

2018

# Human Development and Subnationalism: A Disaggregated Analysis of Indian States: Kerala and Uttar Pradesh

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## Recommended Citation

Garg, Manika, "Human Development and Subnationalism: A Disaggregated Analysis of Indian States: Kerala and Uttar Pradesh" (2018). *CMC Senior Theses*. 1843.  
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Claremont McKenna College

Human Development and Subnationalism

A Disaggregated analysis of Indian States: Kerala and Uttar Pradesh

Submitted to

Professor William Ascher

By

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For

Senior Thesis

2017-18

April 23, 2018

*Abstract: This thesis investigates achievements in human development outcomes on health, education, and poverty indicators across Indian states, in order to discern what factors might influence a state's better orientation toward social policies. After conducting data analysis, the study explains differences in outcomes, as achieved by Kerala and Uttar Pradesh, by building an argument of subnational solidarity and its impact on determining the state's policy agendas.*

## Acknowledgments

I write this terribly crunched for time, typical.

Thank you Bill, for your generous support, indispensable guidance, and quick-wit humor.

I hope I am able to cultivate a work ethic (and sense of humor) like yours.

Thank you to the most- loving friends; I am deeply indebted to you for your relentless pursuit to keep me awake, motivated, occasionally inspired, and forever grateful.

I want to dedicate this thesis, by any objective measure, to the best human in the world; a girl could not have ever asked for, or deserved, a better father.

## Chapter One

### Where does India stand? – The problem of the poor

India is a compilation of contradictions and a study in contrasts. With 1.3 billion citizens, India is the world's largest democracy; but the nation that governs via representation the world's largest democratic populous is also home to its largest number of poor. According to a 2016 World Bank report, "India is *by far* the country with the largest number of people living under the international US\$1.90-a-day poverty line, 224 million, more than 2.5 times as many as the 86 million in Nigeria, which has the second-largest population of the poor worldwide...India accounts for one in three [of the poor worldwide.]"<sup>1</sup>(emphasis added) India not only sustains the unexpected simultaneity of persistent mass poverty with successful democratic practices but also uniquely includes and relies on its poor for the success of its democratic operation. This is evident in Perry Anderson's statement, "a truly distinguishing feature of Indian democracy – one that sets it apart from any other society in the world...In India alone, the poor form not just the overwhelming majority of the electorate, but vote in larger numbers than the better-off. Everywhere else, without exception, the ratio of electoral participation is the reverse."<sup>2</sup> The electorate's resilience against an arguably justified sense of disenfranchisement with a State that has failed too many on too many accounts is further evident in the nation's ever-rising voter turnout rates. With 540 million Indians voting, which is not only their fundamental right but also foremost civic duty, the 2014 general election set a national

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<sup>1</sup> "Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2016." *World Bank*. N.p., 2016. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.

<sup>2</sup> Anderson, Perry. "LRB · Perry Anderson · After Nehru." *London Review of Books*. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.

record with the highest ever voter turnout at 66.4 percent, putting India fourth in the world rankings on voter turnout.<sup>3</sup>

Adding to this political-economy conundrum of India's mass poverty parallel with its democratic politics, is the fact that India is no longer just a poor economy; crossing the two-trillion mark in 2016,<sup>4</sup> India has been one of the largest contributors to the world economy over the past decade; alone accounting for ten percent of the increase in global economic activity since 2005 and forging a threefold rise in its national per capita Gross Domestic Product (in purchasing power parity terms) since 2000.<sup>5</sup> After taking 60 years to reach the \$one-trillion mark, India added the next trillion in just seven years; the economy has almost doubled in size since the 2008 global financial crisis, and has more than quadrupled from the start of this millennium.<sup>6</sup> Today, India is the sixth and third largest economy in the world and in Asia, respectively, while in purchasing power parity terms, it has the world's third-largest Gross Domestic Product.<sup>7</sup>

India has managed to establish its global presence on such a large scale by delivering continued improvement in economic performance since the liberalization, privatization, and globalization reforms undertaken in the early 1990s; when the government, amidst a liquidity crisis, dismantled the '*license raj*' system of tight controls and permits in place since independence in 1947, thereafter diverging starkly from its prior socialist-like planned economy model that had been in place for over 40 years. In

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<sup>3</sup> Timmons, Heather. "Here's How India's Record-setting Voter Turnout Compares to the Rest of the World." Quartz. Quartz, 13 May 2014. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.

<sup>4</sup> India GDP 1960-2017 | Data | Chart | Calendar | Forecast | News." India GDP | 1960-2017 | Data | Chart | Calendar | Forecast | News, tradingeconomics.com/india/gdp.

<sup>5</sup> Corrigan, Gemma, and Attilio Di Battista. "19 Charts That Explain India's Economic Challenge." *World Economic Forum*. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.

<sup>6</sup> Raghavan, Sharad, and TCA. "India Is Now a \$2-trillion Economy." *The Hindu*. N.p., 02 July 2015. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.

<sup>7</sup> "COUNTRY COMPARISON :: GDP (PURCHASING POWER PARITY)." Central Intelligence Agency. Central Intelligence Agency, n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.

the decades following independence, the nation suffered from a ‘Hindu growth rate’ of 3.5 percent,<sup>8</sup> largely as a result of a highly interventionist state employing a misguided import substitution trading regime.<sup>9</sup> After three decades of generally low growth, during which slightly more than one person in two lived under the official poverty line,<sup>10</sup> the Indian economy experienced a growth acceleration starting in the 1990s, thereafter, sustaining rapid economic growth that averaged a rate of six percent in the 1990s and eight percent in 2000s. Surpassing China in 2015, India established itself as the fastest growing economy in the world, and is projected by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to continue as such indefinitely.<sup>11</sup>

While there has been a decline in the number of poor since the 1990s, the pace of poverty reduction has been relatively slow. For instance, every one percent GDP growth led to a 0.3 percent reduction of poverty in India, compared to China’s 0.8 percent;<sup>12</sup> combined with the fact that China had also seen higher growth rates for several years previously leaves India’s overall poverty alleviation outcomes far behind those of China’s. The growth patterns adopted in 1990s help partly explain the paradoxical nature of high growth with low poverty reduction in India; since the patterns of economic growth largely influence how inclusive such growth might be. For example, taking advantage of housing the world's second-largest English-speaking population, India’s growth has been primarily driven by the service sector, which contributes almost 60

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<sup>8</sup> Das, Gurcharan. “The India Model.” Foreign Affairs, 18 Jan. 2012, [www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2006-07-01/india-model](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2006-07-01/india-model).

<sup>9</sup> Kohli, Atul. “Politics Of Economic Growth In India, 1980-2005: Part I: The 1980S On JSTOR.” Politics Of Economic Growth In India, 1980-2005: Part I: The 1980S On JSTOR, Apr. 2006, [www.princeton.edu/~kohli/docs/PEGI\\_PartI.pdf](http://www.princeton.edu/~kohli/docs/PEGI_PartI.pdf)

<sup>10</sup> Datt , Gaurav, and Martin Ravallion. “Shining for the Poor Too? :” Economic and Political Weekly, 13 Feb. 2010, [www.epw.in/journal/2010/07/special-articles/shining-poor-too.html?0=ip\\_login\\_no\\_cache%3D57f90f22307806827bd408a591db43f1](http://www.epw.in/journal/2010/07/special-articles/shining-poor-too.html?0=ip_login_no_cache%3D57f90f22307806827bd408a591db43f1).

<sup>11</sup> Babones, Salvatore. "India May Be The World's Fastest Growing Economy, But Regional Disparity Is A Serious Challenge." Forbes. Forbes Magazine, 10 Jan. 2018. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.

<sup>12</sup> Sen Gupta, Abhijit, et al. Growth, Structural Change, and Poverty Reduction: Evidence from India. Nov. 2013, [www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/31214/south-asia-wp-022.pdf](http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/31214/south-asia-wp-022.pdf).

percent to the country's GDP today, making India the second fastest growing service economy in the world.<sup>13</sup> Information technology alone accounted for \$108 billion worth of services exports in 2014-15, primarily to the United States and Europe.<sup>14</sup> This too, however, is not without contrast; India has arguably greater linguistic diversity than any other large country with 1652 languages listed on the 1961 census, of which 122 are spoken by over 10,000 people and the primary six are spoken by over 50 million people each. Still, India is home to the second largest English-speaking population of 125 million people.<sup>15</sup> India's economic paradox is encapsulated by the different layers within its economic structure, which Ashutosh Varshney notes in stating, "for nearly a decade now, India has had the world's fourth-largest concentration of dollar billionaires (after the United States, China, and Russia), its third-largest middle class (after China and the United States), and its single-largest concentration of poor people. This tripartite structure is new...India is thus simultaneously rich and poor."<sup>16</sup>

Given the somewhat arbitrary nature of poverty lines, a cursory look at the income and consumption profile of the population is informative to our understanding of where the masses stand and why India remains a low-middle income country. This cursory look allows us to note, foremost, that the lower bound for the richest income quintile (of Rs.1.5 lakhs) is just 1.5 times the nation's per capita GDP and less than the minimum income requirement (of Rs. 2.5 lakhs) for one to qualify for income tax. The fact that just slightly over 20 percent of the population earns as much or above the

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<sup>13</sup> Hutt, Rosamond. "India's Economy in Numbers." World Economic Forum. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.

<sup>14</sup> *ibid*

<sup>15</sup> *ibid*

<sup>16</sup> "Journal of Democracy." India's Democracy at 70: Growth, Inequality, and Nationalism | Journal of Democracy. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.

nation's per capita GDP, along with the fact that not all those who fall even in the highest income quintile earn enough to be eligible for income tax, indicates the low levels of earnings that a majority of the population face; whereby, the top 20 percent earners control 45 percent of the total income. Relatedly, while a political democracy with diverse representation on all political fronts, India is not a fiscal democracy; for every 100 voters it has only 7 income taxpayers. This astoundingly low tax-base results from two factors: first, low earnings, especially in the unregulated informal sector that accounts for 92 percent of the Indian economy, such that, 90 percent of the population in urban areas and 95 percent in rural areas earns less than 2.5 lakhs annually, disqualifying this majority from income tax liability. Second, equally if not more importantly, this results from the state's policy choice of setting the qualifier at a level equivalent to 250 percent of the nation's per capita GDP, making India one of the most generous exponents in the world, since in most countries income tax becomes payable when one earns about one-half or one-fourth of the average national income. So while not entirely surprising, India sustains a political democracy without a commensurate fiscal democracy.

The task of highlighting the contradictions within the political-economy of this nation, especially those relating to its poverty -- be that in its democratic politics or its economic laurels -- was undertaken not for its intellectual intrigue and appeal but in order to put forth the following fundamental point about the Indian state: *even though India often attracts generalizations and stereotyping, it also most often defies them. And why wouldn't it, it is an enormous and varied land with a combined genetic, linguistic, socio-economic, ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity that is unparalleled by any other nation.* In fact, the probability of India's inherent characteristics culminating in a 'life of

contradictions’ was not entirely unexpected; we can turn to the prophetic words of Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar, who was a social reformer, Dalit leader and till date remains one of the most celebrated pioneers of the Indian National Movement. When disappointed by the Constituent Assembly’s lack of an official commitment to incorporate the term ‘Socialist’ in the Indian constitution, even after the Assembly acknowledged the imperative for redistribution, in his last speech before the them he argued:<sup>17</sup>

On the 26th January 1950 [when the Constitution was to come into effect] we are going to enter a life of contradictions. In politics we will have equality and in social and economic life we will have inequality. In politics we will be recognizing the principle of one man, one vote, one value. In our social and economic life we shall, *by reason of our social and economic structure*, continue to deny the principle of one man, one value. *How long shall we continue to live this life of contradictions?* (Emphasis added)

### **Many Indias within**

The following section elucidates the various dimensions along which India sustains its unparalleled diversity; building a foundation for the upcoming assessment of how the political-economic structures of the Indian state were formed and justified.

Religion: India has remained a Hindu-majority state since independence, with about 79.8 percent Hindus, 14.2 percent Muslims, 2.3 Christians and 1.7 percent Sikhs in 2011.<sup>18</sup> Even though less than 15 percent of Indians are Muslim, India is home to the second-largest Muslim population in the world, next only to Indonesia. It is the birthplace

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<sup>17</sup> John Harris, “Politics and redistribution in India,” page 211, Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics. 27 Dec. 2012. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.

<sup>18</sup> “C-1 Population By Religious Community.” Census of India Website: Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, India, [www.censusindia.gov.in/2011census/c-01.html](http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011census/c-01.html).

of four major religions: Hinduism, Sikhism, Jainism and Buddhism.<sup>19</sup> Zoroastrianism and Judaism also have an ancient history in India, each with several thousands of Indian adherents. India has the largest population of people adhering to Zoroastrianism (i.e. Parsis and Iranis) and Bahá'í Faith in the world, even though these religions are not native to India.<sup>20</sup> Relating to religion is the caste system - *one of the oldest hierarchies and a distinctive feature of Indian society* - that is omnipresent and all-pervasive in the nation. The term 'caste' can be used to mean *Varna* or *Jait*. *Varna* refers to a segment of the four-fold division of Hindu society based on functional criterion, namely, *Brahmins* (scholars), *Kshatriyas* (warriors), *Vaishyas* (merchants/traders) and *Sudras* (labourers). There is a large sub-population that is completely excluded from the system, previously called Untouchables, but now largely referred to as *Dalits*. While the Indian state has worked to implement policies that reduce the disadvantages faced by 'lower-castes,' especially *Sudras* and *Dalits*, through reservations, caste continues to play a role in "shaping both economic and social transactions."<sup>21</sup> *Jati* refers to a hereditary endogamous status group practicing a specific traditional occupation. There are more than 3,000 *jatis* in India. These are hierarchically graded in different ways in different religions.<sup>22</sup> The practice of caste system is not confined to Hindus alone. One can find castes among the Muslims, Christians, Sikhs as well as other communities. There is the hierarchy of *Shaik*, *Saiyed*, *Mughal* and *Pathan* among Muslims. Furthermore, there are castes like *teli* (oil presser), *dhobi* (washerman), etc. among the Muslims. Similarly, caste consciousness

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<sup>19</sup> Daily Bhaskar, <https://daily.bhaskar.com/news/NAT-TOP-india-cultural-religious-ethnic-diversity-4811522-PHO.html?ref=hf>, Web. 23 Apr. 2018

<sup>20</sup> *ibid*

<sup>21</sup> Kumar, Sunil Mitra. "Does Caste Influence Access to Agricultural Loans in Rural India?", 3 June 2013, [www.ideasforindia.in/article.aspx?article=Does-caste-influence-access-to-agricultural-loans-in-rural-India](http://www.ideasforindia.in/article.aspx?article=Does-caste-influence-access-to-agricultural-loans-in-rural-India).

<sup>22</sup> Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopædia. "Jati." Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 09 Mar. 2016. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.

among the Christians in India is not unknown. Since a vast majority of Christians in India were converted from Hindu fold, the converts carried the caste system into Christianity. In this view, one can imagine the extent of caste diversity and social cleavages in India.<sup>23</sup>

Ethnicity: There are many different ethnic groups who have migrated to India over the course of centuries. Anthropologists are indebted to Sir Herbert Risley for the elucidation of that most complex problem in ethnic classification, “The People of India”, where he notes seven racial types: (1) Turko – Iranian, (2) Indo-Aryan, (3) Scytho-Dravidian, (4) Aryo-Dravidian, (5) Mongo-Dravidian, (6) Mongoloid and (7) Dravidians. These seven racial types can be reduced to three basic types – the Indo-Aryan, the Mongolian, the Dravidian. The vast population of India also consists of the jungle tribes like the *Bhils*, the *Konds*, the *Santhals*, the *Jarawas*, etc; with over 700 tribes that have been notified under Article 342 of the Constitution of India, classified as ‘Scheduled Tribes.’ The largest number of main tribal communities - 62 - has been specified in relation to the state of Orissa,<sup>24</sup> with the majority living in the northeastern states of Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, and Nagaland. Smaller numbers inhabit the hills and forests of central and southern India as well as the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.<sup>25</sup>

Culture: There are close to 111 officially recognized dance forms in the country, with the likes of *Bharatnatyam*, *Kathak*, *Kathakali*, *Kuchipudi*, *Manipuri*, *Mohiniattam* and *Odissi* gaining a worldwide presence. Across India there are diverse folk dance forms such as *Bhangra* of Punjab, *Yakshagana* of Karnataka, *Bihu* of Assam and *Chhau* of

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<sup>23</sup> "In Spite of the Gods: The Rise of Modern India." NPR. NPR, 03 Feb. 2007. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.

<sup>24</sup> "Tip | How Many 'Scheduled Tribes' Are There in India? And What Distinguishes Them from Other Communities? (tribal' or Otherwise) – Information Provided by the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes." Tribal Cultural Heritage in India Foundation. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.

<sup>25</sup> Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopædia. "Adivasi." Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 22 Dec. 2015. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.

Jharkhand.<sup>26</sup> Clothing styles vary based upon region, religion, geography, and climate, with *Saree* and *dhoti* being the main traditional dresses of India. In fact, there are close to 80 recorded ways to tie a *saree*.<sup>27</sup> There are numerous festivals celebrated throughout the year in relation to seasons, religions, myths; some are exclusive to certain communities and religions while others have a national and secular character about them. ‘*Maha Kumbh Mela*’ festival in Allahabad, where millions of Hindu devotees took a ‘holy dip’ in the Ganges, was so massive a gathering that it was visible from space in 2013 via satellite images.<sup>28</sup>

Language: As mentioned earlier, India is one of the most multilingual places in the entire world - with more languages than those spoken in the entire Western Hemisphere. A majority of the 1632 listed languages classified as dialects, the Indian constitution officially recognizes 22 languages, of which Hindi and English are the most widely spoken and used to conduct official state business. The high number of Indian languages belong to five of the world's major language groups; Indo-European, Dravidian, Austro-Asiatic, Tibeto-Burmese and Semito-Hamitic. According to the New Delhi-based Indian Newspaper Society, India has 62,000 newspapers, with a staggering 90 percent of them in local languages.<sup>29</sup> KPMG in India and Google found that Indian-language internet users numbered 234 million in 2016, far more than the 175 million English-language internet users and projected the former group to grow to 536 million by 2021, far outpacing the growth rate foreseen for English-language internet users<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> "Folk Dances of India - Region & State Wise." Traditional Folk Dances of India - Regional & State Wise. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.

<sup>27</sup> "How to Wear a Sari in India." World Hum. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.

<sup>28</sup> "Kumbh Mela Festival." BBC News. BBC, 13 Feb. 2013. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.

<sup>29</sup> Asia-PacificIndia. "Medium for the Masses: How India's Local Newspapers Are Winning Rural Readers." Knowledge@Wharton. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.

<sup>30</sup> "India's Internet Is Led by Local Languages, Not English." EMarketer. N.p., 12 July 2017. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.

Regions: India has all types of physiographic regions, namely, the Northern Mountains, Indo Gangetic Plains, the Peninsular Plateau, Thar Desert, and the Coastal Plains. India is home to one of the wettest, coldest and most humid places in the world. This landscape is further augmented by island clusters in the form of The Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the Lakshadweep. In settlement patterns, the urban population makes up approximately 33.5 percent of the total population, meaning that over half the population lives in rural areas, where 80 percent of India's poor live.<sup>31</sup> The entire region of India has been territorially divided into subnational political units comprising 29 states and 7 union territories; the former being governed by state governments while the latter fall under the purview of the central government. This category of subnational political units, in the form of states, is arguably the most important dimension along which diversity within India is evident; especially because, as the next section will elucidate, these states were formed largely on the basis of groups that shared related cultures, specifically language. Thus, while these states capture much of the social diversity within India, they also add their own dimension of variation, and a rather important one, to the larger Indian context - that of state and local level politics and related matters like community mobilization and social movements, which directly influence developmental outcomes for the residents of these states. This is evident in Singh's statement:<sup>32</sup>

Indian states, the subnational political unit that is vested with constitutional authority over social policy vary greatly in the strength of the solidarity of their political community. These differences in subnationalism have played a critical role in generating differences in the progressiveness of social policy and levels of social development...in terms of the education and health of the population.

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<sup>31</sup> "India's Poverty Profile." World Bank. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.

<sup>32</sup> Singh, Prerna. "Subnationalism and Social Development: A Comparative Analysis of Indian States | World Politics." Cambridge Core. Cambridge University Press, 05 June 2015. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.

An example of such variation, as Forbes magazine notes, “[India’s] 36 states and union territories range from giant Uttar Pradesh with more than 200 million people to tiny island territories...with fewer than half a million....Uttar Pradesh and neighboring Bihar have a combined population roughly equal to that of the U.S., but a combined GDP less than that of Michigan.”<sup>33</sup>

The aggregation of vastly different places, peoples, and societies, all united by one national identity in all their diversity, is followed by a statistical exercise in constructing averages, delivering to us singular facts on ‘India.’ The World Bank’s website information page on India first notes, “[a]ny effort to understand India must begin by acknowledging the existence of many Indias...well-being and prosperity vary widely across the country.”<sup>34</sup> Our characterization of India as featured by conundrums and diversity can be seen most profoundly in the stark variation seen, in any given sphere of life (including and stemming from the several dimensions delineated above), within and across the nation’s various regions. This variation dictates that any fact or statistic which might best describe India entirely *depends on what part of the country one is investigating*. These differences are presented graphically by Prerna Singh:<sup>35</sup>

While certain states have attained levels of social development, conceptualized in terms of the education and health of the population, approaching those enjoyed by middle-income, industrialized countries, other states have fared worse than countries in sub-Saharan Africa. In a country the demographic size of India, these divergences translate into dramatic differences in the quality of life for millions. In the 1950s, residents of Bihar (which has a larger population than France) were less than half as likely to be literate as people in Himachal Pradesh. In the 1970s, women in Orissa (which has a larger population than Argentina) were expected to

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<sup>33</sup> Babones, Salvatore. "India May Be The World's Fastest Growing Economy, But Regional Disparity Is A Serious Challenge." Forbes. Forbes Magazine, 10 Jan. 2018. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.

<sup>34</sup> "India States Briefs." World Bank. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.

<sup>35</sup> Singh, Prerna. "Subnationalism and Social Development: A Comparative Analysis of Indian States | World Politics." Cambridge Core. Cambridge University Press, 05 June 2015. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.

live, on average, over twelve years less than women in Punjab. In the 1990s, children born in Madhya Pradesh (which has a population just a little lower than Turkey) were five times less likely to survive through infancy than those born in the state of Goa. Even today, women in Maharashtra (demographically equivalent to Mexico) are four times less likely to die during childbirth than their counterparts in Assam.

This state-wise disparity clearly indicates that any worthwhile and informative assessment of the socio-economic developmental outcomes faced by the Indian population can only be truly understood via a disaggregated state-level analysis. The states are not only distinctive in their histories, peoples, and norms, but also in their social welfare policies, which are implemented at that state level, allowing for further deviations within the policy realm. As noted in the Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics, “[d]evelopmental performance of Indian states continues to diverge along several dimensions, including economic growth, distribution and poverty alleviation, and quality of governance. Why this should be so remains a complex, important, and under-investigated area of research.”<sup>36</sup> The purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to conduct such a disaggregated analysis, in order to understand the true nature of poverty and deprivation across the different regions within the country. A subnational research design better equips us to handle the spatially uneven nature of processes such as social development.<sup>37</sup> A comparison of subnational units allows us to look beyond the common-place characterization of India as “backward,” by recognizing and evaluating different cases, with some achieving substantial development while others remain egregiously backward, by decomposing the variation that remains hidden by national characterizations and

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<sup>36</sup> John Harris, “Politics and redistribution in India,” page 211, Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics. 27 Dec. 2012. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.

<sup>37</sup> Singh, Prerna. “Subnationalism and Social Development: A Comparative Analysis of Indian States | World Politics.” Cambridge Core. Cambridge University Press, 05 June 2015. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.

averages. This disaggregated analysis is undertaken in the next chapter, which employs data analysis to discern state-level performance on poverty, health, and education outcomes for the Indian population by residence. Additionally, the question of who provides welfare in India provides further support for such a subnational research design. Article 246 of the Indian constitution divides policy areas among three lists – the Union, State, and Concurrent lists. The Union and State lists consist of subjects under the exclusive purview of the central and state governments respectively, while the Concurrent list is composed of subjects upon which both levels of government have jurisdiction. Health is on the state list. Education was shifted from the state list to the concurrent list by the 42nd Amendment in 1976. Institutionally, the primary responsibility for developmental policies has rested with states rather than the national government. States play the key role in the formulation and execution of policies regarding both education and health, and account for nearly 90 percent of total government expenditure on these issues.<sup>38</sup> The importance of noting this institutional design can be seen in the following quote by a former education minister, who observed that prior to 1976, “[w]hether it was primary education or secondary education or university education, the states if they were so inclined, could do what they liked without the Center having any voice in the legislation they passed or in the administration of the system”<sup>39</sup> On this account of institutional design, as well as the previously noted ‘Many Indias within’ section that outlined demographic variation throughout the country, arises

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<sup>38</sup> Singh, Perna. "Subnationalism and Social Development: A Comparative Analysis of Indian States | World Politics." Chapter 1, page 16, Cambridge Core. Cambridge University Press, 05 June 2015. Web. 23 Apr. 2018

<sup>39</sup> Ibid, page 17

the need to clarify the exact nature of the Indian federation, which the following section will do.

### **The Indian Federation: Unity in Diversity**

In India, the federal system emerged after Independence as a means of managing ethnic and linguistic diversity: demands for autonomy could be accommodated more easily than in a unitary structure like that of Sri Lanka. Indian states vary dramatically in their languages, social structures, economies, and party competition, and the federal system institutionalized these differences rather than attempting to homogenize them. This federal structure generally has been successful, particularly in mitigating linguistic conflict in south India in the 1950s and 1960s.<sup>40</sup>

India can be classified as a ‘holding together’ federation, where the centre created the states as they came to be, unlike the U.S., where pre-existing states came together to form one nation. So how did India carve out its states? The central question through India’s freedom movement and post-independence nation building was how this fledgling democracy might be reconciled with its long-standing demographic diversity. Given that federalism is organized via territorial units, this question becomes even more specific in the context of center-state relations, whereby, India had to find a way to consolidate its geographically concentrated diversities with its national democratic experiment. Here, it is worth noting that India’s social and cultural diversities can be reduced to four main forms: caste, religion, language and tribe. Of these, language and tribe are territorially concentrated, making them the mainstay of Indian federalism. It is fortuitous that the

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<sup>40</sup> Paul Staniland, “Insurgencies in India”, page 168, Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics. 27 Dec. 2012. Web. 23 Apr. 2018

Indian population is well-dispersed across the nation when viewed by religion, with the only notable exception being that of a Sikh concentration in Punjab, because the carnage brought on with the India-Pakistan partition served as sufficient warning of the communal-violence and instability religious identity in politics can bring. Religion came to be seen as India's principal fault line, with the immediate post-independence leadership countering this by delegitimizing religion-based demands for states within the federation. We see this in the case of Punjab, where, demands for the state based on the distinctiveness of Sikhism with respect to Hinduism were rejected, but when proposed along linguistic arguments of Punjabi being different from Hindi, Haryana and Punjab were born as separate states, one Hindi speaking, the other Punjabi speaking.<sup>41</sup> While religion is not privileged in politics, the Indian State ensures the protection of religious diversity by guaranteeing freedom of worship, separate 'personal laws' such as the religiously governed codes for property inheritance, divorce and marriage and privileges for minority educational institutions. Varshney notes:<sup>42</sup>

After partition, religion could not be the basis of federal statehood, a principle followed consistently for the more than six decades of Indian democracy regardless of which party ruled in Delhi...language and tribe became the foundations of Indian federation — partly because of their geographical concentration, and in part because these two identities were not viewed as profound existential threats to India.

Given this socio-politically acceptable mechanism of state-formation under India's 'holding together' federal nature, Varshney investigates the question of what relationship this Indian federation shares with its nationhood. To answer this question, he

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<sup>41</sup> How has Indian Federalism Done?, *Studies in Indian Politics*, 1, 1 (2013): 43–63

<sup>42</sup> *ibid*

evaluates the nature of Indian nationhood and argues that unlike France's Nation-state type, which "essentially represents a coincidence of the territorial boundaries of a state and the cultural boundaries of a nation," such that, this type of nationhood tends to be assimilationist in character, and focuses on the removal of ethnic or cultural diversities, India is a state-nation, which "consists of states that have strong cultural diversity, some of which is territorially based and can potentially create demands for independence." State-nations, as defined by Varshney, function on two levels: (1) creating a sense of belonging to the larger political community (in this case, India), (2) while simultaneously institutionalizing guarantees for safeguarding politically salient diversities, such as language, religion and culturally sacred norms.<sup>43</sup> With territorially-centered cultural differences, federalism allows the implementation of culturally respectful policies that also facilitate stability and unity. As such, "the concept of state-nation is both about recognizing diversities and building larger all-India loyalties." While it is certainly not an easy political undertaking to constructively encourage identification with one's diverse subnational background simultaneous to a feeling of unity in being Indian, survey results from 2005 indicate that this process has been largely successful in India; with less than 12 percent of the 5385 survey respondents identifying solely with their state and over 66 percent identifying with both, India and their state.<sup>44</sup> Thus, a commitment to the larger entity of India has been cultivated not by suppressing diversities, but by recognizing and supporting them. The basic idea of the federal bargain is that states will retain loyalty to India even while acting with significant autonomy

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<sup>43</sup> ibid

<sup>44</sup> Ibid

within it.<sup>45</sup> Additionally, an important facet of the success of Indian federalism, as constructed linguistically, is that Indian identities tend to crosscut as opposed to accumulate; such that, depending on where she lives, the first language of a Muslim could be Hindi, Urdu, Bengali or any of the many others, or that a south Indian Dalit shares little with a north Indian Dalit; and being a Brahmin in north India is very different from being one in south India. “When politics mixes with such a social landscape, political entrepreneurs mobilize their communities on a whole variety of issues, creating serious internal pluralism in state politics.”<sup>46</sup> This allows for a remarkable fluidity in how and along what identity dimensions one might construct a majority-minority framework, giving Indian federalism a benign edge.

Having clarified the exact nature of the Indian federation, we are better equipped to make a case for differences in subnationalism as an a plausible explanation for the variation in development outcomes experienced across the states, which will be undertaken in the following chapters.. We can turn to Perna Singh’s definition of Subnationalism:<sup>47</sup>

[Subantionalism is] the identification with, or aspiration for, a self-governing homeland located within the boundaries of a sovereign country. The ideology and movement of subnationalism incorporate both cultural and political dimensions – people with a belief in a shared past and a common culture, based often but not necessarily on language, who identify with, or desire the creation of and control over, a political-administrative unit within a sovereign country that corresponds to a territory they believe belonged to their forebears.

The foremost characteristic of subnationalism is its association with political self-determination. Unlike any other category of identity, be it race, gender, religion or class, subnationalism demands self-determination based on what is seen as one’s historic

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<sup>45</sup> “Paul Staniland, “Insurgencies in India”, Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics. 27 Dec. 2012. Web. 23 Apr. 2018

<sup>46</sup> Ibid, page 57

<sup>47</sup> Singh, Perna. "Subnationalism and Social Development: A Comparative Analysis of Indian States | World Politics." Chapter 1, page 16, Cambridge Core. Cambridge University Press, 05 June 2015. Web. 23 Apr. 2018

culture, group and homeland, while unlike nationalism, it is about political-administration within a larger sovereign entity that subnationals simultaneously identify with. While identity politics has a long-standing history of destructive outcomes, as related to chauvinism, xenophobia, and violence, the limited institutional scope of subnationalism, whereby it does not demand sovereignty or dissociation with the larger uniting entity, in this case being Indian, is actually an important factor in making subnationalism and state-identity a constructive force that leads to social cohesion, which can lead to the materialization of public goods that are beneficial to all. While a large body of development literature is conclusive in noting top-down State intervention as the prime mechanism for provision of public goods, it is argued here that differences in societal action demanding such provisions can be a key variable in influencing the State's decision to prioritize the implementation these services. Indian states are in charge of administering a large list of subjects, which largely scope matters that directly impact everyday lives of their residents, and thus are also the ones most personal to citizens. Managing 61 items on the 'State list' as well as co-managing 52 items on the 'Concurrent list'<sup>48</sup> means that levels of social mobilization can prove to be instrumental in influencing how states decide to allocate their limited resources among competing items on their list and what items end up making it to a government's curated policy agenda.

## Chapter Two: Data Analysis

This chapter undertakes state-level data analysis on outcomes achieved in health, education, and poverty by the Indian states, to discern which states have performed better or worse than expected of them.

### Need for government intervention

Public welfare economics cites two main reasons for government intervention in the economy: market failure and redistribution. Intervention for human development can be justified on both these fronts: an inefficient market system that is unable to allocate resources to their best use leads to high levels of poverty, such that, if the markets were well-functioning, outcomes would be surplus maximizing. Poverty is not a best outcome as it is characterized by low demand for goods and services, consequently lowering their supply and preventing further growth and augmentation of the economy. Additionally, poverty itself is inefficient since it wastes a crucial economic resource: potential human capital. Poverty also creates a self-explanatory need for redistribution of resources. Thus, without a doubt, the government has a strong imperative to reduce poverty, and it must use policy and regulation to this end. *We therefore need to identify factors are effective to this end.*

Additionally, poverty alleviation in India is not only a moral imperative but also an economic and political one. India has been lauded as one of the fastest growing economies with a massive demographic dividend. But mass poverty is simply inefficient – it is a waste of India's human capital. Thus, for true economic efficiency, poverty

alleviation is needed. India is also the world's largest democracy. While we can turn to scholars like Przeworski who categorically defines democratic systems as based foremost in equality before law, without any other qualifying factors since democratic outcomes are inherently uncertain. Yet, the heart of India's constitution is embodied in the preamble, which states that India is a "Sovereign, Socialist, Secular and Democratic Republic." This clearly indicates a certain public commitment toward general welfare; and as a representative democracy, India must provide better outcomes in the interest of those whose name it governs in.

### **Need to go beyond poverty: A Human Development approach**

India's poverty reduction since 2005 has given cause to celebrate – a report by McKinsey<sup>49</sup> notes that the share of the population below the official poverty line fell from 37 percent in 2005 to 22 percent in 2012—the fastest rate of poverty reduction India has achieved since the economic reforms of the early 1990s—as an impressive 137 million people rose above this threshold. But above it looms a hard question: is ending extreme poverty enough to achieve a decent standard of living and sense of dignity for the poor? India's human development indicators show that deprivation extends well beyond the 22 percent of Indian who live below the official poverty line. Forty percent of the nation's children under the age of 3 suffer from malnutrition. Fifty percent of its households have no access to improved sanitation facilities. Seventy percent of those between the ages of 15 and 65 have only a primary school education—or no education at all. These statistics are symptomatic of the broader issue of poor living standards experienced by a

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<sup>49</sup> Gupta, Rajat, Shirish Sankhe, Richard Dobbs, Jonathan Woetzel, Anu Madgavkar, and Ashwin Hasyagar. "India's Path from Poverty to Empowerment." McKinsey & Company. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.

significant portion of India's population. On this account, we turn to the concept of human development, which is defined as a process of enlarging people's choices to lead a long and healthy life, to acquire knowledge and be educated, and to have access to resources needed for a decent level of living.<sup>50</sup>

### **Need for state-wise assessment**

While poverty alleviation has undoubtedly been a top agenda for several successive central governments, understanding growth and development in India requires a state-wise assessment. India is large and diverse, comprising numerous states and their own societies within. The federal structure provides not only a more efficient administration of the vast territory and populace but also serves to better represent the diverse communities within India. Growing interregional disparities strongly support the assumption of varying socio-economic conditions between states. Additionally, the development indicators we are concerned with, namely health, education, and poverty, are matters that fall under the state and concurrent list according to the constitution of India, thereby allowing variations in our outcomes of interest based on the particular state and conditions prevalent within.

States in India perform differently on socio-economic outcomes. Some of this difference may arise from aspects that state policy does not and cannot directly influence, while others arise due to differences in policies, their implementation, and consequent impact. We want to discern what impacts policy agendas adopted by a state, to learn how one might better orient policy toward development. In order to do this, we must identify

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<sup>50</sup> Ghosh, Madhusudan. "Economic Growth and Human Development in Indian States." *Economic and Political Weekly*. N.p., 29 July 2006. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.

the states that have performed well due to their policies; or the states that have performed differently than what would be expected based on their given resource endowment and prevailing conditions. Let me explain this with the following analogy: My father's completion of his bachelor's degree is far superior a success than my completion of my bachelor's degree. His childhood featured financial insecurity in a small town, while mine did not. He started off with few resources. Given his initial endowment of resources, access, network, social capital, and all other relevant factors, he performed exceedingly better than the level of education and success that was expected of him. On the other hand, my initial endowment of resources, access, network, social capital, and all other relevant factors, was substantially higher than his endowment when he was 18. Thus, even though both of us have completed a bachelor's degree, our level of success, and the inputs that went into this success, are not the same! He performed better than what was expected of him, whereas I have performed well within the expectations of someone who is endowed with my resources. It is therefore far more interesting to investigate what factors made him complete his bachelor's degree instead of the factors that made me complete mine, even though the outcome of receiving a college degree was the same.

### **Empirical model**

In order to determine which states have performed outside of their expected levels, this thesis uses regression analysis to determine what the expected or predicted level of performance for a state is based on its endowments. Using state level data, this econometric model estimates the level of achievement in the human development indicators under consideration: poverty, health, and education. Thereafter, the predicted

level is compared with the states actual achievement on these indicators, to determine which states have outperformed and which have underperformed, and accordingly rank them. This thesis thereafter undertakes case study analysis of the best and worst performing states, to delineate the most crucial factors that influenced their performance.

### **Outcome of Interest: Poverty**

To estimate a state's predicted level of poverty, this thesis controls for the states net state domestic product per citizen (NSDP per capita), Median years of schooling in the population, and the proportion of its socio-economically disadvantaged population (ST and SC population.) NSDP per capita is an indicator of how wealthy a state is, and therefore, what level of resources it might be endowed with as well as how well-off its residents might be. Median years of schooling accounts for human capital development that could influence returns to labor. Proportion of ST/SC population indicates the level of systematic disadvantage that this group of the state's populace faces. The first two covariates allow us to control of wealth and the third covariate allows us to control of discrimination, such that, the regression model is now able to estimate what level of poverty the state should have, given its endowment of wealth, human capital and disadvantaged peoples. In essence, we can no longer attribute higher levels of poverty than those predicted, to the states lack of wealth or high prevalence of disadvantaged groups, and vice versa. This helps us expand our investigation of factors relevant to poverty and its alleviation, beyond the non-policy variables like the state's wealth and social composition, to other factors, specifically the ones that are policy-variables.

Another covariate considered for this model was the proportion of rural population, since 80 percent of the poor live in rural India.<sup>51</sup> In rural areas, less than 5 percent earn enough to pay taxes, only 2.5 percent own a four-wheeler vehicle and less than 10 percent have salaried jobs.<sup>52</sup> However, due to high correlation between percentage of rural population and NSDP per capita, the author dropped the former as an explanatory covariate.

Model:

$$\gamma = \beta_0 + \beta_1 (\text{Median schooling}) + \beta_2 (\log \text{NSDP per capita}) + \beta_3 (\text{ST/SC \%})$$

### **Outcome of Interest: Health**

An overarching health outcome indicator not only measures the performance of the health sector but is also closely linked to other development processes, as health is closely linked to economic, social, and environmental factors.<sup>53</sup> This thesis uses two measures to account for the standard of health in a state: life expectancy at birth and infant mortality rate.

#### **1) Life Expectancy**

Life expectancy is perhaps the most important measure of health. It is readily comparable across states and asks the most fundamental question concerning health: how long can the typical person expect to live? Life expectancy increases due to healthcare improvements like the introduction of vaccines, the development of drugs or positive behavior changes like the reduction in smoking or drinking rates. Life expectancy at birth

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<sup>51</sup> "India's Poverty Profile." World Bank. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.

<sup>52</sup> Katyal, Ritika. "India Census Shows Extent of Poverty." CNN. Cable News Network, 03 Aug. 2015. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.

<sup>53</sup> An overarching health indicator for the Post-2015 Development Agenda, WHO, web, [http://www.who.int/healthinfo/indicators/hsi\\_indicators\\_SDG\\_TechnicalMeeting\\_December2015\\_BackgroundPaper.pdf](http://www.who.int/healthinfo/indicators/hsi_indicators_SDG_TechnicalMeeting_December2015_BackgroundPaper.pdf)

is a summary indicator of mortality conditions and, by proxy, of health conditions. It summarizes mortality risks and trends across all age groups, including older people. This measure, however, does not directly address non-fatal health outcomes, disability etc. except through the proxy of mortality risks. “The justification of life expectancy at birth in representing the health dimension is on the grounds of intrinsic value of longevity, association of long life with adequate nutrition, good health and education and its linkages with other valued goals”<sup>54</sup>

To estimate a state’s predicted life expectancy, this thesis controls for the states proportion of rural population (percent rural), median years of schooling (median schooling), proportion of the state’s population that falls in the highest wealth quintile nationally (fifth wealth quintile), proportion of it socioeconomically disadvantaged population (ST/SC percent). The rationale of controlling for rural population and highest wealth quintile is to control for wealth resources. Median years of schooling accounts for the likely impact on health due to returns on education that allow one to maintain better health. ST/SC population as mentioned previously controls for disadvantaged groups. Additionally, all these covariates also capture a sense of the proportion of population that likely have and likely do not have resources to enhance their health outcomes. As mentioned above, life expectancy is a function of factors beyond healthcare, including socioeconomic and environmental conditions. Therefore, controlling for poverty rate and proportion in the highest wealth quintile allows us to put forth a reasonable prediction of the level of life expectancy, while being able to investigate reasons beyond these when assessing differences in the actual achievements.

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<sup>54</sup> Ibid

Model:

$$\gamma = \beta_0 + \beta_1 (\text{Median schooling}) + \beta_2 (\text{Highest wealth quintile}) + \beta_3 (\text{ST/SC \%}) + \beta_4 (\text{Percent rural})$$

## 2) Infant mortality rate

The infant mortality rate (IMR), defined as the number of deaths in children under 1 year of age per 1000 live births in the same year, has in the past been regarded as a highly sensitive (proxy) measure of population health. This reflects the apparent association between the causes of infant mortality and other factors that are likely to influence the health status of whole populations such as their economic development, general living conditions, social wellbeing, rates of illness, and the quality of the environment.<sup>55</sup> Factors that directly impact infant mortality include the mother's prenatal health status, both their access to healthcare facilities, environmental conditions, and socioeconomic status. IMR is internationally recognized as a measure of health as well as a robust proxy for relevant factors that impact the overall structure of health in a state. Therefore, therefore, this thesis uses IMR to capture these conditions.

To estimate a state's predicted infant mortality rate, this thesis controls for the states net state domestic product per citizen (NSDP per capita), proportion of the state's population that falls in the lowest wealth quintile nationally (first wealth quintile), the number of females for every 1000 males (Sex ratio), and the median years of schooling attained by the population aged 6 and over (median years of schooling.) The rationale for controlling for NSDP per capita as well as lowest wealth quintile remains the same as

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<sup>55</sup> Goel MK, Roy P, Rasania SK, Roy S, Kumar Y, Kumar A. Wealth index and maternal health care: Revisiting NFHS-3. Indian J Public Health 2015;59:217-9.

noted in previous sections. The author controls for the sex ratio of a state because of the long-standing history of gender discrimination in many regions of India, as made colloquially popular by Amartya Sen's "100 Million Missing Women" article, which notes how over 100 million more women should be alive in Asia and Africa according to normal biological birth rates, but gender selective abortion, female infanticide, and overall neglect of women's health have led to skewed demographics. He states:<sup>56</sup>

In view of the enormity of the problems of women's survival in large parts of Asia and Africa, it is surprising that these disadvantages have received such inadequate attention. The numbers of "missing women" in relation to the numbers that could be expected if men and women received similar care in health, medicine, and nutrition, are remarkably large. A great many more than a hundred million women are simply not there because women are neglected compared with men.

Infant mortality rates would relate to the sex ratio not only directly via female infanticide, but also indirectly in that states with higher females are likely to provide better healthcare for females overall, reducing the likelihood of high IMR. The author controls for median years of schooling in a state because better education likely translates to better health choices, thoughtful family planning, and overall information access for the population, reducing the probability of high IMR.

Another covariate considered for this model was the average BMI of women, which the author found to be statistically significant in its impact on IMR. However, since women's nutrition can be influenced directly via policy intervention, the author dropped this as a control variable to predict expected IMR. The author also considered including poverty rate or rural population, but NSDP per capita sufficiently captured the

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<sup>56</sup> Sen, Amartya. "More Than 100 Million Women Are Missing." *The New York Review of Books*. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.

resource conditions of a state so the author did not include these unnecessary and highly correlated variables in the model, to avoid issues of multicollinearity.

Model:

$$\gamma = \beta_0 + \beta_1 (\text{Log NDSP per capita}) + \beta_2 (\text{Sex ratio}) + \beta_3 (\text{Lowest wealth quintile}) + \beta_4 (\text{Median schooling})$$

### **Outcome of Interest: Education**

To estimate a state's predicted education level, the author employs enrollment in higher secondary school (XI and XII grade) as the dependent variable. While the author also considers overall attendance rates in schools as well as median years of schooling of the population as potential dependent variables, the foremost outcome of interest is determined to be higher secondary enrollment. This is because attendance does not necessarily indicate learning and is also easily misreported, while median years of schooling in the population is a function of conditions prevalent over the last decade and more, not informing us much about current conditions of education in the state. Thus, enrollment in higher secondary school is found to be the best indicator of the status of education in a state, because to be eligible for enrollment in XIth and XIIth grades, one must pass exit exams for all previous grades, which likely indicates true learning.

Additionally, higher secondary schooling is not covered under the Right to Education Act, allowing this to be a non-policy variable. Students who are enrolled in higher secondary have passed all previous grades and opted into pursuing their education further, without the law requiring them to do so, indicating a private value their families find in their education.

The model used to predict a state's higher secondary gross enrollment rate (HSGER), the author controls for the median years of schooling attained by the population aged 6 and over (median years of schooling), and proportion of the state's population that falls in the highest wealth quintile nationally (fifth wealth quintile), the proportion of ST/SC population (ST/SC percent) and proportion of agriculture and allied sector contribution to the state gross domestic product (Agriculture in GDP). The author controls for median years of schooling because better educated parents are likely to better educate their children, and pursuing higher secondary education is a choice that families make, often contemplating between sending their grown up children to earn wages or to earn a high school diploma. Median years of schooling captures families that recognize the value of schooling. Controlling for the highest wealth quintile accounts for families who are able to afford not only foregoing any wages their children can earn but also the costs of their higher education. ST/SC proportion controls for the disadvantaged groups that historically have lower educational rates as well. Agriculture contribution to state GDP attempts to capture the likelihood of someone attending school given the prevalence of farm employment.

When investigating attendance as the dependent variable, the author found poverty rate and stunting rate of children below five years of age statistically significant in explaining attendance rates. When investigating median years of schooling, the author found poverty rate and proportion in highest wealth quintile statistically significant in explaining variation in this dependent variable across states.

Model:

$$\gamma = \beta_0 + \beta_1 (\text{Median schooling}) + \beta_2 (\text{Highest wealth quintile}) + \beta_3 (\text{ST/SC percent}) + \beta_4 (\text{Agriculture in state GDP})$$

### About the data

The data used for this thesis' regression analysis has been obtained from state and central government open data sources, as well as the National Family Health Survey 2015-16. The following table lists the variables considered along with the corresponding source, time period, relevant summary statistics, and particular notes if applicable.

Only major states have been accounted for, therefore, union territories of Chandigarh, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Daman and Diu, Lakshadweep, Puducherry, Andaman and Nicobar Islands have been left out. This was done primarily because union territories are governed by the central government, and therefore would not inform our state-wise analysis much, while adding noise to the dataset. Telangana has been collapsed into Andhra Pradesh as much of the data used is from 2011, whilst Telangana was declared the 29th State of India in 2014.<sup>57</sup>

Variable	Period	Source	Notes
Poverty Rate	2011	Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Central Statistics Office, Social Statistics Division. September 2017 Government of India <a href="http://www.mospi.gov.in">www.mospi.gov.in</a>	Proportion of population below the State Poverty Line

<sup>57</sup> <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/telangana/The-story-of-Indias-29th-State-%E2%80%94-Telangana/article14384461.ece>

Each State has a poverty line calculate calculated by the Suresh Tendulkar committee method.			
Per Capita NSDP at 2004-05 prices (Rs.)	Annual/ 2012-13	Selected Socioeconomic indicators 2017, Central Statistics Office, Government of India data.gov.in	Log transformed by author
Net State Domestic Product (NSDP) is defined as a measure, in monetary terms, of the volume of all goods and services produced within the boundaries of the State during a given period of time after deducting the wear and tear or depreciation, accounted without duplication. Divided by the total population of State to give Per Capita data.			
Scheduled Tribe and Scheduled Caste Population	2011	Selected Socioeconomic indicators 2017, Central Statistics Office, Government of India data.gov.in	Combined ST and SC population proportions
Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) are among the most disadvantaged socio-economic groups in India.			
SexRatioFemales100 0Males	2011/ Decadal	Census - Selected Socioeconomic indicators 2017, Central Statistics Office, Government of India data.gov.in	
Number of females per 1000 males, according to state			
First Wealth Quintile	2015-16	National Family and Health Survey, 2015-16	
Percent distribution of the de jure population in lowest wealth quintile discerned at a national average, according to residence and state, India, 2015-16			
Fifth Wealth Quintile	2015-16	National Family and Health Survey, 2015-16	

Percent distribution of the de jure population in highest wealth quintile as discerned at a national average, according to residence and state, India, 2015-16			
Attendance	2015-16	National Family and Health Survey, 2015-16	
Percentage of de facto household population age 6-17 years attending school (including pre-primary school) in 2015-16 school year according to state, India, 2015-16			
Higher Secondary Enrollment	2015-16	Ministry of Human Resource Development <a href="https://data.gov.in/resources/gross-enrolment-ratio-2013-14-2015-16">https://data.gov.in/resources/gross-enrolment-ratio-2013-14-2015-16</a>	
<p>Total enrolment in a Higher Secondary (Grades XI and XII) level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the eligible official school-age population corresponding to the same level of education in a given school-year.</p> <p>School-age Population: Population of the age group which officially corresponds to the relevant level of education.</p>			
Median Years of Schooling	2015-16	National Family and Health Survey, 2015-16	*Author has calculated the population median as an average of Male and Female median years of schooling
Percent distribution of the de facto female and male household populations age six and over by highest number of years of schooling completed and median number of years of schooling completed, according to state, India, 2015-16			
Infant Mortality	2015-16	National Family and Health Survey, 2015-16	Infant mortality rates for the five-year period preceding the survey, by state/union territory, India, 2015-16

Infant mortality: The probability of dying between birth and the first birthday.			
Life Expectancy	2010-14	Human Development Index Report, United Nations Development Program (UNDP) India and Sample Registration Survey (SRS) based life table 2010-14.  <a href="https://www.disabled-world.com/calculators-charts/in-lifespan.php">https://www.disabled-world.com/calculators-charts/in-lifespan.php</a>	Due to lack of data, the author has used the life expectancy of Assam for Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, Tripura, and of Maharashtra for Goa.
Life Expectancy: the average number of years a person is expected to live on the basis of the current mortality rates and prevalence distribution of health states in a population			
Stunting	2015-16	National Family and Health Survey, 2015-16	
Height-for-age is a measure of linear growth retardation and cumulative growth deficits. Children whose height-for-age Z-score is below minus two standard deviations (-2 SD) from the median of the reference population are considered short for their age (stunted), or chronically undernourished. Children who are below minus three standard deviations (-3 SD) are considered severely stunted.  Sample: Children under age five years			

Indicator	Variable	Dropped
Poverty	Log NSDP ST/SC Median years of schooling	Rural population (collinear)
Life expectancy	Median years of schooling Rural population Highest wealth quintile ST/SC	Log NSDP Poverty rate
IMR	Sex Ratio, Females per 1000 Males First wealth quintile Log NSDP	BMI Gender gap in literacy

	Median years of schooling	
HSGER	Median years of schooling Highest wealth quintile ST/SC Agriculture proportion in state GDP	Stunting Rural population Log NSDP

### Empirical results

The states' predicted levels are estimated using beta coefficients determined by Model #1 for each indicator. The other models are provided as supporting evidence for the nature, direction, and significance of the relevant covariates to the outcome of interest.

Based on the following results, the author investigates the cases of Kerala and Uttar Pradesh in the following chapters to explain how degrees of subnationalism influenced developmental outcomes experienced in these states, as supported by the following results. Subnationalism did so foremost by impacting the degree of government prioritization of social services in their policy agendas. While itself not a direct policy variable, subnationalism solidarity has been identified and argued as the primary determinant of socially oriented policy choices.

### POVERTY

Model #1			Adjusted R-Squared: 0.5220	
Covariate	Beta Coefficient	Standard Error	T-statistic	P-value

Median years of schooling	-.30829	1.509174	-0.20	0.840
Log of NSDP per capita	-15.13631	4.112619	-3.68	0.001
Proportion of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe	.0467189	.0645029	0.72	0.476
Constant	180.1114	37.62311	4.79	0.000
Model #2			Adjusted R-Squared: 0.3139	
Covariate	Beta Coefficient	Standard Error	T-statistic	P-value
Median years of schooling	-4.468123	1.202378	-3.72	0.001
Constant	46.13555	7.390826	6.24	0.000
Model #3			Adjusted R-Squared: 0.5220	
Covariate	Beta Coefficient	Standard Error	T-statistic	P-value
Log of NSDP per capita	-16.03139	2.724235	-5.88	0.000
Constant	189.592	28.9537	6.55	0.000

	State	Predicted level of poverty	Actual Level of Poverty	Difference	Ranking	In order of Ranking
1	Andhra Pradesh	17.69411519	9.2	8.494115193	4	Meghalaya
2	Arunachal Pradesh	23.67354103	34.7	-11.02645897	28	J & K
3	Assam	27.30113321	32	-4.698866787	20	Rajasthan
4	Bihar	35.49026341	33.7	1.790263408	12	Andhra Pradesh
5	Chhattisgarh	25.9149691	39.9	-13.9850309	29	Punjab
6	Delhi	2.025217213	9.9	-7.874782787	25	Himachal
7	Goa	-0.263819296	5.1	-5.363819296	22	Tripura
8	Gujarat	12.60028845	16.6	-3.999711551	19	Kerala
9	Haryana	11.89554791	11.2	0.695547914	16	Uttarakhand
10	Himachal	14.74862348	8.1	6.648623475	6	West Bengal
11	J & K	23.14006673	10.3	12.84006673	2	Mizoram
12	Jharkhand	26.36537373	37	-10.63462627	27	Bihar
13	Karnataka	18.13070318	20.9	-2.769296824	18	Tamil Nadu
14	Kerala	12.38364163	7.1	5.28364163	8	Uttar Pradesh

15	Madhya Pradesh	26.83534831	31.6	-4.764651694	21	Sikkim
16	Maharashtra	11.68045683	17.4	-5.719543172	24	Haryana
17	Manipur	27.88558158	36.9	-9.014418423	26	Nagaland
18	Meghalaya	25.05846257	11.9	13.15846257	1	Karnataka
19	Mizoram	22.42196335	20.4	2.021963354	11	Gujarat
20	Nagaland	19.50336564	18.9	0.603365636	17	Assam
21	Odisha	27.04368602	32.6	-5.556313981	23	Madhya Pradesh
22	Punjab	16.5626001	8.3	8.262600098	5	Goa
23	Rajasthan	24.78546692	14.7	10.08546692	3	Odisha
24	Sikkim	9.585137955	8.2	1.385137955	15	Maharashtra
25	Tamil Nadu	13.08994633	11.3	1.789946329	13	Delhi
26	Tripura	19.36977233	14	5.369772331	7	Manipur
27	Uttar Pradesh	31.10494871	29.4	1.704948711	14	Jharkhand
28	Uttarakhand	14.31379652	11.3	3.013796519	9	Arunachal Pradesh
29	West Bengal	22.26027317	20	2.260273167	10	Chhattisgarh

**HEALTH**  
LIFE EXPECTANCY

Model #1			Adjusted R-Squared: 0.6785	
Covariate	Beta Coefficient	Standard Error	T-statistic	P-value
Median years of schooling in the population (median schooling)	-.0921349	.0446325	-2.06	0.050
Proportion in highest Wealth Quintile (fifth)	.0681497	.0399244	1.71	0.101
Proportion of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (ST/SC)	-.0703211	.0178652	-3.94	0.001
Proportion of Rural Population (percent rural)	-.0142088	.0320897	-0.44	0.662
Constant	71.74862	3.350907	21.41	0.000
Model #2			Adjusted R-Squared: 0.3468	
Covariate	Beta Coefficient	Standard Error	T-statistic	P-value
Proportion of Population under Poverty line (poverty rate)	-.1969323	.0494441	-3.98	0.000
Constant	71.63773	1.098029	65.24	0.000
Model #3			Adjusted R-Squared: 0.4837	

Covariate	Beta Coefficient	Standard Error	T-statistic	P-value
Proportion in highest Wealth Quintile (fifth)	.1489702	.0285477	5.22	0.000
Constant	64.42406	.8053191	80.00	0.000
Model #4			Adjusted R-Squared: 0.3766	
Covariate	Beta Coefficient	Standard Error	T-statistic	P-value
Proportion of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (ST/SC)	-.0977155	.0230847	-4.23	0.000
Constant	71.63017	1.041116	68.80	0.000
Model #5			Adjusted R-Squared: 0.2165	
Covariate	Beta Coefficient	Standard Error	T-statistic	P-value
Proportion of Rural Population (percent rural)	-.1006821	.034062	-2.96	0.006
Constant	74.56491	2.356649	31.64	0.000
Model #6			Adjusted R-Squared: 0.6776	
Covariate	Beta Coefficient	Standard Error	T-statistic	P-value

Proportion of Population under Poverty line (poverty rate)	-.1020646	.0539792	-1.89	0.071
Proportion in highest Wealth Quintile (fifth)	.085508	.0343441	2.49	0.020
Proportion of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (ST/SC)	-.0678928	.0179757	-3.78	0.001
Log of NSDP per capita	-.4540496	1.275278	-0.36	0.725
Constant	75.31912	13.73149	5.49	0.000
Model #6			Adjusted R-Squared: 0.2343	
Covariate	Beta Coefficient	Standard Error	T-statistic	P-value
Log of NSDP per capita	3.541042	1.14488	3.09	0.005
Constant	30.22493	12.168	2.48	0.019

	State	Predicted level of Life expectancy	Actual Level of Life expectancy	Difference	Ranking	In order of Ranking
1	Andhra Pradesh	69.8	68.5	-1.34	14	Kerala

2	Arunachal Pradesh	65.2	63.9	-1.34	15	J & K
3	Assam	68.8	63.9	-4.93	28	West Bengal
4	Bihar	68.8	68.1	-0.68	12	Himachal
5	Chhattisgarh	67.9	64.8	-3.10	24	Maharashtra
6	Delhi	73.1	73.2	0.06	8	Uttarakhand
7	Goa	73.2	71.6	-1.65	18	Tamil Nadu
8	Gujarat	70.6	68.7	-1.89	20	Delhi
9	Haryana	71.4	68.6	-2.77	22	Punjab
10	Himachal	69.9	71.6	1.65	4	Meghalaya
11	J & K	70.6	72.6	1.97	2	Nagaland
12	Jharkhand	68.0	66.6	-1.37	16	Bihar
13	Karnataka	69.6	68.8	-0.81	13	Karnataka
14	Kerala	72.7	74.9	2.21	1	Andhra Pradesh
15	Madhya Pradesh	68.7	64.2	-4.50	27	Arunachal Pradesh
16	Maharashtra	70.1	71.6	1.49	5	Jharkhand
17	Manipur	68.2	63.9	-4.25	26	Rajasthan

18	Meghalaya	64.2	63.9	-0.31	10	Goa
19	Mizoram	65.8	63.9	-1.93	21	Odisha
20	Nagaland	64.3	63.9	-0.36	11	Gujarat
21	Odisha	67.6	65.8	-1.75	19	Mizoram
22	Punjab	71.7	71.6	-0.09	9	Haryana
23	Rajasthan	69.3	67.7	-1.57	17	Tripura
24	Sikkim	67.9	63.9	-4.01	25	Chhattisgarh
25	Tamil Nadu	69.8	70.6	0.78	7	Sikkim
26	Tripura	66.9	63.9	-3.02	23	Manipur
27	Uttar Pradesh	69.5	64.1	-5.38	29	Madhya Pradesh
28	Uttarakhand	70.3	71.7	1.36	6	Assam
29	West Bengal	68.5	70.2	1.71	3	Uttar Pradesh

#### INFANT MORTALITY RATE

Model #1			Adjusted R-Squared: 0.3043	
Covariate	Beta Coefficient	Standard Error	T-statistic	P-value
Log of NSDP Per Capita	-3.801679	6.261192	-0.61	0.549

Number of Females per 1000 Males (Sex Ratio)	-.0687359	.0452278	-1.52	0.142
Proportion in lowest Wealth Quintile (first)	.0990328	.2369562	0.42	0.680
Median years of schooling in the population (median schooling)	-2.507994	2.465018	-1.02	0.319
Constant	152.0434	84.6979	1.80	0.085
Model #2			Adjusted R-Squared: 0.1855	
Covariate	Beta Coefficient	Standard Error	T-statistic	P-value
Log of NSDP Per Capita	-10.56806	3.891327	-2.72	0.011
Constant	145.1441	41.35778	3.51	0.002
Model #3			Adjusted R-Squared: 0.3001	
Covariate	Beta Coefficient	Standard Error	T-statistic	P-value
Number of Females per 1000 Males (Sex Ratio)	-.0795238	.0409323	-1.94	0.063
Proportion in lowest Wealth Quintile (first)	.3941964	.1246309	3.16	0.004

Constant	102.4835	38.95497	2.63	0.014
Model #4			Adjusted R-Squared: 0.3175	
Covariate	Beta Coefficient	Standard Error	T-statistic	P-value
Median years of schooling in the population (median schooling)	-4.790766	1.279352	-3.74	0.001
Constant	61.61785	7.863972	7.84	0.000
Model #5			Adjusted R-Squared: 0.4083	
Covariate	Beta Coefficient	Standard Error	T-statistic	P-value
Mean BMI Females (BMI)	-6.947839	2.308971	-3.01	0.006
Difference between Male and Female literacy (Gender Gap in Literacy rate)	.4913041	.338421	1.45	0.159
Proportion of Females who own Land (Female Land)	-.1085962	.1699013	-0.64	0.529
Constant	183.1332	56.12148	3.26	0.003

	State	Predicted level of IMR	Actual Level of IMR	Difference	Ranking	In order of Ranking
1	Andhra Pradesh	30.7	31.3	-0.625	18	Arunachal Pradesh
2	Arunachal Pradesh	38.1	22.9	15.186	1	West Bengal
3	Assam	37.4	47.6	-10.246	25	Kerala
4	Bihar	50.9	48.1	2.795	14	Goa
5	Chhattisgarh	35.2	38.3	-3.089	22	Manipur
6	Delhi	27.7	31.2	-3.531	23	Maharashtra
7	Goa	19.9	12.9	7.026	4	Tripura
8	Gujarat	32.6	34.2	-1.635	20	J & K
9	Haryana	33.6	32.8	0.756	16	Meghalaya
10	Himachal	24.7	34.3	-9.569	24	Nagaland
11	J & K	36.9	32.4	4.531	19	Tamil Nadu
12	Jharkhand	42.6	43.8	-1.193	16	Karnataka
13	Karnataka	30.5	26.9	3.586	12	Sikkim

14	Kerala	13.8	5.6	8.215	3	Bihar
15	Madhya Pradesh	40.7	51.2	-10.508	26	Punjab
16	Maharashtra	29.3	23.7	5.606	6	Haryana
17	Manipur	27.9	21.7	6.238	5	Rajasthan
18	Meghalaya	34.3	29.9	4.389	9	Andhra Pradesh
19	Mizoram	28.4	40.1	-11.660	28	Jharkhand
20	Nagaland	33.3	29.5	3.829	10	Gujarat
21	Odisha	37.3	39.6	-2.302	21	Odisha
22	Punjab	31.7	29.2	2.507	15	Chhattisgarh
23	Rajasthan	40.9	41.3	-0.377	17	Delhi
24	Sikkim	32.4	29.5	2.908	13	Himachal
25	Tamil Nadu	24.0	20.2	3.809	11	Assam
26	Tripura	31.3	26.7	4.636	7	Madhya Pradesh
27	Uttar Pradesh	43.7	63.5	-19.779	29	Uttarakhand
28	Uttarakhand	29.1	39.7	-10.573	27	Mizoram
29	West Bengal	36.6	27.5	9.070	2	Uttar Pradesh

EDUCATION

HIGHER SECONDARY GROSS ENROLLMENT RATE

Model #1			Adjusted R-Squared: 0.4422	
Covariate	Beta Coefficient	Standard Error	T-statistic	P-value
Median years of schooling	5.466907	2.34095	2.34	0.028
Proportion in highest Wealth Quintile (fifth)	.15558	.198328	0.78	0.440
Proportion of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe	-.1018749	.1109667	-0.92	0.368
Agriculture sector proportion of state GDP	-16.51277	53.88347	-0.31	0.762
Constant	28.18001	15.7734	1.79	0.087
Model #2			Adjusted R-Squared: 0.2756	
Covariate	Beta Coefficient	Standard Error	T-statistic	P-value
Log of NSDP Per Capita	16.8333	4.931435	3.41	0.002
Constant	-120.3607	52.41226	-2.30	0.030

Model #3			Adjusted R-Squared: 0.2818	
Covariate	Beta Coefficient	Standard Error	T-statistic	P-value
Stunting rate among children 0-56 months	-.9664166	.3664475	-2.64	0.014
Proportion of Rural Population (percent rural)	-.2020768	.1555771	-1.30	0.205
Constant	103.8293	12.94873	8.02	0.000

	State	Predicted level of education	Actual Level of education	Difference	Ranking	In order of Ranking
1	Andhra Pradesh	54.76	60.74	5.98	8	Himachal
2	Arunachal Pradesh	42.74	61.81	19.07	2	Arunachal Pradesh
3	Assam	52.48	38.81	-13.67	26	Tamil Nadu
4	Bihar	38.42	35.62	-2.80	18	Uttarakhand
5	Chhattisgarh	52.27	54	1.73	11	Rajasthan
6	Delhi	79.26	77.9	-1.36	16	Uttar Pradesh
7	Goa	79.42	75.84	-3.58	18	Sikkim

8	Gujarat	62.21	43.43	-18.78	28	Andhra Pradesh
9	Haryana	65.77	59.59	-6.18	23	Manipur
10	Himachal	70.42	95.53	25.11	1	Jharkhand
11	J & K	61.52	58.6	-2.92	19	Chhattisgarh
12	Jharkhand	45.69	48.32	2.63	10	Meghalaya
13	Karnataka	60.54	39.86	-20.68	29	Maharashtra
14	Kerala	81.63	77.56	-4.07	21	Punjab
15	Madhya Pradesh	49.93	45.25	-4.68	22	West Bengal
16	Maharashtra	67.15	67.81	0.66	13	Delhi
17	Manipur	64.37	67.95	3.58	9	Mizoram
18	Meghalaya	42.30	43.35	1.05	12	Bihar
19	Mizoram	57.71	55.68	-2.03	17	J & K
20	Nagaland	49.17	36.43	-12.74	25	Goa
21	Odisha	50.44	36.54	-13.90	27	Kerala
22	Punjab	70.32	70.19	-0.13	14	Madhya Pradesh
23	Rajasthan	47.06	59.31	12.25	5	Haryana

24	Sikkim	58.89	68.23	9.34	7	Tripura
25	Tamil Nadu	67.64	82.03	14.39	3	Nagaland
26	Tripura	54.54	43.46	-11.08	24	Assam
27	Uttar Pradesh	50.10	60.78	10.68	6	Odisha
28	Uttarakhand	63.25	75.83	12.58	4	Gujarat
29	West Bengal	51.99	51.54	-0.45	15	Karnataka

### Chapter Three

This chapter traces the emergence of subnationalism in Kerala and how that encouraged development in the region.<sup>58</sup>

In the mid-nineteenth century, with all social, economic, and political arenas of life strictly structured around caste and religious identities, the Malayali-speaking regions of Travancore and Cochin, which comprise present-day Kerala, sustained one of the most oppressive and devout caste systems in all of India. While Brahmins comprised only about one percent of the population, they controlled most resources and commanded most authority across all social, political, and economic matters, situating themselves, without a doubt, at the top of this rigid system. They received tangible benefits from a Hindu state in the form of free meals and exemption from capital punishment or rigorous imprisonment, while engaged in lucrative professions like trade and money-lending that perpetuated their economic privilege, and most crucially, they occupied positions of power in the princely states. Maharajas (Kings) ruled their princely states in the name of Hindu deities, which made Brahmins especially useful to them for carrying out religious ceremonies, unlike the previously prominent caste of Nairs, who were Sudras, could not do without 'contaminating' the temples. Additionally, the Brahmins' knowledge of English and the British administrative system made them a popular choice for delegation of political power. Of course, the privileged treatment of one group automatically implies a commensurate disadvantage for all others, but in this region, the caste system relentlessly oppressed all non-Brahmins, such that, there were strict restrictions on their

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<sup>58</sup> Unless otherwise noted, this chapter follows chapters 3 and 4 in Singh, Prerna. "Subnationalism and Social Development: A Comparative Analysis of Indian States | World Politics." Cambridge Core. Cambridge University Press, 05 June 2015. Web. 23 Apr. 2018

use of public facilities, like roads, wells, and temples. They went so far as to delineate the exact physical distance that a Sudra must maintain from Brahmins, because unlike the upper castes across the rest of India who frowned upon touching lower castes, the Brahmins in Travancore and Cochin believed that even proximity, to all non-Brahmins who they deemed as untouchables, caused ‘pollution.’

In this setting, which was termed “a madhouse of caste” by social reformer Swami Vivekananda, there was no sense of community either within Hindus across castes nor across the larger Malayali political community. Guided by the ancient Hindu texts regarding government, the Travancore government directed its expenditures toward maintenance of the Palace, civil services, and the army along with religious functions, with no systematic efforts of improving the welfare of its people. The few social services that were available, like Ayurvedic medicine and indigenous schools, exclusively served upper castes. Lower-castes were not allowed admission into public schools and an absence of sanitary education and practices led to high mortality rates arising from preventable diseases.

However, Protestant missionaries who had arrived in the region in the early 19th century supplemented the provision of public services, as they considered education to be a crucial requisite for their religious work, and provided the lower castes, “toward whom their proselytizing activities were targeted and whom they converted in large numbers, their first access to a systematic education.”<sup>59</sup> They brought with them the first allopathic dispensaries, Western education, public health education, and most crucially, the notion of “equality of all before God,” which served all members of the community, regardless

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<sup>59</sup> Singh, Prerna, 2011. "We-ness and Welfare: A Longitudinal Analysis of Social Development in Kerala, India," *World Development*, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 282-293, February.

of the all-pervasive and deeply internalized caste hierarchy, allowing for the emergence of an ideological counter to the oppressive caste system. The Travancore government grew weary of these large-scale conversions and their implications on the viability of the Hindu state. Additionally, concerns regarding British annexation also grew, as evident in a letter from Lord Dalhousie to the Maharaja of Travancore, “which stated that ‘unless averted by timely and judicious reforms, annexation of Travancore is a distinct possibility.’”<sup>60</sup> Combined, these concerns led the government to undertake limited reforms in the social sector, however, these largely remained an exercise exclusive to paper for many years thereafter, but did serve to slowly dismantle the vehicle of institutionalized discrimination.

In this context, the region saw some instrumental changes in social and economic spheres, whereby, a possibility of redefining the prevailing norms emerged. These changes included, in the social arena, an undermining of the pervasive caste-system under the guidance of the missionaries and their teachings as well as wider access to western education across all strata of a deeply unequal society. In the economic realm, commercialization of agriculture, abolition of caste-based agrestic slavery, the state’s granting of ownership rights to tenants, and rapid rise in foreign trade fostered unprecedented economic mobility across caste lines. Arising from the western education and now economically flourishing agrarian group, was an upwardly mobile elite that sought political advancement. Under the previously mentioned reforms, which although had remained exclusive to paper, came the opportunity for this newly trained and mobilized elite from diverse social backgrounds, to engage in systematic contestation for

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<sup>60</sup> Singh, Book, Page 131

political power. These reforms “emphasized merit rather than ritual status as the key criterion for recruitment to the *sarkar* (government) service...[f]or the first time in the history of the state, political power was now potentially accessible to members of all castes and communities and elites from politically un/under-represented groups, especially the Nayers, Syrian Christians, and Izhavas competed zealously and at times, bitterly, to stake their respective claims.”

Such efforts by these newly-minted challenger elites, however, were successfully blocked by the small yet powerful Brahmin group. It is important to note here that these Brahmins hailed from across the Western ghats and were non-Malayali, making Malayali identity the primary source of cohesion among the native elites; uniting Christians, Muslims and lower caste Hindus under the umbrella of their Malayali land against the “foreign” Brahmins. Without giving up their caste or religious identities, the Nayar, Christian, and Izhava elites drew on shared symbols of Malayali identity like language, culture, and history, to come together in competing against the non-Malayali Brahmins. Recognizing that individually they might remain unheard and unrepresented, these groups initiated the first stirrings of Malayali subnationalism. “The espousal of a Malayali subnational identity, which drew on ancient myths of a shared origin, common heroes, and culture, was a purely instrumental calculation. Once it was evoked, however, it took on a powerful emotional valence.”<sup>61</sup> The rigor garnered by the movement is most prolific in the “‘Malayali Memorial;’ a petition demanding greater native representation in public services submitted to the Travancore government in 1891, which had over 10,000 signatories and claimed to express the grievances of all Malayalis—Nambudris,

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<sup>61</sup> ‘Subnationalism and Social Development: A Comparative Analysis of Indian States’. *World Politics*, Vol. 67, No. 3 , July 2015

Nayars, Syrians, other Christians and Izhavas.”<sup>62</sup> This served as the first united protest that “embodied not merely the grievance of a section of the people, but that of the community as a whole.”<sup>63</sup> Unification along a Malayali community, across caste-communal lines, began to materialize at the start of the 20th century. This period saw even the worst-off in the lowest rungs of the caste hierarchy, the “untouchable” *Pulayas* and *Parayas*, mobilize behind their leader Aiyankali to protest and dismantle the remaining mechanisms of discrimination. The overarching identification of the elites with their Malayali homeland curbed the potential for conflict inherent in caste and religious mobilization, uniting them across their other social cleavages. A large number of pan-Kerala institutions and organizations further institutionalized and solidified this identity, spreading to the masses via the ‘Aikya Kerala’ (United Kerala) movement that began in the 1920s and demanded a united Malayali homeland and “fostered a recognition of the concept of equal rights for all.”<sup>64</sup>

A “Kerala-wide consciousness of shared community” allowed for a societal consensus on the need for provision of health and education services to all Malayalis without discrimination. This subnationalism instilled a belief that “the well-being of all sections of the population was the collective responsibility of all Malayalis.”<sup>65</sup> As such, both, upper and lower castes worked together to eradicate caste-based disabilities and move toward a socially equitable society that served all members. Public support was manifest in innumerable petitions, signed by growing numbers, to the government demanding the establishment of hospitals and schools. Consequently, the Travancore

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<sup>62</sup> Singh, Prerna, 2011. "We-ness and Welfare: A Longitudinal Analysis of Social Development in Kerala, India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 282-293, February.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid

<sup>64</sup> Ibid

<sup>65</sup> Ibid

governments' expenditures on education and health increased sharply, and in contrast to prior reforms aimed solely at the elites and upper castes, these served all members. This is evident in the government's proclamation to educate all children irrespective of social identities and defray the entire cost of primary education in the state, as well as lifting restrictions banning 'untouchables' from departmental schools, even introducing affirmative action policies for lower castes via scholarships and fee waivers. Most notably, in the 1940s, the Travancore government instituted midday meals for all students in government primary schools, simultaneously intervening to positively impact their education and health outcomes. This policy has continued uninterrupted since its introduction, expanding significantly in the 1990s, even to other Indian states.

The anti-caste and subnational movements fostered a political consciousness in the community, which encouraged them to hold their government accountable and complaints criticizing inaction or low quality in health and education became commonplace. Such complaints prompted the Travancore government to approach the Rockefeller Foundation, which had set up in India after the First World War, to establish a "public health department on modern lines in 1928."<sup>66</sup> While driven by its own agenda to research specific diseases, the Foundation focused on preventing malaria and filariasis, instead of water-borne cholera that ran rampant in the state. Still, their program was a resounding success and resulted in Kerala becoming the first Indian state to eradicate endemic malaria in 1965. It also provided a foundation to institutionalize public health provision, such that, while lower than education spending, medical expenditure increased six-fold during the period of 1900-1945; primarily spent on programs for vaccinations

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<sup>66</sup> Singh, Book, Page 136

and sanitation to curb preventable diseases that had previously caused high mortality, especially among the lower social groups. At this time, the Travancore government provided welfare largely in opposition to the British, who now complained that the princely states were providing too much welfare.

An important and distinguishing characteristic of Kerala was the active popular involvement with the public goods provided. The public was encouraged to keep a check on these services, ensuring the quality of governance and effectiveness of services were top notch. This put Travancore and Cochin ahead of most other Indian provinces on most developmental indicators, including literacy rates and infant mortality rates. Yet, in absolute terms, these were still quite low; half the population was illiterate and life expectancy loomed at a meagre 29.5 years, while still uneven across demographic groups and geographic regions. Here, Malabar, the third Malayali region under British control, fared terribly on literacy and infant mortality compared to its Malayali brothers and sister in the princely states of Travancore and Cochin.

The post-independence years marked a critical period in Kerala's developmental trajectory, whereby, taking advantage of the newly instated democratic institutions, electoral competition became a foremost mechanism of holding elected governments responsive to public demands. There emerged a pattern of close contestation between the Communist Party and Congress Party; and the former's campaign on a subnational narrative forced the latter to adopt Malayali subnationalism as well, further reinforcing community cohesion along Malayali identity even after independence. This led to unprecedented gains in education and health for members across all social strata, leading to equitable outcomes across gender, ethnic, rural-urban, and regional lines.

Kerala was formed on November 1, 1956, following the same mechanism of state formation being used across the country of bringing together regions which spoke a common language. Accordingly, Princely states of Travancore and Cochin along with the British ruled Malabar were established as one entity under the state of Kerala. While different in their socio-economic conditions, the three regions shared their language - Malayalam - and henceforth were bound together. The success and depths of Malayali subnationalism is most evident in the petitions submitted by the Akiya Kerala movement to the States Reorganization Commission (SRC), in charge of carving out Indian states in a newly democratic nation. The petitions noted the essential need for a United Kerala in ensuring the welfare and development of all Malayalees, where this long-yearned homeland would be governed by natives who share “an attachment to the land and the people, which very often rises stronger and higher than reason and probably life itself...would lead Malayalis to toil for Kerala’s development”<sup>67</sup> It is interesting to note the demand and support for the inclusion of Malabar, which by all accounting measures would at best be a developmental liability to the new state, were argued along deeply subnational notions like “Malabar can come into her own only as a part of Kerala state.”

The newly formed state of Kerala created history by electing the Communist Party of India (Marxist) - the CPI(M) - to its state legislature - the first time a Marxist government was democratically brought to power anywhere in the world.<sup>68</sup> The party’s success has been attributed “above all, by its ability to manipulate the regional patriotism

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<sup>67</sup> Singh, Prerna, 2011. "We-ness and Welfare: A Longitudinal Analysis of Social Development in Kerala, India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 282-293, February.

<sup>68</sup> Kapur, Akash. "Poor but Prosperous." The Atlantic. Atlantic Media Company, 01 Sept. 1998. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.

of all Kerala.”<sup>69</sup> The state’s first chief minister, EMS Namboodiripad, is considered the architect of modern Kerala. Under his leadership, immediate efforts were undertaken to reform remnants of the conventional socio-economic class structure, paving the path for Kerala’s long-term equitable and progressive development. Foremost were the introduction of the Education Bill and the abolishment of the feudal land ownership system under what has been heralded as “one of the most radical and successful land reform bills in the world.”<sup>70</sup> In the 1960s, Kerala was home to the highest number of agricultural workers in India, but suffered from deep inequality in the distribution of land, allowing exploitation of peasants and landless laborers by landlords, who owned 37 percent of the land while constituting only 2.3% of all agricultural households. In advocating for land rights for the landless, further deepening mass consciousness against caste-based discrimination, and other related equitable reforms, the Communist government gained instant popularity among the disadvantaged populous of Kerala. The Land tenure system reforms are seen as the “foundational feature of Kerala’s development...and social and economic progress.”<sup>71</sup>

Successive governments, irrespective of party, have overwhelmingly focused on the provision and expansion of primary education and healthcare. The CPI(M) and Congress have without exception alternated control on the state government every election cycle, making both parties highly responsive to public opinion. “In recent years, Kerala’s history of a powerful and inclusive subnationalism has become established

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<sup>69</sup> Singh, Purna, 2011. "We-ness and Welfare: A Longitudinal Analysis of Social Development in Kerala, India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 282-293, February.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid

<sup>71</sup> Ibid

enough to be showcased as a model in a speech by the Indian Prime Minister.”<sup>72</sup> The Communist Party’s platform of welfare for all Malayalees has been an overarching guide in the state, regardless of which party is actually in office, as the other forms the opposition and encourages accountability, while still serving as a force for political mobilization in the community. Social welfare has emerged as the foremost policy platform on which the two parties compete intensely and relentlessly attempt to outdo the each other in the expansion of the social security net. This commitment is “brought out by the striking fact that no major public service or redistributive program in Kerala has ever been reversed, despite a precarious financial position and a decline in central financial support.”<sup>73</sup>

That Malayali subnationalism has taken deep popular roots has been evident time and again. For instance, a 1996 survey showed that 91 percent of the Hindus, who are the dominant religious group in Kerala, believed it is the government’s duty to protect the rights of religious minorities, compared with 60 percent Hindus across India who shared this sentiment. Kerala’s post-independence extensive social policy, as formulated and implemented by democratic governments, has been characterized by a redistributive nature. Social service provisions have been undertaken commensurate to well thought out targeting of beneficiaries coming from the most disadvantaged groups like Scheduled castes and tribes, women, rural populations, socially backward residents of Malabar region and the poor population. This is in stark contrast to the investments in secondary and higher education that have occurred throughout other Indian states, which by design

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<sup>72</sup> Singh, Prerna, 2011. "We-ness and Welfare: A Longitudinal Analysis of Social Development in Kerala, India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 282-293, February.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid

have benefitted the elite segments most. Compared with other Indian states, Kerala saw lower GDP per capita for most of the post-independence period, only surpassing the national average over the last decade. Yet, its per capita government expenditures on health and education have consistently been the highest. The masses in Kerala have inculcated a political consciousness, awareness, and activism, far above the Indian average as indicated in surveys conducted through 1967, 1996, 2004. This is a crucial and distinguishing feature of Kerala and accounts for the public vigilance that has been instrumental in ensuring the effectiveness of health and primary education services; for example, in monitoring and curbing absenteeism of government teachers and healthcare workers.

Bottom-up activism has allowed public concerns to dictate the government's policy agenda, leading to top-down state policies that best represent public interests. As such, Kerala has achieved the equivalent of middle-income countries in its literacy rates, with a life expectancy of 74 years it is 10 years above the average Indian life expectancy and falls in the top 30 percent countries in the world. In 1950s, Kerala's Infant Mortality was similar to India's, but unlike the rest of India, Kerala focused on women's education and advancement over the following decades and has been able to achieve unparalleled success in reducing IMR. "Today a child in Kerala is almost five times more likely to live beyond her first birthday as compared to a child in any other state in India. Kerala's IMR puts it among the top 33 percent of all countries of the world."<sup>74</sup> These resounding achievements remain incomplete without noting the equitable manner in which they have been accomplished. For example, "various surveys suggest that income has not been a

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<sup>74</sup> Ibid

major determinant of access to better health facilities in the state.”<sup>75</sup> Unlike the urban-rural discrepancy in women’s life expectancy (67 years versus 59 years) across India, Kerala sustains equality at a high 75 years. Muslims in Kerala are also better off, with a 90 percent literacy rate they as likely as their Hindu Malayali brothers to be able to read and 30 percent more likely the average Indian Muslim. “A rural scheduled caste female is more than twice as likely to be literate if she lives in Kerala as compared to any other state in India. A member of the Scheduled Tribes is almost 20% more likely to be literate in Kerala than another Indian state. Social indicators in the northern Malabari districts, which were at a distinct development disadvantage at the time of Kerala’s formation, are now virtually equivalent to the rest of Kerala.”<sup>76</sup>

Today, Malayalis are justly proud of the social development achievements made by their homeland. It is important to note here that their sense of community identity, while certainly reinforced by such warranted pride, does not stem from it. As this chapter has highlighted, the path of Malayali subnationalism was initiated after socio-economic changes that emerged in the mid-nineteenth century facilitated a process of elite competition for political power. These challenger elites from diverse social backgrounds jointly employed historic but latent symbols that exemplified their shared culture, namely their language --*Malayalam*. Mobilizing along their shared identity untied them against the non-Malayali Brahmins who had conventionally commanded authority and maintained an oppressive social system in the region. The growth of the Aikya Kerala movement in the subsequent decades transmitted Malayali subnationalism to the masses,

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<sup>75</sup> Singh, Purna, 2011. "We-ness and Welfare: A Longitudinal Analysis of Social Development in Kerala, India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 282-293, February.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid

paving the way for a politically active citizenry that was effective in influencing its government's policy agenda in favor of provision of public goods, along with societal monitoring of such provisions, so that all of Kerala might have welfare and development as evident in the state's health and education outcomes.

## Chapter Four

This chapter<sup>77</sup> traces the historical social dynamics within the state of Uttar Pradesh, to show how the lack of a subnational solidarity as well as the presence of powerful associations on dimensions above and below the sub-nation, like national, caste, and religious identities, have hampered social development in the state.

In the mid-nineteenth century, Muslims constituted only 13 percent of the population of the Northwestern Provinces of Agra and Awadh, which comprise present-day UP, but like the non-Malayali Brahmins in Travancore, they dominated the social, political, and economic life of the province. They held significant sway over land and government services - the two most important sources of power in the region. Additionally, Muslims also prevailed in the social and cultural life of the province, as evident in the preference of Urdu as the form of expression due to the continued dominance of Muslim elites in the community's cultural life. "Life in the towns of the province was suffused with Persian-Urdu etiquette and was conducted in an overwhelmingly Muslim idiom."

Like Travancore, the Northwestern provinces also witnessed key exogenous changes in the mid-nineteenth century which impacted the prevailing socio-economic conditions. These changes were similar to those occurring in Travancore; namely, the emergence of a challenge to the caste system, changes in agriculture and trade, and limited opportunities for Western education. Growth of railways led to an expansion in

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<sup>77</sup> Unless otherwise noted, this chapter follows chapters 3 and 4 in Singh, Perna. "Subnationalism and Social Development: A Comparative Analysis of Indian States | World Politics." Cambridge Core. Cambridge University Press, 05 June 2015. Web. 23 Apr. 2018

trade, creating a wealthy class of middlemen, predominantly from Hindu merchant castes. Colonial officers opened government schools and colleges that served as the first opportunity for citizens to become literate in English. These opportunities led to an improvement in the socio-economic well-being of the politically non-dominant Hindu merchant caste, cultivating them into an upwardly mobile elite that could now attempt to seek political power that now their higher socio-economic status warranted. At this time, the British found their administrative system inefficient, and introduced two crucial reforms: recruitment to government services based on merit and the introduction of the elective principle into local government. Growing concerned about the domination of certain groups, they introduced caste and communal reservations in government services. These reforms benefited the Hindus more than they did Muslims; for example, Hindus were better able to adapt to English education, as they had done previously with Urdu when the Mughals had come to India, whereas large portions of Muslims continued to attend private schools that instructed Islamic studies in Urdu. As such, a class of challenger elites was formed in the Hindu merchant group, who were now able to compete for power and attempt to overthrow the centuries-long dominance of Muslim elites. This led to intense competition for political power between the two groups.

At this time, “the differences *within* Hindu and Muslim communities were greater than the distinctions *between* the two.” Even though the two groups shared many symbols, including a common spoken language be it called Hindustani, Hindi, or Urdu. “Yet, in their attempt to break Muslim dominance over positions of political power, challenger Hindu elites chose to emphasize the divisive symbols of Hindi and Urdu as the distinct, exclusive, and mutually opposed mother tongues of Hindus and Muslims

respectively, over potentially unifying symbols, such as Hindustani as a shared lingua franca for the province.”<sup>78</sup> This was possible because Hindi written in Devanagari script is comparable with colloquial Hindustani but distinct from written Urdu. Therefore, mobilization of Hindu challenger elites in UP, even though similar to Travancore in uniting along shared language, took place along religious lines. Since the dominant Muslims were native to the province and as such could not be made an ‘out-group’ along subnational sentiment, religious rather than subnational symbols were more useful to them. Threatened Muslims in turn championed Urdu in Persian script as the official vernacular of the province, instated agitational institutions like the Urdu Defense Association, and denounced the “Hindi movement” as malicious toward Muslim interests. Seeing the electoral success of Hindu elites in local elections, Muslim leaders turned to the British rulers for patronage as their only method to maintain their privilege. Requests included separate electorates for Muslims and weightage in any representative system; these were the first stirrings of what lead to Muslim separatism and bloody communal violence in the next decades in India.

At this time, “an analysis of local newspapers in the province showed that [elites] came also to mobilize for policies, and goods and services, including social services, for the exclusive benefit of their group.”<sup>79</sup> In demanding schools and colleges for the advancement of their ‘countrymen,’ the elites employed terms like nation, nationality, or countrymen in reference to members of their respective religions, unlike Kerala where such terms were inclusive of all residents. The elites began viewing development not only along communal lines, but worse, as a zero-sum game where they not only promoted the

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<sup>78</sup> Singh, Book, Page 91

<sup>79</sup> Singh, Book, page 150

advancement of their own group but also prevented that of the other. There was no common identity and no demand for the collective welfare of all the state's residents. "The lack of elite pressure or popular demand meant that social policy did not occupy a prominent place on the policy agenda."<sup>80</sup> The lack of community mobilization and demand for social services left the British and Christian Missionaries as the primary source of discerning what few services they might provide. Few initiatives included expanding schools in select towns, sanitation programs, and a gradual increase in health care facilities, which were largely met with popular indifference. A long-serving British magistrate and collector, W. H. Crooke, "noted that an absence of fellow-feeling among the residents of the state made them 'destitute of regard for the public weal' and prevented them from acting 'to secure what is of primary importance to their welfare.'"<sup>81</sup> At the start of British rule, the Northwestern Provinces were cited as the model for rest of India, but to the shock of the administrators, social statics showed it had turned into the most illiterate region of the country.

Until the early twentieth century, the Hindu-Hindi and Muslim-Urdu identities remained exclusive to the elites in these groups. "The diffusion of elite identities to the population at large is contingent on their espousal by a sociopolitical movement or association."<sup>82</sup> Just how the Aikya Kerala movement brought the masses on board with their challenger elites, political-religious organizations in the Northwestern provinces, like the Hindu Mahasabha and the Muslim League, "played a critical role from the 1920s onward in the mass dissemination of the mutually reinforcing and divisive religious-

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<sup>80</sup> Ibid

<sup>81</sup> Singh, Book page151

<sup>82</sup> Singh, Prerna. "Subnationalism and Social Development: A Comparative Analysis of Indian States | World Politics." Cambridge Core. Cambridge University Press, 05 June 2015. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.

linguistic identities of Hindi-Hindu versus Urdu-Muslim.” Gandhi, growing concerned by what he saw as increased social division, promoted Hindustani in either Persian or Devanagari script to build unity, to no avail however, as the proliferation of religious organizations and movements had created sufficient divide. This was amplified by the British who provided separate electorates for Muslims, and regularly followed their policy of “divide and rule” to further their own interests. By the 1940s, Hindu and Muslim identities were firmly embedded in the popular consciousness of UP. Singh notes:<sup>83</sup>

At the end of the colonial period UP therefore had clearly not witnessed the emergence of any kind of a subnational identity. Instead, the province had turned out to be the crucible for the creation of Pakistan as a homeland for the subcontinent’s Muslims and the emergence of Hindu nationalism, which was to remain an important force in the politics of India after independence.

UP has not be able to establish any sort of subnational identity, as most evident in the lack of a noun, like Malayali, Tamil, Rajasthani, Punjabi, Bengali and so on, to describe the people of UP.<sup>84</sup> Even its name is a direct translation of Northern Province, as there was no naturally fitting names like those of Kerala, Tamil Nadu, or Rajasthan, and the Constituent Assembly did not find a name representative of the diversity within, eventually hastily agreeing on Uttar Pradesh.

UP was formed as purely an administrative unit; its boundaries hardly indicate or encourage a shared sense of identity in culture or history. Several petitions to the SRC for carving out other, better representative states from UP were refused primarily on grounds of promoting the national good. “The most important, and eventually successful,

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<sup>83</sup>Ibid

<sup>84</sup> Ibid

secessionist movement that UP faced has been the demand for a separate hill state of Uttarakhand/Uttaranchal...In recent years, encouraged no doubt by the success of the Uttarakhand agitation, demands have resurfaced for the breakup of UP to form a range of new provinces: Harit Pradesh, Doab Pradesh, Bundelkhand, Purvanchal, and Awadh Pradesh, to name only a few.”<sup>85</sup> Additionally, social cleavages along religion persist, while those along caste have become the state’s most important ethnic fault line in recent years, owing to lower caste mobilization and formation of Dalit parties. Thus, “the locus of popular identification in UP has tended to lie either above the subnational community, with the national realm, or with ethnic identities.”<sup>86</sup>

Following Independence, UP “had succeeded in projecting their province as the ‘heartland’ of the new nation,” due to its history as the birthplace of Hinduism, leading role in the National Movement, and a demographic enormity that bestowed it with the single largest number of seats in the central parliament. This has allowed for UP politicians to wield immense power; all but two prime ministers during the period of 1947-1991 hailed from UP. Jairam Ramesh, a prominent UP politician noted, “The future of India is inextricably linked to what happens or does not happen in UP.”<sup>87</sup> As such, the state came to view itself as more synonymous with the nation, to their own, and even the nation’s, detriment. Its lack of subnationalism was argued to be an asset; as seen in the words of UP’s first Chief Minister, “the only viable administrative unit that was unaffected by either linguism or provincialism...[UP’s greatness lies] in its people’s sense of oneness with other parts of India, overriding local and state considerations”<sup>88</sup> As such,

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<sup>85</sup> Ibid

<sup>86</sup> Ibid

<sup>87</sup> Singh, Book, page 153

<sup>88</sup> Ibid

UP's constant prioritization of India and the central government has cultivated a norm of the politicians rarely being concerned with local development, instead, yearning for prominence in New Delhi.

“UP's propinquity to the national domain – both in terms of national leaders controlling state politics and state leaders pursuing power at the national level – completely crippled subnational politics in the state.” The National Election Survey of 1971 indicates, in stark contrast to Kerala, the residents of UP were more concerned with national politics and higher proportions identified more with the nation than their state. In line with national considerations, voters consistently voted for the ineffective Congress party, as support for the party which reigns in New Delhi. Government expenditures followed the central agenda instead of state needs, prioritizing spending on economic services with no regard for social services.

The lack of identification with, or mobilization around, a subnational identity played an important role in the low levels of interest in, consciousness of, and proclivity to participate in, the public life of the state on the part of UP's citizens. Relatedly, there is little vigilance or demand for accountability; “Drèze and Gazdar document a long-standing pattern of popular indifference and inertia toward problems in the delivery of education and health services, notably teacher and doctor absenteeism.”<sup>89</sup>

Since the 1990s, politics and popular identification have been based on religion and caste. In late 1980s, the Bharatiya Janata Party began growing and mobilizing Hindu support in UP, in contrast to its subnational movement in Rajasthan. During this period, UP also witnessed powerful lower caste movements, culminating in a proliferation of

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<sup>89</sup> Singh, Book, page 162

caste-based parties, the most prominent of which are the militant dalit party named Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and the Samajwadi Party (SP), which primarily represents backward castes, especially Yadavs and Muslims. The politicization of caste was evident in voting patterns in UP, where over 50 percent voted in line with their own caste through the 1990s, compared with Kerala's 5 percent or all-India average of 26 percent. Thereafter, governance in UP has been characterized by the targeting of social expenditures toward specific groups, in what appears to be clientelist politics. While even these targeted policies have made little impact, the question about the viability of employing targeted policies in a society that is largely underdeveloped is too intertwined with the sentiments and politics of the region to receive a fair appraisal, as desperately needed for the sake of the region.

There is a lack of political will and interest when it comes to improving social services for its people. This is evident in the state's poor implementation of the nationally sponsored Midday Meal program, disinterest in the success of the Total Literacy Campaign, and sustained decline in government spending on health and education since the 1990s. This is sadly evident in UP's position as the only Indian state with a lack of innovation in policy, as noted by Singh:<sup>90</sup>

Kerala is famous for its literacy drives, Tamil Nadu for its nutrition schemes, Maharashtra for employment guarantee, Gujarat for drought relief, Karnataka for panchayati raj, Himachal Pradesh for primary education, West Bengal for land reform...Even poor, BIMARU states such as Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh have launched important social initiatives such as the Shiksha Karmi program and the Education Guarantee Scheme respectively, which were subsequently adopted at an all-India level.

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<sup>90</sup> Singh, Book, page 162

This government apathy is matched by public indifference, which likely reinforce one another, ending in a vicious cycle of low development and unaccountability. “The political fragmentation of UP along caste and religious lines has been mirrored in the social sphere...based on extensive field research, Drèze and Gazdar argue that this ‘highly divided nature of the rural society’ has ‘seriously constrained’ collaborative public action to ensure the effective provision of social services in UP’s villages.” Singh notes that, “interestingly, the UP government itself highlights “public apathy” as one of the main causes for the “disarray” of social services in the state ([http://upgov.nic.in/upinfo/up\\_eco.html](http://upgov.nic.in/upinfo/up_eco.html))”

The government and public failure to delineate any conception of a progressive social policy has resulted in UP experiencing a sustained plague of some of the worst human development indicators in all of India. UP has the worst malnutrition rates in the country, with near half its children being underweight and over half are stunted. It has the worst infant mortality and maternal mortality rates in the country. A report by the WHO reports the density of Allopathic doctors per lakh population in UP is 63.5, near the all India level of 61.5. But when disaggregated by educational qualification, it shows some astounding statistics: it drops to 35.9 for allopathic doctors with more than secondary schooling, implying that 27.6 do not have even secondary education. This drops further to a staggering 11.7 for allopathic doctors with a medical qualification, far below the all India average of 26.2 and worst in the country.<sup>91</sup>

Literacy rates remain below the national average, even though significant gains were made in the past decade due to central government and International donor agencies

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<sup>91</sup> "The Health Workforce in India." World Health Organization. World Health Organization, 11 Oct. 2016. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.

implementing large-scale educational campaigns, including notably Operation Blackboard, the Education Guarantee Scheme, Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, and the District Primary Education Program. For all its focus on targeting dalits, UP does not have much to show for it; with its overall underdevelopment leading to a reality in which a dalit women in Tamil Nadu is better off on all social indicators than a upper-caste women in UP.

## **Conclusion**

This thesis determined an estimated expected performance of the Indian states on development outcomes of health, education, and poverty, after controlling for covariates that indicated a state's resource endowment, in different spheres like human capital or per capita net state domestic product. The aim was to identify states that have performed above and below what could be expected of them, conditioned on their resources. The findings of this thesis support recent literature on human development, specifically Prerna Singh's work on welfare and solidarity in Indian states. The state rankings across the three indicators in this thesis resonate with the findings of Singh.

Following in her line, this thesis puts forth the argument of subnational solidarity as a key determinant of developmental performance. The intuition behind this, as supported by the evidence presented in the case study chapters, is that in controlling for non-policy variables, the data led to estimations that likely can be attributed to policy-related matters. While not focusing on specific policies, this thesis addresses the factors that influence good, pro-social and pro-poor policy choices by some states and not others. This is absolutely essential to identify and note, since India remains plagued by high regional disparity, and without cultivating an enabling environment, imposition of even well-thought out policies might not take root. In this regard, the data analysis chapter actually captures exactly that – different social policy choices leading to different outcomes, while different levels of subnationalism has been identified as the primary source of influencing what items make to a state's policy agenda in the first place. The argument here is not whether a specific policy is effective or not, because although that is

important, this thesis has identified subnational solidarity as a necessary requisite for good policies to gain traction and eventually become effective. While this thesis focuses on two states, this analysis can be applied to the other states as well. A crucial consequence of subnationalism as pro-social enabling environment, for policy, relates to a cautioned decentralization of governance; whereby, those echelons of government that citizens interact with most should be in charge of providing social services

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