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# The Influence of Power Dynamics On the Israeli-Palestinian Ethos of Conflict

Bryan Turkel 9842267
*Claremont McKenna College*

Claremont McKenna College

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SUBMITTED TO

PROFESSOR SHANA LEVIN

BY

BRYAN TURKEL

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**Abstract**

The study of intractable conflicts has risen in recent years particularly with the work of Daniel Bar-Tal's work on the ethos of conflict. The ethos of conflict is an original psychological concept that captures the collective societal mindset of cultures locked in intractable conflicts and examines the various factors that keep groups in conflict or help them towards peace. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is arguably the most researched, publicized, and discussed intractable conflict in history. The purpose of this paper is to first examine the foundation of that intractable conflict through the lens of Bar-Tal's theory and apply it once more how it has changed in the modern day. Particularly, this paper focuses on how the change in power structure in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has prioritized the different elements of the ethos of conflict differently for both sides. In the beginning of the conflict, both groups held equitable power that caused them to have similar manifestations of the ethos of conflict. Working with the foundation of Bar-Tal's theory, this paper provides an analysis of how Israel's rise to power in the conflict influences different prioritizations of the ethos of conflict for both parties.

**Introduction**

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the most widely publicized intractable conflicts of our time. While other intractable conflicts such as the ongoing struggle between Russians and the Chechens have been going on for longer (the Russia-Chechen conflict dates back to 1785) and other conflicts such as the Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Rwanda have seen higher degrees of violence including genocide, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is widely known and present throughout the international community. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict features a unique clash or nationalistic cultures: the Jewish-Israeli identity, forged out of the culmination of a near 2,000 year diaspora following the dissolution of ancient Israel in 70 C.E. and the Palestinian identity, fashioned out of an offshoot of Pan-Arab-Nationalism following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1917. Following the beginning of Zionism in the late nineteenth century, there have been contentions and violent clashes between the Jews returning to the land and the Palestinian-Arabs who were living there in modern times. As rising anti-Semitism pushed more and more Jews towards the area these clashes became more frequent and grew in intensity.

Following the Second World War Zionists succeeded in their push for partitioned land from the newly formed United Nations and immediately engaged in a battle for its survival in the Israeli Independence War of 1948. The Israelis managed to stave off multiple Arab armies and the Jewish people secured their first independent state since the fall of ancient Israel. While the Israelis celebrated their victory, the Arab world and the Palestinians in particular mourned its defeat. In the event that Palestinians would later refer to as "al-nakba" (the travesty), hundreds of thousands of refugees fled or were

expelled from the land Israel claimed. Arabs left in the land were granted Israeli citizenship but held under martial law until 1966. Ben Gurion, the Israeli Prime Minister, wrote a letter to the United Nations in 1949 insisting that the Palestinian refugees be absorbed into the neighboring Arab States.

Tensions were high between the new neighbors as Israel was boxed in by hostile Arab armies on all sides. These tensions culminated in the Six Day War in 1967. Through a series of preemptive airstrikes and successive ground invasions, Israel won a decisive victory and gained the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip from the Egyptians, the West Bank of the Jordan River from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. Specifically, the conquering of the West Bank from Jordan in 1967 and Jordan's eventual renucniation of their claims to it in 1988 would set the framework of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The exploding refugee population of Palestinians living in neighboring countries, sometimes at their degradation and mortal risk (Black September in Jordan, ISIS' control of Yarmouk in Syria) has worsened the conflict over the years. However, the focus of the issue is concentrated in the West Bank: the area conquered by the Israelis in the Six Day War. The Palestinians forced there in the Independence War and subsequently conquered in 1967 argue that they are living under occupation, and the growing nationalism that started in the early twentieth century chafes against Israeli governance in growing violence. Israel has so far withstood two intifadas; the first being from 1987-1993 and the second from2000-2005. Arabic for "sweeping out," there appears to be a third intifada brewing at the writing of this thesis (Chandler, 2015). Those in control of the West Bank, in addition to the Palestinian-held Gaza Strip (relinquished by Israel in 2005), seeks the removal of Israeli presence from any land conquered in the Six Day War.

The Israelis claim that the Palestinians seek to destroy Israel altogether and that they deny Jews' right to return to their homeland. Palestinians argue that Israel is displacing the indigenous population to make room for the colonist initiative that is Zionism. The conflict's story is incredibly rich and contains many elements that make it unique unto itself; however, it contains many of the same elements ubiquitously found in intractable conflicts. In his book *Intractable Conflicts: Socio-Psychological Foundations and Dynamics*, Daniel Bar-Tal introduces his theory of an ethos of conflict.

**Ethos of Conflict**

According to Bar-Tal, an ethos provides a dominant orientation to society, illuminates the present state of affairs and conditions, and sets goals for the future. It provides an epistemic basis for the hegemonic social consciousness of the society and for the future direction it takes. An ethos indicates to society members that their behavior is not based on random beliefs but represents a coherent and systematic pattern of knowledge. There are several criteria that indicate if a societal belief constitutes an ethos: the beliefs are known to all society members, even if they do not agree with them, they appear in public debates as arguments of justification and explanation (in mass media and other channels), they serve as a basis for influencing policies and decisions, they appear as major themes in various cultural products like literature and films, and the beliefs constitute major themes transmitted to younger generations e. they appear in societal expressions like ceremonies and rituals.

Ethos of conflict can evolve over time, but holistically contains eight themes.

**Justness of one's own goals**. According to Jost and Banaji's Theory of System Justification (1994), society members cannot accept conflict goals as random and unjustified. The adoption of group goals herald the beginning of the conflict and explain why the inconsistencies between group goals led to violence. Group goals need to first be formally or informally agreed upon within a group in order to recognize how the opposing group obstructs them. This understanding of how the other group obstructs the goal justifies the conflict with the other group. The justification for conflict goals can be historical, economical, theological, cultural, and are frequently embedded in national or ethnic ideology. Some goals are viewed as reflecting sacred values and can concern elements like holy sites, "homeland" territories, or vital resources. Goals that are based off of sacred values are called "moral mandates," and are therefore immune to rational tools that would perhaps challenge their validity or interchangeability with other goals (Skitka, (2002). These goals are especially inflexible because compromising them reflects a violation of group ethics (Landman, 2010). The rigidity of moral mandates is crucial to the duration of intractable conflict; because they are seen as non-negotiable, groups will spend decades or generations locked in stalemate. A group will simultaneously present their goals as just while discrediting the opponent's as unjust or contradictory or obstructive to their own.

**Opponent delegitmization.** Delegimization of an opponent has many aspects. Delegitimizing opponents magnifies the difference between groups, removes individuality within the other group and presents it as an overall evil entity, assigns them hatred, anger, fear, disgust and implies the potential for negative/evil behavior, implies

that they do not deserve to be treated humanely, implies measures should be taken to prevent the harm they might inflict. The last two are especially important because they legitimize hurting the rival group.

There are several methods groups use in order to delegitimize their opponents a. dehumanization: using demonizing, zoological, or medical terms to describe other group, (Jahoda, 1999), (Wistrich, 1999), (Savage, 2007), out-casting: characterizing the opponent as groups that violate pivotal social norms (murderers, psychopaths, rapists) (Bar-Tal, 1988), trait characterization: assigning the group negative traits (aggressors, idiots) (English, Halperin,1987), and political labelization: likening the opponent to negatively perceived political groups (Nazis, Zionists) (Bronfenbrenner, 1961).

In regards to the process of deligitmizaiton, the term "enemy" is very important. The enemy connotes an armed struggle and also clearly places it on the other side of idealogical, social, and moral norms. "The enemy is a stranger; a faceless, barbarous, greedy criminal; and a sadistic and immoral aggressor. The enemy is often presented in depersonalized abstract terms as a torturer, rapist, desecrator, beast, reptile, insect, germ, or devil"(Alexander, Brewer, & Herrmann, 1999).

Delegitmization is a result of minimal contact between the two groups and plays a major role in the conflict. Delegitimization explains the nature of the conflict and how its conception was the fault of the enemy(Bar-Tal,, 1990), justifies violence on the opponent(Tajfel, 1981), creates distance and superiority (Taijfel, 1981), mobilizes group members to avenge acts by enemy and prevent future ones.

**Self-Victimhood.** Groups in intractable conflicts consider themselves to be the sole victims of the ongoing struggle. Self-victimhood is important in intractable conflicts because it prevents people from seeing the rival group's perspective and accepting responsibility for one's own group actions. Self-victimhood stems from having suffered violence, positive collective self-image, emphasizing the wickedness of the opponent's goals, delegitimizing opponent's characteristics (Frank, 1967). The roots of self-victimhood can also have roots in the distant past; a prominent example Bar-Tal uses is the history of Jewish persecution culminating in the Holocaust as providing a basis for modern Israeli self-victimhood.

In addition to a presentation of self-victimhood to one's own group, be it psychologically or through physical events like memorials, self-victimhood is important to project to the international community. Groups that are viewed as the victim by an international third party are viewed with more empathy and support, not blamed for continuation of the conflict, and are more likely to receive worldwide backing in the forms of political, moral, and material support.

**Positive self-image.** A crucial part of the ethos of conflict is setting up an "Us" versus "Them" construct and maintaining a strong and vocal duality between the in-group and the opponent. A vital part of this duality is the positive self-image groups adopt to set up against the delegitimized negativity of the opponent. A positive collective self-image can encompass positive traits, values, and skills that not only characterize the society but also the group's actions and contribution to greater civilization (Hirshberg, 1993). This image is present in times of peace; however, a group's belief about their inherently

supeior positive traits become more important during times of intractable conflict. Groups need to more strongly adhere to their positive self-image and social identity in order to maintain it during the logistical, violent, and sometimes inhumane requirements of intractable.

During intractable conflicts, there are several prominent propagated characteristics separated into two groups 1. Humanness, civility, morality, fairness, and trustworthiness 2. Competence, courage, heroism, and endurance. These groupings of characteristics are intended to create contrasts between the in-group that embodies those positive virtues and the out-group that is devoid of them. The first group is to create a distinctive and recognizable difference to the "Us" versus "Them" (Stagner, 1967). These characteristics allow the in-group to see themselves in a positive humane light that denotes how their identity withstands the conflict. The second group pertains to the positive self-image in regards to the violent aspect of the conflict. These characteristics inform how the in-group perceives itself in regards to the military and violent actions taken during the conflict.

**Security.** Security is one of the foremost elements of the ethos of conflict. Intractable conflicts are armed conflicts that take place over a long time; violence is perpetual and is often directed at both military and civilian populations. Abraham Maslow, most known for his work on the hierarchy of needs, emphasizes the need for human's physical and mental security (Maslow, 1970). Due to human necessity for security and its prominence in armed conflicts, security is often one of the most prominent and visible elements in culture and policy. Ruling parties, be it governments or

informal groups, involved in armed conflicts are obligated to guarantee the security of their constituents. Institutions and industries that create the means to create security become the fulfillment of this promise.

Security, the necessity for it and its implementation, is used as justification for governmental decisions, formal legislation, and educational or cultural programming. It can also be used as an excuse to undermine formal government or military protocol and to facilitate or justify illegal or immoral actions. Most importantly, perceived or materialized threats to security are used to mobilize support (political, financial, military etc.) for the conflict. Many groups in intractable conflicts develop "securatism" where security becomes the driving factor of policies and decisions in many areas of societal life. Once societies have made this switch, security becomes the most central issue of the conflict and has determinative power in the direction of policy and cultural attitude (Bar-Tal, Magal, & Halperin, E. 2009) (Don-Yehiya, Liebman, 1983).

**Patriotism**. In terms of the ethos of conflict, patriotism focuses on the bond between society members and the collective whole that is essential for willing participation and support of the conflict. Even in times of peace, patriotism is found in ethnic groups and nations because it implies an attachment between group members and the society. These feelings of attachments are accompanied with sentiments such as a sense of belonging, affection, and concern (Bar-Gal, 1993).

In his book, Bar-Tal refers to three kinds of patriotism that develop in intractable conflicts. The first is conventional patriotism. Conventional patriotism simply denotes the attachment individuals form to their collective group and society as a whole.

Conventional patriotism is always present both in times of peace and in times of conflict. The second type of patriotism, blind patriotism, is seen more in times of conflict than in times of peace. Blind patriotism is a rigid and inflexible attachment through total identification with the group; it reflects total acceptance of group goals, ideologies, policies, norms, practices, and formal leadership without entertaining criticism of possible failings. Bind patriotism does not tolerate dissenters and dismisses reflective thinking that might find fault in the group. The last type of patriotism is constructive patriotism. Constructive patriotism is seen less during times of conflict because it denotes an attachment to the group that, with care, criticizes group ideologies or tendencies and expresses concern when the group acts immorally.

Patriotism is of major importance during conflicts because people will need to feel attachment and support for their group to justify the heavy costs in terms of human and material resources (Bar-Tal, 2003). During times of conflict, people will have to give up personal comforts, desires, basic human needs, and their very lives in order to help achieve societal goals (Somerville, 1981).  Society members who do not adhere to group goals or further narratives different from the ones perpetuated by the ruling authorities are considered nonpatriots and are scorned. Therefore in many instances those who call for peace are considered disloyal and can face social or political consequences.

**Unity**. The concept of unity is closely related to patriotism in that it binds the affective commitment individuals feel towards the society and binds them into a cohesive whole. Groups act to keep the core consistent and harmonious so that it can better deal with the external threat; unity is stressed because internal conflicts can harm the common

cause (Doise & Moscovici, 1994). A lack of unity leads to internal schisms and polarizations that distract society from its main purpose of confronting the enemy. In order to promote unity, controlling parties try to create the sense that everyone in society supports the conflict goals. This can be done through implementation of mass media, education, public ceremonies, and other highly visible means so that individuals can see that "everyone's" attitudes and dispositions are congruent with the pursuit of group goals. It is important to note that unity is threatened when a fragment of the society realizes there may be a potential for a peace process. This fragment subsequently begins to change their own goals contrary to the rest of society; this switch is also accompanied with changing views and a humanization of the opponent. The controlling parties who seek to maintain unity in pursuance of originally stated conflict goals usually harshly sanction this process.

**Peace**. Peace is not a very present or visible element of the ethos of conflict; confounding factors detrimental to the idea of peace, such as delegitimization of the opponent and justness of one's own goals, imply that the idea of peace (inherently some kind of compromise) is not attainable given the elements on the ground. However, although it is not present most of the time people need to believe in a light at the end of the tunnel. When individuals stuck in intractable conflicts consider peace, they do not necessarily consider the concrete steps that would materialize it but rather an atmosphere and utopia that follow the realization of group goals.

Even though peace is not often earnestly sought throughout intractable conflict groups may feign commitment to the idea to placate or elicit support from the

international community. When a group loudly and repeatedly claims to want "peace,"

especially in forms of mass media or in international groups such as the United Nations,

it presents itself as the more level-headed, reasonable group that would gladly lay down

their arms if only their opponent was not so bloodthirsty or stubborn. Even while the

reality of attaining peace fluctuates between levels of attainability groups frequently

express their desire for it to warrant sympathy from the international community that may

or may not be motivated to intervene on their behalf.

**Aims for This Paper**

In Bar-Tal's exposition of the ethos of conflict, one thing missing is a discussion

on how power dynamics influence the prioritization of the elements of the ethos of

conflict for each side. Although prioritization is influenced by respective national and

ethnic identities, group history, and goals, power influences group circumstances and

contribute to how much emphasis each element receives. A powerless party in intractable

conflict that faces physical and legislative persecution may experience greater societal

feelings of self-victimhood and security. Conversely, those groups in positions of power

may experience collective emphasis of positive self-image because their position of

authority and privilege allows them to consider themselves in an even more positive light.

The ethos of conflict is a comprehensive description of the societal attitudes and

psychological tendencies of groups locked in intractable conflicts; however, the makeup

of those attitudes and tendencies are subject to the fluidity of different factors. Power

dynamics can change in an ongoing conflict and, along with other circumstantial factors,

influence how much weight different elements receive in the ethos of conflict.

Using Bar-Tal's conception of intractable conflict as a benchmark, I first seek to provide an understanding of the ethos of conflict at the beginning the conflict. To do this, I provide a foundation of each of the elements of the ethos of conflict from the start of Zionism through the United Nations Partition of 1947. In relation to the ethos of conflict, this period is important because it sets the stage for the juxtaposition of group goals between the Israelis and the Palestinians before the groups enter into the armed conflicts that will truly frame both sides in intractable conflict. This period tells the story of how two conflicting identities of nationalism formulated from ingredients that had either never been focused into a consolidated identity or had not in thousands of years. During this time we see the formation of the opposing groups in terms of individual and societal attitudes, infrastructure, and the driving psychological forces that would shape the goals of each group.

At this stage in the conflict, the Zionists and the Palestinians held roughly equal amounts of power. Beleaguered by centuries of persecution in Europe and new to a foreign land, the steady stream of Zionists were still able to secure a presence for themselves in their ancestral homeland due to superior agricultural techniques and influxes of capital from Europe. On the other hand, the Palestinians far outnumbered the Zionists and proved to be a consistent physical threat to them over the course of the period. Throughout the time of the Ottoman Empire through the British Mandate, both parties enjoyed the support of international third parties and both felt damage from their change in favor. Both groups held equitable amounts of power, which allowed their respective ethos of conflict to manifest in a similar way.

The Israelis and the Palestinians, at the beginning of the conflict, have different yet balanced power in terms of resources, international support, and physical numbers. The revival of Israeli identity becomes equally matched with the birth of Palestinian Nationalism. Although both groups stem from distinct national heritages, cultures, and histories, the equity in their power and the rise of their respective nationalisms along the same chronological timeline allows each group to organically place similar weight on each element of conflict.

The current period, however, does not share the same equitable distribution of power between both groups. I will define the current period as from 2005, the end of the Second Intifada, through the current day. This time period is important to the ethos of conflict for several ways. Firstly, it represents the stalemate that has come to characterize the conflict with both sides reiterating actions and goals without much of an initiative to move towards peace. The groups have been framed in intractable conflict that has changed from large-scale military clashes to smaller conflicts between militaries with non-state actors. These new kind of altercations along with the rhetorical and cultural clashes between both groups have developed into a rhythm. Secondly, it portrays how each group's ethos of conflict has evolved in relation to the drastic imbalance in power between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

The Israelis enjoy relative economic prosperity and have a far superior political infrastructure and military capacity. The Palestinians are disjointed in leadership, have a lower standard of living due to economic sanctions and corruption in the government, and have no standing army and must rely on foreign sources for the arms they fight with. Day to day interactions between Israelis and Palestinians emblem a clear power dynamic and

usually involve an Israeli in a position of power (usually a soldier) interacting with an average Palestinian civilian. In terms of groups, the Israelis are unanimously seen as having the upper hand and the Palestinians seen as being powerless. The ongoing conflict is monitored by the international community and reaffirms the perception of the power disparity between the two groups.

In this paper I will first examine the foundation of each group's ethos of conflict from the start of Zionism through the United Nations Partition Plan of 1947 and see how the change in power dynamics has affected the ethos of conflict in the modern period. I will argue that Israel's rise in power has influenced them to place more emphasis on security, self-victimhood, and positive self-image while the Palestinians' powerlessness has promoted an ethos of conflict centered on self-victimhood, justness of their own goals, and delegitmization of the Israelis.

**Start of Zionism – the United Nations Partition Plan of 1947**

Although formal armed struggles did not begin for many years, the first stirrings of the conflict are widely considered to have begun in the late 19th century with the start of Zionism. Zionism, the nationalist and political movement of Jews that first sought to create a Jewish cultural center and later a state in the land of Palestine, first began in the 1860's. Millennia of Jewish persecution and uncertain status within the states of Europe prompted Jews to try to answer Europe's "Jewish question" for themselves. The Jewish Question, a term made popular by German historian Bruno Bauer in his book *The Jewish Question*, became the name of the debate on how Europe should accord rights and treatment to their resident Jews (Parkes, 1941). Before Zionism, answers to the Jewish Question ranged from segregation and separate rights, attempts at coerced and forced assimilation, deportation, and death.

The Age of Enlightenment of the mid 18th century brought a suppression of religion and a greater importance on logic and science. The Enlightenment saw the transition from classical Christian anti-Semitism held by religious fanatics, beginning in the 4th century, to a race-centered hate held by prominent intellectuals. Christian anti-Semitism's classic claims followed the narrative that Jews killed Jesus and participated in blood libel, to racial anti-Semitism which claimed that the evil and malicious Jewish traits were based on ethnicity rather than belief. The distinction between the two hatreds is that in times of Christian anti-Semitism a Jew could rid himself of scorn and persecution simply by rejecting his Jewish faith. Indeed, in medieval anti-Semitism it was widely believed that a baptism would rid a Jew of demon-like physical features such as a tail and horrible stench. In the times of racial anti-Semitism, however, even the most

assimilated Jews who were now devout Christians could not escape persecution because, although they had shaken off their faith, their destructive traits were passed down to them by blood and no behavior or belief modification could change that. In tandem with theories of racial anti-Semitism was Social Darwinism that emphasized conflict and hierarchy between races of human beings. In this theory, European Aryans were placed higher than Semitic Jews. This would prove problematic for Jews who had embraced the concept of Haskalah: a movement that advocated making religious and cultural sacrifices in order to better integrate and assimilate among the gentile societies they found themselves in. Many Jews in Enlightenment-era Europe were tired of the constant persecution and degradation that had been characteristic of Jewish existence since the beginning of Christian anti-Semitism. They were ready and willing to make concessions in terms of language and observation of halachic law in order to better their lot in contemporary society.

Although willing to make cultural and religious concessions, Jews still found widespread persecution across Europe. They were viewed as an alien, insidious group of people intent on harming their host country. Often, even though they had been semi-integrated in terms of lacking overly-distinctive practices or dress, Jews experienced communal violence against them in the form of the German Hep-Hep Riots (1819) and the Odessa Pogroms (1821, 1859, 1871, 1881, 1886). After years of failed assimilation beginning with the start of the Haskalah movement in the 1770's, Jewish philosopher and socialist Moses Hess was the first person to offer Zionism as the answer to the Jewish Question in his book *Rome and Jerusalem* (Hess, Boyer-Mathia, & Boyer, 1958). In this book he claims that Jews will always be strangers to European people and they will never

be accepted. He claims that the Jewish "type" is indestructible and will therefore be immune to assimilation and the only solution available to them is to return to their homeland.

Leon Pinsker, an original advocate of assimilation, changed his mind after the 1871 Odessa pogrom in Russia and began to believe that the only answer to the Jewish question was Zionism. After another pogrom in 1882, he wrote the pamphlet *Auto-Emancipation* in which he wrote that Jews' perpetual alien status would never allowed them to be accepted in Europe, "Since the Jew is nowhere at home, nowhere regarded as a native, he remains an alien everywhere. That he himself and his ancestors as well are born in the country does not alter this fact in the least" (Pinsker & Neher, 1944). Responding to the persecution of emancipated Jews, wealthy Jewish philanthropists such as the Montefiore and Rothschild families sponsored what was known as the "First Aliyah" in 1882 (Scharfstein, 1997). Aliyah, the Hebrew word for ascent, is used to refer to Jews who migrate to the Land of Israel.

The first pioneers had already left Europe for the shores of Palestine. However, Zionism did not become a formal movement until after Theodor Herzl witnessed the Dreyfus Affair in France in 1984. The Dreyfus Affair, in which Jewish French captain Alfred Dreyfus was wrongly accused and convicted of treason for giving secret documents to the German military. The trial and the public ceremony that followed shocked Herzl. At the ceremony Dreyfus had his medals stripped, sword broken, and was paraded before a mob of Parisians who chanted, "Kill the Jews!" In his pamphlet, *The Jewish State* (1896), Herzl said that the only way to avoid European anti-Semitism was to create a sovereign Jewish state (Smith, 2004). He established the World Zionist Congress

(1897) with the original intention of establishing a home for the Jewish people in Palestine. After this, there was steady Jewish immigration to Palestine punctuated by large waves of Aliyah following acute events such as pogroms in Russia in 1905 and flight from anti-Semitic regimes in Poland and Hungry between 1924-1929.

However, as Zionism progressed and Jews made aliyah from Europe to Palestine, there began to be friction between these new immigrants and the Arabs already living there. In 1890, there were 489,000 Arabs compared to 43,000 Jews (DellaPergola, 2001). The Arabs of Palestine experienced the early signs of the coming nationalist movement in the 1834 revolt against Egyptian conscription. Muhammed Ali, a rebel ruler who had been ruling since he had ousted Napoleon's forces from Egypt, had demanded conscripts but many Palestinians across all castes of society rebuffed the demand in knowledge that conscription was most likely to lead to death. The revolt was brutally suppressed but is considered by some to be the first formative period of Palestinian nationalism (Kimmerling & Migdal, 2003). The return of Ottoman rule in 1840 brought with it a series of reforms know as the Tanzimat. Although the reforms had a wide effect on different aspects of life under Ottoman rule, none was so systemically transformative as the Ottoman Land Code of 1858 that brought with it the Tapu resmi.

The Tapu was a land deed that required people to formally register their farmland with the government. This was a critical divergence from the traditional perception of ownership by cultivation. In previous times the societal norm was a family declared ownership of the land by working it, not through formal agreements. The mukhtars of Palestinian villages were the only ones who were literate which allowed them to register village lands, farmed by others, under their own name, effectively turning farmers into

proprietors rather than owners of their land. The Tapu is of crucial importance because it later allowed the mukhtars to claim ownership of peasant land and sell it to Jewish immigrants (Shafir, 1996). Palestinian life was largely centered around agriculture and the increase in Jewish land ownership threatened that culture. Although Palestinian nationalism was still a vague movement without distinct direction or leadership, the influx of Jewish immigrants and their rapid purchasing of land posed an economic threat to Palestinian peasant farmers that would help bind them together in the coming years of the conflict.

Zionism, particularly its effect on the region's land ownership, in tandem with the growing discontent with foreign rule (first with the Ottomans from 1840 until 1918 and later the British during the mandate period from 1920-1948), fueled the rising desire for self-determination. Small clashes developed from the start of Zionism but then got markedly worse as time went on. Before 1917, the Arabs living in Palestine viewed Zionism as a presence that was barely tolerable but authorized by the Sultan. While the Arabs living in Palestine did consider themselves subjects of the Ottoman Empire, they were undergoing a surge of nationalism that had begun during the Revolt of 1834 against Egyptian Conscription. The Arabs in Palestine had remained part of a Pan-Arab national movement that emphasized the solidarity and uniqueness of the Arab people, a people that had been chaffing against Ottoman rule. In the Hussein-McMahon correspondence (1915-1916), a series of letters between Great Britain and the Sharif of Mecca, the United Kingdom promised support for Arab independence if they rebelled against the Ottomans.

The Arabs rose up to cast off the Ottomans in 1916 but Great Britain reneged on their promises during their secret Sykes-Picot negotiations they held with France.

Between 1915 and 1916 Great Britain and France had held secret negotiations regarding the international control of the Middle East following World War One. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire the Sykes-Picot Agreement allocated the Palestinian territory to the British Empire rather that allowing it to join Syria as the Palestinians had hoped. Further complicating the issue, Great Britain had issued the Balfour Declaration in 1926 that advocated for a Jewish national home (and the subsequent increased immigration) in Palestine as well as requiring Hebrew to become an equal-status to Arabic in official proclamations and permitting Zionists to fly their flag (Smith, 2004). The Balfour Declaration would become the enemy that united the Palestinian people as it embodied the economic and demographic threat of Zionism.

Palestinian nationalism only intensified during the period of the British Mandate (1920-1948). Chaim Weizmann, a Zionist representative, met with Emir Faisal, a Hashemite Prince, in 1919 (in which would become the Faisal-Weizman agreement) to broker a Jewish settlement in Palestine alongside the Arab kingdom Faisal desired. Faisal gave his support for the Balfour Declaration, which seemed like a compromise in interests for the Palestinian Arabs. The Palestinians had just held their first Palestinian National Congress (1919) in Jersualem where they explicitly rejected the Balfour Declaration. This led Palestinians away from Syrian-Arab-Nationalism that was led by Faisal and refocused them on achieving a separate state with an Arab majority. The Faisal-Weizman agreement led to the first formative period of Palestinian Nationalism; the Palestinians could no longer depend on Prince Faisal and the hope of becoming "Southern Syria." in the Third Arab Congress held in 1920 Musa Kazim al-Husseini, the elected chairman of the executive committee stated, "Now, after the recent events in

Damascus, we have to effect a complete change in our plans here. Southern Syria no longer exists. We must defend Palestine" (Kimmerling, 2009). This event forced the Palestinians to reconsider their expression of identity in an individual, nationalist context.

Between 1919 and 1926 there was a marked increase in Jewish immigration to Palestine. Anti-Semitic occurrences, notably the Kiev Pogroms in the Ukraine (1919) during which 100,000 Jews were killed, led to an increase of 90,000 immigrants to Palestine (Berry & Philo, 2006). In 1922 there were 668,000 Arabs in comparison with the 84,000 Jews (Dellapergola, 2001). This Western-endorsed mass wave of immigrants was the first critical point in creating the intractable conflict we see today; Palestinian Arabs viewed Zionism as a threat to their national identity and relations and grew hostile as a result. The Nebi-Musa riot in 1920 and the Jaffa riots of 1921 (in which Arabs attacked Jews) marked the first large-scale violent conflicts of many soon to follow. In the investigative commission established by Thomas Haycraft, the acting Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Palestine, following the Jaffa riot he concluded that the fundamental cause of the riot was political and economic discontentments related to Jewish Immigration (Tessler, 1994). The Jaffa riots resulted in formation of the Haganah: a Jewish defense organization founded to protect Jewish life and property. It is important to note that Jewish leaders felt as if it was necessary to form their own defense league because they could not rely on British police to stop the Arabs.

The formation of the Haganah led to more frequent direct confrontations between Jews and Arabs. The 1929 Palestine riots saw Jews massacred in Hebron as a result of tensions in the Old City of Jerusalem. Along with the violent struggles instigated on the Jewish Zionists, Palestinians also created militant groups such as the Black Hand to fight

against the British. From the Palestinian perspective, the most important event of the British Mandate period was the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939. Palestinians waged an uprising against the British in a bid for independence and to combat Zionist immigration. Economic hardships following World War One and increased Zionist land ownership fueled the growing nationalism that had been building in Palestine.

The 1937 the British Peel Commission was the first to propose a division of the land into an Arab and a Jewish state. The Zionist Congress originally accepted it so that it could be negotiated further; the Palestinians, on the other hand, rejected it outright. Balfour Declaration swelled the Jewish population, but the Arabs in Palestine still outnumbered them by more than a 2:1 ratio (Dellapergola, 2001). On the brink of World War Two, Great Britain decided to switch tactics in Palestine in order to recruit more Arab support in the fight against Fascism. The 1939 MacDonald White Paper, administered by the British, severely constricted Jewish immigration to Palestine on the grounds that it had fulfilled its mandate of creating a Jewish homeland and that further immigration would be detrimental to the Arab population in Palestine. Relations between the Jews and the Palestinians did not change much during World War Two and tensions remained at a stable, but hostile, level.

After World War Two ended, the Jewish Resistance movement ceased its terroristic operations against British Forces that began with the White Paper and focused instead on illegal immigration of Jews from Europe. Support for Zionism grew and undertook a hysterical importance, as details of the Holocaust became more widely known. In 1947 the United Nations formed the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine that put forth another partition plan. Like the Peel Commission, it was widely

accepted by the Jews and wholeheartedly rejected by the Arabs. Arabs argued that it was unfair to the Arab majority in Palestine but most importantly unanimously opposed the formation of a Jewish state in Palestine at all. The committee adopted the resolution on November 29, 1947 and the first formal armed conflict between the Israelis and Arabs started the same day.

**Ethos of Conflict**

In this period, both groups had similar prioritizations of their ethos of conflict that reflected the equitable power distributions between the two groups. In this chapter, I will present each group's ethos of conflict as it developed from the start of Zionism through the United Nations Partition Plan of 1947. However, I will be presenting them in a structure specific to the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict. For this conflict, specific to this time period, the ethos of conflict can be broken into three sections. The first section, including justness of goals, self-victimhood, positive self-image/delegitimization of the opponent, contains in-group facets of the ethos of conflict. The second group, what contains what I will call the out-group facets, consists of patriotism and unity and is reflective of how groups' internal identities interact with outside forces. Both the first and second groups, however, are influenced by the element of security that colors all of the elements within. Lastly, the element of peace has its own group as this period defines the beginning of the conflict and peace is not earnestly pursued.

In the section that follows, I will provide an analysis of the first two groupings of the Israeli ethos of conflict.

**Israel In-group**

  **Justness of Goals**. Zionism, Jewish nationalism, is tied to the age-old yearning for Zion, which Sami Adwan (2012) defines as "an inseparable part of the religious and national identity of the Jewish people throughout history" The grief at being expelled from their homeland in 70 CE is summarized in Psalm 137, which depicts the Jewish people beside the rivers of Babylon after the Babylonian conquest of Israel. At the time of their expulsion the Jewish people pledge they will never stop longing for Zion; for it is so central that their identity that if they forget it they will not be able to do anything else. "Jerusalem if I forget thee let my right hand forget its cunning" (Rendsberg & Rendsberg , 1993). Jews, throughout their literature and culture, have always referenced the return to Israel as an overarching goal of their culture and religion. Every year during the Passover Sedar it is customary to say "Next year in Jerusalem," in hope that when the family next sits down for a Sedar it might be in the redeemed land of Israel.

  The emergence and justification for Zionism was primarily in response to the emergence of racial anti-Semitism. It became clear that once anti-Semitism evolved into considering Jews an alien race rather than simply demons who killed Christ that they would not be welcomed in any societies. For even if Jews changed their beliefs, their heritage would not permit them to live a safe life in the Gentile communities they had come to settle in. The failure of the Haskalah movement informed Zionism's goals in several ways. First, it allowed them to realize that they needed a home and later state of their own which they decided should be located in their ancestral homeland. Secondly, and more importantly, it convinced Jews that there needed to be a Jewish majority in that state. If history had convinced Jews of anything, it was that they were not safe as a

perpetual minority within countries they inhabited. This mindset allowed Jews to justify the displacement of Arabs who had been living within the Palestine in order to create a Jewish majority.

Another goal of the Jewish immigrants was the desire to finally have a place of physical security. Violence against Jewish immigrants emphasized the justness and necessity of a place where Jews can be safe and mobilized them to secure that goal. From the period of the riots of the early 1920's until 1929, the Haganah was primarily established to protect farmland and kibbutzim. However, the riots of 1929 dramatically changed the role and attitude of Jewish defense. In reaction, the Haganah expanded to include the majority of people in the Jewish settlements. The growing reality of a Palestinian National movement made an imminent armed struggle much more likely; Chaim Arlosoroff, the director of the Jewish Agency's Political Department, declared that Zionism would have to use force to achieve its aims (Shapira, 1992).

The massacres that took place in Hebron and Safed, in addition to a growing appreciation for a legitimate oppositional national force, facilitated a rift in the Haganah that birthed the Irgun Bet ("Second National Military Organization). The Irgun Bet was formed because they did not believe that the simply tactic of defense performed the Haganah was adequate in defending the Yishuv. Irgun Bet policy sprung from the teachings of Jabotinsky in that they believed in the necessity of active retaliation and an armed Jewish force in order to repel the Arabs and secure a Jewish state (Sachar, 2013). The Irgun Bet adopted a policy of "active defense," a term coined by David Raziel's article in the underground newspaper *By The Swor* (Grunor, 2005). The logic was that in order to defeat an enemy one must break their will and their spirit to fight; defensive

action alone will never succeed in this. Thus after the 1929 massacres, a fragment of Jewish security switched from defense, to retaliatory strikes, to eventually preemptive attacks in order to discourage Arab violence on Jews.

Justness of Jewish goals contributed to the ethos of conflict in that, once the Jewish immigrants had decided that they needed a state of their own where they could be safe, it set the stage for conflict with the Palestinians. The Jewish-majority state that Zionists ended up envisioning for themselves sharply contrasted the growing nationalism of the Palestinians that also would desire statehood built on the same land.

**Positive Self-Image and Delegitimization of Opponent.** Jewish positive self-image was steady throughout the period and served as a basis for Zionist policies of separation. It was also constructed via the juxtaposition of Jewish and Arab culture Jews frequently described themselves as superior or as the embodiment of progressive cultures in relation to the backwards Arabs. In his letter to Henrietta Szold, Avlashom Feinberg described Jewish settlements as a bastion between "culture and savagery" where Jewish achievements could only be protected through barbed wire (Gorni, 1987). In an article published in *Ha*-Olam, Moshe Smilansky expressed his desire to make sure resources would benefit the Jews alone because it would prevent the corruption of the Yishuv's good qualities and debasement of its moral standards (Gorni, 1987).

Jews saw themselves as the embodiment of progress and the bearers of Western values, along with being the chosen people, in opposed to the socially primitive and oriental thinking of the Arabs. Jews considered the Arabs as embodying Eastern culture which they characterized as, "submission to oppression against love of liberty; and social oppression and discrimination against women as compared to the Western love of

equality and justice." Whereas Jews, although being a Semitic people themselves and originating in the East, identified with the spiritual and ideological principles of the West (Gorni, 1987). Ze'ev Jabotinsky also professed nobility of race which claimed that racial superiority did not give people the right to rule others but was, "proof of the power to survive while preserving and fostering racial, national, and communal singularity" (Gorni, 1987). He claimed that the Jewish people had exceptionally kept its national character despite of the thousands of years of persecution and trials they had faced.

The positive self-image of the Jews was also reflected from their active participation in the realization of their dream of Zion. The Yishuv believed that they were both pioneers, warriors, and active participants in the completion of a struggle dating back more than a thousand years. During the 1947 United Nations Partion Plan meetings, Ben-Gurion stated, "I know of no greater achievement by the Jewish people … in its long history since it became a people" (Gorni, 1987). Indeed, the positive self-image was also reflected in the fighters of the Yishuv as seen in the case of Joseph Trumpeldor. Trumpeldor, who died in a confrontation at Tel Hai in 1920, said, "Never mind, it is good to die for our country" (Gorni, 1987). A roaring lion statue was erected at the site of the battle and the phrase became a cornerstone in Zionist mythology.

One of the ways in which the separationist movement justified their policies and goals towards a Jewish majority in Palestine was by delegitimizing the Arabs and claiming that their barbaric nature was either infectious or dangerous. The olim viewed the Arabs as "primitive, dishonest, fatalistic, lazy and savage" (Morris, 2011) In an article in *Ha-Po'el ha Tza'ir*, Moshe Smilansky called the Arabs base and ugly, saying, "Let us not be too familiar with the Arab fellahin les our children adopt their ways and learn from

their ugly deeds." In a letter, Avlashom Feinberg, the child of Russian immigrants from the First Aliyah, stated: "I have lived among them all my life and it would be difficult to sway me from my opinion that there is no more cowardly, hypocritical, and false race than this one" (Florence, 2007).

Following the violence in 1920 and 1921 in Jerusalem and Jaffa, there began to be a generally held belief that the Arabs were dangerous and uncivilized. This was not as formally espoused in the media until the 1929 riots and massacres following confrontations at the Western Wall that spread into Safed and Hebron. Following the massacres Arabs were described in Zionist puclications as "bandits, oriental savages, and murderers" (Morris, 2011). Jews began to think that Arabs were not only intent on stopping Zionism but destroying the Yishuv themselves.

In addition to delegitimizing the Arabs character, the Zionists also sought to delegitimize and undermine the growing movement of Palestinian nationalism. During the Arab Revolt it became clear that Zionism faced an oppositional national movement rather than just a rabble of arabs chafing against their increasing presence. They called the anti-zionists outbreaks "pogroms" in order to link it to the mindless, hate violence that had occurred in Europe. This both decreased the importance of the movement itself while at the same time demonizing the Arabs to Jews in Palestine (Morris, 2011). When the Revolt was acknowledged at all it was likened to Nazism and called "immoral and terroristic" (Shapira, 1992). Yitzhak Tabenkin, an ideologue of the kibbutz movement said "The swastika, waved aloft in Hitler's Germany, and the green flag, the Arab 'national' flag, now upraised by the reactionary leadership of the Arabs of Palestine— they are the same flag, the flag of national hatred" (Shapira, 1992).

By delegitimizing the Arabs the Zionists were able to present their opponent as a primitive savage who was not interested in peace or decency in regards to their own positive self-image. Security concerns regarding the Arabs encouraged the Zionists to delegitimize them. That attitude contributed to the ethos of conflict in that they were able to say they had no one to make peace with and therefore pursue their own goals with no respect to the Arabs' goals.

**Self-Victimhood.** The Zionists security concerns regarding the Arabs only compounded the sense of self-victimhood that the Jewish immigrants already felt. Jewish self-victimhood had been culminating for thousands of years, particularly after the diaspora following the Roman conquest of Israel in 70 CE and the rising centrality of Christianity in European life. Anti-Semitism is sometimes described as the "world's oldest hatred," and Jewish persecution has been steady in its consistency and brutality. First reviled and feared for killing Christ, Jews were assigned demon-like characteristics and intentions that made them pariahs whom every manner of ill could be ascribed to. Then, after the rise of racial anti-Semitism, thought to be a malicious and destructive race seeking to leech off and undermine their host societies. A history of persecutions fueled a vibrant culture of self-victimhood in the olim who came to live in Palestine. This carried-over attitude is concisely summarized by Yoseph Haim Brenner published in *Revivim* in 1913, "We Jews are accustomed to being the weak among the strong, and we must therefore be ready for the consequences of the hatred nd must employ all the scant means at our disposal to survive here. After all, since we became a nation we have been accustomed to and are surrounded by hatred" (Frankel, 2009). This prevailing attitude of

self-victimhood influenced Zionist policies of separation and a cultural distrust of the Arabs

The self-victimhood of the Jews in Palestine came to a head during World War two when details of the atrocities in the Holocaust became well known. The proportions of the calamity facing the Jewish people added a new, frantic energy to that of the Zionist movement. Benny Moriss (2011), in his book *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict* states that, "…the Zionists quest for statehood had quickened in the tragic circumstances of the Holocaust into a desperate resolve." In addition, the Holocaust made an irrefutable case for the need for a Jewish state to the international community. Zionist's attempts illegal-immigration following the MacDonald White Paper were proportionally futile; few Jews were saved from the camps and their numbers did not significantly bolster the Jews' ranks in Palestine. However, the British efforts to block Jews fleeing the Holocaust were viewed as inhumane and in fact served to convince the world's powers that Jews needed a sanctuary in that of an independent state.

 In the manner of physical persecution throughout Jewish history and the Holocaust, security concerns helped shape the element of self-victimhood. Self-victimhood contributed to the Zionist ethos of conflict by allowing the Zionists to neglect the Arabs' legitimate grievances by focusing on the validity of their own.


**Israel Out-group**

**Patriotism**. Patriotism is one of the main contributors of the ethos of conflict. Zionism, the celebration of Jewish nationalism and its pursuit towards statehood, was vibrant during this period as Jews were rebuilding a scattered national identity. This

attitude of pride and national/ethnic solidarity contributes to the ethos of conflict in several ways. First, it creates a clear ethnic and national divide between the two groups that separates individuals into distinct and unbridgeable groups. Secondly, it assigns distinct and respective goals to those groups that often conflict with each other.

First there was Political Zionism: the belief that a homeland and statehood for the Jewish people would require first the public and legal support of foreign powers. Theodor Herzl endorsed this approach when he met with the Ottoman Sultan and offered to trade a consolidation of the Ottoman's debt in return for facilitation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. However, Political Zionism was more concerned with how to legally obtain a homeland in Palestine rather than the different expressions of nationalism. The two presiding expressions were Labor and Revisionist Zionism.

Labor Zionism believed that the Jewish State would only come as a result of the Jewish people working the land of Israel and becoming a true nation through working the land. As stated in Moses Hess' *Rome and Jerusalem,* he claims the Jewish people must return to the land of Israel in order to reclaim the productive, working class that they have been unable to enter since the diaspora. He proposed the formation of a socialist state where the "redemption of the soil" will allow the Jewish People into a proper nation (Hess, Boyer, & Boyer-Mathia, 1958). This mix of Socialism and Zionism produced the first kibbutzim. The kibbutzim were generally in outlying lands and focused on restoring the land through agriculture and the redemption of soil Hess proposed.

Labor Zionists emphasized a romantic attachment to the land and a humble, enthusiastic service to Zion. They considered themselves pioneers and embraced the arduous labors that went into turning the harsh climate of Palestine into hospitable land

for a nation. This attitude is characterized in Nathan Alterman's "Morning Song," "Morning sun blazes on the mountains the valley wet with dew We love you, our homeland, in joy, in song and in work. Clothe you in concrete, cover you in gardens, the grains on your rescued lands will rejoice like bells" (Naveh, 2012). The manifestation of Labor Zionism was Hebrew Labor: a policy where Jews only hired other Jews for labor. Hebrew Labor had a direct and palpable contribution to the ethos of conflict by by creating an ethnic divide through policy that benefited the Jews at the exclusion of the Arabs.

Revisionist Zionism was characterized by its ideology of territorial dominance over Eretz Yisrael (the ancient Land of Israel) and insisted Jews should have sovereignty over their entire ancestral homeland. These attitudes prompted them to policies of both separation and expansion and were more assertive and militant in their pursuit of the Jewish State. Revisionist fiercely advocated for military readiness and response to Arabs who had attacked Jews and were much more instrumental in the formation of the Haganah and later the Irgun. Revisionist Zionists emphasized immigration of Jews to Palestine and were very strategic in their interactions with the British during the mandate. As the ideological inheritors of Political Zionism, Revisionist leader Ze'ev Jabotinsky frequently sought to win British favor and convince them that larger portions of Jewish control was in their interest. Revisionist Zionism contributed to the ethos of conflict by establishing a military mindset and infrastructure that enforced a clear divide between Zionists and Arabs.

**Unity**. Jews, ever a disjointed people, experienced elements and events that both added to and detracted from the presence of a unified front in face of conflict. There were

elements of Jewish unity that both contributed and detracted from the ethos of conflict. Booming construction in new settlements in addition to the revival of the Hebrew language as the main language spoken in schools as well as institutions contributed to the cohesiveness diaspora Jews felt as they settled in Palestine. The kibbutzim represented a new emergence of communal life where issues were handled democratically and collectively. Property belonged to the kibbutz itself and everyone was provided for according to their need. The natural unity felt in Jewish communities, borne from years of harsh conditions and oppression, flourished in the settlements and the kibbutzim.

On the other hand, the Yishuv was quite split in regards to how to deal with both the Arabs and the security threats they felt from them. Jews in the earlier part of the period endorsed an "integrationist" approach that advocated for cooperation and interrelations with the Arabs. In "The Hidden Question," Yitzhak Epstein claimed that Zionism depended on Arab consent and goodwill. The Arabs were a people with a profound emotional and cultural attachment to the land, "The Arab, like all other men, is attached to his homeland" (Shlaim, 2000). Those in the integrationist camp encouraged the idea that the Jews and the Arabs could coexist and reclaim their homeland at the same time. Some, such as Dr. Nissim Malul, suggested that the Jews learn Arabic and merge with the Arabs on the basis of joint Semitic nationalism (Gorni, 1987).

Later, the increased hostility towards the Zionist movement the "separatist" outlook gained strength and eventually surpassed the integrationists as the predominant outlook. Those who ascribed to the separationist outlook asserted dominance over Palestine rather than simply equal national rights and looked down and despised Arabs. In tandem with a superior self-image and delegitimization of the Arabs, some of the

Yishuv, as seen in Moshe Smilansky's article in in *Ha-Po'el ha Tza'ir*, believed that contact with base the Arabs would lead to an infection of the Yishuv's moral fiber. Others, like Avlashom Feinberg juxtaposed Jewish and Israeli society and insisted that barbed wire was necessary to protect Jewish interests. In addition to their distaste for the Arab, those in the separatist camp viewed them as practical obstacles in their path to statehood. Joseph Klausner claimed that the whole goal of Zionism was to become "masters of the country" (Morris, 2011). Indeed many Revisionists did not want any kind of cooperation because they wanted to make sure any resources went exclusively to the Yishuv.

Lastly, following the 1929 Riots that ended in massacres in Hebron and Safed, the Jewish community was in disagreement in how to handle the further issues of security. The disagreements and eventual falling out between the Haganah and the Irgun Bet would lead to vastly different perceptions of the Jewish military movement. The Haganah, resting on its policy of defence would cooperate with the British military during the time of the Arab Revolt and again during World War Two. The Irgun went on a campaign of "active defense" and would later commit acts widely regarded as terrorism against both the Arabs and the British. Following the 1944 assassination of Lord Moyne by the an offshoot of the Irgun the Haganah would cooperate with the British in the suppression of Irgun activities in an operation known as The Saison ("Hunting Season").

The Zionists' unity was influenced by a variety of factors and had a mixed effect on the ethos of conflict. The integrationists, at first, had some influence and quelled the ethos of conflict by promoting cooperation with the Arabs. However, after the violence of

the 1920's the separatists held sway and promoted an attitude of "otherness" and aggression that only stoked the ethos of conflict.

**Summary.** In terms of an ethos of conflict, the Zionists developed their elements much quicker because they came to the conflict with a formed identity. This allowed them to quickly establish their goals and allowed other elements such as self-victimhood and positive self-image to formulate much faster because they had already clearly defined their in-group. The Palestinians, on the other hand, only were able to define their identity after a multitude of factors. The Palestinians did not have a firm identity to look positive on until the nationalist movement became a centralized in Palestine itself. In 1919 the First Palestine Arab Congress envisaged Palestine as part of a greater independent Syria. The British Mandate cut Palestine off from Syria; that, in addition to the unique pressures of Zionism helped form the first sense of a solitary Palestinian identity. In the scope of Arab nationalism, the Palestinians faced challenges that they did not share with any other nation. Therefore, once the growing nationalism that had been brewing since the revolt against Egyptian conscription in 1834 was isolated due to Western influence and unique challenges they had to shoulder alone, Palestinian nationalism was born in earnest.

In the section that follows, I will provide a similar analysis for the first two groupings of elements of the ethos of conflict from the Palestinian side.

**Palestine In-group**

**Justness of Goals.** The goals of the Palestinians and the justness attached to them were not quite as concrete as those of the Yishuv as their later formation of nationalism went through an evolution of its own goals. As far as Zionist goals were to be based in action Palestinian goals were based in reaction; the Yishuv pushed towards Zionism, the Palestinnians found themselves working towards their own nationalism through anti-Zionism. In the beginning, Palestinian goals were less concrete and born out of reaction to the effects of Zionism and foreign rule. Those reactions and the subsequent goals of the Palestinians were reflective of the values inherent in Palestinian society. The Palestinians lived in a largely agricultural society; the increasing Jewish immigration and its effect on land labor and prices created economic and cultural despair that the Palestinians sought to correct through nationalism. This is reflective in that the fellahin were the first ones to clash with the Jewish immigrants after the Second Aliyah brought socialist-minded Jews intent on "conquering the soil"(Khalidi, 2010). The security threat the Palestinians felt, and how they influenced their justness of goals, were more related to how the Yishuv threatened their way of life than their physical safety.

The fairly new concept of legal land ownership did not hold weight with the fellahin who believed that, although Jews legally bought the land they had worked, they still had inalienable right to their land. Furthermore, this new wave of Aliyah desired not only the ownership of the land but the cultivation of it; in addition to losing their livelihood this new ideology threatened the very connection the fellahin add with their land. The direct effects of Labor Zionism, which would become the predominant expression of Zionism in the Mandate period, were the displacement and disenfranchisement of the fellahin. The families of fellahin had worked the same land for

generations and they to which they harbored great emotional attachment. In addition, because they put no stock in land by formal ownership, they believed they had an inalienable right to the land they cultivated. The displacement of fellahin was a threat to their very identity as well as their livelihoods. When they looked at Hebrew Labor they saw the subjugation of themselves under a people who had come to fill their roles and reap their benefits. This fear was formally addressed in the First Palestine Congress of 1920, "How can we accept the life of slaves to the Jews and foreigners and not defend our political and natural rights? Raise your voice, protest this treachery" (Gelvin, 2013).

The Palestinian elite was more concerned with the political aims of Zionism than its effect on the land. In his manuscript, Ruhi al-Khalidi warns about the Zionist's intention to create a state in Palestine and used Jewish attempts to form symbols of statehood such as postal stamps and a flag as evidence (Muslih, 1988). The advent of Labor Zionism welded together the link between the Palestinian elite who opposed Zionism on principle and the fellahin who experienced the brunt of its effect on the land (Khalidi, 2010). The collective sense of deprivation, displacement, and helplessness gave substance to the goals of Palestinian nationalism. Palestinian nationalism defined its goals as maintaining its way of life, territory, and holy places from the invading Zionists. The Palestinians also considered their goals in terms of an all or nothing outcome; in 1919 the representatives of the Muslim-Christian Assocations told the committee of the King Crane Commission "We will push the Zionists into the sea-or they will send us back into the desert" (Morris, 2011).

Many Palestinians also harbored beliefs that Zionism was simply another form foreign domination and western imperialism (Muslih, 1988). These feelings festered as

Zionism continued during the mandate under what Palestinians considered imbalanced policies that facilitated Jewish settlement. Once the Palestinians realized that they were their own entity, through a collection of factors including being cut off from Syria and the unique challenges of Zionism and the British, they began forming their own independent goals. The collective desires to be masters of their own fates allowed them to blend their goals of shirking off imperialistic British rule and ending Zionism into a unified directive as seen in the 1936 Arab Revolt, "Young nationalists now argued that British support of Zionism was not simply a delusion, to be corrected. Rather, Zionism was part and parcel of Western imperialism in the Middle East, and only the eradication of the latter could halt the advance of the former" (Kimmerling, 2009).

The justness of Palestinian goals spring from the security threats to the way life had been before the presence of the Yishuv or the British. Past that, the goals sprung from threats they believed the Zionists and the British posed to the rising movement of Palestinian nationalism.

**Positive Self-Image and Delegitimization of Opponent.** As Zionism increased and tensions grew between the Jewish immigrants and the Palestinians they began to assign Jews insidious and evil characteristics according to the role they perceived them to be playing. After it became clear that the Zionists were systematically purchasing land to displace fellahin and substitute tem with Hebrew labor the Palestinians began to think of the Zionists as an invading force. The Zionists were viewed as greedy colonizers who had no regard for the native people living there and sought to establish their own state on top of theirs. In the Nebi Mousa riots in 1920, Arabs celebrating the holiday were incited to

violence and chanted slogans such as, "Palestine is our land, the Jews are our dogs!" (Segev, 2001).

In addition to conquerors of he land, the Jewish immigrants were seen as threats to the faiths of the Palestinians. In regards to the Christian-Palestinians, Jews were assigned their stereotypical roles assigned to them in traditional European anti-Semitism. These roles included Christ-killer and opponents to all things holy. In the demonstration before the Nebi Mousa riots, placards were held that read: "Shall we give back the country to a people who crucified our Lord Jesus?" (Morris, 2011). The Palestinian Muslims rejected the idea of Jews sharing their holy spaces, "the Jews— a *dhimmi*, inferior race— harboring, and attempting to further, political ambitions, and what's more, on Muslim land" (Morris, 2011).

It was generally believed that land conquered by Muslims became forever held by Islam; the presence of a small minority of Christians in their midst was not enough to draw ire from the Muslims but large-scale Jewish immigration did. Muslim sentiment of the Jews is captured in a poem by Sheikh Sulayman al-Taji, "Jews, sons of clinking gold, stop your deceit; We shall not be cheated into bartering away our country! … The Jews, the weakest of all peoples and the least of them, Are haggling with us for our land; How can we slumber on?" (Morris, 2011) These accusations were closely related to the anger and confusion brought on by the changes in land ownership policy. Still adhering to the concept of ownership by cultivation, Palestinians viewed Jews buying land as the literal embodiment of an unwanted change. They saw this happening in such large proportions and were thus able to assign Jews labels such as cheaters and deceivers as they robbed land from Palestinians.

In 1929, leaflets printed by the Husseini activists attempted to mobilize Muslims against Jews by claiming Jews had violated Islam by trying to claim the western wall, " O Arab nation, the eyes of your brothers in Palestine are upon you…and they awaken your religious feelings and national zealotry to rise up against the enemy who violated the honor of Islam and raped the women and murdered widows and babies" (Morris, 2011 Palestinian Muslims viewed the holy sites they shared with Jews as exclusively theirs and therefore considered any significant presence as encroachment on their holy territories and rights. The pamphlet used by Husseini activists utilized classic devices of delegitimization including the labeling the Jews as violators of the sacred goal of Islam as well as portraying them as a group that violates pivotal social norms.

In regards to their positive self-image Palestinian identity came to define what it opposed: Zionism and the British Mandate. Palestinians viewed themselves as freedom fighters that defended the various parts of identity and culture under attack. These freedom fighters defended the individual elements of Palestinian society that made up the composite whole: the displaced and disadvantaged fellahin struggling as a result of Zionist immigration, the proud Muslim offended by the encroachment of Jews into the holy sites and towns, and the frustrated Arab rising up against imperial rule. In 1936, the leaders of the Arab Revolt issued a statement that read: "Palestine summons us to fight in the Path of God so that the world might bear witness to the unity of the nation.… We are called to battle for freedom, independence, and hope, and see the rebellion against oppression as a religious duty" (Nels, 1982).

Izz ad-Din al-Qassam embodied the liberator of the fellahin and muslim community. Upon his return to Palestine he became infuriated at the plight of the fellahin.

He began preaching in Haifa and his sermon's were rooted in Islam; he preached against the British and the Zionists whom he claimed Islam was ideologically and politically opposed to. Al-Qassam organized the Black Hand: a militant organization that conducted strikes against British and Zionist targets. In 1935, al-Qassam died in a shootout with British police but his death galvanized the Palestinian people and he became a symbol of the resistance. At his funeral, the euology praised him as Islam's ideal soldier and challenged those to follow his footsteps, "Who would imitate Qassam as Islam's ideal soldier, Follows, if he wishes release from his inherited humiliation" (Gelvin, 2013).[1] He was praised as a martyr, which was the other side of the positive self-image coin to the freedom fighter. Martyrs, those who had died in service to the cause, were highly revered and respected in Palestinian society. This idealization of those who fell fighting was characterized in Mahmud Abd Al-Raheem's poem *Al-Shaheed* (The Martyr): "Let it be a life which brings joy to the heart of friends, or a death which brings sorrow to the heart of foe! The spirit of a nobleman has but two aims: to die nobly or attain its aspirations" (Naveh, 2012).

Palestinian positive self-image and their delegitimization of the Jews developed in tandem to the security threats they faced as a people. Palestinians viewed their physical land, livelihoods, religion, and way of life being threatened by the Zionists and later the British. This caused them to view and label them as invaders, desecrators of holy sites, and other malicious labels as they viewed them undermining the native Palestinian. Their positive self-image is rooted in their defiance to these threats; Palestinians considered themselves freedom fighters fighting against the dominating invading forces they were

confronted with. Delegitimization of the Jews and the positive self-image that accompanied it contributed to the ethos of conflict by defining what the enemy was and identified the heroism of the Palestinians who fought it. This further defined the in-group out-group of the conflict and assigned each side characteristics that would polarize the two groups.

  **Self-Victimhood**.  As opposed to the Jewish immigrants, who's self-victimhood predated the current conflict by almost two thousand years, Palestinian self-victimhood was largely formed at the start of the conflict. The Tapu installed by the Ottoman Empire concentrated legal ownership of the hands of a few elites, many of who lived far away from the land they owned. Later these land owners would sell large swaths of the land they owned to Jewish immigration agencies the fellahin who believed they had an inalienable right to the land felt both culturally affronted and were displaced. Early on in the First Aliyah fellahin were usually allowed to remain employed under the new Jewish landowners in a plantation-like arrangement. However, after the onset of Labor Zionism and the emphasis on Hebrew Labor the fellahin both lost the land they still considered theirs and lost their livelihood. Territorial displacement was to be the biggest mobilizing factor in regards to Palestinian Nationalism and aggression towards the Jews (Morris, 2011). Increased Jewish land ownership sent fellahin towards the fringes of big towns and put them in the lower rungs of socioeconomic society. Jewish land ownership financed by European capital and advanced farming methods rendered the remaining fellahin increasingly uncompetitive.

  In addition to the damages Jewish immigration and land ownership had on Palestinian pride and economy, Palestinians felt themselves at the mercy of two different

forces: the Zionism and the British. The Palestinians were almost immediately aware that the Zionists intended on displacing them and taking their homeland for themselves. As early as the First Aliyah a settler recorded observed that the animosity between the Jewish immigrants and the Palestinians, "The natives are hostile towards us, saying that we have come to drive them out of the country" (Morris, 2011). When these intentions were publicized and supported by the British in the Balfour Declaration the Palestinians now found themselves against the might of the Zionist movement and a world superpower.

When it came to the British, the Palestinians considered them a Western influence that was controlled by international Jewry. The Palestinians suspected the British of attempting to create factions and discord within Palestinian leadership by installing oppositional political parties and tampering with elections (Naveh, 2012). Jewish immigration increased dramatically during the time of the British Mandate and further exacerbated fellahin landlessness and despair. Economic hardships were compounded by high taxes the mandatory government placed on Palestinian citizens. The final straw came when the British walked back on their promises to limit Jewish immigration in the Passfield White Paper. The MacDonald White Paper (to be known to Palestinians as the "Black Paper") nullified the original document and reaffirmed the Mandate's commitment to establishing a Jewish home in Palestine. The Black Paper cemented the idea that the British did not have the Palestinian's best interests at heart.

This self-victimhood stemming from security threats to Palestinian livelihood contributed to the ethos of conflict; the collective feelings of despair and victimhood

required an entity that the collective society could blame and hate for their suffering. In addition to the British, the Palestinians held the Yishuv responsible.

**Palestinian Out-group**

      **Patriotism**. In Baruch Kimmerling and Joel Migdal's book, *Palestinian People: A History*, they claim, "Palestinialism meant the assertion of Palestine as a common homeland at a time when political boundaries were new and still quite uncertain." The idea of Palestinian nationalism first formed at the start of the British Mandate where it became clear that they would have to find another expression of identity that did not include Syria. At the end of April, 1920 Palestinian leadership began to accept to accept Palestine's fate as separate and distinct (Morris, 2011). It budding sense of patriotism would grow until the Arab Revolt in 1936 where we see the true birth of Palestinian nationalism as its own separate, unique movement. The Arab Revolt was the first display of a patriotic movement that engaged all levels of Palestinian society in a coordinated movement; the symbols around which the populace rallied and the enemy they fought were uniquely Palestinian (Smith, 2004).

      Palestinian patriotism was mostly synthesized and developed as a result of Zionism. Zionist officials admitted this to themselves as early as 1921; Jacob Thon, a prominent settler, insisted that the Zionist movement would have to reckon with an oppositional nationalist movement, "We ourselves— our own [movement]— are speeding the development of the Arab national movement" (Morris, 2011) The increase in dispossession due to Jewish immigration and Hebrew Labor pushed evictees towards national activism. Even though the land purchases affected a very small portion of

Palestinian families it had disproportionate effect on nationalist movement. Yehoshua Porath, a Jewish historian, claims that even though relatively few Palestinians were dispossessed, "The Arabs came to feel like they were facing a galloping process" (Morris, 2011).

Palestinian patriotism contributed to the ethos of conflict in that it was formulated to oppose the competing patriotism of Zionism. Palestinian nationalism was not present before the conflict but was rather created in the crucible of it; this means that it was involved in conflict before it even had clarity and thus contributed more once it had definition.

**Unity**. Palestinian unity was severely fractured during the time period and had a diminishing effect on the ethos of conflict. Power struggles between prominent factions of Palestinian leadership (Husseinis versus Nashashibis), disagreements over what should be the organizing foundation of national identity (nationalist versus Islamic), land sales to the Zionists, and chaos during the Arab Revolt weakened the Palestinian ethos of conflict by fracturing the unified front they presented to the Zionists and British. The various divisions between Palestinian elite and the fellahin, and the different motives that accompanied them, prevented a single Palestinian identity from forming for the majority of the period.

The biggest threat to Palestinian livelihood and way of life was the land sales being made to Zionist that strictly employed Hebrew Labor. The continuous sale of land to Jews built feelings of hostility and anger within the Palestinian community; Arab politicians and media openly attacked those who sold land and declared that, "by selling land, they sell the blood and remains of their fathers" (Morris, 2011) These people were

branded as traitors to the cause; however, there was so much selling of land happening that it was evident that prominent elites who held most of the land must be selling land as well.

The Arab Revolt divided the Palestinian people into those who wanted to end the Revolt for economic reasons and those who wanted to continue until the British Mandate was removed once and for all. The Revolt created a clear polarization within the Palestinian people; Morris (2011) claims, "Opposition supporters were beaten and intimidated; political moderates, those who sold land to Jews, informers, and Nashashibi supporters— all fell prey to Husseini gunmen." As the revolt progressed, it descended into a free-for-all among the rebels as they attacked fellow Palestinians as much as they did the British or Zionists. Morris (2011) says that bands or rebels clashed in the countryside over territory and loot while the people in the villages increasingly began to resist rebel efforts to extort "contributions" from them.

Unity severely detracted from the Palestinian ethos of conflict by fracturing the unified front they wanted to present to the out-group. Dissension within the in-group led to weak Palestinian solidarity that did not allow the Palestinians to specifically define their identity and goals.

**Peace**

Peace is not an element very present in this period. As with all conflict, the formative years are more about how the other seven elements, the ones that maintain the conflict, are formed rather than the one meant to end the conflict. In this section I will

conclude this period by briefly providing an analysis for the element of peace for both groups.

The integrationists believed that the conflict and malice from the Arabs was largely stemming from the displacement of fellahin labor from land purchased by Zionists. As a result, they believed that the issue could be resolved through dialogue and cooperation reflected in labor policies. Dr. Arthur Ruppin, once wrote "Though we must, of course, think first of giving work and bread to our own poorer brethren, we must avoid anything that may resemble exclusion of Arabs" (Morris, 2011). He stressed that the push for exclusive Hebrew labor would alienate and anger their Arab neighbors. At the Fourth United Labor Convention in 1924, the body adopted "a platform that would protect the interests of workers from both peoples, express international solidarity and serve to draw together, and create a dialogue between the Zionist Labor movement and the authentic national movement of the Arab people" (Morris, 2011)

Those in the separatist camp believed that only a strong show of force against the Arabs can discourage them in their intention to remove Zionism. Only once any hope of removing Zionism is defeated can there be genuine dialogue and eventual reconciliation. Jabotinsky popularized this argument in his *Iron Wall* essay, "So long as the Arabs harbor a desire, with the slightest hope of success, of being rid of us, there are no pleasant words nor heartfelt promises that will persuade them to let go of this hope" (Shlaim, 2000). This principle required the establishment of a strong Jewish society, and to create a strong Jewish society the Yishuv must first extricate itself completely from the Arab society. The primary mechanism of this school of thought was exclusionary Jewish labor.

The Histadrut, founded in 1920, was a Jewish labor organization that dealt primarily in providing new Jewish immigrants with work and excluding Arab labor.

In the 1937 Peel Commission the Yishuv was almost unanimously in favor of transfer in which a certain amount of Arabs would be displaced to make room for the new Jewish state. Jews had been in favor of transfer since the star of Zionism and justified their position by likening the Arabs in Palestine to Arabs in neighboring countries and the Arab world at large in contrast to the unique national struggle of the Jewish people. In 1905, Israel Zangwill stated: "We cannot allow the Arabs to block so valuable a piece of historic reconstruction.… And therefore we must gently persuade them to 'trek.' After all, they have all Arabia with its million square miles.… There is no particular reason for the Arabs to cling to these few kilometers" (Morris, 2011). The Yishuv leadership knew that transfer might in practicality become expulsion and affirmed that they would use force if necessary. That prophecy was fulfilled after the United Nations partition of 1947.

The Arabs ardently opposed the concept of the Jews receiving statehood on the land they considered to be rightfully theirs for several reasons. They viewed it as unholy encroachment on Muslim soil, feared that a small Jewish State would serve as a platform for future expansion, and objected to the idea of the displacement of several hundred thousand Arabs to make room for the Jewish State.

**The Modern Day**

Today's conflict involves different dynamics, different key players, and different power structures than it did before the founding of the Israeli state. After a series of shocking military upsets, most notably the Six Day War, Israel expanded its territory and affirmed its presence in the Middle East. The end of the Six Day War saw Israel in control of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank of the Jordan River, and Jerusalem. Shortly thereafter Israel evicted the newly formed Palestinian Liberation Organization that had been conducting attacks on Israeli military and civilian targets to Jordan. The PLO continued their attacks against Israel while at the same time rebelling against Jordanian rule; these attacks against the Jordanian government culminated in the 1970 Palestinian Revolt which would later be known as "Black September" and saw thousands of Palestinians dead and the PLO expelled to Lebanon. Over the course of the next several decades Palestinian operatives carried out campaigns of plane hijackings, assassinations, and massacres against Israeli targets in Israel and abroad. Notable among these was the Entebbe plane hijacking, the Munich massacre, and the Avivim school buss massacre.

After Israel's victory in the Six Day War they established military governances to run the affairs of the Arab populations in their newly conquered territories. Israel had opened their labor market to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip but largely reserved Palestinians for undesirable employment Israelis did not want. Palestinians experiences regular hardships and degradations from Israelis; the regular disenfranchisement in addition to high birth rates and confiscation of land led to a general unrest that built until it exploded in the First Intifada in 1987. A fatal car accident involving an IDF truck and a civilian Palestinian car in a refugee camp sparked

widespread resistance and boycott of Israel in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Importantly, the Intifada was the first occurrence of widespread violence against the IDF. Rock and Molotov cocktails were initially responded to with live ammunition but scaled down to clubs and plastic bullets after the high number of children and young Palestinians being killed. Between civilians and IDF soldiers the Intifada claimed 160 Israeli and over a thousand Palestinian lives (Espositio, 2005).   However, intra-Palestinian violence was the cause of an estimated 700-800 deaths as suspected collaborators were executed. (Catigani, 2008). Just as important as the violence was the global awareness of events unfolding in the conflict. Globally disseminated photos of IDF soldiers beating young Palestinians with clubs and the high death count prompted international condemnation from the United Nations and international community (Cronin, 2012). The most important outcome of the First Intifada, however, was the Oslo Peace Accords of 1993.

Following the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference, the Oslo Accords were secret negotiations conducted by Israelis and the PLO that sought to develop a framework of Palestinian interim self-government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In exchange for this good faith the PLO promised to formally acknowledge the State of Israel, cease their violence against Israelis, and promote tolerance throughout the Palestinian community. Ultimately, the goal was a two-state solution that would end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The IDF withdrew to various degrees in areas throughout the West Bank and Gaza strip and was replaced with Palestinian authority. However, the Palestinian Authority (created to govern the areas Israel had withdrawn from) did not hold up to their

pledge to denounce and incite violence. Terrorist attacks continued against Israelis and the continued violence created a rift in Israeli society regarding the efficacy of the Oslo Accords and whether or not the concessions they gave actually promoted peace or encouraged further terrorism. When the leaders of each side signed the agreement that marked the end of the first stage of negotiations there had already been suicide bombings throughout Israel. In 1995, the Israeli public and opposition leaders within the Knesset began to accuse the Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of betraying Israel and the Jewish People. At a rally, Benjamin Netanyahu of the Likud Party accused Rabin of being, "removed from Jewish tradition and Jewish values" (Smith, 2004). Following the assassination of Rabin by a right-wing radical, Netanyahu won the election and challenged many of the fundamental tenants of the Oslo Accords. He believed that no concessions should be made until resolution was reached on major issues such as the assertions in the Palestinian National Charter that Israel had no right to exist.

Violence escalated until 2000 when Ehud Barak, who had been elected prime minister the year before, and Yasser Arafat met at the Camp David Summit to try to negotiate a "final status" agreement. Areas of negotiations included territory, Jerusalem and the Temple Mount, refugees and the right of return, security arrangements, and settlements. The formal of the negotiations were all or nothing where nothing was considered binding until everything was agreed upon (Pressman, 2003). Arafat rejected the Israeli proposal without offering a counter-proposal and the negotiations broke down.

The withdrawals of Palestinian territory at the beginning of the Oslo Accords had not materialized in the future Palestinian state that had been promised. The latest rounds of negotiations had produced absolutely nothing tangible for the Palestinians; they grew

frustrated with peaceful means as they continued with routine degradation and standard of living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In addition, the continued settlement construction that had occurred under Netanyahu and the Likud Party angered the Palestinians who believed that these actions went against the very purpose of the Oslo Accords. Palestinians were ready to rise up, and on September 28, 2000, they got the provocation they needed. After Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount, revered as the holiest site in Judaism and the third holiest site in Islam, Palestinians began to riot against this affront to Islam. This event would mark the beginning of the Second Intifada: a five-year period of intensified violence where the Palestinians rose up against the Israelis. The period was characterized by Palestinian suicide bombings in civilian areas.

The Second Intifada had two major effects: the prevalent belief in Israeli society that they did not have a partner for peace and the construction of the separation wall built along the 1949 Armistice Line. The mass Israeli casualties, mostly civilian, eroded confidence they had that a partner for peace with the Palestinians. After the drastic increase in suicide bombings in civilian areas, notably the bombing of the Dolphinarium nightclub in Tel Aviv, the Israeli government sought to implement a solution that could keep their people safe. The wall has been remarkably effective and has reduced suicide bombings by almost 90% (Kemp, 2006). However, this has not come without cost. While absolutely necessary in terms of safety, the wall has negative impacts on Palestinians and is frequently cited as an argument against Israel in the international community.

In an attempt towards a final peace agreement, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon ordered a unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2003. The withdrawal was celebrated as a move toward peace from the Israeli left and fiercely rebuked by his own

party and members of the religious right. The plan was carried out in 2005; IDF soldiers came to issue evacuation decrees and in many cases had to forcibly remove residents who refused to abandon their homes. Shortly thereafter, Hamas won elections in the Gaza Strip and promptly engaged in rocket fire towards Israel and orchestrated a high profile kidnapping of an IDF soldier. This led to the first conflict between Gaza and Israel that would be followed by others at an almost biannual basis until the current day.

This leads us to the stalemate of the present day. Gaza is still ruled by Hamas and maintains their stance on not recognizing or negotiating Israel and actively promoting violence against the state and its civilians. In the West Bank, ruled by the Palestinian Authority, Israel still administers military governance over all the areas not ceded to Palestinian control in the Oslo Accords and maintains a strong military presence in areas like Hebron and Jerusalem. Both sides claim, often and loudly, to want a two-state solution but both have impediments to their full participation. There are many issues, both internal and external, that are preventing peace from being made.

There are many uncertainties and shifting factors that have prevented peace; however one could confidently say that from the start of Zionism to the present day the power dynamic has shifted. The Zionist immigrants, who later became the Jews of Israel, were initially weak from their persecution in Europe and proportionally outnumbered in regard to the native Palestinians. They gathered strength and sought aid from the international community to achieve their goals. The Palestinians were disorganized but posed a clear demographic threat to the Zionists. In the modern day, however, the Israelis clearly have the upper hand in terms of power. Through military conquest they have become the deciders in the conflict while the weakened Palestinians seek support from

outside sources. In this chapter I will speak to the ethos of conflict in the modern period and how the different elements have been reprioritized in regards to the exchange in power between the two sides. I will argue how the Israeli rise to power has focused their ethos of conflict on security, self-victimhood, and positive self-image and how the Palestinians' powerlessness has focused their ethos on self-victimhood, justness of their own goals, and delegitmization of the Israelis. For the purpose of this paper, I will consider the "modern" period to be the end of the Second Intifada through the present day. I choose 2005 as the starting point of this period after the Second Intifada because the implementation of the security wall and its controversy has further reinforced the power dynamic and has had a cascading effect on various elements of the ethos of conflict (Michael, 2002).

**Israel**

Since its establishment in 1948, Israel has experienced an increasing rises in power in a variety of spheres including militarily, economically, and politically. In the Six Day War in 1967 Israel conquered large areas of strategic of strategic and lucrative land. Moral skyrocketed, the power of the IDF increased from its militarily significant holdings in the Golan and Jordan Valley, and Israel enjoyed an influx of funds from new tourism, donations, and oil from the Sinai Peninsula. Although it would eventually relinquish some of the territories conquered in the Six Day War in exchange for peace with its neighbors, Israel's new territories allowed it relative security and allowed them to fight future wars that would not necessarily threaten its very existence. The strength of

the IDF itself has also greatly increased over time. A military culture synthesized through mandatory conscription, significant aid from the United States, and a disproportionate amount of the national budget on defense has allowed the IDF to become one of the most powerful militaries in the world. The IDF facilitates life in the West Bank for Palestinians living in disputed territories.

Israel's economy has flourished over the years due to its quality university education and disproportionate contribution to global science and technology. In addition, Israel has a vibrant startup and venture capital country second only to Sillicon Valley; Google chairman Eric Schmidt claims that, "Israel has the most important high-tech center in the world after the United States" (Efune, 2012). Israel, despite being a nation of only 8 million, has the 24th highest GDP per capita of any nation. Israelis enjoy a high standard of living and in 2015 were ranked 19th among 187 Nations on the United Nation's Human Development Index.

In addition, following the Six Day War Jews of the diaspora began making aliyah in much higher numbers and Jewish organizations in America began to publicly declare their support. Since 1967, lobbying firms supporting Israel including the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and Christians United for Israel (CUFI) have grown in prominence and influence in the American political system. These lobbies exercise their power and influence political support of Israel by means of campaign contributions and creating public awareness in the media for Israel's legitimacy. Israel has enjoyed recognition as a state from the United Nations and has been a permanent member since 1949.

These factors have contributed to Israel's rise in power and have influenced its ethos of conflict. Now that the Israeli State has been established, one could consider the Israeli's goals as largely completed. The modern Israeli collective is more focused on how to maintain and defend their hard-won accomplishments against constant attack. The conflict still continues in a violent fashion, but since Israel has the upper hand they consider themselves on the defensive of many conflicts and as the reactionaries to instigations by the Palestinians. In terms of their security as a safe, Jewish state, Israelis find themselves facing security issues that threaten their demographic integrity in addition to their physical security.

Israelis feel that their relative position of power allows many of legitimate security concerns to go unaddressed; the constant threat they feel in addition to the flippant attitude of the international community contributes to its sense of self-victimhood. Israel's rise to power has prompted numerous and frequent attacks on both its civilian safety and legitimacy as a state. The frequency of those attacks has allowed self-victimhood to become a heavily emphasized element in the Israeli ethos of conflict. In addition, the relentless and sometimes brutal nature of these attacks has prompted Israelis to delegitimize Palestinians in relation to self-victimhood. Their characterization of the Palestinians as bloodthirsty, insatiable for conflict, and radicals only serves to stoke feelings of self-victimhood. In addition, Israel's increase in power and its successes in various fields increase their sense of self-victimhood when they feel from the international communities. Despite doing everything, "right," Israelis believe they receive disproportionate outrage, news coverage, and global demonization. These factors make

them believe that they are merely the latest manifestations of age-old anti-Semitism where Jews are persecuted no matter what they do.

Israel's dramatic and unlikely rise to prominence and prosperity has also influenced them to have a much higher value on their positive self-image. Israelis pride themselves on their accomplishments and consider themselves the pioneers and victors of the ancient struggle to redeem their ancestral homeland. In terms of in-group out-group dynamics, Israel's position of power has manifested itself in the positive self-image it views itself in regards to the delegitimized Palestinians. Positive self-image manifests itself in Israel frequently juxtaposing its battle tactics, political intentions, and culture with that of the Palestinians. In this arena, Israel's power has allowed it to equate itself with progress and reason and contrast it with the powerless Palestinians they describe as primitive.

In this section I will provide a description of each of Israel's predominant elements of the ethos of conflict now that they hold the majority of the power in the conflict.

**Security.** Security concerns are broken down into two categories: security regarding the safety of citizens and the threat posed to the State of Israel itself. Indiscriminate Palestinian violence continually targets Israeli civilians and its effect on the collective Israeli mindset is easily seen in Zionist rhetoric and its prominence in Israeli politics. Memories of the Second Intifada supplemented by civilian-targeted rocket strikes from Gaza and frequencies of "lone wolf" attacks prevent many Israelis from envisioning a pathway to peace. Security concerns regarding physical safety are so high that they influence other aspects of the ethos of conflict so that each element is colored by

how it relates to security. In addition, Israelis fear for the security of the State of Israel itself regarding its identity as a Jewish State and how it is perceived in the international community. Security concerns are widely acknowledges as the biggest barrier to peace and elections are predicated on candidate's stances on security and how their various policies will affect it.

Regarding security concerns, the modern period holds little in common with security concerns of previous times when Israel was not as powerful. In the past, Israel faced direct threats to its existence from Arab states that would deploy their armies with the intention of destroying Israel itself. However, as Israel rose to power in the region and began to assert its military superiority beginning in the Six Day War the dynamics of Israeli security began to change. Beginning with the Second Intifada followed by the unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005 and the subsequent rise of Hamas Israel's main enemy became non-state actors who target civilians rather than the IDF or country itself. This development had a major influence on policy. After the poorly executed war that saw heavy rocket fire into Negev communities and kidnappings following the withdrawal from Gaza it became clear that cease-fires and agreements held no weight. This furthered the public belief that Israel could not make peace with the Palestinians and allowed a sense of uncertainty and fear to penetrate Israeli society. In a press conference Bibi Netanyahu said, "Next time it will be Qassams not only on the Negev communities but also on Tel Aviv" (Gelvin, 2005). The fear instilled in Israelis also prompted heavy military response and bombardment of locations where rockets had been fired from. In light of terrorism and kidnappings Israel needed to show their enemies that they could crush them militarily.

The Gaza War of 2008 commonly referred to as "Cast Lead" helped solidify the Israeli perception that they were not only under attack as a country but under attack as a civilian population. The war began in an attempt to stop Hamas from firing rockets into civilian areas and destroy the tunnels used to abduct soldiers. Hamas broke several ceasefires prompting more airstrikes from the Israeli Air Force; in a press conference a spokesman for Ehud Olmert said that Israel was committed to a truce but it could not accept a "one-sided ceasefire" and a situation where rockets are coming in everyday targeting Israeli civilians. The war had an undeniable effect on Israeli society as the constant rocket fire disrupted daily life, closed schools, and destroyed homes. In addition to rockets, Hamas employed psychological tactics that instilled fear and paranoia in Israeli society. Hamas publicly stated their intent of kidnapping Israelis and announced they would fire rockets on Tel Aviv; over text message, Hamas sent texts in Hebrew to Israeli civilians saying, "Rockets on all cities, shelters will not protect you" (Hazem, 2009). As a result, Israeli Jews overwhelmingly supported the war and subsequent wars such as Pillar of Defense (2012) and Protective Edge (2014) received similar endorsement from the Israeli public.

The fear that is prevalent throughout Israeli society is not unsubstantiated; a 2009 study by the University of Haifa found that one in every five Israelis have lost a relative or a friend in a terrorist attack (Kober, 2009). Media outlets for the Palestinian Authority and Hamas regularly incite and glorify terror. Both groups revere terrorists as martyrs and public spaces like parks are frequently named after terrorists (Donzis, 2014). A 2014 poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research found that 80% of Palestinians support attempts by "individual Palestinians to stab or run over Israelis in

Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank." Terror has been on a consistent rise on an interpersonal basis. According to the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time this paper is written, November 30, 2015, there has been almost 20 separate instances of lone wolf attacks involving individual Palestinians stabbing, shooting, or running over Jews with their vehicles in the last month.

Future policies and the framework of peace are affected by how Israel thinks it will affect security. After the disaster that has become Gaza, Israelis are much more hesitant to move forward with the concept of "land for peace." Israel cites the continuous rocket fire and other forms of terror as evidence that a Palestinian State would be dangerous to Israelis. People claim that if the same Qassam rockets were fired from cities in the West Bank the Iron Dome would be rendered useless and Tel Aviv could be bombarded in the same manner as Sderot or Ashkelon. From a strategic standpoint, Israel has continuously reiterated that a withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders is not possible because the topography of the land makes those borders indefensible. They equate these borders with the paralyzing insecurity felt by Israelis before the Six Day War and even before the State of Israel itself, referring to them as "Auschwitz" borders (Dimant, 2014). In addition the physical security, Israel worries over the integrity of its Jewish character. It frequently demands that the Palestinian Authority recognize Israel as a Jewish state and the Jewish People's right to self-determination. Another major concern is how it will keep its Jewish majority and maintain its democratic nature. The growing Palestinian population presents a threat to the mission of the State of Israel itself: a nation with a Jewish majority to protect Jews in a way that they were not in countries where they were a minority.

The security element of Israel's ethos of conflict is highly related to its self-victimization. Physical attacks from Palestinians in addition to attacks on Israel's legitimacy from the international community supports elevated feelings of self-victimhood within Israeli society

**Self-Victimhood and Delegitimization of Palestinians.** Israeli self-victimhood is broken into two components: their self-victimhood in relation to the Palestinians and in relation to the international community. In regards to the first component, Israel's position of power allows it to see itself as the party continually extending its hand for peace but getting violence in return. Israelis believe that they have no partner for peace and the Palestinians are consumed by hate and a desire to kill both Israelis and Jews. Israelis believe that Palestinian terrorism is not contingent upon any stage or forecast in the peace process, but rather they commit terrorism simply because they hate Jews and do not want them there. In a press conference following a recent string of terror attacks, Natanyahu opposed the idea that Palestinians were lashing out due to frustration, "They're attacking us not because they want peace or don't want peace," he said. "It's because they don't want us here" (Goodenough, 2015). Lone wolf attacks contribute to this feeling of self-victimhood because they are seen as ordinary representatives of the greater, violent population. These attacks, in addition to proving widespread incitement and indoctrination of terror, occur in everyday places like bus stations or public squares and make Israelis believe that they cannot go about their daily tasks without fear for their life. Palestinian anti-Semitism is also placed in context with a larger Arab anti-Semitism. In "Why Israel Is the Victim," David Horowitz (2002) asserts that Arabs, "hate Jews so

ferociously that they cannot live alongside them. There is not an Arab state or Arab controlled piece of territory in the Middle East that will allow one Jew to live in it."

However a large part of Israeli self-victimhood has to do with its treatment and portrayal in the international community. In Israel and Zionist communities around the world, anti-zionism is seen as the "new anti-Semitism." Israeli journalist Dan Horowitz (2015) claims that anti-zionism is the "politically correct anti-Semitism." It is the way for traditional anti-Semites to continue their hatred but still be accepted in modern circles that reject group-based bias like anti-Semitism. Israel feels that its treatment and portrayal in the international community largely stems from a continuation in the ancient traditions of anti-Semitism. While criticism of Israel is legitimate, it is largely used in ways that suggest Israel is not the issue. The 3D test of anti-Semitism uses three criteria to distinguish criticism of Israel from anti-Semitism and has been adopted by the US Department of State. The criteria are delegitimization of Israel, demonization of Israel, and holding Israel to a double standard. These three elements and the "new anti-Semitism" contribute to self-victimhood in regards to Israel's position of power in that Israel thinks of itself, as a state and as a culture, as doing everything right only for new manifestations of the same hatred to appear.

Israel is frequently delegitimized in the media in that the Jewish people's right to self-determination is portrayed as illegitimate and racist. Some refer to this as "political anti-Semitism," where people deny Israel's right to exist. It is seen that the denial of the Jewish people's fundamental rights, such as self-determination, is anti-Semitic in the sense that the world singles out the Jews, and the Jews alone, to not receive that right (Cotler, 2015). In regards to demonization, Israel is frequently ascribed a gamut of evil

and insidious characteristics similar to Jews in the era of Christian of racial anti-Semitism. Israel is portrayed as "the embodiment of all evil, including racism, imperialism, colonialism, ethnic cleansing, apartheid and even Nazism" (Cotler, 2015). Anti-zionist groups like Students for Justice in Palestine distribute propaganda that portrays Israel as the secret controller of worldwide banks and media. Pamphlets and tweets display Israel deliberately massacring and reveling in the deaths of civilians.

Israel frequently bemoans the double standard it is held to in the media and the disproportionate amount of coverage it gets in relation to greater atrocities. Many Israelis believe that their actions are held under a microscope and held to standards not applied to other nations. In 2012, after receiving intense international condemnation in regards to what was deemed disproportionate response to Gaza rocket fire, Netanyahu issued a statements saying, "No government would tolerate a situation where nearly a fifth of its people live under a constant barrage of rockets and missile fire, and Israel will not tolerate this situation" (JNS.org, 2012). Movements like BDS (Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions) target Israel seek to put pressure on Israel for human rights violations while at the same time ignoring far worse abuses in neighboring countries. Perhaps most importantly, the United Nations Security Council has been described by numerous sources such as UN Watch, the ADL, and Alan Dershowtiz as spending a "disproportionate amount of time," on Israel-Palestine compares to other issues. In 2013, there were 21 resolutions against Israel and none against Saudi Arabia or North Korea, both notorious abusers of human rights violations.

Like self-victimhood, Israel's positive self-image is also heavily influenced by their delegitimization of Palestinians. Both elements use a heavy juxtaposition stemming

from their differences in power to allow them a prominent position in Israeli ethos of conflict.

**Positive Self-image and Delegitimization of Palestinians.** Israel's rise to power is reflected in their positive self-image. Israelis have a strong national identity and are proud of the many accomplishments they have achieved in their short time as a state. Israel has disproportionately contributed to global technology and commerce; an example being drip irrigation that is used throughout the world as a method of agricultural efficiency and water conservation. Their positive self-image is rooted in their accomplishments and the sense of pride they derive from the struggle of the Jewish people as they realize their age-old dream of redeeming the State of Israel. At the United Nations General Assembly, Netanyahu declared, "In our time the Biblical prophecies are being realized. As the prophet Amos said, they shall rebuild ruined cities and inhabit them. They shall plant vineyards and drink their wine. They shall till gardens and eat their fruit. And I will plant them upon their soil never to be uprooted again. Ladies and gentlemen, the people of Israel have come home never to be uprooted again" (Times of Israel Staff, 2013).

In 2014, Nefeseh B'nefesh, a nonprofit organization, released a video for Yom Haatzmaut (Israeli Independence Day) that captures the spirit of Israeli positive self-image. In the video, 66 Israelis labeled as "heroes" talk about the journey and success of re-founding Israel. The narrative speaks to those brave souls who returned to Israel to achieve independence, renew their identity, and reclaim their homeland against opposition: "Flourishing in the wilderness, reviving the Hebrew language, building cities, villages, and towns, with our own economy and culture" (Nefesh B'Nefesh, 2014).

People who founded a new society founded on values of liberty, justice and peace; who would "uphold social and political equality for all of its citizens, without distinction of religion, race, or sex. Israel ensured freedom of conscious, and religion, education, culture, and language, and the safeguarding of the sanctity of the holy places of all religions" (Nefesh B'Nefesh, 2014).

A large part of the Israeli positive self-image is how they contrast themselves against the Palestinians. In culture but also in the value they have derived from the land in a short span of time compared with the much larger amount of time the Palestinians have had with it. Israel prides itself on being a multicultural, democratic society that includes diversity in all levels of society including industry, the IDF, and even the government that has self-identified Palestinian members of the Knesset who regularly speak out and condemn policies. This is juxtaposed against Palestinian society, where Jews do not have representation in the Palestinian Authority or are even allowed in the Gaza Strip. Israeli and Zionist pundits around the world use contrasts to demonstrate superior Israeli self-image. David Horowitz (2002) summarizes this dichotomy, Israel "Palestinians into their communities with full rights while Arabs/Palestinians wont even tolerate Jews in their countries."

LBGT and women's rights and their lacking counterparts in Palestinian society are other big factors. Israel prides itself on being the progressive LGBT country in the Middle East and Tel Aviv, which is known as the "gay capital" of the Middle East, if famous for its Pride Week and Pride Parade that happen every summer. In contrast, homosexual activity is illegal in the Gaza Strip and homosexuals in the West Bank do not have protected rights. Outed Palestinians can even face public humiliation, torture, and

death(Ben-Dor, Cahana & Kagan, 2008). Israeli pundits frequently cite these facts to the international community and use the contrast to both delegitimize Palestinians while at the same time bolster their positive self-image. In Israel, women serve in the IDF, Knesset, and every facet of Israeli society. In fact, Gilda Meir served as the Israeli Prime Minister in the early 1970's. In Gaza, women face restrictions on clothing and behavior; in 2010, women in Gaza were barred from smoking hookah because Hamas claimed it was leading to increasing divorces (Blomfield, 2010). Even more seriously, women in both Gaza and the West Bank are subject to honor killings as punishment for "immoral sexual behavior." There were 26 honor killings in 2014 alone (Odgaard, 2014). Israeli and Zionist publications write pieces on women's rights that blatantly contrast the differences in women's and gay rights in Israel that serve to preserve their positive self-image in Israel and to the international community.

Israel also casts itself in a superior light in terms of violence and terrorism. In regards to conflicts with Gaza, Israel has considered itself the most moral army in the world. In 2014 Richard Kemp, a British army commander, said that, "No army in the world acts with as much discretion and great care as the IDF in order to minimize damage. The US and the UK are careful, but not as much as Israel" (Harkov, 2014). Critics against Israeli condemnation cite practices such as Israel texting residents of a building that its going to be bombed or "roof knocking" in which the Israeli air force would drop a smaller bomb on the roof of a targeted building to warn residents to leave. Israel regularly uses comparison between itself and Hamas to both condemn them and increase their self-perception in terms of battle tactics. When it became known that Hamas was regularly using human shields during Operation Protective Edge, both Israeli

and Zionist organizations around the world released graphics showing the dichotomy of Israel's iron dome versus Hamas' human dome. These graphics showed civilians above and below ground with rockets raining down and slogans such as, "Israel uses weapons to protect its people, Hamas uses people to protect its weapons" (Gordan & Perugini, 2014). Israeli sanctity for life, such as releasing known terrorists to barter back kidnapped soldiers, is compared to Hamas-run television that proclaims, "The Al-Qassam Brigades love death more than you love life" (Gabbay, 2012).

Lastly, positive self-image is derived from Israeli response to terror and how that compares to Palestinian response and culture to terror. In 2015, an Israeli threw a firebomb into a Palestinian building that resulted in the death of a baby. Israelis and Zionists all over the world wasted no time condemning the act. Netanyahu labeled the death an act of terror and described the arsonist as a murderer; he later called Mahmoud Abbas to express his condolences and offer what assistance he could. This strongly contradicts the Palestinians who have a handbook forbidding them to say the word "terror," and their refusal to condemn terrorist attacks (Abu Toameh, 2015).

**Palestine**

Since the United Nations Partition Plan of 1947, the Palestinians have experienced the opposite turn of fortune that the Israelis have enjoyed. The Israeli Independence War of 1948 resulted in the Palestinian exodus that would later be known as the Nakba. The Nakba created hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees who fled to neighboring countries; those who tried to return to their homes were branded infiltrators in order to prevent them from returning. The Palestinians were subjected to

the treatment of the neighboring countries they fled to who often dealt with them harshly. In what was deemed the "Lost Years" by a Palestinian-American historian Rashid Khalidi, Palestinians lacked solidarity and centrality as the population was fractured between the West Bank, Gaza, and neighboring countries (Khalidi, 2010). The Six Day War further broke the cohesiveness of the Palestinians and began the military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip that continues into the present.

The emergence of the PLO offered some cohesiveness and clarity to the Palestinian cause but their operations lacked geographic proximity and suffered from internally disjointed unity. Palestinians remaining in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, or East Jerusalem following the Six Day War have been subject to military occupation. The occupation has resulted in poorer economic standard of living, freedom of movement, and quality of life. Palestinians face daily degradations as a result of the occupation in addition to the other consequences of occupation; these effects have been compounded by the construction of the separation wall in the West Bank and the blockade in the Gaza Strip. In a 2005 report the United Nations claimed that the separation wall "severs communities, people's access to services, livelihoods and religious and cultural amenities" (Sadat, 2009). As a nation or as a people, Palestinians do not enjoy the prosperity or freedom that Israelis do.

Militarily, the Palestinians are at a severe disadvantage compared to the domestic and foreign-financed militaristic culture of Israel. The Palestinian Authority has a small standing force tasked with the security of the Palestinian president and leadership. In the Gaza Strip, Hamas receives training and weapons from foreign sponsors such as Iran. The firepower they receive, however, pales in comparison with the military grade

firepower used by the IDF. Hamas mainly employs homemade rockets and resorts to tactics such as suicide bombings and kidnappings in order to have an effect.

Politically, the Palestinians power has been fractured through a lack of unity. Following the elections in the Gaza Strip in 2006 Hamas violently ousted political opponent Fatah and the conflict resulted in high tensions and discord between the two parties that continues to the current day. The two parties have radically different views and goals in terms of ending the conflict and Palestinian political power suffers through the inconsistent tactics and image they present to the international community. Hamas is designated as a terrorist organization by the European Union, Israel, and the United States; in addition, Israel refuses to negotiate with Hamas because it does not recognize Israel's legitimacy as a state. The Palestinians were first given observer status at the United Nations in 1974 and then upgraded to the status as a non-member observer state in 2012. Although they gained power in recognition of being a state in the United Nations, their observer status does not allow them to vote on resolutions.

The Palestinians' lack of power has centered their ethos of conflict on three areas: self-victimhood, justness of their goals, and delegitimization of the Israelis. The power dynamic of the conflict seeps into the Palestinian collective mindset via every day interactions. They experience their lack of power at Israeli checkpoints when civilians deal with armed IDF soldiers in their everyday actions living under occupation. The military presence and separation wall makes them feel as if they are an inferior ethnic group being branded as inferior and dangerous. Militarily, the disparity in firepower allows Palestinians to develop a David versus Goliath mindset when they feel as if their homemade rockets or rocks are met with airstrikes and live ammunition. Politically, all

they can do is petition the world for assistance while Israel wields its power of full statehood. The combination of experiences born out of a lack of power creates a palpable sense of self-victimhood that is expressed from every part of society and also used to garner support from the international community.

The tangible effects of a lack of power that Palestinians experience that foster a sense of self-victimhood also help to reaffirm the justness of their own goals. Their poor standard of living and degraded experience resulting from living under occupation creates motivation to see themselves in control of their own destiny. They wish to claim their status a natives of the land and live as such while simultaneously protecting Islam and the holy sites. Palestinians recognize that it is their lack of power that keeps their goals from being met and therefore first and foremost wish to achieve statehood because they believe that self-determination will allow them to better their day-to-day existence and achieve their other goals that they are entitled to.

Lastly, the lack of power causes them to have an extremely negative view of Israelis that manifests itself in delegitimization. Palestinians see Israelis as the source of their misery and humiliation and hold an extremely negative view of the people they view to be their oppressors. They recognize that Israel holds the power over their daily lives; they reconcile their discontent with their present situation by ascribing evil and malicious traits to those in power to make sense of their current situation. Palestinian delegitimization is born out of an earnest psychological reaction to their experience with Israeli; however, their powerlessness also allows them to use delegitimization in a strategic way to the international community. To the rest of the world, Palestinians describe Israelis as racist, colonialist regime that is intends to disenfranchise an

indigenous population. In the 21st century awakening of the awareness of racism, colonialist power dynamics, and the exploitation of indigenous populations these accusations have put significant pressure on Israel to change its policies. Even more serious, during armed conflicts Israel is repeatedly accused of deliberately targeting civilians, collective punishment, and genocide. The power dynamic between the two groups allows Palestinians to cast these traits onto the Israelis in a way that mobilizes support for their goals.

In this section I will provide a description of each of Palestine's predominant elements of the ethos of conflict now that they hold the minority of the power in the conflict.

**Self-Victimhood.** As the relatively powerless player in the current power structure, a large part of the modern Palestinian ethos of conflict constitutes self-victimhood. Palestinians consider themselves underneath the heel of a foreign oppressor that takes happiness in their suffering. The presence of the IDF in the West Bank and the facilitation of supplies and energy in the Gaza Strip reduce quality of life for Palestinians. IDF checkpoints in the West Bank impede rights to transportation and enhance the physical and cultural separation between Israel and Palestine. More importantly, these checkpoints are a source of daily abuse and degradation that Palestinians experience at the hands of the Israelis. Testimonies collected by Ynet documented the daily abuses and humiliations that Palestinians experience on a daily basis, "There was a case in which a military policeman pushed an Arab on the floor and simply started kicking him. In another case, two Arabs began fighting and instead of separating between them, the

soldiers stood by, laughed and applauded" (Zitun, 2015). The blockade of Gaza holds up needed supplies and contributes to the "ghettoization" of life there (Ratner, 2014).

Their relative position of powerless and the ethnic divide that defines the conflict makes Palestinians feel as if the Israelis are treating them as second-class citizens at best and less than humans at worst. One Palestinian activist described the occupation as a system that "discriminates between people based on race, nationality, ethnicity, and religion" (Norton, 2015). In the West Bank, Jews are under the governance of civil law while Palestinians live under military law. This means that, "while their Jewish neighbors come and go freely, West Bank Palestinians are subject to arbitrary arrest and detention, and to the denial of freedom of movement; they are frequently barred from access to educational or healthcare facilities" (Makdisi, 2014). Palestinians believe that their lives are not valued and they are indiscriminately killed to prove a point or for no reason at all; this attitude is seen in times of "collective punishment" in Gaza for Hamas rocket fire. They believe that Israel "has not only a complete lack of sanctity for Palestinian life but a willingness to kill large amounts of Palestinians in "incremental Genocide" (Ratner, 2014).

Politically, Palestinians feel themselves at the mercy of the international community. Having a fractured political system and no real authority in the United Nations, all Palestinians can do is plead with the powers at be to put pressure on Israel. Militarily, they feel that they do not stand a chance in the armed struggle against Israelis. What weapons they do have are given by foreign powers such as Iran; in terms of arms, a crucial element of intractable conflict, Palestinians are the victims in that they have no control over the armed struggle.

**Justness of Goals**. Opposite from the Israelis, the Palestinians have not achieved their goals, and the lack of power and the self-victimhood they feel because of it enhances the necessity and justness of their goals. Palestinians strongly believe that their present situation will be remedied by self-determination and the control it will bring over their own destiny. Palestinians, loudly and frequently, claim their need for an independent state that will rid them of Israeli oppression. In addition, Palestinians claim that they own the holy sites the Israelis desecrate and it is their duty to keep them sacred.

The justness and importance of Palestinian goals are reflected in the acceptance Palestinians have for the tactics used to realize them. In what has come to be known as the "despair argument," Palestinians are driven to violence because Israel is so relentlessly cruel and oppressive and they see no other options to advance their aims (Leibovitz, 2015). Israel, "with the occupation, increasing settlements, checkpoints, lack of economic and educational opportunities, large prison complexes and police/Israel Defense Forces brutality" leads to this despair (Mason, 2015).

These agents have "nothing to lose" and as long as their actions are aimed at ending the occupations, it doesn't matter what they do (Ravid, 2015). This rationale, of the oppressed Palestinian at the end of his rope, is used to justify and glorify individual attacks on Israelis. Those who die in an attack on Israelis are considered martyrs like the Palestinian heroes of the Black Hand before the establishment of Israel. They are celebrated within Palestinian society but, in the international community, their actions are depicted as the last resort of a desperate person. After a Palestinian fired on Israelis in Hebron Abbas chose to speak of the economic situation caused by Israeli occupation that leads the Palestinian nation to a "state of despair and stress" (Times of Israel Staff, 2015).

After a young boy stabbed an Israeli and was injured by IDF response, an image of the young boy bleeding on the ground was circulated on the Internet. In a press release, Abbas said, "We will not give in to the logic of brute force and policies of occupation and aggression practiced by the Israeli government and its herds of settlers who engage in terrorism against our people and our holy places and our homes and our trees, and the summary execution of our children in cold blood, as they did with the child Ahmed Manasra and other children in Jerusalem and other places" (Eisenbud, 2015).

**Delegitimization of Opponent.** Similar to self-victimhood and justness of goals, delegitimization of Israelis stems from the collective experience that Palestinians feel as a result of the power dynamic. A critical component of Palestinian culture is their delegitimization of Israel to their own people and the international community. Due to the drastic imbalance in power, Israelis and Jews are viewed as usurpers, destroyers, and defilers. The Hamas charter is outwardly anti-Semitic and includes claims that Jews were behind world disasters and are planning to take over the world. It presents Jews as the fundamental enemy of Islam and says Jihad against Jews is a duty. A segment on Palestinian Authority media features children saying "Jews are barbaric monkeys, sons of pigs, brought up on spilling blood, the most evil among creations," to the applause of an audience (Palestinian Media Watch, 2013). Another features an artist explaining his painting that depictures a dragon wearing a kippah with a Palestinian child in its mouth, "Zionists are monsters that revel in the butchery of children" (Palestinian Media Watch, 2012).

A 2012 study of Palestinian Textbooks discovered several themes: denying Israelis to the land and holy sites and demonization. The books deny Jews historical

precedence to the land and refer to them as "inhabitants," rather than Israelites, Jews, or Hebrews. Jewish holy sites (Western Wall, Tomb of the Patriarchs) are described as Muslim ones that Jews usurped. In the books, Zionism is not portrayed as a Jewish National Movement but as a racist, colonialist movement connected to western imperialism. In context of their historical connection as an adversary of Mohammed, Jews are described as snakes that use tricks and violate treaties. Jews are described as murderers in vivid detail, and Israel is named the source of all evil with an exhaustive list of crimes including murderers of women/children and desecrators of holy sites (Arnon, 2012).

In accordance with the power structure, Israel is described as this gargantuan force pummeling the defenseless Palestinians that serves to delegitimize Israel to both the Palestinian and international community. Lethal responses to attacks on Israelis are often described as executions and are reported as such in the media. In conflicts with Hamas, Israeli response to rocket fire that kills civilians is often described as genocide; during the summer of 2014, Abbas accused Israel of committing genocide at the United Nations. In a larger scope, wars such as Operation Cast Lead is framed against wars against the Palestinian people rather than as wars against Hamas.

After World War Two, long-standing practices such as colonialism began to be greatly frowned upon with other virtues such as racism. Israel, as the dominant power, is placed in context with other western, imperial countries that disenfranchise and abuse indigenous people for the land. Palestinian news outlets and anti-Zionist publications characterize Israel as racist and refer to their intent to ethnically cleanse the region and displace the indigenous population. Organizations like Students for Justice in Palestine

conduct "Israeli Apartheid Week" that likens Israel's practices to the racist South African regime. Labels are used strategically, particularly within the Palestinian Authority. In the Palestinian Terminology Guide put out by the Palestinian Authority, the book instructed people to say "Israeli colonialist occupation" instead of Israel and "Israel Occupation Force" rather than Israel Defense Force.

**Conclusion**

Like all intractable conflicts, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a conflict that has spanned generations and is influenced by a multitude of historical and environmental factors. Originally the conflict developed as a competition between two national identities that strived to use the same land to realize their goals of self-determination. The justness and necessity of the Jews' goals were made apparent after a fundamental change in Jewish behavior elicited the same hateful response in the Gentile communities they resided in. When their millennia-old persecution reached a culmination in the dawn of racial anti-Semitism, the Jews decided that a homeland (and later a state) in their ancestral homeland was the only way to achieve safety and well being for their people. The Palestinian identity and the goals attached to it, on the other hand, coalesced in response to the unique pressures they faced opposed to other Arab peoples. Those unique challenges, Zionism and the British Mandate, isolated them from the greater cause of pan-Arabism and forced them to define themselves in a solitary nationalistic manner.

In the earliest period of the conflict, both sides had equitable power that manifested itself in similar prioritizations of the ethos of conflict. Both sides have in-group and out-group elements of conflict that were all affected by the element of security. While efforts at coexistence and concepts of peace were present, they were not thoroughly pursued as both groups' justness of their own goals, delegitimization of their opponent, and positive self-image prevented them from humanizing the other and prevented them from considering the validity of their goals.

In the modern period, the balance of power has shifted dramatically and this has manifested itself in different prioritizations of power for each group. For Israel, security

is tantamount as it seeks to protect and maintain its position of power. The continuous attacks on that power foster a sense of self-victimhood in Israeli community. That self-victimhood is supplemented by a barbarous view of the Palestinians that serves to create an evil monster they must protect themselves from. Lastly, their position of power and their various successes promotes a collective positive self-image that is often juxtaposed with their disdainful view of the Palestinians.

From the Palestinian perspective, their powerless position leads them to prioritize self-victimhood in their ethos of conflict above all else. Their daily suffering and lack of control over their own destiny promotes a feeling of helplessness and victimhood that is prevalent throughout society. This self-victimhood born out of their lack of power emphasizes the justness and necessity of their goals; goals that they view would liberate them from their present condition. Finally, their powerless position leads to extreme delegitimization of the Israelis. Viewed as their captors and oppressors that take glee in their misery, Palestinian delegitimization of Israel is present in every rung of society from the government to popular culture.

It goes without saying that peace is the ultimate goal for any intractable conflict. However the makeup of every conflict is vastly different depending on the defining identity of groups involved, the source of and logic behind their goals, and the historical and present circumstances that have led to the present situation. The makeup and prioritization of ethos of conflict will be different for different groups; therefore, the peace that is sought for each circumstance must address the unique ethos of conflict involved in those conflicts.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the most studied and spoken of intractable conflicts in history. Masses of time and resources have been devoted to finding a solution. To suggest a specific solution would be completely beyond the scope of this paper, but I will claim that any proposed solution will have to address and mediate the most important elements of both sides ethos of conflict that are barring peace. Israelis must first and foremost be assured their security, both in the safety of their citizens and the integrity of their state. I believe that once this is solved it will lessen their sense of self-victimhood and allow them to see Palestinians as having just goals as well. Greater security will also allow them to lower their guard and recognize the humanity in the Palestinians. For the Palestinians, their suffering must be alleviated by some means so that they can see Israelis in a more positive way and consider them worthy of peace. This increase in relative power will lessen their sense of self-victimhood and allow them a greater sense of agency over their own destiny that will allow them to recognize and remove their self-constructed barriers to peace.

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