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**ELITE FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING REGARDING ISRAEL: A COMPARISON
BETWEEN JORDAN AND LEBANON**

by

MISHAAL B. IJAZ

**SUBMITTED TO SCRIPPS COLLEGE IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF ARTS**

**PROFESSOR PAHWA
PROFESSOR SINANOGLU**

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Introduction

In 2020, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco signed a series of treaties called the Abraham Accords which normalized diplomatic relations with Israel. A year after the Abraham Accords were signed, an Israeli embassy opened in Abu Dhabi and an United Arab Emirates embassy opened in Israel—signifying that Arab and Israeli governments are committed to solidifying their new diplomatic relationship.

In a 2022 survey¹ that asked people living in Arab countries about their attitudes towards normalization with Israel, 17% of respondents from Lebanon supported Arab states pursuing normalization with Israel. Although this percentage is low, it was the third highest percentage shown in the survey after Sudan and Morocco, which happen to be countries who have signed normalization agreements with Israel in 2020. Out of the countries that have not signed the Abraham Accords or pursued peace with Israel, Lebanon holds the highest percentage of people who support Arab states normalizing their relationship with Israel. Jordan, despite still having a normalization agreement with Israel since 1994, has a very low percentage of people who favor normalization with Israel. Only 4% of Jordanian respondents said they support Arab states pursuing normalization with Israel. These puzzling survey results led me to question, how do political elites make foreign policy decisions regarding Israel? My argument makes two key points: I argue that external foreign powers, such as the United States and Syria, pushed Jordanian and Lebanese elite foreign policymakers to pursue or reject normalization with Israel. Furthermore, analyzing Jordanian and Lebanese public opinion regarding Israel in conjunction

¹ <https://www.arabbarometer.org/2022/09/how-do-mena-citizens-view-normalization-with-israel/>

with external foreign actors is important because it reveals how public opinion is shaped by foreign policy decisions.

I am focusing specifically on elite policy decision making in non-democracies and weak democracies because Jordan and Lebanon both experience major hindrances towards democratic freedoms. According to Freedom House, Lebanon has struggled to form a democratic government since Prime Minister Hassan Diab's resignation in August 2020 and the severe economic collapse.² Freedom House also noted that non-democratically accountable actors such as Hezbollah have and continue to exert major influence on Lebanese voters and public figures, undermining democracy in the country. However, Lebanon still has certain freedoms such as the right to public assembly. Also, Lebanon has the political framework for a parliamentary democracy, even if in practice democratic freedoms are being eroded. Thus, Lebanon seems to be a weak democracy. In Jordan, Freedom House noted that hereditary monarch King Abdullah II wields all political power and can use it freely at his discretion.³ Also, legislative representatives are not voted into power through free and fair elections. Jordanians do not have the freedom of assembly and must have protests approved by the government. Jordan is a non-democracy.

Before proceeding, it is necessary to define "elites." Elites are defined as the small number of decision makers who occupy top positions in social and political structures. Elites control the deployment of resources, such as money and political power, which is a level of control that non-elites are unable to access (Hafner-Burton & Hughes, 2013). In authoritarian government systems, the elites can be patronage groups associated with the leader and the inner

² <https://freedomhouse.org/country/lebanon/freedom-world/2022>

³ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/jordan/freedom-world/2022>

circle of political advisers that can influence the leader to make certain decisions (Newson & Trebbi, 2018). Elizabeth Saunders (2022) builds on Hafner-Burton and Hughes' understanding of elites and provides a detailed overview of foreign policy elites specifically. She argues that political goals or ambitions can influence how foreign policy elites make decisions. She also argues that bias is an important part of a foreign policy decision-maker, and they tend to rely on prior beliefs to filter information and make decisions. Using this definition and understanding of foreign-policy elites, I now turn to more specific explanations regarding why elites make certain foreign policy decisions.

Literature Review:

Existing research that examines how and when non-democratic regimes respond to shifting public opinion and public pressure suggests that non-democracies do not listen to public opinion. However, Xiao Tang, Weiwei Chen, and Tian Wu (2018) found that in China, governmental response to public opinion was selective within the field of environmental governance. While provincial governing bodies were unresponsive to public pressure regarding water pollution control, they listened to public demands regarding waste gas pollution control. This study reveals that context matters when looking at when non-democratic political elites respond to public opinion, and that political elites do not respond equally to all types of public opinion. Political leaders were more inclined to listen to public demands to fix environmental problems when short-term benefits could be derived. This shows that non-democratic leaders make calculated foreign policy decisions and make cost-benefit analyses when they take public

opinion into consideration. While this study reveals that non-democratic elites often listen to public opinion, it is limited to domestic issues and not foreign policy.

Existing literature about the elites and public opinion in relation to foreign policy focuses on democratic regimes because it is important to examine why political elites are meant to represent the population that elected them to power (Kertzer, 2020, Park & Hawley 2020). However, in non-democratic regimes, or backsliding democratic regimes, it is critical to examine what influences political elites to make decisions when they are not expected to always represent public interest. Michael Horowitz and Matthew Fuhrmann (2018) argued that individual people, and not states are ultimately responsible for foreign policy decisions. Their findings varied from traditional theoretical approaches to elite policy decision making that argue individual leaders make little impact on foreign policy decisions and are instead heavily constrained by domestic and institutional barriers. Elizabeth Saunders (2018) builds on the leader-focused level of analysis that Horowitz and Fuhrmann adopt, but posits that political leaders have “inner circles” that push them to make certain political decisions, especially during wartime circumstances. Political leaders, while critical actors in foreign policy decision making, are rarely making decisions on their own in isolation of the people who work alongside them. While Saunders paves a new path in understanding how elites make policy decisions, her research is limited to the United States which is a democratic regime where elites are expected to listen to public opinion. Thus, to understand how elites make decisions in weak democracies and non-democracies, other explanations need to be examined.

Brandon Kinne (2005) wanted to better understand why leaders of non-democracies make contentious foreign policy decisions, especially when public opinion is not their priority. He argues that poliheuristic theory can be applied to non-democratic leaders. He categorizes non-

democracies into three groups: personalist autocracy, military autocracy, and single-party autocracy. In personalist autocracies, leaders make foreign policy decisions that will allow them to maintain a perception of prestige and respect. He noted that Saddam Hussein's decision to stay in Kuwait during the 1991 Gulf War was not a mere misperception of American power. Rather, Kinne argues that Saddam knew that withdrawing from Kuwait would have made him seem like a weak, unsuccessful gambler that would have led to a decline in his power and prestige among the Arab states. In military autocracies, political leaders will rely on the inner circle of military generals to make foreign policy decisions since the military poses the greatest threat to the leader's power. This argument is most similar to Saunders' (2018) argument regarding how elites rely on their inner circles to make foreign policy decisions in democratic governments. In single-party autocracies, political leaders will sacrifice their own political views for the dominant ideologies that surround them. The goal is still to maintain power in both the ruling regime and in the public, even if that means leaders must accept new political views. My research focuses less on the individual traits of elites and their interactions with one another and instead examines how foreign powers shape elite foreign policy decisions.

Scholarship on Jordanian foreign policy tends to argue that regime survival motivates political elites to make certain foreign policy decisions. Russell Lucas (2003) argues that monarchical regimes such as Jordan are more willing to use political liberalization as a survival strategy than their republican neighbors. Political liberalization gives monarchical regimes the opportunity to activate "divide-and-rule" policies which can increase public support for unpopular government policies. Lucas also argues that monarchies roll-back political liberalization reforms as a survival strategy given certain contexts. While Lucas effectively points out political liberalization as a survival strategy for monarchical regimes such as Jordan,

he does not elaborate on why and when Jordanian political elites will repeal political liberalization reforms as a survival strategy and ignore public opposition to unfavorable government policy. This paper seeks to expand on this research and examines the various domestic and foreign contexts that push elite politicians to make certain foreign policy decisions.

Mohammed B.E. Saaida (2021) has examined how Jordanian policymakers are influenced by geography, social structure, economy, and public opinion when making foreign policy decisions. However, his research does not account for nuance or overlap within these categories. While it may be true that Jordanian political elites have security concerns as Israel's neighbor, economic concerns can prevent Jordanian policymakers from choosing how to deal with specific issues relating to security. Saaida's article is a step closer to understanding elite foreign policymaking in Jordan but requires more nuance and discussion.

Scholarship on Lebanese foreign policy making typically focuses on how decisions are made within Lebanon's consociationalist system (Dekmejian, 1978, Fakhoury, 2014, Salloukh, 2023). Elisabeta-Cristina Dinu (2022) argues that external actors in Lebanon such as Syria and Lebanon are a source of polarization among Lebanese political parties. Lebanese political parties tend to believe that Israel poses a security threat to Lebanon but disagree on how to tackle the problem (Dinu, 2022). Some political blocs think that Hezbollah should be disarmed, and the national army should be strengthened while some political blocs believe the opposite (Dinu, 2022). What is evident, however, is that the consociationalist system in Lebanon is highly fragmented. My research takes note of this fragmentation and applies Dinu's understanding of consociationalism in Lebanon to explain why peace between Israel and Lebanon failed throughout various historical periods.

It is necessary to examine the political systems of both Jordan and Lebanon. Lebanon became a sectarian political system in 1843 when Mount Lebanon was split into two districts: a Maronite district in the north and a Druze district in the south (Stearns, 2008). Each district was governed correspondingly by Maronite and Druze deputy governors. Each deputy was assisted by a council of twelve members that equally represented Lebanon's six major sects. One issue with this political system was that it encouraged competition between parties on sectarian basis and promoted sectarian belonging over common citizenship. The common citizenship prior to World War I was Ottoman citizenship, not Lebanese citizenship (Salibi, 1971). However, following World War I and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the sectarian system continued and eroded what then became a common Lebanese citizenship. The sectarian system carried on following Lebanese independence in 1943 with the establishment of the National Pact and later on in the Taif Accords in 1989. The National Pact called for the president to be a Maronite, the prime minister to be a Sunni, and the speaker of parliament to be a Shiite. Thus, Lebanon's political elite is composed of people with various sectarian identities who may feel inclined to support foreign policy decisions that best align with their sectarian identity. It should also be noted; however, that recent scholarship by Makdisi (2019) argues that the salience of sectarian identities in Lebanon have ebbed and flowed throughout history and should not be viewed as stagnant categories of classification. This is an important viewpoint for understanding foreign-policy decision making in Lebanon.

In Jordan, the king has the most authority in making choices and other members of government play a supporting role. According to the 1952 constitution, the King of Jordan is the head of the executive, legislative, and judicial authorities. Another important part of the Jordanian government is the Cabinet. The Cabinet is composed of the Prime Minister and other

ministers for public interest. The Prime Minister is selected by the King and the Prime Minister selects all the other Ministers with the King's approval. Besides the King, the Prime Minister is most involved in foreign affairs (Saiida, 2021).

Methodology

I used a comparative approach in this paper because both Lebanon and Jordan have pursued peace with Israel but had vastly different outcomes. Both countries also border Israel, so it is easy to assume that they would have similar political strategies; however, this is not the case. The comparative approach allows me to examine which factors led to a normalization treaty between Israel and Jordan that still exists today, and the lack of a treaty between Israel and Lebanon. I focus on specific historical moments where peace between countries was possible but examine the factors that either hindered peace or allowed peace to be established. For Jordan, I looked at the 1994 normalization treaty with Israel and then public uprisings in the 2000s that called for Jordan to break the treaty. For Lebanon, I looked at the never-implemented May 17 agreement in 1983, failed attempts at peace in the 1990s and early 2000s, and public opposition to peace with Israel. I rely on existing public opinion surveys to see if public opinion was at odds with elite foreign policy makers, and how Jordanian and Lebanese political elite had geopolitical concerns that pushed them to either pursue or not pursue peace with Israel. I also examine the role of foreign influence and intervention in both Lebanon and Jordan to see if external actors shaped these country's relationship with Israel. I also use economic data from the World Bank, IMF, and economic policy experts to see if economic conditions shaped how elites dealt with Israel.

Roadmap

This first section examines the first instance of formal political normalization between Israel and Jordan that occurred in 1995. I will discuss the reasons why King Hussein decided to establish normalized relations with Israel, and how public opinion responded to Jordan's increased closeness to Israel. I will then turn to the attempted peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel in 1983 and examine why Lebanon was unable to establish normalized relations with Israel. Next, I will examine why King Abdullah II of Jordan maintained peace with Israel despite public calls to end the treaty in the early 2000s and during the Arab Spring. Then, I will look at other opportunities for peace between Israel and Lebanon in the 2000s, and why these attempts were unsuccessful. Through this comparison, it will become abundantly clear that external foreign powers play a critical role in shaping Jordan and Lebanon's policy towards Israel.

1994 Jordan-Israel Treaty

In this section, I argue that King Hussein chose to normalize relations with Israel to restore Jordan's economy following the Gulf War. Furthermore, despite public pushback to the normalization treaty in 1996, King Hussein maintained normal relations with Israel. This is because an economic relationship with Israel's major ally, the United States, was more important for King Hussein than acquiescing to public opposition to Israel.

King Hussein intended peace with Israel to end Jordan's estrangement from the United States resulting from Jordan's pro-Iraq stance in the 1990-1991 Gulf War (Lucas, 2004). He also wanted Jordan to be firmly in the center of an American linked, "New Middle East," where

Jordan would become Israel's diplomatic and economic connection to the Arab world (Lucas, 2004). It must be noted that Jordan has a historical connection to seeking approval from the West. When Jordan was under British mandatory rule and was known as Transjordan in 1921, the British installed King Abdullah as political leader. King Abdullah worked closely with Zionists in Palestine to advance British interests in the region, and to possibly take over part of Palestine while leaving Jews with the rest of the land (Jasse, 1986). Thus, it is unsurprising that King Hussein also pursued a strong relationship with the West in the 1990s to advance his own political and economic interests. King Hussein was aware that normalizing relations with Israel would also allow Jordan to receive aid from Israel's major ally, the United States, which was initially cut off when Jordan sided with Iraq during the war. From an economic perspective, King Hussein believed that normalizing relations with Israel would open new avenues for trade and bring economic prosperity to Jordan. King Hussein's desire to normalize relations with Israel in 1994 was thus an attempt to strengthen Jordan's position in the Arab world and repair Jordan's diplomatic relationship with the United States. King Hussein was also interested in establishing normal relations with Israel because he wanted to maintain power over religious sites in Jerusalem (Frisch, 2004). Prior to the 1994 treaty, Israel recognized the special role that the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan would have in controlling religious sites in Jerusalem (Frisch, 2004). The 1994 normalization agreement thus presented an opportunity for King Hussein to formally solidify Jordan's control over critical religious sites.

The 1994 treaty negotiations took place during a period of relatively high elite responsiveness towards public pressure in Jordan. Following fuel price increases in 1989, Jordanians took to the streets in riots and protests (Wiktorowicz, 1999). The protests mainly took place in southern Jordan, which was particularly concerning for King Hussein because his

largest support base tended to be in southern Jordan. Since traditional regime supporters were protesting, King Hussein felt compelled to make significant political changes. King Hussein decided to hold elections just a few months after the fuel riots in southern Jordan. The November 1989 elections in Jordan for example, were the first free elections since 1959 and gave way for the Muslim Brotherhood, Jordan's major Islamist party, to win 22 parliamentary seats (Brand, 1999). Islamists made major political strides during this election. In 1990, Islamists and the royal commission began working on the National Charter which guaranteed a pluralist political system and gave Islamists an opportunity to hold political power. However, the Charter also required acceptance of the Hashemite monarchy which set-back leftists parties and their push for greater political liberalization (Brand, 1999). Nonetheless, the 1989 elections marked a moment where King Hussein was responsive to public pressure and decided to allow political pluralism to instill peace in Jordan. This case of elite responsiveness to public pressure shows how Jordan's ruling regime can succumb to public pressure and make transformative political decisions.

King Hussein's quick movement towards normalization faced widespread opposition from East Bank Jordanians and Islamist parties. East Bank Jordanians, who typically supported the King, were concerned that Jordan was moving too fast in the normalization process and should have taken more input from Lebanon and Syria (Lalor, 1999). They believed that Jordan needed regional allies, and establishing a normalized relationship with Israel without accounting for Lebanese and Syrian interests could isolate the country (Lalor, 1999). Regardless of the calls to halt the peace process from his own political supporters, King Hussein's interest in joining the post-Gulf War peace camp, stimulating the Jordanian economy, and solidifying Jordan's borders and control over water superseded worried supporters (Lucas & Sham, 2001). It is important to note that East Bank Jordanians were not necessarily opposed to Jordan seeking a peaceful

relationship with Israel. Rather, they were concerned with ensuring that the Jordan-Israel treaty had multilateral support and input from neighboring countries.

The Muslim Brotherhood shared the East Bank Jordanian belief that establishing normalized ties with Israel could risk cutting Jordan off from the rest of the Arab world. However, the Muslim Brotherhood also argued that the potential Jordan-Israel treaty did not address Palestinian refugees and their right to return to their homeland as a political issue (Lucas & Scham, 2001). Islamists once again were not entirely opposed to the idea of making peace with Israel, but they wanted the treaty to call for guaranteed Palestinian rights to return to their homeland. Islamists also took issue with the fact that the Jordanian government was reversing its strides towards political liberalization by shutting down anti-treaty protests and sentiment (Lucas & Scham, 2001). Despite calls from Islamists to slow down or alter the normalization agreement with Israel, King Hussein proceeded with the normalization agreement and solidified it in 1994.

King Hussein's decision to normalize relations seems contradictory based on his old political rhetoric. Initially, King Hussein seemed in favor of Palestinian liberation through seceding control over the West Bank during the 1987 Palestinian Intifada (Robins, 1989). However, during the treaty negotiations in 1994, King Hussein sidelined calls to halt the process and failed to take into consideration Palestinian perspectives with their right to return. The ending of the Gulf War and Jordan's tarnished reputation in the West seemed to be a driving factor that motivated him to sideline his perspective on Palestinian liberation. It appears that King Hussein prioritized the revitalization of Jordan's position within the Arab and Western world, rather than advocating for Palestinian liberation. King Hussein decided to make a foreign policy decision that he believed would allow Jordan to be accepted by the United States. King

Hussein's desire to be accepted into the Western world after the Gulf War superseded his interest in advocating for Palestinian issues.

As King Hussein became more interested in making peace with Israel in 1993, he began to roll back his political liberalization initiatives which marked a strong contrast to his push for political liberalization moves in 1989. King Hussein introduced a new electoral system based on the single, nontransferable vote which rewarded rural and tribal allies while also rigging electoral outcomes against city-based opposition candidates, particularly those from the Muslim Brotherhood (Lucas, 2003). The new electoral reforms also targeted Palestinians specifically and ensured they would be excluded from the political system. King Hussein gave preferential treatment to East Bank Jordanians where parliamentary seats held greater weight compared to Palestinian-majority areas (Schwedler, 2003). Just as King Hussein was easily able to introduce political liberalization in Jordan, he was able to take these freedoms away. Thus, when the PLO signed the Oslo Accords with Israel in 1993, King Hussein was prepared to initiate the peace process without major opposition. In the November 1993 parliamentary elections, King Hussein's opposition lost nearly half its seats. The treaty was quickly passed in the East Bank-majority parliament and King Hussein was then able to sign a peace treaty with Israel in 1994. King Hussein still believed that peace with Israel was the best choice for Jordan. He told members of parliament that Jordan's survival depended on securing Western interests, and Jordan could free itself from political and economic strains through making full peace with Israel (Adoni & Schwedler, 1996). King Hussein's hard-lined stance was rooted in a deep insecurity that Jordan was struggling and needed to be saved by Western powers. He was willing to sideline members of parliament to ensure that Jordan would not suffer economically and could be a well-respected nation following his alignment with Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War. In a sense,

King Hussein's rhetoric aligns with Kinne's (2005) argument that leaders are interested in how they are perceived by external foreign powers. It is possible that King Hussein did not want to appear weak following the Gulf War and knew that aligning with the United States and Israel would fix Jordan's reputation.

In Figure 1, among professionals in Jordan, there was considerable support for peace talks with Israel in 1994 despite general worries that the peace process was moving too fast. However, it is important to note that the Jordanian employment sector in the 1990s was split between East Bank Jordanians and Palestinians. Following King Hussein's decision to "Jordanise" the public and government sectors in the 1970s, employment in these sectors was restricted to only East Bank Jordanians (Muhtaseb, 2013). On the other hand, the private and economic sector was left mainly to Palestinians. Palestinians were unable to access government employment and often faced discrimination when applying to public universities. King Hussein

TABLE 1
SUPPORT FOR PEACE TALKS IN THREE ARAB SOCIETIES

	LEBANESE (ALL IN BEIRUT)								OTHER ARABS (ALL PROFESSIONALS)								
	Shi'a				Sunni				Maronite		Syria		Jordan	Palestinians			
	Students		Professionals		Students		Professionals		Students	Profs.	Damascus		Amman	Beirut		Amman	
	1993	1994	1993	1994	1993	1994	1993	1994	(1994 only)		1993	1994	1994	1993	1994	1993	1994
	Yes	47%	56%	49%	60%	29%	44%	37%	48%	78%	82%	28%	45%	66%	23%	17%	26%
No	43%	39%	44%	36%	59%	51%	58%	48%	15%	14%	54%	49%	32%	59%	78%	51%	32%
Unsure	9%	5%	7%	4%	11%	5%	5%	4%	7%	4%	18%	6%	2%	18%	6%	23%	4%
Sample	(150)	(125)	(100)	(85)	(150)	(125)	(100)	(85)	(125)	(85)	(100)	(245)	(150)	(100)	(90)	(150)	(90)

Figure 1: Washington Institute on Near East Policy 1996

gave preferential treatment to East Bank Jordanians to affirm their loyalty to the regime and prevent conflict between various sectors of the Jordanian population from arising within his government. Considering that the normalization treaty was framed as a great economic benefit for Jordanians by King Hussein, it is unsurprising that professionals were responding favorably to the Jordan-Israel treaty in 1994. Business elites, being mainly of Palestinian origin, rallied behind the treaty because of the perceived economic benefits of normalization (Lucas, 2012). This indicates that the treaty was framed as an economic benefit for those working in the private sector. East Bank Jordanians working in the public sector did not specifically rally behind the treaty for the perceived economic benefits, meaning the treaty seemed more economically helpful for the private sector. Non-Palestinian Jordanian professionals most likely supported the treaty because King Hussein was giving them preferential treatment in the public sector.

King Hussein framed the Israeli normalization agreement as an immense economic benefit and capitalized on Jordanian anxieties regarding the influx of Jordanian-Palestinian immigration. During the Gulf War, 200,000 Jordanian-Palestinians immigrated to Jordan from Kuwait which exacerbated Jordan's severe unemployment problem, strained state services, and drove up housing prices for all Jordanians (Brand, 1995). The changing demographics in Jordan created a sense among Jordanians that they were losing control of their country. This grievance, called 'East Banker first' was typically expressed through holding opposition to Palestinians and Palestinian institutions in Jordanian affairs (Brand, 1995).

Based on my analysis, the economy seemed to be a particularly salient issue among political elites and Jordanian civilians in both public and private sectors. Thus, an examination of whether the Jordan-Israel treaty was economically beneficial for Jordanians is warranted. This

can be examined through analyzing remittance flows and whether Jordanians participated in protests for economic reform following the establishment of the treaty.

Since Jordan suffered a major economic downturn during the Gulf War, Jordanians were looking for greater economic prosperity. The Jordanian economy is highly dependent on remittance flows (Wiktorowicz, 1999). Relying on remittance flows allows the Jordanian regime to be slightly less accountable to society and function without extracting revenue from civilians or domestic sources. When the Gulf War began in 1990, Jordanian migrants in Iraq and Kuwait suffered great economic losses which cut remittance flows into Jordan by a significant amount. Also, a large number of Jordanian migrants who were living in Iraq and Kuwait returned to Jordan when the Gulf War began which also cut remittance flows to the country (Foad, 2009). The remittance dynamic in Jordan was disrupted when the Gulf War began which plunged Jordan into a severe economic crisis. The figure below shows how remittance flows, imports, and exports dipped when the Gulf War began and Jordanian migrants in Kuwait had to move back to Jordan.




Figure 2: OECD Jordan Paper

Following the peace treaty in 1994, Jordan and Israel pursued industrial ventures that have led to the importation of labor from India, Bangladesh, and other Southeast Asian states (Chatelard, 2010). However, following the signing of the treaty, remittance flows did not increase significantly. In fact, remittance flows were steadily climbing prior to 1994. The same trend can be seen for imports and exports of goods and services into Jordan. Figure 1 shows that the Jordan-Israel treaty did not result in immediate and significant economic benefit for Jordanian or Palestinian recipients of remittance money. While there was a slight increase in imports, exports, and remittances in 1995, Jordanian civilians most likely did not feel a major economic upturn following the treaty if Jordan's import and export economy was already improving in 1993. Since one of the purposes of the treaty was to recover Jordan's economy after the war, it would be unsurprising if Jordanian civilians felt disappointed after realizing the major economic growth they were promised under the treaty and from King Hussein's rhetoric did not truly deliver. This growth chart shows that economic normalization with Israel was somewhat beneficial but may have not been substantial enough to benefit Jordanian civilians in the post-Gulf War economy. The perceived lack of economic benefits from the Jordan-Israel treaty became a major source of contention in 1996 which will be discussed in the following sections.

By 1995, public opposition to economic normalization with Israel began mounting. In Figure 3, a high proportion of Jordanian professionals polled in 1995 either opposed or strongly opposed economic normalization with Israel. One reason public opinion shifted was because as early as 1995, the Israeli government decided to confiscate 500 dunams of land around Jerusalem which was in violation of the 1994 treaty that gave King Hussein considerable control over religious sites in Jerusalem (Lucas, 2004). Although Prime Minister Rabin returned the land,

Jordanian civilians and elites became concerned that Israel was actually their enemy rather than a trustworthy ally (Lucas, 2004). Furthermore, King Hussein's promise that the United States would economically support Jordan after the treaty was signed did not materialize, evidenced by the minor remittance growth in Figure 2. To make matters worse, Israel's Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who signed the treaty with King Hussein, was assassinated in 1995 which stalled the peace process (Lucas, 2004). Based on the shift in public opinion among professionals, it is clear that many Jordanians did not feel they were receiving the economic benefit of the Jordan-Israel treaty and there was a growing mistrust towards Israel. Palestinians living in Jordan were most likely not receiving the economic benefits they thought they would receive in the private sector. This must have been particularly upsetting for Palestinians in the private sector because they were highly supportive of the perceived economic benefits included in the treaty. East Bank Jordanians most likely did not feel the economic benefits in the public sector either given the widespread opposition among professionals. This public opinion data reveals that domestic support for Israel hinged on whether Jordanians received economic benefits from the Jordan-Israel relationship. In 1994, Jordanian professionals in the private sector supported normalization with Israel. However, once remittance flows did not sharply increase by 1995, Jordanians seemed to believe they were not receiving enough of an economic benefit from the 1994 treaty.

TABLE 7
SUPPORT AMONG LEBANESE AND JORDANIAN PROFESSIONALS
FOR ECONOMIC NORMALIZATION WITH ISRAEL¹⁷

Question: *What is your position on economic relations with Israel?*

	<u>Lebanese</u>	<u>Jordanians</u>
Strongly support	8%	8%
Support	27%	10%
Uncertain	11%	12%
Oppose	27%	30%
Strongly oppose	28%	41%

Figure 3: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1996

Despite public opinion turning against Israel in 1995, King Hussein did not break the normalization treaty with Israel. The 1996 bread riots gave King Hussein an opportunity to alter or end the treaty with Israel, but King Hussein preserved the treaty. The 1996 bread riots were targeted directly towards the dissolution of the Israel-Jordan treaty and indicated that the average Jordanian was not feeling the benefits of economic normalization with Israel (Adoni & Schwedler, 1996). One of the political elites responsible for ending the economic boycott with Israel and lifting bread subsidies was Prime Minister ‘Abd al-Karim Kabariti. Public anger was expressed towards him specifically due to the increased price of bread, but King Hussein refused to fire him. This marks a strong contrast to 1989 where King Hussein simply fired the Prime Minister after Jordanians expressed anger over the rising fuel prices. King Hussein’s reluctance to fire Kabariti indicates that preserving an economic relationship with Israel was more important for regime survival than listening to protesters and rioters. This episode reveals that maintaining normalized relations with Israel was extremely important to King Hussein. If King Hussein was willing to listen to make political changes due to riots in the past, it begs the question as to why he ignored protests and kept the normalization treaty with Israel.

King Hussein wanted to uphold the 1994 treaty to strengthen Jordan's diplomatic relationship with the United States for military and material support. The United States government has always found it strategically important for Israel to be surrounded by peaceful neighbors (Carafano, 2021). This is because Israel is a major ally to the United States and is seen as a democratic bulwark that maintains peace and control in the Middle East. Thus, Middle Eastern countries that establish peaceful relations with Israel and defend this critical ally of the United States receive economic benefits and support from the United States government. It is no coincidence that the United States granted Jordan Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status in 1996, one year after Jordan established peace with Israel. As a MNNA ally, Jordan became eligible to receive excess U.S. defense articles, training, and loans of equipment for research and development (Sharp, 2023). Since King Hussein's goal was to join the U.S.-led international order following the Gulf War, it is logical that he was unresponsive to declining public support for economic relations with Israel. The treaty was successful in putting Jordan under the United States' wing and King Hussein was not interested in changing that dynamic, especially because of Jordan's precarious economic situation in the 1990s.

King Hussein was implicitly pressured by the United States to maintain normalized ties with Israel. While the United States did not tell King Hussein directly to make peace with Israel, the fact that they extended major allyship to Jordan one year after the treaty was established is no coincidence. It appears that King Hussein was willing to ignore public calls for the dissolution of the treaty for the sake of bolstering Jordan's economic status. This marks a contrast to 1989 where King Hussein believed that listening to public outrage was more important for the regime than maintaining high fuel prices. The fact that King Hussein maintained peace with Israel despite protests indicates that peace with Israel was particularly salient to him and to the rest of

the ruling elite. King Hussein was willing to ignore public opposition to Israel to ensure that he would have U.S. economic support following the Gulf War.

Lebanon-Israel normalization 1983

Lebanon was unable to normalize relations with Israel because Syrian leaders, who were backed by the USSR, had a vested interest in preventing peace between Israel and Lebanon.

Lebanon's initial attempt to normalize relations with Israel took place during the Lebanese civil war in which Israel was also an actor. The first phase of the civil war saw the rapid collapse of Lebanon's central authority and an outbreak of fighting between Christian right-wing militias and leftist, Palestinian, and Muslim militias on the other side. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) grew immensely powerful and threatened to defeat the Christian militias. Lebanon's government completely transformed when Syria decided to send troops into Lebanon in 1976 and stop the advance of the Palestinian-leftist-Muslim coalition. Syria ended up filling the political vacuum in the crumbling Lebanese state. The United States was involved as well and brokered the "red line agreement" where Israel would tolerate Syrian control over Lebanon as long as Syria would not deploy troops in south Lebanon (Salem, 2023). The situation in Lebanon remained relatively peaceful from 1976 to 1977. However, in 1978, Israel launched an invasion in south Lebanon and established a security zone that was manned by a local Lebanese militia. Also in 1978, relations began deteriorating between Christian and Syrian forces and killing ensued between the two groups. Bashir Gemayel, leader of the Lebanese Christian population, was also particularly threatening for the Palestinian-Muslim-leftist coalition. Gemayel wanted to build an alliance with Israel to defeat both the Palestinians and the Syrians and create a Maronite-dominated Lebanese state (Salem, 2023). He believed an alliance with

Israel would allow him to defend Lebanon from the PLO. He made a direct connection to King Hussein in Jordan and believed if the United States and Israel assisted Jordan, they could help Lebanon.

The alliance that Gemayel created with Israel led to the second Israeli invasion in 1982 where PLO and Syrian militias suffered extreme losses. Israel's second invasion of Lebanon ended the PLO's strong presence in Lebanon. Due to Israeli pressure, the Lebanese parliament quickly elected Bashir Gemayel to the presidency. His plan was rolling into motion—he was going to create a Maronite-controlled Lebanon with an Israeli alliance (Salem, 2023). However, he was assassinated shortly after the election by the Syrian Social National Party. This moment highlights the Syrian government's clear desire to prevent Israel from establishing an alliance with Lebanon. Bashir Gemayel's more centrist brother, Amine Gemayel was elected into power by Lebanon's parliament. Following the election, Israel began pushing for a peace treaty with Lebanon. However, the Lebanese parliament only wanted to negotiate the withdrawal of Israeli forces and maintain independence using United States and Arab support. Because the Lebanese parliament was eager for Israeli forces to leave, the U.S. brokered withdrawal talks between Israel and Lebanon which culminated with the May 17 Agreement (Salem, 2023). The Lebanese parliament approved of the treaty; however, it was never implemented.

When the civil war ended in 1989, the Lebanese parliament signed the Taif agreement which recalibrated political power among the various sectarian communities in Lebanon (Salem, 2006). The sectarian system was reformed to give more power to the Sunni minority in Lebanese parliament. Prior to the Taif agreement and under the 1943 National Pact, the sectarian system gave proportional representation to Christian, Sunni, and Shia communities which favored Christians because they were a slight majority. The Taif agreement required that the seats in

Parliament are evenly split between Christians and Muslims, ending Maronite preeminence, and granting more political power to Shia and Sunnis. The agreement also required that Parliament elects a Maronite Christian as president, Shiite Muslim as Speaker, and a Sunni Muslim as prime minister (Salem, 2006). The Taif agreement also required the departure of Syrian troops from Lebanon, but this did not occur until 2005. Until 2005, Syria controlled Lebanon's foreign policy decisions which severely undermined the role of parliament.

The May 17 agreement was never implemented because Syria went to great lengths to ensure the treaty was abrogated. Syria was effective in rebuilding relations with Lebanese groups, mainly the powerful Druze Shiite population. Syria also created strong ties with Sunni leaders who were encouraged to oppose the treaty. Syrian president, Hafez al-Assad was not interested in rescinding his control over Lebanon, which is a fact both Israel and the United States undermined (Freedman, 1986). Syria flatly rejected the May 17 agreement because Syrian leaders derided the idea that Lebanon could have a national interest separate from the interests of the Syrian state (Korn, 1986). Leaders also derided the idea that Lebanon negotiated separately with Israel and the United States without asking for Syrian input. Syria took a hard-lined stance to resist the treaty (Korn, 1986). Syria also opposed the treaty because south Lebanon was still left under Israeli control, which Syrian saw as a threat to Lebanon's sovereignty and Syrian security. President Assad was also against any treaty with Israel that did not pave a path for Syria to recover the Golan Heights, which was territory Israel captured in 1967. The government insisted that they would keep troops in Lebanon as long as the May 17 agreement remained in effect. Israel tried to push back by stating their troops would not withdraw if Syria's troops did not withdraw. This resulted in complete deadlock and essentially destroyed the May 17 agreement and any prospect of official peace between Israel and Lebanon (Korn, 1986).

While Syria controlled Lebanon's foreign policy decision making in the 1980s, it is important to note that the Soviet Union (USSR) had immense interest in ensuring Lebanon would not normalize relations with Israel. The USSR may have been a looming concern for Syria foreign policy decision makers when it came to dealing with Lebanon and Israel. To examine the USSR's influence in Syrian foreign policy and the Lebanon issue, it is important to look at the USSR's interest in the Middle East. Syria and the USSR formed a strong relationship by the 1980s due to developments in the Middle East that took place in the 1970s that deeply undermined the USSR's power in the Middle East. For example, the Camp David treaty between Egypt and Israel took Egypt out of Soviet influence and pushed the USSR to get closer to other Arab allies, this being Syria (Shad & Boucher et.al, 1995). The ascent of an Egypt-United States-Israel allyship motivated the USSR to increase economic and military assistance. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the USSR provided Syria with 550 combat aircrafts from 1975 to 1985 (Shad & Boucher et.al, 1995). Another reason why the USSR had dwindling influence on Arab states in the 1970s was because a spike in oil prices allowed Arab leaders to buy technology from Western nations. These factors combined led to great insecurities among USSR leaders that they were losing control of the Middle East to Israel and the United States.

The USSR decided that to retain influence over the Middle East, they would create a bloc of anti-imperialist states within the Arab world. The USSR wanted groups like the PLO and Arab Communist parties to come together and oppose the "linchpin" of Western imperialism in the Middle East: Israel (Freedman, 1986). The immediate departure of the PLO from Beirut when the Israeli invasion of Lebanon began in 1982 severely threatened the USSR's plan of creating an anti-imperialist bloc to oppose Israel. Examining the USSR's desire to influence the Middle

East and turn Arab states away from the United States and Israel is critical for understanding why Syria forced Lebanon to abrogate the treaty. By the time of the 1982 invasion, Syria was one of Moscow's few loyal allies enjoying military equipment and economic assistance from the USSR (Freedman, 1986). The USSR was concerned that if Lebanon normalized relations with Israel, the country would fall under American influence and lead to a new American-controlled Middle East. Syrian leaders had an incentive to prevent peace between Israel and Lebanon because the USSR provided economic aid to Syria in the 1980s and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union established ties with the Syrian Ba'ath party.

It is important to note how the sectarian parties in Lebanon's parliament viewed normalization with Israel following the civil war. The Shia community, represented through Hezbollah, strongly resisted normalizing ties with Israel (Bahout, 2016). This is most likely because Hezbollah had a Syrian backing, and Syria derided the idea that Israel and Lebanon should have a normalization treaty. The Sunni community was most interested in financially reconstructing Lebanon by strengthening pre-existing economic partnerships with Gulf states, and not Israel (Bahout, 2016). The Sunni perspective on economic relations with Israel will be further discussed in the next section. The Maronites supported normalization with Israel given their alliance during the civil war, but due to their reduced political influence following the Taif agreement, it is unlikely that Lebanese parliament was strongly considering normalizing relations with Israel.

Lebanon's parliament was divided along religious lines when it came to normalizing relations with Israel. Furthermore, Lebanon's foreign policy was heavily influenced by Syria who was controlled by the USSR. Lebanon was inhibited by two layers of foreign influence who were interested in preventing peace between Lebanon and Israel. Foreign powers successfully

undermined the Lebanese parliament and excluded Lebanon from making its own foreign policy decisions with Israel. While Jordan was implicitly influenced by the United States to make peace with Israel due to the known economic impacts of U.S. allyship, Jordanian elites were free of direct foreign intervention in their political affairs. The failure of peace between Israel and Lebanon can be attributed to that fact that Syria and the USSR had significant political influence over Lebanon that exacerbated sectarian tensions, considering Syria's support for the Shia community, and prevented normalization between Israel and Lebanon.

Economic explanation for Lebanon's failed normalization with Israel

Despite Lebanon's poor economy during the 1970s and 1980s, political elites did not pursue economic normalization with Israel because of Syria's control over Lebanese foreign policy, and Saudi Arabian economic influence on Lebanon's prime minister.

Lebanon's economy struggled immensely during the civil war. According to GDP data from the IMF in Figure 4, Lebanon experienced negative GDP growth rates in 1975, 1976, and 1982. The decline of GDP is most notable in 1982 because Israel invaded Lebanon and reached the southern suburbs in Beirut. Despite Lebanon's declining economy, the 1983 treaty between Lebanon and Israel, called the May 17 agreement, did not stipulate any economic agreement between the two countries. This marks a sharp contrast to the future 1994 treaty between Israel and Jordan that clearly outlines an economic relationship between the two countries. Lebanon's reluctance to include economic stipulations within the treaty indicates that leaders may not have been interested in having Israel as an economic ally, despite the country's declining economic situation. The reason why Lebanon did not pursue an economic agreement with Israel could be Syria's strong resistance to the idea that Lebanon and Israel should be allied. Also, unlike Jordan,

Lebanon seemed more concerned with maintaining the balance of Palestinian Muslims and Christians within parliament rather than making an economic agreement with Israel. Thus, the proposed treaty between Israel and Lebanon had more to do with preventing the PLO from infiltrating the Lebanese border rather than tackling economic concerns. It is also possible that the Lebanese parliament knew Syria would strongly object to complete normalization between Lebanon and Israel which is why Lebanon only included the security concerns in the treaty. Regardless, Syria was completely against any type of formal peace being established between Israel and Lebanon.

Lebanon's economic relationship with Saudi Arabia could have dissuaded the Lebanese parliament from pursuing economic normalization with Israel. Saudi Arabia was involved in Lebanon's political affairs because along with Syria, the Saudi government mediated the Taif agreement. The Saudi government sought involvement in the Taif agreement because they wanted to undermine Iran and Hezbollah's power in Lebanon through creating an agreement that would give more power to the Sunnis in Lebanon's parliament (Bosco, 2009). In 1992, Rafic Hariri was elected to parliament and then took over as Lebanon's prime minister with both U.S. and Saudi backing because he was Sunni, well-connected to the Saudi Arabian business community, and rejected Syrian and Iranian influence in Lebanon (Bosco, 2009). Hariri took over as prime minister because the sectarian system in Lebanon required a Sunni head of government. Hariri wanted to use the fortune he amassed in Saudi Arabia to invest in Lebanese commercial projects. However, he did not want to stop there. Hariri's goal was to transform Beirut into a commercial center in the Middle East with a strong economic relationship to oil-rich Arab states (Salaam, 1994). Hariri knew that to establish an economic partnership with Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich Gulf states he could not pursue economic normalization with

Israel, despite Lebanon's failing economy. This is because Saudi Arabia strongly opposed Israel and had already punished Lebanon in 1983 by banning their exports out of fear that Lebanon was exporting Israeli products (Denton, 1983). Thus, it seems plausible that Hariri did not advocate for economic normalization with Israel out of fear that he would lose his relationship to Saudi Arabia and destroy his plan of making Lebanon a commercial center for oil-rich Arab states.

	Nominal GDP	Real GDP ¹	Electricity Production ²	CPI (1974=100)	Real GDP Growth (in percent)	Rates ¹			Trend Growth Rates		
						(.0595)	(.0400)	(.0200)	(.0595)	(.0400)	(.0200)
1964	3,200	4,573	692	70	—	4.458	—	—	—	—	—
1965	3,523	4,890	765	72	6.93	4.732	—	—	—	—	—
1966	3,867	5,229	864	74	6.91	5,022	—	—	—	—	—
1967	3,820	4,980	907	77	-4.74	5,329	—	—	—	—	—
1968	4,273	5,609	1,035	H	12.62	5,656	—	—	—	—	—
1969	4,565	5,731	1,139	80	2.17	6,003	—	—	—	—	—
1970	4,866	6,108	1,230	80	6.59	6,371	—	—	—	—	—
1971	5,399	6,672	1,375	81	9.23	6,762	—	—	—	—	—
1972	6,365	7,496	1,548	81	12.35	7,176	—	—	—	—	—
1973	7,103	7,891	1,791	90	5.27	7,616	—	—	—	—	—
1974	8,137	8,137	1,975	100	3.11	8,083	—	—	—	—	—
1975	7,500	6,824	1,826	110	-16.14	8,578	8,413	8,246	-22.88	-20.93	-18.93
1976	4,099	2,894	1,009	142	-57.59	9,104	8,756	8,413	-114.61	-110.71	-106.71
1977	8,199	4,853	1,839	169	67.71	9,662	9,113	8,583	-68.85	-63.00	-57.00
1978	8,799	4,728	1,979	186	-2.58	10,255	9,485	8,756	-77.42	-69.62	-61.62
1979	11,150	4,841	2,315	230	2.38	10,883	9,872	8,933	-81.01	-71.26	-61.26
1980	14,000	4,912	2,771	285	1.48	11,551	10,275	9,113	-85.50	73.80	-61.80
1981	16,800	4,939	1,498	340	0.54	12,259	10,695	9,297	-90.91	-77.26	-63.26
1982	12,599	3,122	1,793	404	-36.79	13,010	11,131	9,485	-142.73	-127.13	-111.13

Figure 4: International Monetary Fund

Jordan maintains treaty with Israel in during Palestinian Intifada and Arab Spring

Despite public opinion being strongly against Israel, the Jordanian government upheld the 1994 treaty because Jordan established a Free Trade Agreement with the United States, a major Israeli ally in the early 2000s.

In 2002, the Jordanian government decided to maintain normalized relations with Israel despite civilian protests and boycotts. The political landscape had changed in the years between

1994 and 2002, starting with the death of King Hussein and the rise of King Abdullah II in 1999. King Abdullah II dismissed the parliament shortly after he rose to power, and Jordan stayed without a parliament for two years. With the prime minister, King Abdullah II created “temporary” laws that required organizers of public gatherings to receive permits from the governor to hold events (Lucas, 2004). This law was directly targeted at people who were protesting during the second Palestinian Intifada in 2000. Despite attempts at repression, protests continued in the early 2000s. In 2002, Amman was shut down for weeks when Jordanians took to the streets to call for the dissolution of the treaty with Israel. The regime did not listen to these demands, and instead sent Queen Rania to lead a Palestinian solidarity march that resulted in no change in relations between Israel and Jordan (Lucas, 2004). Queen Rania is Palestinian herself so she may have held solidarities with people living in Palestine, but the purpose of the march was to diffuse tension in Amman (Lucas, 2004). While Jordanian professionals supported peace with Israel in 1994, Jordanians’ overall attitude towards Israel seemed to be overwhelmingly negative by 2003 evidenced in the public opinion survey results in Figures 5 and 6.

Question: Which statement comes closest to your opinion?...A way can be found for Israel to exist so that the rights and needs of Palestinian people are taken care of OR, the rights and needs of the Palestinian people cannot be taken care of as long as Israel exists? [1133]

EXPORT TO EXCEL		EXPAND ALL		COLLAPSE ALL	
Country	Survey Data	Can coexist	A way cannot be found		
^ Jordan					
	Spring 2007	17	78		
	May 2003	14	85		

Figure 5: Pew Research Center 2003

Question: Now thinking about the dispute between Israel and the Palestinians, which side do you sympathize with more, Israel or the Palestinians? [754]

EXPORT TO EXCEL		EXPAND ALL		COLLAPSE ALL	
Country	Survey Data	Israel	Palestinians	Both (VOL)	Neither (VOL)
^ Jordan					
	Spring 2013	1	94	4	1
	Spring 2007	1	88	3	7
	Spring 2006	1	97	1	1
	Spring 2004	1	93	0	4

Figure 6: Pew Research Center 2003

By May 2003, it is abundantly clear from the figures that Jordanians do not believe Israel can exist while also treating Palestinian people with respect. Jordanians do not appear as supportive of the Israeli state, which makes it difficult to believe that they would support their country having a normalized relationship with Israel. Furthermore, in figures 5 and 6, it is clear that Jordanians sympathized much more with Palestinians than Israelis which is not reflected among elite policymakers who maintained the normalization treaty with Israel in the early 2000s. If the regime sympathized with Palestinians, they could have reinstated the economic boycott against Israel that was lifted following the establishment of the treaty. Instead of responding to Jordanian sympathies towards Palestinians and overall concern that Israel does not treat Palestinians well, the ruling regime continued its normalized relationship with Israel.

King Abdullah II decided to maintain a normalized relationship with Israel in the early 2000s, despite public opinion being broadly unsupportive of Israel. The increased economic benefits of maintaining a normalized relationship with Israel appears to be one reason why King Abdullah II did not dissolve the treaty. In 2000, Jordan signed a Free Trade Agreement with the United States. Jordan also started using Qualified Industrial Zones which allows the country to engage in duty-free trade with the United States (Mastel, 2004). The economic benefit of the

Free Trade Agreement is noticeable, especially when comparing Jordanian exports to the United States from 1998 to 2003. In 1998, the United States gave Jordan a limited tariff concession which jump-started their economic relationship (Mastel, 2004). However, after the establishment of the Free Trade Agreement in 2000, exports increased substantially. In the first half of 1998, Jordan exported US \$4.1 million worth of goods. By the first half of 2003, Jordan had exported US \$133.3 million worth of goods to the US (Mastel, 2004).

Considering that Jordan was signing a major trade agreement with the United States in the early 2000s, it would be hard to believe that King Abdullah II would dissolve a treaty with Israel—a major ally to the United States. Also, the Jordanian government had the recent memory of being economically cut-off from the United States during the Gulf War and most likely did not want to risk losing their new and successful economic relationship with the United States by cutting ties with Israel.

Despite Jordan enjoying an economic relationship with the United States in the early 2000s, it should be noted that King Abdullah II supported Yasser Arafat, leader of the Palestinian Authority (PA). This is notable because the United States did not support Arafat in the early 2000s because of his escalation of the intifada (Frisch, 2004). President George W. Bush even ordered the CIA to search for Arafat's replacement in 2001 (Al-Jazeera, 2023). Despite the United States' clear dislike of Arafat, King Abdullah II refused to denounce the leader. This indicates that while King Abdullah II was interested in staying on the United States' side in the early 2000s, he was unwilling to sacrifice his personal views for the sake of appeasing the United States, even if his support for Arafat threatened his relationship with the Bush administration. It is also possible that King Hussein was attempting to appease the Jordanian public by not calling for the removal of Arafat and showing his disapproval over the Intifada. His

support for Arafat could have been a means for him to show the Jordanian public that he is not completely on Israel's and the United State's side.

Jordanians organized boycotts of Israeli and American products in 2003 to protest Israel's treatment of Palestinians, and King Abdullah II's regime responded with political liberalization reforms. The 2003 parliamentary elections were held under a new election law that increased the number of seats in parliament for opposition representation (Ryan, 2013). More Islamist candidates were elected due to the reforms. The pattern of political liberalization in response to public uprising seems to be one of Jordan's most prominent regime survival tactics regardless of who is in power. Both King Hussein and King Abdullah II use political liberalization reform as a means to quell public uprising. King Abdullah II did not modify or dissolve the peace treaty with Israel despite boycotts of Israeli products, and instead found another means to quiet public opposition to him and his regime. Breaking normalization with Israel was much more threatening to King Abdullah II's regime than allowing political liberalization. However, a critical shift occurred when Israel began constructing a security barrier between Israel and the West Bank in 2003. The Jordanian foreign minister claimed that the purpose of the border wall was to unilaterally establish the new borders of Israel and make living conditions so difficult for Palestinians behind the wall that they move out of the West Bank and into Jordan (Susser, 2021). King Abdullah II lamented the idea that Jordan would become an alternative homeland for Palestinians which is why he led the charge against Israel at the International Court of Justice. Still, the official treaty between Israel and Jordan was not broken.

In 2012, Islamist groups flooded the streets in Amman calling for the cancellation of the treaty with Israel and governmental reform. The main trigger for the protests was Prime Minister Fayez Tarawneh's statement that if given the chance, "he would sign a peace deal with Israel

again” (Köprülü, 2014 p. 322). The majority of people who participated in the protests were Islamists who opposed Jordan’s peace with Israel (Ryan, 2018). In June of 2012, King Abdullah II passed a new electoral law with new elections scheduled for the end of that year. However, Islamist Action Front (IAF) leader Mansur dismissed this attempt at political liberalization as a cosmetic change meant to buy time and delay real reforms (Köprülü, 2014). Once again, the Jordanian government decided to increase political liberalization instead of abolishing normal relations with Israel.

In 2014, Jordan’s National Electric Power Company (NEPCO) signed a letter of intent with Noble Energy, a U.S. energy company, to import natural gas from an oil field controlled by Israel (Ryan, 2018). This oil field was particularly important to many Jordanians because they believed that the field belonged to Palestinians, not the Israeli government. In 2015, a mass protest in Jordan ensued which included Pan-Arab nationalist political parties, labor organizations, trade groups, and women’s groups. This protest brought together Arabs, Circassians, Christians, Muslims, and people from various social and economic backgrounds (Ryan, 2018). While the Jordanian government did not break the gas contract with the United States, King Abdullah II was already changing his tone with Israel. King Abdullah II pulled the Jordanian ambassador from Israel in 2014 because of police incursions, visits by Israeli politicians, and the bad treatment of Muslim worshippers at al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem (Booth & Luck, 2014). Jordanian officials believed that Israel was undermining Jordanian control over al-Aqsa, which goes against the 1994 treaty that gave Jordan the right to control religious sites in Jerusalem. King Abdullah II was clearly attempting to keep Jordanians content by showing his public disapproval of the Israeli government. Despite Jordan’s anger that Israel was overstepping

in Jerusalem and popular protests for Jordan to recede from the gas deal, King Abdullah II still did not break the treaty with Israel.

These episodes are troubling because it appears that public opinion and the ruling regime both oppose Israel. However, King Abdullah II was consistently reluctant to completely break the peace treaty with Israel. While King Abdullah II pulled the Jordanian ambassador in 2014 and tried to challenge Israel in the international courts in 2003, the treaty still remained in place.

This contradiction reveals that elite policymaking is bias dependent, which echoes Saunders (2022) argument on foreign policy elites. Based on King Abdullah's actions in 2003, it appears that the issue of Jerusalem was particularly important to the ruling elite. On the other hand, Palestinian claims to the gas field seemed to be quite unimportant to the regime.

Maintaining a strong economic relationship with the United States was deeply important for Jordanian political elite, but not important enough to support the replacement of Arafat. These varying attitudes reveal how foreign policy elites had different values regarding Israel. If Israel oversteps in Jerusalem, Jordan does not maintain a peaceful attitude with Israel. If Jordan needs natural resources such as gas, the ruling elite will maintain peaceful relations with Israel and ignore public demands to end the treaty. Jordan's attitude toward Israel constantly moved on a spectrum of cold peace to warm peace, all while still being connected to the 1994 peace treaty and being concerned with maintaining an economic relationship with the United States.

Peace Attempts between Israel and Lebanon

Israel and Lebanon have been unable to establish a normalization treaty since the first attempt in 1983 because of Hezbollah's rise to prominence in Lebanon, and the Gulf states' continued influence on Lebanese politics.

Following the failed attempt at normalization between Israel and Lebanon in 1983, the two countries have struggled to make peace. During the period of 1991 to 1994, Israel and Lebanon completed 18 rounds of peace talks and got close to a formalized peace agreement. Israel negotiators told the Lebanese delegation that they had no claim on Lebanese territory and were only concerned with security, which convinced Lebanon that peace was possible with Israel since territorial concerns were not involved. While Lebanon and Israeli governments were ready to move forward with a peace agreement, Syria was still holding out. During the peace talks, there was considerable support for economic normalization between Israel and Lebanon among the Christian community. The support for normalization among Lebanese Christians is unsurprising because during the civil war, Gemayel sought peace with Israel to ensure Maronites could stay in power. It is interesting to note that a large portion of Lebanese Muslims either oppose or strongly oppose economic normalization with Israel. There seems to be a clear religious divide between Lebanese people and their stance on normalization with Israel, and it seems to follow civil war trends.

TABLE 8

RELIGION AND SUPPORT FOR ECONOMIC NORMALIZATION¹⁸

	LEBANESE (1993)		JORDANIANS (1995)	
	Muslims	Christians	Muslims	Christians
Strongly support	7%	8%	3%	24%
Support	18%	39%	7%	22%
Uncertain	10%	13%	13%	12%
Oppose	28%	25%	29%	30%
Strongly oppose	36%	15%	48%	12%

Figure 7: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1996

Syria refused to sign a peace agreement with Israel in the 1990s, and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak vowed to withdraw troops from Lebanon in 2000 to push Syria to make a deal. However, Syrian president Hafez Assad broke off peace negotiations with Israel on behalf of Lebanon because Israel refused to meet his territorial demands. Assad wanted Israel to return the territory they seized before the 1967 war, but Israel was unwilling to commit to Assad's plan. Thus, Israel's troops remained in Israel and no peace agreement was made between Lebanon and Israel. The fact that Lebanese delegates agreed to peace with Israel, but no peace agreement ended up materializing shows that Lebanon was not in charge of the peace process, despite technically being a sovereign nation. Syria was in charge of negotiations with Israel and still had the same geopolitical concerns from the 1980s that prevented peace with Israel. Syria was particularly influential in the 1991 because Lebanon and Syria signed the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination that streamlined each other's security and foreign policy objectives (Salloukh, 2005). The treaty also institutionalized the coordination between Lebanon and Syria regarding economic, foreign policy, and defense initiatives (Salloukh, 2005). Unlike Harriri's external patron networks to Gulf states that influenced whether Lebanon pursued normalization with Israel, the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination was a politically legitimate, bilateral agreement that gave Syria considerable control over Lebanon's foreign policy. It is difficult to measure how Lebanese political elite take public opinion into consideration when their foreign policy towards Israel is dictated by Syria under this treaty. It may be true that the Lebanese political elite, many of which are Christian due to the sectarian political system, pushed for peace with Israel which is why peace almost occurred in the 1990s. However, Syria was the dominant political actor when it came to negotiations between Israel and

Lebanon which complicates the analysis of Lebanese foreign policymakers and shows they were not autonomous actors who had the ability to factor public opinion in their calculus.

The powerful political party, Hezbollah, was also critical in preventing peace between Israel and Lebanon. Hezbollah became politically powerful from 1992 to 2000 because it won eight seats in parliament and began expanding its political influence. Despite being political actors, Hezbollah also engaged in aggressive military campaigns against Israel to end Israel's occupation of south Lebanon. Tensions between Hezbollah and Israel in 2000 grew increasingly bitter because Hezbollah launched a series of attacks on Israeli soldiers in the security zone that eventually forced Israel to withdraw its troops from south Lebanon. This was seen as a political and military victory for Hezbollah and cemented the idea that Hezbollah was the dominant actor in south Lebanon (Hussain, 2007). Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon was particularly notable because it was the first time Israel unilaterally withdrew from an Arab territory without concessions or a peace treaty (Wilson Center, 2023). Because of this notable achievement, Hezbollah was even able to garner widespread support from even Christian, Druze, and Sunni Muslim segments of Lebanese society rather than just their Shia support base after they pushed Israel to withdraw from Lebanon (Holmes, 2024). Hezbollah's militaristic actions majorly prevented peace between Israel and Lebanon. Despite Hezbollah only representing a segment of the Lebanese parliament, the use of force against Israel in southern Lebanon ended any possibility of a peace process in 2000. Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon, however, had lasting effects on Lebanon's political structure. Israel's support for the Maronites through the sponsorship of the Southern Lebanon Army, which was created to defend Maronites in southern Lebanon during the civil war, promoted fragmentation within the Lebanese regime that carried on after Israel withdrew (Mahmood, 2008). Although Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000, it

left a legacy of immense political fragmentation along sectarian lines that most likely prevented political coalitions from coming together to make peace with Israel.

When Syria withdrew from Lebanon in 2005, the establishment of normalized ties between Israel and Lebanon seemed plausible since Syria was no longer directly intervening in Lebanese political affairs. However, in 2006, Hezbollah ambushed two Israeli Defense Force (IDF) vehicles on the border between Israel and Lebanon and killed three soldiers. Hezbollah also kidnapped two Israeli soldiers in 2006 which was aimed at freeing the Lebanese prisoners in Israeli jails and a gesture of support to the Intifada after the Israeli incursion into Gaza in the same year (Alagha, 2006). Lebanon incurred a major cost following Hezbollah's attacks. The Israeli government decided to launch a massive bombardment campaign, destroying bridges, roads, airports, and factories mainly in southern Lebanon. Israel mainly targeted southern Lebanon because the people living there comprised Hezbollah's strongest support base. Israel south Lebanon residents to turn against Hezbollah and blame it for the bombardment (Human Rights Watch). As a result of the bombardment, one million Lebanese people were displaced and 1,200 people died, one-third of whom were children (Alagha, 2006). Hezbollah also fired back, killing 158 people, more than two-thirds of whom were soldiers. The war came to an end after Israel, Hezbollah, and the rest of the Lebanese government accepted UN Resolution 1701.

Following the end of the war and the signing of a cease-fire treaty, normalization between Israel and Lebanon did not occur. One explanation is that public opinion was generally supportive of Hezbollah and was not interested in the Lebanese government pursuing peace and normalization with Israel. Since Lebanon was no longer strictly controlled by Syria in 2006, it is possible that the parliament would be able to respond to public opinion more compared to the past. A Gallup poll from 2006 states that "nearly half (48%) of all Lebanese respondents Gallup

interviewed say they personally have a better view of Hezbollah than the one they held prior to the conflict (including 33% "much better"), while one-quarter of Lebanese respondents say their view of the group has worsened" (Gallup, 2006). Surprisingly, Christians were the least affected by the 2006 war. According to Gallup, "Christians are the least affected, with roughly one-third (34%) saying they now hold a better opinion of Hezbollah, another one-third (32%) saying their opinion has worsened, and the remainder indicating that their appraisal has remained unchanged" (Gallup, 2006). Despite Israel's intention to turn public opinion against Hezbollah, Lebanese public opinion was either unchanged or more supportive of Hezbollah than before the conflict. Thus, it is possible that the public was not pushing the Lebanese government to normalize relations with Israel and preferred Hezbollah's offensive tactics against Israel instead.

Another plausible explanation as to why normalization was not pursued by Israel and Lebanon following the 2006 conflict was because both sides adopted a deterrence strategy instead of a normalization treaty (Samaan, 2014). It is possible that both Israel and Lebanon understood the devastation that the next round of fighting could occur and chose to adopt a deterrence policy rather than formal normalization. It is possible that both Lebanese and Israeli foreign policymakers knew a normalization agreement was not possible between Israel and Hezbollah and left both Israel and Hezbollah to adopt a policy of deterrence to preserve peace.

While both Jordanian and Lebanese policymakers were influenced by foreign powers when attempting to establish normalized relations with Israel, Jordan did not have a militaristic political group such as Hezbollah that was actively trying to remove Israeli influence from the country. Furthermore, Israel was occupying Lebanon in 1983 and 2000 while trying to establish normalized relations with Lebanon which was not the case for Jordan. Both countries, however, did have formal agreements linking them to external powers: the Treaty of Brotherhood

Cooperation and Coordination between Syria and Lebanon and the Free Trade Agreement between the U.S. and Jordan. Both countries border Israel but had vastly different security concerns. To Hezbollah, Lebanon's survival hinged on the removal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon rather than a peace treaty. For Jordan, establishing peace with Israel and reaping the economic benefits of normalization with Israel was important regime survival. In Jordan's case, public opinion did not seem to matter to the ruling elite except in 2003 where King Hussein refused to support the CIA removal of Arafat. It is possible that King Hussein did not want to anger the public by showing his disapproval over the Intifada. In Lebanon, public opinion was often undermined because Syria and Gulf states either controlled or exercised immense influence over Lebanon's foreign policy. However, in 2006 following Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon, public opinion was generally supportive or indifferent towards Hezbollah which could be why peace between Lebanon and Israel has not been achieved.

Conclusion

This paper has shown that foreign powers were able to shape the calculus of Lebanese and Jordanian foreign-policy elites who were pursuing normalized relations with Israel. In Jordan's case, foreign influence promoted peace with Israel. In Lebanon's case, foreign influence prevented peace with Israel. Public opinion played a marginal role in influencing the political elite in both countries. However, it may have not been completely absent from the policy makers' decision-making calculations. This research shows that multiple factors such as foreign influence, economy, domestic political actors, and public opinion need to be examined together to make sense of why elites make certain foreign policy decisions. This research also has

applications today. Israel's latest siege on Gaza that began in 2023 has sparked public uprisings in Jordan. Jordanians are calling for the government to break the 1994 normalization treaty in response to Israel's violence in Gaza. Whether King Abdullah II will break the normalization treaty with Israel or maintain the treaty in the face of public uprisings remains to be seen. Furthermore, Israel sent airstrikes in February of this year to villages in southern Lebanon injuring 14 people, most of which were Syrian workers. The Israeli government claimed they were responding to a drone sent by Hezbollah to Israel. This escalation is strangely similar the events that took place in 2006, which begs the question of whether Lebanon and Israel will eventually normalize relations or return to their deterrence strategy. The Lebanese public have spoken out against Western support for Israel in their protests at the French Embassy in Beirut which further complicates the potential for a future normalization process. Whether the Jordanian and Lebanese governments will reassess their relationship to Israel following Israel's current siege on Gaza remains to be seen.

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