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Claremont McKenna College

Media Merger Madness: An Event Study Analyzing Acquiror
Returns in Media & Entertainment

submitted to

Professor Murat Binay

by

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for

Senior Thesis

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Abstract

Utilizing an event study methodology, this paper studies the effect that mergers and acquisitions (M&A) announcements have on media acquirors' stock returns. This study also examines the effect that various characteristics of the target and acquiror have on acquirors' returns. These characteristics include: location of the acquired company, year of the acquisition, industry of the acquired company, price of the acquired company, size of the acquiror, and serial acquiror status of the acquiror. My findings are consistent with previous literature that find that, in a short-term event window surrounding the announcement of a merger or acquisition, acquirors experience returns that are not significantly different from zero, on average. Additionally, my results indicate that an increased acquiror size corresponds with a predicted increase in acquiror returns and that acquisitions of media companies correspond with a predicted decrease in acquiror returns.

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I. Introduction

With increased competition and globalization, it is getting increasingly difficult for companies in mature markets to carve out market share and grow through organic strategies. This is especially true for the media and entertainment industry. Because entertainment content is so subjective and rooted in consumer preference, the industry is constantly forced to assess and evolve to stay relevant. In recent years, primary trends are the increased importance of technological capabilities, the emergence of streaming services, and the aggressive acquisition of content.¹ These industry drivers make acquisitions aimed at these areas particularly attractive to firms in the space.

There is a gap in literature concerning whether American media companies' acquisitions are creating value and what factors are significantly related to the creation of value. Given the aforementioned industry shifts and the significant market success of companies like Disney and Netflix have recently experienced, this paper will explore how much, if any, value that media mergers have for the acquiror. In addition to determining if acquiring firms recognize financial value from an acquisition, characteristics of both the acquired company and acquiror are examined to better understand the variation in acquiror returns.

I utilize an event study methodology to determine value created by mergers over the past two decades. By calculating the cumulative abnormal return for an acquiring company in a short time window around the announcement of a merger, the market's reaction to the event can be quantified. I also regress various factors that are

¹ "Standing out from the crowd: How media and entertainment companies can use M&A to secure the content, customers and capabilities they need to differentiate" *Deloitte Insights Case Study*, 2020

hypothesized to affect the market's reaction to the acquisition such as the target's industry and country of origin, deal price, acquiror's size, serial acquiror status of the acquiror, and year that the acquisition occurred in against the cumulative abnormal return.

On average, I discovered that there is not a significant return for acquiring firms in the media and entertainment industry. At the p-value of less than 0.20 level, there was a small slightly negative cumulative abnormal return that arose during the short-term merger window. The factors studied had various levels of significance, depending on the model utilized and number of observations available with the data. In Model XI, size of the acquiror had a statistically significant (p-value < 0.05) positive impact on acquiror returns. In Model XII, media purchases were found to have a statistically significant negative impact on acquiror returns.

A. Literature Review

This literature review focuses on previous papers that analyze mergers and acquisitions using an event study methodology to study merger announcements. Additionally, I provide an overview of the recent changes in the media and entertainment industry and the factors that may be associated with the uptick in merger activity in the industry.²

A.1. M&A Literature

Given the frequency of acquisitions despite very high failure rate that some estimate to be between 70% and 90%,³ studying the value creation from M&A is

² Refer to Chart I

³ "The New M&A Playbook" *Christensen, Alton, Rising, Waldeck*, Harvard Business Review, March 2011

essential to understanding why firms continue to acquire and what benefits they receive. Before getting into how to measure this, it's essential to understand why firms acquire and what outcomes acquisitions create.

Given that mergers and acquisitions have been happening since the creation of businesses, there is significant literature focused on examining M&A performance. Das and Kapil (2012) provided a review of empirical research that serves as a solid foundation for my research. By reviewing 48 different empirical M&A papers (funneled down from 730 between 1990 and 2010), the authors create a comprehensive review of past literature. Additionally, they detail how there are large discrepancies between findings on the success of M&A, despite being an extremely common avenue for growth.

Through this meta-analysis, the dependent variables utilized to measure M&A success are accounting measures, market-related measures, other objective measures, and subjective measures. Accounting measures are usually centered around growth or return, such as ROE and NPV of acquisition to the acquiror. Most market-related measures utilize a short-term stock performance event study methodology. Other objective measures feature combined variables related to accounting and event studies or new measures such as employee growth rate or number of patents granted post-acquisition. Subjective measures include quality of innovation and satisfaction.

To better understand the underlying reasons for acquisitions, Haleblan et al. (2009) developed a framework by reviewing 167 empirical studies from 1992 to 2009 focused on quantitative acquisition research. They found the primary reasons for acquisitions to be value creation, managerial self-interest, environmental factors, and firm characteristics. The moderators of acquisitions include deal characteristics, managerial

effects, firm characteristics, and environmental factors. Outcomes are primarily focused on performance and include acquisition premiums, turnover, and customer and bondholder outcomes.

In addition to studying why mergers occur, Dilshad (2013) detailed why mergers and acquisitions fail, citing flawed strategy and objective clarity, poor integration planning, cultural differences, lack of experience and knowledge, over-optimism, and a difficult external environment.

Once understanding why M&A occurs, methods for testing the success were reviewed. Andrade et al. (2001) details how event studies work and why they are the best measure for judging the success of M&A. In short-term event studies, “the average abnormal stock market reaction at merger announcement is used as a gauge of value creation or destruction.” Per Dilshad (2013), abnormal returns are “the part of the return that is not predicted by the market index.” Event studies are viewed as valid measures based upon the assumption that global capital markets are efficient and react quickly following public information changes such as a merger announcement. Common time windows are comparing a day or two before and after the announcement of a merger and one prior to the announcement and one when the transaction closes.

Andrade et al. (2001) found, from 1973-1998, the abnormal returns for the target when comparing the day before and after announcement date averages 16.0%, while the acquiror’s abnormal return is -0.7%. This trend survives throughout each decade and highlights how the market views both the target and acquiror. Additionally, Agrawal et al. (1992) found that in 765 mergers between 1955 and 1987, acquirors experience negative cumulative abnormal returns in the medium to long-term (1 month to 60

months). Overall, short-term event studies are viewed as better measures for M&A value judgement than long-term event studies because of confounding events that occur in the long-run, long-term abnormal performance face difficulties getting statistically significant results with expected returns over time varying greatly, and the controversial assumption that abnormal returns are independent across firms.

Next, in line with Andrade et al. (2001), Dutordoir et al. (2020) found that, on average, the target firm experiences positive abnormal returns at announcement. However, they found that there has been a significant decline in the magnitude of positive abnormal returns, decreasing from 10% in the 1980s to 2% after 2010. There are two explanations for this that are related to different hypotheses about target returns. The deal anticipation hypothesis assumes legal trading activity drives returns. The insider trading hypothesis argues illegal trading by insiders drives returns. Dutordoir (2020) tested whether deal anticipation or changes in deal and firm characteristics impacts the decline and did not find significant results. However, he found that more stringent insider trading rules was related to the decline in target abnormal returns, suggesting validity for the insider trading hypothesis.

For event study methodologies, Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is the primary tool to test hypotheses. Detailed by Agrawal et al. (1992), there are a few different methods for calculating cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). These include the Market model, Market-adjusted Model, Fama French Model, and Carhart Model. Brown and Warner (1985) found that the different methods for calculating CAR did not have an effect when the event period is short.

A.2. Media & Entertainment Literature

Although there has been a significant amount of research focusing on M&A, there are very few that specifically cover American media and entertainment companies. Specifically, there has not been an empirical study examining American companies in the space in the past 5 years, when there have been several significant media mergers and an uptick in deals in the movies, music, and entertainment sector.

Given lack of academic empirical studies focusing on media & entertainment, practitioners reports were utilized to provide a basis for examining M&A in the space further. Deloitte's Center for Technology, Media & Telecommunications (2020) released a report detailing recent trends and the future of M&A in TMT. From 2014 to 2020, companies had spent more than \$700 billion on M&A in media and entertainment. With massive deals like Walt Disney Co's acquisition of Twenty First Century Fox and AT&T's acquisition of TimeWarner, the industry has rapidly evolved in recent history. Deloitte detailed the variety of reasons for these high levels of M&A activity and deal volume.

First, there has been an explosion of content creation, evidenced by the volume of scripted original TV shows across networks and digital platforms jumping from 216 in 2010 to 532 in 2019. As content booms, so has the popularity of streaming, with 80% of consumers using at least one streaming service compared to 49% in 2017. As the number of streaming services continues to increase, there must be a decision point where consumers decide to focus their spending power on one. This inevitable consolidation is a large driver of M&A in the space.

Deloitte (2020) utilized their research and insider knowledge to create a list of three primary M&A implications for media and entertainment companies. First, players

will focus on providing differentiated content. As more and more content is released, quality becomes paramount to securing customer loyalty, driving acquisitions of those with premium content offerings. Second, firms who provide better streaming services will win the battle for streaming viewership (via a subscription model). In an effort to create better service offerings, companies should acquire those with sophisticated technology and software. Lastly, media and entertainment companies will be emphasizing the ability to monetize and target consumers. Utilizing acquisitions to improve data analytics can be a large differentiator in the streaming wars.

Katz (2021) offered further insight into Deloitte's claims in an article that emphasizes the reasons why consolidation and M&A are booming in the entertainment industry. Given the overwhelming number of streaming services and attractiveness of content aggregation created through M&A, he sees the streaming industry fitting into four distinct groups. First, there is a premium group for top content and streaming capabilities. Second, there is a niche group with targeted services towards specific media consumers. Third, there is a free group that focuses on using subscriptions for alternative business purposes. Fourth, there is a sports group focusing on providing athletic coverage. Mike Chapman, Partner and Americas Media Lead at Kearney, believes that streaming services will consolidate to form three to five major services and one or two niche services.

Although limited, there are some empirically based studies focusing on the media and entertainment sector. Thomas et al. (2020) utilized financial ratios pre and post-merger to analyze five entertainment company mergers, with a majority based in India.

Through studying two years before and two years after acquisition, it was found that the acquisition did not have a significant impact on their financial performance.

M&A in the growing South Korean entertainment and media industry has also been studied. N. Kim and J.H. Kim (2020) utilized a reliable event study methodology and found that acquirors earn approximately 8% CAR twenty days prior to announcement and 4% average abnormal return on the announcement date. This finding indicates that M&A slightly benefits acquiror share prices and signals positive investor sentiment in the entertainment and media industry.

Rheume and Bhabra (2008) found that between 1993 and 2005, there was positive wealth change for acquirors in “information-based industries”. These industries include telecommunications, computing, entertainment, electronics, and publications. These findings contrast with the general M&A literature that states that there is generally zero or negative wealth change for acquiring firms, when utilizing a short-term event study methodology. This study gives rise to a possible special quality about technology and/or entertainment companies that might be a determinant of a positive abnormal return for acquirors.

Lastly, a senior thesis completed at Claremont McKenna College found that media and entertainment acquirors did not earn returns that are statistically significant from 0, on average when studying 85 deals between 1998 and 2014 (Abdul-Rahim (2015)).

A.3. Theory and Hypotheses

My research attempts to answer questions surrounding the effect of M&A on American media and entertainment companies. The primary two questions that will be

examined empirically are: (1) What are the announcement effects for acquirors in the American media and entertainment industry? (2) What factors about the acquiror and acquired (target) company affect the announcement effect? All hypotheses are referring to the market announcement effect on returns for acquirors.

Hypothesis 1: The market announcement effect for acquirors in the American media and entertainment industry will be negative or zero, on average.

Andrade et al. (2001), Agrawal et al. (1992), and Healy et al. (1992) found that acquiror's earn insignificant returns in short term event windows following acquisition announcements. Despite some conflicting research for non-American companies, mentioned in the literature review, this is hypothesized to be the same case in my study of American media and entertainment companies.

Hypothesis 2: The announcement effect will be, on average, positive when the acquired company is headquartered outside of the United States. The effect will be opposite for acquired companies headquartered in the United States.

Peltier (2004) discovered that internationalization of media companies was positively correlated with positive economic and operational performance in a study of 11 media companies in 1998 and 1999. Similar results are expected in this study when reviewing the market effect rather than a firm-level effect.

Hypothesis 3: The announcement effect will vary based on industry of the acquired company. Specifically, acquirors that purchase software companies will realize positive announcement effects and those that purchase media companies will realize zero or negative effects, on average. All other industries examined will realize negative or zero returns following announcement, in line with Hypothesis 1.

Rheaume and Bhabra (2008) found that acquiring firms in different industries had different effects on returns for the acquiror. Specifically, they found that acquisitions of entertainment companies did not have significant effects, but telecommunications, electronics, information content, and information highways companies were associated with a positive change in cumulative abnormal returns. This finding, along with prior knowledge of software company stock growth in the past decade, led me to hypothesize that software acquisitions would generate positive returns.

Hypothesis 4: The announcement effect will be negatively related to the price paid for the target.

Discussed by Dong et al. (2006), higher target valuations are associated with equity rather than cash offers. In a sample of 3732 deals from 1978 to 2000, transactions using equity were found to have negative returns surrounding announcement. One possible reason for this is the overvaluation hypothesis, that asserts a company will use equity for a transaction because it believes its stock is overvalued. Another is the basic principle of overpayment: many acquisitions fail due to overpayment and higher target valuations may signal overpayment. Lastly, a company paying a larger price for an acquisition may signal to the market that they have exhausted all organic growth opportunities, discovered by Jovanovic and Braguinsky (2002).

Hypothesis 5: The announcement effect will be positive, on average, for media companies classified as serial acquirors, relative to non-serial acquirors.

Cihan and Tice (2014) found that acquirors who were diversified companies had higher acquisition announcement returns than acquirors who were business line focused in a 1678 deal sample between 1980 and 2010 across industries. The highly acquisitive

firms in my sample, such as Disney and Live Nation Entertainment, are diversified companies with multiple business lines, making me hypothesize they might generate positive returns, relative to less-diversified players. Additionally, serial acquirors may generate more positive returns due to the general psychological and economic theory that actors act in their best self-interest and if a company continually had acquisition failures it would probably stop acquiring more companies.

Hypothesis 6: The announcement effect will be, on average, negative for larger acquirors compared to smaller acquirors.

Moeller et al. (2003) that found there to be a significant size effect, with acquisitions by smaller acquirors generating returns 2% greater than larger acquirors, on average. Peltier (2004) also found that a media firm's size in an acquisition was negatively correlated with economic performance, measured by profit margin. I expect a similar result to occur for my data set of media and entertainment companies when testing how acquiror size affects CAR.

Hypothesis 7: There will be no statistically significant effect of time (in years) on acquiror returns.

There is no applicable evidence to suggest that recency of M&A would have a statistically significant effect on cumulative abnormal returns. Years are used as a control variable.

II. Data Description

A. *Sample Selection*

My analysis focused on M&A that occurred between 2000 and 2020 that featured American media company acquirors. This time period was chosen because it is long enough to analyze differences over time, has a large enough sample of acquisitions, and is recent enough to capture important trends in the industry.

I utilized Pitchbook to filter my search for deals. The Pitchbook database has significant data on acquisitions with breakdowns by industry that is judged as reliable due to daily updating and popularity of the resource in financial services. I underwent a step-by-step filter process to ensure I found the data set that would be applicable to my research questions. First, I limited the list to only deals with publicly traded American acquirors to ensure that stock data would be available to generate a cumulative abnormal return. Second, I limited deal types to only include M&A control transactions where the acquiror was the lead or sole investor. This solidified that an acquisition was the event rather than other types of deals such as corporate divestitures or reverse mergers. Third, and most importantly, I narrowed my search to include only acquirors in the “movies, music and entertainment” sub-sector.⁴ Pitchbook has a robust filtering process that categorizes primary industry group, primary industry sector, verticals, and primary industry code or sub-sector. I filtered down to the primary industry code to avoid getting firms that were not the focus of my research such as technology companies, information services companies, and publishing companies.

⁴ In this paper, when referring to “media” or “entertainment” companies, I am referencing companies who operate in the movies, music, and entertainment sub-sector, as defined by Pitchbook.

After filtering these criteria, and then using WRDS Event Study methodology to ensure data availability, 195 separate M&A deals were found since January 1st, 2000. These deals served as my primary data set to analyze. The additional information that I contracted through Pitchbook are announcement date, primary industry group and code, target headquarters location, and acquiror enterprise value. Deal price was also provided, but only for a limited number (N=92) of deals. A full deal list is provided at the end of the Appendix, in Table XIII.

B. Data Summary

A key facet to recognize for the data set utilized is the lack of public target firms. This relates to a unique component of the movies, music, and entertainment sector that I am researching; there are very few large public companies that dominate the space and frequently buy up smaller private companies to grow. Of the 195 total deals studied, none featured a publicly traded target company. This created limitations in calculating the total value of the acquisition, which would require calculating target cumulative abnormal returns.

An essential part of the success of an acquisition is the timing and market environment of the new combined company. My data indicated that a majority of deals in the space have occurred in the last five years. Because there is 21 years of data, quartiles were calculated based on 5.25-year time periods, or 5 year and 3 months. Of the 195 total deals, 11 occurred between January 2000 and March 2005 (6%), 58 occurred in the next five and a quarter year (30%), 50 occurred in the five and a quarter year following that (26%), and 76 deals occurred in the most recent five and a quarter year (39%). The most acquisitions in one year occurred in 2019, where there were 21 deals in the space. This

information provides validity to the nature of my research due to an increase in acquisitions in the market recently.

Second, global region information was provided and analyzed. Target firms headquartered in the Americas were the large majority, with 137 companies, good for 70% of the sample. Second was Europe with 45 companies and 23% of the sample. Asia had 8 deals or 4% of the sample. Both the Middle East and Oceania had 2 deals each, or 1% of the sample. Africa had 1 company or .5% of the total sample. Results are visible in Table III.

Next, analyzing target industry sectors yielded very interesting descriptive results. The largest target sector was media, with 73 acquired firms being categorized as such (37%). The next three largest were Commercial Services with 51 (26%), Software with 33 (17%), and Restaurants, Hotels, and Leisure with 13 (7%). All other industries had 4 or less companies, which corresponded to 2% of the total sample or less. Results are visible in Table II.

Lastly, interesting finding was the number of total acquirors in the sample. The data set was limited by time rather than acquiror, so multiple acquisitions from the same acquiror was possible. The 195 deals studied yielded only 24 acquirors. This hints at the fact that the M&A space in the industry is dominated by a few large hyper-acquisitive public players rather than a large number of companies who rarely pursue acquisitions. Of the 24 acquirors, 11 were found to be what I am categorizing as “serial acquirors”. I classified a company as a serial acquiror if it had acquired 5 or more companies in the past two decades. This sample was top heavy, with the 4 most acquisitive firms each having more than 10 acquisitions in the past 20 years. Live Nation Entertainment (LYV)

led the way with 63 acquisitions, good for 32% of the total sample. Second, was the Walt Disney Company (DIS) with 38 acquisitions or 19% of the total sample. Third was Avid Technology (AVID) with 14 acquisitions or 7% of the total sample. The fourth serial acquiror was Viad Corporation (VVI) with 12 acquisitions or 6% of the total acquisitions during the time period. Results are visible in Table I.

C. Cumulative Abnormal Returns Data

To calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the acquiring firms, I utilized Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). WRDS has an event study methodology software that allows one to input specific parameters and data regarding an event to generate CARs.

III. Event Study Methodology

Using WRDS software, I chose an estimation window of 100 days, a minimum number of valid returns at 70, a gap of 50 days between the estimation and event window, and an event window of two days prior to two days after announcement [-2,2]. These criteria were selected to ensure that cumulative abnormal returns were calculated correctly with available information on expected and abnormal returns in the time period determined by the announcement date. A [-2,2] event window was chosen to avoid any auxiliary factors that may affect the abnormal returns further before or after the acquisition. Calculating using 2 days before and after, rather than only 1 day, also allows there to be some leakage of information prior to announcement and some small lag in market reaction included in the calculation. This is consistent with literature on short-term event studies.

CARs were originally calculated using 4 different models: Market Model, Market-Adjusted Model, Fama French Three Factor Model, and Fama French Plus Momentum Model. In line with Brown and Warner (1985), no model yielded drastically different results from the rest, but the Fama French Three Factor Plus Momentum Model as defined by Carhart (1997) was utilized for the CARs because it had the most statistically significant results. The Fama French Plus Momentum Model expands upon the basic CAPM Market model to include market, style, size, and momentum factors, providing a more accurate calculation of abnormal returns. Utilizing this model to calculate abnormal returns is as follows

$$AR = R - E(R) = R - (Rf + \alpha + \beta_1 * (Rm - Rf) + \beta_2 * SMB + \beta_3 * HML + \beta_4 * MOM)$$

where AR is abnormal return, R is the actual return, $E(R)$ is the expected return, R_f is the risk-free rate, $R_m - R_f$ is the market risk premium, SMB is the difference between the return of a portfolio of small stocks minus the return of a portfolio of large stocks (i.e. size factor), HML is the return difference between cheap and expensive stocks, calculated based upon a portfolio with a high book-to market (B/M) ratio minus a low B/M portfolio (i.e. the value factor), and MOM is the average return of two high prior return portfolios minus the average return on the two low prior return portfolios. (i.e. the momentum factor). Abnormal returns are calculated each day of the event window and summed on day = +2 to determine the cumulative abnormal return for the company.

A Cross-Sectional T Test is utilized to test the significance of the event study, where the null hypothesis of the cross-sectional t test is that the mean of cumulative abnormal returns does not differ significantly from zero.

IV. Results

A. *Event Study*

The first results to analyze and interpret are the abnormal returns for the acquirors. Table IV reveals the results of the event study and supports Hypothesis 1 in displaying that acquiror announcement effects are not statistically significant from zero, on average.

There was a slight majority in deals that yielded negative cumulative abnormal returns, with 105 of 195 or 54% of acquirors. 90 deals (46%) yielded positive cumulative abnormal returns for the acquiror. However, with a cross-sectional t-score of -1.37 and p-value of .172, none of the cumulative abnormal returns was found to be statistically significant from zero at the 0.05 level. The mean of the cumulative abnormal returns was -0.59%, with a large variance leading to a standard error of .44%. The minimum CAR was -32.4% and the maximum was 21.3%.

B. *Continuous Variable Assignment*

There were a variety of factors that were considered and tested to find out the impact on the acquiror's CAR. The continuous variables that were regressed against the cumulative abnormal returns are detailed below.

Deal Price: For 92 of the 195 deals, data was available via Pitchbook on the deal price or deal size. This is the total price paid for the target at time of acquisition. A natural log was taken of this variable for help in interpretation ("Ln Deal Size").

Acquiror Size: The enterprise value of the acquiror at time of acquisition was also recorded and regressed against the CARs. In line with the rest of my study, data was

obtained through Pitchbook. A natural log was taken of this variable for help in interpretation (“Ln Acquiror Size”).

Years: A time effect was considered also. Data ranged from year 2000 to 2020. These yearly values were regressed against the CARs.

C. Dummy Variable Assignment

In order to effectively complete a linear regression analysis with interpretation possibilities, given available data, dummy or binary variables were created. These factors were regressed against the cumulative abnormal returns generated from the first part of the study. Dummy variable assignments are visible in Table V.

Global Region: The global region variable was split into 6 areas: Africa, Americas, Asia, Europe, Middle East, and Oceania. For the purpose of the study, targets headquartered in Americas were given a value of 1, with targets headquartered in all other territories being given a value of 0.

Industry: The industry variable was originally structured as a categorical variable. Acquired companies were split into 14 industry sectors. The industries are: Apparel and Accessories, Capital Markets/Institutions, Commercial Products, Commercial Services, Communications and Networking, Computer Hardware, Consumer Durables, Energy Equipment, IT Services, Media, Restaurants/Hotels/Leisure, Retail, Services (Non-Financial), and Software. To regress each variable with comparative interpretations, each sub-sector has been given a [1,0] variable designation, with the value corresponding to a CAR being 1 if the industry matches. More information is given in the abstract below Table X. For my primary regression analysis, I am looking at target companies in the same industry (media) versus a target company in any other industry.

Serial Acquiror: If an acquiror had 5 or more acquisitions in the period since the beginning of 2000, it was considered a serial acquiror. Serial acquirors were given a value of 1, where non-serial acquirors were given a value of 0.

D. Determinants of Announcement Effects (Cross-Sectional Regressions)

Following calculations of CARs for the event window surrounding an acquisition announcement, I regressed the CAR against different characteristics to find if they have an effect on the acquiror's announcement effects. To study individual effects, I ran 3 primary sets of models. For each model set, one regression utilized the entire N=195 data set and an additional regression was run that included deal price and had an N=92. The first models (Models I and II) focus only on factors related to the acquiror. The second set of models (Model III and IV) focus only on factors related to the target. The third and final model set (Model V and VI) look at how acquiror, target, and market factors impact the CAR. Overall, the different characteristics analyzed are (1) global region, (2) industry classification, (3) deal price, (4) time period in years, (5) serial acquiror classification, and (6) acquiror size.

For the cross-sectional regression analysis, I regressed each variable against the cumulative abnormal returns. For everything except deal price and acquiror size (which are continuous variables), I created a dummy variable to test impact on CAR. Each model regression formula is given below the model title.

Model I: Acquiror Only Factors

$$CAR_i = \beta_1 + LnAcquirorSize\beta_2 + SerialAcquiror\beta_3 + \varepsilon_i$$

The first model examined only factors related to the acquiror in the transaction. The model evaluated the impact of the size of the acquiror and whether the acquiror was determined to be a serial acquiror. As evident in Table VI, this model found the size of the acquiror to be significant at the $P < 0.10$ level. Holding all else fixed, a 1% increase in acquiror size is associated with a predicted increase in CAR of .37%. With a p-value of 0.8, I found that, relative to non-serial acquirors, acquisitions by serial acquirors were related to an increase in CAR of .27%. Given the high p-value, my results reject Hypothesis 6: that serial acquirors have a positive effect on CAR relative to non-serial acquirors.

Model II: Acquiror Only Factors (including deal price)

$$CAR_i = \beta_1 + LnAcquirorSize\beta_2 + SerialAcquiror\beta_3 + LnDealPrice\beta_4 + \varepsilon_i$$

When deal price was considered and the number of observations changed from 195 to 92, no statistically significant results were found. Directionally, both acquiror size and status as a serial acquiror continued to be associated with an increase in CAR. Results are presented in Table VII.

Model III: Target Only Factors

$$CAR_i = \beta_1 + GlobalRegion\beta_2 + IndustryRelation\beta_3 + \varepsilon_i$$

The second set of models evaluated only factors relating to the target. Model III analyzed the impact of global region and industry relation on the CAR. As evident in

table VIII, neither factor was found to be statistically significant. With a p-value of 0.9, I found that, relative to the acquired company being headquartered outside of the Americas, acquisitions of American companies corresponded with a decrease in CAR of 0.14%. With a high p-value, this result rejected Hypothesis 2, which predicted that acquisitions of international companies related to positive CARs. With a p-value of 0.8, I also found that, relative to acquisitions in unrelated industries, acquisitions of a company in the same industry (media) is associated with a decrease in CAR of .22%.

Model IV: Target Only Factors (including deal price)

$$CAR_i = \beta_1 + GlobalRegion\beta_2 + IndustryRelation\beta_3 + LnDealPrice\beta_4 + \varepsilon_i$$

When considering the deal price factor and decreasing the number of observations from 195 to 92, interesting results were found. As visible in Table IX, a target firm's location in the Americas was still found to be statistically insignificant from 0 and associated with a decrease in CAR. Next. At a $P < 0.10$ level, relative to acquisitions in unrelated industries, an acquisition of a company in the media industry was associated with a decrease in CAR of 3.0%. Lastly, the size of the deal was statistically significant at the 0.05 level, with a 1% increase in deal size corresponding with a predicted increase in CAR of .73%. These findings hint that acquisitions by media companies are viewed more negatively by the market than other industries and that larger deals are viewed more positively.

In addition to running cross-regressions with multiple independent variables, to test individual target industries on acquiror CAR, univariate regressions were ran with each individual industry in its dummy variable form. As visible in Table X, most

industries were found to have no statistically significant effect on CAR. Industries that are very statistically significant (Apparel and Accessories, Commercial Products, Energy Equipment, and IT Services) should be interpreted warily because each had extremely small sample sizes ($N < 4$) that overstate regression results. Disregarding significance, commercial products, commercial services, communications and networking, restaurants/hotels/leisure, retail, services, and software acquisitions were associated with a predicted increase in CAR. Some of my Hypothesis 3 was proven true. Though statistically insignificant, different target company industries yielded different effects on CARs. Additionally, Software companies were found to have a statistically insignificant positive effect on CARs.

Model V: Acquiror, Target, and Market Factor Model

$$CAR_i = \beta_1 + Years\beta_2 + GlobalRegion\beta_3 + IndustryRelation\beta_4 + LnAcquirorSize\beta_5 + SerialAcquiror\beta_5 + \varepsilon_i$$

The third and final model set looked at the impact that all available factors had on acquirors' CAR. It incorporated the variables from both Model I and Model III, while adding in the time variable "Years". Therefore, the variables tested were global region, industry relation, acquiror size, serial acquiror status, and years. Table XI reveals results of the regression. The size of the acquiror was the only variable with a statistically significant impact at the 0.05 level. Holding all else fixed, a 1% change in acquiror size was associated with a predicted increase in CAR of 0.41%. At a p-value of 0.7, a 1-year change was associated with a predicted decrease in CAR of 0.04%. With a p-value of 0.9, I found that, relative to the acquired company being headquartered outside of the

Americas, acquisitions of American companies corresponded with a decrease in CAR of 0.13% (in line with Model II). With a p-value of 0.5, I also found that, relative to an acquisition in an unrelated industry, an acquisition of a company in the same industry was associated with a decrease in CAR of 0.69% (in line directionally with Model II). Lastly, with a very insignificant p-value of 1.0, relative to non-serial acquirors, being a serial acquiror was associated with a decrease in CAR of .01%.

Model VI: Acquiror, Target, and Market Factor Model

$$CAR_i = \beta_1 + Years\beta_2 + GlobalRegion\beta_3 + IndustryRelation\beta_4 + LnAcquirorSize\beta_5 + SerialAcquiror\beta_6 + LnDealPrice\beta_7 + \varepsilon_i$$

Slightly different results were found when considering the deal price factor along with all other variables, visible in Table XII. In this regression, the only statistically significant results at the 0.05 level was industry relation. Where, relative to non-media targets, acquisitions of a media target were associated with a predicted decrease in CAR of 3.5%. This was a similar directional finding as in Model IV and V. The deal size variable was found to be significant at the 0.20 level, with a 1% change in deal size being associated with an increase in CAR of .57%. The size of the acquiror and global region variable had the same directional interpretations as in Model V, that excluded deal size.

V. Conclusion and Discussion

This study examines the effect of M&A announcements on cumulative abnormal returns for acquirors in the media and entertainment industry in the 21st century. Results were overall consistent with previous literature, finding that acquirors experienced cumulative abnormal returns that were statistically insignificant from 0, on average. My analysis hints that the American media and entertainment industry does not have special dynamics that lead to significant acquiror value creation as a result of a merger or acquisition.

Although the generation of cumulative abnormal returns yielded statistically insignificant results, my cross-regression analysis did find some significant findings. My primary finding, detailed in Table XI, was that an increase in acquiror enterprise value was associated with a predicted increase in CAR, leading me to reject Hypothesis 6. This result contradicts the findings of Moeller et al. (2003) that found large acquirors have average announcement returns that are 2% less than small acquirors'. One possible interpretation for this finding is that the entertainment industry is uniquely structured so that larger firms are generally viewed more positively than smaller firms. Because the barriers to entry are so high for companies like movie studios or movie theater chains, the market is dominated by a few big players that elbow each other out for small market share increases. These few top players, like AMC and ViacomCBS, then experience a more positive market reaction compared to smaller players.

Next, I discovered interesting results surrounding the effect of industry on CAR. Media, which was the most common target industry, yielded a large (3.5%) statistically significant negative effect on CAR in Model VI. This finding supported Hypothesis 3:

that acquired media companies would generate negative or zero returns, on average. One possible interpretation of this is that the market negatively views the movies, music, and entertainment industry as a whole. Given business models that are tied to consumer trends and artistic preferences, the cash flows and stability of businesses in this industry are likely to be more volatile. By acquiring companies in this media space rather than more predictable industries like those in the restaurant or commercial services space, the acquiror takes on more risk that may lead to negative returns around the announcement date.

The other 3 most common industries for acquisitions, Commercial Services, Restaurants/Hotels/Leisure, and Software yielded a (statistically insignificant) positive effect on CAR. A larger sample of software acquisitions may have had a statistically significant effect, as predicted by Hypothesis 3. Overall, software may have a more positive market reaction due to digitization trends and the increasing importance of top-notch software in the highly competitive entertainment industry.

The Commercial Services M&A market is dominated by Live Nation Entertainment with 34 of the 51 acquisitions (67%). A majority of the acquisitions are focused on event management services or companies that expanded digital service offerings such as marketing or staffing. Acquisitions of companies in this space are likely more attractive given their tech-enabled services and geographic synergies that are generally easier to integrate compared to other growth or cost cutting rationales for acquisitions. The restaurants, hotels, and leisure acquisitions vary greatly in target business model. There is a fairly even combination of restaurants, hotels, and film-related companies. A positive CAR in these industries could be reflective of the generally

positive view of the tourism industry during the time of the acquisition. The rest of the industries examined had a very small number of acquisitions, meaning that drawing clear rationales is likely a fool's errand.

Another interesting finding from my study was that the deal price corresponded with a predicted increase in CAR at $P < 0.10$ level (visible in Table XII), which would signal rejection of Hypothesis 4. This contrasted what Dong et al. (2002) found when looking at public to public transactions, where higher target valuations led to use of more stock, which in turn led to lower returns around the announcement date. One possible explanation is that acquisitions of private firms using equity does not decrease abnormal returns. This finding is supported by Chang (1998) which found that private firms acquired with stock between 1981 and 1992 had positive abnormal returns and Fuller et al. (2002) that found that acquisitions of private firms from 1990 to 2000 realized positive abnormal returns on average, regardless of method of payment. These studies provide evidence that private target firms spur different market reactions than public targets. For additional reasoning why an increase in deal price may correspond with an increase in CAR, it is possible that the market had a non-zero reaction because the bigger target companies were more well-known private companies that spurred a specific investor reaction.

When examining the impact of global region, I found contradicting findings in the literature. My results indicated that acquisitions of American companies corresponded with a (statistically insignificant) increase in CAR, relative to acquisitions of international companies, leading me to reject Hypothesis 2. One reason for this could be limitations of data, with only 58 international acquisitions utilized. Another explanation could be

specific to the media and entertainment industry. Purchasing international content or entertainment services may be viewed either negatively or agnostically by the United States market due to unfamiliarity and unpopularity of foreign media in the US.

Next, I found that there was no effect of time on CAR, supporting my Hypothesis 7. Even when split into 4 even time period quartiles, all results were statistically insignificant. The first, second, and fourth time periods yielded (statistically insignificant) negative relationships with CARs. Surprisingly, the third quartile had a positive (statistically insignificant) relationship with CAR. A possible explanation for this is the market rebound following the 2007-2009 recession. Views of the market were generally very bullish and contributed to positive CARs for media companies during this time period.

Lastly, my results found that there was no statistically significant relationship between serial acquirors and CAR, relative to non-serial acquirors. This finding rejected my Hypothesis 5. This finding would suggest that very acquisitive companies don't earn a financial benefit from acquisitions. Looking deeper at the data, the most acquisitive companies, Disney and Live Nation Entertainment, both had an overall negative average CAR when considering all acquisitions. Assuming that these companies have intelligent management, the firm must see value in acquisitions beyond their effect on short-term stock market returns.

In conclusion, my study found that, on average, abnormal returns for acquiror's in the media and entertainment space are not statistically different from zero. Additionally, I found that acquiror size and acquisitions of media companies had a significant impact on acquiror returns.

VI. Limitations & Suggestions for Future Research

My research and findings gave rise to a number of interesting questions that that would be helpful to study further. Additionally, there were a variety of limitations that must be acknowledged when considering my results. First, my data was limited, with my models having a number of observations of 92 or 195. This small sample size could have skewed the findings or led to possible insignificance that would change given a larger data set. Second, I focused on a very specific subset of the media and entertainment industry: companies in the movies, music, and entertainment sub-sector, as categorized by Pitchbook. No public acquiror in this space was found to acquire a public target. In future research, it would be helpful to measure a combined cumulative abnormal return (including the target) to get a fuller picture of the true wealth creation of the acquisition.

Next, my study utilized Pitchbook data as the main source. My research was therefore limited to what is available on that particular database. In future research on acquiror returns around an announcement, different factors would be interesting to study. For example, data on how the deal was financed, the specific strategy of the deal, and target financial data information may have an impact on the average CAR. Additionally, due to cost constraints, I was unable to download more than one data set, which limited possible number of observations because I could not re-download and complete the same analysis on a larger data set. Lastly, my research focused on a market measure to judge the value created by the merger, the cumulative abnormal return. For one, this measure assumes the efficient market hypothesis to be true. Also, there are other non-market ways to assess an acquisition such as accounting, operational, or qualitative analysis. Future

studies would benefit from considering the limitations of this study and expanding upon the research undertaken.

VII. Appendix

Table I. Acquisitions by Acquiror

Company Ticker	Number of Acquisitions	% of Total
AMC	5	3%
AMCX	6	3%
AVID	14	7%
CIDM	6	3%
CNK	4	2%
CSSE	3	2%
DIS	38	19%
EB	1	1%
FOXA	1	1%
GAIA	7	4%
IAC	4	2%
IHRT	1	1%
IMBI	1	1%
LYV	63	32%
MCS	2	1%
NCMI	1	1%
NFLX	3	2%
SAPX	2	1%
TIXC	1	1%
UEIC	5	3%
VIAC	7	4%
VVI	12	6%
WMG	6	3%
WWE	2	1%
Total	195	100%

Table I displays the total number of acquisitions by acquiror between 2000 and 2020. With only 24 acquirors, it's apparent that very few firms are acquisitive in the movies, music, and entertainment space. Additionally, the table shows that a few major players are highly acquisitive, with the top two most acquisitive companies (LYV and DIS) accounting for over 50% of total deal volume in the time period.

Table II. Acquisitions by Industry

Target Industry	Number of Acquisitions	% of Total
Apparel and Accessories	2	1%
Capital Markets/Institutions	1	1%
Commercial Products	3	2%
Commercial Services	51	26%
Communications and Networking	3	2%
Computer Hardware	1	1%
Consumer Durables	4	2%
Energy Equipment	2	1%
IT Services	1	1%
Media	73	37%
Restaurants, Hotels, and Leisure	13	7%
Retail	4	2%
Services (Non-Financial)	4	2%
Software	33	17%
Total	195	100%

Table II displays the total number of acquisitions made by a media company in each industry between 2000 and 2020. Media was the space with the most acquisitions, with commercial services coming in second, software in third; and restaurants, hotels, and leisure in fourth. The table shows that media companies acquire a diverse set of companies.

Table III. Acquisitions by Region

Global Region	Number of Acquisitions	% of Total
Africa	1	1%
Americas	137	70%
Asia	8	4%
Europe	45	23%
Middle East	2	1%
Oceania	2	1%
Total	195	100%

Table III displays the total number of acquisitions made by a media company in each region between 2000 and 2020. Most target companies were headquartered in the Americas (70%). The only other sizable region was Europe, with 45 acquisitions in the time period (23%).

Chart I. Number of Media Acquisitions Per Year




Chart I displays the total number of yearly acquisitions made by a media company between 2000 and 2020. There is a general increase in deal volume in the space. From 2000 to 2004 there were only 9 acquisitions, compared with 76 acquisitions from 2016 to 2020. This increase in deal volume in the movies, music, and entertainment sub-sector was a large motivator for this study.

Table IV. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (Daily) ⁵

Day Relative to Event	CAR	T-Stat
-2	-0.0032	(-2.00)***
-1	-0.0042	(-1.62)**
0	-0.0049	(-1.76)**
1	-0.0050	(-1.31)*
2	-0.0059	(-1.37)*


Table IV displays the acquirors' average daily cumulative abnormal returns for the data set described and an event window of [-2,2], with N=195. The cumulative abnormal returns were derived from the Fama French Three Factor Model Plus Momentum (Carhart (1997)). The total cumulative abnormal return 2 days after announcement was found to be -0.59% with a t-stat of -1.37. This result leads to the conclusion that, on average, acquirors do not earn an abnormal return that is statically significant from 0 at the 0.05 level.

⁵ P>|t| 0.20 = *, P>|t| = 0.10 = **, P>|t| = 0.05 = ***, P>|t| = 0.01 = ****

Chart II. Event Study Results for [-2,2] Event Window

Cumulative Abnormal Return: Mean & 95% Confidence Limits

There are 195 events in total with non-missing returns.




Highcharts.com

Chart II displays the acquirors average daily cumulative abnormal returns for the data set described and an event window of [-2,2], with N=195, graphically. Results show the gradual negative trend from 2 days before the announcement to 2 days following.

Chart III. Event Study Results for [-10,10] Event Window

Cumulative Abnormal Return: Mean & 95% Confidence Limits

There are 195 events in total with non-missing returns.



Highcharts.com

Chart III displays the acquirors average daily cumulative abnormal returns for the data set described and an event window of [-10,10], with N=195, graphically. Results show the gradual negative trend from 10 days before the announcement to 10 days following. There was a brief positive bump between 10 days before announcement to 8 days before announcement. This bump may be evidence of the insider trading hypothesis.

Table V. Dummy Variable Assignments for Cross-Sectional Regressions

Variable	$D_i = 1$	$D_i = 0$
Global Region	Americas	Other
Serial Acquiror	5 or More Acquisitions	4 or Less Acquisitions
Industry Relation	Media	All Others

Table V displays the variables that were assigned dummy variables utilized in my regression analysis. The first column shows the variable name. The second column shows the categorization of the variable that was given the value of 1. The final column shows the categorization of the variable that was given the value of 0, making the variable binary.

Table VI. Impact of Acquiror Factors on Acquirors' CAR⁶

Independent Variable	β (t-stat)	Std Error
Ln Acquiror Size	0.0037465 (1.81)**	0.0020697
Serial Acquiror	0.0027439 (0.21)	0.0129824

Table VI displays the results of Model I, the first regression of acquiror factors on cumulative abnormal returns (N=195). The model evaluated how acquiror size (natural logged for interpretation) and serial acquiror status affected cumulative abnormal returns of the acquiror. Acquiror size was found to have a statistically significant positive effect on CAR at the 0.10 level, whereas serial acquiror status was not found to be statistically significant from 0.

⁶ $P > |t| 0.20 = *$, $P > |t| = 0.10 = **$, $P > |t| = 0.05 = ***$, $P > |t| = 0.01 = ****$

Table VII. Impact of Acquiror Factors on Acquirors' CAR (including Deal Size)

Independent Variable	β (t-stat)	Std Error
Ln Acquiror Size	0.0014441 (0.36)	0.0040471
Serial Acquiror	0.0014925 (0.07)	0.021005
Ln Deal Price	0.0042055 (0.98)	0.0043117

Table VII displays the results of Model II, the second regression of acquiror factors on cumulative abnormal returns (N=92). The model evaluated how acquiror size (natural logged for interpretation), serial acquiror status, and deal price (natural logged for interpretation) affected cumulative abnormal returns of the acquiror. None of the results were found to be statistically significant from 0 in this model.

Table VIII. Impact of Target Factors on Acquirors' CAR

Independent Variable	β (t-stat)	Std Error
Global Region	-0.0014052 (-0.15)	0.0095123
Industry Relation	-0.0021546 (-0.24)	0.008985

Table VIII displays the results of Model III, the first regression of target factors on cumulative abnormal returns (N=195). The model evaluated how target headquarters region and industry relation to the acquiror affected cumulative abnormal returns of the acquiror. None of the results were found to be statistically significant from 0 in this model.

Table IX. Impact of Target Factors on Acquirors' CAR⁷ (including Deal Size)

Independent Variable	β (t-stat)	Std Error
Global Region	-0.0065305 (-0.36)	0.0183146
Industry Relation	-0.0298785 (-1.83)**	0.0163628
Ln Deal Price	0.0073497 (1.97)***	0.0037325

Table IX displays the results of Model IV, the second regression of target factors on cumulative abnormal returns (N=92). The model evaluated how target headquarters region, industry relation to the acquiror, and deal price (natural logged for interpretation) affected cumulative abnormal returns of the acquiror. At the 0.10 level, relative to an acquisition in an unrelated industry, an acquisition of a company in the same industry (media) was associated with a decrease in CAR of 3.0%. Also, at the 0.05 level, a 1% increase in deal price corresponded with a predicted increase in CAR of .73%. Global region was not found to be statistically significant from 0.

⁷ P>|t| 0.20 = *, P>|t| = 0.10 = **, P>|t| = 0.05 = ***, P>|t| = 0.01 = ****

Table X. Impact of Target Industry on Acquirors' CAR⁸		
Independent Variable	β (t-stat)	Std Error
Media	-0.0021765 (-0.24)	0.008961
Apparel and Accessories	-0.1004317 (-2.37)***	0.0424382
Capital Markets/Institutions	-0.0370695 (-0.61)	0.0606655
Commercial Products	0.0527431 (1.51)*	0.0350361
Commercial Services	0.0059328 (0.60)	0.0098603
Communications and Networking	0.004254 (0.12)	0.0352399
Computer Hardware	-0.0523311 (-0.86)	0.0606072
Consumer Durables	-0.0297629 (-0.98)	0.0305245
Energy Equipment	-0.0685162 (-1.60)*	0.0427661
IT Services	-0.1583941 (-2.66)****	0.0596442
Restaurants Hotels and Leisure	0.0068035 (0.39)	0.0173813
Retail	0.0117229 (0.38)	0.0305879
Services (Non-Financial)	0.0024251 (0.08)	0.0305991
Software	0.009746 (0.84)	0.0115464

Table X displays the results of separate univariate regressions evaluating the effect of target company industry on cumulative abnormal returns (N=195). Each β coefficient represents a regression where the industry variable listed was a dummy variable, with being in that industry given a value of 1 and not being in the industry given a value of 0. Therefore, each result should be interpreted as “relative to all other industries, an acquisition in this industry is associated with a predicted change in CAR”. The regression aims to answer questions surrounding how acquisitions in different industries are valued. The only results that were statistically significant from 0 had $N < 4$, so interpretations should be cautious given small sample size.

⁸ $P > |t| = 0.20 = *$, $P > |t| = 0.10 = **$, $P > |t| = 0.05 = ***$, $P > |t| = 0.01 = ****$

Table XI. Impact of Acquiror, Target, & Market Factors on Acquirors' CAR⁹

Independent Variable	β (t-stat)	Std Error
Years	-0.000434 (-0.49)	0.0008857
Global Region	-0.0013061 (-0.13)	0.010114
Industry Relation	-0.0069297 (-0.73)	0.0094557
Ln Acquiror Size	0.0041363 (-1.94)***	0.0021359
Serial Acquiror	-0.0001248 (-0.01)	0.0139131

Table XI displays the results of Model V, the first regression of all factors on cumulative abnormal returns (N=195). The model evaluated how years, target headquarters region, industry relation to the acquiror, acquiror size (natural logged for interpretation), and serial acquiror status affected cumulative abnormal returns of the acquiror. At the 0.05 level, a 1% increase in acquiror size corresponded with a predicted increase in CAR of .41%. All other variables were not found to be statistically significant from 0 in this model.

⁹ $P > |t| 0.20 = *$, $P > |t| 0.10 = **$, $P > |t| 0.05 = ***$, $P > |t| 0.01 = ****$

Table XII. Impact of Acquiror, Target, & Market Factors on Acquiror's CAR (Including Deal Size)¹⁰

Independent Variable	β (t-stat)	Std Error
Years	0.0006419 (0.42)	0.0015422
Global Region	-0.0059739 (-0.31)	0.0193536
Industry Relation	-0.035412 (-2.04)***	0.0173811
Ln Acquiror Size	0.0034839 (0.83)	0.0041742
Serial Acquiror	0.0036245 (0.16)	0.0226823
Ln Deal Price	0.0057872 (1.32)*	0.0043749

Table XII displays the results of Model VI, the second regression of all factors on cumulative abnormal returns (N=92). The model evaluated how years, target headquarters region, industry relation to the acquiror, acquiror size (natural logged for interpretation), serial acquiror status, and deal price (natural logged for interpretation) affected cumulative abnormal returns of the acquiror. At the 0.05 level, relative to non-media targets, acquisitions of a media target were associated with a predicted decrease in CAR of 3.5%. The deal price variable was found to be significant at the 0.20 level, with a 1% change in deal price being associated with an increase in CAR of .57%.

¹⁰ P>|t| 0.20 = *, P>|t| = 0.10 = **, P>|t| = 0.05 = ***, P>|t| = 0.01 = ****

Table XIII. Deal List (N=195)

Acquiror	Target	Announcement Date
AMC Theatres (NYS: AMC)	Starplex Cinemas	14-Jul-2015
AMC Theatres (NYS: AMC)	Carmike Cinemas	03-Mar-2016
AMC Theatres (NYS: AMC)	ODEON Cinemas	12-May-2016
AMC Theatres (NYS: AMC)	Nordic Cinema Group	23-Jan-2017
AMC Theatres (NYS: AMC)	Cinetopia	23-May-2019
AMC Networks (NAS: AMCX)	Chellomedia	28-Oct-2013
AMC Networks (NAS: AMCX)	RLJ Entertainment	26-Feb-2018
AMC Networks (NAS: AMCX)	Levity Entertainment Group	20-Apr-2018
AMC Networks (NAS: AMCX)	IKO Media Group (Film+)	02-Feb-2015
AMC Networks (NAS: AMCX)	Kinowelt Television	24-Apr-2014
AMC Networks (NAS: AMCX)	Riverwood Studios	04-Aug-2017
Avid Technology (NAS: AVID)	Blue Order Technologies Solutions	05-Jan-2010
Avid Technology (NAS: AVID)	Euphonix	12-Apr-2010
Avid Technology (NAS: AVID)	Maximum Throughput	31-Jul-2009
Avid Technology (NAS: AVID)	Medéa Corporation	12-Jan-2006
Avid Technology (NAS: AVID)	M-Audio	20-Aug-2004
Avid Technology (NAS: AVID)	Sundance Digital	13-Apr-2006
Avid Technology (NAS: AVID)	NxN Digital Entertainment	02-Jan-2004
Avid Technology (NAS: AVID)	Pluto Technologies International	07-Sep-2000
Avid Technology (NAS: AVID)	Sibelius Software	02-Aug-2006
Avid Technology (NAS: AVID)	Wizoo Sound Design	22-Aug-2005
Avid Technology (NAS: AVID)	Pinnacle Systems	09-Aug-2005
Avid Technology (NAS: AVID)	Rocket Network	04-Apr-2003
Avid Technology (NAS: AVID)	iKnowledge	29-Oct-2002
Avid Technology (NAS: AVID)	The Motion Factory	29-Jun-2000
Cinedigm (NAS: CIDM)	Gaiam Vivendi Entertainment	17-Oct-2013
Cinedigm (NAS: CIDM)	New Video Group	19-Apr-2012
Cinedigm (NAS: CIDM)	The Film Detective	19-Oct-2020
Cinedigm (NAS: CIDM)	ComicBlitz	28-Nov-2018
Cinedigm (NAS: CIDM)	StoryBox.tv	18-May-2016
Cinedigm (NAS: CIDM)	Viewster	10-Dec-2018
Cinemark Theatres (NYS: CNK)	Circuito Espaço de Cinema	09-Apr-2018
Cinemark Theatres (NYS: CNK)	Hoyts General Cinema South America	25-Aug-2011
Cinemark Theatres (NYS: CNK)	Sea Turtle Cinemas	03-May-2011
Cinemark Theatres (NYS: CNK)	Rave Cinemas	16-Nov-2012
Chicken Soup for the Soul Entertainment (NAS: CSSE)	Truli Media Group (OTC: TRLI)	25-Oct-2018
Chicken Soup for the Soul Entertainment (NAS: CSSE)	Pivotshare	14-Aug-2018

Chicken Soup for the Soul Entertainment (NAS: CSSE)	Crackle	14-May-2019
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	US Weekly	28-Feb-2001
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	Fox Family Worldwide	24-Oct-2001
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	The Baby Einstein Company	06-Nov-2001
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	Avalanche Software	01-Apr-2005
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	Mind Eye Productions	08-Jun-2005
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	Pixar	05-May-2006
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	United Home Entertainment	26-Jul-2006
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	Mobile2win China	06-Mar-2006
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	Black Rock Studio	28-Sep-2006
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	Enorbus Technologies	19-Mar-2007
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	Junction Point Studios	12-Jul-2007
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	Club Penguin Island	01-Aug-2007
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	Iparenting	04-Dec-2007
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	The Walt Disney (Disney Store North America)	26-Mar-2008
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	Ideal Bite	12-Jun-2008
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	FanLib	02-Sep-2008
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	UTV Software Communications	29-Sep-2008
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	DigiSynd	20-Oct-2008
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	Kerpoof	20-Feb-2009
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	Amazingmoms.com	01-Apr-2009
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	Marvel Entertainment	31-Dec-2009
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	The Disney Store Japan	31-Mar-2010
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	Tapulous	01-Jul-2010
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	Playdom	27-Jul-2010
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	Togetherville	23-Feb-2011
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	Rocket Pack	03-Mar-2011
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	Babble	14-Nov-2011
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	One True Media	01-Jun-2012
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	Das Vierte	24-Sep-2012
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	Studio Ex	10-Dec-2012
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	Lucasfilm	31-October-2012
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	Maker Studios	25-Mar-2014
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	Euro Disney	06-Oct-2014
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	MakieLab	01-Jul-2016
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	BamTech	08-Aug-2017
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	SportsTime Ohio	05-Dec-2017
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	21st Century Fox	20-Jun-2018
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)	Fox Sports Mexico	20-Mar-2019
Eventbrite (NYS: EB)	ToneDen	16-Nov-2020
Fox Corporation (NAS: FOXA)(Lachlan Murdoch)	Tubi (Movies, Music and Entertainment)	17-Mar-2020

Gaia (Colorado) (NAS: GAIA)	Fresh Eye Productions	08-Nov-2013
Gaia (Colorado) (NAS: GAIA)	GoodTimes Brands Holdings	30-Sep-2005
Gaia (Colorado) (NAS: GAIA)	SPRI Products	10-Mar-2008
Gaia (Colorado) (NAS: GAIA)	Conscious Enlightenment	02-Jul-2007
Gaia (Colorado) (NAS: GAIA)	Real Goods Trading	02-Jan-2001
Gaia (Colorado) (NAS: GAIA)	Zaadz	06-Aug-2007
Gaia (Colorado) (NAS: GAIA)	Yoga Studio	16-Oct-2014
IAC (NAS: IAC)	Vivian Health	26-Jun-2019
IAC (NAS: IAC)	Bluecrew	26-Feb-2018
IAC (NAS: IAC)	Care.com	20-Dec-2019
IAC (NAS: IAC)	TelTech Systems	01-Oct-2018
iHeartMedia (NAS: IHRT)(Robert Pittman)	Voxnest	22-Oct-2020
iMedia Brands (NAS: IMBI)	J.W. Hulme	26-Nov-2019
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Musictoday	31-Jul-2006
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	HOB Entertainment	06-Nov-2006
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Live Nation Espana	19-Dec-2006
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	TRUNK	27-Apr-2007
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Bamboozle Festival	04-Sep-2007
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Anthill Trading	31-Oct-2007
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Live Nation Merchandise	15-Nov-2007
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	DF Concerts & Events	10-Apr-2008
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Live Nation Middle East FZ	15-Feb-2008
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Lugerinc	17-Jun-2008
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Ticketmaster Entertainment	02-Jan-2009
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Ticketmaster International	09-Nov-2010
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Front Line Management Companies	07-Feb-2011
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	BigChampagne Media Measurement	14-Dec-2011
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Setlist.fm	06-Mar-2012
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Michael Coppel Presents	04-Apr-2012
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Cream Holdings	09-May-2012
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	HARD Events	26-Jun-2012
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Rexly	16-Jul-2012
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Maverick Management	02-Jan-2013
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Insomniac Events	02-May-2013
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	BDG Music Group	19-Jun-2013
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Ticketnet Belgium	21-Oct-2013
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Sherpa.be	09-Sep-2014
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	C3 Presents	06-Oct-2014
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Starr Hill Presents	12-Jan-2015
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Front Gate Tickets	09-Jun-2015
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Mama & Company	07-Aug-2014
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Arts Club	11-Aug-2015

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	InDMusic	16-Feb-2016
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Big Concerts International Proprietary	22-Feb-2016
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Founders Entertainment	21-March-2016
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	GreenLight Media and Marketing	04-May-2016
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Nous Productions	01-Aug-2016
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	AC Entertainment	31-Oct-2016
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Sweden Rock Festival	22-Nov-2016
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Secret Sounds Connect	05-Dec-2016
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Pristine Alpine Entertainment	03-Jan-2017
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Bottlerock	13-Jan-2017
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Isle of Wight Festival	17-Mar-2017
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	United Concerts	04-Oct-2017
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Big Loud Management	09-Nov-2017
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Frank Productions	11-Jan-2018
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Songkick	12-Jan-2018
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Soda Jerk Presents	09-Jan-2018
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Wolfson Entertainment	05-Apr-2018
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	ScoreMore (concert promoters)	30-May-2018
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Red Mountain Entertainment	27-Jun-2018
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	DF Entertainment	20-Dec-2018
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	ONE Production	28-Jan-2019
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Embrace Presents	05-Feb-2019
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Planet Events	06-Feb-2019
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Neste Live	12-Feb-2019
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Blockfest	15-Feb-2019
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Tons of Rock	21-Feb-2019
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Levitate Music and Arts Festival	25-Apr-2019
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	PDH Music	14-May-2019
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Spaceland Presents	17-May-2019
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Go Ahead	03-Jun-2019
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	OCESA	25-Jul-2019
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Hög Agency	02-Oct-2019
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Groot Hospitality	21-Oct-2019
Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)	Bergen Live	28-Feb-2020
The Marcus Corporation (NYS: MCS)	Safe House	15-Jun-2015
The Marcus Corporation (NYS: MCS)	Wyndham Milwaukee Center Hotel	27-May-2005
National Cinemedia (NAS: NCMI)	Fantasy Movie League	17-May-2017
Netflix (NAS: NFLX)	ABQ studios	19-Nov-2018
Netflix (NAS: NFLX)	StoryBots	09-May-2019
Netflix (NAS: NFLX)	Millarworld	07-Aug-2017
Wireless Connect (PINX: SAPX)	Big Jake Music	23-Aug-2011
Wireless Connect (PINX: SAPX)	Seven Arts Filmed Entertainment Louisiana	02-Jul-2012

Tix (PINX: TIXC)	All Access Entertainment	02-Mar-2010
Universal Electronics (NAS: UEIC)	Enson Assets	04-Nov-2010
Universal Electronics (NAS: UEIC)	Ecolink Intelligent Technology	06-Aug-2015
Universal Electronics (NAS: UEIC)	RCS Technology	06-Apr-2017
Universal Electronics (NAS: UEIC)	Zilog (Remote Control Software)	01-Feb-2018
Universal Electronics (NAS: UEIC)	Simpledevices	04-Oct-2004
ViacomCBS (NAS: VIAC)	Wallstrip.com	21-May-2007
ViacomCBS (NAS: VIAC)	CSTV Networks	04-Nov-2005
ViacomCBS (NAS: VIAC)	CBS Outernet	06-Sep-2007
ViacomCBS (NAS: VIAC)	Ananey Communications	06-Apr-2020
ViacomCBS (NAS: VIAC)	The Insider	10-Oct-2007
ViacomCBS (NAS: VIAC)	Last.fm	30-May-2007
ViacomCBS (NAS: VIAC)	MaxPreps	04-Apr-2007
Viad (NYS: VVI)	Esja Attractions	03-Nov-2017
Viad (NYS: VVI)	ON Services	11-Aug-2016
Viad (NYS: VVI)	N200	24-Nov-2014
Viad (NYS: VVI)	Resource Creative	19-Feb-2013
Viad (NYS: VVI)	Becker Group	04-Jan-2008
Viad (NYS: VVI)	FlyOver Canada	29-Dec-2016
Viad (NYS: VVI)	Alaska Collection	11-Mar-2016
Viad (NYS: VVI)	Maligne Tours	04-Jan-2016
Viad (NYS: VVI)	West Glacier Motel & Cabins	01-Jul-2014
Viad (NYS: VVI)	Banff International Hotel	07-Mar-2012
Viad (NYS: VVI)	Travel Technology Group	07-Oct-2014
Viad (NYS: VVI)	Mountain Park Lodges	10-Jun-2019
Warner Music Group (NAS: WMG)	Mariann Grammofon	19-May-2006
Warner Music Group (NAS: WMG)	The Rights Company	28-Nov-2006
Warner Music Group (NAS: WMG)	ZebraLution	22-Jan-2007
Warner Music Group (NAS: WMG)	Base Camp Productions	02-Jan-2009
Warner Music Group (NAS: WMG)	Frank Sinatra Enterprises	19-Nov-2009
Warner Music Group (NAS: WMG)	Artist Arena	04-Jan-2010
World Wrestling Entertainment (NYS: WWE)	EVOLVE Wrestling	02-Jul-2020
World Wrestling Entertainment (NYS: WWE)	Universal Wrestling Archives	11-Jun-2012

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