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**REIMAGINING THEORIES OF NATIONALISM: A CRITICAL
EXAMINATION OF PREVAILING NATIONALIST THEORIES**

by

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**SUBMITTED TO SCRIPPS COLLEGE IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
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Abstract:

Traditional theories of nationalism tend to fall in one of two categories: 1) top-down, or official nationalism, which holds that nationalist sentiments are created by state actors, or 2) bottom-up, or popular, nationalism, which holds that nationalist sentiments originate with the people.

However, there are major flaws in both of those theories, as well as a decent amount of overlap between them. This paper dismantles the supposed binary between these two theories, and looks for a way to view the theories in combination with one another. Looking at the places of overlap, as well as the elements of each theory that should be discarded altogether, a different theory of nationalism - a hybrid theory - emerges. This paper applies the hybrid theory to a case study, Italy from the mid-1800s to mid-1900s, to see how the theory plays out in reality.

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Introduction

Like all other Scripps first years entering college in 2016, the very first text I was assigned to read for college was Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities*. At the time, it was one of the most difficult books I had ever read, with pretentious language obfuscating already complex ideas. I relied heavily on my peers and instructors to understand what Anderson was really saying. Anderson was writing about the ways the communities we create, particularly on a national level, are just constructs.¹ Everything from the shape of our borders to the names we call ourselves are invented. Even when I understood what Anderson was talking about, something about his ideas felt off to me. Anderson talks about the "imagined community," but never clarified who was doing the imagining, although it was implied to be the people. For every point Anderson made, I found myself thinking "what about ____?" What about legacies of colonialism? What about countries not discussed? What about the effects of capitalism? What about barriers in transmission of ideas? But I moved on, and rarely thought about *Imagined Communities* once the class ended.

That is, until I took an entire class on the topic of nationalism. Once again, I was immediately required to read *Imagined Communities*; this time, I understood the language and ideas much better, but still found myself asking "what about ____?" after many of the points he made. I hoped that the class would expose me to authors who could begin to fill in the gaps that I thought Anderson left open. Many of the theorists, like Eric Hobsbawm and Atossa Araxia Abrahamian, were on the same page as Anderson, either influencing his work or being influenced by it. They upheld the notion of the nation as a construct that exists in the minds of

¹ Anderson, Benedict R. OG. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, 2016.

the people, establishing that nationalism comes from the people first and foremost. Their work left me with similar questions as Anderson's, and a few new ones, mostly involving *where* the nationalist sentiments come from, and how the ideas apply to colonized/formerly colonized nations. Other theorists took a completely different perspective, writing that the state itself creates a sense of nationalism, and forces the people to buy into it through state action. This raised a whole different set of questions for me: how did the state come into existence? How does the state get the people to buy into their idea of the nation? Does this type of nationalism only exist in strictly totalitarian states?

Some of the conflict lies in what nationalism itself really means. Even the same author can express confusion: Ernest Gellner, in *Nations and Nationalism* defines nationalism both as “a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be more congruent”² and “the organization of human groups into large, centrally educated, culturally homogenous units.”³ For the purposes of this thesis, I am defining nationalism as a political movement that pushes for the existence, or continued existence, of a nation under which all the people are unified. It is a sense of a national consciousness. This definition allows me to look at emerging nations as well as existing nations, which is important because nationalism is a continuing ideology. Nationalism does not end when a nation has been established; in fact, it sometimes does not emerge until well after a nation has been established. Additionally, in this thesis, the idea of a nation encompasses both the government and the people, while the idea of a state refers only to the operations of the government itself. Understanding the relationship between the nation, the state, and the people is essential for understanding processes of nationalism.

² Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983. 1.

³ *Ibid.*, 35.

One thing that all the authors agree on is that nationalism is not a naturally occurring process; it needs to be constructed by someone. Gellner writes: “contrary to popular and even scholarly belief, nationalism does not have any very deep roots in the human psyche. The human psyche can be assumed to have persisted unchanged through the many many millennia of the existence of the human race, and not to have become either better or worse during the relatively brief and very recent age of nationalism.”⁴ The times of city-states or vast empires have passed, and nations are what currently dominate. If nationalism were inherent to humanity, the way that community seems to be, we would see evidence of it throughout history. Instead, the ‘age of nationalism’ only seems to appear around the 18th century, gaining in strength more recently, as evidenced by the fact that “since World War II every successful revolution has defined itself in *national* terms.”⁵ The question that the theorists are arguing over is *who* constructs nationalism?

The type of nationalism that Anderson focuses on is known as popular nationalism, or bottom-up nationalism. This theory focuses exclusively on the relationship between the nation and the people. It states that the idea of the nation originates with the people, and the people take their national consciousness and use it to build a nation. This definition operates under the assumption that a group of people and their sense of community presupposes the existence of a state. Alternatively, official nationalism, or top-down nationalism, is the theory that the state imposes a sense of nationalism onto the people. This theory focuses primarily on the relationship between the state and the nation, with little emphasis on the people other than as something ideas can be imposed onto. It assumes that the state exists, and has power over the people.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Anderson, 2.

A professor once told me that when various authors seem to be talking past each other, it usually means they are having completely different conversations. In this case, I believe these authors are actually having the same conversation; they just do not realize it. Instead of viewing popular nationalism as completely different from official nationalism, I believe there is a way to view the two in conversation with one another. The ideas of official nationalism fill in many of the gaps that Anderson leaves open, and ideas of popular nationalism answer many of the questions that arise from studying official nationalism. For example, who creates the borders, the names we call ourselves, and the languages we speak? The state. How does the state get buy-in from the people? By working with the people, and influencing the culture that the people are a part of.

In this paper, I try to explore the true relationship that these two theories of nationalism have with one another. In the first chapter, I specifically explore the theories as they currently exist, looking at the specific methodologies used by nationalist leaders to create a nationalist sentiment. In the second chapter, I break down those theories, looking at history to analyze what has really occurred. I find that the two theories have great points of overlap, and that neither theory can completely claim any methodology. Although it is not the main point of my research, I also bring in examples from colonized and formerly-colonized nations, to see how processes of colonization and imperialism affect the nationalism-building process. In the third chapter, I closely analyze how the hybrid method of analysis holds up when applied to a real nation. I look at the history of Italy, primarily from the mid-1800s to the mid-1900s, looking at the various nation and nationalism building techniques that were utilized.

Chapter 1: The Theory

As nationalism is not a naturally occurring process, the question becomes: where does nationalism come from? Is it created by people? By governments? By society? Because nationalism is a sense of identification inherently linked to the existence of a nation-state, theorists must also contend with the relationship between nationalism and nations.

The two leading bodies of thought on this topic are 1) top-down nationalist theory, or that nationalism is imposed on the people by the state, and 2) bottom-up nationalist theory, or that the people use a sense of national identity to create the state. For many scholars, these two theories are seen as completely distinct from one another. I, however, believe that there is much overlap between the two theories, and that they should be viewed in conjunction with one another. I will explore the overlap of these two theories in the next chapter, but it is first helpful to explore the theories as they are traditionally viewed - separately.

Top-down Nationalism

Top-down, or official, nationalism is the theory that a unified state constructs nationalism and diffuses that sense of identity to all of its people. A variety of techniques may be used, such as state education, propaganda, suppression of non-homogenous identities, and even violence; all these methodologies must come from state actors or the state as a whole for it to be considered top-down nationalism.

Education

One of the most prominent ways of creating and diffusing a sense of nationalism throughout the people is state-run education. When the state has full control of the education system, it can control what and how people learn. Education programs are easy to manipulate in

order to spread nationalist ideology, as the government is able to spread propaganda directly to the people in school settings. Schools can teach about the history of the country, portraying it to be always noble or victorious, regardless of the true history.⁶ Schools can teach about the civil government, encouraging loyalty to their nation.⁷ Schools can act as a training ground for nationalist actions, such as saying the Pledge of Allegiance and recognizing state symbols, such as flags and national animals. Furthermore, schools act as a disseminator of culture; what is taught in schools carry into the students' home lives, influencing their parents and siblings, as well as their future beliefs, identities, and loyalties.

Many American educational theorists believe that the purpose of public schools is to create good citizens. Dianne Ravitch, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Education, wrote that public education “is responsible for a democratic citizenry.”⁸ David Laboree, professor of Education at Stanford, wrote that “we want schools to provide us with good citizens and productive workers, to give us opportunity and reduce inequality; to improve our health, reduce crime, and protect the environment.”⁹ This purpose can be achieved through teachers who “set habits and set attitudes” in their students and through textbooks, which reify the portrayal of the nation the government deems most suitable.¹⁰ For example, American textbooks portray the notion that:

Ours is a government not of force or fear but of ideals...Liberty is an American ideal, and every man desires liberty above all other gifts. Justice is an American ideal, and every

⁶ Pierce, Bessie Louise. “The School and the Spirit of Nationalism.” *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 175, no. 1 (September 1934): 117–22. doi:10.1177/000271623417500116. 117.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ravitch, Diane. *Reign of Error*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013. 5.

⁹ Labaree, David F. 2010. *Someone has to fail: the zero-sum game of public schooling*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 1.

¹⁰ Pierce, 119.

right-minded man believes in justice. Equality (meaning equal rights) is an ideal in which men have always believed, yet the human quality of all citizens was never admitted by any nation until it was written into the Constitution of the United States.¹¹

This type of portrayal idealizes the nation and sparks loyalty to it in the students, who want to be part of a nation that stands for equality, liberty, and justice – regardless of the truth. Many American textbooks skip over nasty parts of American history, like the genocide of indigenous people, internment of Japanese-Americans, and even slavery. This is not unique to the United States. Chinese textbooks teach that “it was from Chinese mathematics that the Western sciences borrowed,” Soviet Russia taught socialism as the best form of economics, Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany rewrote textbooks to promote their leader’s ideologies as truth.¹² By erasing the bad and promoting the good, this mode of education sparks a sense of nationalist pride in the students.

This process is taken to an extreme level in situations of colonialism, where the colonizing country introduces its own educational model into the colonized land. The colonizers use education as a way to justify colonialism, teaching of the economic benefits the colonized receive and creating an idea of the colonized as primitive and the colonizer as a saving force. It also fits into the ‘civilizing’ narrative of colonialism. Those who receive this education begin to identify more with the colonizer than with their own people; they then begin to serve as what Anderson calls “missionaries of nationalism,” spreading information to their fellow people.¹³

Take India as an example: the British instituted their own educational system in India in order to create ‘a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinion, in

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid., 120.

¹³ Anderson, 80.

morals, and in intellect.”¹⁴ Often times, these students would go abroad and study in Britain, spending much of their formative years away from their homeland. When they returned, their identification had shifted; “*in mind and manners he was as much an Englishman as any Englishman*. It was no small sacrifice for him, because in this way he completely estranged himself from the society of his own people and became socially and morally a pariah among them...He was as much a *stranger in his own native land* as the European residents in the country.”¹⁵ Now being more like the British than the Indians, these students could serve as representatives of Britain. They were prepared to serve in the government, acting like a colonizer in their own land. They were “a fraction of the colonized who are indispensable for the running the colonial machine...[they made] up the most loyal clientele of the nationalist parties and by the privileged position they occupy in the colonial system represent the ‘bourgeois’ fraction of the colonized population.”¹⁶ Without this colonial bourgeoisie, the colonizer would not be able to imbue a sense of nationalism into the colonized land.

The link between education and nationalism will likely not fade, as education is inherently reliant on the state: “exo-socialization, education proper, is now the virtually universal norm...this educational infrastructure is large, indispensable, and expensive...this educational infrastructure is too large and costly for any organization other than the biggest one of all, the state. But at the same time, though only the state can sustain such a large burden, only the state is also strong enough to control so important and crucial a function.”¹⁷

¹⁴ Ibid., 91; quoting Thomas Babington Macaulay, British politician who played a large role in instituting this educational system in India

¹⁵ Ibid., 92.

¹⁶ Fanon, Frantz, Richard Philcox, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Homi K. Bhabha. *The Wretched of the Earth*. Cape Town: Kwela Books, 2017. 64.

¹⁷ Gellner, 37.

Violence

Like propaganda and education, violence can be used to create a sense of national identity by spreading certain information about the state, which can be used to create an “in-group” and an “out-group” – with the in-group identifying more strongly with the nation. Violence is often coupled with propaganda in order to create a widespread narrative about why certain groups are on the receiving end of this violence. For example, during the Holocaust, violence was exerted against Jewish people, coupled with propaganda that justified the violence, in order to convince the people that the state actions were correct. This type of violence is not used to scare people into submission, but rather “to realize constantly its ideological doctrines and its practical lies.”¹⁸ When the people see the violence and believe the propaganda, they believe the government actions are justified. This causes them to identify more with the state than with those on the receiving end of the violence, and thus a sense of nationalism forms.

Additionally, violence *against* a nation-state from an outside source can also create a sense of nationalism. After the attacks on September 11, Americans came together with a much stronger sense of national identity.¹⁹ The attack on the nation provided a rallying point for the nation. The result was a much stronger sense of patriotism and nationalism, with 81% of people identifying strongly with a nationalist perspective even four years after the attack, much higher than in the years prior to the attack.²⁰ Similarly, a sense of nationalism arises during times of war,

¹⁸ Arendt, Hannah. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. San Diego, NY, London: Harcourt Brace, 1985. 340.

¹⁹ Ross, Michael E. “Poll: U.S. Patriotism Continues to Soar.” NBCNews.com. NBCUniversal News Group, July 4, 2005.

http://www.nbcnews.com/id/8410977/ns/us_news/t/poll-us-patriotism-continues-soar/#.XIBKUBd7kcg.

²⁰ Ibid.

such as during the World Wars, when the whole nation pitched in to help the soldiers, and by extension, the country. Soldiers voluntarily enlisting is an indication of a sense of nationalism (among other factors), and the Victory Gardens and other conservation efforts taking place domestically indicated the overall commitment to the nation during times of war.

Census and Maps

A sense of nationalism can also be created through administrative processes, such as the construction of censuses and drawing of maps. These processes “profoundly shaped the way the colonial state imagined its dominion - the nature of the human beings it ruled, the geography of its domain, and the legitimacy of its ancestry.”²¹ The processes work in conjunction with one another to categorize the world and the people in it. Both the census and the map create modes of identification, creating labels and words to describe people.

A census’s role is to count how many people belong to a certain land. The existence of a census legitimizes the nation itself. Everyone listed in the census is assumed to be either a citizen or a non-citizen of the nation, which legitimizes the fact that the nation exists at all. Additionally, labels used in the census can create divisions amongst the people which are used to strengthen the nation overall. Censuses either solidify or erase ‘other’ identities through the labeling process; the exclusion process creates an ‘in-group’ that becomes the basis of a national identity.

Although this is true in all countries, the impact of the census is most profound in countries under foreign influence. For example, in the late-1800s to early-1900s, the British conducted censuses on lands throughout East Asia. The British officials conducting these censuses used terms derived from religious (Hindoos), racial (Begalis, Burmese, Malay), and

²¹ Anderson, 163.

territorial (Jambi, Krinchi) backgrounds.²² These words held meaning for the British, but not as much for the actual people living in the surveyed lands; “it is extremely unlikely that, in 1911, more than a tiny fraction of those categorized and subcategorized would have recognized themselves under such labels. Those ‘identities’ [were] imagined by the (confusedly) classifying mind of the colonial state.”²³ These words created by the British (or Dutch, or whoever was conducting censuses) became the popular words, superseding the local names people had for themselves, until the global community identified someone as Malaysian, rather than their specific Orang Asli identity.²⁴ As time went on, the national identity of these people became more aligned with the imposed labels given in the 1800s, rather than the historical, ethnolinguistic labels they used prior to foreign interference.

The census and the map work together to reify the constructed representation of colonized lands, as “the census filled in politically the formal topography of the map.”²⁵ However, maps are more than formal topography; they too are political devices used to redefine nation-states. Essentially, maps are used to legitimize nations. Nations are constructed, and therefore rely on physical portrayals to justify the imagined nation. Borders are specially arbitrary, and (short of physical boundaries being constructed to separate nations from each other) nations rely on maps to portray agreed upon borders. Maps can also be political in expressing contentious borders or not formally recognized names for countries or territories.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid., 165.

²⁴ “Indigenous Peoples in Malaysia” IWGIA. <https://www.iwgia.org/en/malaysia>.

²⁵ Anderson, 174.

In colonized lands, “a map anticipated spatial reality, not vice versa. In other words, a map was a model for, rather than a model of, what it purported to represent.”²⁶ Again, outside forces imposed ideas onto colonized lands, and the proliferation of those maps made the spatial ideas a reality. For example, when imperial powers came together and divided up Africa, in meetings such as the Berlin Conference, they created boundaries and names for the countries they were claiming, and represented them on a map. They ignored existing boundaries, tribal relations, and self-identifications. These things were replaced by the imperialist world-view, which was later solidified through colonial governments, to literally redefine the land. Looking at the 3 maps below, it is clear that the current map of Africa (Image 3) far more closely resembles the map constructed after the Scramble for Africa (Image 2) than the map from before (Image 1).




Image 1; 1876²⁷




Image 2; 1914²⁸




Image 3; 2018²⁹

²⁶ Ibid., 173.

²⁷ Source: <https://matadornetwork.com/read/mapped-africa-scramble-africa/>

²⁸ Source: <https://worldhistoryleverett.wordpress.com/2018/02/08/the-scramble-for-africa/>

²⁹ Source: <https://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/afpoliticalg.htm>

Part of the reason for the proliferation of this version of the map, despite governmental changes and revolutions over the past century, is the pervasiveness of the image itself. The map acts as a logo that has become embedded in national imaginations. It started as the “practice of the imperial states of colouring their colonies on maps with an imperial dye...As this jig-saw effect became normal, each ‘piece’ could be wholly detached from its geographic context...instantly recognizable, everywhere visible.”³⁰ Countries became defined by the shapes and colors they were given by the imperial forces, and those images remained even as the governments changed. The logo-map had “penetrated deep into the popular imagination, forming a powerful emblem” that remained even as the nations began to define themselves.³¹ Modern nation-states, removed from imperial forces, define themselves by the definitions given by their former imperialists; the sense of nationalism has been transformed, but the influences remain.

Administrative Unit

In order for many of the already discussed operations to function, a state needs an administrative unit. This administrative unit, more commonly referred to as a bureaucracy, allows the state to permeate into all areas of the people’s lives. When the people become reliant on the state for identification, social welfare programs, infrastructure, etc., the validity of the state is reaffirmed. For example, if a person has an American passport, they are more likely to think of themselves as an American. The passport, as administered by American democracy, creates a sense of belonging, which is essential to a sense of American nationalism; this same sentiment occurs in countries throughout the world.³² The administrative unit works to create a

³⁰ Anderson, 175.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Abrahamian, Atossa Araxia. *The Cosmopolites The Coming of the Global Citizen*. New York, NY: Columbia Global Reports, 2015.

sense of belonging amongst the employees of the unit itself. The workers feel a strong sense of loyalty to the country they are working for, and take pride in being an essential element in helping the country run smoothly. “Their professional honor and self-respect...derived from their being servants of the nation as a whole,”³³ rather than in the minutiae of their jobs. This pride in being connected to the nation via bureaucracy exemplifies a form of nationalism that can only exist through the state itself.

The administrative state also works to create a sense of belonging in colonized countries. In order to save time and resources, colonizing nations would often establish certain colonized people as part of the government, to act as a proxy. By doing so, these people may turn into what Fanon described as a colonial bourgeoisie,³⁴ complicit in the oppression of themselves and their fellow countrymen, or they could become a basis of a future nationalistic movement. Instead of naming them colonial bourgeoisie, Anderson calls this group of people ‘creole functionaries’ to signify their dual status as part of a colony as well as part of an official government. Through the process of becoming trained to lead, each functionary would travel from location to location, from administrative center to administrative center, and “in his journey he understood rather quickly that his point of origin - conceived either ethnically, linguistically, or geographically - was of small significance...out of this pattern came that subtle, half-concealed transformation, step by step, of the colonial-state into the nation-state.”³⁵ Due to their role in the newly forming colonial government, the functionaries understand the state building process and understand how arbitrary it can be, which actually creates an idea that the emerging colonial-state could be a

³³ Arendt, 151-152.

³⁴ Fanon, 64.

³⁵ Anderson, 114-115.

nation-state of its own. Instead of creating a sense of nationalism that aligns with the colonizers, it creates a sense of nationalism that aligns with the natives of that land. However, this sense of nationalism is still tied to the state itself, rather to the people, as its early formations are by the state officials.

Gellner claims that “not all societies are state endowed. It immediately follows that the problem of nationalism does not arise for stateless societies.”³⁶ Under this theory, without an administrative unit, top-down nationalism would not exist. However, the ‘problem of nationalism’ can arise from the people just as much as it can arise from the state.

Bottom-up nationalism

Bottom-up, or popular nationalism, occurs when the people create a sense of national identity based on their shared values, language, or history. This sense of commonality is the base of a sense of belonging, which is later used to build a state. The national identity comes before the nation is created, and is built by the people, rather than the state. In this case, “nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it *invents* nations where they do not exist.”³⁷ With this type of nationalism, it is less specific methodologies that create a sense of nationalism, and more the societal conditions themselves.

Shared Culture

First and foremost, the people must identify themselves as belonging to a shared culture. The elements of what a shared culture looks like will be discussed in detail below, but the existence of a shared culture is critical to developing a bottom-up form of nationalism. Although it is true that nationalism “sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations,

³⁶ Gellner, 4.

³⁷ Anderson, 6.

sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures,”³⁸ the focus of this section is on the ways that nationalism turns existing cultures into nations.

This type of “nationalism has to be understood by aligning it, not with self-consciously held political ideologies, but with the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which - as well as against which - it came into being.”³⁹ The exact motivations of the people are not in question, but rather the ways that they are connected due to their past and current cultural systems. In many ways, “nationalism is *not* the awakening of an old, latent, dormant force, although that is how it does indeed present itself. It is in reality the consequence of a new form of social organization, based on deeply internalized, education-dependent high cultures.”⁴⁰ In other words, nationalism does not inherently exist, but is rather the consolidation of people who share a culture into a new mode of thinking. From this sense of nationalism, a nation is able to emerge:

When general social conditions make for standardized, homogenous, centrally sustained high cultures, pervading entire populations and not just elite minorities, a situation arises in which well-defined educationally sanctioned and unified cultures constitute very nearly the only kind of unit with which men willingly and often ardently identify. The cultures now seem to be the natural repositories of political legitimacy.⁴¹

Without the shared culture, the people would not have come together in such a way, and the new nation would have no legitimacy if not for the shared culture. Because nationalism came before the nation, the people are more likely to identify with that nation, and recognize their compatriots: “two men are of the same nation if and only if they *recognize* each other as belonging to the same nation,”⁴² which often relies on them sharing the same culture.

³⁸ Gellner, 49.

³⁹ Anderson, 12.

⁴⁰ Gellner, 48.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 55.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 7.

Language

Language is the one of the most uniting factors in creating a sense of nationalism. When people share a language, they are able to communicate with one another. This communication allows people to bond with one another. It allows them to discover similarities with one another. It allows them to maintain meaningful connections with one another. With a shared language, a system of connections can form, and those connections are the basis of popular nationalism.

Language is generally linked to specific societies and communities. “Human language must have been used for countless generations in such intimate, closed, context bound communities”⁴³ such as tribes in ancient civilizations. These close-knit communities were independent and isolated, as they often did not share a language with other tribes. As time progressed, tribes could interact with each other, developing a shared language or mode of communication, and could form a larger society, such as Ancient Greece. Eventually, common languages became the norm, with Latin dominating Europe and Arabic in the Middle East – these widespread shared languages existed in large, empire style societies. The decline of vernacular coincided with the decline of empires; “in a word, the fall of Latin exemplified a larger process in which the sacred communities integrated by old sacred languages were gradually fragmented, pluralized, and territorialized.”⁴⁴ Eventually, vernacular rose in popularity, with language becoming more specific to the location. For example, “in the two decades 1520-1540 three times as many books were published in German as in the period 1500-1520, an astonishing transformation to which Luther was absolutely central.”⁴⁵ A rise in vernacular,

⁴³ Ibid., 33.

⁴⁴ Anderson, 19.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 39.

helped along by technology such as the printing press and movements like the Reformation, allowed for a return to the intimate, closed communities that existed prior to the rise of common languages.

Culture has many components, but “an at least provisionally acceptable criterion of culture might be language, as at least a sufficient, if not a necessary, touchstone of it.”⁴⁶ With the reemergence of vernaculars, culture could begin to form in these new, closed contexts. If language equals culture, an emergence of a new language correlates with an emergence of a new culture. Emergence of culture indicates both an existence of and a furthering of a sense of community and commonality. This sense of community can quickly transform into a sense of nationalism, especially when it is contained within a larger, different community.

Each language that exists acts as a ‘potential nationalism’ or a group that has the potential to form a sense of national consciousness. These groups are generally a minority, a subset of the nation they exist in, such as a tribe or small faction; they rarely are part of the majority in their nation. According to Gellner, there are over 8,000 languages in existence, and only around 200 nations. Even if four times as many nations existed, only 10% of ‘potential nationalisms’ are backed by a nation. Gellner uses this to claim that nationalism needs a nation to succeed, but the reality is that the idea of ‘potential nationalism’ reveals that nationalism can exist without a state. If the people, based primarily on a shared language, are able to gather together to form the basis of a national consciousness, limited only by the lack of existence of a nation-state, then the national consciousness is rooted outside of the state. Unfortunately, “most cultures or potential national groups enter the age of nationalism without even the feeblest effort to benefit from it

⁴⁶ Gellner, 33-44.

themselves...most of them go meekly to their doom, to see their culture (though not themselves as individuals) slowly disappear, dissolving into the wider culture of some new national state.”⁴⁷ However, just because a nation does not always emerge from these potential nationalisms, does not mean they never can. The failures of some nationalisms to become nations, yet the ability of the elements of nationalism to live on, demonstrates the efficacy of popular nationalism.

Print capitalism

A common language may be enough to solidify bonds in a smaller, closed context community, but cannot unite a large expanse of land into a single community. This unification, essential in creating a sense of nationalism amongst a larger group, is dependent on print capitalism for its success.

Print capitalism reinforced the emerging existence of vernaculars and allowed groups to feel united over a larger distance. When novels and newspapers are printed in a vernacular language, it creates a sense of commonality between all those who speak the language, regardless of how far apart they may live from one another. Someone who lives in Mexico City could be reading the same words as someone living in Tijuana, thousands of miles away. “These fellow-readers, to whom they were connected through print,” even without having ever met in person, form “the embryo of the nationally imagined community.”⁴⁸ Without their connections, the ‘nationally imagined community’ would be confined to only those who could interact with each other regularly; with print-capitalism, the network can be far broader. In this way, “the very

⁴⁷ Ibid., 47.

⁴⁸ Anderson, 44.

idea of 'nation' is now nestled firmly in virtually all print languages; and nation-ness is virtually inseparable from political consciousness."⁴⁹

Print-capitalism takes its form in mass printing projects that can be sold and distributed far and wide. In the case of nationalism, the newspaper and the novel are most influential in connecting people with a common sense of identity. The newspaper especially creates a sense of commonality by creating a sense of shared time. Through the existence of the newspaper, a person is assured that others are existing in the same moment as they are. This is achieved through "two obliquely related sources. The first is simply calendrical coincidence. The date at the top of the newspaper, the single most important emblem on it, provides the essential connection - the steady onward clocking of homogenous, empty time."⁵⁰ The newspaper is proof that time is moving at the same speed across the nation, and that the entire nation is experiencing the same events on the same day. The second source is the ceremony of the newspaper, especially because "the obsolescence of the newspaper on the morrow of its printing...creates this extraordinary mass ceremony: the almost precisely simultaneous consumption (imagining) or the newspaper-as-fiction."⁵¹ Especially in countries where consumption of newspapers is a widely held experience, people know that all across the nation, their fellow people will wake up and read the newspaper. They will read the same events and the same stories, regardless of location. The news changes each day, requiring the ceremony to take place each and every morning. The shared experience of reading the newspapers links people across the nation, forming a connection essential for a sense of nationalism.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 135.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 33.

⁵¹ Ibid.

Shared History

In understanding others to be part of the same community, a shared history is helpful, although not absolutely critical. The reason for this is the shared history of a nation is often part of a shared history of a far broader group of people; a nation “is the culmination of a long past of endeavours, sacrifice, and devotion...a heroic past, great men, glory (by which I mean genuine glory), this is the social capital upon which one bases a national idea. To have common glories in the past and to have a common will in the present to have performed great deeds together, to wish to perform still more - these are the essential conditions for being a people.”⁵² Finding the elements that bonded the people together in the past is helpful in bonding people together in the present.



Both religions and empires (sometimes at the same time) Image 4⁵³

bonded large groups of people under the same leadership. At one point, Christianity (orange in Image 4) spanned almost the entirety of Western Europe and beyond, and Islam (green in Image 4) has about equal land mass in the Middle East, Far East, and Northern Africa. However, having a history of a shared religion is not enough, otherwise those lands would still be united, rather than individual, autonomous states like they are now. Likewise, “as late as 1914, dynastic states made up the majority of the membership of the world political system,”⁵⁴ but the effects of a

⁵² Renan, Ernest. *What Is a Nation?* New York: Columbia University Press, 2018. 19.

⁵³ Source: <https://mayencigomez.weebly.com/>

⁵⁴ Renan, 22.

shared history under an empire has had no large bonding effect on the now independent nations. France and Germany may have been unified under the Holy Roman Empire, but those bonds have not transcended into bonding the two now independent nation states.

That being said, elements of the shared history do play a role in shaping new nations. England, for example, was primed to be an independent nation due to its isolation “from the surrounding world by natural frontiers,” but the “common descent, common origin, [and] common language” of the people made the formation of a nation-state much easier.⁵⁵ Having a shared history as well as a shared language allowed people to connect with one another. This connection was essential in forming a sense of national consciousness among all the people. It also allowed England to expand beyond the natural frontiers, creating an empire of its own that felt a sense of national consciousness towards England. This primarily worked in places where England utilized settler colonialism, such as in the United States, Canada, and Australia, where the people felt the same “common descent, common origin, [and] common language,” thereby feeling bonded to England as a motherland.

Although not all who experience a shared history join together in a common sense of nationalism, the nationalism that does arise from shared history is genuine and strong. In places where the people do not have a shared history, or a shared culture, it becomes very difficult for a sense of nationalism to arise. Germany is a great example of this. While the nations surrounding what is now Germany began to solidify into strong nation-states, with strong senses of community and commonality, the principalities of Prussia struggled to come together. “This failure [to make a nation out of the German people in 1814] to raise the people to nationhood,

⁵⁵ Arendt, 182.

out of the lack of common historical memories and the apparent popular apathy to common destinies in the future” required external actors to step in, creating an artificial sense of nationalism, resembling more the top-down nationalism discussed earlier.⁵⁶ This example provides insight into the true complexity of theories of nationalism. The theorists have created a clear divide between top-down and bottom-up nationalism, ignoring any overlap between the two. However, the stark divide does not hold up when examined more closely; the two forms of nationalism are not as different as they may appear.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 166.

Chapter 2: Re-Evaluating the Theory

Even though many nationalist theorists attempt to create a divide between top-down and bottom-up nationalism, this is a false division. It is unrealistic to assume that a nation can be formed solely through shared language and culture; or that a sense of belonging can be formed solely through the workings of state officials.

In order for a sense of community to become a national identity, there needs to be a nation. This can either be an existing nation, or an emerging nationalism, as in cases of colonized people throwing off the colonizers to form their own nation. However, if there is no semblance of a nation, the sentiments that the people feel cannot truly be called nationalism. Think back to Gellner's example in the previous chapter: there are over 8,000 'potential nationalisms' based on existing languages in the world.⁵⁷ Gellner is careful to call these *potential* nationalisms, as they only become actual nationalisms once there is a state to which those sentiments are attached. In the absence of a state, people need to step up to structure a new government to give support to the emerging nationalist sentiment. This may require negotiations, drafting of new constitutions, or even a revolution, depending on the context. Regardless of how it happens, individuals need to step up to become state actors in order for the bottom-up nationalism to truly take effect, thus showing the binary between bottom-up and top-down nationalism is not true.

In order for top-down nationalism to be successful, leaders must be operating in a realm where the people already feel some sort of connection with one another. Ideally, they would speak the same language, have a shared history, utilize the same economic model, and find some sort of community, whether in person or through print, with one another. Rarely does a nation

⁵⁷ Gellner, 45.

emerge from a complete lack of community – the closest examples in late-1800s Europe are Germany and Italy, both emerging from vastly divided principalities, variable languages, and little commonalities. The leaders who came into power in these forming nations needed to find a way to artificially create a sense of connection amongst all of these people. In order to do this, they needed to utilize techniques of bottom-up nationalism. In doing so, they merge the two theories, disproving the binary between top-down and bottom-up.

Education

As established in the previous chapter, public schools can be used by the state to convey a prevailing sense of nationalism. By imposing certain requirements, like a pledge of allegiance said at the start of the school day, and sharing information in specific ways, generally meant to portray the nation in question favorably, the students are taught to view their nation as best, thus planting the seeds for a sense of nationalism.⁵⁸ “Teachers taught or were expected to teach ‘not just the love of art or science...but for the love of’ country,” meaning they were tasked with educating students about their subjects as well as their country.⁵⁹ But nationalism is not the only element of common culture that is disseminated through the school system. School systems are able to create a common culture by creating a common experience, creating norms that affect the entirety of the country, and even creating economic systems shared by the whole country.

Schools are used to create a common sense of what it means to be a citizen of a country. In France, “the school, notably the village school, compulsory and free, has been credited with the ultimate acculturation process that made the French people French.”⁶⁰ Once society evolved

⁵⁸ Weber, Eugen. *Peasants into Frenchmen: the Modernization of Rural France; 1870-1914*. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 2007. 303-338.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 336.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 303.

to a point where there was regular attendance and competent teachers, the school system began to embed culture into the school system.⁶¹ The first step was to create a culture of *going* to school, because “when going to school was the thing to do, all would do it.”⁶² Schooling could then change the way people behave and interact with one another; education “taught order, cleanliness, efficiency, success, and *civilization*. Official reports coupled poor education with rude, brutal ways.”⁶³ Elements of morality greatly shifted the society to a more polite and ‘civilized’ one in the eyes of historians, but this had great implications in the culture of the society. Things like cleanliness greatly changed the culture, as once schools started enforcing proper hygiene (clean hair, nails, and ears; proper state of clothes), then society as a whole began to put a greater emphasis on cleanliness and hygiene.⁶⁴ All of these things contribute to the building of a national identity, which is the basis for the forming nation.

The public school system was designed to prepare students to be workers, generally in a factory setting. This mode of education became incredibly popular in the United States in the 1900s, following the model of ‘Taylorism,’ named after Frederick Winslow Taylor’s idea of scientific management.⁶⁵ Institutions of the school system are used specifically to create conditions that prepare students for a work life. For example, “factory-like efficiency in education is driven by objectives,” thus standardizing education models and goals across the country and creating a culture of working to achieve a specific goal, not to learn.⁶⁶ The idea of

⁶¹ Ibid., 310-320.

⁶² Ibid., 326.

⁶³ Ibid., 329.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Wayne Au (2011) Teaching under the new Taylorism: high-stakes testing and the standardization of the 21st century curriculum, *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, 43:1, 25-45, DOI: [10.1080/00220272.2010.521261](https://doi.org/10.1080/00220272.2010.521261)

⁶⁶ Weber, 330.

standards and objectives is partially to reinforce a chain of command; “teachers must be required to follow the methods determined by their administrators because they are not capable of determining such methods themselves.”⁶⁷

There are even more practical elements of how schools prepare students for factory life, embedded into what Barbara Tye refers to as the ‘deep structures of schooling,’ or the “society’s widely shared assumptions about what schools are for and how they should function.”⁶⁸ Elements of this deep structure include how time and space are utilized. The block schedules of schools, on a bell system, are exactly structured to prepare students for work in a factory, where they will be required to work for a designated period of time and will be released by auditory cues, like bells, for breaks and end of the work day. The way schools utilize space also prepares students for the routine and discipline of factory work: students are required to sit in one place for long periods of time and are often spaced out from others so that discussions are uncomfortable. The mode of instruction is directly tied to socio-economic status and career projections for the students; “students in more affluent schools and top tracks are given the kind of problem-solving education that befits the future managerial class, whereas students in lower tracks and higher-poverty schools are given the kind of rule-following tasks that mirror much of factory and other working class work.”⁶⁹

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Tye, Barbara Benham. “The Deep Structure of Schooling: What It Is and How It Works.” *The Clearing House: A Journal of Educational Strategies, Issues and Ideas* 71, no. 6 (1998): 332–34. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00098659809599585>.

⁶⁹ Mehta, J. 2014. “Deeper Learning Has a Race Problem.” Learning Deeply Blog, Education Week. Available at http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/learning_deeply/2014/06/deeper_learning_has_a_race_problem.html

These deep structures of schooling relate to the creation of a culture in two important ways: solidifying connections between students who will never meet each other, and supporting an industrial economic model. Education requires a uniform language in the classroom to be most successful. Students are both taught and taught in the same language as their classmates, and their peers across the nation. This helps prepare them for communication with others from their nation in the future, forming a societal network that can communicate broadly. Education works similar to print capitalism, in that it provides a foundation for those who will likely never meet each other to be connected to each other: “An American will never meet, or even know of, the names of more than a handful of his 240,000,000-odd fellow-Americans. He has no idea of what they are up to at any one time. But he has complete confidence in their steady, anonymous, simultaneous activity.”⁷⁰ Students feel assured that across the country, other students are having the same experiences they are. With the popularity of technology, such as messaging boards, students have more tangible assurances that other students are being educated the same way. Even before that, the sense of community that a regimented education system provides was essential to creating a class of citizens that felt connected and united. This sense of commonality is part of the culture that is necessary for bottom-up nationalist sentiments to form.

Perhaps more importantly is the way that education reifies and reinforces an industrial economic model. Gellner believes that nationalism can only arise in an industrial society, a type of society that “live[s] by and rel[ies] on sustained and perpetual growth, on an expected and continuous improvement.”⁷¹ According to Gellner, an industrial society is the only society in which a nation can actually be sustained long-term. Industrialization and education are highly

⁷⁰ Anderson, 26.

⁷¹ Gellner, 22.

linked, as without education, the innovation for new technology could not be achieved, and without education, a proper workforce would not be formed. Even though education comes from the state, education creates the conditions necessary for a state to be maintained. In this way, education works as both a top-down and a bottom-up functionary of nationalism.

Language

Language certainly serves as an important factor in helping people across a nation feel connected to each other. Without a shared language, it would be much harder for people to communicate with one another, and harder for a sense of nationalism to bloom. However, language and vernacular do not occur naturally, and the state is actually an active factor in solidifying a common language for its people.

While print-capitalism certainly allowed a vast public to read and communicate in a new language, the rise of print capitalism did not occur until after the 16th century, with the invention of the printing press and popularity of vernaculars due to the Reformation.⁷² However, the first evidence of state languages in vernacular began appearing earlier in the form of administrative vernaculars. Administrative vernaculars began appearing before the print and religious upheavals in the 1500s; “between 1200 and 1350, this state-Latin [which was the language of the court, literature, and administration] was superseded by Norman French. In the meantime, a slow fusion between this language of a foreign ruling class and the Anglo-Saxon of the subject population produced early English.”⁷³ At this time, the writings in this new language were only in the form of state documents, not spoken generally by the public. It is important to note that this vernacular was only used for internal communications within the state government; the

⁷² Anderson, 39.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 41.

government made no effort to impose this language onto the people.⁷⁴ At this point, “nothing suggests that any deep-seated ideological, let alone proto-national, impulses underlay this vernacularization where it occurred.”⁷⁵ Regardless, the initial push to transfer language from a global-empire mode of communication like Latin to more local vernaculars began at the state level, not the popular level.

During the revolutionary period of the 19th century, this transformation became more intentional, as “policies pursued by nineteenth century dynasts confronted with the rise of hostile popular linguistic-nationalisms.”⁷⁶ Nationalist movements began to think of languages as “the personal property of quite specific groups - their daily speakers and readers - and moreover that these groups, imagined as communities, were entitled to their autonomous place in a fraternity of equals.”⁷⁷ These sentiments could have destroyed the empire-system by encouraging language-designated sections of the empire to break off to form autonomous nations based solely on language. As popular nationalist sentiments linked to language gained power, the existing dynasties and state powers adapted by changing official languages to match the desires of the people. The Austro-Hungarian Empire switched its official language to German, “the only one which had a vast culture and literature under its sway” despite only “a considerable minority” (which did not even include the leaders) speaking German.⁷⁸ For the empire, it was better to switch to a vernacular to retain the unity of the empire, even as they had to force the language

⁷⁴ Ibid., 42.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 41.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 42.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 84.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

onto the rest of its subjects. German vernacular may have started as a popular movement, but its adoption by the rulers allowed it to spread and to be solidified as a lasting language.

Israel and Modern Hebrew is a revealing example of state and popular movements colliding when it comes to language. Hebrew as a language dates back to ancient times, and existed as a liturgical language for centuries. The language was used almost exclusively for prayers and transmission of holy information. “Use of the spoken language declined from the 9th century until the 18th century,” and thus the language was used only for religious purposes.⁷⁹ Jewish identity in relationship to language was still tied to Hebrew as a holy language, but Jews generally spoke the language of wherever they lived during the diasporic period. It was not until 1922 that ‘Modern Hebrew’ was invented, around the same time as a push for Jews to return to the land of Palestine to form a Jewish homeland. Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, who is credited with the invention of modern Hebrew, “conceived of Jewish nationalism as both the return to the historical homeland in the Land of Israel, as well as the revival of the Hebrew language.”⁸⁰ His work to transform Hebrew into a spoken language that can encapsulate modern vocabulary was so successful that in 1922, Hebrew was named the official language of Jews in Palestine by the British Mandate.⁸¹ After Israel was named a country in 1948, Ben-Yehuda worked to further the progression of the language of Hebrew as a national language. In this case, although the language was invented by an individual, rather than the state, the intention of the language

⁷⁹ The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. “Hebrew Language.” Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica, inc., November 16, 2018. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Hebrew-language>.

⁸⁰ Saiger, David. “Eliezer Ben-Yehuda and the Making of Modern Hebrew.” My Jewish Learning. Accessed March 2, 2020.

<https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/eliezer-ben-yehuda/>.

⁸¹ The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Hebrew Language.”

creation was always with a sense of nationalism in mind, and the state took advantage of that and used the modern language to further its own purposes.

With all that said, it is interesting to note places where languages and nationalism are not the same, and to analyze why that may be the case. Renan highlights the fact that England and the United States share a language, but are not the same country; likewise he discusses Latin America and Spain.⁸² This is certainly true: 20 countries have Spanish as a national language,⁸³ 29 have French,⁸⁴ 25 have Arabic,⁸⁵ and 67 have English (although not everyone in those countries necessarily speaks those languages).⁸⁶ This information seems to disrupt the idea that language can be a direct correlation to nationalism. However, it is important to consider *why* these countries have the same language: colonialism and imperialism. The languages of the mother country - English, French, and Spanish primarily - were enforced onto other nations and colonies throughout the world. Even after revolutions occurred, many countries retained the language of their oppressor.⁸⁷ Arabic is the product of large empires, like the Ottomans, and thus many formerly Ottoman countries still speak Arabic, albeit in vastly different forms and dialects from one another. In these cases, the dominant factor in regards to nationalism relates more to the shared history than to the shared language.

⁸² Renan, 16.

⁸³ “Arabic Speaking Countries 2020”. Arabic Speaking Countries 2020. Accessed March 2, 2020. <http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/arabic-speaking-countries/>.

⁸⁴ “French Speaking Countries: Francophone Countries 2020.” French Speaking Countries | Francophone Countries 2020. Accessed March 2, 2020. <http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/french-speaking-countries/>.

⁸⁵ “Spanish Speaking Countries 2020.” Spanish Speaking Countries 2020. Accessed March 2, 2020. <http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/spanish-speaking-countries/>.

⁸⁶ “English Speaking Countries List: Lingoda Online English Language School.” Lingoda. Accessed March 2, 2020. <https://www.lingoda.com/en/content/english-speaking-countries/>.

⁸⁷ Kincaid, Jamaica. *A Small Place*. London: Daunt Books, 2018.

On the other hand, some countries have more than one national language, and yet are able to maintain a cohesive sense of nationalism. 41 countries have two national languages, 12 countries have three national languages, three countries have four national languages, and South Africa has eleven.⁸⁸ These discrepancies might also suggest that language and nationalism should be thought of as completely independent of one another, but this too can be related to histories of colonization and imperialism. In many multilingual nations, the national languages are a mix of indigenous language and the oppressor's language: English and Filipino in the Philippines, Kyrgyz and Russian in Kyrgyzstan, French and Malagasy in Madagascar, Guarani and Spanish in Paraguay, to name a few.⁸⁹ The existence of an indigenous language alongside the oppressor's language shows a pervasive sense of nationalism and the power of the people to bring the indigenous languages to the forefront. Elevating indigenous languages to the status of national languages is an example of bottom-up and top-down nationalism merging. In other cases, like Switzerland, the languages come from a mix of the surrounding nations - Italian, German, French, and Romansh.⁹⁰ Renan believes that "there is something in man which is superior to language, namely, the will. The Will of Switzerland to be united, in spite of the diversity of her dialects, is a fact of far greater importance than the similitude often obtained by various vexatious measures."⁹¹ The ambiguous concept of 'will' of a nation demonstrates the difficulty

⁸⁸"How Many Countries in the World Have More than One Official Language?" Quora, n.d. <https://www.quora.com/How-many-countries-in-the-world-have-more-than-one-official-language>

⁸⁹ "How Many Countries in the World Have More than One Official Language," March 9, 2018. <https://www.quora.com/How-many-countries-in-the-world-have-more-than-one-official-language>

⁹⁰ Educations.com. "What Languages Do They Speak in Switzerland?" [educations.com](https://www.educations.com), February 1, 2020. <https://www.educations.com/articles-and-advice/languages-spoken-in-switzerland-17884>.

⁹¹ Renan, 16.

of pinpointing the determinants of a nation, but even in Switzerland, there is a shared history, dating all the way back to the Holy Roman Empire and the alliances formed at that time. One could argue that Switzerland is the exception that proves the rule, but it seems to me that Switzerland's diverse languages support the idea that history and culture equally influence the language spoken just as much as the state does.

Cultural Homogeneity

The idea of bottom up-nationalism is that a shared culture is the foundation for the nation-state. However, the idea of a 'shared culture' and complete cultural homogeneity seems to have merged in the minds of writers; "it is not the case that nationalism imposes homogeneity out of a willful cultural *Machtbedurfniss*;⁹² it is the objective need for homogeneity which is reflected in nationalism."⁹³ This idea that a culture must be completely homogenous in order for a nation to arise makes very little sense in reality. When one thinks about the existing countries in our world, they may wonder: "how is it that Switzerland, which has three languages, two religions, and three or four races, is a nation, when Tuscany, which is so homogenous, is not one?"⁹⁴ The reality is that no culture will ever be homogenous.

First, the idea of culture must be examined. Gellner believes culture to be intrinsically linked to language, as "an at least provisionally acceptable criterion of culture might be language, as at least a sufficient, if not a necessary, touchstone of it."⁹⁵ Presumably, each distinct language represents a distinct culture, and all those who speak the same language share the same culture. As explored above, homogeneity in language is not necessary for nationalism.

⁹² "*Machtbedurfniss*" translates to "need for power"

⁹³ Gellner, 46.

⁹⁴ Renan, 12.

⁹⁵ Gellner, 33.

Switzerland is non-homogenous in language yet a single nation; Latin America is several nations yet homogenous in language. Another idea of culture might be religion. If everyone in the nation has the same religion, then they likely have the same values and beliefs, as well as traditions. This would indicate a shared culture. However, just like languages, some countries vastly share the same religious identities - for example, most Central and South American countries are Catholic, and yet they are all autonomous nations (this, just as language, relates back to a history of imperialism and missionaries). Other countries are made up of multiple religions, which either co-exist peacefully within one another or are the cause of great conflict. Sometimes, this conflict does give way to a division of nations by religion, such as in the case of India and Pakistan, but generally a diversity of religion does not mean the doom of the nation as a whole.

Another example might be race. Many scholars have worked in racial theory, positing that the color of one's skin can be an indicator of the type of culture they belong to:

The OED cites Matthew Arnold as the first person to distinguish between savages and barbarians in English (1835), but it was J.S. Mill's essay 'Civilization' of the following year which formalized the trio not as general categories but as a hierarchy of the historical stages of man, bringing geography and history together in a generalized scheme of European superiority that identified civilization with race. The apogee of this conflation came in Prichard's theory of racial difference, in which he posited that the first people had been black and identified the cause of subsequent whiteness as civilization itself. White skin therefore became both a marker of civilization and a product of it.⁹⁶

This logic, racist as it is, is not solely a thing of the 1800s. In the 1990s, Samuel Huntington theorized the world was broken up into distinct civilizations: Western and non-Western.⁹⁷ He defines civilizations as the "broadest level of cultural identity people have," yet he includes race

⁹⁶ Young, Robert. *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race*. London: Routledge, n.d. 33.

⁹⁷ Huntington, Samuel P. "The Clash of Civilizations." *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993): 22-49. 23.

as a defining factor in what constitutes civilizations, as ‘Western’ includes only North America and Europe, and excludes Latin America and Arab civilizations.⁹⁸ This suggests that even in modern times, culture is linked to the ethnic makeup of its population; if this is true, the logic follows that if the ethnic makeup of the country is homogenous, then perhaps the culture of the country would be homogenous as well. One can easily think this might be true in countries that are largely thought of as homogenous when they were founded, like those in Western Europe, but even that is a myth. Take France as an example. While the demographic of France may have been largely white and European at the time of its foundation, that does not mean it was actually homogenous, as ‘French’ was already a melding of Gaul, Frank, and Burgundian heritage.⁹⁹ Even in China, where 90% of its inhabitants are Han, there are great distinctions made regarding ethnicity. Despite the supposed homogeneity, “there are many groups of people within this capacious majority catchall group who speak mutually unintelligible dialects and have radically dissimilar customs. To cite just one illustration, the Hakka, or “guest people,” scattered around China are considered Han but have many characteristics that, in another context, might easily lead observers to categorize them as “ethnically” distinct from those they live among.”¹⁰⁰ Judgements are made on people living in rural areas, or other cities, that attack ethnicity, suggesting that the people view ethnicities as different, regardless of what genetic testing or history might say.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 24.

⁹⁹ Renan, 15.

¹⁰⁰ Wasserstrom, Jeffrey. “The Myth of One China.” Foreign Policy, April 13, 2010. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/04/13/the-myth-of-one-china/>.

Some would argue that a nation made up of different ethnicities cannot exist successfully; “such hybridized, forced unions between nations,¹⁰¹ Herder argues, are bound to disintegrate.”¹⁰² History has proven this to be false. When countries come together of their own volition (as in colonizing forces do not intervene and create nations out of nothing, such as in Africa), the racial differences do not cause the country to dissolve. There certainly may be tensions between certain groups, but the country as a whole still exists. In fact, critical race theorists would argue that race itself is a construct, and that there are no finite definitions of race. The idea of ‘racial purity’ is deeply problematic, as 1) race itself is a construct, 2) even if it weren’t, there is no way to prove racial purity, because going back far enough indicates some sort of cross-race mixing, and 3) using ideas of racial purity are almost exclusively used for violent, genocidal or exclusionary tactics (Spanish Inquisition, Holocaust, Armenian Genocide, Hindutva, etc). The idea that a country needs to be based on racial homogeneity is impossible and equally problematic.

If race, religion, and language are not homogenous, in what other ways may a country be homogenous? The economic culture, according to Gellner, should be the same (industrial), but even this does not lend itself to complete homogeneity. Divisions arise in an industrial society between the workers and the managers, between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, between the 99% and the 1%. The culture of the wealthy is so vastly different from the culture of the poor that this system could hardly be considered one of cultural homogeneity. Jacob Riis’ influential work *How the Other Half Lives* is a perfect example; the idea of two separate halves making up a society indicates a complete lack of homogeneity, and the pictures clearly demonstrate the

¹⁰¹ Here “nations” are defined as “one people, having its own national form, as well as its own language”

¹⁰² Young, 36-37.

dissonance between the two types of culture. Clearly, there can be no such thing as a truly homogeneous culture in any country.

How the state might create a 'common culture'

Despite the lack of real cultural homogeneity anywhere, there remains the idea that “cultural homogeneity [is] demanded by nationalism.”¹⁰³ In order for the state to convey a sense of cultural uniformity, they often turn to the past, manipulating history and tradition to best fit their needs. Counterintuitively, “traditions which appear old are often quite recent in origin and sometimes invented,”¹⁰⁴ as the state actually created the tradition and gave it the illusion of reaching back in time, in order to create a sense of continuity and historical uniformity amongst the people. They can be used to “establish social cohesion in real or artificial communities, legitimize institutions and authority, or socialize/inculcate beliefs values and conventions of behavior.”¹⁰⁵ In non-homogenous cultures, the usage of traditions by the government is essential. In fact, “governing cannot take place without [traditions like] stories, signs, and symbols that convey and reaffirm the legitimacy of governing in thousands of unspoken ways. In a sense, legitimacy is the general agreement on signs and symbols.”¹⁰⁶

Traditions themselves are a “set of practices governed by accepted rules and rituals or symbolic nature, meant to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, implies continuity with the past.”¹⁰⁷ This can take the form of folk songs, folk tales/fairy tales, modes of

¹⁰³ Gellner, 39.

¹⁰⁴ Hobsbawm, Eric John, and Terence Osborn. Ranger. *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Pr., 2018. 1.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 9.

¹⁰⁶ Hunt, Lynn. *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004. 54.

¹⁰⁷ Hobsbawm, 9.

communication, or even uniforms that officials wear.¹⁰⁸ Traditions themselves, however, do not need to have that continuity to be seen as legitimate. For example, in the United States, the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance may feel like it goes back to the inception of the nation, as it is hailed as an indication of the American values cemented by the Framers and is repeated daily at public schools and legislative meetings across the country. The reality is, however, the American Pledge of Allegiance was not even written until 1892, and was modified in 1954 to include ‘Under God’ (to distinguish the U.S. from ‘godless communist states’).¹⁰⁹ Few people know, or care to know, the history of the Pledge of Allegiance, preferring to view it as a linkage to the Founding Era of the United States.

States are also able to create a sense of cultural homogeneity by creating new symbols and devices. These symbols and devices often come “into existence as part of national movements and states...[such as the national anthem, the national flag,] or the personification of ‘the nation’ in symbol or image, either official, as with Marianne and Germania, or unofficial, as in the cartoon stereotypes of John Bull, the lean Yankee Uncle Sam, and the German Michel.”¹¹⁰ They become interchangeable with the state, and the people are easily able to identify with the symbol, and thus the nation. Likewise, national anthems and flags can come to represent a nation. At the Olympics, athletes stand on podiums with their nation’s flag waving behind them and their national anthem playing. The athlete, regardless of where they come from, is immediately identifiable by their flag and anthem. These devices become symbols of the state,

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 4-6.

¹⁰⁹ Crawford, Amy. “How the Pledge of Allegiance Went From PR Gimmick to Patriotic Vow.” Smithsonian.com. Smithsonian Institution, September 1, 2015. <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/pledge-allegiance-pr-gimmick-patriotic-vow-180956332/>.

¹¹⁰ Hobsbawm, 7.

and thus represent nationalism. This works in part because these invented traditions are “quite unspecific and vague as to the nature of values, rights, and obligations of the group membership the inculcate: ‘patriotism,’ ‘loyalty,’ ‘duty.’”¹¹¹ Especially during times of revolution, a state will create, rather than renew, traditions. In these cases, “it is not because the old are no longer available or viable, but because they are deliberately not used or adapted.”¹¹² The state actors purposefully create something new and impose it as a tradition in order to best create a culture that will establish the form of nationalism that would best sustain the new nation.

This work of generating traditions and symbols can equally be done by the people. Everyday objects can become symbols of the society or the state; “colors, adornments, platewar, money, calendars, and playing cards became ‘signs of rallying’ to one side or another. Such symbols did not simply express political positions; they were the means by which people became aware of their positions.”¹¹³ Take clothing for example: during the tumultuous period surrounding the French Revolution, certain clothing styles pledged loyalty or affinity to certain groups (such as the royals, the Jacobins, Napoleon); “different costumes indicated different politics, and a color, the wearing of a certain length of trousers, certain shoe styles, or the wrong hat might touch off a quarrel, a fistfight, or a general street brawl.”¹¹⁴ These costumes, while potentially divisive, also served to bring people together, allowing them to identify others with the same beliefs. If or when their political group rose to power, that style of clothing would further rise in cultural prominence, potentially even becoming something that all people are required to wear, further embedded the style into the culture of the time and affirming the power

¹¹¹ Ibid., 10.

¹¹² Ibid., 8.

¹¹³ Hunt, 53.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 52-53.

of the political group at the time.¹¹⁵ Having tangible symbols of the state, such as in the form of coins or clothing, remind the people of their allegiance to their state, and reinforces ideas of nationalism. This shows how intertwined culture and politics can become, which is significant in looking at patterns in nationalism. If politics and culture are intertwined in both nation-building and nationalism, it follows that the state and the people would be as well. For that reason, we cannot completely separate official and popular nationalism from one another.

Creating historical legitimacy


By utilizing traditions, newly-formed (or re-formed) governments are able to give historical legitimacy to their regime.¹¹⁶ For example, the Republic of Rome was greatly heralded for its strength and republican values. It eventually fell, but seemed to leave a lasting legacy, which many more recent governments have tried to claim as their own. The *Repubblica di Siena*, the Republic of Siena, existed from 1125 to 1555. This was a time period in which many European nations were monarchical or empirical; to have a republican form of government was seen as weak. To counteract this narrative, the Sienese government made an effort to tie their republic to that of Rome. They claim the origin of Siena ties directly back to Romulus and Remus; while Romulus was the founder of Rome, Remus had two sons, who fled Rome to protect themselves and founded the city of Siena.¹¹⁷ There was no way to prove this myth to be true, but in front of their main buildings - including *Palazzo Pubblico* (the Town hall), the *Duomo* (cathedral) and the *Palazzo Tolomei* (the main economic building) - the Sienese people constructed statues of Lupa and the twins, Romulus and Remus, claiming the she-wolf as the

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 59, 77-82.

¹¹⁶ Hobsbawm, 12.

¹¹⁷ Catoni, Giuliano, and Gabriella Piccinni. *An Illustrated History of Siena*. Ospedaletto, Pisa: Pacini, 2008. 14.

symbol of their city, just as it was the symbol of Rome. Many claim that the statue of the she-wolf in front of the *Duomo* (Image 5) was brought to Siena by Remus's twin sons, Senius and Aschius; this however does not align with the true history of Siena, which was found by the Etruscans, rather than the Romans.¹¹⁸ Regardless of the truth, the ability of the Sienese Republican government to tie their government to that of the Republic of Rome



was critical in providing legitimacy to their style of government. Image 5¹¹⁹

This legitimacy was important to protect the city from outside forces, who might think Siena to be weak, but also to create a bond within the republic, to make the people feel connected to one another through a sense of shared history, even though that shared history was false.

The United States, likewise, uses the Roman Republic to gain legitimacy. Even though the U.S. often calls itself a democracy, it is really a republic, based on many of the same structures as that in the Roman Republic. The American people elect representatives to govern on their behalf, just as the Romans did. America has a bicameral legislature, just as the Romans did. The upper house is called the Senate, in both republics. The United States also uses symbolism to tie the two governments together. The writers of the Federalist and Anti-Federalist Papers specifically chose names that referenced the Roman Republic: Publius, Brutus, Cicero,

¹¹⁸ Catoni, 14.

¹¹⁹ Source:

<https://dissolve.com/stock-photo/Statue-Lupa-Roman-she-wolf-front-Duomo-Cathedral-royalty-free-image/101-D943-171-10079>

Cato, etc. In addition to keeping the writings anonymous, this gave legitimacy to their ideas. The United States motto printed money and other seals (*ex pluribus unum*) is in Latin, the language of the Roman Republic. Even the main government buildings are designed to resemble Roman buildings, with the columns and white marble of buildings like the Supreme Court and Capitol Building. This design is not incidental; “Thomas Jefferson wanted Congress housed in a replica of an ancient Roman temple.”¹²⁰ Rome was the only example of a large-scale, functioning republic prior to the creation of the United States. The Framers knew that modelling their government off the Roman one would give it the best chance for survival, and references to the Roman Republic would give it legitimacy in a world where monarchy and empire still reigned. Furthermore, creating a ‘shared history’ for the country, reaching all the way back to Ancient Rome, created a bonding factor for the people, who likely did not have a real shared history. Artificially creating this shared history allows for a foundation of shared culture to arise.

Funding of Public Art

Yet another way that the state is able to create a common culture is by literally influencing culture, in the form of art. Although government funded art may be stigmatized in the United States, “in countries like France, Germany, Mexico, or China, most arts funding comes from the government—either at a federal or local level. These systems tend to be simple, fixed, and centralized, often focused in a large ministry of culture.”¹²¹ State funded art and media can be an opportunity for artists to create without having to worry as much about the profits, because those “institutions tend to be well subsidized with large annual grants while the outsiders

¹²⁰ “Capitol Hill Neoclassical Architecture.” Architect of the Capitol. Accessed March 5, 2020. <https://www.aoc.gov/capitol-hill/architecture-styles/neoclassical-architecture-capitol-hill>.

¹²¹ Giola, Dana. “How the United States Funds the Arts.” *National Endowment for the Arts*, October 2004. v.

survive on the margins of the culture, if they survive at all.”¹²² It allows artists to have flexibility and creative license without worrying about profits or success. This public art may take the form of sculptures in front of buildings, or buildings themselves (like opera houses), or music played within the buildings.¹²³ The actual involvement that the government has in shaping the content of the art varies from country to country; countries with a more authoritarian style of rule may utilize censorship or control more strongly, while countries that are more democratic may give more free reign to artists. In the countries with censorship, the culture that the art creates is shaped more by the government. The specific mode of culture that emerges aligns with the culture the government is trying to promote, and dissenters may be punished. Even in more free countries, government involvement in art is designed to build a culture that bonds the people.

Sometimes this art has a more practical purpose. It may bind the people together during a time of crisis. Radio addresses are a common, cross-national example of this: during World War II, President Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill, Emperor Hirohito, and Hitler all used the radio to communicate the status of the war, to ask for help, and to create a sense of unification and loyalty during wartime. It was expected for people to gather with their families during President Roosevelt’s ‘Fireside chats,’ and then to speak with their neighbors about it the next day. Hearing directly from leaders, especially during times of trouble, helps to create a sense of unity. The government could also commission art to convey information. Frank Capra was paid by the Office of War Information to create “Why We Fight,” a series of videos shown to inspire U.S. soldiers about the moral justification of World War II. It is essentially a propaganda film, talking

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid.

about the battle between the “slave world” and “free world.”¹²⁴ While initially only shown to soldiers, it eventually was shown to the U.S. people as well to support the U.S. narrative of the ‘just war.’ Art like this provides common information to the people, as well as invokes loyalty to the government and nation. It binds the people together with moral language, and in doing so strengthens a sense of nationalism.

In some ways, nationalism serves as a solution to the cultural divides that exist amongst the people. It can create commonalities where language, race, and history may not be able to. Nationalism is unique to each group of people, and therefore can create a unique cultural movement in each country. It is strengthened by the fact that it is influenced by both the people and the state. The state alone could not bring the people together, and the people cannot bring themselves together without the state. In the same vein, the state cannot exist without the buy-in of the people, which relies heavily on the existence of a nationalist ideology. There is no way to separate top-down nationalism from bottom-up nationalism and still accurately assess what is happening in the nations themselves. It is better to use a hybrid theory, which gives credence to both original theories of nationalism but that acknowledges the overlaps and discards the flaws in both theories. This hybrid theory allows techniques to be viewed as they are used in each case, rather than assigning them absolutely to either official or popular nationalism. Additionally, using this hybrid theory, it is easier to analyze the specific actions taking place in individual countries during certain time periods.

¹²⁴ *Prelude to War*. Special Services Division, 1942.

Chapter 3: Applying the Theory to Italy

As it is impossible to distinguish entirely between top-down and bottom-up nationalism, we must understand developing nationalisms as a mixture of the two, as a hybrid. There may be times, depending on who is in power or what is happening in the world, where a nationalist sentiment is spurred more by the government or by the people; for this reason it is helpful to look at a country broadly and over the course of many years. In this chapter, I will analyze the development of Italian nationalist sentiment from the mid-1800s to the mid-1900s. During this period, Italy went from a set of several completely divided states into a unified country, under a unified government, working towards a unified language and culture. The impetus of the development of this nationalism was often the people, although the presence of the Italian Kingdom contributed greatly to its development; the rule of the Fascists and Mussolini also played a large role in transforming the way Italians thought about themselves as a people.

Unification Efforts (1850-1919)

The Italian peninsula has rarely been unified under a single government or consciousness. The Roman Republic and Empire encompassed the entire peninsula, but as the previous chapters have shown, sweeping empires cannot produce a sense of national identity. Italy "suffered an abrupt halt [or loss] of its political unity in 476 AD after the collapse of the Western Roman Empire."¹²⁵ Different areas on the peninsula formed their own governments: northern Italy was mainly made up of independent city-states and republics (like the Republic of Venice, Republic of Florence, Republic of Siena), central Italy was controlled by the Papal states and the pope, and

¹²⁵Salvadori, Massimo L. *Storia Di Italia*. Enciclopedia dei ragazzi Treccani, 2005.

the south was generally unified under the Kingdom of Sicily.¹²⁶ Foreign political entities also became involved on the peninsula: the French, and Austro-Hungarians, and the Spanish all claimed different areas on the peninsula at different points in time.

Throughout these centuries, there was no sense of commonality between the people living on the Italian peninsula. They spoke different versions of Italian, they had different governments, they had different cultures. The cities fought with one another constantly. There was no common identity, let alone a sense of nationalism. People identified with their city, rather than with an idea of 'Italy.' This began to change in the 1800s, however. The people began to reject foreign rule, especially after the Congress of Vienna in 1815. This rejection of foreign rule can be seen as the beginning of the nationalist sentiment that would arise later in the next few decades.

The early nationalist sentiment came from the people exclusively. It permeated art and literature. Authors like Vittorio Alfieri, Francesco Lomonaco, Niccolò Tommasco, and Alessandro Manzoni wrote of a unified Italy, sharing their ideas through literature. At this time, the idea of what an Italian nation would look like was unclear; some wanted the Pope to lead a confederation of states, others wanted a unified republic. Although the details were unclear, the sentiment of wanting a unified Italy was strong. Throughout this time period, some leaders rose to prominence. Guiseppe Mazzini, a radical revolutionary who had been part of the Carbonari (a revolutionary organization pushing for unification) formed *La Giovine Italia* (Young Italy).¹²⁷ This provided a network for revolutionaries and demonstrates the growing nationalist sentiments.

¹²⁶ Smith, Denis Mack. *Italy; a Modern History*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997. 1.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 13-14.

The organization had a red, white, and green flag, required an oath to the movement, and a slogan: *Unione, Forza, e Libertà* (Union, Strength, and Liberty). Hobsbawm shows that, even though they are invented from nothing, elements like slogans and flags can be used as a basis of a nationalist movement to give the movement legitimacy, recognition, and identity.¹²⁸ *La Giovine Italia* also served as a network for planning the revolutions that took place across the peninsula.

One of the members of this organization was Giuseppe Garibaldi, who became one of the most prominent generals in the fight for unification. Initially, Garibaldi was a revolutionary, but after being caught and sentenced to exile in 1836, he fled to South America. While there, he trained in guerilla warfare; Garibaldi returned to Italy in 1848. He led several charges to push out foreign rulers and reclaim areas of Italy, like *Lombardia*, to make the country whole. Garibaldi was important in the formation of the nation, but was even more important through his role as a figurehead. People viewed Garibaldi as a representative of the fight for nationalism; “his success with his men, who loved him and believed him invincible, was above all one of character, for he lacked calculation and guile, was unambitious for himself, and devoid of cheap ostentation. He was an honest man with the reputation of being one...No one could meet Garibaldi without recognizing his single-minded and disinterested love for Italy.”¹²⁹ His image began to coincide with the image of Italy itself, similar to the role George Washington plays for the Americans. Having a symbol of Italy through a man, especially a man who was still alive and still accomplishing feats, helped bolster the sense of nationalism throughout the developing nation.

Garibaldi and the revolutionaries fought several Wars of Independence throughout the second half of the 1800s. The King of Sardinia, who also ruled the state of Piedmont, took the

¹²⁸ Hobsbawm, 7.

¹²⁹ Smith, 15.

side of the unification and offered his army to aid in the war effort. They methodically collected various states and areas of the peninsula and islands, including Lombardy, Sicily, Naples, and Rome. The entirety of Italy was consolidated into a constitutional monarchy: the Kingdom of Italy, was under the rule of King Victor Emmanuel II.¹³⁰

Cultural Unification Efforts

Initially, unification under a government was not sufficient for cultural unification. Not everyone identified as Italians, despite the new regime. They felt loyalty to their town; it was said that “the patriotism of the Italians is like that of the ancient Greeks, and is love of a single town, not of a country; it is the feeling of a tribe, not of a nation.”¹³¹ Part of the problem of this was the continued identification as separate states, and the tensions between Northern and Southern Italy. Northern Italy viewed itself to be far superior to Southern Italy, culturally and economically.¹³² The Italian South, especially areas surrounding Naples, is much poorer than the North, with dirtier streets, more homelessness, and systemic economic disparity. This economic disparity was linked to the idea that the South is not as safe, which is only exacerbated by the Sicilian Mafia. The result is that Italians (to this day) claim that Southern Italy is ‘south of me’ because being seen as a Southerner is bad. The dynamic is reflected in the form and function of the government, especially in the early years. The Kingdom of Italy was an almost exact replication of the Kingdom of Sardinia, which previously ruled over Piedmont, one of the northernmost regions. The constitution of the Kingdom of Italy was almost exactly the

¹³⁰ Ibid., 27.

¹³¹ Ibid., 5.

¹³² Ibid., 2.

constitution for the new Kingdom of Italy; King Victor Emmanuel II, who had previously been King of Sardinia, extended his territory but kept his title.¹³³

Additionally, Italy was divided because of regional language differences. There are at least 5 dialects of Italian based on regions - Romanesco (from Rome/central Italy), Venetian (from Venice/North Eastern Italy), Neapolitan (from Naples/Southern Italy), Sicilian (from Sicily), and Tuscan (from Tuscany/Central Italy).¹³⁴ Even within these general breakdowns, there is variety (Tuscany has almost as many dialects as it does cities¹³⁵). Venetian and Sicilian Italian are both “distinct enough from Standard Italian to be considered a separate language,” sometimes making it difficult to communicate with those from other regions.¹³⁶ Although a shared language is not necessary for a shared culture,¹³⁷ different languages make a sense of community difficult.

This was the divided Italy that made ideas of nationalism difficult, even when Italy was a technically a united country, bound together under a singular government. The efforts to form a more cohesive nationalism had to take place on both fronts: official and popular. The official nationalism began during the *Risorgimento* process, with the war and violence of the unification bringing people together through a common goal: rejecting foreign interference. The war-building efforts gave the people a common cause, which gave them a common identity. Symbols of the nation, such as statues of leaders like Giuseppe Garibaldi and King Victor Emmanuel II, were constructed in towns all over Italy to spark loyalty to those leaders and the new nation. Perhaps most importantly, the capital city was moved from Florence, situated in

¹³³ Ibid., 27.

¹³⁴ Paul. “Top Dialects of the Italian Language.” Listen & Learn USA, August 16, 2015. <https://www.listenandlearnusa.com/blog/top-dialects-of-the-italian-language/>.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Renan, 12.

northern Italy in the region of Tuscany, to Rome, which was closer to southern Italy. The movement of the capital to a more central location gave more legitimacy to the South, making Southerners feel more connected to their government and less shunned by their country. It is also important that the new capital was Rome, as opposed to another central or southern city, as Rome came with a history of power and empire. Reminding the people of Italy of their shared past, dating back thousands of years, connected them in the present.

Efforts were also taken by the people. One of the most important efforts in building a sense of nationalism was unifying the culture through language.¹³⁸ Just as Anderson observed elsewhere in the world, the unification of language was carried out via print-capitalism.¹³⁹ The Tuscan, specifically Florentine variety, was chosen as the standard Italian, primarily because “many great Italian writers — such as Dante, Petrarch, and Machiavelli — came from Florence,” and thus wrote in Florentine Italian.¹⁴⁰ People had the easiest access to texts written in this type of Italian, and therefore it was easiest for them all to learn. More modern writers supported the movement, most famously Alessandro Manzoni. Manzoni’s 1840 *I promessi sposi* (The Betrothed), widely considered to be “the most influential novel ever written in Italian,” was written in the standard Italian.¹⁴¹ This widely printed, widely read novel “proved decisive in confirming Tuscan as the classic prose style for Italian literature.¹⁴² It also served as a uniting cultural artifact, bringing the people together through literature; the content of the novel itself was a critique of Austrian rule, thus reminding people of the merits of being Italian rather than

¹³⁸ Gellner, 33.

¹³⁹ Anderson, 44.

¹⁴⁰ Paul.

¹⁴¹ Smith, 10.

¹⁴² Ibid.

under foreign rule. Schools began teaching Standard Italian to students, so that after a generation all Italians would speak the same language. As schools became standardized, the experiences of students became a bonding factor, just as it had in France in the century prior.¹⁴³

This, of course, was not sufficient in overriding centuries of strife. Language differences remained, along with regional feelings of superiority. In the 1920s, a new political party rose to power, and the actions of this party made great strides in restructuring the Italian identity and creating a true sense of national consciousness.

Fascism's Role in Developing National Consciousness

In the 1920s, the *Partito Nazionale Fascista*, or the National Fascist Party, rose to power in Italy with Benito Mussolini as the leader. After World War I, Italians were unhappy with the social and economic issues Italy faced, priming the country for change. Mussolini and the fascists offered “‘the potential for change’ (i.e. as it would seem, for social revolution, and could have both transformed Italian society and provided the basis ‘for restructuring all Western societies.’”¹⁴⁴ With popular support, Mussolini successfully led a March on Rome on October 29, 1922, resulting in his appointment as Prime Minister.¹⁴⁵ This was a legal transfer of power, allowed by the King and the constitution. Once in power, Mussolini, now called *il Duce* (The Leader), and the fascist Italian government worked to institute policies and cultural artifacts that could unify the people in more than just name. Most of Mussolini’s efforts to unify the nation

¹⁴³ Weber.

¹⁴⁴ Vivarelli, Roberto. "Italian Fascism." *The Historical Journal* 17, no. 3 (1974): 644-51. Accessed April 12, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/2638394.647. 647

¹⁴⁵The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. “March on Rome.” Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica, inc., October 21, 2019. <https://www.britannica.com/event/March-on-Rome>.

were done by connecting his regime to that of Rome, giving validity to his rule as well as a common narrative to the people.

The fascist period of Italy furthered the cultural unification in many ways, most prominently through connections to the past. A fascist government, in many ways, is the ideal example of how nationalism is built by the government and the people simultaneously, and the overlap between the two groups is great. Obviously, any policies or practices instituted by the fascist government that builds a sense of nationalism would be classified as official nationalism, but fascism itself cannot survive without the support and consensus of the people. Unlike totalitarianism, where loyalty to the nation is imposed on the people, facism attempts to spark a sense of nationalism through cultural, intellectual, and social reforms. Fascism is thought of as a culture of the masses; Italian fascism particularly “was rooted in the day-to-day realities of Italian life during the postwar period.”¹⁴⁶ Additionally, “fascism sees its salvation in giving these masses not their right, but instead a chance to express themselves...The logical result of Fascism is the introduction of aesthetics into political life.”¹⁴⁷ Mussolini utilized everything from antiquity to modern media to create a sense of nationalism that could exist independent of his regime, but was ultimately designed to support his rule.

Antiquity as a Means of Authority/Legitimacy

Mussolini attempted to give the new Italy legitimacy by tying it to the great Roman Empire and himself legitimacy by tying his regime to that of great Roman leaders. As shown in the last chapter, Mussolini is not the only leader to “use history as a legitimator of action and

¹⁴⁶ Vivarelli, 651.

¹⁴⁷ Benjamin, Walter. *The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction*. New York: Schocken Books, 1969. 19.

cement of group cohesion,”¹⁴⁸ but his efforts in the 20th century successfully reframed modern Italy as an extension of the Roman Empire. Mussolini viewed “Rome [as] a set of transcendent, eternal values as well as a tangible, mouldable physical space – [and as] a dynamic, vital force to be enacted in the present, not just a venerable past to be recalled.”¹⁴⁹ Throughout his rule, he found ways to bring Rome into the present, thus legitimizing his rule and creating a foundation for nationalist sentiment to grow.

Mussolini attempted to “colonize time” in a way that blurred “the spatial and temporal boundaries between Roman antiquity and Fascist modernity...[making it seem as if] the distant past had occurred only a few years earlier, its vanishing traces to be preserved in photo albums, museums and archives; by contrast, the unencumbered monuments of classical antiquity were signs of the nation’s renewal (hygienic, moral, aesthetic) and its glorious future.”¹⁵⁰ Much of this was done through physical restructuring and restoration of the city of Rome, such as rebuilding old monuments or recreating ancient structures. He also made connections to Italy through his language. In his 1922 “Passato e Avvenire” speech, Mussolini referenced back to Rome several times. He claimed that “Rome is our point of departure and reference; it is our symbol or, if you wish, our myth,” solidifying Italy’s connection to Rome.¹⁵¹ This type of connection unified the people from all regions of Italy, who were able to see their common history as well as their differences, somewhat transcending the regional tensions that existed.

¹⁴⁸ Hobsbawm, 12.

¹⁴⁹ Arthurs, Joshua. “The Excavatory Intervention: Archaeology and the Chronopolitics of Roman Antiquity in Fascist Italy.” *Journal of Modern European History* 13, no. 1 (2015): 44–58. https://doi.org/10.17104/1611-8944_2015_1_44. 47

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 45-54.

¹⁵¹ Mussolini, Benito. “Passato e avvenire.” April 21, 1922.

Mussolini also used the connection to Rome to validate the Fascist regime. In the same speech, he said: “Much of what was the immortal spirit of Rome, resurges in Fascism.”¹⁵² Later in his rule, he made a direct comparison between the two regimes, saying “Italy at last has her Empire, the Fascist Empire” (spoken after conquering Ethiopia).¹⁵³ If the Fascist regime was seen as a direct continuation of the Roman Empire, the Fascists would be viewed as more powerful and legitimate in the eyes of the people and the world. The people viewing their country as strong bolsters a sense of nationalism, creating pride in one’s country. This was important for the still developing Italy, coming out of World War I and entering World War II.

Beyond attempting to legitimize Fascist rule via connections to Rome, Mussolini attempted to legitimize his own rule by comparing himself to great Roman leaders. “Shortly after the 1922 March on Rome, Mussolini compared himself to Julius Caesar and likened his own march to Caesar’s famous journey from Gaul, across the Rubicon, and through the Italian peninsula,”¹⁵⁴ although he generally preferred to compare himself to Augustus, the first emperor, than Caesar, the dictator who was assassinated because of his power. Mussolini consciously “positioned himself as Augustus’s continuator, both politically and militarily” in his published works and speeches.¹⁵⁵ Furthermore, Mussolini emulated Augustus through “the achievement and maintenance of an imperial position; the use of effective propaganda, public display, and public address; and the development of urban projects that enhanced Rome, recalled its imperial

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Mussolini, Benito. “The discourse on empire” May 9, 1936.

¹⁵⁴ Wilkins, Ann Thomas “Augustus, Mussolini, and the Parallel Images of Empire” in *Donatello and the Blackshirts* ed. Claudia Lazarro and Roger J. Crum (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005) 53.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 54.

heritage, and glorified the man who had been the catalyst for the empire.”¹⁵⁶ By acting as if he were the successor to Augustus, he inserted himself into the line of succession, thereby giving himself legitimacy from a source beyond his elected position. Even though his actions on this front were primarily for self gain, the work he did, “aimed to demonstrate the continuity between the Rome of Augustus and that of Mussolini,” was successful in helping “to generate national pride.”¹⁵⁷ It gave the people a tangible way to connect to their glorious past and see the way their current country was glorious, which helped to develop a sense of nationalism.

Mussolini and Architecture

The most obvious way in which Mussolini connected himself and Italy to the Roman Empire is through the architectural work he did throughout the city of Rome. He embarked on what Joshua Arthurs refers to as an “excavatory intervention” in the present, which was “both literal and figurative. In its most direct application, it meant the archaeological excavation and restoration of ancient monuments, a process that the regime construed as a spectacular transformation of time and space.”¹⁵⁸ This would bring the past into the present by literally restoring and updating ancient monuments while expanding and updating Rome itself. Mussolini had plans “that ranged from new houses, roads, and bridges to a sports center, to the Foro Mussolini, and EUR (Esposizione Universale di Roma), the setting for a major Fascist exhibition that was intended to evolve into a permanent suburb.”¹⁵⁹ Between 1924 and 1930, he successfully “excavated the Republican temples at Torre Argentina, the Markets of Trajan, the Theatre of Marcellus and portions of the Capitoline Hill, the Forum Romanum and the Fora of

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Arthus, 47.

¹⁵⁹ Wilkins, 54.

Julius Caesar and Augustus.”¹⁶⁰ These projects swept throughout Rome, tackling many of the most prominent ancient sites, which worked to create the illusion that the historical Roman Empire lived on through modern Italy, blurring the lines between past and present.

In addition to the general restructuring and restoration work he did to connect Rome to the Roman Empire, Mussolini used architecture to connect his rule to that of Augustus. One major way he did so was by restoring monuments in the *Campus Martius* (The Field of Mars) and building obelisks throughout the country. The Campus Martius was an important symbol of the Augustan regime; it consisted of 3 major monuments: the Ara Pacis, the mausoleum of Augustus, and the Horologium. Mussolini restored two of the monuments and added four buildings symbolic of his own fascist regime in the square, “united by the use of neutral colors, repeated designs, and sculptural friezes...The visual correspondences may have been intended to merge buildings from different time periods into a coherent whole, thereby emphasizing the parallels between the two eras.”¹⁶¹ This Piazzale Augusto Imperator, Square of Emperor Augustus, was conceived “to honor Augustus on the billennium of his birth and to suggest that Mussolini was his successor.”¹⁶² The unveiling of the new square in 1937 celebrated Augustus’ birth and regime, as well as Mussolini’s power.

One of the main monuments in the Campus Martius is the Ara Pacis. The Ara Pacis, or the Altar of Peace, was dedicated to the goddess Pax (Peace), and meant to symbolize the peace that Augustus brought to Rome. Specifically, it “was erected to honor Augustus’s return from Spain and Gaul in 13 B.C.E...it celebrated the establishment of empire and dynasty as well as the

¹⁶⁰ Arthurs, 49.

¹⁶¹ Wilkins, 59.

¹⁶² Ibid., 55.

pacification of the Roman world made possible by his military victories.”¹⁶³ Over the years, the monument was dismantled and destroyed, leaving it

“fragmented, partially buried...[and] compromised as a coherent monument;” instead of displaying the remaining pieces in a museum, Mussolini decided “to reconstruct the monument as a whole.”¹⁶⁴ By stripping away everything except the ancient, and



Image 6¹⁶⁵

rebuilding the rest, Mussolini created the illusion that the construction of the altar, and Augustus’s reign in general, was far more recent than it was. It also allowed Mussolini to become a stand in for peace and prosperity, something important during the interwar period.

The Campus Martius also housed the mausoleum that Augustus built for himself and his families. It was a commanding building made entirely out of marble, meant to signify the glory and power of his rule, as well as the dynastic nature of the Empire. Over the years, it was used as “a source for marble...a fortress, a Renaissance garden, an amphitheater, a bullring, and finally - in 1906, a



concert hall.”¹⁶⁶ In Mussolini’s eyes, this diminished the legacy of

Image 7¹⁶⁷

¹⁶³ Ibid., 56.

¹⁶⁴ Wilkins, 57.

¹⁶⁵ Source: <https://www.rome-museum.com/ara-pacis.php>

¹⁶⁶ Wilkins., 56.

¹⁶⁷ Source: <https://www.ancient.eu/article/657/mausoleum-of-augustus/>

Augustus, replacing reverence with practicality. For this reason, Mussolini chose to demolish the post-antique structures surrounding the mausoleum so that “Augustan history would be celebrated.”¹⁶⁸ The original Campus Martius also included an obelisk, stolen from Egypt to celebrate the conquest of the Romans over the Egyptians. The obelisk, the Horologium, was not rebuilt, but Mussolini did utilize the symbolism of the obelisk throughout his regime, imitating “the ancient imperial practice of using obelisks to express the power of the victor and to emphasize the exotic nature of the vanquished.”¹⁶⁹ For the ancient Romans, including Augustus, obelisks “functioned symbolically as statements of self-promotion, and their reerection provided occasion for




Image 8¹⁷⁰

elaborate Roman spectacles.”¹⁷¹ In this spirit, Mussolini stole an obelisk from Ethiopia and transferred it to Rome after Italy’s victory in Ethiopia in 1937, and installed it in front of the Ministry of Italian Africa in the Piazza di Porta Capena in a large celebration that also commemorated the fifteenth anniversary of Mussolini’s March on Rome.¹⁷² Despite his decision against rebuilding the Horologium, Mussolini honored Augustus through his reliance on obelisks. The tradition remained, and the integration of new obelisks throughout Rome was meant to remind people of the glory of Mussolini’s reign and the strength of the new Italy.

Not all of the work Mussolini did was to restore ancient monuments. He built many new structures throughout Rome dedicated solely to himself and his fascist regime. He built a new

¹⁶⁸ Wilkins, 56.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 61.

¹⁷⁰ Source: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4459671.stm>

¹⁷¹ Wilkins, 61.

¹⁷² Ibid.

sports complex in Rome, named *Foro Mussolini*, dedicated solely to himself. The Foro Mussolini contained statues from the different provinces, a Fascist school of physical education, and an obelisk. The Foro Mussolini was intended as a way to bring the Olympic games to Rome with Italy as a host. Hosting an Olympic games would



Image 9¹⁷³

generate much nationalistic pride amongst the people; despite not being chosen, the Forum, specifically the statues, served as a physical reminder of the strength of the Italian people, intended to generate a sense of nationalism. The obelisk was specifically intended to create a sense of awe of and loyalty to the Fascists; it was “constructed of marble blocks shaped to represent a fasces, topped with gold, and ornamented with an inscription reading Mussolini Dux.”¹⁷⁴ The Foro Mussolini has been renamed *Foro Italiano*, representing the strength of Italy rather than the strength of the Fascists (although the obelisk remains unaltered), thus continuing to spark a sense of nationalistic pride even after the country disavowed the constructor. Mussolini also constructed a new neighborhood in Rome, dedicated to the Fascist regime. The neighborhood, the *Esposizione Universale Roma* or EUR, was meant to symbolize the strength of the regime and the benefits it could bring to Italy. The original intention was for it to be opened in 1942 to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the March on Rome, thus celebrating national and fascist victory. World War II prevented the celebration from taking place and the city was never finished, but the intention was clear: to show off the strength of Fascist Italy to Italians and to the world. He also was instrumental in the building of the Milan

¹⁷³ Source: <https://www.hotelnazionale.it/en/blog/foro-italico/>

¹⁷⁴ Wilkins, 61.

Train Station, which was designed to highlight the power of the Fascist regime. The size and beauty of this train station make it stand out, reminding Italians and the world of the abilities of the Italian Fascists. His plan was not entirely divorced from practicality, as the restoration would lead to “made more beautiful, sanitation and traffic patterns would be improved, and the project would provide employment.”¹⁷⁵

Mussolini and Art

Another way that Mussolini was able to stir up nationalist sentiments was via the media. He utilized explicit propaganda to demonstrate his greatness. Most propaganda related directly to Mussolini himself, portraying him the way he thought best. This is seen in the transformation over time from “the representation of Mussolini from a figure whose moral authority emanated from various demonstrations of strength and virility to one whose stature derives from his skill as an international statesman.”¹⁷⁶ The propaganda came from a variety of sources, all funded or censored by the fascist Italian government. For example, the newspaper *Il popolo* was founded by Mussolini during World War I and used as a source to draw in revolutionaries to his fascist ideals. Mussolini himself often wrote articles for the paper, ensuring that his ideas would be promoted. The regime also monopolized the radio industry after recognizing “how radio could be used as a tool for building consent for its policies.”¹⁷⁷

He also took control of the film industry, founding the National Fascist Institute of Culture, an Italian Academy and *L'Unione Cinematografica Educativa* in 1925¹⁷⁸, as well as

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 56-57.

¹⁷⁶ Ricci, Steven. *Cinema and Fascism: Italian Film and Society, 1922-1943*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008. 5.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 53.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

Direzione Generale per la Cinema in 1934.¹⁷⁹ These were designed to be censorship organizations, controlling what the people had access to via media. Surprisingly, the regime “appears to have applied that authority in less than totalitarian ways. Critics and historians are surprised, therefore, by the extremely limited representation of state officials, uniforms, and monuments in the period’s fiction films and equally by the state’s modest application of censorship laws.”¹⁸⁰ However, films were certainly screened to ensure optimal loyalty to the government: “the discourse of fascism is full of anecdotes of the perfect, consenting body: the young woman who faints when she sees il Duce in person; the infant from Ancona who is born with a mark of the fascio littorio (the fascist emblem of grains wrapped around a sword) imprinted on her skin.”¹⁸¹

Mussolini also used the power of government controlled media to introduce “social initiatives and cultural iconographies that formed a lexicon of images and imagined topoi that were the shared background of filmgoing throughout” the entire fascist period.¹⁸² He believed in the power of the media in shaping the minds of the people. Mussolini therefore encouraged a few genres of film, vastly different from each other but equally dedicated to ensuring the people viewed Italy as a great nation. One of the genres was Italian Realism, focusing on what was happening in the daily lives of the Italian people and utilizing great Italian monuments as locations for scenes. This had the dual effect of ensuring that “not only would audiences enjoy more authentic films, but the showing of Italian monuments, culture and subject matter would

¹⁷⁹ The Cinema Under Mussolini. Accessed April 13, 2020.

<http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/italians/resources/Amiciprize/1996/mussolini.html>.

¹⁸⁰ Ricci, 4-6.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 85.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, 3.

bolster pride and love for their country and raise popular support for the nationalistic actions of the Fascist government.”¹⁸³

Another genre of film Mussolini encouraged was military costume films. Films glorifying the triumph of the Italian military emphasized the success the Italians were having abroad in building their empire, specifically occupying Ethiopia. Between 1936 and 1942, films like *Cavalleria*, *Pietro Micca*, *Squadrone bianco*, *Scipione l'africano*, *Condottieri*, *Ettore Fieramosca*, *Il cavaliere senza nome*, and *Il figlio del corsaro rosso* support the idea of a strong Italy, sparking strong nationalistic sentiments.¹⁸⁴

The other genre was historical pieces about the Roman Empire. As explored above, the more people were reminded of the glory of the empire, the more they would feel a sense of nationalistic pride to be living in modern Italy. Films like *Scipione* invoke “the ancient heritage of the Roman Empire in order to inscribe a manifest destiny for contemporary Italian imperialism in Africa” thus both validating the actions of the fascists and sparking nationalistic pride in remembrance of the glory of Rome.¹⁸⁵ The state explicitly told the people to read the films in this way; the Minister of Corporations Giuseppe Bottai wrote “Scipio, for the children, is not the Roman hero, but rather Mussolini. Scipio’s actions, by virtue of their transposition, evoke the actions of Mussolini. The analogy becomes identity.”¹⁸⁶ By encouraging the people to think of Italy in terms of the Roman Empire, they are reminding the people of the legacy that Italy carries and the glory that it can achieve again.

¹⁸³ The Cinema Under Mussolini

¹⁸⁴ Ricci, 87.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 96.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 100.

Mussolini took advantage of the time he was living in, a technological age, to widely disseminate his art, or art he supported, to the people. The ability of people across the country to watch the films he endorsed or to view photographs of the architecture he sponsored was invaluable. Additionally, the technology in existence allowed artifacts and art pieces to be viewed as a photograph, putting “the copy of the original into situations which would be out of reach for the original itself.”¹⁸⁷ Important artifacts, like those discovered during the various archeological expeditions Mussolini funded, could be viewed by more than just those able to visit museums in Rome. This served two purposes: to increase the sentiment of historical legitimacy beyond the city of Rome, and create a sense of shared time and space. To be sure, the quality of the art is depreciated when copies are made, and “by making many reproductions it substitutes a plurality of copies for a unique existence,”¹⁸⁸ but Mussolini’s reliance on art was more for the social impact than for its value as art itself. Mussolini was not interested in the unique experience each person may have viewing the piece of art, but rather the collective consciousness that would emerge by a vast number of people viewing the same thing. It is more about the ‘cult factor’ of art, the ability of art to transform the way people think about things.¹⁸⁹ Mussolini utilized the ability to mass produce art, in the forms of photographs and movies, to transform the way people thought about themselves, the Fascists, and Italy as a whole.

This work was an important part of continuing the work of eradicating social divisions between Italians. “Where its social politics attempted to fuse private and public life, the regime’s cinema policies would seek to efface local issues, that is, to erect a national industry that could

¹⁸⁷ Benjamin, 4.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 7.

suppress the cultural markers of social difference;”¹⁹⁰ his usage of art, architecture, and media does the same work. This, after all, was the one of the goals of the fascist regime: to unify the people, reminding them that they are of *one* Italy. This constant effort from the government to encourage nationalistic sentiments, both through government action and influence in popular culture, successfully was able to cement the idea of a unified nation in the minds of the people. All of Mussolini’s actions detailed above show the blurred divide between official and popular nationalism. Technically, all the actions were done by or sponsored by state actors, thereby making them a part of official nationalism building. However, the actions themselves and the results of those actions were intrinsically related to the culture of the people, and often relied on input and support from the people themselves, bringing in popular nationalism. There is no way to completely separate the two movements from one another, and that was the point. The leaders of the *Risorgimento* and Mussolini knew they could not create an idea of a unified Italy without the support of the people, and the people knew they could not be unified without a singular government.

¹⁹⁰ Ricci, 12.

Conclusion

It is clear that neither top-down nor bottom up theories of nationalism are sufficient in explaining the realities of nationalism formation. Neither theory answers fundamental questions regarding how nationalism spreads or what relationships the nation, the people, and the state have with each other. Additionally, there is extensive overlap between the two theories, as each theory claims similar methodologies. Instead of viewing nationalism through the lens of either of those theories, it is better to view them in combination with one another, as a hybrid.

A hybrid theory of nationalism allows nationalism to be viewed as a spectrum. It maintains the idea that, in some countries, the sense of nationalism comes more from the state, rather than the people, or vice versa. In a totalitarian state, the type of nationalism may be at the far end of the spectrum, towards the top-down side. In a colonized land attempting to throw off foreign rulers, it may fall far closer to the bottom-up end of the spectrum.

Top-Down Nationalism

Bottom-Up Nationalism

Totalitarian State

Revolutionary State

The spectrum model also allows for changes over time, as senses of nationalism evolve just as much as nations themselves do. Italy in the 1830s was very different from Italy in the 1930s; the sense of nationalism too evolved greatly. Italy in the 1830s can be classified as mostly bottom-up, as there was no state at the time, and the sense of nationalism was almost exclusively related to the actions of the people and of popular movements. Italy in the early-1900s can be classified as more top-down, as the government had a larger say, but the people were still greatly

involved in conceptualizing nationalism, especially in regards to language. Italy during the fascist period greatly shows the mix of the two theories, as all actions done by Mussolini can be considered top-down, as he was a state official, but also as bottom-up, as they were done specifically with the intention of uniting the people under a common theory.

Top-Down Nationalism

Bottom-Up Nationalism

Italy, 1900-1920	Italy, 1920-1945	Italy, 1830-1900
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Additionally, viewing nationalism through this hybrid lens, on a spectrum, allows the overlaps between top-down nationalism and bottom-up nationalism to be identified and nuanced. There were many specific methodologies that both theories of nationalism claimed, but in different ways. Language, for example, was claimed by bottom-up theorists as a culture-building technique that could bring the people together through print-capitalism; top-down theorists claimed it due to the state’s usage of administrative vernacular, which predated popular usage of vernacular. To me, it seems that language falls more towards the bottom-up end of the spectrum, but should remain closer to the middle due to the state’s influence in its evolution. Education, on the other hand, is claimed by both bottom-up theorists, due to its role in creating a common culture, and top-down theorists, due to the state’s control over curriculum. I believe the state’s role in creating the curriculum in a way favorable to the state heavily influences the common culture, and therefore believe it falls far more towards the top-down end of the spectrum. This same balancing act can be done with every method explored throughout this paper, and can be modified on a case-by-case basis. If art, which may generally fall towards the bottom-up end of

the spectrum, is completely state funded and state controlled in a certain country, then it would fall on the top-down end of the spectrum for that country.

The hybrid theory fixes the largest flaw in the two original theories: the attempt for universals. Both theories tried to create a one-size-fits-all mode of analysis, but this did not truly fit a majority of nations. By looking at nationalism through the hybrid theory, there is no illusion of universals; rather, theorists would be looking at nations individually. It does not completely throw away a framework, but rather pulls the best of each original theory together.

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