everyday life, and there is limited transparency in almost every aspect of society. The negative impact that corruption has on Tanzanian politics, economics, and social interactions is astounding. One problem associated with corruption is the deep divide between social classes; those who are fortunate enough to hold positions in the government, which they likely attained through bribery or nepotism, are able to extract resources from the state for their own benefit, without regard for many middle and lower-class Tanzanians who live in poverty. The deeply engrained nature of corruption in Tanzania makes it unsurprising that “in 2009, President Kikwete estimated that one-third of Tanzania’s annual budget of nine trillion Tanzanian shillings was being lost to corruption.”¹⁶² While it may be convenient for the president to consider the money as “lost,” the truth is that it is likely diverted to the pockets of the government officials. Nevertheless, no matter what term is used, this figure is deeply troubling, especially when one considers the multitude of undeveloped institutions and programs in the country, such as those related to infrastructure, education, healthcare, social services, and more, which could certainly benefit from this portion of the national budget. It is therefore evident why transparency guarantees are one of the five freedoms that Sen outlines in his model – corruption can undermine all of the other capabilities. This chapter will first seek to define corruption, explore the different

¹⁶² Lofchie, p. 49.

kinds of corruption that are commonplace in Tanzania, examine the implications that corruption can have on the other four freedoms in Sen's model, and conclude with a discussion of potential solutions to the rampant corruption continues to be experienced in the country today.

What is Corruption?

Tanzanians face a difficult choice when others take advantage of them through the system: either they can accept defeat, or in turn, they can attempt to recoup their losses and benefit from exploiting others. The outcome of this choice has resulted in a cycle of corruption that is so deeply ingrained in the society that it seems to be insolvable. Corruption can take many forms, such as bribery, nepotism or the misappropriation of funds. For the purpose of this thesis, the term "corruption" is understood as a "general term covering misuse of authority as a result of considerations of personal gain, which need not be monetary."¹⁶³ Corruption directly undermines Sen's freedom of transparency guarantees. Daniel E. Agbiboa identifies four major types of corruption in his article entitled "Between Corruption and Development." The first is cost-reducing corruption, whereby a company illegally reduces their tax obligations to the state.¹⁶⁴ The second is cost-enhancing corruption, in which the government sets price ceilings on commodities, often resulting in shortages of essential goods.¹⁶⁵ The third, benefit-enhancing corruption, is when civil servants illicitly allocate resources for certain individuals or groups, usually

¹⁶³ Agbiboa, "Between Corruption and Development: The Political Economy of State Robbery in Nigeria." *Springer Science and Business Media* (2010): JSTOR. 6 Nov. 2014. p. 327.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 238.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 239.

for people with which they are acquainted, or in order to facilitate a bribe.¹⁶⁶ The fourth is benefit-reducing corruption, where civil servants manipulate the system in such a way that they can benefit from services that were meant for others. An example of this type of corruption is if “a manager of a state pension fund delay[s] the transmission of retirement benefits to pensioners, deposit[s] the funds in an interest-bearing account at a local bank, and subsequently appropriate[s] the accrued earnings for his own benefit.”¹⁶⁷ In Tanzania, there are countless instances of corrupt activities such as these; the vast majority of them go undocumented.

Examples of Corruption in Tanzania

Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ranks countries based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be. A score of zero on this index indicates a high amount of perceived corruption, whereas a score of 100 would indicate that there is no perceived corruption. In 2014, Tanzania ranked 31 out of 100, placing its ranking at 119 out of 175 countries across the globe.¹⁶⁸ This measurement underscores the prevalence of corruption in the country and places Tanzania into perspective with the rest of the world; alarmingly, more than half of the other countries in the world experience less corruption than Tanzania.

Corruption in Tanzania is not limited to government affairs – it extends to everyday interactions in the country. In *The Political Economy of Tanzania*, Michael

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ “Corruption by Country/Territory.” *Transparency International*. Web. 27 Feb. 2015.

Lofchie notes that corruption is so commonplace in Tanzanian society that it has even developed its own vocabulary:

“The [Swahili] expression *lete chai* (literally, “bring me a cup of tea”), means, “May I have a bribe?” and generally elicits the favorable response, *mitakupa chai* (“I will give you tea”). Encounters with the police also have their own phraseology: the common expression *kuingia bure, kutoka kwa pesa* means that there is no cost to go in to the police station, but it will require a bribe to leave.”¹⁶⁹

Lofchie argues: “Once embedded in the system, corruption becomes entrenched. [...] Despite an outpouring of donor complaints, media attention, and citizen frustration, the problem remains unabated.”¹⁷⁰ Alarmingly, almost all of the Tanzanian government departments including the justice department and police force are corrupt. Even if criminals are caught, turned over to the police, and forced to pay a fine, the police force is notorious for pocketing at least a portion of every fine.¹⁷¹ In fact, “one of the most common forms of corruption in Tanzania is the extortion of bribes by the police for imagined offenses.”¹⁷² Unfortunately, more often than not, “reporting a crime to the police is counterproductive, as the police themselves rob the poor or are in cahoots with the criminals.”¹⁷³ When the police engage in the same activities as the criminals, the dangers of living in this kind of society are endless. With a corrupt police force setting a negative example for the citizens in conjunction with a lack of legal enforcement,

¹⁶⁹ Lofchie, p. 45.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 46.

¹⁷¹ Cole, p. 29.

¹⁷² Lofchie, p. 45.

¹⁷³ Easterly, p. 132.

criminals are unafraid and may even feel justified to steal from others and engage in other kinds of criminal activities.

Lofchie notes that corruption in Tanzania “arose as a coping mechanism that enabled public officials, in contrast with ordinary Tanzanians, to augment their incomes.”¹⁷⁴ The public officials do not only seek to extract from the state for their own personal gain – it is also for the benefit of their close friends and relatives: “In Tanzania, extended family pressures added even further to the challenge of reducing corruption, as those fortunate enough to have lucrative public sector employment were expected to provide for relatives who did not.”¹⁷⁵ This system results in a society that is not only characterized by an ‘every-man-for-himself’ mentality, but also an ‘every-family-for-themselves’ approach to everyday life. Lofchie notes, “What had begun as corruption for the purpose of supplemental income had led, in a series of stages, to the mutilation of an entire social class. [...] This evolutionary sequence explains why corruption has proven so difficult to eradicate.”¹⁷⁶ Government positions are seen almost entirely as opportunities to capitalize on the extractive, corrupt nature of the state for lucrative ends. In fact, “any government official or politician who is in a position to enrich himself corruptly but has failed to do so will, in fact, be ostracized by his people upon leaving office. He would be regarded as a fool, or selfish or both.”¹⁷⁷ The fact that someone who does not steal from the state would be regarded as “selfish” reveals the lack of moral qualms associated with extracting resources at another’s expense. Therefore, one reason why corruption is so rampant in Tanzanian society is because it is highly profitable, it is

¹⁷⁴ Lofchie, p. 40.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 43.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 42.

¹⁷⁷ Agbiboa, p. 330.

an easy way to augment meager incomes, and it comes with little remorse on behalf of the perpetrators.

High rates of corruption in Tanzania are an indication that there are other societal problems that are not being addressed. For example, many people feel forced to steal from the state or from their fellow citizens because they see no other means to acquire their desired ends. Often times, there are not enough employment opportunities available, and even those who are lucky enough to have a job are not paid a wage that is reasonable enough to cover their expenses. Other times, they witness the politicians and officials of the state engaging in corrupt activities and feel justified in mimicking these actions in their everyday lives. This mimicry can be exacerbated by a view of the state as something that is illegitimate or immoral due to the corrupt actions of government officials.

Implications for Other Freedoms

A low level of transparency guarantees can have various consequences for all of the other freedoms. One way in which social opportunities and protective securities could be hindered is because a considerable portion of the national budget is squandered in corrupt activities. In a highly transparent society, the amount the national budget that could be allocated for these programs could be significantly higher. However, unless this is transparency is coupled with extensive political freedoms including universal suffrage, a highly engaged civil society, and other elements of democracy, it is unlikely that the national budget would be allocated towards ends that would contribute to development and the expansion of freedoms.

Corruption also has a negative impact on political freedoms, since corrupt activities provide politicians with a prime opportunity to extract from the state under a guise of serving the country's citizens. In fact, some job postings for political positions in sub-Saharan Africa attract prospective applicants by listing the benefits that can be acquired from the job, without even beginning to explain any responsibilities that the individual would be expected to fulfill. The extractive nature of a position in the government is among the top priorities for those who are seeking to attain such a role, and whether the official ever acts on his or her responsibilities is not clear. Further, corruption in the political system can actually serve to inhibit government action on development initiatives if the government actors are too comfortable in their existing positions. The Tanzanian government can and should be concerned with investing in the well being of the country's citizens, but if the political elite reap enormous benefits from the status quo, it is conceivable that they would be opposed to any significant changes. A report by the Crisis States Research Center at the London School of Economics echoes this concern: "The very people who should be supporting the consolidation of state authority and legitimacy in the eyes of urban residents actually undermine the state and have powerful incentives to maintain the informal status quo."¹⁷⁸ Moreover, the ineffectiveness of the government in administering effective urban expansion, particularly in Dar es Salaam, has created yet another mechanism for government agents to extract rents from the state. It has also provided a platform for the incumbent CCM

¹⁷⁸ Beall, Jo, Sean Fox and Haris Gazdar. "Policy Directions: Cities and Fragile States" *Crisis States Research Center – London School of Economics*. Jun 2010. Web. 27 Feb. 2015.

political party to retain its support in urban areas by not enforcing rational urban planning regulations in order to appease landowners.¹⁷⁹

Corruption can also have a negative impact on economic facilities by hindering long-term investments, faith in the system, and the amount of social capital and trustworthy relationships that can be formed. Lofchie notes, “The cause and effect connection between corruption and low growth is both multidimensional and all-pervasive. Corruption represents a transfer of scarce economic resources away from vitally important expenditures on schools, medical facilities, and infrastructure.”¹⁸⁰ Not only has corruption had a negative impact on the public sector, it has also hindered the development of the private sector. Corruption has greatly obstructed the potential for the economic system to function optimally; it is a potentially insurmountable hurdle for all kinds of Tanzanian businesses. It is interesting to take note of how this has shaped the most common types of industries that businesspeople choose to engage in:

“In an environment in which virtually every business activity involved some sort of transaction with a governmental agency, bribes increased the costs and the risks of everyday business activity. This has lowered economic performance by shifting investment priorities away from productive enterprises, such as factories and farms, which were proving to be vulnerable to official predation, toward economic activities that exposed less capital to political risk, such as small retail kiosks or other forms of petty trading.”¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Lofchie, p. 47.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

Therefore, the corrupt environment poses great challenges for Tanzanian businesspeople, hindering the economic performance of the country. Additionally, the Tanzanian economy operates below its potential because of the losses that Tanzania has endured in terms of human capital; wary of the hazards that the corrupt environment poses, many bright and aspiring entrepreneurs take their businesses elsewhere in the world in hopes of finding a greater chance of success.¹⁸² Moreover, the existing system is inhospitable for investment, since “Tanzanian courts have offered no certainty that business contracts would remain binding, that business partners would make payments as scheduled, or that contractors would deliver goods and services of agreed-upon quality.”¹⁸³ Thus, corruption greatly undermines various facets of the economy and keeps the country's economic performance at low levels.

Potential Solutions to Corruption

In order to tackle corruption, transparency and accountability are necessary. An educated populace with an active civil society and voting rights is essential in order for government transparency to increase, because the people must demand it of their government in order for it to materialize. However, a Catch-22 arises: government dollars are being squandered through corruption, so there is low investment in public education in Tanzania. In other words, the lack of government transparency provides a low breeding ground for an active civil society, which in turn allows corruption to continue to occur. It is reasonable to conclude that break in this cycle must occur in order for

¹⁸² Ibid., p. 48.

¹⁸³ Ibid., p. 47.

Tanzanian society to progress and move forward.¹⁸⁴ In order to solve problems associated with corruption in Tanzania, the leadership must agree to take steps to fight it. However, as long as the Tanzanian government officials and elite continue to reap the benefits of the system, it seems unlikely that this will happen anytime soon. The real question is how government officials could be persuaded to do their jobs in such a way that would be beneficial for themselves as well as for the society over which they preside. This section will explore a few potential strategies to tackle corruption in Tanzania, and in Chapter Nine, the ability of technological innovations to circumvent corrupt practices will be discussed.

In a country like Tanzania where the police force is just as corrupt, if not more corrupt than the citizens it is supposedly monitoring, some sort of public shaming of those who engage in corrupt behavior would be helpful in order to keep order and justice. For that to occur, the conception of corruption must be changed from something that is acceptable to something that is shameful. Avner Grief proposes a multilateral punishment strategy, as described by William Easterly in *The White Man's Burden*. In such a system, “everybody in a network agrees that they will never hire an agent who has ever cheated any of them.”¹⁸⁵ This increases the consequences for cheaters: if they violate an agreement, it will decrease their chances of doing repeat business with others in the community. This system would “have an ongoing relationship of trading, so one [member] will not cheat the other and risk losing all future trade. Potential business

¹⁸⁴ For an alternate view, see “Governance, Economic Growth and Development since the 1960s” by Mushtaq H. Khan.

¹⁸⁵ Easterly, p. 84.

partners stay on probation for a while until you trust them.”¹⁸⁶ This system could have a positive impact for economic facilities since the trust and accountability that preserve transparency guarantees are also central to securing overall economic growth.

According to Easterly, “Different societies have different amounts of ‘social capital’ or ‘trust,’ that is, how much people follow rules without any coercion.”¹⁸⁷ In a self-interested society where most people only look out for themselves, their closest relatives and friends, and jump at the opportunity to benefit at a stranger’s expense, there is less trust, which translates into less rapid economic growth.¹⁸⁸ Unfortunately, this kind situation sounds similar to the conditions in Tanzania at present day. However, it is possible that increasing the amount of trust in society could curb corruption and stimulate the economy. In order to increase the amount of trust in society, people must be dependable and give others good reason to trust them, and in order for people to be dependable, there must be consequences for their actions. Especially in a society where the police force cannot be depended on to enforce justice and order, informal checks like Grief’s multilateral punishment strategy could potentially serve as negative reinforcement for corrupt behavior.

As previously mentioned, a major reason why corruption is so commonplace in Tanzania is because there are few economic opportunities for the citizens. Those lucky enough to attain a position in the public sector still receive a meager and undependable salary, and their counterparts who do not hold positions in the government are even worse off. There is a desperate need for more viable opportunities for Tanzanian citizens

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 82.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

to productively contribute to their economy. Agbiboa suggests that taking steps to enable the private sector to thrive would have a positive effect on curbing corruption.¹⁸⁹ The World Bank also promotes the idea of “reducing regulations, licensing requirements, and other barriers to entry for new firms” in Tanzania.¹⁹⁰ A potential means to tackle corruption could be to require all public officials to manage privately held businesses in order to attain a position in the government. Not only could this generate additional income for the public servants, it could also stimulate the economy by creating more job opportunities for the citizens. This requirement could help Tanzania transition away from an economy that is dominated by the public sector, promote more research and innovation, and create a start-up culture. Just as the Tanzanian leadership is currently setting a poor example for the citizens by engaging in corrupt practices, if they are required to hold private enterprises, they could instead set a positive example for citizens to follow suit. The benefits of curbing corruption in this way would not be limited to improvements in economic facilities; since corruption undermines all four of Sen’s other freedoms, an increase in transparency guarantees could expand social opportunities, political freedoms and protective security programs, thereby enabling development to take place. However, convincing government agents to adopt such a policy would be a challenge in and of itself.

Shortsightedness can lead government officials to engage in corrupt political practices that will yield them immediate benefits. Yet, if political corruption in Tanzania were to decrease, the overall state of the economy and standard of living would improve

¹⁸⁹ Agbiboa, p. 335.

¹⁹⁰ “Helping Countries Reform Economic and Sector Policies.” *Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank*. The World Bank. Web. 27 Feb. 2015.

greatly. These improvements would certainly be beneficial for the elite members of society as well as for others, but these long-term benefits are easily overlooked. The situation is similar for economic corruption; corporations would benefit from being more reliable, but it is often tempting for them to engage in unethical behaviors. Some countries have enacted regulations to prevent economic corruption, such as the United States' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).¹⁹¹ While American businesses could certainly benefit from cutting corners in their transactions, they also recognize that compliance with this act makes them a trustworthy choice when engaging in international business, which contributes to their success. In addition, NGOs, international consortiums and trade agencies can also provide incentives for countries to adhere to international standards with regards to curbing political and economic corruption. Therefore, there are feasible ways in which government officials and corporations can be enticed to refrain from engaging in corrupt activities. Judging by the success of other countries, there is hope that someday Tanzania might take steps to align political and economic incentives in this manner. Furthermore, NGOs can also influence the development of an active civil society in Tanzania, which could demand transparency in the government and thereby reduce corruption.

Overall, it is clear that corruption is a multi-faceted issue that can serve to undermine the expansion of other freedoms in the country. As previously mentioned, corruption can undermine protective securities because it can diminish the amount of funds that are available to the government to devote to social security programs. Among other factors, this is one of the reasons why protective securities in Tanzania remain

¹⁹¹ "Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977." *The United States Department of Justice*. Web. 21 Apr. 2015.

underdeveloped. The next chapter explores the state of protective securities in Tanzania in detail.

CHAPTER EIGHT: Protective Security

Protective security is set in place to assist the poorest and most vulnerable members of society, and in Sen's view, it is one of five freedoms that can secure development. The provision of education and health care services is a component of protective security, which is why this freedom is heavily related to the expansion of social opportunities, which were discussed in detail in Chapter Four. According to Sen, "priority [should be] given to providing social services (particularly health care and basic education) that reduce mortality and enhance the quality of life."¹⁹² The World Bank views effective social protection programs as those that are "designed to reduce poverty and vulnerability by promoting efficient labor markets, diminishing people's exposure to risks, and enhancing their capacity to manage economic and social risks, such as unemployment, exclusion, sickness, disability and old age."¹⁹³ There are three common types of social protection programs: labor market interventions, which are policies that aim to promote employment and worker protection programs, social insurance, which provides security for individuals in the case of unemployment, sickness, disability, work-related injury, and old age, and social assistance programs such as welfare that transfer

¹⁹² Sen, p. 46.

¹⁹³ "Social Protection Sector Strategy: From Safety Net to Springboard." *The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development: The World Bank* (2001): *Institute for Development Studies*. Web. 23 Feb. 2015.

resources to the most needy and vulnerable members of society.¹⁹⁴ Sen argues that economic underdevelopment is not a valid justification for a lack of social programs in a country: “A poor economy may *have* less money to spend on health care and education, but it also *needs* less money to spend to provide the same services, which would cost much more in the richer countries.”¹⁹⁵ This is because “the relevant social services [...] are very *labor intensive*, and thus are relatively inexpensive in poor and low-wage economies.”¹⁹⁶ Thus, Sen argues that economic prosperity in Tanzania is not a necessary prerequisite for effective social protection programs; in fact, the interconnectedness of freedoms means that expanding these very programs can facilitate economic growth and consequently have a positive impact for the expansion of other freedoms.

Factors Causing Protective Security Dilemmas

As explored in the previous four chapters, there are numerous factors that can lead to a deprivation of freedoms. For example, economic conditions affecting the public and private sectors, “as a result of national policies, changes in international markets, or policies of foreign governments” can have a serious impact on the kinds of protective measures that the state sets in place for its citizens.¹⁹⁷ Also, natural environmental conditions can lead to droughts and famines, which can have negative consequences for the economy as well as for the standard of living of the people in a society.

Environmental conditions can also be degraded by the poor control of natural resources

¹⁹⁴ “Social Protection.” *Wikipedia*. Web. 23 Feb 2015.

¹⁹⁵ Sen, p. 48.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁷ Lerrisse, Fred, Donald Mmari, and Mgeni Baruani. “Vulnerability and Social Protection Programmes in Tanzania.” *Research and Analysis Working Group* (2003). Print. p. 8.

by government agencies.¹⁹⁸ In addition, government policies such as those regarding taxation and social security programs can increase poverty and social deprivation in a society. Socio-cultural values and norms, such as those that restrict the role of women in society, can also hinder social progress.¹⁹⁹ Further, health conditions such as epidemics, famine, the inaccessibility of safe drinking water, and the prevalence of diseases such as cancer and HIV/AIDS are a significant component of poverty and freedom deprivations.²⁰⁰

Examining Protective Security in Tanzania

The current state of social protection programs is severely limited in the country. The United Nations Social Protection program in Tanzania states: “ninety percent of Tanzanians have no protection in the event of life contingencies, livelihood shocks or severe deprivation. [Only] a small number – mostly wealthy people living in urban areas – have formal security and health insurance with modest benefits.”²⁰¹ Also, many children remain unprotected by the state; there are over two million orphans, and twenty percent of 5-17 year olds are involved in child labor.²⁰² Table 3 below depicts some of the most vulnerable groups of individuals in Tanzania and explains the specific challenges that they face.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ “Social Protection.” *United Nations in Tanzania*. United Nations Tanzania, 2011. Web. 23 Feb. 2015.

²⁰² Ibid.

*Table 3: Vulnerable Social Groups in Tanzania*²⁰³

Social Group	Description
Children and Youth	Vulnerable to disease, malnutrition, and inadequate care. Some live on the street, are neglected and marginalized, and fend for themselves through begging, rummaging through garbage, and stealing. At considerable risk for exploitation; often engage in risky and low-paid jobs.
People with disabilities	Physically handicapped or mentally incapacitated. Usually unable to work for earnings, and depend on the work of others.
The elderly	People who are 65 years old and above. Cultural attitudes and values will influence the way in which the community will care for the elderly.
People with prolonged illness (such as HIV/AIDS)	People who are affected by communicable and non-communicable diseases. In addition to physical inability, people in this group are often faced with stigmatization.
Women	Marginalized widows and other women unable to support themselves due to economic and social processes.
People with substance abuse problems	Adults who regularly engage in substance abuse as well as children and youth who are at risk of substance abuse. This vulnerable group often lives or works on the streets, do not attend school, and earn a living from begging, sex work, or stealing. A large percentage of alcoholics are adult males who may increase the vulnerability of women through creating economic hardship for the family and/or through increased domestic violence.

²⁰³ Lерisse, et. al. p. 9.

Potential Solutions to Protective Security Dilemmas

A potential method of addressing the inadequate social security programs in Tanzania could be to invest in sectors that can have the maximum impact on poverty reduction, such as agriculture and manufacturing.²⁰⁴ Additionally, the benefits of investing in infrastructure could be wide reaching and improve the standard of living for the poorest individuals in society, thereby reducing their need for protective security programs in the first place. Furthermore, it would be advantageous to take additional steps to guarantee that future revenues from the country's industries and natural resources will be invested in such a way that improves the business climate and yield positive benefits for all citizens.²⁰⁵ With low transparency guarantees and a high prevalence of corruption in Tanzania, social protection programs remain underdeveloped. Recall that under Sen's conception of development, it is beneficial to prioritize these programs, even if the economy remains underdeveloped in other sectors. As Sen says, "a country need not wait until it is much richer [...] before embarking on rapid expansion of basic education and health care," and before securing these freedoms through effective protective security programs.²⁰⁶

With a clear picture of Tanzania's development over time according to Sen's five freedoms, we now delve in to Part Three of this thesis that deals with two additional factors that are central to development. The next chapter discusses the role of technology, focusing particularly on its potential to address various unfreedoms in Tanzania and serve as a catalyst for development.

²⁰⁴ Charle, et. al.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Sen, p. 48-49.

PART THREE:

TECHNOLOGY AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF

CAPABILITIES

“[Technology] lets people be creative. It lets people be productive. It lets people learn things they didn't think they could learn before, and so in a sense it is all about potential.”

~ Steve Ballmer, CEO of Microsoft from 2000-2014

CHAPTER NINE: The Role of Technology


The world has seen incredible advancements in technology in recent years, and the improvements in quality of life that these advancements have been able to yield are far-reaching. This chapter will explore how a few technological innovations have the potential to expand freedoms and greatly contribute to development in Tanzania.

Among other great technological advancements, sub-Saharan Africa has recently experienced incredible growth in the use of mobile phones. At the beginning of 2012, “there were almost 650 million mobile subscriptions in Africa, more than in the United States or the European Union, making Africa the second-fastest growing region in the world [in terms of mobile phone use] after South Asia.”²⁰⁷ The global mobile revolution has been particularly noteworthy in the developing world, and “mobile phone technology in developing countries now accounts for four out of every five connections worldwide.”²⁰⁸ In these countries, mobile phones are not only being used for traditional communication purposes; they are transforming the way in which people conduct business, sign up for government-sponsored programs, receive health care, learn educational material in schools, and more. Figure 1 (below) depicts the dramatic increase in mobile subscriptions in Africa between the years of 2000 to 2011.

²⁰⁷ Yonazi, et. al., p. 1.

²⁰⁸ “Technology Can Empower Children in Developing Countries – if it’s Done Right.” *The Guardian*. 17 Jun. 2013. Web. 3 Mar. 2015.

*Figure 1: Mobile Phone and Fixed Line Subscriptions in Africa, 2000-2011*²⁰⁹



Mobile phones fall under the umbrella of information and communication technologies (ICT), which are the “key to improving the lives of Africans and driving entrepreneurship, innovation and economic growth throughout the continent.”²¹⁰ An example of an ICT that can advance economic facilities is Esoko, which is a tool that was developed for use on mobile platforms to deliver crucial information to farmers and improve their agricultural prospects.²¹¹ Esoko allows farmers to learn of the current market prices of goods without having to travel long distances to discover them.²¹² A Kenyan text-messaging platform called SokoniSMS64 can work in conjunction with Esoko to allow farmers to negotiate deals with traders before they even arrive at the

²⁰⁹ Yonazi, et. al., p. 22.

²¹⁰ “Technology Can Help Africa Leap-Frog Development Challenges.” *African Development Bank Group*. 28 May 2013. Web. 3 Mar. 2015.

²¹¹ “The Most Powerful Platform for Connecting to Farmers.” *Esoko*. 2015. Web. 7 Mar. 2015.

²¹² Tsao, Clara. “6 Ways Mobile Technology Has Transformed the World’s Poor.” *Huffington Post*. 10 Aug. 2013. Web. 3 Mar. 2015.

market.²¹³ While Esoko is operational in Kenya and in other parts of the continent, it is not operational in Tanzania. However, there are other innovations such as Tigo Kilimo in Tanzania, which offer similar services to Esoko and also provide “instant weather figures and agricultural tips to small-scale farms.”²¹⁴ In addition, an application called iCow allows farmers to track their cows’ gestation periods so that they are aware of the best opportunities to expand their herd.²¹⁵ In combination with other useful tools, these kinds of mobile applications have the potential to transform the agricultural sector by greatly increasing efficiency and productivity. Under Sen’s conception of development, these mobile applications could be viewed a successful expansion of economic facilities for the Tanzanian population. As discussed, an expansion of economic freedoms can have a domino effect on expanding other crucial freedoms in a society.

Low transparency guarantees and high rates of corruption in Tanzania make it both costly and time consuming to have any kind of paperwork processed by the government. Mobile applications can provide an effective method of circumventing this issue by making it possible to process birth and death registries from a mobile device. The flagship Mobile Vital Records System (VRS) in Uganda allows people to register births and deaths in such a manner that is as simple as dialing a phone number followed by a pin. Within the first few months of operation from January to July 2013, the VRS contributed to a 4.7 percent reduction in the number of unregistered children under the age of five in Uganda.²¹⁶ Especially in a region that has high fertility rates (the World

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ “Cow Farming Program Wins Apps 4 Africa Competition.” 8 Oct. 2010. Web. 7 Mar. 2015.

²¹⁶ Tsao, Clara. “6 Ways Mobile Technology Has Transformed the World’s Poor.” *Huffington Post*. 10 Aug. 2013. Web. 3 Mar. 2015.

Bank estimated 5.29 births per woman in Tanzania in 2012), a system that simplifies the birth registry system could encourage Tanzanians, especially those living in rural areas with limited access to city centers, to officially register their children.²¹⁷ In addition to circumventing corrupt practices in the government, this system also has the potential to expand other freedoms such as social opportunities and protective security. This potential exists because one must have a birth registry in order to reap the benefits of any government program, including the school registration or immunizations.²¹⁸ Thus, if implemented in Tanzania, this system has the potential to expand capabilities for members of the population who would have otherwise been unregistered and excluded from the related benefits.

A mobile tool called M-PESA, where “M” stands for mobile and “pesa” means “money” in Swahili, is widely used in Tanzania and is greatly expanding economic facilities for the population. M-PESA originated in Kenya and has successfully expanded to Tanzania and to other African countries. It allows people to conveniently transfer money to one another as well as to carry out other online banking functions from their mobile device. With M-PESA, people can “store credit on their mobile phone accounts to pay bills or buy products. Money can be transferred to merchants, people, or government agencies through a creditor’s related phone number.”²¹⁹ M-PESA transacts approximately \$1.2 billion USD every month, “representing more than a third of Tanzania’s gross

²¹⁷ “Fertility Rate, Total (Births Per Woman).” *The World Bank*. Web. 7 Mar. 2015.

²¹⁸ Tsao, Clara. “6 Ways Mobile Technology Has Transformed the World’s Poor.” *Huffington Post*. 10 Aug. 2013. Web. 3 Mar. 2015.

²¹⁹ Van der Berg, Regardt. “M-Pesa: Vodacom’s Money Spinner in Tanzania.” *Tech Central*. 29 Sept. 2014. Web. 3 Mar. 2015.

domestic product.”²²⁰ The reason behind M-PESA's success in Tanzania is in part because the country's formal banking system is underdeveloped. Even in order to perform simple banking tasks, it is not uncommon for Tanzanians to spend an entire day waiting in line at the local bank, only to deal with incompetent staff members as well as risk being a victim of corrupt practices such as bribery or theft.²²¹ Furthermore, M-PESA provides a method for Tanzanians who live in rural areas, who would have otherwise had to travel great distances to reach a bank, to perform related tasks from the security and convenience of their mobile device. In fact, it even reduces the need for citizens to have a bank account, since M-PESA allows “debits [to be] deducted directly [through] mobile phone accounts, without the need to fuss over a bank account.”²²² It is for these reasons that M-PESA has received an overwhelming demand from the Tanzanian market. In addition to the VRS, M-PESA is another innovation that is leading development by improving efficiency, expanding economic facilities, and allowing users to circumvent corrupt practices.

Innovations like the VRS and M-PESA are attracting two kinds of users: the first were unable to access these kinds of services in the first place, and the second were engaging in these activities but were enduring a long and daunting process in order to do so. Thus, these innovations are not only expanding the accessibility of these services for people who were otherwise excluded from them, but they are making great strides in efficiency which convinces existing participants to use their new method instead of

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Anderson, Mark. “UK and International Donors Suspend Tanzania Aid After Corruption Claims: Payments of \$490m Frozen Following Claims that High-Ranking Officials Siphoned off Funds from the Country's Central Bank.” *The Guardian*. 13 Oct. 2014. Web. 7 Mar. 2015.

²²² Van der Berg, Regardt. “M-Pesa: Vodacom's Money Spinner in Tanzania.” *Tech Central*. 29 Sept. 2014. Web. 3 Mar. 2015.

struggling through a long and arduous process with the traditional methods. While these innovations do not necessarily address corruption in such a way that directly expands transparency guarantees, they indirectly address the problem by providing a clean alternative to the traditional methods. However, if the new innovations gain enough popularity and have adequate infrastructure to be able to sustain a high volume of users, it is conceivable that they could eventually replace the traditional methods and remove corrupt practices from these fields altogether.

In addition, various mobile tools are directly helping to expand social opportunities such as health care and education. Remote diagnosis can allow hospitals to outsource health-related data to medical professionals and receive a diagnosis from them, regardless of where the patient and professional are located. This has had numerous benefits for the medical field: there is less crowding in hospitals when patients remotely submit information about their health, and it is also beneficial to use foreign expertise in diagnosis.²²³ Furthermore, mobile phone apps are facilitating viral campaigns to spread awareness about health problems like malaria and HIV/AIDS, as well as educate users about preventative methods. Results indicate that “text campaigns like these have been phenomenal, increasing bed net use [for malaria prevention] by 12 percent, translating into 500,000 people sleeping under nets which otherwise may be vulnerable to a deadly mosquito bite.”²²⁴ Further, mobile innovations are improving the quality of education through platforms such as Eneza that makes quizzes and lessons accessible to anyone

²²³ Studstill, Kyle. “Future of Health: Remote Diagnosis.” *PSFK*. 2 Aug. 2010. Web. 7 Mar. 2015.

²²⁴ Tsao, Clara. “6 Ways Mobile Technology Has Transformed the World’s Poor.” *Huffington Post*. 10 Aug. 2013. Web. 3 Mar. 2015.

who has access to a mobile phone or the Internet.²²⁵ These innovations are being used both inside and outside of the classroom, providing learning opportunities for children who are unable to attend school, as well as improving the quality of instruction that school children receive. These methods can improve the accessibility, efficiency and knowledge of health care practices, in addition to improving the accessibility of educational materials, and therefore contribute greatly to the expansion of social opportunities.

In addition, solar power is also having a transformative impact in Tanzania. As previously mentioned in the discussion of economic facilities and infrastructure in Chapter Six, access to electricity in the country is sparse and unreliable. Solar power is a feasible alternative that is gaining momentum and is able to circumvent some problems associated with poor infrastructure in the country. There are a number of successful Tanzanian companies such as Helvetic Solar Contractors that “supplies, installs and maintains solar systems” throughout the country.²²⁶ A few common solar products in Tanzania include photovoltaic panels (solar panels), water heaters, battery banks, and generators.²²⁷ Solar power has the potential to improve the status of infrastructure in Tanzania, and as previously explored, improved infrastructure can have an enormous impact on the expansion of economic facilities as well as for other freedoms.

This chapter has demonstrated the potential of various technological innovations to enhance capabilities and contribute to development in Tanzania. Technology can be viewed as a tool to expand freedoms, and as a means to an end. As Jenny Aker notes:

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ Nsehe, Mfonobong. “The Young African Millionaire Lighting Up Tanzania.” *Forbes*. 1 Aug. 2013. Web. 7 Mar. 2015.

²²⁷ Ibid.

“Technology must work in partnership with other public good provision and investment,” otherwise, the full potential of technological innovations will not be realized.²²⁸ With a thorough understanding of Sen’s conception of development, the state of affairs in Tanzania according to Sen’s five freedoms, and an overview of the potential of technology to address some of the nation’s most pressing developmental issues, the final chapter of this thesis addresses a topic that remains underdeveloped in Sen’s account. The question of inequality, or how capabilities should be distributed within a population, is explored in the final chapter.

²²⁸ Aker, Jenny C. and Isaac M. Mbiti. “Mobile Phones and Economic Development in Africa.” *Center for Global Development*. Jun. 2010. Print.

CHAPTER TEN: The Question of Inequality

In our world today, inequality is most commonly viewed in monetary terms. Only a few measurements of development, such as the Gini Index and IHDI, take inequality into account, and these are not among the most commonly used metrics. Furthermore, metrics that include measurements of inequality rarely search for indicators beyond a society's discrepancies in levels of income. Just as Sen paints a holistic view of poverty as a deprivation of capabilities, and not only as a lack of financial means, inequality can be viewed in a similar way under his conception of development. Sen says: “‘Real poverty’ (in terms of capability deprivation) may be, in a significant sense, more intense than what appears in the income space.”²²⁹ Similarly, inequality is not only about differing levels of income; it is also about discrepancies in the levels of access to social opportunities, political freedoms, economic facilities, and protective securities among different groups of people in a population. While inequality is not necessarily an unfreedom in itself, it dictates how freedoms are distributed among a population. The distribution of capabilities is an integral issue in development, but it is one that Sen does not take a definitive stance on. This chapter seeks to explore the question of inequality, consider Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum and John Rawls' views on the issue, and discuss what implications it has for development in Tanzania.

²²⁹ Sen, p. 88.

As explored in Chapter Two, the Gini Index is a measure of income inequality in a country. Sen notes that measures like the Gini Index are only somewhat indicative of the discrepancies in capabilities across members of a population: “We cannot know how significant the income gaps are without actually considering the *consequences* of the income gaps.”²³⁰ Thus, it is often these consequences that deserve attention when attempting to reduce inequalities and expand capabilities, and “the easy ‘reading’ of income gaps must not be taken as a suggestion that the corresponding income transfers would remedy the disparities most effectually.”²³¹ It is important to recognize that highly impactful methods of reducing inequalities can be derived from facilitating the expansion of capabilities.

While Sen touches on the question of inequality on a few occasions in *Development as Freedom*, such as in his discussion of development metrics, he does not give an explicit account of how the lack of capabilities of the poor should be weighed against the lack of capabilities of the rich. In other words, he does not attempt to answer the question of whether certain people should be prioritized when seeking to expand capabilities for a population. Sen does acknowledge that there is a conflict between aggregative and distributive considerations, but his discussion only asserts the difficulty of comparing capabilities across the board, warning that “*relative* deprivation in terms of incomes can yield *absolute* deprivation in terms of *capabilities* [and] being relatively poor in a rich country can be a great capability handicap, even when one’s absolute income is high in terms of world standards.”²³² He also argues that it is important to

²³⁰ Ibid., p. 84.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Ibid., p. 89.

recognize that “a person who is denied the opportunity of employment but given a handout from the state as an ‘unemployment benefit’ may look a lot less deprived in the space of incomes than in terms of the valuable – and valued – opportunity of having a fulfilling occupation.”²³³ Thus, Sen demonstrates that there are intangible aspects of inequality that are just as important, if not more important, to take into account in when considering the levels of inequality.

Furthermore, Sen vaguely considers both sides of the coin when it comes to the consequence of inequality on society, stating: “Inequality may erode social cohesion, and some types of inequalities can make it difficult to achieve even efficiency. And yet, attempts to eradicate inequality can, in many circumstances, lead to loss for most – sometimes even for all.”²³⁴ While Sen neglects to take a definitive stance on the issue, it is clear that he believes that there are *instrumental* problems associated with inequality, which are the problems that occur as a result of pervasive inequality in a society. However, he does not attempt to consider the question of whether inequality is *intrinsically* problematic, or a problem in and of itself.

Sen discusses John Rawls’ requirement of “the priority of liberty,” where Rawls “puts extensive classes of rights – varying from personal liberties to property rights – as having nearly complete political precedence over the pursuit of social goals.”²³⁵ While Rawls dares to prioritize these liberties, Sen diplomatically outlines Rawls’ beliefs as well as the beliefs of other philosophers but does not put forth a conclusive standpoint of his own. In *Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach*, Martha

²³³ Ibid., p. 94.

²³⁴ Ibid., p. 93.

²³⁵ Ibid., p. 63.

Nussbaum takes a definitive stance on inequality in her conception of development. In fact, she argues that there are, indeed, intrinsic problems associated with a high level of inequality in society. According to her, all beings have a claim to several important capabilities, and argues that if any individual is deprived of any of the capabilities, it is worthy of concern. Nussbaum states: "Respect for human dignity requires that citizens be placed above an ample (specified) threshold of capability."²³⁶ Thus, she believes that there should be a minimum level of each capability that every individual should have attained, and argues that it is up to the discretion of each state to determine an appropriate threshold for their citizens in accordance with their unique customs and traditions. She posits that the idea of a threshold is useful insofar as it "is a partial theory of social justice: it does not purport to solve all distributional problems, it just specifies a rather ample social minimum."²³⁷ Nussbaum admits that her Capabilities Approach does not yet provide a definitive answer to questions related to the exact function and appropriate level of the threshold, but hopes to continue to seek out these answers in future studies.²³⁸

Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs can be used as a tool to conceptualize the idea of Nussbaum's threshold. Maslow's theory depicts a pyramid with basic needs at the bottom, and other needs that decrease in urgency as they approach the top. At the bottom of the pyramid, Maslow's theory depicts psychological needs, which are the essential needs for human survival, and include the need for air, water, food and shelter.²³⁹ When Nussbaum's theory is applied to this model, if psychological needs are not met and an

²³⁶ Nussbaum, Martha C. *Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach*. Cambridge: Belknap of Harvard University Press, 2011. Print. p. 36.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*

²³⁹ Maslow, A. H. "A Theory of Human Motivation." *Psychological Review* (1943): 370-96. *Classics in the History of Psychology*. Web. 31 Mar. 2015.

individual has no hope for survival, it would be inappropriate to address needs at other levels of the pyramid. In addition, if a country's threshold was set at basic needs, the individual who is deprived of basic needs should have their needs prioritized over other individuals who have already attained basic needs and are working on attaining needs at higher levels of Maslow's hierarchy. Furthermore, Nussbaum's theory can complement Sen's conception of development, in which assisting vulnerable and deprived members of the population to the extent that they are no longer consumed with tending to their basic needs can enable them to seek out further opportunities to advance their livelihoods and expand their capabilities.

There are many elements of Nussbaum's argument that could be applied to the case of development in Tanzania. For example, she claims that a government's priority should be to ensure that all citizens have met the threshold of a capability before beginning to expand the capability beyond the threshold for the more fortunate members of society. In this sense, Nussbaum believes that policies should be construed in such a way to "equalize access to primary education for all when we are not yet in a position to give everyone access to secondary education."²⁴⁰ In addition to its consequences for education policies, the idea of the threshold can also be applied to health care, as well as to the expansion of political freedoms, economic facilities and protective security. Essentially, the adoption of this view would entail that the most deprived members of the population should have their needs prioritized over the needs of those that already have capabilities at or beyond the threshold.

²⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 39.

Nyerere certainly believed in the advantages of equality in a society, and his economic policies were almost exclusively formed with this in mind. However, Nyerere's idealistic vision never became a reality, and the fact of the matter is that rampant corruption in the government currently permits politicians and their relatives to enjoy an affluent lifestyle while many ordinary Tanzanians live in poverty.²⁴¹ Moreover, the rapid expansion of technology in Tanzania could either exacerbate or ameliorate the pervasive inequality in Tanzanian society; the outcome depends largely on the ways in which the state is committed to harnessing new technologies, and the related policies that it enacts. One could reasonably argue that “across urban-rural and rich-poor divides, mobile phones [and other technologies] connect individuals to individuals, information, markets and services.”²⁴² However, at the same time, one could contend that the country's infrastructure permits technology to be best utilized in urban centers, thereby intensifying the urban-rural and rich-poor divides.

As explored in previous chapters, there is significant room for improvement in terms of expanding capabilities for Tanzanians, ranging from the accessibility of the political system, to adequate healthcare, to the ability to participate in the market, and beyond. Nussbaum's conception of development takes Sen's ideals a step further by arguing for the idea of a threshold of capabilities in response to the question of how capabilities should be distributed. There are countless Tanzanians who are currently struggling to feed their families, find shelter, or meet other basic needs that will allow them to survive another day, and would surely benefit from extra attention in policymaking. However, with widespread corruption in the government, the elite

²⁴¹ Lofchie, p. 38.

²⁴² Aker, p. 2.

continues to receive the highest payouts, even though they are among the least deprived members of society. Thus, the high level of corruption in the country is a primary reason why achieving development in Tanzania is particularly arduous.

CONCLUSION

Applying Sen's framework to the case of Tanzania shows that development is a complicated process that can be facilitated by expanding highly interconnected freedoms. It also helps to reveal some of the most pressing sources of unfreedom in the country today. While all five of Sen's freedoms are integral to secure in achieving development, this thesis has shown that a lack of transparency guarantees in Tanzania is one of the most urgent problems in the country. The particular urgency of curbing corruption stems from the negative consequences that it can have for all of the other freedoms. In addition to the particular urgency of improving transparency guarantees, efforts to bring about development in Tanzania by expanding the other four freedoms would also be well suited. When planning development initiatives, it is important to keep in mind the intricate interconnections that exist among the different freedoms. This information can assist in making educated decisions about what kinds of efforts might yield the best results. It is also important to keep Easterly's comparison of planner and searcher methods in mind, and recognize that the most impactful solutions to underdevelopment are those that collaborate with the local community in every step of the process.

Chapter Four touches on the importance of education in facilitating development, and argues that there is currently a pressing need to improve the quality of schooling for Tanzanian children. The country would also be well advised to take measures to increase

enrollment rates, particularly for female students. Rather than taking steps to change the language of instruction from English to Swahili, the country should instead focus on ameliorating the existing system before implementing dramatic changes that would such as these. This chapter also discusses how Tanzania has made significant strides in public health in recent years, but still has pressing issues to address, especially in light of the high incidence of malaria and HIV/AIDS in the country. In order to address these problems, organizations should consider following a model similar to that of Seva Canada in order to facilitate the expansion of various other of freedoms in conjunction to improving health care.

Chapter Five discusses the consequences that the proposed constitution might have if it is implemented. Allowing females and males to have equal land ownership rights will greatly expand economic freedoms for women, the benefits of which could be seen across the entire country. Further, requiring an equal representation of women and men in parliament is a phenomenal proposition and would be a milestone achievement for the country. In doing so, it is also important to secure social opportunities such as improving enrollment rates for women and the overall quality of the education system, so that the country can raise astute political leaders. Chapter Six demonstrates that while investments in infrastructure may not be the most appealing to governments or donor organizations, they may actually have the greatest impact on facilitating development. Sen's conception demonstrates why this is the case; improving economic freedoms can greatly expand various other capabilities in the process.

In order to address one of the most pressing unfreedoms in the country today, which is the lack of transparency guarantees, Chapter Seven argues that taking steps to

increase the accountability of government agencies and officials as well as requiring transparency in their work can help to tackle corruption. Further, implementing a program similar to Avner Grief's multilateral punishment strategy could yield positive results. Additionally, if the ownership of privately held businesses were to be made a prerequisite to attaining a position in political office, it could potentially reduce corruption. This policy would generate an additional income for government officials from their business, which could reduce their need to engage in corrupt activities to augment their currently insufficient incomes. This policy could also have a positive impact on the expansion of economic freedoms, thereby strengthening other freedoms in the process, and facilitate a transition away from an economy that is dominated by the public sector. Furthermore, NGOs and other agencies can incentivize the government to reduce political and economic corruption and work to foster an active civil society that can demand transparency in the government.

Chapter Eight argues that protective security should be made a priority for the Tanzanian government, regardless of the country's level of economic development. It also suggests that investing in sectors that can have a high impact on poverty reduction, such as manufacturing and agriculture, could also be wise. Furthermore, Chapter Nine demonstrates the potential for improvements in technology to circumvent some of the problems that arise from corruption, and also argues that it can facilitate the expansion of various other freedoms. Additionally, Chapter Ten urges us to keep the question of inequality, or the distribution of capabilities, in mind when planning development initiatives.

While this thesis provides an overview of Tanzania's development landscape, it does not examine the specific role of NGOs and other aid agencies in bringing about development. In further research, it would be advantageous to examine the role of these organizations as well as their potential to collaborate with Tanzania's public and private sectors to tackle underdevelopment.

Overall, Sen challenges common conceptions of poverty and therefore alters the way in which we address poverty alleviation. Sen humanizes development by dividing it into its components, namely the five freedoms that he proposes, and shows how intricate the development process really is. Moreover, with this complex understanding of development in mind, we must also consider Easterly's recommendations of how to approach development on a micro level. Both Sen and Easterly advocate for individual agency in development, and Easterly warns of the adverse consequences that can arise from employing a planner mentality in executing development projects.

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