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'IT'S LIKE BAKING A CAKE': AN ANALYSIS OF CONSCIENCE
VOTING IN THE NEW ZEALAND HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES SINCE THE INTRODUCTION OF THE
MIXED-MEMBER PROPORTIONAL SYSTEM IN 1996

SUBMITTED TO

PROFESSOR ERIC HELLAND

BY

HARRISON G. HOSKING

FOR

PUBLIC POLICY (HONORS) SENIOR THESIS

FALL 2021

DECEMBER 6, 2021

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Abstract:

Conscience voting in the New Zealand House of Representatives offers a unique opportunity to assess Sam Peltzman's 'Principal-Agent Theory' as outlined in his 1984 paper, *Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting*.

In this thesis I will conduct a brief of assessment of the principal-agent model (and other literature regarding parliamentary representation) before looking at the New Zealand Parliamentary system as well as the phenomenon of private member's bills and how they aid the legislative process before exploring the dataset of conscience votes that have occurred since the inception of the mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral system in 1996. This is then followed by an analysis of the conscience voting patterns of the 52nd Parliament and an attempt to form an ideology score for each Members of Parliament present since the 45th Parliament, based purely off of a subset of these conscience votes. This followed upon by regression and statistical prediction analysis that aims to capture a measure of legislative shirking as well as assessing the strength of the principal-agent theory when it comes to conscience voting and the various principals that comprise it. Finally, I aim to qualitatively assess the motives behind conscience voting in the New Zealand House of Representatives by discussing conscience voting with several current Members of Parliament who were present during the 52nd Parliament session, including Dr. Deborah Russell, Tim van de Molen and Anahila Kanongata'a-Suisuiki, before concluding with a final discussion and assessment of the topic of conscience voting in the New Zealand House of Representatives.

Key Words: New Zealand Parliament, Conscience Voting, Principal-Agent Theory, Political Economy, Mixed-Member Proportional, Private Members' Bill

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This thesis has truly been one of my favorite things I've ever worked on – I am very proud of it and I hope it is a useful resource for anyone interested in the topic.

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To New Zealand, even though I have left you for these past 4.5 years, I am very excited to return to you and I wrote this thesis about you and for you – thank you.

Any questions/inquiries regarding this thesis can be emailed to hhosking21@cmc.edu

1. Introduction

The principal-agent theory is a phenomenon in the world of political economy that attributes the voting records of legislators to that of the interests of their principals (constituents) who then reward these legislators through voting for them come election-time.¹ Assessing conscience voting in the New Zealand House of Representatives can test out this principal-agent theory and whether New Zealand Members of Parliament indeed vote with the best interests of their constituents in mind or whether they instead ‘shirk’ their constituents when it comes to voting.² The New Zealand Parliament provides us with a unique environment to conduct this political economy experiment considering that, unlike the United States and other similar democracies, the vast majority of votes in the House of Representatives are whipped votes, with the Members of Parliament voting along party lines.³ Conscience voting and private members’ bills (PMBs) have been a part of New Zealand’s parliamentary system since the first New Zealand Parliament sat in 1854. Throughout New Zealand parliamentary history, many influential laws, such as homosexual law reform, prostitution law reform and the legalization of euthanasia have resulted directly from private members’ bills. Many of these bills are voted on in parliamentary ‘conscience votes’ in which the political parties relinquish their power and allow their members to ‘vote their conscience’. Conscience voting, when provided, offers a rare opportunity for this principal-agent theory to be tested and determine how Members of Parliament come to their decisions on how to vote when granted a large amount of freedom to autonomously form their decision.

Members of Parliament are faced with many competing factors when it comes to forming decisions around conscience voting and the weighting of these factors is highly personalized to each member. These competing factors make it difficult to directly measure the principal-agent effect because these agent-members (Members of Parliament) have multiple principals, all with differing levels of importance when it comes to forming a decision. Some of these factors include; personal views and philosophies on certain legislative issues, constituency interests, party interests, potential political pressure from the leadership of one’s political party and the pressures faced by the potential of re-election. The mix with which the members weigh these respective factors can potentially be examined quantitatively as well as by assessing their voting in light of the principal-agent theory, which suggests that legislators should be voting with their constituents’ best interests in mind in order to be rewarded with votes for re-election. However, voting with constituents’ best interests in mind has proven to not always be the case, as seen in historical examples of legislative shirking.

¹ Sam Peltzman, “Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting”, The University of Chicago Press for The Booth School of Business”, April 1984.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/725157.pdf?ab_segments=0%252Fbasic_search_gsv2%252Fcontrol&refreqid=excelsior%3A6e679f281ff8acf5faf29388d9d6c8d0. Accessed November 27, 2021.

² Shirking is the economic term for misalignment of the incentives of the principals and the incentives of the agent, resulting in the agent voting in their own best interests

³ A vote against one’s party could be the sign of ‘no confidence’ in the party and the ‘crossing of the floor’ by a member may result in potential expulsion from their party as well as losing their seat in Parliament

The results of my analysis found that electorate demographics and party variables accounted for around 60% of the variation in the conscience voting pattern of Electorate MP, implying that a great deal of decision-making is autonomously made. The findings also suggested that the relaxation of party control does in fact take place, with MPs feeling very little to no pressure from party leadership when it comes to forming a decision surrounding conscience voting.

In this thesis I will conduct a brief of assessment of the principal-agent model (and other literature regarding parliamentary representation) before looking at the New Zealand Parliamentary system as well as the phenomenon of private member's bills and how they aid the legislative process before exploring the dataset of conscience votes that have occurred since the inception of the mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral system in 1996. This is then followed by an analysis of the conscience voting patterns of the 52nd Parliament and an attempt to form an ideology score for each Members of Parliament present since the 45th Parliament, based purely off of a subset of these conscience votes. This followed upon by regression and statistical prediction analysis that aims to capture a measure of legislative shirking as well as assessing the strength of the principal-agent theory when it comes to conscience voting and the various principals that comprise it. Finally, I aim to qualitatively assess the motives behind conscience voting in the New Zealand House of Representatives by discussing conscience voting with several current Members of Parliament who were present during the 52nd Parliament session, including Dr. Deborah Russell, Tim van de Molen and Anahila Kanongata'a-Suisuiki, before concluding with a final discussion and assessment of the topic of conscience voting in the New Zealand House of Representatives.

2. A Principal-Agent Model of Parliamentary Representation (Literature Review):

Sam Peltzman outlines the ‘principal-agent model’ in his paper, *Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting*, published in 1984.⁴ This model suggests that legislative agents vote in a manner that best serves the interests of those who ‘pay’ for their representation in the form of votes and even political donations, i.e. their constituents.⁵ In his paper, Peltzman aims to classify how much of legislators’ behavior can be attributed to the principals’ (constituents’) demands, without invoking an ‘ideology’ metric (a residual category that cannot be easily measured).⁶ Peltzman also iterates the political phenomenon of ‘shirking’ in which legislators seemingly vote against the best interests of their constituents, seeming to justify the phenomenon by explaining ‘rational ignorance’ behind some voters not paying close enough attention to how their representative in actually voting when it comes to legislative measures.⁷ Peltzman finds that legislators’ own personal preferences seem to account for the majority of their legislative voting behavior statistically, implying that many representatives potentially place their own priorities in front of those of their constituents.⁸ However, Peltzman also establishes that these personal priorities may in fact be proxies for the fact that liberal representatives and conservative representatives tend to have constituencies compiled of different demographic makeups, explaining most of the voting patterns without having to rely on the concept of voter shirking.⁹ Peltzman’s findings can be explored in the New Zealand House of Representatives by comparing how one actually votes when it comes to conscience to the respective ideological breakdown of their respective constituents. With voting along party lines being much more strictly monitored in the New Zealand House of Representatives when compared to the United States Congress, deviations from party interests when it comes to conscience voting can be more greatly assessed using Peltzman’s principal-agent model.

Principal-agent theory has been explored in many further research papers since, including *Accountability and Principal-Agent Models* by Sean Gailmard, published in August 2012.¹⁰ Gailmard establishes two frameworks surrounding the application of principal-agent theory in terms of public accountability; bureaucratic accountability to higher-level political actors, and electoral accountability of representatives to constituents.¹¹ Both of these models are highly applicable to research on conscience voting in the New Zealand House of Representatives. Gailmard’s first framework applies bureaucratic agency in the form of the United States Congress.¹² Gailmard discusses Congress’ accountability to higher level actors such as the Office

⁴ Sam Peltzman, “Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting”

⁵ Sam Peltzman, “Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting”

⁶ Sam Peltzman, “Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting”

⁷ Sam Peltzman, “Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting”

⁸ Sam Peltzman, “Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting”

⁹ Sam Peltzman, “Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting”

¹⁰ Sean Gailmard, “Accountability and Principal-Agent Models”, Department of Political Science – University of California Berkeley, Published August 2012.

[https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/csls/Gailmard - Accountability and Principal-Agent Models\(2\).pdf](https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/csls/Gailmard_-_Accountability_and_Principal-Agent_Models(2).pdf). Accessed November 27, 2021.

¹¹ Sean Gailmard, “Accountability and Principal-Agent Models”

¹² Sean Gailmard, “Accountability and Principal-Agent Models”

of Management and Budget in the Executive Office of the President, and the President when looking to pass Congressional budget proposals.¹³ In Gailmard's second framework surrounding electoral agency, the idea arises that elections can present opportunities to select politicians with representative voting records as well as 'sanction' politicians whose voting records do not reflect their constituency.¹⁴ This aspect of the principal-agent theory explains the dual-accountability that elections hold, both in terms of praising and punishing respective voting behaviors. Both of Gailmard's frameworks are relatively flexible and can be applied to conscience voting in the New Zealand House of Representatives when assessing the principal-agent theory and how it impacts potential voting behaviors.

Most of the current literature on the impact of independent, conscience-like voting in governmental systems comes from examination of the American Congress and its Congressmembers. Kristina C. Miller's 2011 article, *The Constituency Motivations of Caucus Membership*, highlights the impact of caucus membership on constituency representation and finds that there is significant evidence that elected official's decision-making about caucus membership strongly reflect their constituency representation, even when controlling for important variables such as committee membership, political party, and leadership seniority.¹⁵ This implies that Congressmembers caucus memberships and subsequent voting behaviors are indicative of their constituency representation more than any other factor – a theory that could potentially be applied to the New Zealand parliamentary system and Electorate-based MPs.

The paper, *Sizeable Representation? How Constituency Population and Diversity Affect Legislative Behavior* by Klaus H. Goetz, David M. Willumsen and Christian Stecker examines the voting behaviors of Senators in the Australian Senate, finding that larger constituencies, population-wise, actively increase the number of questions asked in the House as well as the introduction of more bills and amendments. However, an increase in a district's racial diversity finds Senators becoming less active in the House and introducing less bills and amendments.¹⁶ Goetz et. al. emphasize how "electoral and time pressures have important influence on how representatives behave in the legislature" in their study. These findings again speak to the direct link between constituencies and representative's voting habits, posing a direct question of whether the population makeup of New Zealand's electorates in fact impacts how Members of Parliament vote when it comes to conscience votes.

Congressional Party Defection in American History, by researchers Timothy P. Nokken and Keith T. Poole outlines the history of party defectors in the American Congress, finding that periods of high ideological political polarization are when party defections are most likely to

¹³ Sean Gailmard, "Accountability and Principal-Agent Models"

¹⁴ Sean Gailmard, "Accountability and Principal-Agent Models"

¹⁵ Kristina C. Miller, "The Constituency Motivations of Caucus Membership", University of Illinois, Urbana, Published 2011, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1532673X11407148>. Accessed October 9, 2011.

¹⁶ Klaus H. Goetz et. al, "Do electoral district size and diversity affect legislative behavior?", *Australian Journal of Political Science* 54(3), Published October 2018. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328495794_Do_electoral_district_size_and_diversity_affect_legislative_behaviour. Accessed October 9, 2021.

occur.¹⁷ Party defections that stemmed directly from legislation in New Zealand have been rare in recent political history, however, MP Dame Tariana Turia's notable exit from the Labour Party directly resulted from the party's stance on the controversial Foreshore and Seabed Act, during a time of heightened political polarization, attests to the findings of Nokken and Poole.¹⁸ While voting against the majority of one's party/the leader of one's party during a conscience vote, is not classified as a party betrayal or a form of 'waka jumping'¹⁹, consistent voting against the majority of one's party during conscience votes could put members at odds with the leadership team and present a disunified party to the public, leading to party leaders to aim to corral votes, even if they happen to be conscience votes.²⁰

The topic of governmental gatekeeping of votes is explored in the article, *Gatekeeping* by researchers Christophe Crombez, Time Groseclose and Keith Krehbiel. Crombez et. al define the process of political gatekeeping as "a collective choice process in which the first-stage player has a procedural right to implement unilaterally an exogenous status quo policy, in which case the second-stage player is denied the opportunity to participate in collective choice", as outlined previously by Denzau and Mackay (1983).²¹ Crombez et. al (2006) outline that the economic gatekeeping model is flawed from the perspective of social efficiency at a hypothetical sense.²² However, more real-world applications, such as the veto power possessed by the US Senate, the procedural status of the Commission of the European Union, or the discharge procedure possessed by the Bundestag indicate that the real world is inherently more complex than the Pareto efficiency model outlined by Denzau and Mackay (1983).²³ Thus, Crombez et. al propose a redefining of the process of gatekeeping as a "behavior regularity rather than as a codified, constraining institution".²⁴ In this redefined definition, Crombez et. al establish gatekeeping as a concept that aims to influence the behavior of elected representatives, especially when it comes to influencing voting in representative chambers. In this sense, whipping votes and aiming to influence conscience votes in the New Zealand House of Representatives could potentially constitute a form of gatekeeping enacted by the leadership structures of the respective parties. Political parties can also illicit gatekeeping measures by being the ones to release MPs to vote freely on conscience votes, forming a 'Denzau-committee', as outlined in Denzau and Mackay

¹⁷ Timothy P. Nokken & Keith T. Poole, "Congressional Party Defection in American History", *Legislative Studies Quarterly* Vol. 29, November 2004.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/3598591?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents. Accessed November 27, 2021.

¹⁸ "Te Paati Māori – About us", Māori Party

¹⁹ The New Zealand-specific term for a Member of Parliament swapping from one political party to another political party

²⁰ "Waka Jumping Definition", *English Encyclopedia*, Updated 2021.

https://www.encyclo.co.uk/meaning-of-Waka_jumping. Accessed October 9, 2021.

²¹ Christophe Crombez et. al., "Gatekeeping", *The University of Chicago Press Journals*, Published 2006. <https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00409.x>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

²² Christophe Crombez et. al., "Gatekeeping"

²³ Christophe Crombez et. al., "Gatekeeping"

²⁴ Christophe Crombez et. al., "Gatekeeping"

(1983).²⁵ However, unlike Denzau-committees, political parties also have the discipline to force compliance with leadership from their caucus, leveraging powerful tools such as the ability to expel a dissenting member from caucus.²⁶ Implicit forms of gatekeeping could potentially come in the form of demotion down the party list or potentially missing out on leadership opportunities/promotions when they arise.

Tanya Bagashka's article *Representation in Hybrid Regimes: Constituency and Party Influences on Legislative Voting in the Russian Duma 1996-1999* represents a study aimed at interpreting voting district preferences in comparisons to legislators' voting methods in the Russian Duma.²⁷ This study finds a salient link between vote responsiveness and the awareness of the representative's constituency towards a certain vote, even when accounting for party membership, again emphasizing the findings of Miller (2011) and Goetz et. al (2016) that constituency preferences plays a highly influential role in determining how politicians vote.²⁸ I will aim to see if this fact holds up in the New Zealand parliamentary system or whether Members of Parliament are more swayed by the potential gatekeeping abilities of their respective party leadership teams.

Dr. Therese Arseneau explored the concept of the introduction of the Mixed-Member Proportional system on diversity within Parliament in the paper, *The Impact of MMP on Representation in New Zealand's Parliament— a view from outside Parliament*.²⁹ In her paper, Dr. Arseneau explained that MMP was expected to increase the fairness and diversity within the New Zealand Parliament when it was first enacted, resulting in a group of politicians that more accurately 'represented' the New Zealand population.³⁰ Party lists were also meant to be the mechanism to achieve this greater diversity, with political parties aiming to provide a "balanced

²⁵ Arthur T. Denzau & Robert J. Mackay, "Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An Analysis of Sincere and Sophisticated Behavior", *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 27, Published November 1983.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/2110891?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents. Accessed November 29, 2021.

²⁶ Arthur T. Denzau & Robert J. Mackay, "Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An Analysis of Sincere and Sophisticated Behavior"

²⁷ Tanya Bagashka, "Representation in Hybrid Regimes: Constituency and Party Influence on Legislative Voting in the Russian Duma 1996-1999", *Social Science Quarterly* Vol. 95, Published June 2014.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/26612176?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents. Accessed October 9, 2021.

²⁸ Tanya Bagashka, "Representation in Hybrid Regimes: Constituency and Party Influence on Legislative Voting in the Russian Duma 1996-1999"

²⁹ Dr. Therese Arseneau, "The Impact of MMP on Representation in New Zealand's Parliament— a view from outside Parliament", Convenor, New Zealand Branch ASPG, Published 2014. <https://www.aspg.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Session-2-Dr-Therese-Arseneau-The-Impact-of-MMP-on-Representation-in-New-Zealands-Parliament.pdf>. Accessed November 27, 2021.

³⁰ Dr. Therese Arseneau, "The Impact of MMP on Representation in New Zealand's Parliament— a view from outside Parliament"

ticket... of how a party sees itself and who it represents”.³¹ The party lists in fact did increase overall diversity within the New Zealand Parliament with the proportion of female MPs and Māori MPs doubling between 1990 and 2011.³² There was also an increase in the number of Asian MPs and MPs of Pacific Island descent.³³ Dr. Arseneau revealed that the majority of female MPs and Māori MPs are List MPs and not Electorate MPs, an interesting fact considering that Electorate MPs make up the majority of seats in each parliamentary session.³⁴ Dr. Arseneau also established that there is in fact a higher turnover in Parliament of List MPs compared to Electorate MPs, with the turnover rate being over twice as high (23.84% turnover for List MPs compared to 10.58% turnover for Electorate MPs). Dr. Arseneau explains that this leads to a potential ‘safety net’ for Electorate MPs as they are much less likely to exit Parliament as a result of losing their seat come an election, thus granting them more freedom when it comes to conducting themselves in Parliament.³⁵ As a result, I speculate that Electorate MPs will deviate more from their party majority than List MPs when it comes to conscience voting, however, they will be more tightly bound by the principal-agent model with their constituents than the looser constituencies of List MPs.

There is currently very little published empirical research relating to the New Zealand Parliamentary system, let alone the phenomenon of conscience voting within the House of Representatives. David Geoffrey Lindsey explored the concept of conscience voting in *Conscience Voting in New Zealand*, outlining the history dating back to the 19th Century as well as the more modern uses of the tool. I will aim to explore the links between the empirical data surrounding conscience votes and the potential reasons for certain behaviors behind conscience voting patterns in the era of MMP in New Zealand.³⁶

³¹ Dr. Therese Arseneau, “The Impact of MMP on Representation in New Zealand’s Parliament—a view from outside Parliament”

³² Dr. Therese Arseneau, “The Impact of MMP on Representation in New Zealand’s Parliament—a view from outside Parliament”

³³ Dr. Therese Arseneau, “The Impact of MMP on Representation in New Zealand’s Parliament—a view from outside Parliament”

³⁴ Dr. Therese Arseneau, “The Impact of MMP on Representation in New Zealand’s Parliament—a view from outside Parliament”

³⁵ Dr. Therese Arseneau, “The Impact of MMP on Representation in New Zealand’s Parliament—a view from outside Parliament”

³⁶ David Geoffrey Lindsey, “Conscience Voting in New Zealand

3. Background

New Zealand Parliamentary System since 1996

Understanding the layout of the New Zealand Parliamentary system is key to interpreting the analysis behind conscience voting. Since 1996, New Zealand has operated under the Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system.^{37,38} The New Zealand Parliament, which is modeled on the historical Westminster system of parliamentary representation, currently has 120 seats in Parliament, as of the 53rd Parliament, made up of a mixture of electorate representing MPs (Electorate MPs) and MPs who won representation based on their place on their respective party's list (List MPs).³⁹ The implementation of the MMP system has seen the creation of coalition formed governments, with all but one government, the current and Sixth Labour government, being formed out of a combination of one of the two major parties (the National Party and the Labour Party) and one or more minor parties in coalition.⁴⁰

³⁷ Prior to the introduction of MMP, New Zealand utilized the 'first past the post' electoral system between 1853 and 1996

³⁸ "The road to MMP", New Zealand History, Updated 2021.


<https://nzhistory.govt.nz/politics/fpp-to-mmp/first-past-the-post>. Accessed November 29, 2021.

³⁹ "Quick history", New Zealand Parliament, Last Updated June 29, 2021.

<https://www.parliament.nz/en/visit-and-learn/history-and-buildings/quick-history/>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

⁴⁰ "Quick history", New Zealand Parliament

Figure 1: Timeline of Major Party/Coalition Partners that have formed Government (1996-Present)



Source: *Governments in New Zealand since 1856*, New Zealand Parliament

As seen in Figure 1 there have been four coalition governments, led by six different Prime Ministers, that have formed since the inception of MMP in 1996. Two governments have been led by a National Party formed coalition, while two governments have been led by a Labour Party formed coalition. National, under Prime Minister Jim Bolger, formed the first government under MMP after the 1996 election with the minor party, New Zealand First. This coalition stayed intact even after a leadership challenge which saw Dame Jenny Shipley replace Bolger as the head of the National Party and as the Prime Minister.⁴¹ However, tensions arose between Dame Jenny Shipley and New Zealand First leader, Winston Peters, and the coalition broke down in 1998.⁴² National and Dame Jenny Shipley lost power in the 1999 general election to the Labour Party who, under Prime Minister Helen Clark, formed a coalition with the Alliance, another minority party.⁴³ This coalition lasted all the way through to the 2008 election (with the Alliance rebranding as Jim Anderton's Progressive Party) when the Labour-led coalition was defeated and replaced by the National Party.⁴⁴ Under Prime Minister Sir John Key, the National Party formed a coalition with the Act Party, United Future and the Māori Party (all minor parties) which lasted through to the 2017 election.⁴⁵ Sir John Key stepped down as the leader of the National Party at the end of 2016 and was replaced by his Deputy Prime Minister, Sir Bill English, who had previously served as the Leader of the Opposition for a period of time after the 2002 election. The National government was then subsequently defeated by a Labour-led coalition formed out of the Green Party and the New Zealand First Party in the 2017 general election, placing Jacinda Ardern as the Prime Minister of New Zealand.⁴⁶

Where these respective Prime Ministers align within their caucus in terms of conscience voting behaviors will be revealing to the role of party leadership when MPs are voting on conscience votes. I hypothesize that most Prime Ministers will be at their party's ideological center as not to alienate any members of their caucus to their political left or right. This could be classified as a form of principal-agent theory, as outlined in Gailmard (2012).⁴⁷ Here the leadership team, which

⁴¹ "Jenny Shipley", Ministry for Culture and Heritage, Last Updated November 12, 2020. <https://nzhistory.govt.nz/people/jenny-shipley>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

⁴² "Jenny Shipley", Ministry for Culture and Heritage

⁴³ "Final results update for the 1999 New Zealand general election", Parliamentary Library, December 23, 1999. <https://www.parliament.nz/resource/en-NZ/00PLLawRP99111/4d5c2cf501956d02710301e0b3284ae8bc5758f7>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

⁴⁴ "New Zealand General Election 2008 – Official Results", Electoral Commission, November 22, 2008. <https://elections.nz/media-and-news/2008/new-zealand-general-election-2008-official-results-2/>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

⁴⁵ "New Zealand 2017 General Election – Official Results", Electoral Commission, October 7, 2017. <https://elections.nz/media-and-news/2017/new-zealand-2017-general-election-official-results/>. Accessed October 9, 2021.


⁴⁶ Breanna Barraclough, "NZ's new Government: NZ First chooses Labour", Newshub, October 19, 2017. <https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/election/2017/10/nz-s-new-government-nz-first-chooses-labour.html>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

⁴⁷ Sean Gailmard, "Accountability and Principal-Agent Models"

is chosen by the members of their own party caucus⁴⁸, is aiming to placate the interests of their principals (caucus members) by voting in the ideological center of their party, as to appease as many caucus members as possible.

⁴⁸ In New Zealand, the leadership structure of each political party is decided internally, with the public having very little electoral say in who leads the respective political parties

Figure 2: Timeline of Prime Ministers and Leaders of the Opposition (1996-Present)



Source: *Governments in New Zealand since 1856*, New Zealand Parliament

While there has been relative stability in terms of a low turnover of Prime Ministers and changes in government, the same cannot be said for the Leaders of the Opposition, with the leading party not in government often looking to change their leadership when the party performs poorly in the polls. While there have been six Prime Ministers since the inception of MMP in 1996, there have been fourteen Leaders of the Opposition⁴⁹ during this same time period as seen in Figure 2, including nine unique Leaders of the Opposition since 2010. Both Prime Ministers and Leaders of the Opposition face challenges in maintaining a happy caucus, however, MPs who are not in government seem to be much more willing to try out different leadership combinations in an attempt to win power come election time and be able to form a government, as seen by the higher turnover in the role of Leader of the Opposition. Ensuring that all members of caucus are pleased with party leadership again echoes back to first principal-agent theory frameworks established in Gailmard (2012).⁵⁰

Conscience Voting

I hypothesize that conscience voting is more heavily influenced by one's constituency⁵¹, as outlined in Sam Peltzman's principal-agent model, as well as one's own personal beliefs and philosophies when it comes to the specific conscience voting issues. Due to the rare nature of these types of votes, I hypothesize there is relatively little pressure coming from political parties, with greater scrutiny placed on MPs by their respective constituencies, who keep an eye out for how their elected Member of Parliament votes when party pressure is alleviated. I also hypothesize that Electorate MPs face less internal party pressure due to being elected by the constituents of a certain electorate and not having to rely on the party list in order to get into Parliament. Thus, these MPs may feel more liberated to go against the general consensus voting of their party, especially if the constituents in their electorate disagree with this consensus. In this case, using Peltzman's principal-agent model, both the party and constituents are principals, with each member having to strike their own balance in order to vote in the best interests of both.

According to the New Zealand Parliament's Parliamentary Practice Guide, the Speaker of the House of Representatives is normally the judge of whether the topic of a certain vote would warrant that of a conscience vote, and thus has the power to grant Parliament-wide conscience votes.^{52,53} Individual political parties are also responsible for releasing their MPs to vote in a conscience vote, normally deciding whether a matter is a conscience vote within individual caucus meetings while other parties have established conscience voting issues written into their respective party constitution.

⁴⁹ As of the end of the 52nd Parliamentary session

⁵⁰ Sean Gailmard, "Accountability and Principal-Agent Models"

⁵¹ Whether that be directly represented in the form of an electorate or more loosely represented in terms of a group of people/more broad general area

⁵² Even when the Speaker has announced an issue is a conscience vote, some parties can still decide that their members will vote unanimously along party lines, even if opposing parties releases their members to vote their conscience

⁵³ "Chapter 17 Voting", New Zealand Parliament, June 8, 2018.

https://www.parliament.nz/en/visit-and-learn/how-parliament-works/parliamentary-practice-in-new-zealand/chapter-17-voting/#_ftn61. Accessed October 28, 2021.

Conscience voting can be granted by the individual political parties for a number of reasons. It can be used as a political tool by party leaders, namely to accommodate the broad social views that belong within the two largest and most well-established parties in the New Zealand political arena, the National Party and the Labour Party. In *Conscience Voting in New Zealand*, David Geoffrey Lindsey outlined many of the key reasons these leaders grant conscience to their MPs, one of which being to prevent their MPs from crossing the floor and joining the opposition ranks.⁵⁴ While this is an incredibly rare situation, when this has happened, it has resulted in the fracturing of parties.⁵⁵ The prevention of the fracturing of parties through allowing individual MPs to express their own personal beliefs through voting, without having to technically vote against their own party, is an example of conscience votes working.

Both the Labour Party and the National Party do not normally allow conscience voting to occur when the party has a particular stance on a certain policy issue.⁵⁶ Crossing the floor happens on very rare an occasion and usually requires permission from a party leader in order to avoid expulsion from the party (due to a party's political constitution).⁵⁷ Since the inception of the MMP system in New Zealand there have only been three notable instances of Labour or National MPs crossing the floor to vote with the opposition; Dame Tariana Turia, Damien O'Connor and Rino Tirikatene, with party loyalty and discipline on whipped votes being heavily emphasized.⁵⁸ A party leader must seek to ensure that their caucus is supportive of the stance that their party is taking on legislation. Leaders who do not achieve this are threatened by potential leadership challenges. However, the MMP system has also forged a stronger level of loyalty between MPs and their party, as many often rely on a high enough placement on the party list in order to make it into Parliament.

Conscience voting can also be used by parties in order to pass through potentially controversial legislation that may potentially upset the public or their own party base, by putting distance

⁵⁴ David Geoffrey Lindsey, "Conscience Voting in New Zealand", pg. 182, The University of Auckland, Published 2011

⁵⁵ A well-known occurrence of this was when Labour Party MP Dame Tariana Turia crossed the floor to vote against her own party during a vote on the Foreshore and Seabed Act in 2004, thus effectively being expelled from the Labour caucus and leaving Dame Turia to found the Māori Party.

-(*"Te Paati Māori – About us"*, Māori Party, Updated 2021.

https://www.Māoriparty.org.nz/about_us Accessed October 9, 2021.)

⁵⁶ David Geoffrey Lindsey, "Conscience Voting in New Zealand", pg. 184

⁵⁷ Such an agreement was granted by Labour Party leader David Cunliffe when he allowed two Labour MPs, Damien O'Connor and Rino Tirikatene to cross the floor in 2014 to join the National Party in voting to support a bill on wind-throw logging

-*"Fired-up MP defends decision to cross floor"*, The Greymouth Star, June 26, 2014,

<https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/fired-up-mp-defends-decision-to-cross-floor/I6ZJTNO3UIE4KLFL7JKCG7SKKM/>. Accessed October 9, 2021)

⁵⁸ John Hartevelt, "The chaos of the conscience vote", Stuff, June 30, 2012.

<https://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/comment/columnists/john-hartevelt/7367698/The-chaos-of-the-conscience-vote>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

between the issue and the party voting for it.⁵⁹ In this sense, conscience voting may also relieve MPs of voting for legislation that may be less popular in their own electorate than the rest of the country in general, saving face with their constituents and allowing them to act in accordance with the principal-agent theory established in Peltzman (1984). Conscience voting, in its essence, can also spare politicians from voting for legislation that they personally disagree with, and, as David Lindsey articulates, “maintaining the health of a political party by preserving the individuality of its members whilst insulating the party itself from the damaging effects of internal disagreement.”⁶¹ Granting a conscience vote on a certain issue may also be seen as taking the moral high ground on this issue, especially if it results in a unanimous party vote.⁶² The party leader can use this political tool as a way to show unity within the caucus or to appear favorably to the public on a popular issue that the opposition may oppose, publicly challenging them to also hold a conscience vote amongst their caucus, as well as potentially highlighting disunity within the opposing party. Conscience votes granted by governments also do not have a history of failing.⁶³ This may be due to governments not putting contentious pieces of legislature that may fail to conscience votes, instead using whipped votes to pass these into law.

Private Members’ Bills in the New Zealand Parliamentary System

Private members’ bills hypothetically allow any Member of Parliament, that is not part of the Executive branch, to draft prospective law and potentially have their bill read in the House. In New Zealand, whether a private members’ bill is read in front of the House comes purely down to luck. A lottery system is in place where all bills are assigned a corresponding chip when they

⁵⁹ David Geoffrey Lindsey, “Conscience Voting in New Zealand”, pg. 183

⁶⁰ When MP Louisa Wall introduced her private members’ bill, the Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Bill in 2012, only 49% of the country were in favor of same sex marriage according to a Research New Zealand poll. This approval figure remained the same mid-way through 2013 when the second and third readings of the bill took place. The party in power at the time, the center-right National Party, led by Prime Minister Sir John Key, carefully negotiated this legislation being introduced by permitting a conscience vote for National MPs, thus insulating these MPs representing more conservative electorates, despite the fact that he personally voted for the Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Bill at all three stages of its readings

-“Same Sex Marriages, Civil Union and Adoption”, Research NZ, September 21, 2012.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20150210112917/http://researchnz.com/pdf/Media%20Releases/RNZ%20Media%20Release%20-%20Same%20sex%20marriage.pdf>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

-Isaac Davidson, “Shock poll over gay marriage bill”, New Zealand Herald, March 25, 2013.

<https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/shock-poll-over-gay-marriage-bill/A7AJTEEW3DA6NXD2D5VUFAJBDI/>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

-“Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Bill”, New Zealand Parliament, Updated 2021, https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/bills-and-laws/bills-proposed-laws/document/00DBHOH_BILL11528_1/tab/hansard. Accessed October 9, 2021.

⁶¹ David Geoffrey Lindsey, “Conscience Voting in New Zealand”, pg. 188

⁶² David Geoffrey Lindsey, “Conscience Voting in New Zealand”, pg. 183

⁶³ The last conscience vote to be backed by a Prime Minister that failed was the Licensing Amendment (No.2) Bill, which was backed by PM Gordon Coates and was defeated in 1928

-David Geoffrey Lindsey, “Conscience Voting in New Zealand”, pg. 190

are drafted.⁶⁴ This chip is then placed into a ‘biscuit tin’.⁶⁵ This biscuit tin holds all of the chips from which the member’s bills are drawn out of, in a lottery like process. Each member can only have a maximum of one private members’ bill in the tin at a time.

In the New Zealand House of Representatives, every second Wednesday is dedicated to the discussion of local bills and private members’ bills, with the drawing of members’ bills from the biscuit tin occurring periodically.⁶⁶ Private members’ bills are often bills whose nature lies in a respective social issue, with the Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Bill (2013) and the End of Life Choice Bill (2017) being two notable examples from recent history. Thus, these private members’ bills often end up being voted on through conscience votes. The first ever conscience vote in the New Zealand House of Representatives occurred in 1891 and this vote was a private members’ bill titled the Female Franchise Bill which would have granted women the right to vote.⁶⁷ Although this vote did not pass, it set a strong precedent for many social issues and private members’ bills to be voted on through conscience votes in the House.

The contents of many private members’ bills can also get adopted by governments, such as the case with the Corrections (Mothers with Babies) Amendment Bill and the Waste Management Bill which were both private members’ bills written by Members of Parliament from the Green Party and then subsequently adopted by a Labour-led government coalition.⁶⁸ Only 56 private members’ bills have passed into law since the adoption of the mixed member proportional (MMP) electoral system in 1996, speaking to the steep odds they face when looking to pass into law.⁶⁹ Private members’ bills can be very specific pieces of legislation, sometimes pertaining only to certain regions of the country and can often be viewed as being too specific for a government to include in its broader legislation priorities. However, some private members’ bills have been adopted by governments after being read in the House.⁷¹

⁶⁴ Phil Smith, “Members’ bills: Defying sad odds”, Radio New Zealand, July 2, 2020. <https://www.rnz.co.nz/national/programmes/the-house/audio/2018753270/members-bills-defying-sad-odds>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

⁶⁵ Phil Smith, “Members’ bills: Defying sad odds”

⁶⁶ “Proposed members’ bills”, New Zealand Parliament, Updated 2021.

<https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/bills-and-laws/proposed-members-bills/>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

⁶⁷ David Geoffrey Lindsey, “Conscience Voting in New Zealand”, pg. 239

⁶⁸ “Members’ bills”, New Zealand Parliament, February 15, 2017.

<https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/research-papers/document/00PLLawRP2017011/members-bills>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

⁶⁹ “Members’ bills”, New Zealand Parliament

⁷⁰ As of the conclusion of the 52nd Parliamentary Session

⁷¹ An example of this is the Crimes (Abolition of Force As a Justification for Child Discipline) Amendment Bill 2005, which was initially a private members’ bill drafted by Green Party MP Sue Bradford, and then adopted by the Labour government under Prime Minister Helen Clark. -Peter Hughes, “Report to the Minister for Social Development and Employment pursuant to Section 7(2) of the Crimes (Substituted Section 59) Amendment Act”, Ministry of Social Development, November 2009.

A private members' bill that is drawn can hypothetically circumvent the current government's priorities and force conscience votes to be held in the House, taking up significant parliamentary time and media time away from that government's actual priorities. On top of this, as of the start of the 53rd Parliament, any private members' bill for which 61 members outside of Cabinet explicitly indicate their support for, automatically gets introduced without needing to be drawn from the biscuit tin.⁷² This opportunity to 'fast track' or 'bypass' the lottery process allows for important member's bills to be more speedily introduced and read in the House.

Private members' bills and conscience voting in the New Zealand Parliament offer an interesting option for governments in power, potentially allowing transformative legislation to pass into law while relinquishing Members of Parliament from voting for any legislation that may hurt them electorally. Private members' bills and conscience voting also relinquish the parties in government from any direct responsibility for passing legislation that may potentially be controversial with certain sections of the public, allowing the onus to fall more on the individual members who vote to pass the legislation into law. Many Prime Ministers have personally voted to pass individual private members' bills into law through conscience votes while also not adopting the legislation as part of their government's official agenda. Two recent examples include Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern voting 'Aye' on the 'End of Life Choice Act 2019', allowing the legalization of euthanasia to be voted on in a nation-wide referendum, and then-Prime Minister Sir John Key voting 'Aye' on the 'Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Act 2013' which legalized same-sex marriage in New Zealand. Both Ardern and Key had the option of including these pieces of legislation as a part of their government's agenda but instead chose to let these bills remain in their private members' bill form and be voted on by the wider Parliament in a conscience vote.

https://img.scoop.co.nz/media/pdfs/0911/20091110_Chief_Executives_Monitoring_Report_on_s59.pdf. Accessed October 28, 2021.

⁷² 61 MPs represents an outright majority in the 120 Member House of Representatives -"Proposed members' bills", New Zealand Parliament

4. Different Types of Conscience Votes under MMP (1996-Present)

Conscience voting in the New Zealand House of Representatives has been fairly limited in terms of the scope of topics of bills voted on. The 428 votes observed in the dataset of conscience votes held since 1996 fall into twelve distinct categories; Abortion, Alcohol, Cannabis, Child Welfare, Euthanasia, Gambling, the International Convention Center, LGBT Rights, Prostitution, the 2011 Rugby World Cup, Shop Trading Hours and an Omnibus conscience vote held in 2005 that encompassed many individual bills that varied in terms of topic, with the total breakdown of conscience votes being highlighted in Table 1.

Table 1: Number of individual Conscience Votes held in Parliament by topic since the beginning of MMP

| Topic | Number of Votes | Percentage of Total Votes |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------|
| Abortion | 40 | 9.3 |
| Alcohol | 60 | 14.0 |
| Cannabis | 2 | 0.5 |
| Child Welfare | 14 | 3.3 |
| Euthanasia | 89 | 20.8 |
| Gambling | 29 | 6.8 |
| International Convention Center | 21 | 4.9 |
| LGBT Rights | 120 | 28.0 |
| Omnibus | 1 | 0.2 |
| Prostitution | 23 | 5.4 |
| Rugby World Cup | 7 | 1.6 |
| Shop Trading Hours | 22 | 5.1 |
| Total | 428 | 100 |

Source: Author's calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliamentary Hansard Reports

Lindsey (2011) examined the entire catalogue of conscience votes held in the New Zealand House of Representatives between 1891-2010 with many of the key topics having persisted over time. Lindsey breaks down these votes into 22 unique categories as highlighted in Appendix Table A.1.⁷³ This list highlights the nature of conscience voting throughout New Zealand, focused primarily on social issues. As seen in Appendix Table A.1, the three topics of Alcohol, Gambling and Marriage/Family/Children contribute over 50% of the 236 individual bills compiled in Lindsey (2011) of conscience votes held in New Zealand between 1891 and 2010. These three topics have consistently been subject to conscience votes throughout the decades and continue to this day. Examining the different bills that have been voted on via conscience votes since the inception of MMP will give us an insight into the types of issues that are typically selected for a conscience vote.

⁷³ Alcohol, Gambling, Marriage/Family/Children, Constitutional Reform, Summer Time, Health and Safety, Crime and Punishment, Electoral Reform, Shop Trading Hours, Religious Instruction, Abortion, Homosexuality, Business/Employment, Rights (Human and Animal), Governance and Infrastructure, Miscellaneous, Euthanasia, Prostitution, Treaty of Waitangi Settlement, Education, Censorship, Drugs

Abortion

Abortion has consistently been an issue that has been polarizing to many governments around the world, including in New Zealand, with many unsure of how to handle the issue. Since the inception of MMP in 1996, New Zealand MPs have been tasked to vote on abortion in four different circumstances, the first three of which being votes on appointees to the Abortion Supervisory Committee, in 2001, 2007 and 2011 respectively.⁷⁴ In these situations, MPs were instructed to vote their conscience on whether they believed an appointee to the Abortion Supervisory Committee would be suitable, with those receiving an ‘Aye’ majority being approved onto the Committee.⁷⁵ The other circumstance of MPs having to vote their conscience on abortion came during the Abortion Legislation Bill (2019), in which the Labour-led Government shepherded a government bill through which intended to; decriminalize abortion, align the regulation of abortion services with other health services and modernize the legal framework for abortion currently set out in the Crimes Act 1961 (the Crimes Act) and the Contraception, Sterilisation, and Abortion Act 1977 (the CSA Act).⁷⁶ The Labour-led government released this bill to be a conscience vote despite the scenario of it also be a government bill due to the more conservative New Zealand First, a member of the coalition government, pushing for a conscience vote.⁷⁷ This bill passed into law, after MPs voted 68 ‘Ayes’ to 51 ‘No’s’ during its third reading, not before MPs had to vote on 24 supplemental orders aimed at changing the wording on the bill.⁷⁸

Alcohol

Alcohol has also been a topic that conscience votes have traditionally and consistently dealt with throughout the years, contributing to 26% of the total conscience votes in the New Zealand House of Representatives between 1891 and 2010, the most of any subcategory.⁷⁹ Since 1996, there have been eight different bills voted on regarding alcohol reform including; the Sale of Alcohol Liquor Amendment Bill (No 2) (1998), the Sale of Liquor Amendment Bill (No. 2) (1999), the Sale of Liquor (Health Warnings) Amendment Bill (2000), the Sale of Liquor (Youth Alcohol Harm Reduction) Amendment Bill (2005), the Sale of Liquor (Objections to Applications) Amendment Bill (2008), the Liquor Advertising (Television and Radio) Bill

⁷⁴ The Abortion Supervisory Committee is a committee designed by the New Zealand Ministry of Justice to oversee the process of abortions within the county

⁷⁵ “Abortion Legislation Bill 2019 164-1”, New Zealand Parliament, Published August 7, 2019. <https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/bills-and-laws/bills-digests/document/52PLLaw25991/abortion-legislation-bill-2019-bills-digest-2599>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

⁷⁶ “Abortion Legislation Bill 2019 164-1”, New Zealand Parliament

⁷⁷ Boris Jancic, “National Leader Simon Bridges to back abortion law changes at first reading”, New Zealand Herald, August 5, 2019. <https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/national-leader-simon-bridges-to-back-abortion-law-changes-at-first-reading/DJS7NKWC7IQBYS7IACZQ37N33U/>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

⁷⁸ “Abortion Legislation Bill”, New Zealand Parliament, Updated 2021. https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/bills-and-laws/bills-proposed-laws/document/BILL_89814/abortion-legislation-bill. Accessed October 9, 2021.

⁷⁹ David Geoffrey Lindsey, “Conscience Voting in New Zealand”, pg. 5

(2009), the Alcohol Reform Bill (2012) and the Sale and Supply of Alcohol (Renewal of Licences) Amendment Bill (No 2) (2018). David Lindsey describes votes on alcohol reform as being “almost automatically unwhipped” due to this historical nature of voting on alcohol reform.⁸⁰ However, several critics of conscience voting on alcohol reform issues, including former Prime Minister Sir Geoffrey Palmer, have called for alcohol to be more tightly voted on through whipped votes.⁸¹ Palmer is quoted in 2012 as saying that “Parliament has proven a more coherent manager of such matters when votes are cast down party lines”, with this notable criticism potentially impacting on the decline in the number of conscience votes on alcohol reform that have occurred since 2012.⁸²

Cannabis

Cannabis reform has been a fairly new issue that has fallen under the range of conscience voting in the New Zealand House of Representatives. Unlike the vast amount of alcohol reform bills sent to conscience votes throughout the years, cannabis reform has only been voted on twice in Parliament, once in 2009 and once in 2018. In 2009 the Misuse of Drugs (Medicinal Cannabis) Amendment Bill, intended to legalize medicinal cannabis for medical purposes, authored by Green MP Metiria Turei, failed its first reading.⁸³ In 2018, the Misuse of Drugs (Medicinal Cannabis and Other Matters) Amendment Bill, introduced and authored by Green MP Chlöe Swarbrick, intending to legalize medicinal cannabis for terminally ill patients, also failed its first reading.⁸⁴ As a result of these votes failing at their first readings, there have only ever been two parliamentary conscience votes by MPs in the New Zealand House of Representatives on the issue of cannabis reform.

Child Welfare

Child Welfare has been a prevalent topic throughout the history of conscience votes, contributing towards the 28 votes that make up the Marriage/Family/Children category of conscience votes, as outlined by Lindsey (2011) and in Appendix Table A.1. However, since 1996 there has only been one instance of child welfare issues being put to a conscience vote: when Green MP Sue Bradford’s private members’ bill, Crimes (Abolition of Force as a Justification for Child Discipline) Amendment Bill, was drawn from the private members’ bill lottery in 2005.⁸⁵ As

⁸⁰ David Geoffrey Lindsey, “Conscience Voting in New Zealand”, pg. 24

⁸¹ John Hartevelt, “The chaos of the conscience vote”

⁸² John Hartevelt, “The chaos of the conscience vote”

⁸³ “Misuse of Drugs (Medicinal Cannabis) Amendment Bill”, New Zealand Parliament, Updated 2021. https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/bills-and-laws/bills-proposed-laws/document/00DBHOH_BILL7386_1/misuse-of-drugs-medicinal-cannabis-amendment-bill. Accessed October 9, 2021.

⁸⁴ “Misuse of Drugs (Medicinal Cannabis and Other Matters) Amendment Bill”, New Zealand Parliament, Updated 2021. https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/bills-and-laws/bills-proposed-laws/document/BILL_74308/misuse-of-drugs-medicinal-cannabis-and-other-matters. Accessed October 9, 2021.

⁸⁵ “Crimes (Substituted Section 59) Amendment Bill”, New Zealand Parliament, Updated 2021. https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/bills-and-laws/bills-proposed-laws/document/00DBHOH_BILL6844_1/crimes-substituted-section-59-amendment-bill. Accessed October 9, 2021.

outlined by Bradford, “the purpose of this Bill is to stop force, and associated violence, being inflicted on children in the context of correction and discipline”, colloquially referred to as the ‘anti-smacking bill’.⁸⁶ This bill, which passed its first reading of the House, was then adopted by the Clark-led Labour government and redrafted as the Crimes (Substituted Section 59) Amendment Bill, with the National Party still permitting its members to vote their conscience on the issue.⁸⁷ The passage of this bill into law represents the last time a child welfare issue came under a conscience vote, with child welfare issues now being strongly written in to the party policy of all major political parties.^{88,89}

Euthanasia

The topic of Euthanasia has been one that has recently received a lot of public interest in New Zealand as a result of a highly competitive referendum held on the legalization of euthanasia which occurred during the 2020 New Zealand general election. This referendum came as a result of ACT PM David Seymour’s End of Life Choice Bill (2017), a private members’ bill drawn from the private members’ bill lottery in 2017, and that passed its third reading in late 2019.⁹⁰ This bill was hotly contested in Parliament, receiving 113 supplemental orders, with many looking to restrict the jurisdiction of the bill, with MPs on both sides of the House being permitted to vote their conscience.⁹¹ Prior to the End of Life Choice Bill, the only other vote held on the subject of Euthanasia was the Death with Dignity Bill, a private members’ bill drawn in 2003, drafted by New Zealand First PM Peter Brown.⁹² However, this bill did not gain much traction in the House, failing at its first reading by a 58-60 ‘No’ majority vote.⁹³

Gambling

Gambling, like alcohol reform, has traditionally been a subject that is “almost automatically unwhipped” when voted on in the New Zealand House of Representatives.⁹⁴ Between 1891-2010, gambling reform constituted 14% of all conscience votes, with reform coming in both liberalizing and restricting the gambling laws.⁹⁵ Since 1996 there have been several conscience

⁸⁶ “Crimes (Substituted Section 59) Amendment Bill”, New Zealand Parliament

⁸⁷ “NZ anti-smacking bill likely to pass”, The Age, Published May 2, 2007.

<https://www.theage.com.au/world/nz-anti-smacking-bill-likely-to-pass-20070502-gdq1lp.html>.

Accessed October 9, 2021.

⁸⁸ “Children & Families”, Labour, <https://www.labour.org.nz/children>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

⁸⁹ “Families and Children”, National Party, Published 2021.

https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/nationalparty/pages/14869/attachments/original/1600987062/Giving_children_the_best_start_in_life_Policy.pdf?1600987062. Accessed October 9, 2021.

⁹⁰ “End of Life Choice Bill”, New Zealand Parliament, Updated 2021.,

https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/bills-and-laws/bills-proposed-laws/document/BILL_74307/end-of-life-choice-bill. Accessed October 9, 2021.

⁹¹ “End of Life Choice Bill”, New Zealand Parliament

⁹² “Death with Dignity Bill”, New Zealand Parliament, Updated 2021.

https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/bills-and-laws/bills-proposed-laws/document/00DBHOH_BILL5309_1/death-with-dignity-bill. Accessed October 9, 2021.

⁹³ “Death with Dignity Bill”, New Zealand Parliament

⁹⁴ David Geoffrey Lindsey, “Conscience Voting in New Zealand”, pg. 24

⁹⁵ David Geoffrey Lindsey, “Conscience Voting in New Zealand”, pg. 5

votes held on different gambling bills including; the Casino Control (Poll Demand) Amendment Bill (1997), the Casino Control (Moratorium) Amendment Bill (1997), the Gaming Law Reform Bill (1998), the Casino Control (Moratorium Extension) Amendment Bill (2000) and the Gambling (Gambling Harm Reduction) Amendment Bill (2012). Jack Elder, Labour MP and the Minister for Internal Affairs at the time, spoke in the House during the reading of the Casino Control (Moratorium) Amendment Bill in 1997, stating that it, “is conscience legislation... that is suitable for a conscience vote in this House, because it deals with something that people in the community feel very strong about in different ways ... The opinions really span the spectrum of attitudes. That is quite natural given the nature of the subject we are dealing with”.⁹⁶ Elder’s thoughts effectively summarize the reason why there is such a large number of different conscience votes held on gambling reform, speaking to the perennial nature of this issue as a conscience vote.

International Convention Center

Linked directly to the issue of gambling was the granting of a conscience vote to the New Zealand International Convention Centre Bill in 2013. This bill was a government bill drafted by the Key-led National government and granted a conscience vote by the Speaker of the House, David Carter.⁹⁷ Green MP Metiria Turei echoed Jack Elder’s sentiment stating, upon the bill being granted a House-wide conscience vote, that, “we’re very pleased that the Speaker has agreed that this should be a conscience vote. Gambling issues should be”.⁹⁸ The bill granted SkyCity, a large casino based in Auckland, the right to build a multimillion-dollar International Convention Center in exchange for the casino being granted additional allowance to employ more gambling machines and extend its gaming license.⁹⁹ However, despite the granting of the conscience vote, the bill passed its third reading of the House strictly on party lines, with MPs from the National Party, ACT Party and United Future Party all voting for the bill while MPs from the Labour Party, Green Party, Māori Party, New Zealand First Party and Mana Party all opposed the bill.¹⁰⁰

LGBT Rights

LGBT Rights have been subject to a large number of conscience votes since the begging of MMP in 1996. Prior to 2000, there had only been one conscience vote on LGBT rights in the

⁹⁶ “Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) – Volume 565”, House of Representatives, First Session, Forty-fifth Parliament, 1997, pg. 1140, Published 1997.

<https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B1Iwfzv-Mt3CaTB1cEd4STIsVXM/view?resourcekey=0-2SRdYrXoPmlq-5k4PKN96g> . Accessed October 9, 2021.

⁹⁷ “SkyCity Convention Center Bill conscience vote a fizzer”, National Business Review, July 11, 2013. <https://www.nbr.co.nz/article/sky-city-convention-centre-bill-conscience-vote-fizzer-ck-142765>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

⁹⁸ Michael Fox et. al, “Conscience vote for pokies”, Stuff, July 11, 2013. <http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/8901117/Conscience-vote-for-pokies>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

⁹⁹ “SkyCity Convention Center Bill conscience vote a fizzer”, National Business Review

¹⁰⁰ “Journals of the House for the week beginning Tuesday, 12 November 2013”, New Zealand Parliament, Published November 12, 2013. <https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/journals-of-the-house/weekly-journals/document/00HOHJournals201311121/journals-of-the-house-for-the-week-beginning-tuesday-12>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

New Zealand House of Representatives and this came in 1986 in the form of the Homosexual Law Reform Act 1986, which narrowly passed the House by a 49-44 ‘Aye’ margin.¹⁰¹ Since the turn of the century however, LGBT Rights has been one of the topics that have been most prevalent when it comes to conscience votes. These votes include the Matrimonial Property Amendment Bill (2000), the Property (Relationships) Amendment Bill (2000), the Civil Union Bill (2004), the Relationships (Statutory References) Bill (2005), and the Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Bill (2013). These bills have advanced LGBT rights significantly in New Zealand throughout the 21st Century, allowing same-sex couples additional protective property rights, the right to enter into a Civil Union, equality in terms of ensuring that the same legal rights and responsibilities are applied to same-sex couples and finally the right to get married. Like child welfare, conscience votes on LGBT rights have not occurred since the passing of the Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Bill in 2013, perhaps an indication of the shift in public mood towards the issue, with parties such as the Labour Party and the Green Party now having clear policy missions when it comes to the LGBT community.¹⁰² Recent legislation on LGBT issues, such as the Conversion Practices Prohibition Legislation Bill, aiming to ban conversion therapy, resulted in party-line votes with all parties besides the National Party voting for this bill at its first reading in the House.¹⁰³¹⁰⁴ Also, many MPs who voted against the passage of the Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Bill have stated that they have since regretted their votes on the bill, including notable conservative National MPs, Simon Bridges and Dr. Nick Smith, again reiterating the fact that, like child welfare, votes on LGBT rights may be subject to whipped votes in future parliamentary sessions.¹⁰⁵¹⁰⁶

Prostitution

The issue of the legalization of prostitution arose during the year 2000 when Labour MP Tim Barnett’s Prostitution Reform Bill was drawn from the private members’ bill lottery.¹⁰⁷ This bill

¹⁰¹ “Homosexual Law Reform Act 1986”, New Zealand Legislation, Published July 11, 1986. <https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1986/0033/latest/whole.html>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

¹⁰² LabourVoices, “Supporting our Rainbow whānau”, Labour, February 14, 2021. <https://www.labour.org.nz/news-supporting-our-rainbow-whanau>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

¹⁰³ Katie Scotcher, “Conversion therapy ban legislation passes first reading at Parliament”, Radio New Zealand, August 5, 2021. <https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/448565/conversion-therapy-ban-legislation-passes-first-reading-at-parliament>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

¹⁰⁴ This vote occurred during the 53rd Parliamentary session

¹⁰⁵ Greta Yeoman, “Marriage equality, five years on: we ask opposing MPs if they’d still vote no”, The Spinoff, October 14, 2019. <https://thespinoff.co.nz/politics/14-10-2019/marriage-equality-five-years-on-we-ask-opposing-mps-whether-they-would-still-vote-no-in-2019/>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

¹⁰⁶ “Outgoing National MP Nick Smith apologises to LGBT+ community for voting against gay marriage”, Newshub, June 10, 2021. <https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/politics/2021/06/outgoing-national-mp-nick-smith-apologises-to-lgbt-community-for-voting-against-gay-marriage.html>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

¹⁰⁷ “Prostitution Reform Bill”, New Zealand Parliament, Updated 2021. https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/bills-and-laws/bills-proposed-laws/document/00DBHOH_BILL3421_1/prostitution-reform-bill. Accessed October 9, 2021.

aimed to decriminalize prostitution with the intent to “provide a framework that protects the rights and promotes the welfare and occupational health and safety of sex workers”.¹⁰⁸ The bill passed through the House, with the third and final reading passing by a margin of 60-59.¹⁰⁹ This vote was put to a conscience vote and likely only passed as a result of Labour MP Ashraf Choudhary, the only Muslim MP at the time, voting to abstain from the vote, rather than voting for or against the bill.¹¹⁰ Many members in both the government and the opposition were lobbied intensely by their respective communities, with Labour MP Winnie Laban who originally opposed the bill, changing her mind at the last reading, after intense lobbying from Christian communities.¹¹¹ Prostitution reform has been voted on in two conscience votes since the Prostitution Reform Act passed in 2003, in the forms of two local government bills, aimed at regulating a certain area of the country through the greater New Zealand House of Representatives. These two bills are the Manukau City Council (Control of Street Prostitution) Bill (2006) and the Manukau City Council (Regulation of Prostitution in Specified Places) Bill (2010), which both failed at their respective second readings.¹¹²¹¹³ These bills aimed at regulating prostitution solely within Manukau City by authorizing “the Auckland Council to make bylaws prohibiting the business of prostitution or commercial sexual services in specified public places”.¹¹⁴

Rugby World Cup

The Rugby World Cup 2011 (Empowering) Bill was a government bill proposed by the Key-led National government in 2010, aimed at granting the Rugby World Cup authorities extra jurisdictions to grant alcohol licenses and alter hours of operations for bars and restaurants during the Rugby World Cup, an international sporting event.¹¹⁵ While all three readings of the

¹⁰⁸ “Prostitution Reform Bill”, New Zealand Parliament

¹⁰⁹ “Prostitution Reform Bill – Procedure, Third Reading”, New Zealand Parliament, Published June 25, 2003. https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/hansard-debates/rhr/document/47HansD_20030625_00001319/prostitution-reform-bill-procedure-third-reading. Accessed October 9, 2021.

¹¹⁰ Dave Crampton, “Prostitution Bill passes by one vote”, Scoop, June 26, 2003.

<https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0306/S00192/prostitution-bill-passes-by-one-vote.htm>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

¹¹¹ Dave Crampton, “Prostitution Bill passes by one vote”

¹¹² “Manukau City Council (Control of Street Prostitution) Bill”, New Zealand Parliament, Updated 2021. https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/bills-and-laws/bills-proposed-laws/document/00DBHOH_BILL7085_1/manukau-city-council-control-of-street-prostitution-bill. Accessed October 9, 2021.

¹¹³ “Manukau City Council (Regulation of Prostitution in Specified Places) Bill”, New Zealand Parliament, Updated 2021. https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/bills-and-laws/bills-proposed-laws/document/00DBHOH_BILL10290_1/tab/hansard. Accessed October 9, 2021.

¹¹⁴ “Manukau City Council (Regulation of Prostitution in Specified Places) Bill”, New Zealand Parliament,

¹¹⁵ “Rugby World Cup 2011 (Empowering) Bill – First Reading”, New Zealand Parliament, Published June 22, 2010. https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/hansard-debates/rhr/document/49HansD_20100622_00001145/rugby-world-cup-2011-empowering-bill-first-reading. Accessed October 9, 2021.

bill were voted along Party lines, the Labour Party granted its MPs the right to a conscience vote when voting on amendments to the bill, resulting in split votes for these decisions, after fears that the Minister in Charge of the Rugby World Cup, National MP Murray McCully would amass “too much power” as a result of the passage of the bill.¹¹⁶ The Rugby World Cup 2011 (Empowering) Bill shows a unique showcase of a bill that was voted on through both whipped votes and conscience votes.¹¹⁷

Shop Trading Hours

Shop Trading Hours have been a consistent topic for conscience votes throughout New Zealand’s parliamentary history. Between the 1940s and the 1980s, shops were not permitted to be open and trade by the government on both Saturday and Sunday, with regulations to amend this only coming in the mid-1980s.¹¹⁸ Amendments allowed Saturday trading to commence in 1980 while further regulation in 1990 allowed for Sunday trading.¹¹⁹ The current framework enforces shops to close on Christmas Day, Good Friday and ANZAC Day (until 1pm). The Shop Trading Hours Amendment Bill, a Key-led government bill, allowed territorial authorities to decide whether shops in their local jurisdictions are allowed to open and trade in their districts on Easter Sunday.¹²⁰ Several other conscience votes since 1996 have also examined loosening shop trading hour regulations for certain regions of the country. Labour MP Steve Chadwick introduced a local bill, the Rotorua District (Sunday Easter Trading) Bill in 2002, with the intention of granting “a partial exemption from the Shop Trading Hours Act Repeal Act 1990 to allow shops in the Rotorua District to be open on Easter Sunday during the period from 9.00am to 5.00pm”.¹²¹ National MP Jacqui Dean also introduced a private members’ bill in 2010, the Shop Trading Hours Act Repeal (Waitaki Easter Trading) Amendment Bill, with the intention of allowing retailers within the Waitaki electorate to be able to trade on Good Friday and Easter Sunday.¹²² Both of these bills failed at their second and first readings respectively. On the whole,

¹¹⁶ “Fears Rugby World Cup minister will get too much power”, Radio New Zealand, September 29, 2010. <https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/58079/fears-rugby-world-cup-minister-will-get-too-much-power>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

¹¹⁷ Labour Party MPs were granted a conscience vote on the issue, all other MPs voted along party lines under whipped votes

¹¹⁸ Carl Walrond, “Food shops – Shopping hours”, Te Ara – The Encyclopedia of New Zealand, Updated September 16, 2016. <https://teara.govt.nz/en/food-shops/page-7>. Accessed October 10, 2021.

¹¹⁹ Carl Walrond, “Food shops – Shopping hours”

¹²⁰ “Shop Trading Hours Amendment Bill”, New Zealand Parliament, Updated 2021.

https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/bills-and-laws/bills-proposed-laws/document/00DBHOH_BILL66378_1/shop-trading-hours-amendment-bill. Accessed October 9, 2021.

¹²¹ “Bills Digest – Rotorua District (Easter Sunday Shop Trading) Bill 2002”, New Zealand Parliamentary Library, October 16, 2002. <https://www.parliament.nz/resource/en-NZ/47PLLawBD9231/20bd140d9a4237a14e60761a32ed159a29e5bf2f>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

¹²² “Shop Trading Hours Act Repeal (Waitaki Easter Trading) Amendment Bill”, New Zealand Parliament, Updated 2021. <https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/bills-and-laws/bills-proposed->

Shop Trading Hours have been an issue for which both the National Party and the Labour Party have nominated conscience votes for, believing the issue transcends party politics.¹²³

Omnibus Bill

In 2005, the Labour MP David Benson-Pope, the Associate Minister of Justice, for the Clark-led Labour government introduced an Omnibus Bill, effectively attaching several bills to the third reading of the Relationships (Statutory References) Bill, a bill that aimed to ensure “that the same legal rights and responsibilities apply to married, de facto (whether opposite or same sex), and civil union relationships”.¹²⁴ Thus, if MPs on both sides of the House wanted these other bills to pass, they would have to vote ‘Aye’ on the Relationships (Statutory References) Bill.¹²⁵ The Omnibus bill passed by a 76-44 vote, passing all 23 of these bills into law. Opposition National MP Dr. Richard Worth criticized the government’s handling of the bill stating that; “there are anomalies in this legislation, and that is not surprising because it is incredibly complicated. We saw that complexity in one of the Supplementary Order Papers, which proposed to divide the original bill into 23 separate Acts. In addition to that, there are changes that make substantial amendments to a number of regulations. There is nothing that is straightforward about this legislation”.¹²⁶ This bill and breaking the vote down into 23 different conscience votes was a tactical move by the Clark-led Labour government in an attempt to ensure the passage of the legislation into law.

[laws/document/00DBHOH_BILL10119_1/shop-trading-hours-act-repeal-waitaki-easter-trading](https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/bills-and-laws/bills-proposed-laws/document/00DBHOH_BILL10119_1/shop-trading-hours-act-repeal-waitaki-easter-trading). Accessed October 9, 2021.

¹²³ “Suppressing their consciences: Easter Trading Bill”, Caritas Aotearoa New Zealand, Updated 2015. <https://caritas.org.nz/newsroom/stories/suppressing-their-consciences-easter-trading-bill>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

¹²⁴ “Relationships (Statutory References) Bill”, New Zealand Parliament, Updated 2021. https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/bills-and-laws/bills-proposed-laws/document/00DBHOH_BILL6188_1/relationships-statutory-references-bill. Accessed October 9, 2021.

¹²⁵ The other bills incorporated into this bill included the third readings of the Administration Amendment Bill (No 2), the Care of Children Amendment Bill, the Child Support Amendment Bill (No 3), the Deaths by Accidents Compensation Amendment Bill, the Estate and Gift Duties Amendment Bill, the Goods and Services Tax Amendment Bill, the Government Superannuation Fund Amendment Bill (No 4), the Income Tax Amendment Bill, the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Amendment Bill (No 4), the Interpretation Amendment Bill, the Life Insurance Amendment Bill (No 2), the Marriage Amendment Bill, the Minors’ Contracts Amendment Bill, the New Zealand Superannuation Amendment Bill (No 2), the Parental Leave and Employment Protection Amendment Bill (No 2), the Property (Relationships) Amendment Bill, the Real Estate Agents Amendment Bill, the Social Security Amendment Bill, the Tax Administration Amendment Bill, the Trustee Amendment Bill, the War Pensions Amendment Bill (No 3), and the Wills Amendment Bill.¹²⁵

-“Relationships (Statutory References) Bill”, New Zealand Parliament

¹²⁶ “Relationships (Statutory References) Bill; AND BILLS THEREFROM – Third Readings”, New Zealand Parliament, March 15, 2005. https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/hansard-debates/rhr/document/47HansD_20050315_00000827/relationships-statutory-references-bill-and-bills-therefrom. Accessed October 9, 2021.

5. Dataset Background

The dataset of votes collected dates back to the beginning of the 45th Parliament, the first Parliament to be elected using the Mixed Member Proportional system of representation. The first conscience vote to be held in the 45th Parliament was a vote on the second reading of the Shop Trading Hours (Repeal of Restrictions) Bill on the May 14, 1997.¹²⁷ This has been followed by 427 conscience votes across eight different parliamentary sessions, resulting in a dataset of 428 individual votes.

Table 2: Overview of Conscience Votes/Members of Parliament since the beginning of MMP

| Parliament | Number of Votes | Percentage of Total Votes | Total MPs | Total Votes |
|-----------------|-----------------|---------------------------|-----------|-------------|
| 52nd Parliament | 125 | 29% | 120 | 15000 |
| 51st Parliament | 9 | 2% | 120 | 1080 |
| 50th Parliament | 68 | 16% | 121 | 8228 |
| 49th Parliament | 15 | 4% | 121 | 1815 |
| 48th Parliament | 23 | 5% | 122 | 2806 |
| 47th Parliament | 92 | 21% | 121 | 11132 |
| 46th Parliament | 57 | 13% | 120 | 6840 |
| 45th Parliament | 39 | 9% | 120 | 4680 |
| Total | 428 | 100% | 965 | 51581 |

Source: Author's calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

As seen in Table 2, there is a large variety of the number of conscience votes per parliamentary sessions. The 52nd Parliamentary session featured the most conscience votes at 125 individual votes. This session was preceded by the 51st Parliament which only held 9 unique conscience votes, the smallest number of votes a parliamentary session has held since the introduction of MMP in 1996. The range in number of conscience votes per parliamentary session is due to the nature of the legislation that is read in the House at the time. Those parliamentary sessions with a higher number of conscience votes usually have one or two defining pieces of legislation that result in a large number of conscience votes. For example, the 52nd Parliamentary session had both the Abortion Legislation Bill (2019) and the End of Life Choice Bill (2017) which passed in 2019, which attributed to 49 and 74 individual conscience votes respectively. The Civil Union Bill, which passed into law in 2004, generated 55 individual conscience votes, resulting in the 47th Parliament having the second highest number of total conscience votes by parliamentary session.

The number of MPs in Parliament per parliament also differs, as seen in Table 2. This is due to the 'overhang seats' issue that arises due to the workings of the Mixed Member Proportional system. The New Zealand Parliament is usually supposed to naturally have 120 members,

¹²⁷ "Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) – Volume 560", House of Representatives, First Session, Forty-fifth Parliament, 1997, pg. 333, Published 1997. <https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B1Iwfzv-Mt3CaHRDRI93c2ZXNFU/view?resourcekey=0-PvEAs9F96Wx1Ck-b6VTq2g>. Accessed October 28, 2021.

comprised of both Electorate MPs and List MPs.¹²⁸ However, overhang seats can increase the total number of seats in a parliamentary session. Overhang seats are generated when a party wins more electorate seat than it would be entitled to, given its share of the party vote.¹²⁹ This resulted in the 47th, 49th and 50th Parliaments all having one overhang seat and 121 members, while the 48th Parliament had 122 total members, with two extra overhang seats resulting from the 2008 election.¹³⁰¹³¹

As seen in Table 1, of the 428 votes, there is a variety of different issues voted on, comprised of the twelve board categorizes defined in the previous section. LGBT Rights represents the most voted on issue via conscience vote since 1996, accounting for 28% of the total votes and 120 unique votes in the dataset. This is then followed by Euthanasia, Alcohol and Abortion, accounting for 89, 60 and 40 individual conscience votes respectively. On the other end of the scale, the issue of Cannabis reform only had two individual conscience votes while the Omnibus bill was only one vote.¹³²

Each bill that passes through the House of Representatives must be voted on to be read three unique times.¹³³¹³⁴ Depending on the nature of the bill, several supplemental orders could be set in place to be voted on. For example, the End of Life Choice Bill (2017) received 113 supplemental order from various MPs across the political spectrum, aiming to both loosen and restrict the

¹²⁸ “New Zealand’s Electoral System”, Electoral Commission, Published 2014.
<https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/ERRE/Brief/BR8391757/br-external/2PedenR-e.pdf>. Accessed October 28, 2021.

¹²⁹ “New Zealand’s Electoral System”, Electoral Commission

¹³⁰ “New Zealand General Election 2008 – Official Results”, Electoral Commission

¹³¹ This was due to the Māori Party winning 5 electorate seats while only receiving 2.39% of the total party vote

-“New Zealand General Election 2008 – Official Results”, Electoral Commission

¹³² Due to the passage of the bill being split via a supplementary order

-“Relationships (Statutory References) Bill; AND BILLS THEREFROM – Third Readings”, New Zealand Parliament

¹³³ “How a bill becomes law”, New Zealand Parliament, January 22, 2016.

<https://www.parliament.nz/en/visit-and-learn/how-parliament-works/how-laws-are-made/how-a-bill-becomes-law/>. Accessed October 28, 2021.

¹³⁴ The first reading provides a chance for the parliament to first debate a bill in the House, after which it is then voted on for the first time. If the bill passes its first reading it is referred to one of the parliamentary select committees for further examination. After the bill has been examined by the respective select committee it is voted on by the House in a second reading vote. The second reading is preceded by another House-wide debate in which members can offer supplemental order papers which aim to alter or divide the bill in question

-“How a bill becomes law”, New Zealand Parliament

jurisdiction of the bill.¹³⁵ The third reading of a bill usually ends up being a summarizing debate of the bill in its final form, followed by a third House-wide vote.¹³⁶

Voting, including conscience voting, in the New Zealand House of Representatives is usually a binary vote, with ‘Aye’ for the affirmative and ‘No’ for the negative.¹³⁷ There is also the option to abstain from a vote for whatever reason the Member of Parliament feels is appropriate.¹³⁸ Normally, the voting is recorded by a voice vote for regular, party-line votes. In conscience votes there are two separate doors, leading to two different lobbies, which the members have to assemble in, one representing Ayes and one representing Noes.¹³⁹ Those who abstain go directly to the table in front of the Speaker.¹⁴⁰

Table 3: Number of absent votes recorded in Conscience Votes held in Parliament since the beginning of MMP

| Parliament | Absent Votes | Average Absent Votes per Vote |
|-----------------|--------------|-------------------------------|
| 52nd Parliament | 128 | 1.0 |
| 51st Parliament | 1 | 0.1 |
| 50th Parliament | 179 | 2.6 |
| 49th Parliament | 64 | 4.3 |
| 48th Parliament | 48 | 2.1 |
| 47th Parliament | 205 | 2.2 |
| 46th Parliament | 199 | 3.5 |
| 45th Parliament | 401 | 10.3 |
| Total | 1225 | 26.1 |

Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

Along with the introduction of MMP, 1996 also marked the introduction of voting by proxy.¹⁴¹ Voting by proxy allows members who are absent from the Parliamentary chamber, where voting takes place, to authorize another Member of Parliament to cast a vote on their behalf.¹⁴² For conscience votes, the member issuing the proxy must put their proxy vote in writing, including both signing and dating the proxy as well as recording how the present member must vote when

¹³⁵ “End of Life Choice Bill”, New Zealand Parliament, Updated 2021.

https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/bills-and-laws/bills-proposed-laws/document/BILL_74307/end-of-life-choice-bill. Accessed October 28, 2021.

¹³⁶ “How a bill becomes law”, New Zealand Parliament

¹³⁷ “Voting in the House of Representatives”, New Zealand Parliament, March 19, 2013.

<https://www.parliament.nz/en/get-involved/features-pre-2016/document/00NZPHomeNews201303191/voting-in-the-house-of-representatives>. Accessed October 28, 2021.

¹³⁸ “Voting in the House of Representatives”, New Zealand Parliament

¹³⁹ “Voting in the House of Representatives”, New Zealand Parliament

¹⁴⁰ “Voting in the House of Representatives”, New Zealand Parliament

¹⁴¹ “Chapter 17 Voting”, New Zealand Parliament

¹⁴² “Chapter 17 Voting”, New Zealand Parliament

it comes to the conscience votes.¹⁴³ The introduction of proxy voting has effectively eliminated the excuses for not voting on a conscience bill, considering the member now does not have to actively be present in the Parliamentary Chamber in Wellington in order to record a vote. The advent of the internet has also aided members in recording proxy votes when they are unable to make it to the Parliamentary Chamber. Thus, absences from the voting record since 1996 imply a level of intentionality in terms of not recording a vote one way or the other. This brings up a fourth option for how members can treat a conscience vote (with the other options being voting Aye, voting No, or abstaining from the vote), and begs the question of how to treat absences from the voting record when it comes to conscience votes. As seen in Table 3 there has been a steady decline in the number of absences per votes across the differing parliamentary sessions, with the 45th Parliament (1996-1999) remaining an outlier due to the new nature of the proxy vote at the time.

¹⁴³ “Chapter 17 Voting”, New Zealand Parliament

6. 52nd Parliamentary Session: A Closer Look

Overview of Conscience Voting in the 52nd Parliament

The 52nd Parliamentary session, which began on the November 7, 2017 and concluded on September 6, 2020, held a total of 125 individual conscience votes, the most of any parliamentary session since the introduction of MMP in 1996.¹⁴⁴ During this session, the 125 votes were all from four individual bills; the Abortion Legislation Bill (2019), the End of Life Choice Bill (2017), the Misuse of Drugs (Medicinal Cannabis and Other Matters) Amendment Bill (2018), and the Sale and Supply of Alcohol (Renewal of Licences) Amendment Bill (No 2) (2018).¹⁴⁵

The 2020 Abortion Legislation Bill had 49 individual conscience votes while the End of Life Choice Bill (2017) had 74 individual conscience votes. The first two votes of the End of Life Choice Bill (2017) occurred in December 2017.¹⁴⁶ All other votes for the End of Life Choice Bill (2017) occurred between July and November of 2019. The first reading of the Abortion Legislation Bill (2019) occurred in August 2019, with the other 48 votes occurring all within a

¹⁴⁴ “What happens to Parliament with a delayed 2020 general election date?”, New Zealand Parliament, August 18, 2021. <https://www.parliament.nz/mi/get-involved/features/what-happens-to-parliament-with-a-delayed-2020-general-election-date/>. Accessed October 28, 2021.

¹⁴⁵ The Misuse of Drugs (Medicinal Cannabis and Other Matters) Amendment Bill (2018), and the Sale and Supply of Alcohol (Renewal of Licences) Amendment Bill (No 2) (2018) only contributed one conscience vote each, with the voting being on their respective first readings in the House, with the former failing to pass by a total of 47 to 73 while the latter passed by a majority of 63 to 56.

-“Journals of the House for the week beginning Tuesday, 20 February 2018”, New Zealand Parliament, February 20, 2018. https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/journals-of-the-house/weekly-journals/document/JNLW_76557/journals-of-the-house-for-the-week-beginning-tuesday-20. Accessed October 29, 2021.

¹⁴⁶ These votes were a vote on the introduction and subsequent first reading of the bill and a second vote proposed by author of the bill, ACT Party leader and MP David Seymour, to report the bill to the House nine months removed from its first reading

-“Journals of the House for the week beginning Tuesday, 12 December 2018”, New Zealand Parliament, December 12, 2017. https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/journals-of-the-house/weekly-journals/document/JNLW_76395/journals-of-the-house-for-the-week-beginning-tuesday-12. Accessed October 29, 2021.

15-day block in March 2020.^{147/148} During this period, there were a total of 125 politicians who voted on conscience votes in the New Zealand House of Representatives.¹⁴⁹

Analysis of Results

In order to operationalize the voting data, I assessed whether the conscience vote made the respective legislation either more or less restrictive, i.e. liberalized or made more restrictive (conservative). If a member voted in the conscience vote to make a bill more ‘conservative’ they received one point. If they voted to liberalize the bill via a conscience vote they received zero points. Thus, if a member voted to restrict legislation for all 125 votes, they would receive 125 points. If a member was absent or abstained from a vote they did not receive a point and this vote would be subtracted from their score total. For example, if a member missed 15 votes, their total

¹⁴⁷ “Journals of the House for the week beginning Tuesday, 10 March 2020”, New Zealand Parliament, March 10, 2020. https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/journals-of-the-house/weekly-journals/document/JNLW_96342/journals-of-the-house-for-the-week-beginning-tuesday-10. Accessed October 29, 2021.

¹⁴⁸ “Journals of the House for the week beginning Tuesday, 17 March 2020”, New Zealand Parliament, March 17, 2020. https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/journals-of-the-house/weekly-journals/document/JNLW_96361/journals-of-the-house-for-the-week-beginning-tuesday-17. Accessed October 29, 2021.

¹⁴⁹ This was due to the fact that there were several resignations/retirements within the National Party caucus during this Parliament; with members Sir Bill English, Steven Joyce, Jonathan Coleman, Chris Finlayson and Nuk Korako all leaving Parliament at some point during the session. They were replaced in the National Party caucus by new members; Maureen Pugh, Nicola Willis, Dan Bidois, Agnes Loheni and Paulo Garcia, respectively, thus resulting in 125 Members of Parliament over the course of the 52nd Parliament. Due to the nature of the resignation and replacement process, many of those members who resigned/came into Parliament during the session, did not participate in all of the conscience votes held during this parliamentary session

-Joel Ineson, “Maureen Pugh back in Parliament after Bill English’s retirement”, Stuff, February 14, 2018. <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/101442769/maureen-pugh-back-in-parliament-after-bill-englishs-retirement>. Accessed November 27, 2021.

-Tess Nichol, “Nicola Willis to enter Parliament following Steven Joyce’s retirement”, New Zealand Herald, March 5, 2018. <https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/nicola-willis-to-enter-parliament-following-steven-joyces-retirement/LPUPFLF6SG2OWFRKMXX24VZLR4/>. Accessed November 27, 2021.

-Dileepa Fonseka, “Coleman’s vote intact in Northcote, victorious Dan Bidois says after by-election”, Stuff, June 10, 2018. <https://www.stuff.co.nz/auckland/104593171/colemans-vote-intact-in-northcote-victorious-dan-bidois-says-after-by-election>. Accessed November 27, 2021.


-Audrey Malone, “National Party bracing for another resignation from Parliament after election loss”, Stuff, April 8, 2018. <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/102910419/finlayson-gone-loheni-in>. Accessed November 27, 2021.

-Stacey Kirk, “National MP Nuk Korako announces retirement from Parliament”, Stuff, April 15, 2019. <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/112038048/national-mp-nuk-korako-announces-retirement-from-parliament>. Accessed November 27, 2021.

score would be divisible by 110 instead of 125. One's total score can be found by dividing the total conservative score by the number of votes they were present in, with a perfectly conservative voting record receiving an overall score of 1, while a perfectly liberal voting record receives a score of 0.

It is very difficult to control for one party voting along party lines for a certain vote, i.e. not voting in a conscience vote-like manner. For example, all National Party MPs voted 'No', the more conservative choice, on the first readings of the Misuse of Drugs (Medicinal Cannabis and Other Matters) Amendment Bill (2018), and the Sale and Supply of Alcohol (Renewal of Licences) Amendment Bill (No 2) (2018). It is impossible to differentiate whether all of these MPs thought that 'No' was the correct option on their own accord or whether this conscience vote worked more like a whipped vote for the National Party caucus. Thus, I will be including all conscience votes in which some Members of Parliament vote their conscience in the dataset, regardless of whether other parties vote along party lines.


Figure 3: Ideology Score by Member of Parliament in the 52nd Parliament



Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

As seen in Figure 3 and Appendix Table A.2, there is a myriad of scores ranging from 0.008 to 1 (these scores are further broken down into Euthanasia scores and Abortion scores in Appendix Table A.3) There are general patterns in terms of groupings in which people vote. As seen in Figure 3, 63 MPs have scores of less than 0.1, indicating that they voted for the more liberal option on a conscience vote more than 90% of the time. Conversely, 31 MPs, have scores higher than 0.9, indicating that they voted for the more liberal option on a conscience vote less than 10% of the time. This left a resulting 31 MPs who voted for the more liberal option on a conscience vote between 10% and 90% of the time, with only 8 MPs falling within the 25%-75% middle range. These results can be further broken down to assess relative trends in differing demographics possessed by the respective Members of Parliament and their scores.

Figure 4: Mean/Median Ideology Score by Party in the 52nd Parliament



Source: Author's calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

Different political party affiliation had a clear sway in the way each party's respective member reacted to the set of conscience votes, as seen in Figure 4 and Appendix Table A.4. Of the five parties present in the 52nd Parliament, the largest party, the center-right National Party, saw its MPs receive an average score of 0.68, as seen in Appendix Table 4. As seen in Figure 3, the top 34 most conservative voting records in the 52nd Parliament all belonged to National MPs, over

half of the National Party caucus. National Party MPs, Tim Macindoe and the Deputy Leader of the National Party Gerry Brownlee, were both present in over 120 of those votes and had a perfectly conservative voting score of 1. However, this same conservative voting record did not apply to all of its MPs, with 13 of its MPs having scores of less than 0.1, including one of the leaders of the National Party during the 52nd Parliament, Judith Collins.


The average Labour Party MP had a score of 0.21, with a median score of 0.032. The majority of the Labour caucus had scores under 0.1, yet there were some MPs that voted more conservatively than they did liberally, going against the majority of their center-left party members. Seven Labour MPs; Damien O'Connor, Meka Whaitiri, Adrian Rurawhe, Rino Tirikatene, Jamie Strange, Jenny Salesa and Anahila Kanongata'a-Suisuiki, all had scores over 0.75, vastly higher than the median Labour MP scores of 0.032, indicating that they had a majority conservative voting record for the four conscience issues that occurred within the 52nd Parliament.

The eight MPs of the Green Party, New Zealand's most left-wing party politically, all had the most liberal voting records with all MPs recording the same score.¹⁵⁰ Whilst the Green Party still treated these votes as conscience votes, there was no deviation in the voting patterns of their MPs, with all eight of them voting as a block on each occasion. The MPs of the New Zealand First Party saw an average score of 0.092, well below that of the center-left Labour Party, however, their median score was higher than that of the Labour Party at 0.096. Much like the Green Party, the New Zealand First MPs tended to vote as a block during these conscience votes with the only difference in voting records coming from New Zealand First MPs Jenny Marcroft and Tracey Martin.¹⁵¹ The libertarian ACT Party was represented solely by MP David Seymour who had a voting record of 0.032. Normally associated with the center-right National Party, David Seymour's voting patterns differentiated from that of his fellow opposition MPs given that the End of Life Choice Bill was his own private members' bill and he voted to preserve it in the way that he presented it to Parliament.

¹⁵⁰ Besides co-leader Marama Davidson, who only had a different score as a result of missing one of the votes

¹⁵¹ Marcroft and Martin voted separately from the rest of their Party during two votes, the third reading of the Abortion Legislation Bill and a vote on the question of whether 'Clause 2 should stand', after Supplementary Order Paper 292 (which would have put the passage of the bill to a nationwide referendum) was voted down

Figure 5: Mean/Median Ideology Score by Electorate Urbanization Level in the 52nd Parliament



Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

Table 4: Ideology Score by Electorate Urbanization Level in the 52nd Parliament

| Urbanization Level | Average | Standard Deviation | Variation | Median |
|--------------------|---------|--------------------|-----------|--------|
| Major Urban Center | 0.318 | 0.378 | 0.143 | 0.049 |
| Māori | 0.393 | 0.397 | 0.157 | 0.203 |
| Medium-Size City | 0.686 | 0.421 | 0.177 | 0.951 |
| Rural | 0.587 | 0.403 | 0.162 | 0.771 |

Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

The urban-rural political divide has become a well-established global phenomenon in recent decades. Pasokification in Europe and the ever-growing urban-rural divide in the United States have established a recent trend in which more liberal politicians represent urban dwelling cities

while conservative politicians represent larger, more rural communities.¹⁵² In New Zealand, there has been an observed recent urban-rural divide over the response to the Labour Party's environmental policies when it comes to reforming agricultural practices observed on rural New Zealand farms.¹⁵³ The urbanization levels of New Zealand electorates, as classified by the website, the Spinoff, are broken down into four different types of electorates; Major Urban Center, Māori, Medium-Size City and Rural.¹⁵⁴ Measuring the voting behaviors of MPs representing these different electorates illustrates the relative liberal-conservative leans of these electorates with different levels of urbanization.

As seen in Table 4 and Figure 5, the average score of the 31 MPs representing Major Urban Center electorates is 0.31 with the median score being 0.048. Six of the twelve National MPs representing Major Urban Center electorates made up the top seven most conservative scores, skewing the average more conservative. The Māori electorate MPs, all represented by Labour MPs in the 52nd Parliament, had an average score of 0.39 with a median score of 0.20, indicating that they voted more conservatively than MPs representing Major Urban Center electorates. Of the seven MPs, four had scores less than 0.25, while three, Adrian Rurawhe, Rino Tirikatene and Meka Whaitiri, all had scores over 0.8, higher than that of the average National Party MP. In a surprising outcome, MPs representing Medium-Size City electorates had both a higher average and median score than MPs representing Rural electorates, indicating that they voted more conservatively when it came to conscience voting in the 52nd Parliament. These scores also occurred despite the fact the 28% of Medium-Size City electorates were represented by Labour MPs while only 5% of Rural electorates were represented by a Labour MP.¹⁵⁵ MPs representing Medium-Size City electorates had an average score of 0.68, with a median score of 0.95 while MPs representing Rural electorates had an average score of 0.58 and a median score of 0.77. These scores bring up many potential discussions including whether those National MPs that represented their Medium-Size City electorates were in fact too conservative for their constituents.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵² Jacob S. Cox, "PASOKification: Fall of the European Center Left or a Transformation of the System", *Governance: The Political Science Journal at UNLV*: Vol. 6, Article 5, 2019. <https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=governance-unlv>. Accessed October 29, 2021.


¹⁵³ Laura Walters, "Hoe real is the rural-urban divide", *The Spinoff*, July 22, 2021. <https://thespinoff.co.nz/society/22-07-2021/how-real-is-the-rural-urban-divide/>. Accessed October 29, 2021.

¹⁵⁴ Stephen Beban, "A better visual breakdown of the 2020 election results – updated"

¹⁵⁵ Damien O'Connor, MP for West Coast-Tasman, being the sole Labour MP representing a Rural electorate

¹⁵⁶ In the 2020 election which preceded the 52nd Parliament, five of these ten National MPs representing Medium-Size City electorates lost their re-election campaigns (David Bennett, Tim Macindoe, Shane Reti, Nick Smith, Jonathan Young) – "2020 General Election official results", Electoral Commission

Figure 6 : Mean/Median Ideology Score by Type of MP in the 52nd Parliament




Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

Whether one is a List MP or an Electorate MP could also affect voting behaviors in Parliament when it comes to conscience voting. Electorate MPs are elected to represent their respective electorate and constituency in Parliament, and while they have to win their party’s respective electorate nomination, they, in theory, owe less of their position in Parliament to their party. List MPs, on the other hand, are only in Parliament as a result of being placed high enough on their party list to then be allocated a seat in Parliament. Thus, List MPs may feel obliged to vote more closely with their party, even when it comes to conscience voting, while Electorate MPs may feel more independent given that their seat in Parliament was given to them directly by their constituency and not their party. List MPs, who were comprised of 17 Labour MPs, 15 National MPs, 9 New Zealand First MPs and 8 Green MPs, had an average score of 0.34 and a median score of 0.08, as seen in Figure 6 and Appendix Table A.5. Electorate MPs, comprised of 41 National MPs, 29 Labour MPs and 1 ACT Party MP, had an average score of 0.47 and a median score of 0.41. These results may be potentially skewed due to the average orientation of each party, with Green Party MPs, who are all List MPs, voting more liberally than any other MPs in

Parliament while National Party MPs, who make up the largest percentage of Electorate MPs voted more conservatively.

Figure 7: Mean/Median Ideology Score by Type of MP (National Party/Labour Party) in the 52nd Parliament



Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

When breaking these votes down by the two main parties, as seen in Appendix Table A.6 and Figure 7, there is a clear distinction in the voting patterns between the List MPs and the Electorate MPs for both the National Party and the Labour Party. The average National List MP had a score of 0.81 and a median score of 0.99 in comparison to the average National Electorate MP who had a score of 0.62 and a median score of 0.85. This implies that the National List MPs voted a lot more conservatively than their Electorate representing counterparts. Conversely, the average Labour List MP had a score of 0.12 and a median score of 0.024 while the average Labour Electorate MP had an average score of 0.26 and a median score of 0.048. Thus, the average Labour List MP voted more liberally than their Labour Electorate MP counterparts. This phenomenon indicates that Electorate MPs, respective of political party, are more likely to vote in a manner that isn’t entirely liberal or conservative and that being voted in by a certain

constituency grants them more flexibility to vote in a different manner from the rest of their party. There is also the potential factor of aiming to please a broader range of constituents, and not just party loyalists, by voting in a more ‘bipartisan’ manner. List MPs on the other hand, appear to be more ideologically in sync with their respective parties, and are less likely to have a mixed voting record, tending to vote one way when it comes to conscience voting in the 52nd Parliament.

There are exceptions to these rules, as seen in the 52nd Parliament voting records. Labour List MPs Jamie Strange and Anahila Kanongata'a-Suisuiki both had respective scores of 0.824 and 0.83, both voting more conservatively than the average National List MP. Conversely National List MPs Nicola Willis and Jian Yang had scores of 0.056 and 0.048 respectively, placing their scores in the middle of the cohort of Labour List MPs. Electorate MPs were more spread out in terms of their scoring with nine Labour MPs having scores over 0.5, much greater than the two Labour List MPs. 10 National MPs representing electorates had scores less than 0.1, many more than the two National List MPs. These figures also build on the theory that Electorate MPs feel a greater freedom and flexibility when it comes to deviating from the main conscience voting stream of their party.


Another interesting phenomenon that could influence party voting is the respective islands MPs come from; the North Island and the South Island. Culturally, the two islands view themselves as having different customs, with residents of the North Island, especially Aucklanders, being more metropolitan while South Islanders view themselves as kinder, more traditional and living life at a slower pace.¹⁵⁷ This rivalry culminates in an interisland rugby match between the North Island and South Island that has been occurring semi-regularly since 1897.¹⁵⁸ There have also been small movements throughout history that have advocated for South Island independence.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁷ “Counting the changes”, Stuff, February 18, 2009. <http://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/christchurch-life/211501/Counting-the-changes>. Accessed October 29, 2021.

¹⁵⁸ Lynn McConnell, “North V South: Know Your Interisland History”, All Blacks, September 1, 2020. <https://www.allblacks.com/news/north-v-south-know-your-interisland-history/>. Accessed October 29, 2021.

¹⁵⁹ Some of these movements include the South Island Party and the New Munster Party running as political parties, however, neither gained much traction in respective elections they contested -Dan Satherley, “NZ’s wackiest political parties – part 2”, 3 News, November 23, 2011. <https://archive.ph/20120716173928/http://www.3news.co.nz/NZs-wackiest-political-parties---part-2/tabid/1620/articleID/229520/Default.aspx>. Accessed October 29, 2021.


Figure 8: Mean/Median Ideology Score by Electorate-Based Island in the 52nd Parliament



Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

Currently, 55 electorates are located in the North Island while 17 electorates are located in the South Island, due to the respective population differences. During the 52nd Parliament, the North Island MPs were comprised of 21 Labour MPs, 33 National MPs and 1 ACT Party MP. The South Island was represented by 8 Labour MPs and 9 National. The North Island MPs have an average score of 0.47 and a median score of 0.33 while South Island MPs also have an average score of 0.47 and a median score of 0.59, as seen in Appendix Table A.7 and Figure 8. These scores indicate that, on average, MPs from both the North Island and the South Island voted similarly, while, the median score for the South Island MPs indicated that the North Island had a greater share of MPs with consistently lower scores than their South Island counterparts.

Figure 9: Mean/Median Ideology Score by Government/Opposition in the 52nd Parliament



Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

Political gatekeeping and voting in line with the rest of one’s government, party and party leader, despite the fact that these conscience votes should inherently be uninfluenced by party politics due to not being whipped votes, is a political phenomenon established and assessed in Crombez et. al (2006). As seen in Appendix Table A.8 and Figure 9, there is a large difference in the scores between those MPs who were members of the government and those MPs who formed the opposition. Those MPs that were part of the government during the 52nd Parliament (members of the Labour Party, New Zealand First Party and Green Party) had an average score of 0.17 and a median score of 0.032. Government ministers had an average score of 0.16 while non-ministers had an average score of 0.17 implying that both ministers and non-ministers who formed the government voted very similarly when it came to conscience voting. Members of the opposition parties (the National Party and the ACT Party) had an average score of 0.67 and a median score of 0.91, implying that they voted much more conservatively than the members who made up the government.

Table 5: Ideology Score by Party Leader (National Party/Labour Party) in the 52nd Parliament

| Member | Party | Total Scores | Votes Missed | Votes Attended | Score | Ranking |
|----------------|----------|--------------|--------------|----------------|-------|---------|
| Jacinda Ardern | Labour | 4 | 1 | 124 | 0.03 | 31 |
| Simon Bridges | National | 119 | 1 | 124 | 0.96 | 98 |

Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

The Prime Minister during the 52nd Parliament was the Leader of the Labour Party, Jacinda Ardern. Prime Minister Ardern’s score for conscience voting in the 52nd Parliament was 0.03, ranking her voting as the twenty-second most liberal within the Labour Party caucus of 46, placing her within the middle of her caucus ideologically. The Leader of the Opposition for 123 of the 125 votes during the 52nd Parliament was MP Simon Bridges of the National Party. Bridges’ voting score was 0.96 placing him as the thirty-eight most liberal voting record of total 62 members of the National Party who were MPs at some point during the 52nd Parliament. Despite having a drastically different voting record from Ardern, Bridges is similar to Ardern in the fact his voting patterns situated himself roughly within the middle of his own party ideologically, as seen in Table 5. These findings line up with the game theory proposition of median voter theorem, as originally established by Duncan Black in 1948.¹⁶⁰ This theorem suggests that “in a majority rule voting system, the candidate/party most preferred by the median voter will be elected” and this theorem holds up when applying to party leaders voting at the ideological center of their caucus.¹⁶¹

Robustness Check of the Scores during the 52nd Parliament

Throughout the 52nd Parliament there were a multitude of different types of conscience votes that members had to vote on. As previously discussed, conscience votes can be either voting on the first, second, or third reading of a bill, elevating the legislation through Parliament, or voting for a supplemental order paper which typically aims to change, omit or add content to the legislation in question. In the 52nd Parliament, many supplementary order papers were introduced in order to ‘filibuster’ the legislation, aiming to stall out the passage of the respective pieces of legislation into law.^{162,163} This glut of supplemental order papers filled with proposed changes, often to specific

¹⁶⁰ Jørgen Veisdal, “The Median Voter Theorem”, Cantor’s Paradise, October 11, 2019. <https://www.cantorsparadise.com/the-median-voter-theorem-c81630b57fa4>. Accessed December 2, 2021.

¹⁶¹ Jørgen Veisdal, “The Median Voter Theorem”

¹⁶² Phil Smith, “Filibustering the End of Life Choice”, Radio New Zealand, May 1, 2019. <https://www.rnz.co.nz/national/programmes/the-house/audio/2018693123/filibustering-the-end-of-life-choice>. Accessed November 19, 2021.

¹⁶³ Votes were held on amendments such as, replacing the words “medical practitioner, nurse practitioner, or specialist psychiatrist” with “health practitioner” in clause 27(1) of the supplemental order paper, put forward by National MP Simon O’Connor -“Journals of the House for the week beginning Tuesday, 24 September 2019”, New Zealand Parliament, September 24, 2019. <https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/journals-of-the-house/weekly->

wording of the legislation, occupied much of the voting time in the House for these pieces of legislation, with many MPs tending to vote either entirely one way or the other, often via proxy voting.

There may be bias in equally weighting a vote on a supplemental order paper, aiming to simply filibuster, to a vote on an important first, second or third reading of a bill. Thus, weighting these scores can serve as a robustness measure for the above results.

By weighting the voting of first, second, or third readings of votes more heavily, considering that these votes were indeed the votes that progressed the legislation through the Parliament, it could potentially reveal a more accurate and holistic view of the ideology scores and MP's voting behaviors than just treating every vote on an equal weighting. As a result, I divided the eight, 'reading votes' and the 117 'non-reading votes' (comprised mostly of votes on supplemental order papers) into two different categories. I then used the same methodology as before where if a member voted in the conscience vote to make a bill more 'conservative' they received one point, if they voted to liberalize the bill via a conscience vote they received zero points. This score was then divisible by the number of votes they actually voted resulting in. This resulted in two unique scores, as seen in Appendix Table A.9 a 'Reading Votes' score and a 'Non-Reading Votes' score. The Reading Votes scores was effectively made up of the first reading of the Sale and Supply of Alcohol (Renewal of Licences) Amendment Bill (No 2), and the Misuse of Drugs (Medicinal Cannabis and Other Matters) Amendment Bill, as well the first, second and third readings of the End of Life Choice Bill and the Abortion Legislation Bill. These two scores were then averaged to give an overall 'Weighted Score'. This 'Weighted Score' gives a greater weighting to those reading votes, aiming to filter the effects of the large number of filibuster amendments.


As seen in Appendix Table A.10, there was actually very little shift in the ideology scoring when ranking these weighted scores of members against each other. 69 of the MPs either didn't change ranking positions relative to the other Members of Parliament, or only moved up or down a single ranking position. 11 MPs had ranking shifts greater than 10 places. The biggest parliamentary movers were National MPs Judith Collins and Nicola Willis. Judith Collins, the most liberal National MP under the unweighted scoring system, fell 29 slots from being the 35th most liberal MP in Parliament when it comes to conscience voting to being the 64th most liberal MP in Parliament when it comes to conscience voting under the combined weighted rankings.¹⁶⁴ On the other hand, Nicola Willis rose 12 slots, the most of any MP, rising from the 48th most liberal MP under the unweighted scoring to the 36th most liberal MP under the unweighted scoring, becoming the National MP with the most liberal voting record in conscience voting under this metric. However, Willis' results are slightly biased as she was not an MP during the

[journals/document/JNLW_91502/journals-of-the-house-for-the-week-beginning-tuesday-24](https://www.parliament.nz/journals/document/JNLW_91502/journals-of-the-house-for-the-week-beginning-tuesday-24). Accessed November 19, 2021.

¹⁶⁴ This was due to Collins having a 'Reading Votes' score of 0.375, having voted 'No' on the first readings of the End of Life Choice Bill, the Sale and Supply of Alcohol (Renewal of Licences) Amendment Bill (No 2), and the Misuse of Drugs (Medicinal Cannabis and Other Matters) Amendment Bill

first four votes of the 52nd Parliament, coming off of the National Party list after the resignation of National MP Steven Joyce.¹⁶⁵

Figure 10: Difference in Unweighted Ideology Scores and Weighted Ideology Scores by Party in the 52nd Parliament



Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

When comparing the Weighted scores to the Unweighted scores, as seen in Figure 10 and Appendix Table A.11, it can be seen that the weighting of the ‘Reading Votes’ results in very little change to the relative mean and median scores for the political parties, with the mean score for National Party MPs remaining at 0.68. The mean score for Labour Party MPs dropped from 0.21 to 0.19, indicating that weighting Reading Votes more heavily resulted in an even more

¹⁶⁵ As a result, she was not present during the first readings of the Sale and Supply of Alcohol (Renewal of Licences) Amendment Bill (No 2), and the Misuse of Drugs (Medicinal Cannabis and Other Matters) Amendment Bill, which were effectively whipped votes for National Party MPs, as every MP present voted ‘No’, thus granting them more conservative voting records under the weighted scoring system than Willis

liberal average voting record as a whole for Labour MPs. The largest change in Party scores after the adjusted weighting came in the form of the New Zealand First Party, with the mean score for their MPs nearly doubling from 0.09 to 0.15. The ACT Party, represented solely by David Seymour, also saw its score rise slightly from 0.032 to 0.075 due to his 'No' vote on the first reading of the Sale and Supply of Alcohol (Renewal of Licences) Amendment Bill (No 2). When breaking down the National Party MPs and the Labour Party MPs into List MPs and Electorate MPs, National List MPs, Labour Electorate MPs and Labour List MPs all had more liberal scores under the weighted scoring system, while National Electorate MPs had a slightly more conservative mean score under the weighted scoring system.

As seen in Appendix Tables A.12 – A.16, there were no other notable changes in scores after the weighting of 'Reading Votes' were implemented. The gap between Electorates representing Medium-Size Cities Electorates and Rural Electorates closed slightly from 0.099 to 0.071 and the gap between MPs representing North Island Electorates and South Island Electorates shrunk by 0.005 points. The only change observed under the weighted scoring system was that ministers became more conservative than non-ministers, partly due to the greater proportion of New Zealand First MPs who were ministers relative to New Zealand First MPs who were non-ministers.

The weighted scoring system did not change the prevailing trends observed in the unweighted scoring system, speaking to the consistency with which Members of Parliament voted on certain bills. For example, very few MPs voted liberally for the reading of one of the bills while voting conservatively in the Supplemental Order Paper votes, or vice versa, which would have altered ones' score between the weighted and unweighted scoring systems. The weighted scoring systems check can be viewed as a robustness test on the initial scoring method, adding a level of validity to those results, even when accounting for the fact that many of the supplemental order paper votes were technically attempts by conservative Members of Parliament to filibuster the legislation from passing through the House.

7. Creating an Ideology Measure

By creating an overall ideology measure I will be attempting to collate an MP's voting behavior when it comes to conscience votes across all parliamentary sessions, creating a measure with which different factors can be assessed as to determining their voting behaviors. This figure can then also be compared with their respective constituencies in order to assess the relative strength the principal-agent model has over various Members of Parliament.

Since the inception of the Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP) system in 1996, the New Zealand House of Representatives has seen 428 conscience votes which, as previously described, fall into twelve distinct categories; Abortion, Alcohol, Cannabis, Child Welfare, Euthanasia, Gambling, the International Convention Center, LGBT Rights, Prostitution, the 2011 Rugby World Cup, Shop Trading Hours and an individual Omnibus conscience vote. Of these twelve categories, conscience votes for six of these issues can be distinctly categorized as making the respective legislation either more or less restrictive, i.e. liberalized or made more conservative. These six topics are; Abortion, Cannabis, Child Welfare, Euthanasia, LGBT Rights and Prostitution. As a result, votes on these six topics can be operationalized in order to give an MP a lifetime 'ideology' score across several parliamentary sessions, similar to that in the analysis of conscience voting during the 52nd Parliament.¹⁶⁶

In this operationalized dataset there are 288 total votes, comprised of these six topics, in which an MP could have been present for, all held between 2000 and 2020. There are a total of eighteen unique bills across these six topics, with the breakdown of these bills showcased in Table A.17. As a result of this wide time period, the number of votes the 359 MPs are present for differs significantly. Long-standing MPs David Carter of the National Party and Ruth Dyson of the Labour Party were both present for the most votes, voting in 286 individual votes each, and only missing two of these votes over this 20-year period. On the other hand, 41 MPs were not present for any of these 288 votes, failing to register a score and thus effectively removing them from the dataset, bringing the total to 318 MPs with operationalized scores. By giving each MP a score based on their voting patterns throughout their time in Parliament, I will be attempting to classify and measure the liberal-conservative ideologies of each MP, as well as assessing the summary statistics for different groupings of MPs, including different scores of political parties, whether they are an Electorate MP or a List MP, whether they are from an electorate in the North Island or the South Island and the urbanization level of the electorate that they represent.

While these scores are weighted evenly, with each vote equaling that of another, it is worth noting that this scoring method is limited by the wide time span measured and lack of overlap between different MPs for different votes. For example, one MP could be present for 50 votes and another could be present for a different 50 votes, yet they may register the exact same ideological score despite having very different ideological views. On average, the 318 MPs who registered scores were present for 107 of the 288 votes, with several MPs being present for less

¹⁶⁶ If a member, in a conscience vote, votes in a way that makes a bill more restrictive/conservative then they receive one point, and if they vote to liberalize the bill via a conscience vote they receive zero points. Their total score is then divided by the number of votes that they are present for in Parliament, giving them an overall score out of 1


than 10 votes. These scores are also inherently limited by the lack of total conscience votes in the New Zealand Parliament over this time period as well as the ambiguity behind other conscience votes topics, such as trading shop hours. Some MPs ideology scores may be biased from the parliamentary session they were present in. For example, there could be a certain parliamentary session where there were a plethora of votes in which the vast majority of MPs voted to liberalize, thus potentially skewing certain MPs scores to appear more liberal than the MP actually is. Future work, operationalizing more of these conscience votes would add greater validity to this ideology-measuring system.

Several MPs also swapped parties between different parliamentary sessions, often leaving Parliament and then emerging years later, representing a different party. Some of these notable members include; John Banks, Tau Henare, Hone Harawira, Willie Jackson, Shane Jones and Dame Tariana Turia. Members of the Green Party as well as member of Jim Anderton's Progressive Party also came from the predecessor Alliance party. For simplicity's sake, the MP's score is attributed to the political party that they were most recently associated with in Parliament if they changed political parties throughout their career, in order to avoid double-counting scores.

As seen in Figure 11, much like the results for the 52nd Parliament, members of the National Party, on average registered the majority of the most conservative conscience voting records in Parliament. Eight National MPs registered a score of 1, indicating perfectly conservative voting records when it came to these six issues.¹⁶⁷ On the other hand, 25 MPs registered perfectly liberal voting records. These MPs were all comprised of members of the Alliance, the Labour Party and the Green Party. Interestingly though, National Party MP Claudette Hauiti and ACT Party MP Hilary Calvert, also registered scores of 0 despite being members of traditionally more socially-conservative political parties. However, this phenomenon may be due to Hauiti and Calvert only being present for 10 and 2 conscience votes respectively. As seen in Figure 11 and Appendix Table A.18, on average the 318 MPs registered an average score of 0.42 and a median score of 0.25, indicating that more often than not MPs were voting to liberalize legislation for these six issues.

¹⁶⁷ These MPs; Paul Quinn, Nuk Korako, Simon Upton, Pesata Sam Lotu-Iiga, Alec Neill, Brian Neeson, Gavan Herlihy, and Tim Macindoe, were all members of the National Party

Figure 11: Operationalized Ideology Score by Member of Parliament



Source: Author's calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports


Table 6: Operationalized Ideology Score by Party

| Party | Average | Standard Deviation | Variation | Median |
|-------------------|----------------|---------------------------|------------------|---------------|
| ACT | 0.603 | 0.333 | 0.111 | 0.669 |
| Alliance | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Green | 0.014 | 0.021 | 0.000 | 0.008 |
| Progressive | 0.096 | 0.008 | 0.000 | 0.096 |
| Labour | 0.126 | 0.220 | 0.048 | 0.034 |
| Mana | 0.033 | N/A | N/A | 0.033 |
| Māori | 0.254 | 0.278 | 0.077 | 0.138 |
| National | 0.712 | 0.312 | 0.097 | 0.832 |
| New Zealand First | 0.558 | 0.324 | 0.105 | 0.600 |
| United Future | 0.900 | 0.076 | 0.006 | 0.932 |

Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

Ten unique parties have been represented during the 288 total votes in the operationalized dataset. These parties include the ACT Party, the Alliance, the Green Party, Jim Anderton’s Progressive Party, the Labour Party, the Mana Party, the Māori Party, the National Party, the New Zealand First Party and United Future. As seen in Table 6 and Figure 12, the MPs representing these respective parties have vastly different ideological scores when it comes to conscience voting on these six topics.

Figure 12: Mean/Median Operationalized Ideology Score by Party



Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

Eight of these parties can be classified as ‘minor parties’, with only the National Party and the Labour Party consistently having more than 30 MPs present in the eight parliamentary sessions since the introduction of MMP. Members of the Green Party and the Alliance had the most liberal voting records, with all seven Alliance MPs having a perfectly liberal voting record and an ideological score of 0, and the Green Party MPs having an average score of 0.014 with a median score of 0.008 indicating all of their MPs had highly liberal voting records. The two MPs who comprised Jim Anderton’s Progressive Party also had highly liberal voting patterns when it came to conscience votes, with average and median scores of 0.096.¹⁶⁸ Two of these parties, the

¹⁶⁸ Both of these MPs, Jim Anderton and Matt Robson, were members of the Alliance before it fragmented prior to the 2002 election, and these slightly more conservative voting records perhaps give an insight into ideological differences between these two different sets of MPs -“Hon Jim Anderton”, New Zealand Parliament, November 26, 2011. <https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electoral-districts/former-members-of-parliament/anderton-jim/>. Accessed November 19, 2021.
 -“Matt Robson – Ministers”, Beehive.govt.nz, Last Updated May 29, 2000. <https://www.beehive.govt.nz/minister/matt-robson?page=12>. Accessed November 19, 2021.

Māori Party and the Mana Party, were set up in order to represent the Māori people of New Zealand. The Mana Party was represented solely in parliament by former Māori Party MP Hone Harawira, who registered a score of 0.033.¹⁶⁸ Members of the Māori Party, who were coalition partners with the center-right National Party between 2008 and 2017, had an average score of 0.25 and a median score of 0.13, indicating a much more socially-conservative option for Māori representation in Parliament, at least when compared to the Mana Party.¹⁷⁰ Members of the New Zealand First Party, which has been present in all parliamentary sessions since the introduction of MMP besides the 49th Parliamentary session, registered an average score of 0.55 and a median score of 0.6, indicating a fairly mixed approach when it comes to conscience voting. The ACT Party, a traditionally libertarian party, registered an average score of 0.60 amongst its MP with a median score of 0.66.¹⁷¹ Interestingly, the United Future Party, a party that describes itself as a centrist party and was originally made up of members of both the Labour Party and the National Party, registered an average score of 0.90 between its eight MPs who registered scores, with an even higher median score of 0.93.¹⁷² Even its long-term party leader MP Peter Dunne, who was a Member of Parliament between 1984 to 2017¹⁷³, registered a personal score of 0.72 indicating that more often than not he voted conservatively when it comes to conscience votes.¹⁷⁴ It is interesting that a Party that brands itself as being a ‘centrist party’ has a much more conservative voting records than parties that are traditionally further to right on the political spectrum, including the National Party and the ACT Party. However, this may be due to the heavy Christian presence within the United Future party, resulting in highly conservative voting records when it comes to topics such as euthanasia, LGBT rights and prostitution.

The two main parties in the New Zealand political landscape, the Labour Party and the National Party had very different voting records between their MPs when it came to conscience voting. The MPs of the Labour Party had an average score of 0.12 and a median score of 0.033 while the MPs of the National Party had an average score of 0.71 and a median score of 0.83. This 0.59 gap across the eight parliamentary sessions is wider than the 0.47 gap present in the scores of the 52nd Parliament, indicating that there may have been greater polarization prior to the 52nd Parliament when it came to conscience voting issues. The most conservative Labour MPs, including Jamie Strange, Jenny Salesa and Anahila Kanongata'a-Suisuiki, were all present during the 52nd Parliament voting on the End of Life Choice Bill and the Abortion Legislation Bill. In

¹⁶⁸ “Hone Harawira”, New Zealand Parliament, October 7, 2014.

¹⁶⁹ “Hone Harawira”, New Zealand Parliament, October 7, 2014.

<https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electoralates/former-members-of-parliament/harawira-hone/>. Accessed November 19, 2021.

¹⁷⁰ “Te Paati Māori – About us”, Māori Party

¹⁷¹ “Principles”, ACT Party, Updated 2021. <https://www.act.org.nz/principles>. Accessed November 19, 2021.

¹⁷² Alex Braae, “Why did United Future die? Not enough Damian Lights”, The Spinoff, November 16, 2017. <https://thespinoff.co.nz/politics/16-11-2017/why-did-united-future-die-not-enough-damian-lights/>. Accessed November 19, 2021.

¹⁷³ Dunne was a Labour Party MP prior to 1994

¹⁷⁴ “Hon Peter Dunne”, New Zealand Parliament, September 25, 2017.

<https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electoralates/former-members-of-parliament/dunne-peter/>. Accessed November 19, 2021.

fact, of the Labour Party MPs that registered the ten most conservative voting records, only one, Taito Phillip Field, was not present during the 52nd Parliament, potentially indicating that that parliamentary session was more bipartisan than others when it came to conscience voting.¹⁷⁵ Damien O’Connor, a Labour MP, who personally describes himself as someone on ‘the right of the party’, was present for all eight parliamentary sessions in the dataset, yet only found himself ranked as the twelfth most conservative Labour MP, indicating that his voting presence in other sessions mitigated his conservative voting record.¹⁷⁶ As seen in Table 7, Helen Clark, the long-term and popular leader of the Labour Party throughout the first two decades of MMP and the Prime Minister between 1999 and 2008, had a personal voting score of 0.026, indicating a highly liberal voting record. On the other hand, National MPs found their voting records to be a lot more conservative when compared to the rest of Parliament, with only two National MPs being ranked in the top 100 most liberal MPs in Parliament, the aforementioned Claudette Hauiti and Jami-Lee Ross.¹⁷⁷

Table 7: Operationalized Ideology Scores of Prime Ministers

| Member | Party | Total Scores | Votes Missed | Votes Attended | Score |
|------------------|----------|--------------|--------------|----------------|-------|
| Jacinda Ardern | Labour | 4 | 153 | 135 | 0.030 |
| Helen Clark | Labour | 4 | 138 | 150 | 0.027 |
| Sir Bill English | National | 146 | 128 | 160 | 0.913 |
| Sir John Key | National | 80 | 172 | 116 | 0.690 |
| Jenny Shipley | National | 41 | 243 | 45 | 0.911 |

Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

Prolific National Party Leader Sir John Key, who was Prime Minister between 2008 and 2016, and characterized the direction of National Party for the large part of a decade, had a personal score of 0.68 indicating that his conscience voting record leaned conservative, but well below the


¹⁷⁵ “Taito Phillip Field’, New Zealand Parliament, 8 Rangī 2008. <https://www.parliament.nz/mi/mps-and-electorates/former-members-of-parliament/field-phillip/>. Accessed November 19, 2021.

¹⁷⁶ Vernon Small, “Damien O’Connor – a Coaster through and through”, New Zealand Herald, March 30, 2001. <https://web.archive.org/web/20201029095916/https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/damien-oconnor-a-coaster-through-and-through/IC62C4ONALRTV4JJJ7ZHW77CFA/>. Accessed November 19, 2021.

¹⁷⁷ Ross resigned from the National Party caucus in 2018 after an altercation with then National Party Leader Simon Bridges and became an independent MP - Tracy Watkins, “Explosive allegations before disgraced MP Jami-Lee Ross quits National Party, forcing by-election”, Stuff, October 16, 2018. <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/107877604/explosive-allegations-before-disgraced-mp-jamilee-ross-quits-national-party-forcing-by-election>. Accessed November 19, 2021.

median score of 0.83 of other National MPs.¹⁷⁸ Interestingly enough, both Key and Clark voted, on average, a lot more liberally than the average member of their caucus, differing from the other Prime Minister in the dataset, Jacinda Ardern who was ranked in the middle of her party’s conscience voting ideology scores when looking purely at the 52nd Parliamentary session alone.

Figure 13: Mean/Median Operationalized Ideology Score by Type of MP




Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

The difference observed between List MPs and Electorate MPs in the 52nd Parliament stays nearly identical when expanded to all eight parliamentary sessions, with the List MPs having an average score of 0.39 and Electorate MPs having an average score of 0.47 as seen in Figure 13 and Appendix Table A.19. This shows, on average, Electorate MPs vote more conservatively than List MPs when it comes to conscience votes on this issue. With multiple parliamentary sessions being factored in there are also a unique group of MPs who were both a List MP and an Electorate MP at one point during their respective parliamentary careers. 54 MPs fall into this

¹⁷⁸ “The John Key legacy”, Otago Daily Times, December 6, 2016. <https://www.odt.co.nz/opinion/editorial/john-key-legacy>. Accessed November 19, 2021.

category, being chiefly comprised of Labour Party MPs and National Party MPs as well as the minor party MPs Jeanette Fitzsimons, Rodney Hide, Winston Peters, Richard Prebble and Dame Tariana Turia. There are numerous reasons why these MPs have been both List MPs and Electorate MPs, one of which being that they lost their electorate election and had to rely on the party list to be brought back into Parliament. Other MPs start out on the list and then end up winning electorate seats. A handful of long-term electorate MPs, such as Sir Bill English, Lockwood Smith and Trevor Mallard stepped aside as electorate MPs later in their careers in order to take up and focus on leadership positions, such as Party Leader or Speaker of the House, choosing to be elected via the party list. Interestingly, this group of 54 MPs had an average score of 0.36, lower than that of both the group of Electorate MPs and List MPs. Takeaways from this may indicate that those MPs in marginal seats may attempt to construct a more liberal voting in order to appeal to their electorate base.

Figure 14: Mean/Median Operationalized Ideology Score by Type of MP (National Party/Labour Party)



Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

When the differences between List MPs, Electorate MPs, and MPs who have been both elected via the List and represented an Electorate are broken down by major political party, the results differ to those seen in the 52nd Parliamentary analysis. As seen in Figure 14, the average score for Labour Party Electorate MPs is 0.16, nearly double the average score of Labour Party List MPs which is 0.085. Labour Party MPs who have been both registered an average score of 0.100, slightly higher than that the average Labour Party List MPs. What this tells us is that Labour Party Electorate MPs vote more conservatively than their List MP counterparts, as was highlighted during the analysis on conscience voting during the 52nd Parliament. This again may be due to greater pressure to vote liberally from the party base and the people that choose the order of the Labour Party list as well as more conservative Electorate MPs representing electorates that are less liberal as a whole, for example Damien O'Connor representing the socially conservative electorate of West Coast-Tasman.

Table 8: Operationalized Ideology Score by Type of MP (National Party/Labour Party)

| Party | Average | Standard Deviation | Variation | Median |
|---------------------|---------|--------------------|-----------|--------|
| National Electorate | 0.713 | 0.315 | 0.099 | 0.832 |
| National List | 0.694 | 0.334 | 0.111 | 0.785 |
| National Both | 0.740 | 0.275 | 0.075 | 0.874 |
| Labour Electorate | 0.168 | 0.261 | 0.068 | 0.033 |
| Labour List | 0.085 | 0.206 | 0.042 | 0.025 |
| Labour Both | 0.100 | 0.142 | 0.020 | 0.039 |

Source: Author's calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

However, the results from the analysis on conscience voting during the 52nd Parliament do not hold up when assessing the differences between National Party List MPs and Electorate MPs. In the 52nd Parliament, National Party List MPs voted a lot more conservatively than their Electorate MP counterparts, implying that they too had potentially faced more pressures from either their voters or party leadership to vote more conservatively than Electorate MPs. However, when this analysis was expanded to all eight parliamentary sessions conducted under MMP, this trend reversed. As seen in Table 8, the average score for National Party Electorate MPs was 0.71 while the average score for National Party List MPs was only 0.69. National Party MPs who were both Electorate MPs and List MPs at one point in their parliamentary careers have the highest average score of them all at 0.74. This reversal of trends may be due to the presence of noted liberal figures of the National Party, including Nicola Willis and Katherine Rich, being List MPs and thus lowering the average score.¹⁷⁹ Many National Party Electorate MPs from the 45th and 46th

¹⁷⁹ Rich was notably removed from the front bench of the National Party by the National Party leader at the time, Don Brash, for failing to “get tough on social welfare” - Audrey Young, “Blue-green ambitions”, New Zealand Herald, March 26, 2010. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/blue-green-ambitions/KE3R5IYVRA3GA3QWAACVVIPB5Q/?c_id=280&objectid=10634569&pnum=0. Accessed November 19, 2021.

Parliamentary sessions also had perfect, or near perfect conservative voting records, thus bringing up the average for Electorate MPs.¹⁸⁰

Table 9: Table of Elections Results for the West Coast-Tasman Electorate (2005-2011)

| 2011 Election Results | Party | Candidate | Candidate Votes | Candidate Vote% | Party Vote | Party Vote% |
|------------------------------|--------------|------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| | Labour | Damien O'Connor | 15753 | 47.51 | 9200 | 27.25 |
| | National | Chris Auchinvole | 13214 | 39.85 | 15462 | 45.79 |
| 2008 Election Results | Party | Candidate | Candidate Votes | Candidate Vote% | Party Vote | Party Vote% |
| | Labour | Damien O'Connor | 14873 | 43.66 | 11532 | 33.46 |
| | National | Chris Auchinvole | 15844 | 46.51 | 15187 | 44.07 |
| 2005 Election Results | Party | Candidate | Candidate Votes | Candidate Vote% | Party Vote | Party Vote% |
| | Labour | Damien O'Connor | 15178 | 47.69 | 12012 | 37.22 |
| | National | Chris Auchinvole | 13024 | 40.93 | 12776 | 39.59 |

Source: *West Coast-Tasman Electorate Profile September 2012*, New Zealand Parliamentary Library

National Party MPs who were both Electorate MPs and List MPs had both a higher average and median score than those who were either only elected on the List or only represented an electorate. Many of these MPs sit in marginal seats and may have either won or lost these seats over the course of their parliamentary careers. Contrary to voting in a more split, bipartisan manner, as outlined in Duncan Black's, median voter theorem, these MPs on average vote more conservatively as a group.¹⁸¹ However, this is not the case of all National MPs in this dataset. One example, Chris Auchinvole, who defeated long-term Labour MP Damien O'Connor to capture the West Coast-Tasman seat during the 2008 election, had a perfectly split voting score of 0.5, as seen in Appendix Table A.18.¹⁸² Auchinvole ran against O'Connor in three separate election, losing the 2005 election to O'Connor by 2,154 votes before defeating O'Connor by a majority of


¹⁸⁰ Some of these MPs included Gavan Herlihy of Otago, Brian Neeson of Waipareira, and Warren Kyd of Hunua. Both Herlihy and Neeson registered a perfect score of 1 while Kyd scored 0.97. All three MPs represented relatively conservative electorates and thus may have wanted to emulate this through voting conservatively at nearly every given opportunity

¹⁸¹ Jørgen Veisdal, "The Median Voter Theorem"

¹⁸² "Chris Auchinvole", New Zealand Parliament, September 22, 2014. <https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/former-members-of-parliament/auchinvole-chris/>. Accessed November 19, 2021.

971 votes in the 2008 election.¹⁸³ O'Connor then defeated Auchinvole by a majority of 2,539 votes in the 2011 election.¹⁸⁴ These tight contests show the narrow margins that politicians face in swing electorates, making the voting records of National MPs who have been both Electorate MPs and List MPs even more curious.

Figure 15: Mean/Median Operationalized Ideology Score by Electorate-Based Island



Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports


There was relatively little difference between the voting patterns for MPs from the North Island and MPs from the South Island, as seen in Appendix Table A.20 and Figure 15, and was observed in the 52nd Parliamentary analysis. North Island MPs registered an average score of 0.43 with a median score of 0.31 while South Island MPs registered an average score of 0.45 and a median score of 0.48. This small difference indicates that the island an MP’s electorate is based

¹⁸³ “West Coast-Tasman: Electorate Profile”, New Zealand Parliamentary Library, September 2012. https://www.parliament.nz/resource/en-NZ/DBHOH_Lib_EP_West%20Coast-Tasman_TOC_1/40feca6986551b322c3e9f9796c5aa36e8e2abf1. Accessed November 19, 2021.

¹⁸⁴ “West Coast-Tasman: Electorate Profile”, New Zealand Parliamentary Library

in should not be a strong determining factor of the MP's behavior when it comes to conscience votes.

Figure 16: Mean/Median Operationalized Ideology Score by Electorate Urbanization Level



Source: Author's calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

Table 10: Operationalized Ideology Score by Electorate Urbanization Level

| Party | Average | Standard Deviation | Variation | Median |
|--------------------|---------|--------------------|-----------|--------|
| Major Urban Center | 0.342 | 0.366 | 0.134 | 0.099 |
| Māori | 0.243 | 0.306 | 0.094 | 0.100 |
| Medium-Size City | 0.533 | 0.416 | 0.173 | 0.643 |
| Rural | 0.574 | 0.376 | 0.142 | 0.763 |

Source: Author's calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

Urbanization levels, as seen in the 52nd Parliament analysis, appeared to play a large role in determining an MP's conscience voting behavior, with MPs from 'Major-Urban Centers' electorates voting much more liberally than MPs representing electorates based in 'Medium-Size Cities' or 'Rural' electorates.¹⁸⁵ The figures for MPs representing these four different types of electorates differed significantly from the 52nd Parliamentary session figures potentially alluding to Electorate MPs in the 52nd Parliament not necessarily representing the views of their constituents when it came to conscience votes. As seen in Figure 16 and Table 10, MPs representing electorates based in Major Urban Centers had an average score of 0.34 and a median score of 0.09 while MPs representing Māori electorates has an average score of 0.24 and a median score of 0.1. These more liberal scores are largely due to Labour Party MPs having strong constituencies based in electorates in the three major cities of New Zealand; Auckland, Christchurch and Wellington, while the Māori electorates have never been represented by a member of the more conservative National Party.¹⁸⁶ In the 52nd Parliament analysis Māori MPs had a more conservative average score than MPs representing electorates based in Major Urban Centers, but this trend was reversed when expanding to look at all eight parliamentary sessions. On the other hand, MPs representing electorates based in Medium-Size Cities had an average score of 0.53 and a median score of 0.64 while MPs representing Rural electorates has an average score of 0.57 and a median score of 0.76. This is also a reversal of the trend observed in the 52nd Parliament where MPs representing electorates based in Medium-Size Cities had, on average, a much more conservative voting than MPs from any other type of electorate. Traditional political thought would assume that the more rural one's electorate is, the more socially conservative one's constituency is. This may be an indication that those conservative National MPs, who represented these Medium-Size Cities-based electorates during the 52nd Parliament, were in fact too conservative for their constituency as also indicated by the fact that 5 of the 10 National Party incumbents in these seats lost re-election to Labour MPs in the 2020 election.

¹⁸⁵ New Zealand electorate boundaries are assessed and adjusted after each 5-yearly population census by the bipartisan Electoral Commission and thus I have taken some liberty into categorizing defunct electorates into the four different categories utilized by the Spinoff. For the most part, the electorate boundaries only marginally change, with old electorates being able to map onto new electorates in most circumstances. For example, the defunct electorate of Aoraki resides entirely within the current electorate of Rangitata, which is classified as being Rural, thus one can safely assume the composition of the old Aoraki electorate is also rural -"How are electoral boundaries decided?", Electoral Commission, Updated 2020. <https://elections.nz/democracy-in-nz/what-are-electorates/how-are-electoral-boundaries-decided/>. Accessed November 19, 2021.

-"Electorate Profile Aoraki", Parliamentary Library, October 2005. <https://www.parliament.nz/resource/en-NZ/00PLSocEP05011/b6852bd98d1d4cb60edf5386278ac7b0109a12dc>. Accessed November 19, 2021.

¹⁸⁶ The Māori Electorates have only being represented by MPs from the Labour Party, the Māori Party, the Mana Party and the New Zealand First Party

8. Demographic Data

Demographic data reveals the differing constituent makeups of the respective electorates, aiming to potentially illuminate whether certain voting patterns, when it comes to conscience voting, can be attributed to specific constituent demographic breakdowns. By outlining the demographic data of the respective electorates, I will aim to gain additional insight into the constituency pressures placed on Electorate MPs in the New Zealand House of Representatives.

New Zealand's currently has 72 unique electorates, 65 regular electorates and 7 Māori electorates represented in the House of Representatives.¹⁸⁷ Thus, of the 120 members of the 53rd Parliament elected as a result of the 2020 general election, 72 were elected via winning electorate seats while 48 were selected from the respective party lists. 49 of the general electorates are based in the North Island while 16 are based in the South Island.¹⁸⁸ For the Māori electorates, the North Island has 6 unique Māori electorates while the South Island only has one Māori electorate, Te Tai Tonga.¹⁸⁹


¹⁸⁷ "MPs and Electorates", New Zealand Parliament, Updated 2021.

<https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

¹⁸⁸ "Number of electorates and electoral populations: 2018 Census", Stats NZ, September 22, 2019. <https://www.stats.govt.nz/information-releases/number-of-electorates-and-electoral-populations-2018-census>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

¹⁸⁹ "Te Tai Tonga – Electorate Profile", New Zealand Parliament, Updated April 27, 2021. <https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/te-tai-tonga-electorate-profile/>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

Figure 17: Visualization of Electorates and Urbanization Level (2020 General Election Electorates)



Source: *A better visual breakdown of the 2020 election results – updated*, The Spinoff

As seen in Appendix Table A.21, the electorates vary considerably in terms of demographics, including level of urbanization, racial make-up, level of education and level of personal income. Each electorate roughly represent 65,000 people on average, as of the 2020 general election.¹⁹⁰ As seen in Figure 17, there are four different categorizations of urbanization that the website the

¹⁹⁰ “Number of electorates and electoral populations: 2018 Census”, Stats NZ

Spinoff used in its classification of electorates for its coverage of the 2020 general election.¹⁹¹ These four categories are Major Urban Center, Medium-Size City, Rural and Māori electorate. According to the Spinoff, 31 electorates are classified as Major Urban Centers, indicating a high level of urbanization.¹⁹² All of these electorates are located in one of the three main cities in New Zealand; Auckland, Christchurch and Wellington. 14 of the electorates are classified as Medium-Size Cities and are located throughout the country, including the cities of Dunedin, Hamilton, Invercargill, Napier, Nelson, New Plymouth, Palmerston North, Rotorua, Tauranga and Whangarei.¹⁹³ The last 20 electorates are classified as ‘Rural’ electorates, indicating that there is no large urban center in the electorate, consisting instead of small townships and farming communities.¹⁹⁴

Major Urban Centers tend to skew more liberal and are thus generally more likely to be represented by Labour Party MPs.¹⁹⁵ As of 2020, only 7 of the 31 Major Urban Center electorates are represented by National Party or ACT Party MPs.¹⁹⁶ On the other hand Rural electorates tend to be represented by more conservative MPs, with 12 of the 20 electorates being represented by National MPs despite the fact that their party only managed to gather 25.6% of the party vote in the 2020 election, compared to the Labour Party’s 50% of the party vote.¹⁹⁷ As of the 2020 election, nine of the ‘Medium-Size Cities’ electorates are represented by Labour MPs, while five are represented by National MPs.¹⁹⁸ This was a reversal from the results of the 2017 election, in which National MPs won 10 of the ‘Medium-Size Cities’ seats at the Labour Party won 4. The Māori electorate represent vast swaths of the country and the MPs are voted on by those in the Māori roll.¹⁹⁹ As of 2020, six of the seven Māori electorates are represented by the Labour Party with the seventh electorate, Waiariki being represented by Māori Party MP Rawiri Waititi.²⁰⁰ As

¹⁹¹ Stephen Beban, “A better visual breakdown of the 2020 election results – updated”, The Spinoff, Updated November 16, 2020. <https://thespinoff.co.nz/politics/16-11-2020/a-better-visual-breakdown-of-the-2020-election-results/>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

¹⁹² Stephen Beban, “A better visual breakdown of the 2020 election results – updated”

¹⁹³ Stephen Beban, “A better visual breakdown of the 2020 election results – updated”

¹⁹⁴ Stephen Beban, “A better visual breakdown of the 2020 election results – updated”

¹⁹⁵ Andrew Macfarlane, “Most left and right-leaning electorates: Where does yours sit?”, 1 News, October 4, 2020. <https://www.1news.co.nz/2020/10/05/most-left-and-right-leaning-electoralates-where-does-yours-sit/>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

¹⁹⁶ A caveat to this is that the 2020 was an unprecedented election for the Labour Party, being the most resounding election victory for any party in over 50 years

¹⁹⁷ “2020 General Election official results”, Electoral Commission, November 6, 2020.

<https://elections.nz/media-and-news/2020/2020-general-election-official-results/>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

¹⁹⁸ “2020 General Election official results”, Electoral Commission

¹⁹⁹ “What is the Māori Electoral Option?”, Electoral Commission, Updated 2021,

<https://elections.nz/democracy-in-nz/what-is-an-electoral-roll/what-is-the-Māori-electoral-option/>. Accessed October 28, 2021.

²⁰⁰ Waititi defeated the incumbent Labour Party MP Tāmami Coffey

- Kelly Makiha, “Election results 2020: Rawiri Waititi and Tāmami Coffey react after winner revealed”, Rotorua Daily Post, November 5, 2020. <https://www.nzherald.co.nz/rotorua-daily->

of 2011, 39 of the 53 Māori MPs in Parliament had been elected via the Māori Electorates, signifying the importance of these electorates to Māori representation in Parliament.²⁰¹

The racial makeup of each electorate also varies significantly, potentially having an impact on the way their Member of Parliament conducts themselves in Parliament and when it comes time for conscience votes. The four main ethnic groups in New Zealand are; New Zealand European, Māori, People of Pacific Island descent, and people of Asian descent.²⁰² As seen in Table A.21, the average electorate in New Zealand contains a demographic that is 70.2% European, 16.5% Māori, 8.1% Pacific Peoples and 15.1% Asian descent.²⁰³ However, these results vary notably between electorates. Many electorates classified as Rural and Medium-Size City contain populations that are upwards of 85% European descent.²⁰⁴ On the other hand, several electorates in the greater Auckland-region have larger populations of People of Pacific Island descent and people of Asian descent than they do populations of European people. People of European decent make up the plurality in eight general electorates, all within the greater Auckland-region.²⁰⁵ The seven Māori electorates all have a Māori majority constituency. Goetz et. al (2016) established a clear link between a district's racial diversity and their respective Senators becoming less active in the Australian House in terms of introducing new bills and asking questions.²⁰⁶ This phenomenon could potentially cross over into impacting a Member of Parliament's voting behavior when it comes to conscience votes.

Given that most conscience votes are on social issues that are supposed to “transcend party politics”, the religious faith of constituents could potentially influence MPs voting behaviors in the House, especially for topics such as that of gambling, alcohol and abortion.²⁰⁷ New Zealand is a fairly non-secular society, with 48.2% of individuals not identifying with any religious group, according to the 2018 census.²⁰⁸²⁰⁹ Christianity is the largest religion in New Zealand with

[post/news/election-results-2020-rawiri-waititi-and-Tāmami-coffey-react-after-winner-revealed/IYGGDQFYLPIFPNP4U3BPKHGNRM/](https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/). Accessed October 28, 2021.

²⁰¹ Dr. Therese Arseneau, “The Impact of MMP on Representation in New Zealand’s Parliament—a view from outside Parliament”

²⁰² “Electorate profiles 2020”, New Zealand Parliament, Last Updated April 27, 2021. <https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

²⁰³ “Electorate profiles 2020”, New Zealand Parliament

²⁰⁴ The top five electorates with the highest percentage of European population are all in the South Island; West Coast-Tasman, Waimakariri, Waitaki, Taieri and Kaikōura

²⁰⁵ These electorates are Te Atatū, Kelston, Botany, Mount Roskill, Takanini, Manurewa, Panmure-Ōtāhuhu and Māngere.

²⁰⁶ Klaus H. Goetz et. al, “Do electoral district size and diversity affect legislative behavior?”

²⁰⁷ “Suppressing their consciences: Easter Trading Bill”, Caritas Aotearoa New Zealand

²⁰⁸ “Electorate profiles 2020”, New Zealand Parliament

²⁰⁹ This figure is up from 41.9% reporting no religious affiliation in the 2013 census and 29.6% in the 2001 census. 2018 marked the first point in New Zealand’s history where non-religious people outnumbered Christians in New Zealand

-“Losing our religion”, Stats NZ, October 2, 2019. <https://www.stats.govt.nz/news/losing-our-religion>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

Protestants and Catholics being the two largest denominations.²¹⁰ Measuring the percentage of an electorate that identifies as non-religious aims to measure the religiosity of a member's constituents. Those electorates with the lowest percentage of non-religious communities are closely affiliated with those with the lowest percentage of European residents, with Mount Roskill, Takanini, Manurewa, Panmure-Ōtāhuhu and Māngere all having the lowest percentage of non-religious constituents. The ten electorates with the lowest percentage of non-religious residents all lie within the greater Auckland region. The electorate of Māngere stands out having only 18.1% of its residents identify as non-religious, nearly 10% lower than the electorate with the second lowest proportion of non-residents, Panmure-Ōtāhuhu.²¹¹ Instead, 60.8% of Māngere's residents identify as Christian.²¹²

The overall education level of an electorate may also potentially have an impact on the voting behaviors of its elected MPs. Measuring the percentage of residents who have achieved a Bachelor's degree or higher can aim to capture this phenomenon. The figure of 'Percentage of Bachelor's Degree or higher' included in Table A.21 compiles the 2018 census figures that include 'Bachelor degree and Level 7 qualification', 'Post-graduate and honours degrees', 'Masters degree' and 'Doctorate degree'.²¹³ On average, 24.8% of residents in a given electorate are expected to have a 'Bachelor's degree or higher'. Electorates that are classified Major Urban Centers tend to have higher education levels as indicated by this metric, with only three of the top 25 electorates not being classified as Major Urban Centers by the Spinoff.²¹⁴ Over 50% of the residents in the electorates of Wellington Central and Epsom have a Bachelor's Degree or higher level of education, over twice the national average. On the other hand, Rural electorates and Māori electorates tend to have lower levels of education with the Māori electorates of Te Tai Hauauro and Ikaroa-Rawhiti having only 10.5% of its residents holding a Bachelor's Degree or higher level of education.

An electorate's unemployment rate may indicate economic and material hardship faced by a member's constituents.²¹⁵ It may also indicate an electorate's financial situation as well as its residents' potential access to economic opportunities. Across the 72 electorates, the average unemployment rate is 5.8%, however, this figure varies markedly between electorates. 6 of the 7 Māori districts have higher unemployment rates than any of the general electorates, with

-“New Zealand Culture – Religion”, Cultural Atlas, Updated 2020.
<https://culturalatlas.sbs.com.au/new-zealand-culture/new-zealand-culture-religion>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

²¹⁰ “New Zealand Culture – Religion”, Cultural Atlas

²¹¹ “Māngere – Electorate Profile”, New Zealand Parliament, Updated April 27, 2021.

<https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/electorate-profiles/māngere-electorate-profile/>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

²¹² “Māngere – Electorate Profile”, New Zealand Parliament

²¹³ “Number of electorates and electoral populations: 2018 Census”, Stats NZ

²¹⁴ These electorates are Dunedin, Hamilton East, Whangaparaoa, all classified as Medium-Size Cities

²¹⁵ Greg Iacurci, “Here's why the unemployment rate is so important”, CNBC, June 5, 2020.

<https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/05/heres-what-unemployment-rate-actually-means-and-why-its-important.html>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

unemployment rates all exceeding 10%. Another interesting observation is that, of the 30 electorates with the highest unemployment rates, only two are represented in Parliament by members of the National Party, as of the 2020 general election. Conversely, all five electorates with the lowest unemployment rates are represented by members of the ACT Party and the National Party.²¹⁶ A common characteristic of those electorates with low unemployment rates are having a rural constituency as well as being situated in the South Island. Of the ten electorates with the lowest unemployment rates, only two of them reside in the North Island. There appears to be a correlation between an electorates employment rate and a more conservative representation within Parliament, indicating that this factor could be a strong indicator as to voting behaviors by politicians when it comes to conscience voting.

The last variable that Table A.21 measures is the relative wealth of an electorate. This variable is measured by combining the total personal income 2018 census figures for both the '\$50,001-\$70,000' bracket and the '\$70,001 or more' together to create a percentage of personal income greater than \$50,000 variable. As seen in Table A.21, the average electorate has 31.6% of its constituents earning a yearly personal income of greater than \$50,000. This figure also varies significantly by electorate with the wealthy electorates of Ohariu, Tamaki and Epsom all having the highest percentage of those with a yearly personal income of greater than \$50,000. 13 electorates have only 25% or less of their residents earning \$50,000. These electorates are a mixture of Rural electorates, Major Urban Centers and Māori electorates. 12 of these 13 electorates are represented by Labour MPs. While there may be a strong correlation between level of personal income and the party of the respective MP, with Labour MPs tending to be more economically liberal than the opposing National MPs when it comes to economic issues such as government benefits and the minimum wage, it is unknown as to whether the relative personal wealth of the constituents of an electorate effect the voting behaviors for conscience votes cast in the House.

Prior to the 2020 election, One News and Vox Pop Labs created the Vote Compass tool, a survey asking New Zealanders their thoughts on issues such as gay marriage, cannabis legalization, racism in New Zealand, rights to gun ownership, among many other issues.²¹⁷ This nationwide survey was taken by upwards of 300,000 residents and allowed for electorates to be ranked in terms of their liberal or conservative leanings on these issues.^{218,219} The Vote Compass ranked all electorates against each other in terms of the responses of those voters in their electorates, thus creating a rough ranking of the 72 electorates from most liberal to most conservative. While this dataset is not public, I was able to incorporate this data through a brief publishing of it prior to the 2020 general election by TVNZ, who included every electorate besides Ohariu in their news story.²²⁰ This allowed a ranking of 71 of the 72 electorates to be formed and these electorates to be ranked against each other when it came to political ideology. Assessing an electorates ideological

²¹⁶ These electorates are Epsom, Selwyn, Kaikōura, Waitaki and Southland

²¹⁷ "Vote Compass – 2020 New Zealand General Election", 1 News, Updated 2021. <https://votecompass.tvnz.co.nz>. Accessed October 9, 2021.

²¹⁸ Andrew Macfarlane, "Most left and right-leaning electorates: Where does yours sit?"

²¹⁹ Of the electorates, Rangitata came out as the most politically conservative electorate while the Māori electorate of Te Tai Hauauru was the most liberal electorate

²²⁰ "Vote Compass – 2020 New Zealand General Election", 1 News

leaning of its constituents in comparison to other electorates may also be a strong indicator as to how their MP may vote on conscience votes that are tackling contentious issues such as euthanasia, abortion and cannabis legalization.

9. Testing of the Principal-Agent Model through Regression and Prediction Analysis

Regression Analysis

By regressing all of the electorate variables onto the ideology scores of the Electorate MPs, I will be aiming to establish which variables have either a positive or negative effects on one's ideology score as well as estimating how much of the variance in ideology is captured by the party and constituency demographics. Through this measure I will be assessing the effects of the principal-agent model and whether the conscience voting patterns of Electorate MPs and the subsequent ideological scores are influenced at all by the demographic breakdown of the electorates. If many of these demographic categories have a statistically significant impact on the voting behaviors of these Electorate MPs then one can assume that the principal-agent model, which states the MP must vote with the best interests of their constituents in mind, in fact holds true. If very little of MPs' voting habits can be attributed to their constituency demographics then one can assume that legislative shirking of sorts occurs with MPs potentially voting with other interests in mind, such as their own personal views.

Table 11: Table of Results from Regression of Party and Electorate Demographics on Operationalized Ideology Scores of Electorate MPs

| VARIABLES | (1) score | (2) score | (3) score |
|--|-----------------------|--------------------|-------------------------|
| % Electorate of European Ancestry | 0.00385 (0.0136) | | 0.0164* (0.00985) |
| % Electorate of Māori Ancestry | 0.0101 (0.0104) | | 0.0134* (0.00752) |
| % Electorate of Pacific Island Ancestry | -0.00184 (0.0100) | | 0.0170** (0.00742) |
| % Electorate of Asian Ancestry | 0.00890 (0.0137) | | 0.0127 (0.00994) |
| % Electorate of Non-Religious | -0.0116 (0.0120) | | -0.00542 (0.00872) |
| % Electorate with Bachelor's Degree+ | -0.00110 (0.00761) | | 0.0118** (0.00579) |
| Electorate Unemployment Rate | -0.0644** (0.0308) | | -0.0132 (0.0229) |
| % Electorate with Personal Income \$50000+ | 0.00290 (0.00912) | | -0.0191*** (0.00688) |
| Māori Electorate | -0.188 (0.414) | | -0.229 (0.300) |
| Major Urban Center Electorate | - | | - |
| Medium-Size City Electorate | 0.235* (0.124) | | 0.0528 (0.0910) |
| Rural Electorate | 0.240* (0.131) | | -0.0342 (0.0977) |
| ACT Party | | 0.245 (0.305) | 0.305 (0.316) |
| Green Party | | -0.0889 (0.386) | -0.101 (0.391) |
| Labour Party | | 0.0396 (0.275) | -0.0289 (0.277) |
| Mana Party | | -0.0687 (0.386) | -0.242 (0.394) |
| Māori Party | | 0.152 (0.305) | -0.0599 (0.317) |
| National Party | | 0.617** (0.274) | 0.637** (0.279) |
| New Zealand First Party | | 0.437 (0.386) | 0.390 (0.392) |
| United Future | | 0.621 (0.386) | 0.772* (0.392) |
| North Island | -0.193 (0.379) | | 0.0209 (0.272) |
| South Island | -0.260 (0.383) | | 0.0647 (0.276) |
| Constant | 0.828 (1.199) | 0.102 (0.273) | -0.994 (0.922) |
| Observations | 170 | 176 | 170 |
| R-squared | 0.151 | 0.534 | 0.586 |

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The first column of Table 11 shows the regression of electorate demographic data on the ideology scores of Electorate MPs. Interestingly, the R-squared variable is only 0.151, indicating that only 15.1% of the variation in ideology scores can be attributed solely to the differing electorate demographics. When these results are compared to those in column two, in which the different political party covariates are regressed on the ideology scores of Electorate MPs, the R-squared figure is much larger at 0.534. This indicates that the political party an MP belongs to determines the majority of the variation within ideology scores, showing the powerful impact self-selecting into a party has on one's conscience voting behaviors and subsequent ideological scores.

The third column of Table 11 is a regression of both the electorate and party covariates on the ideology scores of Electorate MPs. This R-squared figure is 0.586 meaning that 58.6% of the variation in Table 11 can be attributed to the covariates of party and electorate demographics together. This indicates that there is some form of the principal-agent model that is present in determining conscience voting scores comprised of both the party pressures and constituency pressures, however, there is still a large proportion of variation in conscience voting scores that could potentially be attributed to other variables unmeasured as well as indicating the presence of legislative shirking when it comes to conscience votes.

As seen in the third column of Table 11, in which all of the differing electorate and party demographics are regressed on the individual operationalized ideology score of the respective Electorate MPs, there are a few statistically significant results indicating that these demographic factors may have an important influence over an MP's voting patterns when it comes to conscience votes, when all other factors are controlled for.²²¹

Racial demographics of the electorates appeared to have a slight influence over the conscience voting-influenced ideology scores. Holding all else fixed, the covariates of % Electorate of European Ancestry, % Electorate of Māori Ancestry, and % Electorate of Pacific Island Ancestry, all have differing degrees of statistical significance when it comes to influencing ideology scores. The covariates, % Electorate of European Ancestry and % Electorate of Māori Ancestry are both statistically significant at the 10-percent level and have a positive 1.638 unit effect and a 1.340 unit effect on ideology scores respectively. The covariate of % Electorate of Pacific Island Ancestry has an even larger positive unit effect of 1.699 for every unit increase, as well as a greater statistical significance at the 5-percent level. This is interesting considering that the average electorate population is comprised of only 8.1% of people from Pacific Island descent. This may suggest that, when this percentage is higher, such as in the electorates comprising South Auckland, where there is a large Pacific Island community, it may have a strong impact on the voting behaviors of their MPs. The covariate % Electorate of Asian Ancestry did not have statistical significance, indicating that the Asian population of an electorate did not have a large sway on the voting behaviors of their Electorate MPs when it comes to conscience votes. This may be because those of Asian descent only comprise 15.1% of the average electorate population, representing a relatively small portion of the average MPs constituency.

²²¹ The Major Urban Center urbanization covariate was dropped from the regression due to collinearity purposes

According to the third column of Table 11, the academic achievement of an electorate can impact the ideology scores in a statistically significant manner. A one unit increase in % Electorate with Bachelor's Degree+ is associated with a 1.179 unit increase in ideology score, holding all other factors constant, indicating that those electorates with a more highly educated population have MPs which vote more conservatively. These results are statistically significant at the 5-percent level. One reason for this may be due to the fact that five of the seven Māori electorates, all represented by members of the more liberal Labour Party, have the lowest percentage of constituents with a Bachelor's Degree or greater.

Linked to academic achievement is the covariate of personal income, with more educated people usually having access to higher paying jobs, leading to higher income levels. As seen in the third column of Table 11, a one unit increase in the covariate % Electorate with Personal Income \$50000+ is associated with a 1.913 unit decrease in ideology score, holding all other factors constant. These results are statistically significant at the 1-percent level. This is interesting considering one would assume that educational attainment and personal income would work tangentially in impacting the ideology score of an Electorate MP. However, as seen in the third column of Table 11 they have opposite impacts. This may be due to electorates with higher personal incomes being located in more expensive cities, such as Auckland or Wellington, that also tend to lean towards the more liberal Labour Party. When looking at, Appendix Table A.22, one can see that there is a roughly even balance of electorates with a high levels of their electorates with personal incomes greater than \$50,000 between electorates represented by Labour MPs and electorate represented by National MPs, also contributing to this theory. One caveat associated with this covariate result is that many of the defunct electorates, whose income levels are lower as a result of having older versions of their demographic data, are represented by more conservative MPs. Four of the five electorates with the smallest percentage of their electorate with personal incomes of more than %50,000 are defunct electorates who represented by National MPs who all have ideological scores over 0.9, indicating that they are highly conservative when it comes to conscience voting. These defunct electorates may have potentially biased the results of this covariate.

Some covariates representing membership of a certain political party also produced statistically significant results. The National Party covariate was significant at the 5-percent level while the United Future covariate was significant at the 10-percent level. Being a member of the National Party increased one's ideology score by 63.7 units while being a member of United Future increased one's ideology score by 77.15 units, when compared to the average MP. Both of these results indicate that being a member of one of these two parties very much increases the likelihood of one voting conservatively when it comes to conscience votes – confirming previous findings in this paper. Interestingly being a member of the ACT Party, Green Party, Mana Party, Māori Party and New Zealand First Party bore results that were not statistically insignificant.

Looking at the third column of Table 11 there were also a handful of other covariates that produced statistically insignificant results. These were the percentage of the electorate that identified as non-religious, the unemployment rates of electorates, the various urbanization levels of the electorates and the covariates that differentiated which island an electorate was situated in. The unemployment rate covariate was interestingly statistically significant at the 5-percent level

in column 1, but not statistically significant in column 3, indicating that the presence of the party covariates accounted for these variations.

As seen by the respective R-Squared scores of all three columns, it appears that the political party one is a member of explains much of the variation in ideology scores, however, some of the variation can still be attributed to the selected demographic covariates present in Table 11. However, 40% of the variation is unaccounted for, leading one to believe, when looking at the regression results through the eye of the principal-agent model, that Peltzman's definition of legislative shirking is present amongst MPs when it comes to conscience voting.

Prediction Analysis

Using the demographic data results from the prior section, combined with the individual Member of Parliaments' ideology scores also calculated previously, we can assess whether Electorate MPs voted along the lines of how they should have by comparing the residual of their predicted voting score to their actual voting score.

$$\text{Actual Ideology Score} - \text{Predicted Ideology Score} = \text{Residual Ideology Score}$$

The predicted score is formed algorithmically by assessing the various factors present in the electorate dataset, comprised of MPs' individual ideology scores as well as demographic variables.²²² This residual score aims to measure the extent of the deviation between how an MP should vote based on the demographic composition of their electorate and how the MP voted in actuality. Thus, one can assume that those MPs with a larger residual score potentially voted more with their own personal views in mind than the interests of their constituents, forming a case of legislative shirking.

Variables that went into contributing to these predicted scores, as outlined in Appendix Table A.22, include; the political party of the Member of Parliament, whether one was the Prime Minister or the Leader of the Opposition at some point during their parliamentary career, whether the member's electorate was from the North Island or the South Island, whether the member had also been a List MP at some point during their parliamentary career, the percentage of their electorate that was of European descent, the percentage of their electorate that was of Māori descent, the percentage of their electorate that was of Pacific Island descent, the percentage of their electorate that was of Asian descent, the percentage of the electorate that identified as non-religious, the percentage of the electorate who held a Bachelor's Degree (or equivalent) or higher of educational attainment, the unemployment rate of the electorate, the percentage of the electorate that earned over \$50,000 NZD in annual personal income and the respective urbanization level of the electorate (Major Urban Center, Māori, Medium-Size City, Rural). All of these variables aim to account for many influencing factors established in Goetz et. al. (2018) that could potentially influence the voting patterns of Members of Parliament.

²²² The Predicted Score had the MPs' previously calculated ideology scores multiplied by 100, resulting in the predicted score and the residual score being out of 100 opposed to out of 1 in order to make the analysis more clear

Due to New Zealand electorate boundaries being adjusted after each 5-yearly population census by the bipartisan Electoral Commission, there are some Members of Parliament who are representing defunct electorates in this dataset.²²³ These demographic data points from these defunct electorates are drawn from the most recent respective Parliamentary Electoral Profile before they became a defunct electorate, all dating between 2005-2017. While I estimate there to be little impact on the unemployment rate and the ethnic breakdowns of these electorates over time, the percentage of the electorate that earns over \$50,000 NZD in annual personal income may be biased due to inflation. This should be caveated when assessing the impact of personal income on these results. These electorate demographic results, including current electorates, as well as historic, now-defunct electorates can be seen in Appendix Table A.22.

Of the 176 Members of Parliament who have been Electorate MPs at some point in their parliamentary career, 170 received a predicted ranking. These six excluded MPs (David Carter, Brian Connell, Gavan Herlihy, John Luxton, Dame Jenny Shipley, Jim Sutton) did not receive a predicted score due to their respective defunct electorate not carrying data on the religious breakdown of their respective electorate.²²⁴ As a result, a predicted score could not be formed for them.

Appendix Table A.23 displays the breakdown of the Member of Parliament's actual score, their calculated predicted score and then the residual score made from subtracting the actual score from the predicted score. There is a wide variety of residual scores ranging from 60.71 to -68.57. Of the 170 Members of Parliament who registered predicted scores, 85 voted more conservatively than their predicted score, 79 voted more liberally than their predicted score and 6 MPs voted exactly their predicted score.²²⁵

As seen in Appendix Table A.23 there is a wide variety of residual scores indicating different voting behaviors by these Electorate MPs when it comes to conscience voting. Those MPs that have scores closer to zero act more in accordance with Peltzman's principal-agent theory, voting at an ideological manner that closely matches that of their represented constituents. Six MPs had residual scores of zero, while a further 69 had residual scores of less than 10 points, indicating that their voting behavior in conscience votes mirrored the views of their constituents. These MPs were a mixture of National MPs, Labour MPs and minor party MPs. There was also a wide variety of predicted scores within this subset of 69 Electorate MPs who had residual scores of less than 10, ranging from Labour MP Trevor Mallard's predicted score of 0.5 to National MP Marie Hasler's predicted score of 89.8, highlighting the wide variety of constituent ideologies that encompass different electorates.

On the other hand, 101 Electorate MPs had residual scores greater than 10, indicating that they may have taken the liberty to vote more with their own personal views in mind than the views of their constituents, i.e. legislative shirking. These MPs were also a mixture of National MPs,

²²³ "How are electoral boundaries decided?", Electoral Commission

²²⁴ All of the data for these defunct electorates were taken from 2005 Parliamentary Electoral Profiles which did not measure the religious demographics of an electorate

²²⁵ These six MPs are Jim Anderton, Peter Dunne, Winston Peters, Jeanette Fitzsimons, Hone Harawira, Bob Clarkson

Labour MPs and minor party MPs, indicating that legislative shirking is not limited to one party. Three National MPs registered the largest residual scores with Scott Simpson registering the largest residual score of the dataset at a score of 69.2.²²⁶ Simpson registered a score of 6.0, yet had a predicted score of 75.1, indicating that he voted a lot more liberally than his electorate constituency would've predicted. Simpson has represented the rural and relatively-conservative electorate of the Coromandel since 2008.²²⁷ The majority of MPs that recorded the highest residual scores were either National MPs who voted liberally than their predicted score would suggested or Labour MPs who voted more conservatively than their predicted score would've suggested. However, there were also examples of National MPs voting more conservatively than their electorate suggested, with National MPs Simeon Brown and Chris Penk voting more than 35 points more conservatively than their conservative electorates would've suggested.²²⁸ On the other hand, several of the Labour MPs that voted more liberally than their predicted score would've predicted represented Māori electorates.²²⁹ This further suggests the role of MPs voting with their own personal ideologies in mind when it comes to conscience votes.

Legislative shirking appears to be a common practice in the New Zealand House of Representatives when it comes to conscience voting, with around 60% of MPs in the dataset having residual scores greater than 10, and seventeen MPs having a score greater than 50. While some MPs' voting behaviors mirror their electorate-derived predicted behaviors, indicating the appearance of the principal-agent theory, many more appear to vote with their own views at the forefront, as indicated by the large number of residual scores greater than 10. One theory that may explain this high-level of legislative shirking may be the fact that conscience votes rarely occur within the New Zealand House of Representatives, with the vast majority of votes being whipped. Thus, Electorate MPs may potentially be afforded some slack by their constituents when it comes to conscience voting, as long as they vote in line with their party's whipped votes, which may more closely mirror the views of constituents.

²²⁶ The three National MPs who registered the largest residual scores were Scott Simpson, Nikki Kaye and Chris Bishop

²²⁷ The Coromandel was ranked the 56th most liberal electorate according to the 2020 Vox Labs findings

-“Vote Compass – 2020 New Zealand General Election”

²²⁸ Both Brown and Penk had near perfect conservative voting scores of 99.2

²²⁹ Labour MPs John Tamihere, Mahara Okeroa, and Peeni Henare all voted more than 25 points more liberally than their predicted score would've suggested

10. Interviews conducted with Members of the 52nd Parliament

While the numerical analysis of conscience voting can provide us some insight into the world of conscience voting in the New Zealand House of Representatives, it can potentially miss the human factor behind this parliamentary function. While ideological measures can tell us what someone voted for and where on the political spectrum their voting behavior places them, it does not get into the crux of why politicians vote a certain way when it comes to conscience voting. Questioning politicians on the motivations behind their voting can offer insight into how many Members of Parliament operate, and the thought processes that go on behind some of these very important pieces of legislation.

In order to gain a more holistic view of conscience voting in the New Zealand House of Representatives I interviewed a number of Members of Parliament who were present during the 52nd Parliament, including Dr. Deborah Russell, Tim van de Molen and Anahila Kanongata'a-Suisuiki. All of these interviews were conducted individually in October and November of 2021. Each Member of Parliament I interviewed was given the opportunity to remain anonymous or have their name published and thus the exact number of MPs I interviewed will remain unknown in order to respect the privacy of the Members of Parliament who wished to remain anonymous. All MPs interviewed were asked their views on conscience votes and how they are utilized in the New Zealand House of Representatives, their experiences during the conscience voting process, most notably drawing on their experiences during the passages of the Abortion Legislation Bill and the End of Life Choice Bill through the House, their views on representing their constituency during conscience votes, and their views on private members' bills and how they function in the New Zealand Parliamentary system. There was a wide variety of views expressed during these interviews, emphasizing the fluid nature of these votes, with very few rules on the table when it comes to voting behaviors during these conscience votes.

General views on conscience votes

All MPs I interviewed thought positively about the concept of conscience votes and how they are currently being utilized in the New Zealand House of Representatives. Dr. Deborah Russell stated that, “they are almost the last remnant of MPs having the support of their electorates rather than being members of a party”, emphasizing that the majority of votes members vote on in the House are whipped votes with decision-making on which view to taking usually being controlled by the respective party leadership teams. Tim van de Molen echoed this sentiment stating that conscience votes are “an exciting way to allow real opinions and real views for individual MPs to come out”. Other MPs expressed that it was both an opportunity to vote against the social leaning of their party as well as not having to be influenced by the decisions of leadership, with one expressing shock at how little actual pressure there was to vote a certain way – attesting this to conscience votes working effectively in the House, stating that “I haven’t felt any pressure from the party leadership or from the other MPs around how I should vote which is good. To be honest, I thought there might be a bit more pressure, but there wasn’t – which is positive, to me shows that the process works well”.

Many of the MPs also explained their respective party’s approach to announcing conscience votes in the House. Anahila Kanongata'a-Suisuiki explained that the Labour Party had three key

principles, abortion, alcohol and drugs, and any time these topics were brought up, Labour Party MPs would be free to vote their own conscience. It was expressed by several MPs that conscience votes were discussed in the individual party's weekly caucus meetings, with the Leader/Shadow Leader of the House, for each party, detailing the votes for the week that were to be scheduled in the House. In the rare situation in which a conscience vote topic was on the docket then the MPs would express whether they wanted a conscience vote, holding an inner-caucus vote, with the results influencing the decision-making process of the leadership team. Tim van de Molen highlighted that in the National Party caucus, that MPs discuss whether or not a vote is a conscience vote or a caucus vote, and from there MPs are effectively allowed to make their own decisions. Both the Labour Party caucus and the National Party caucus have similar approaches to determining whether or not a vote is a conscience vote, according to the MPs that I interviewed, with many topics being agreed to as "transcending party politics".

Role of leadership in conscience votes

The leadership team for each party determines whether or not a vote is a conscience vote, but they, according to most MPs interviewed, did not influence the decision-making process of MPs when it comes to forming a position on a vote. Anahila Kanongata'a-Suisuiki stated that "nobody holds anything against you" when it comes to forming a position that goes against the views of the majority of one's party. She also stated that, "When the caucus decides it is not going to be a conscience vote then that is it, you are part of caucus... you are a part of the team", emphasizing the role that leadership plays in determining caucus decisions. Dr. Deborah Russell explains that, once she had formed a view on the way she was voting, the leadership did not influence the way she voted in the slightest, explaining that the leadership only influences whether or not the vote is a conscience vote. One MP alluded to the dispute within the National Party caucus over the decision to make the recent vote on the first reading of the Conversion Practices Prohibition Legislation Bill a caucus vote in the direction of 'No', stating that it caused a large division within the party having to vote uniformly against the bill when some MPs vehemently disagreed.

One Labour MP mentioned that, despite being against the premise of the Abortion Legislation Bill, they voted for it at the first reading "because I knew that Jacinda wanted this bill to go through and basically one of the key reasons I was elected ... was because of Jacinda's leadership and so out of respect to her and to respect to her views on the bill, I voted for it at the first reading, to make sure it would have a select committee process because I thought that was really important for it to have a select committee process." Thus, despite leadership not outwardly influencing votes, there still appears to be a level of loyalty to certain members of the leadership team when it comes to conscience voting.

Another MP also discussed the interesting dynamic around people being on the party list and voting during conscience votes, both within caucus meetings and in the wider House. They stated, as a List MP, that they thought whether or not they voted with or against the majority of their party would affect their list ranking when it came to the next election, believing that a vote effectively against the majority of the party would be remembered by the party membership when determining the order of the next party list. As a result, they believed that List MP were more loyal to the party leadership, even though these votes were conscience votes.

Discussion of voting and lobbying during conscience votes

All MPs were asked about the process of discussing votes with other MPs after conscience votes had been announced by the parties. All MPs noted that discussion of voting was rampant throughout Parliament, both within and between parties. According to Tim van de Molen, “Some MPs are very clear on what their views are, so they are not willing to engage with either side”, however, most end up discussing the bills, mostly within their own “friendship groups”. He also stated that some MPs looked to heavily lobby other MPs in order to influence their voting.

Dr. Deborah Russell stated that informal groupings arose within her party, the Labour Party, during both major conscience votes issues during the 52nd Parliament, stopping short of calling them factions “because we weren’t at each other’s throats or anything like that”. Anahila Kanongata'a-Suisuiki discussed that within the Labour Party caucus they identified who was for and who was against a conscience issue and then identified leaders that would represent the differing schools of thought. Kanongata'a-Suisuiki took the ‘No’ count for the End of Life Choice (Bill), being in charge of collecting the proxy votes for the ‘No’ count as well as meeting with members of the other parties, who were voting along similar lines, to discuss strategy. Another MP mentioned that there were groups of Labour MPs and National MPs who regularly communicated, both in person and via text, to discuss strategies in relation to voting, especially for the End of Life Choice Bill, which was a private members’ bill put forward by the lone ACT Party MP, David Seymour. One MP from the Labour Party stated that because the bill was not put forward by a member of the National Party or Labour Party, “the gloves were off when it came to lobbying” for that vote, with MPs from both major parties not being bound by loyalty to the author of the bill.

Abstaining from a conscience vote has also been a valid option to take, and has been utilized in the past, most notably when MP Ashraf Choudhary abstained from the third reading of the Prostitution Reform Bill, allowing it to pass by a vote of 60-59.²³⁰ Anahila Kanongata'a-Suisuiki brought up the potential to abstain from a vote, stating that she has not yet abstained from a vote, and if so it would be for a political decision. She brought up the recent conscience voting in the 53rd Parliament for ‘safe areas’ around abortion clinics, bringing up the fact that, “there are women who are anti-abortion but didn’t want to be voting ‘Yes’ in any abortion bill, so they actually abstained instead of saying ‘Yes’ or ‘No’, they abstained their vote so that’s just an indication to people that their belief is this way but they think it’s a good idea that there is a safe zone”. In this sense, the ability to abstain from a vote sends an indication that one may be for or against a certain piece of legislation, however pressures either from the party or the public may prevent them from fully committing to a cause and voting one way or the other. Dr. Deborah Russell agreed with Kanongata'a-Suisuiki, stating that she may abstain for a “particular tactical reason” however, she thinks that “abstaining is a wimp’s move... [and] we are actually obliged to vote a vote for or against... I just think that is sort of not quite having the guts to make a decision”.

²³⁰ Dave Crampton, “Prostitution Bill passes by one vote”

Differences in Abortion Legislation Bill and the End of Life Choice Bill

The Abortion Legislation Bill and the End of Life Choice Bill were the two main pieces of conscience voting legislation during the 52nd Parliament and many MPs brought up the differing experiences between the two bills. Tim van de Molen explained that “there was certainly a difference in the mood and the seriousness of the voting”, with the underlying processes being very similar.

One MP mentioned due to the differing nature of the votes, with the Abortion Legislation Bill being a government bill backed by the Labour Party, and the End of Life Choice Bill being a private members’ bill, that there were resultant different levels of lobbying. They mentioned that the ‘No’ camp for the Labour Party were a lot more hesitant to conduct cross-party strategy talks against the bill, purely out of respect to the Prime Minister, who wanted the bill to pass, again alluding to the implicit sway party leadership holds when it comes to conscience votes.

Anahila Kanongata'a-Suisuiki, a leading voice in the ‘No’ vote for the Labour Party, stated that “with the End of Life Choice Bill, you really get to know one another”, alluding to the high level of strategy that went on when lobbying around this vote. Kanongata'a-Suisuiki also expressed frustration with the End of Life Choice and Abortion Legislation supporters, who “did not compromise anything with us, yet the asked us to compromise”. She also mentioned the Safe Areas Amendment, which was a supplemental order paper put forward by Green Party co-leader, Marama Davidson, which she explained failed due to “the side that was supporting it weren’t aware what was happening, so they didn’t vote the way that they wanted to vote, whereas we were fully aware of it and we just let it pass that the Safe Areas Amendment failed”.

Representing Constituencies during Conscience Votes

One important factor when it comes to conscience votes is an MP’s constituency, being both the people who you represent in Parliament as well as the people who re-elect you to Parliament. The MPs I interviewed all had very different views on how constituency factored into their conscience voting patterns, emphasizing the individualized nature of this aspect of Parliament. One MP likened the conscience voting experience to being “a bit like baking a cake where you have certain ingredients go in. One of those ingredients is the majority view of the electorate and then another key ingredient is my personal view and my personal experiences and my philosophy”.

Tim van de Molen mentioned that in his electorate, the Waikato, which he described as a “reasonably conservative electorate”, he would hold public meetings to discuss these issues with his constituents, stating that “the process I went through was to hold a series of public meetings arounds my electorate to give all of my constituents an opportunity to come along, hear from people on both sides, so I’d have speakers for and against and then to ask questions of those speakers or myself and to perhaps learn something additional themselves or form their view or to try to advocate their particular perspective as well. So, it was really just me, as the local Member of Parliament trying to ensure that I was giving my constituency an opportunity to share their view on what they thought my voting should be on that bill”. He also mentioned that he put out newsletters and surveys to his constituent, providing people with the opportunity for feedback.

He acknowledged that the results were “quite split, but were slightly in favor of supporting the [End of Life Choice] Bill, which is an interesting outcome because when I think about that, it is not an unbiased poll, because a letter coming out from me, as the elected member but, still with my party branding on it, and so I suspect that is more likely to have been answered by people who are supporters of the National Party, which is a center-right party, being slightly more conservative, and so the respondents were likely to be slightly more conservative than an unbiased, natural sample might have been, and yet there was slight support from them”. However, van de Molen did acknowledge that his conscience voting perspective “is about being informed and then making a decision based on a little bit of what my constituency wants but also fundamentally what are my values and what are my beliefs as a person, because that is ultimately what has got me to this position. For the members, the constituents of the Waikato, the members of the National Party, who selected me and then elected me, if they didn’t like my values then they wouldn’t have given me that opportunity”.

Dr. Deborah Russell took a different approach from Mr. van de Molen when it came to factoring in one’s constituency during conscience voting. She stated that, she was elected by her constituents “to think through some of those issues myself and vote based on my own understanding of the issues”, further extrapolating that “even though my powerbase is my electorate, I am the one that gets to decide on that little piece of legislation, and I am the one that needs to, crudely, sleep at night afterwards, thinking that I have actually cast the right vote”. Dr. Russell brought up the fact that some MPs poll their electorates on conscience voting issues, believing that “some MPs do that as a little bit of an excuse as they don’t want to make the decision themselves or they want to be able to justify the decision they’ve made”. Dr. Russell’s approach to conscience voting represents a differing school of thought from Mr. van de Molen, choosing to autonomously vote on conscience votes, knowing that she has the backing of the electorate.

Anahila Kanongata'a-Suisuiki also took a differing approach to conscience votes, largely due to the fact that she is a List MP. Kanongata'a-Suisuiki is currently based in the National Party-held seat of Papakura and states that she gauges the views of “hundreds of people every time I go to church or go to a church function” in the electorate. Kanongata'a-Suisuiki also views her position as a List MP as a representative for the Pacific community, explaining that “I’m coming in as a Member of Parliament because I am chosen as a Pacific woman, my ranking on the list is because I am representing the Pacific population”. As a result of this she felt the liberty to vote ‘No’ on many of the conscience vote issues because members of this community “were saying to me that they disagreed, that they’d vote against it, and it was not a priority for them that we reviewed, it is not a priority, so their views were to vote ‘No’ against that”. Kanongata'a-Suisuiki also emphasized her strong faith when factoring in how to vote in conscience vote decisions. Kanongata'a-Suisuiki’s experiences highlight the interesting dilemma of List MPs in determining what constituency, if any at all, to represent during conscience votes.

One MP brought up the prospect of re-election when deciding which way to vote during conscience votes – stating that they observed their electoral opponent putting a stronger emphasis on the view of their electorate, questioning “whether it is for their own political purposes to get re-elected or whether that is truly meant to represent the electorate”. This same MP also observed their electoral opponent watching them in the House to assess which way they

were voting, stating that they “were actually watching me in the House to see which way I was going to go in the House, and then when I went, [they] stood up then went the other way”. The aspect of re-election was not brought up by any other MPs, but judging by the actions of these two MPs who run in the same electorate, it would definitely have a bigger sway than most would let on.

Damien O’Connor was brought up as an example of an MP whose voting patterns more solidly aligned with the beliefs of their electorate opposed to that of their general party base.²³¹ Despite being a member of the more socially-liberal Labour Party, O’Connor’s voting habits were described as “socially conservative” aligning with West Coast-Tasman which was described as “a socially conservative electorate”. O’Connor’s longevity in Parliament was ascribed to his ability win the West Coast-Tasman seat, with this fellow MP using O’Connor as an example of one’s views and subsequent conscience voting patterns representing their electorate and their constituents over the majority view of the political party they are a part of.

Supplemental Order Papers during the 52nd Parliament Session

Supplemental Order Papers (SOPs) were very strategically used during both the Abortion Legislation Bill and the End of Life Choice Bill, often to filibuster the passage of these two pieces of legislation. Many MPs noted that most MPs tended to vote a certain way when it came to the SOPs, noting that it was quite challenging to navigate the process due to the rapid nature with which these papers were released. Often times, many MPs relied on one of the leading MPs for either the ‘Yes’ or the ‘No’ vote to decide on behalf of the group as to whether they would vote for or against a certain SOP. One MP expressed that they regretted some of their votes during the SOPs as they did not have time to fully read all of the bills and thus voted in line with the rest of their voting bloc. Anahila Kanongata'a-Suisuiki, being one of the leading proponents of the ‘No’ Labour Party vote for both bills, discussed how a group was formed that discussed the individual SOPs and that many MPs trusted her with their proxy votes. Kanongata'a-Suisuiki’s also stated that if the group was unable to decide whether to support a SOP or not, “then our default is a ‘No’”, emphasizing the rigidity of these voting blocs.

Two MPs that did not vote strongly in one direction or the other were Dr. Deborah Russell and Tim van de Molen. Dr. Russell expressed frustration at a lot of the SOPs being filibusters, informing me that, “I thought bugger that, and just voted them down because I wasn’t interested in that kind of tactic”. Dr. Russell worked as part of a group analyzing the different SOPs for both the Abortion Legislation Bill and the End of Life Choice Bill. However, she also explained

²³¹ O’Connor, a Labour Party MP, has held the seat of West Coast-Tasman (named West Coast prior to 1996) for all but one parliamentary term, since 1993. This large, rural electorate (O’Connor was the only Labour MP in the 52nd Parliament to hold a seat classified by The Spinoff as being ‘Rural’) is fairly conservative, being ranked as the 46th most conservative electorate by the Vote Compass scoring

-“Hon Damien O’Connor”, New Zealand Parliament, November 26, 2020.

<https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/members-of-parliament/oconnor-damien/>.

Accessed November 19, 2021.

-Stephen Beban, “A better visual breakdown of the 2020 election results – updated”

that “I just went my own way on quite a lot of them, but that goes with making my own choices on a conscience vote anyways”. Tim van de Molen also expressed slight frustration at the filibustering nature of some of the SOPs, explaining that “a number of those SOPs were put forward simply to try and slow up the process of passing the bill and so we were voting until 1:30 in the morning on one of these nights just to try and get through all of these supplementary order papers that had been put forward”. He also acknowledged that SOPs that aimed to filibuster were a normal part of the process for government bills, where you “often see supplementary order papers put forward to either try and highlight an issue or to show the ridiculousness of something, or to simply try and prolong the process it takes to pass a piece of legislation”. The End of Life Choice Bill was the first piece of conscience voting legislation that van de Molen had voted on and he took it upon himself to “read each individual one and chose to support or not based on whether I thought that added value to the bill”, unlike many of the MPs who relied on voting blocs. Van de Molen described these voting blocs as “a shame because personally I think there is some aspects that could’ve been improved had they had the support”.

Discussion of Private Members’ Bills

The majority of MPs I interviewed all had pending private members’ bills in the ‘biscuit tin of democracy’ at the time at which I conducted the respective interviews. All MPs interviewed had positive things to say about private members’ bills as well as the new rule which came in at the start of the 53rd Parliament which allows a bill to bypass the lottery process if it receives support from the majority of non-executive Members of Parliament. Anahila Kanongata'a-Suisuiki said that the new rule regarding private members’ bills was a good tool to facilitate cross-party talk given that all MPs needed members of the opposing party to support their bill in order for it to bypass the tin and get moved directly to the Order Papers for the House. Kanongata'a-Suisuiki reiterated the politics behind supporting a private members’ bill, stating that she believed those members of the Opposition would be less likely to support a private members’ bill put forward by a Labour Party member, when the Labour Party could just add the content of that bill to their governmental legislative agenda. She added that the only thing that could break this mindset would be “pressure externally, outside from their voters, or how well I have a good relationship with whoever the portfolio holder is, so, it relies on relationships really”.

Tim van de Molen expressed that, “I love the fact that we have these members bills, it is a really unique way to bring forward different priorities and often that is based on what MPs are hearing from constituents”. He also brought up his own conscience bill currently in the tin, the Public Works (Increased Compensation) Amendment Bill, which would provide additional compensation above the market value for people whose land is acquired compulsorily by the government for the purpose of public works. He mentioned that this often happens to constituents in his electorate, the Waikato, having to have their farmland acquired in order to make way for new roads and infrastructure.²³² The Public Works (Increased Compensation) Amendment Bill is an example of a how a private members’ bill can be directly targeted at one’s

²³² “Public Works (Increased Compensation) Amendment Bill, Tim van de Molen”, New Zealand Parliament, Last Updated March 9, 2021. <https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/bills-and-laws/proposed-members-bills/public-works-increased-compensation-amendment-bill-tim-van-de-molen/>. Accessed November 19, 2021.

constituents, with van de Molen stating that he wanted to add a “sweetener” to compensate those displaced by public works projects.

Dr. Deborah Russell also discussed her private members’ bill, the Employment Relations (Extended Time for Personal Grievance for Sexual Harassment) Amendment Bill, which was in the ballot and the time of the interview (and has since been drawn out of the tin and is awaiting a first reading in the House).²³³ This bill extends the time a person is able to raise a personal grievance that involves a sexual harassment allegation from 90 days to 12 months.²³⁴ Dr. Russell states that this bill appealed to her “longstanding interests as a feminist”.

Dr. Russell also discussed “parliamentary tactics” utilized with private members’ bills. Every Member of Parliament that is not part of the Executive can have one member’s bill in the ballot, and Dr. Russell discussed the importance of all members of the Labour Party having bills in the ballot in order “to crowd out opposition member’s bills”. Private members’ bills that do not originate from members of the government can take away significant parliamentary and media time away from the government’s agenda, hence the desire to crowd out opposition member’s private members’ bills.

Overview

These interviews allowed integral insight into the thought processes that Members of Parliament face when having to decide how to vote during conscience votes as well as confirming Peltzman’s principal-agent model in how it applies to New Zealand legislators when it comes to conscience voting. There is no correct method to voting, with each member I interviewed taking a highly individualized route to their final respective decisions. It was particularly interesting hearing that most MPs felt absolutely zero pressure from their respective leadership teams regarding how to vote. However, one List MP did note that they felt pressure from the general Party membership to vote a certain way and that failure to do so may result in them dropping down the party list come the next election. When looking at this from the framework provided by Peltzman’s principal-agent model, it appears that for List MPs, the party tends to be more the dominant principal while for Electorate MPs, their constituency tends to be the more dominant principal.

The differing-levels of pressure felt by members from their respective constituencies was also worth noting. It appears to be an ‘entirely personal-entirely constituent’ based continuum on which the MPs fall under when it comes to conscience voting, with many members often noting that importance of balancing the representation of their constituents’ views as well as their own personal views and philosophies. This adds validity to the constituency breakdown analysis as

²³³ “Employment Relations (Extended Time for Personal Grievance for Sexual Harassment) Amendment Bill”, New Zealand Parliament, Updated October 21, 2021. https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/bills-and-laws/bills-proposed-laws/document/BILL_116380/employment-relations-extended-time-for-personal-grievance. Accessed November 19, 2021.

²³⁴ “Employment Relations (Extended Time for Personal Grievance for Sexual Harassment) Amendment Bill”, New Zealand Parliament

well as the regression analysis and the prediction analysis in that it aims to quantify the representational aspect of conscience voting, however, it is near impossible to measure the precise weighting an individual MP places on all of these aspects without explicitly asking them – some MPs may not even know themselves.

11. Discussion

Conscience voting in the New Zealand House of Representatives is a complex and highly personalized process, with MPs all taking their own independent strategies in handling these important votes. This unique political environment allows one to measure the relative strength of the principal-agent theory on Members of Parliament as they face many competing principals when it comes time to making decisions regarding which way to vote. Given that the vast majority of votes in the New Zealand House of Representatives are whipped, caucus votes, when conscience votes arise they represent a moment of autonomy that is rarely felt by MPs when it comes to voting. In this circumstance, one of the main principals (the political party) relaxes its control over the MPs and, as proven by the various interviews undertaken with MPs, it appears that a release of control truly takes place. Individual views can be expressed in caucus meetings; however, this presents a chance for one's name to be recorded down in the Hansard journals next to a decision that they ultimately had to make themselves. Representation of constituencies, personal philosophies and beliefs, internal pressures from within the party, and re-election were all mentioned as factors that came into MPs mind when formulating decisions on how to vote, with the balance at which these factors play a part differing for all MPs. As the results and interviews suggest, several important discussions can be taken away from conscience voting in the House, especially in regards to how it effects representation and re-election within the House of Representatives that could be expanded in future work.

Several MPs, including Dr. Deborah Russell and Tim van de Molen discussed the idea of 'added safety' behind being elected to an electorate seat and not having to rely on the party list to earn one's seat in Parliament. This sentiment was backed in the results from the 52nd Parliamentary analysis, which found Electorate MPs from both the National Party and the Labour Party having more bipartisan voting records than their List MP counterparts. Dr. Russell, the Electorate MP from the Auckland-based seat of New Lynn, discussed that she felt an ease with conscience voting as her personal philosophy was that she could vote however she wanted, because her constituents had put faith in her and her thought process to make the 'right decision' when it came to conscience voting. Mr. van de Molen mentioned that he polled his constituents on their thoughts regarding issues that are brought up in conscience voting, such as with the End of Life Choice Bill and the Abortion Legislation Bill. List MPs can either represent a certain area or certain demographic of people and thus have a less clear idea of who their voting actually represents, and thus may look more generally to the Party base instead. There is sometimes an essence of 'carpetbagging' when it comes to List MPs, as many List MPs often try to contest different electorates during different election cycles, in the hopes of becoming an Electorate MP. Other MPs interviewed also verified this theory that being a List MP does create an additional layer of people one must consider when voting in a conscience vote, as one's spot on the party list could potentially be affected by the right or wrong decision being made, ultimately resulting in one's seat in Parliament being on the line.

Linked to the idea that List MPs potentially face more pressure from the Party when it comes to conscience votes is analysis on one's ranking on the party list and ministerial positions given out to MPs throughout one's career. Many factors go into order of the party list, which is uniquely determined by each party and put forward at each election time. While conscience voting may play a role in determining one's party ranking, there are obviously many other confounding

variables that effect one's ranking, including ensuring each political party adequately represents its constituents in its caucus as well as many other reasons such as loyalty to current party leadership. When Judith Collins took over as leader of the National Party in July of 2020 there was a shadow cabinet reshuffle, with two more liberal National MPs, Nicola Willis and Chris Bishop being granted much higher positions in the shadow cabinet and the party list than in 2017, partly due to their role in the earlier leadership coup which saw Todd Muller replace Simon Bridges as leader of the National Party.²³⁵²³⁶ In this case, loyalty and connections accounted for a large role in determining one's position on the party list, just one example of how difficult it is to analyze these changes. Accounting for these confounding variables is near impossible considering the complexity of the issue of party lists and thus future work on this may be limited by this factor.

Likewise, assessing one's promotion to leadership positions, such as cabinet ministers, within the party is influenced by much more than just how one behaves during conscience votes. Damien O'Connor revealed that his vote against Helen Clark in her Labour Party leadership challenge in 1993 set his parliamentary career back entirely as she then subsequently did not appoint him to become a minister when she became Prime Minister in 1999.²³⁷ Individual cases such as that of O'Connor's reveal the many moving parts that go in to Parliament, making it hard to pin down and assess the results of one factor of Parliament, such as conscience votes in statistical analyses such as this.

When the dataset of Electorate MPs and their operationalized ideology scores was regressed against the demographic data of the respective electorates it was found that 58.6% of the variation in the ideology scores could be attributed to the underlying characteristics of the member's constituency and party variables. This shows that there is in fact some form of principal-agent theory in play, with MPs (the agents) representing the best interests of their constituents (principals). This still leaves over 40% of the variation in ideology scores unaccounted for and, as seen by the vast array of residual scores calculated in the prediction analysis, many MPs choose to shirk, in Peltzman's terminology, their representative duties and vote according to their volition, whether that be to appeal to party leadership or simply due to following their own core beliefs, something that is at the crux of the phenomenon of conscience voting.

²³⁵ Amelia Wade, "National leader Judith Collins reveals caucus reshuffle – Bridges turns down finance, Muller down the list", New Zealand Herald, November 10, 2020. <https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/politics/national-leader-judith-collins-reveals-caucus-reshuffle-bridges-turns-down-finance-muller-down-the-list/ADM5HUCLFHL2ZCTPNTE5LX4PJI/>. Accessed November 19, 2021.

²³⁶ Claire Trevett, "National leadership coup: Simon Bridges confident ahead of new poll, Todd Muller challenge", New Zealand Herald, May 20, 2020. <https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/national-leadership-coup-simon-bridges-confident-ahead-of-new-poll-todd-muller-challenge/A4ZBPE6A5JGQOL3XGBKOCQJJ74/>. Accessed November 19, 2021.

²³⁷ Andrea Vance, "Damien O'Connor: Helen Clark coup 'set my career back'", Stuff, June 9, 2018. <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/104530822/damian-oconnor-helen-clark-coup-set-my-career-back>. Accessed November 19, 2021.

One final note on the measuring of ideologies via conscience vote is that these votes should definitely not be entirely representative of an individual MP's political ideology when it comes to all issues, nor can a definitive graph/comparison, such as the DW Nominat scoring system in the US, be made.²³⁸ The vast majority of votes in the New Zealand Parliamentary system are whipped, creating little wiggle room for individual ideology in most votes. If an MP decided to cross the aisle and vote against their party, then they potentially face expulsion. While there is a slight divide with MPs from the Green Party and Labour Party being classified as more liberal and National Party and ACT Party MPs being classified as more conservative, there is a mixing of the two parties in the middle when it comes to conscience votes, represented by MPs from both parties who vote both liberally and conservatively on different conscience vote issues. A future study could aim to classify whipped votes into the same metric in order to create a more holistic ideology metric and I hypothesize that this would result in the ideologies of MP being a lot more divided by parties, as seen in current DW Nominat scoring in the US. By creating these ideology comparisons and conscience voting measurements, I was looking to assess the influences of different pressures MPs face when participating in conscience votes and how these differing pressures effected voting behaviors.

²³⁸ "DW-Nominat Plot", voteview.com, Updated 2021. <https://voteview.com/congress/senate>. Accessed November 19, 2021.

12. Conclusion

Conscience voting, while a rare occurrence, offers a valuable insight into personal political ideology and the importance of the principal-agent model in the New Zealand House of Representatives. While the principal-agent model was at play when it came to Electorate MPs and their conscience voting behaviors, with MPs mostly voting in a way mirrored their represented electorates, there was still a lot of unexplained variance which could potentially be attributed to voter shirking, and voting based on one's conscience, as outlined by Dr. Deborah Russell. As one interviewed MP put it, “[conscience voting is] a bit like baking a cake where you have certain ingredients go in. One of those ingredients is the majority view of the electorate and then another key ingredient is my personal view and my personal experiences and my philosophy”. While many MP's cakes end up looking the same, the ingredients and cooking instructions are all highly personalized, with only the author of the recipe, the individual MP, truly ever knowing their own formula to conscience voting.

Appendix:

Appendix Table A.1: List of all Conscience Vote Bills in New Zealand Parliament (1891-2010)

| Topic | Total | % |
|-------------------------------|--------------|-------------|
| Alcohol | 62 | 26% |
| Gambling | 33 | 14% |
| Marriage/Family/Children | 28 | 12% |
| Constitutional Reform | 19 | 8% |
| Summer Time | 12 | 5% |
| Health and Safety | 12 | 5% |
| Crime and Punishment | 11 | 5% |
| Electoral Reform | 11 | 5% |
| Shop Trading Hours | 10 | 4% |
| Religious Instruction | 9 | 4% |
| Abortion | 7 | 3% |
| Homosexuality | 4 | 2% |
| Business/Employment | 3 | 1% |
| Rights (Human and Animal) | 3 | 1% |
| Governance and Infrastructure | 2 | 1% |
| Miscellaneous | 2 | 1% |
| Euthanasia | 2 | 1% |
| Prostitution | 2 | 1% |
| Treaty of Waitangi Settlement | 2 | 1% |
| Education | 1 | 0% |
| Censorship | 1 | 0% |
| Drugs | 1 | 0% |
| TOTAL | 237 | 100% |

Source: David Geoffrey Lindsey, “Conscience Voting in New Zealand”, pg. 5, The University of Auckland, Published 2011

Appendix Table A.2: Breakdown of Ideology Scores of Individual MPs present in the 52nd Parliament

| Member | Party | Total Scores | Votes Missed | Votes Attended | Score | Rank |
|--------------------------------|--------------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|--------------|-------------|
| Adams, Amy | National | 6 | 0 | 125 | 0.048 | 40 |
| Allan, Kiri | Labour | 9 | 0 | 125 | 0.072 | 52 |
| Andersen, Ginny | Labour | 3 | 1 | 124 | 0.024 | 21 |
| Ardern, Jacinda | Labour | 4 | 1 | 124 | 0.032 | 31 |
| Bakshi, Kanwaljit Singh | National | 124 | 0 | 125 | 0.992 | 113 |

| | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|-------------------|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|
| Ball, Darroch | New Zealand First | 12 | 0 | 125 | 0.096 | 56 |
| Barry, Maggie | National | 121 | 1 | 124 | 0.976 | 102 |
| Bayly, Andrew | National | 98 | 0 | 125 | 0.784 | 81 |
| Bennett, David | National | 108 | 2 | 123 | 0.878 | 92 |
| Bennett, Paula | National | 6 | 2 | 123 | 0.049 | 45 |
| Bidois, Dan | National | 91 | 4 | 121 | 0.752 | 78 |
| Bishop, Chris | National | 6 | 2 | 123 | 0.049 | 45 |
| Bridges, Simon | National | 119 | 1 | 124 | 0.960 | 98 |
| Brown, Simeon | National | 124 | 0 | 125 | 0.992 | 113 |
| Brownlee, Gerry | National | 123 | 2 | 123 | 1.000 | 120 |
| Carter, David | National | 100 | 0 | 125 | 0.800 | 82 |
| Clark, David | Labour | 82 | 1 | 124 | 0.661 | 75 |
| Coffey, Tāmati | Labour | 6 | 0 | 125 | 0.048 | 40 |
| Coleman, Jonathan | National | 2 | 121 | 4 | 0.500 | 72 |
| Collins, Judith | National | 4 | 20 | 105 | 0.038 | 35 |
| Craig, Liz | Labour | 3 | 0 | 125 | 0.024 | 12 |
| Curran, Clare | Labour | 3 | 0 | 125 | 0.024 | 12 |
| Davidson, Marama | Green | 1 | 1 | 124 | 0.008 | 8 |
| Davis, Kelvin | Labour | 4 | 0 | 125 | 0.032 | 27 |
| Dean, Jacqui | National | 124 | 0 | 125 | 0.992 | 113 |
| Doocey, Matthew | National | 8 | 0 | 125 | 0.064 | 49 |
| Dowie, Sarah | National | 121 | 2 | 123 | 0.984 | 103 |
| Dyson, Ruth | Labour | 2 | 1 | 124 | 0.016 | 11 |
| Eagle, Paul | Labour | 3 | 1 | 124 | 0.024 | 21 |
| English, Bill | National | 4 | 121 | 4 | 1.000 | 120 |
| Fafoi, Kris | Labour | 4 | 1 | 124 | 0.032 | 31 |
| Falloon, Andrew | National | 10 | 0 | 125 | 0.080 | 53 |
| Finlayson, Chris | National | 4 | 121 | 4 | 1.000 | 120 |
| Garcia, Paulo | National | 120 | 2 | 123 | 0.976 | 101 |
| Genter, Julie Anne | Green | 1 | 0 | 125 | 0.008 | 1 |
| Ghahraman, Golriz | Green | 1 | 0 | 125 | 0.008 | 1 |
| Goldsmith, Paul | National | 102 | 2 | 123 | 0.829 | 90 |
| Guy, Nathan | National | 115 | 2 | 123 | 0.935 | 95 |
| Hayes, Jo | National | 124 | 0 | 125 | 0.992 | 113 |
| Henare, Peeni | Labour | 4 | 1 | 124 | 0.032 | 31 |
| Hipango, Harete | National | 123 | 0 | 125 | 0.984 | 107 |
| Hipkins, Chris | Labour | 3 | 0 | 125 | 0.024 | 12 |
| Hudson, Brett | National | 14 | 0 | 125 | 0.112 | 64 |
| Hughes, Gareth | Green | 1 | 0 | 125 | 0.008 | 1 |
| Huo, Raymond | Labour | 3 | 0 | 125 | 0.024 | 12 |
| Jackson, Willie | Labour | 8 | 1 | 124 | 0.065 | 51 |

| | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|
| Jones, Shane | New Zealand First | 12 | 1 | 124 | 0.097 | 61 |
| Joyce, Steven | National | 4 | 121 | 4 | 1.000 | 120 |
| Kanongata'a-Suisuiki, Anahila | Labour | 103 | 1 | 124 | 0.831 | 91 |
| Kaye, Nikki | National | 5 | 0 | 125 | 0.040 | 36 |
| King, Matt | National | 26 | 1 | 124 | 0.210 | 69 |
| Korako, Nuk | National | 4 | 121 | 4 | 1.000 | 120 |
| Kuriger, Barbara | National | 7 | 0 | 125 | 0.056 | 47 |
| Lee, Denise | National | 100 | 0 | 125 | 0.800 | 82 |
| Lee, Melissa | National | 123 | 1 | 124 | 0.992 | 110 |
| Lees-Galloway, Ian | Labour | 3 | 0 | 125 | 0.024 | 12 |
| Little, Andrew | Labour | 3 | 0 | 125 | 0.024 | 12 |
| Logie, Jan | Green | 1 | 0 | 125 | 0.008 | 1 |
| Loheni, Agnes | National | 121 | 2 | 123 | 0.984 | 103 |
| Lubeck, Marja | Labour | 2 | 0 | 125 | 0.016 | 9 |
| Luxton, Jo | Labour | 3 | 3 | 122 | 0.025 | 26 |
| Macindoe, Tim | National | 120 | 5 | 120 | 1.000 | 120 |
| Mahuta, Nanaia | Labour | 25 | 2 | 123 | 0.203 | 68 |
| Mallard, Trevor | Labour | 4 | 0 | 125 | 0.032 | 27 |
| Marcroft, Jenny | New Zealand First | 10 | 0 | 125 | 0.080 | 53 |
| Mark, Ron | New Zealand First | 12 | 0 | 125 | 0.096 | 56 |
| Martin, Tracey | New Zealand First | 10 | 0 | 125 | 0.080 | 53 |
| McAnulty, Kieran | Labour | 5 | 0 | 125 | 0.040 | 36 |
| McClay, Todd | National | 114 | 4 | 121 | 0.942 | 97 |
| McKelvie, Ian | National | 103 | 0 | 125 | 0.824 | 86 |
| Mitchell, Clayton | New Zealand First | 12 | 1 | 124 | 0.097 | 61 |
| Mitchell, Mark | National | 20 | 1 | 124 | 0.161 | 67 |
| Muller, Todd | National | 122 | 1 | 124 | 0.984 | 105 |
| Nash, Stuart | Labour | 4 | 0 | 125 | 0.032 | 27 |
| Ngaro, Alfred | National | 123 | 1 | 124 | 0.992 | 110 |
| O'Connor, Damien | Labour | 81 | 18 | 107 | 0.757 | 79 |
| O'Connor, Greg | Labour | 12 | 0 | 125 | 0.096 | 56 |
| O'Connor, Simon | National | 124 | 0 | 125 | 0.992 | 113 |
| Parker, David | Labour | 5 | 1 | 124 | 0.040 | 39 |
| Parmar, Parmjeet | National | 123 | 1 | 124 | 0.992 | 110 |
| Patterson, Mark | New Zealand First | 12 | 0 | 125 | 0.096 | 56 |
| Penk Chris | National | 124 | 0 | 125 | 0.992 | 113 |

| | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|-------------------|-----|---|-----|-------|-----|
| Peters, Winston | New Zealand First | 12 | 1 | 124 | 0.097 | 61 |
| Prime, Willow-Jean | Labour | 3 | 1 | 124 | 0.024 | 21 |
| Pugh, Maureen | National | 120 | 4 | 121 | 0.992 | 109 |
| Radhakrishnan, Priyanca | Labour | 3 | 2 | 123 | 0.024 | 25 |
| Reti, Shane | National | 117 | 5 | 120 | 0.975 | 99 |
| Robertson, Grant | Labour | 3 | 0 | 125 | 0.024 | 12 |
| Ross, Jami-Lee | National | 5 | 0 | 125 | 0.040 | 36 |
| Rurawhe, Adrian | Labour | 101 | 0 | 125 | 0.808 | 85 |
| Russell, Deborah | Labour | 14 | 0 | 125 | 0.112 | 64 |
| Sage, Eugenie | Green | 1 | 0 | 125 | 0.008 | 1 |
| Salesa, Jenny | Labour | 103 | 0 | 125 | 0.824 | 86 |
| Scott, Alastair | National | 122 | 1 | 124 | 0.984 | 105 |
| Sepuloni, Carmel | Labour | 4 | 1 | 124 | 0.032 | 31 |
| Seymour, David | ACT | 4 | 0 | 125 | 0.032 | 27 |
| Shaw, James | Green | 1 | 0 | 125 | 0.008 | 1 |
| Simpson, Scott | National | 8 | 0 | 125 | 0.064 | 49 |
| Sio, William | Labour | 42 | 1 | 124 | 0.339 | 71 |
| Smith, Nick | National | 124 | 0 | 125 | 0.992 | 113 |
| Smith, Stuart | National | 15 | 3 | 122 | 0.123 | 66 |
| Stanford, Erica | National | 6 | 0 | 125 | 0.048 | 40 |
| Strange, Jamie | Labour | 103 | 0 | 125 | 0.824 | 86 |
| Swarbrick, Chloe | Green | 1 | 0 | 125 | 0.008 | 1 |
| Tabuteau, Fletcher | New Zealand First | 12 | 0 | 125 | 0.096 | 56 |
| Tinetti, Jan | Labour | 3 | 0 | 125 | 0.024 | 12 |
| Tirikatene, Rino | Labour | 103 | 0 | 125 | 0.824 | 86 |
| Tolley, Anne | National | 93 | 0 | 125 | 0.744 | 77 |
| Twyford, Phil | Labour | 84 | 0 | 125 | 0.672 | 76 |
| Upston, Louise | National | 119 | 3 | 122 | 0.975 | 100 |
| van de Molen, Tim | National | 39 | 0 | 125 | 0.312 | 70 |
| Wagner, Nicky | National | 93 | 3 | 122 | 0.762 | 80 |
| Walker, Hamish | National | 115 | 2 | 123 | 0.935 | 95 |
| Wall, Louisa | Labour | 6 | 0 | 125 | 0.048 | 40 |
| Warren-Clark, Angie | Labour | 3 | 0 | 125 | 0.024 | 12 |
| Webb, Duncan | Labour | 2 | 0 | 125 | 0.016 | 9 |
| Whaitiri, Meka | Labour | 100 | 1 | 124 | 0.806 | 84 |
| Williams, Poto | Labour | 74 | 1 | 124 | 0.597 | 73 |
| Willis, Nicola | National | 7 | 4 | 121 | 0.058 | 48 |
| Wood, Michael | Labour | 78 | 3 | 122 | 0.639 | 74 |
| Woodhouse, Michael | National | 109 | 3 | 122 | 0.893 | 94 |

| | | | | | | |
|------------------------|----------|-----|---|-----|-------|-----|
| Woods, Megan | Labour | 3 | 1 | 124 | 0.024 | 21 |
| Yang, Jian | National | 6 | 1 | 124 | 0.048 | 44 |
| Young, Jonathan | National | 118 | 6 | 119 | 0.992 | 108 |
| Yule, Lawrence | National | 108 | 2 | 123 | 0.878 | 92 |

Source: Author's calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

Appendix Table A.3: Breakdown of Ideology Scores of Individual MPs present in the 52nd Parliament by Type of Vote

| Member | Party | Euthanasia Score | Abortion Score | Other Score | Combined Score |
|--------------------------------|-------------------|------------------|----------------|-------------|----------------|
| Adams, Amy | National | 0.000 | 0.082 | 1.000 | 0.048 |
| Allan, Kiri | Labour | 0.027 | 0.143 | 0.000 | 0.072 |
| Andersen, Ginny | Labour | 0.000 | 0.063 | 0.000 | 0.024 |
| Ardern, Jacinda | Labour | 0.000 | 0.083 | 0.000 | 0.032 |
| Bakshi, Kanwaljit Singh | National | 1.000 | 0.980 | 1.000 | 0.992 |
| Ball, Darroch | New Zealand First | 0.000 | 0.224 | 0.500 | 0.096 |
| Barry, Maggie | National | 1.000 | 0.938 | 1.000 | 0.976 |
| Bayly, Andrew | National | 1.000 | 0.449 | 1.000 | 0.784 |
| Bennett, David | National | 0.986 | 0.702 | 1.000 | 0.878 |
| Bennett, Paula | National | 0.000 | 0.104 | 1.000 | 0.049 |
| Bidois, Dan | National | 0.851 | 0.571 | N/A | 0.752 |
| Bishop, Chris | National | 0.000 | 0.085 | 1.000 | 0.049 |
| Bridges, Simon | National | 0.986 | 0.917 | 1.000 | 0.960 |
| Brown, Simeon | National | 1.000 | 0.980 | 1.000 | 0.992 |
| Brownlee, Gerry | National | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Carter, David | National | 1.000 | 0.490 | 1.000 | 0.800 |
| Clark, David | Labour | 0.946 | 0.250 | 0.000 | 0.661 |
| Coffey, Tāmāti | Labour | 0.041 | 0.061 | 0.000 | 0.048 |
| Coleman, Jonathan | National | N/A | 0.000 | 1.000 | 0.500 |
| Collins, Judith | National | 0.000 | 0.069 | 1.000 | 0.038 |
| Craig, Liz | Labour | 0.000 | 0.061 | 0.000 | 0.024 |
| Curran, Clare | Labour | 0.000 | 0.061 | 0.000 | 0.024 |
| Davidson, Marama | Green | 0.014 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.008 |
| Davis, Kelvin | Labour | 0.000 | 0.082 | 0.000 | 0.032 |
| Dean, Jacqui | National | 1.000 | 0.980 | 1.000 | 0.992 |
| Doocoy, Matthew | National | 0.000 | 0.122 | 1.000 | 0.064 |
| Dowie, Sarah | National | 1.000 | 0.957 | 1.000 | 0.984 |
| Dyson, Ruth | Labour | 0.000 | 0.042 | 0.000 | 0.016 |

| | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Eagle, Paul | Labour | 0.000 | 0.063 | 0.000 | 0.024 |
| English, Bill | National | N/A | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Fafoi, Kris | Labour | 0.000 | 0.083 | 0.000 | 0.032 |
| Falloon, Andrew | National | 0.000 | 0.163 | 1.000 | 0.080 |
| Finlayson, Chris | National | N/A | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Garcia, Paulo | National | 1.000 | 0.939 | N/A | 0.976 |
| Genter, Julie Anne | Green | 0.014 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.008 |
| Ghahraman, Golriz | Green | 0.014 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.008 |
| Goldsmith, Paul | National | 0.851 | 0.787 | 1.000 | 0.829 |
| Guy, Nathan | National | 1.000 | 0.830 | 1.000 | 0.935 |
| Hayes, Jo | National | 1.000 | 0.980 | 1.000 | 0.992 |
| Henare, Peeni | Labour | 0.000 | 0.063 | 0.500 | 0.032 |
| Hipango, Harete | National | 1.000 | 0.959 | 1.000 | 0.984 |
| Hipkins, Chris | Labour | 0.000 | 0.061 | 0.000 | 0.024 |
| Hudson, Brett | National | 0.014 | 0.224 | 1.000 | 0.112 |
| Hughes, Gareth | Green | 0.014 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.008 |
| Huo, Raymond | Labour | 0.000 | 0.061 | 0.000 | 0.024 |
| Jackson, Willie | Labour | 0.041 | 0.083 | 0.500 | 0.065 |
| Jones, Shane | New Zealand First | 0.000 | 0.229 | 0.500 | 0.097 |
| Joyce, Steven | National | N/A | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Kanongata'a-Suisuiki, Anahila | Labour | 0.946 | 0.667 | 0.500 | 0.831 |
| Kaye, Nikki | National | 0.000 | 0.061 | 1.000 | 0.040 |
| King, Matt | National | 0.000 | 0.500 | 1.000 | 0.210 |
| Korako, Nuk | National | N/A | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Kuriger, Barbara | National | 0.000 | 0.102 | 1.000 | 0.056 |
| Lee, Denise | National | 0.851 | 0.714 | 1.000 | 0.800 |
| Lee, Melissa | National | 1.000 | 0.979 | 1.000 | 0.992 |
| Lees-Galloway, Ian | Labour | 0.000 | 0.061 | 0.000 | 0.024 |
| Little, Andrew | Labour | 0.000 | 0.061 | 0.000 | 0.024 |
| Logie, Jan | Green | 0.014 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.008 |
| Loheni, Agnes | National | 1.000 | 0.959 | N/A | 0.984 |
| Lubeck, Marja | Labour | 0.000 | 0.041 | 0.000 | 0.016 |
| Luxton, Jo | Labour | 0.000 | 0.065 | 0.000 | 0.025 |
| Macindoe, Tim | National | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Mahuta, Nanaia | Labour | 0.041 | 0.468 | 0.000 | 0.203 |
| Mallard, Trevor | Labour | 0.041 | 0.020 | 0.000 | 0.032 |
| Marcroft, Jenny | New Zealand First | 0.000 | 0.184 | 0.500 | 0.080 |

| | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|-------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Mark, Ron | New Zealand First | 0.000 | 0.224 | 0.500 | 0.096 |
| Martin, Tracey | New Zealand First | 0.000 | 0.184 | 0.500 | 0.080 |
| McAnulty, Kieran | Labour | 0.000 | 0.102 | 0.000 | 0.040 |
| McClay, Todd | National | 1.000 | 0.844 | 1.000 | 0.942 |
| McKelvie, Ian | National | 1.000 | 0.551 | 1.000 | 0.824 |
| Mitchell, Clayton | New Zealand First | 0.000 | 0.229 | 0.500 | 0.097 |
| Mitchell, Mark | National | 0.000 | 0.375 | 1.000 | 0.161 |
| Muller, Todd | National | 1.000 | 0.958 | 1.000 | 0.984 |
| Nash, Stuart | Labour | 0.000 | 0.061 | 0.500 | 0.032 |
| Ngaro, Alfred | National | 1.000 | 0.979 | 1.000 | 0.992 |
| O'Connor, Damien | Labour | 1.000 | 0.510 | 0.000 | 0.757 |
| O'Connor, Greg | Labour | 0.000 | 0.224 | 0.500 | 0.096 |
| O'Connor, Simon | National | 1.000 | 0.980 | 1.000 | 0.992 |
| Parker, David | Labour | 0.000 | 0.104 | 0.000 | 0.040 |
| Parmar, Parmjeet | National | 1.000 | 0.979 | 1.000 | 0.992 |
| Patterson, Mark | New Zealand First | 0.000 | 0.224 | 0.500 | 0.096 |
| Penk Chris | National | 1.000 | 0.980 | 1.000 | 0.992 |
| Peters, Winston | New Zealand First | 0.000 | 0.229 | 0.500 | 0.097 |
| Prime, Willow-Jean | Labour | 0.000 | 0.063 | 0.000 | 0.024 |
| Pugh, Maureen | National | 1.000 | 0.979 | N/A | 0.992 |
| Radhakrishnan, Priyanca | Labour | 0.000 | 0.064 | 0.000 | 0.024 |
| Reti, Shane | National | 1.000 | 0.932 | 1.000 | 0.975 |
| Robertson, Grant | Labour | 0.000 | 0.061 | 0.000 | 0.024 |
| Ross, Jami-Lee | National | 0.000 | 0.061 | 1.000 | 0.040 |
| Rurawhe, Adrian | Labour | 0.946 | 0.633 | 0.000 | 0.808 |
| Russell, Deborah | Labour | 0.108 | 0.122 | 0.000 | 0.112 |
| Sage, Eugenie | Green | 0.014 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.008 |
| Salesa, Jenny | Labour | 0.946 | 0.653 | 0.500 | 0.824 |
| Scott, Alastair | National | 1.000 | 0.958 | 1.000 | 0.984 |
| Sepuloni, Carmel | Labour | 0.000 | 0.083 | 0.000 | 0.032 |
| Seymour, David | ACT | 0.000 | 0.061 | 0.500 | 0.032 |
| Shaw, James | Green | 0.014 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.008 |
| Simpson, Scott | National | 0.000 | 0.122 | 1.000 | 0.064 |
| Sio, William | Labour | 0.432 | 0.208 | 0.000 | 0.339 |
| Smith, Nick | National | 1.000 | 0.980 | 1.000 | 0.992 |

| | | | | | |
|----------------------------|-------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Smith, Stuart | National | 0.027 | 0.239 | 1.000 | 0.123 |
| Stanford, Erica | National | 0.000 | 0.082 | 1.000 | 0.048 |
| Strange, Jamie | Labour | 0.946 | 0.673 | 0.000 | 0.824 |
| Swarbrick, Chloe | Green | 0.014 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.008 |
| Tabuteau, Fletcher | New Zealand First | 0.000 | 0.224 | 0.500 | 0.096 |
| Tinetti, Jan | Labour | 0.000 | 0.061 | 0.000 | 0.024 |
| Tirikatene, Rino | Labour | 0.946 | 0.673 | 0.000 | 0.824 |
| Tolley, Anne | National | 0.973 | 0.388 | 1.000 | 0.744 |
| Twyford, Phil | Labour | 0.946 | 0.286 | 0.000 | 0.672 |
| Upston, Louise | National | 1.000 | 0.938 | 1.000 | 0.975 |
| van de Molen, Tim | National | 0.230 | 0.408 | 1.000 | 0.312 |
| Wagner, Nicky | National | 1.000 | 0.383 | 1.000 | 0.762 |
| Walker, Hamish | National | 1.000 | 0.830 | 1.000 | 0.935 |
| Wall, Louisa | Labour | 0.041 | 0.061 | 0.000 | 0.048 |
| Warren-Clark, Angie | Labour | 0.000 | 0.061 | 0.000 | 0.024 |
| Webb, Duncan | Labour | 0.000 | 0.041 | 0.000 | 0.016 |
| Whaitiri, Meka | Labour | 0.932 | 0.625 | 0.500 | 0.806 |
| Williams, Poto | Labour | 0.892 | 0.146 | 0.500 | 0.597 |
| Willis, Nicola | National | 0.027 | 0.106 | N/A | 0.058 |
| Wood, Michael | Labour | 0.903 | 0.271 | 0.000 | 0.639 |
| Woodhouse, Michael | National | 1.000 | 0.717 | 1.000 | 0.893 |
| Woods, Megan | Labour | 0.000 | 0.063 | 0.000 | 0.024 |
| Yang, Jian | National | 0.000 | 0.083 | 1.000 | 0.048 |
| Young, Jonathan | National | 1.000 | 0.978 | 1.000 | 0.992 |
| Yule, Lawrence | National | 0.973 | 0.729 | 1.000 | 0.878 |

Source: Author's calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

Appendix Table A.4: Ideology Score by Party in the 52nd Parliament

| Party | Average | Standard Deviation | Variation | Median |
|-------------------|----------------|---------------------------|------------------|---------------|
| National | 0.681 | 0.398 | 0.158 | 0.935 |
| Labour | 0.216 | 0.310 | 0.096 | 0.032 |
| Green | 0.008 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.008 |
| New Zealand First | 0.093 | 0.007 | 0.000 | 0.096 |
| ACT | 0.032 | N/A | N/A | 0.032 |

Source: Author's calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

Appendix Table A.5: Ideology Score by Type of MP in the 52nd Parliament

| Type of MP | Average | Standard Deviation | Variation | Median |
|------------|---------|--------------------|-----------|--------|
| List | 0.348 | 0.429 | 0.184 | 0.080 |
| Electorate | 0.472 | 0.416 | 0.173 | 0.419 |

Source: Author's calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

Appendix Table A.6: Ideology Score by Type of MP (National Party/Labour Party) in the 52nd Parliament

| Type of MP | Average | Standard Deviation | Variation | Median |
|---------------------|---------|--------------------|-----------|--------|
| National List | 0.811 | 0.337 | 0.114 | 0.992 |
| Labour List | 0.126 | 0.265 | 0.070 | 0.024 |
| National Electorate | 0.622 | 0.413 | 0.171 | 0.851 |
| Labour Electorate | 0.269 | 0.326 | 0.106 | 0.048 |

Source: Author's calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

Appendix Table A.7: Ideology Score by Electorate-Based Island in the 52nd Parliament

| Island | Average | Standard Deviation | Variation | Median |
|--------|---------|--------------------|-----------|--------|
| North | 0.470 | 0.415 | 0.173 | 0.339 |
| South | 0.479 | 0.432 | 0.187 | 0.597 |

Source: Author's calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

Appendix Table A.8: Ideology Score by Government/Opposition in the 52nd Parliament

| Govt. | Average | Standard Deviation | Variation | Median |
|--------------|---------|--------------------|-----------|--------|
| Minister | 0.167 | 0.255 | 0.065 | 0.032 |
| Non-Minister | 0.175 | 0.290 | 0.084 | 0.028 |
| Government | 0.172 | 0.275 | 0.076 | 0.032 |
| Opposition | 0.671 | 0.403 | 0.163 | 0.914 |

Source: Author's calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

Appendix Table A.9: Breakdown of Weighted Ideology Scores of Individual MPs present in the 52nd Parliament

| Member | Party | Reading Score | Non-Reading Score | Total Score | Average Score | Rank |
|-----------------|----------|---------------|-------------------|-------------|---------------|------|
| Adams, Amy | National | 0.250 | 0.034 | 0.284 | 0.142 | 47 |
| Allan, Kiri | Labour | 0.125 | 0.068 | 0.193 | 0.097 | 42 |
| Andersen, Ginny | Labour | 0.000 | 0.026 | 0.026 | 0.013 | 21 |

| | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|-------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-----|
| Ardern, Jacinda | Labour | 0.000 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.017 | 29 |
| Bakshi, Kanwaljit Singh | National | 1.000 | 0.991 | 1.991 | 0.996 | 112 |
| Ball, Darroch | New Zealand First | 0.250 | 0.085 | 0.335 | 0.168 | 55 |
| Barry, Maggie | National | 0.875 | 0.983 | 1.858 | 0.929 | 100 |
| Bayly, Andrew | National | 0.750 | 0.786 | 1.536 | 0.768 | 86 |
| Bennett, David | National | 0.625 | 0.896 | 1.521 | 0.760 | 85 |
| Bennett, Paula | National | 0.143 | 0.043 | 0.186 | 0.093 | 41 |
| Bidois, Dan | National | 0.400 | 0.767 | 1.167 | 0.584 | 77 |
| Bishop, Chris | National | 0.250 | 0.035 | 0.285 | 0.142 | 49 |
| Bridges, Simon | National | 0.875 | 0.966 | 1.841 | 0.920 | 99 |
| Brown, Simeon | National | 1.000 | 0.991 | 1.991 | 0.996 | 112 |
| Brownlee, Gerry | National | 1.000 | 1.000 | 2.000 | 1.000 | 120 |
| Carter, David | National | 0.625 | 0.812 | 1.437 | 0.718 | 81 |
| Clark, David | Labour | 0.375 | 0.681 | 1.056 | 0.528 | 75 |
| Coffey, Tāmāti | Labour | 0.000 | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.026 | 34 |
| Coleman, Jonathan | National | 0.667 | 0.000 | 0.667 | 0.333 | 70 |
| Collins, Judith | National | 0.375 | 0.010 | 0.385 | 0.193 | 64 |
| Craig, Liz | Labour | 0.000 | 0.026 | 0.026 | 0.013 | 12 |
| Curran, Clare | Labour | 0.000 | 0.026 | 0.026 | 0.013 | 12 |
| Davidson, Marama | Green | 0.000 | 0.009 | 0.009 | 0.004 | 8 |
| Davis, Kelvin | Labour | 0.000 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.017 | 27 |
| Dean, Jacqui | National | 1.000 | 0.991 | 1.991 | 0.996 | 112 |
| Doocey, Matthew | National | 0.250 | 0.051 | 0.301 | 0.151 | 51 |
| Dowie, Sarah | National | 0.875 | 0.991 | 1.866 | 0.933 | 101 |
| Dyson, Ruth | Labour | 0.000 | 0.017 | 0.017 | 0.009 | 11 |
| Eagle, Paul | Labour | 0.000 | 0.026 | 0.026 | 0.013 | 21 |
| English, Bill | National | 1.000 | 1.000 | 2.000 | 1.000 | 120 |
| Fafoi, Kris | Labour | 0.000 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.017 | 29 |
| Falloon, Andrew | National | 0.250 | 0.068 | 0.318 | 0.159 | 53 |
| Finlayson, Chris | National | 1.000 | 1.000 | 2.000 | 1.000 | 120 |
| Garcia, Paulo | National | 0.833 | 0.983 | 1.816 | 0.908 | 96 |
| Genter, Julie Anne | Green | 0.000 | 0.009 | 0.009 | 0.004 | 1 |

| | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-----|
| Ghahraman, Golriz | Green | 0.000 | 0.009 | 0.009 | 0.004 | 1 |
| Goldsmith, Paul | National | 0.875 | 0.826 | 1.701 | 0.851 | 94 |
| Guy, Nathan | National | 0.750 | 0.948 | 1.698 | 0.849 | 93 |
| Hayes, Jo | National | 1.000 | 0.991 | 1.991 | 0.996 | 112 |
| Henare, Peeni | Labour | 0.125 | 0.026 | 0.151 | 0.075 | 39 |
| Hipango, Harete | National | 0.875 | 0.991 | 1.866 | 0.933 | 104 |
| Hipkins, Chris | Labour | 0.000 | 0.026 | 0.026 | 0.013 | 12 |
| Hudson, Brett | National | 0.250 | 0.103 | 0.353 | 0.176 | 62 |
| Hughes, Gareth | Green | 0.000 | 0.009 | 0.009 | 0.004 | 1 |
| Huo, Raymond | Labour | 0.000 | 0.026 | 0.026 | 0.013 | 12 |
| Jackson, Willie | Labour | 0.125 | 0.060 | 0.185 | 0.093 | 40 |
| Jones, Shane | New Zealand First | 0.250 | 0.086 | 0.336 | 0.168 | 59 |
| Joyce, Steven | National | 1.000 | 1.000 | 2.000 | 1.000 | 120 |
| Kanongata'a-Suisuiki, Anahila | Labour | 0.875 | 0.828 | 1.703 | 0.851 | 95 |
| Kaye, Nikki | National | 0.250 | 0.026 | 0.276 | 0.138 | 45 |
| King, Matt | National | 0.375 | 0.198 | 0.573 | 0.287 | 69 |
| Korako, Nuk | National | 1.000 | 1.000 | 2.000 | 1.000 | 120 |
| Kuriger, Barbara | National | 0.250 | 0.043 | 0.293 | 0.146 | 50 |
| Lee, Denise | National | 0.875 | 0.795 | 1.670 | 0.835 | 91 |
| Lee, Melissa | National | 1.000 | 0.991 | 1.991 | 0.996 | 109 |
| Lees-Galloway, Ian | Labour | 0.000 | 0.026 | 0.026 | 0.013 | 12 |
| Little, Andrew | Labour | 0.000 | 0.026 | 0.026 | 0.013 | 12 |
| Logie, Jan | Green | 0.000 | 0.009 | 0.009 | 0.004 | 1 |
| Loheni, Agnes | National | 0.833 | 0.991 | 1.825 | 0.912 | 98 |
| Lubeck, Marja | Labour | 0.000 | 0.017 | 0.017 | 0.009 | 9 |
| Luxton, Jo | Labour | 0.000 | 0.026 | 0.026 | 0.013 | 26 |
| Macindoe, Tim | National | 1.000 | 1.000 | 2.000 | 1.000 | 120 |
| Mahuta, Nanaia | Labour | 0.250 | 0.200 | 0.450 | 0.225 | 67 |
| Mallard, Trevor | Labour | 0.000 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.017 | 27 |
| Marcroft, Jenny | New Zealand First | 0.125 | 0.077 | 0.202 | 0.101 | 43 |
| Mark, Ron | New Zealand First | 0.250 | 0.085 | 0.335 | 0.168 | 55 |
| Martin, Tracey | New Zealand First | 0.125 | 0.077 | 0.202 | 0.101 | 43 |

| | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|-------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-----|
| McAnulty, Kieran | Labour | 0.000 | 0.043 | 0.043 | 0.021 | 32 |
| McClay, Todd | National | 0.875 | 0.947 | 1.822 | 0.911 | 97 |
| McKelvie, Ian | National | 0.750 | 0.829 | 1.579 | 0.790 | 87 |
| Mitchell, Clayton | New Zealand First | 0.250 | 0.086 | 0.336 | 0.168 | 59 |
| Mitchell, Mark | National | 0.250 | 0.155 | 0.405 | 0.203 | 66 |
| Muller, Todd | National | 0.875 | 0.991 | 1.866 | 0.933 | 102 |
| Nash, Stuart | Labour | 0.125 | 0.026 | 0.151 | 0.075 | 37 |
| Ngaro, Alfred | National | 1.000 | 0.991 | 1.991 | 0.996 | 112 |
| O'Connor, Damien | Labour | 0.625 | 0.768 | 1.393 | 0.696 | 79 |
| O'Connor, Greg | Labour | 0.375 | 0.077 | 0.452 | 0.226 | 68 |
| O'Connor, Simon | National | 1.000 | 0.991 | 1.991 | 0.996 | 112 |
| Parker, David | Labour | 0.000 | 0.043 | 0.043 | 0.022 | 33 |
| Parmar, Parmjeet | National | 1.000 | 0.991 | 1.991 | 0.996 | 109 |
| Patterson, Mark | New Zealand First | 0.250 | 0.085 | 0.335 | 0.168 | 55 |
| Penk Chris | National | 1.000 | 0.991 | 1.991 | 0.996 | 112 |
| Peters, Winston | New Zealand First | 0.250 | 0.086 | 0.336 | 0.168 | 59 |
| Prime, Willow-Jean | Labour | 0.000 | 0.026 | 0.026 | 0.013 | 21 |
| Pugh, Maureen | National | 1.000 | 0.991 | 1.991 | 0.996 | 109 |
| Radhakrishnan, Priyanca | Labour | 0.000 | 0.026 | 0.026 | 0.013 | 25 |
| Reti, Shane | National | 1.000 | 0.973 | 1.973 | 0.987 | 106 |
| Robertson, Grant | Labour | 0.000 | 0.026 | 0.026 | 0.013 | 12 |
| Ross, Jami-Lee | National | 0.250 | 0.026 | 0.276 | 0.138 | 45 |
| Rurawhe, Adrian | Labour | 0.625 | 0.821 | 1.446 | 0.723 | 83 |
| Russell, Deborah | Labour | 0.250 | 0.103 | 0.353 | 0.176 | 62 |
| Sage, Eugenie | Green | 0.000 | 0.009 | 0.009 | 0.004 | 1 |
| Salesa, Jenny | Labour | 0.875 | 0.821 | 1.696 | 0.848 | 92 |
| Scott, Alastair | National | 0.875 | 0.991 | 1.866 | 0.933 | 102 |
| Sepuloni, Carmel | Labour | 0.000 | 0.034 | 0.034 | 0.017 | 29 |
| Seymour, David | ACT | 0.125 | 0.026 | 0.151 | 0.075 | 37 |
| Shaw, James | Green | 0.000 | 0.009 | 0.009 | 0.004 | 1 |

| | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|-------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-----|
| Simpson, Scott | National | 0.250 | 0.051 | 0.301 | 0.151 | 51 |
| Sio, William | Labour | 0.375 | 0.336 | 0.711 | 0.356 | 72 |
| Smith, Nick | National | 1.000 | 0.991 | 1.991 | 0.996 | 112 |
| Smith, Stuart | National | 0.286 | 0.113 | 0.399 | 0.199 | 65 |
| Stanford, Erica | National | 0.250 | 0.034 | 0.284 | 0.142 | 47 |
| Strange, Jamie | Labour | 0.625 | 0.838 | 1.463 | 0.731 | 84 |
| Swarbrick, Chloe | Green | 0.000 | 0.009 | 0.009 | 0.004 | 1 |
| Tabuteau, Fletcher | New Zealand First | 0.250 | 0.085 | 0.335 | 0.168 | 55 |
| Tinetti, Jan | Labour | 0.000 | 0.026 | 0.026 | 0.013 | 12 |
| Tirikatene, Rino | Labour | 0.750 | 0.829 | 1.579 | 0.790 | 87 |
| Tolley, Anne | National | 0.500 | 0.761 | 1.261 | 0.630 | 78 |
| Twyford, Phil | Labour | 0.375 | 0.692 | 1.067 | 0.534 | 76 |
| Upston, Louise | National | 1.000 | 0.974 | 1.974 | 0.987 | 107 |
| van de Molen, Tim | National | 0.375 | 0.308 | 0.683 | 0.341 | 71 |
| Wagner, Nicky | National | 0.625 | 0.772 | 1.397 | 0.698 | 80 |
| Walker, Hamish | National | 0.714 | 0.948 | 1.663 | 0.831 | 90 |
| Wall, Louisa | Labour | 0.000 | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.026 | 34 |
| Warren-Clark, Angie | Labour | 0.000 | 0.026 | 0.026 | 0.013 | 12 |
| Webb, Duncan | Labour | 0.000 | 0.017 | 0.017 | 0.009 | 9 |
| Whaitiri, Meka | Labour | 0.625 | 0.819 | 1.444 | 0.722 | 82 |
| Williams, Poto | Labour | 0.375 | 0.612 | 0.987 | 0.494 | 74 |
| Willis, Nicola | National | 0.000 | 0.060 | 0.060 | 0.030 | 36 |
| Wood, Michael | Labour | 0.250 | 0.667 | 0.917 | 0.458 | 73 |
| Woodhouse, Michael | National | 1.000 | 0.886 | 1.886 | 0.943 | 105 |
| Woods, Megan | Labour | 0.000 | 0.026 | 0.026 | 0.013 | 21 |
| Yang, Jian | National | 0.286 | 0.034 | 0.320 | 0.160 | 54 |
| Young, Jonathan | National | 1.000 | 0.991 | 1.991 | 0.995 | 108 |
| Yule, Lawrence | National | 0.750 | 0.887 | 1.637 | 0.818 | 89 |

Source: Author's calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

Appendix Table A.10: Difference in Unweighted Ideology Scores and Weighted Ideology Scores for MPs present in the 52nd Parliament

| Member | Party | Unweighted Score | Weighted Score | Difference (Weighted-Unweighted) | Unweighted Rank | Weighted Rank | Difference |
|--------------------------------|-------------------|------------------|----------------|----------------------------------|-----------------|---------------|------------|
| Adams, Amy | National | 0.048 | 0.142 | 0.094 | 40 | 47 | 7 |
| Allan, Kiri | Labour | 0.072 | 0.097 | 0.025 | 52 | 42 | -10 |
| Andersen, Ginny | Labour | 0.024 | 0.013 | -0.011 | 21 | 21 | 0 |
| Ardern, Jacinda | Labour | 0.032 | 0.017 | -0.015 | 31 | 29 | -2 |
| Bakshi, Kanwaljit Singh | National | 0.992 | 0.996 | 0.004 | 113 | 112 | -1 |
| Ball, Darroch | New Zealand First | 0.096 | 0.168 | 0.072 | 56 | 55 | -1 |
| Barry, Maggie | National | 0.976 | 0.929 | -0.047 | 102 | 100 | -2 |
| Bayly, Andrew | National | 0.784 | 0.768 | -0.016 | 81 | 86 | 5 |
| Bennett, David | National | 0.878 | 0.760 | -0.118 | 92 | 85 | -7 |
| Bennett, Paula | National | 0.049 | 0.093 | 0.044 | 45 | 41 | -4 |
| Bidois, Dan | National | 0.752 | 0.584 | -0.168 | 78 | 77 | -1 |
| Bishop, Chris | National | 0.049 | 0.142 | 0.094 | 45 | 49 | 4 |
| Bridges, Simon | National | 0.960 | 0.920 | -0.039 | 98 | 99 | 1 |
| Brown, Simeon | National | 0.992 | 0.996 | 0.004 | 113 | 112 | -1 |
| Brownlee, Gerry | National | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.000 | 120 | 120 | 0 |
| Carter, David | National | 0.800 | 0.718 | -0.082 | 82 | 81 | -1 |
| Clark, David | Labour | 0.661 | 0.528 | -0.133 | 75 | 75 | 0 |
| Coffey, Tāmati | Labour | 0.048 | 0.026 | -0.022 | 40 | 34 | -6 |
| Coleman, Jonathan | National | 0.500 | 0.333 | -0.167 | 72 | 70 | -2 |
| Collins, Judith | National | 0.038 | 0.193 | 0.155 | 35 | 64 | 29 |
| Craig, Liz | Labour | 0.024 | 0.013 | -0.011 | 12 | 12 | 0 |
| Curran, Clare | Labour | 0.024 | 0.013 | -0.011 | 12 | 12 | 0 |

| | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|-------------------|-------|-------|--------|-----|-----|-----|
| Davidson, Marama | Green | 0.008 | 0.004 | -0.004 | 8 | 8 | 0 |
| Davis, Kelvin | Labour | 0.032 | 0.017 | -0.015 | 27 | 27 | 0 |
| Dean, Jacqui | National | 0.992 | 0.996 | 0.004 | 113 | 112 | -1 |
| Doocey, Matthew | National | 0.064 | 0.151 | 0.087 | 49 | 51 | 2 |
| Dowie, Sarah | National | 0.984 | 0.933 | -0.051 | 103 | 101 | -2 |
| Dyson, Ruth | Labour | 0.016 | 0.009 | -0.008 | 11 | 11 | 0 |
| Eagle, Paul | Labour | 0.024 | 0.013 | -0.011 | 21 | 21 | 0 |
| English, Bill | National | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.000 | 120 | 120 | 0 |
| Faafai, Kris | Labour | 0.032 | 0.017 | -0.015 | 31 | 29 | -2 |
| Falloon, Andrew | National | 0.080 | 0.159 | 0.079 | 53 | 53 | 0 |
| Finlayson, Chris | National | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.000 | 120 | 120 | 0 |
| Garcia, Paulo | National | 0.976 | 0.908 | -0.067 | 101 | 96 | -5 |
| Genter, Julie Anne | Green | 0.008 | 0.004 | -0.004 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Ghahraman, Golriz | Green | 0.008 | 0.004 | -0.004 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Goldsmith, Paul | National | 0.829 | 0.851 | 0.021 | 90 | 94 | 4 |
| Guy, Nathan | National | 0.935 | 0.849 | -0.086 | 95 | 93 | -2 |
| Hayes, Jo | National | 0.992 | 0.996 | 0.004 | 113 | 112 | -1 |
| Henare, Peeni | Labour | 0.032 | 0.075 | 0.043 | 31 | 39 | 8 |
| Hipango, Harete | National | 0.984 | 0.933 | -0.051 | 107 | 104 | -3 |
| Hipkins, Chris | Labour | 0.024 | 0.013 | -0.011 | 12 | 12 | 0 |
| Hudson, Brett | National | 0.112 | 0.176 | 0.064 | 64 | 62 | -2 |
| Hughes, Gareth | Green | 0.008 | 0.004 | -0.004 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Huo, Raymond | Labour | 0.024 | 0.013 | -0.011 | 12 | 12 | 0 |
| Jackson, Willie | Labour | 0.065 | 0.093 | 0.028 | 51 | 40 | -11 |
| Jones, Shane | New Zealand First | 0.097 | 0.168 | 0.071 | 61 | 59 | -2 |
| Joyce, Steven | National | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.000 | 120 | 120 | 0 |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|-------------------------|-------|-------|--------|-----|-----|-----|
| Kanongata'a -Suisuiki, Anahila | Labour | 0.831 | 0.851 | 0.021 | 91 | 95 | 4 |
| Kaye, Nikki | National | 0.040 | 0.138 | 0.098 | 36 | 45 | 9 |
| King, Matt | National | 0.210 | 0.287 | 0.077 | 69 | 69 | 0 |
| Korako, Nuk | National | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.000 | 120 | 120 | 0 |
| Kuriger, Barbara | National | 0.056 | 0.146 | 0.090 | 47 | 50 | 3 |
| Lee, Denise | National | 0.800 | 0.835 | 0.035 | 82 | 91 | 9 |
| Lee, Melissa | National | 0.992 | 0.996 | 0.004 | 110 | 109 | -1 |
| Lees- Galloway, Ian | Labour | 0.024 | 0.013 | -0.011 | 12 | 12 | 0 |
| Little, Andrew | Labour | 0.024 | 0.013 | -0.011 | 12 | 12 | 0 |
| Logie, Jan | Green | 0.008 | 0.004 | -0.004 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Loheni, Agnes | National | 0.984 | 0.912 | -0.071 | 103 | 98 | -5 |
| Lubeck, Marja | Labour | 0.016 | 0.009 | -0.007 | 9 | 9 | 0 |
| Luxton, Jo | Labour | 0.025 | 0.013 | -0.011 | 26 | 26 | 0 |
| Macindoe, Tim | National | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.000 | 120 | 120 | 0 |
| Mahuta, Nanaia | Labour | 0.203 | 0.225 | 0.022 | 68 | 67 | -1 |
| Mallard, Trevor | Labour | 0.032 | 0.017 | -0.015 | 27 | 27 | 0 |
| Marcroft, Jenny | New Zealand First | 0.080 | 0.101 | 0.021 | 53 | 43 | -10 |
| Mark, Ron | New Zealand First | 0.096 | 0.168 | 0.072 | 56 | 55 | -1 |
| Martin, Tracey | New Zealand First | 0.080 | 0.101 | 0.021 | 53 | 43 | -10 |
| McAnulty, Kieran | Labour | 0.040 | 0.021 | -0.019 | 36 | 32 | -4 |
| McClay, Todd | National | 0.942 | 0.911 | -0.031 | 97 | 97 | 0 |
| McKelvie, Ian | National | 0.824 | 0.790 | -0.034 | 86 | 87 | 1 |

| | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|-------------------|-------|-------|--------|-----|-----|----|
| Mitchell, Clayton | New Zealand First | 0.097 | 0.168 | 0.071 | 61 | 59 | -2 |
| Mitchell, Mark | National | 0.161 | 0.203 | 0.041 | 67 | 66 | -1 |
| Muller, Todd | National | 0.984 | 0.933 | -0.051 | 105 | 102 | -3 |
| Nash, Stuart | Labour | 0.032 | 0.075 | 0.043 | 27 | 37 | 10 |
| Ngaro, Alfred | National | 0.992 | 0.996 | 0.004 | 110 | 112 | 2 |
| O'Connor, Damien | Labour | 0.757 | 0.696 | -0.061 | 79 | 79 | 0 |
| O'Connor, Greg | Labour | 0.096 | 0.226 | 0.130 | 56 | 68 | 12 |
| O'Connor, Simon | National | 0.992 | 0.996 | 0.004 | 113 | 112 | -1 |
| Parker, David | Labour | 0.040 | 0.022 | -0.019 | 39 | 33 | -6 |
| Parmar, Parmjeet | National | 0.992 | 0.996 | 0.004 | 110 | 109 | -1 |
| Patterson, Mark | New Zealand First | 0.096 | 0.168 | 0.072 | 56 | 55 | -1 |
| Penk Chris | National | 0.992 | 0.996 | 0.004 | 113 | 112 | -1 |
| Peters, Winston | New Zealand First | 0.097 | 0.168 | 0.071 | 61 | 59 | -2 |
| Prime, Willow-Jean | Labour | 0.024 | 0.013 | -0.011 | 21 | 21 | 0 |
| Pugh, Maureen | National | 0.992 | 0.996 | 0.004 | 109 | 109 | 0 |
| Radhakrishnan, Priyanca | Labour | 0.024 | 0.013 | -0.011 | 25 | 25 | 0 |
| Reti, Shane | National | 0.975 | 0.987 | 0.012 | 99 | 106 | 7 |
| Robertson, Grant | Labour | 0.024 | 0.013 | -0.011 | 12 | 12 | 0 |
| Ross, Jami-Lee | National | 0.040 | 0.138 | 0.098 | 36 | 45 | 9 |
| Rurawhe, Adrian | Labour | 0.808 | 0.723 | -0.085 | 85 | 83 | -2 |
| Russell, Deborah | Labour | 0.112 | 0.176 | 0.064 | 64 | 62 | -2 |
| Sage, Eugenie | Green | 0.008 | 0.004 | -0.004 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Salesa, Jenny | Labour | 0.824 | 0.848 | 0.024 | 86 | 92 | 6 |

| | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|-------------------|-------|-------|--------|-----|-----|----|
| Scott, Alastair | National | 0.984 | 0.933 | -0.051 | 105 | 102 | -3 |
| Sepuloni, Carmel | Labour | 0.032 | 0.017 | -0.015 | 31 | 29 | -2 |
| Seymour, David | ACT | 0.032 | 0.075 | 0.043 | 27 | 37 | 10 |
| Shaw, James | Green | 0.008 | 0.004 | -0.004 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Simpson, Scott | National | 0.064 | 0.151 | 0.087 | 49 | 51 | 2 |
| Sio, William | Labour | 0.339 | 0.356 | 0.017 | 71 | 72 | 1 |
| Smith, Nick | National | 0.992 | 0.996 | 0.004 | 113 | 112 | -1 |
| Smith, Stuart | National | 0.123 | 0.199 | 0.076 | 66 | 65 | -1 |
| Stanford, Erica | National | 0.048 | 0.142 | 0.094 | 40 | 47 | 7 |
| Strange, Jamie | Labour | 0.824 | 0.731 | -0.093 | 86 | 84 | -2 |
| Swarbrick, Chloe | Green | 0.008 | 0.004 | -0.004 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Tabuteau, Fletcher | New Zealand First | 0.096 | 0.168 | 0.072 | 56 | 55 | -1 |
| Tinetti, Jan | Labour | 0.024 | 0.013 | -0.011 | 12 | 12 | 0 |
| Tirikatene, Rino | Labour | 0.824 | 0.790 | -0.034 | 86 | 87 | 1 |
| Tolley, Anne | National | 0.744 | 0.630 | -0.114 | 77 | 78 | 1 |
| Twyford, Phil | Labour | 0.672 | 0.534 | -0.138 | 76 | 76 | 0 |
| Upston, Louise | National | 0.975 | 0.987 | 0.011 | 100 | 107 | 7 |
| van de Molen, Tim | National | 0.312 | 0.341 | 0.029 | 70 | 71 | 1 |
| Wagner, Nicky | National | 0.762 | 0.698 | -0.064 | 80 | 80 | 0 |
| Walker, Hamish | National | 0.935 | 0.831 | -0.104 | 95 | 90 | -5 |
| Wall, Louisa | Labour | 0.048 | 0.026 | -0.022 | 40 | 34 | -6 |
| Warren-Clark, Angie | Labour | 0.024 | 0.013 | -0.011 | 12 | 12 | 0 |
| Webb, Duncan | Labour | 0.016 | 0.009 | -0.007 | 9 | 9 | 0 |
| Whaitiri, Meka | Labour | 0.806 | 0.722 | -0.084 | 84 | 82 | -2 |
| Williams, Poto | Labour | 0.597 | 0.494 | -0.103 | 73 | 74 | 1 |

| | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|----------|-------|-------|--------|-----|-----|-----|
| Willis, Nicola | National | 0.057 | 0.030 | -0.027 | 48 | 36 | -12 |
| Wood, Michael | Labour | 0.639 | 0.458 | -0.181 | 74 | 73 | -1 |
| Woodhouse, Michael | National | 0.893 | 0.943 | 0.050 | 94 | 105 | 11 |
| Woods, Megan | Labour | 0.024 | 0.013 | -0.011 | 21 | 21 | 0 |
| Yang, Jian | National | 0.048 | 0.160 | 0.112 | 44 | 54 | 10 |
| Young, Jonathan | National | 0.992 | 0.995 | 0.004 | 108 | 108 | 0 |
| Yule, Lawrence | National | 0.878 | 0.818 | -0.060 | 92 | 89 | -3 |

Source: Author's calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

Appendix Table A.11: Weighted Ideology Score by Party in the 52nd Parliament

| Party | Average | Standard Deviation | Variation | Median |
|-------------------|---------|--------------------|-----------|--------|
| National | 0.683 | 0.359 | 0.129 | 0.851 |
| Labour | 0.198 | 0.285 | 0.081 | 0.019 |
| Green | 0.004 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.004 |
| New Zealand First | 0.153 | 0.030 | 0.001 | 0.168 |
| ACT | 0.075 | N/A | N/A | 0.075 |

Source: Author's calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

Appendix Table A.12: Weighted Ideology Score by Electorate Urbanization Level in the 52nd Parliament

| Urbanization Level | Average | Standard Deviation | Variation | Median |
|--------------------|---------|--------------------|-----------|--------|
| Major Urban Center | 0.317 | 0.350 | 0.123 | 0.142 |
| Māori | 0.368 | 0.359 | 0.129 | 0.225 |
| Medium-Size City | 0.662 | 0.406 | 0.165 | 0.916 |
| Rural | 0.590 | 0.345 | 0.119 | 0.732 |

Source: Author's calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

Appendix Table A.13: Weighted Ideology Score by Type of MP in the 52nd Parliament

| Type of MP | Average | Standard Deviation | Variation | Median |
|------------|---------|--------------------|-----------|--------|
| List | 0.354 | 0.420 | 0.176 | 0.160 |
| Electorate | 0.465 | 0.384 | 0.147 | 0.348 |

Source: Author's calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

Appendix Table A.14: Weighted Ideology Score by Type of MP (National Party/Labour Party) in the 52nd Parliament

| Type of MP | Average | Standard Deviation | Variation | Median |
|---------------------|---------|--------------------|-----------|--------|
| National List | 0.809 | 0.320 | 0.102 | 0.996 |
| Labour List | 0.115 | 0.257 | 0.066 | 0.013 |
| National Electorate | 0.625 | 0.364 | 0.132 | 0.804 |
| Labour Electorate | 0.246 | 0.293 | 0.086 | 0.075 |

Source: Author's calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

Appendix Table A.15: Weighted Ideology Score by Electorate-Based Island in the 52nd Parliament

| Island | Average | Standard Deviation | Variation | Median |
|--------|---------|--------------------|-----------|--------|
| North | 0.464 | 0.382 | 0.146 | 0.341 |
| South | 0.468 | 0.400 | 0.160 | 0.494 |

Source: Author's calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

Appendix Table A.16: Weighted Ideology Score by Government/Opposition in the 52nd Parliament

| Govt. | Average | Standard Deviation | Variation | Median |
|--------------|---------|--------------------|-----------|--------|
| Minister | 0.172 | 0.239 | 0.057 | 0.075 |
| Non-Minister | 0.167 | 0.264 | 0.070 | 0.015 |
| Government | 0.167 | 0.251 | 0.063 | 0.021 |
| Opposition | 0.673 | 0.364 | 0.132 | 0.850 |

Source: Author's calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

Appendix Table A.17: Bills used in Operationalized Votes Dataset

| Name of Bill | Type of Bill | Number of Total Votes | Date of First Vote | Date of Last Vote |
|--|---------------|-----------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| Abortion Legislation Bill | Abortion | 35 | 8/8/19 | 3/18/20 |
| Appointment---Abortion Supervisory Committee | Abortion | 1 | 8/30/01 | 8/30/01 |
| Civil Union Bill | LGBT Rights | 53 | 6/24/04 | 12/9/04 |
| Crimes (Abolition of Force as a Justification for Child Discipline) Amendment Bill | Child Welfare | 3 | 7/27/05 | 2/21/07 |
| Crimes (Substituted Section 59) Amendment Bill | Child Welfare | 11 | 3/14/07 | 5/16/07 |
| Death with Dignity Bill | Euthanasia | 1 | 7/30/03 | 7/30/03 |
| End of Life Choice Bill | Euthanasia | 88 | 12/13/17 | 11/13/19 |
| Government notice of motion No 5— appointment of Chairperson and | Abortion | 1 | 4/7/11 | 4/7/11 |

| | | | | |
|--|--------------|-----|----------|----------|
| members of Abortion Supervisory Committee | | | | |
| Government notice of motion No 1— Chairman and members of Abortion Supervisory Committee | Abortion | 3 | 7/12/07 | 7/12/07 |
| Manukau City Council (Control of Street Prostitution) Bill | Prostitution | 1 | 10/11/06 | 10/11/06 |
| Manukau City Council (Regulation of Prostitution in Specified Places) Bill | Prostitution | 1 | 10/8/10 | 10/8/10 |
| Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Bill | LGBT Rights | 10 | 8/29/12 | 4/17/13 |
| Matrimonial Property Amendment Bill | LGBT Rights | 6 | 5/4/00 | 11/14/00 |
| Misuse of Drugs (Medicinal Cannabis and Other Matters) Amendment Bill | Cannabis | 1 | 1/31/18 | 1/31/18 |
| Misuse of Drugs (Medicinal Cannabis) Amendment Bill | Cannabis | 1 | 7/1/09 | 7/1/09 |
| Property (Relationships) Amendment Bill | LGBT Rights | 38 | 11/21/00 | 3/13/01 |
| Prostitution Reform Bill | Prostitution | 21 | 11/8/00 | 6/25/03 |
| Relationships (Statutory References) Bill | LGBT Rights | 13 | 6/29/04 | 3/9/05 |
| Total | | 288 | | |

Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

Appendix Table A.18: Breakdown of Operationalized Ideology Scores of Individual MPs

| Member | Party | Total Scores | Votes Missed | Votes Attended | Score | Rank |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------|--------------|----------------|-------|------|
| Adams, Amy | National | 10 | 154 | 134 | 0.075 | 123 |
| Adams, Paul | United Future | 82 | 200 | 88 | 0.932 | 267 |
| Alexander, Marc | United Future | 77 | 200 | 88 | 0.875 | 250 |
| Allan, Kiri | Labour | 9 | 164 | 124 | 0.073 | 119 |
| Anae, Arthur | National | 44 | 243 | 45 | 0.978 | 294 |
| Andersen, Ginny | Labour | 3 | 165 | 123 | 0.024 | 56 |
| Anderton, Jim | Jim Anderton's Progressive Party | 15 | 141 | 147 | 0.102 | 138 |
| Ardern, Jacinda | Labour | 4 | 153 | 135 | 0.030 | 71 |
| Ardern, Shane | National | 108 | 134 | 154 | 0.701 | 202 |
| Auchinvole, Chris | National | 15 | 258 | 30 | 0.500 | 175 |
| Awatere Huata, Donna | ACT | 63 | 221 | 67 | 0.940 | 280 |

| | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|-------------------|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|
| Bakshi, Kanwaljit Singh | National | 134 | 153 | 135 | 0.993 | 309 |
| Baldock, Larry | United Future | 83 | 201 | 87 | 0.954 | 285 |
| Ball, Darroch | New Zealand First | 12 | 164 | 124 | 0.097 | 132 |
| Banks, John | ACT | 1 | 279 | 9 | 0.111 | 140 |
| Barker, Rick | Labour | 6 | 136 | 152 | 0.039 | 98 |
| Barnett, Tim | Labour | 4 | 138 | 150 | 0.027 | 63 |
| Barry, Maggie | National | 124 | 155 | 133 | 0.932 | 270 |
| Bayly, Andrew | National | 97 | 164 | 124 | 0.782 | 217 |
| Beaumont, Carol | Labour | 0 | 276 | 12 | 0.000 | 1 |
| Bennett, David | National | 128 | 137 | 151 | 0.848 | 240 |
| Bennett, Paula | National | 19 | 136 | 152 | 0.125 | 147 |
| Benson-Pope, David | Labour | 4 | 139 | 149 | 0.027 | 66 |
| Beyer, Georgina | Labour | 4 | 153 | 135 | 0.030 | 71 |
| Bidois, Dan | National | 91 | 167 | 121 | 0.752 | 212 |
| Bishop, Chris | National | 5 | 166 | 122 | 0.041 | 102 |
| Blue, Jackie | National | 13 | 259 | 29 | 0.448 | 171 |
| Blumsky, Mark | National | 12 | 271 | 17 | 0.706 | 204 |
| Borrows, Chester | National | 23 | 258 | 30 | 0.767 | 215 |
| Boscawen, John | ACT | 1 | 285 | 3 | 0.333 | 162 |
| Bradford, Max | National | 42 | 243 | 45 | 0.933 | 272 |
| Bradford, Sue | Green | 2 | 136 | 152 | 0.013 | 35 |
| Brash, Don | National | 67 | 201 | 87 | 0.770 | 216 |
| Braybrooke, Geoff | Labour | 7 | 242 | 46 | 0.152 | 151 |
| Bridges, Simon | National | 125 | 157 | 131 | 0.954 | 286 |
| Brown, Peter | New Zealand First | 133 | 137 | 151 | 0.881 | 252 |
| Brown, Simeon | National | 123 | 164 | 124 | 0.992 | 304 |
| Browning, Steffan | Green | 0 | 278 | 10 | 0.000 | 1 |
| Brownlee, Gerry | National | 233 | 8 | 280 | 0.832 | 234 |
| Bunkle, Phillida | Alliance | 0 | 244 | 44 | 0.000 | 1 |
| Burns, Brendon | Labour | 0 | 286 | 2 | 0.000 | 1 |
| Burton, Mark | Labour | 4 | 139 | 149 | 0.027 | 66 |

| | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|-------------------|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|
| Calder, Cam | National | 2 | 275 | 13 | 0.154 | 152 |
| Calvert, Hilary | ACT | 0 | 286 | 2 | 0.000 | 1 |
| Campbell, Kevin | Alliance | 0 | 242 | 46 | 0.000 | 1 |
| Carter, Chris | Labour | 5 | 139 | 149 | 0.034 | 88 |
| Carter, David | National | 235 | 2 | 286 | 0.822 | 231 |
| Carter, John | National | 143 | 137 | 151 | 0.947 | 283 |
| Catchpole, Brent | New Zealand First | 75 | 200 | 88 | 0.852 | 241 |
| Chadwick, Steve | Labour | 4 | 135 | 153 | 0.026 | 62 |
| Chauvel, Charles | Labour | 0 | 267 | 21 | 0.000 | 1 |
| Choudhary, Ashraf | Labour | 16 | 185 | 103 | 0.155 | 153 |
| Clark, David | Labour | 82 | 155 | 133 | 0.617 | 192 |
| Clark, Helen | Labour | 4 | 138 | 150 | 0.027 | 63 |
| Clarkson, Bob | National | 13 | 271 | 17 | 0.765 | 214 |
| Clendon, David | Green | 1 | 276 | 12 | 0.083 | 129 |
| Coddington, Deborah | ACT | 50 | 212 | 76 | 0.658 | 197 |
| Coffey, Tāmāti | Labour | 6 | 164 | 124 | 0.048 | 111 |
| Coleman, Jonathan | National | 20 | 260 | 28 | 0.714 | 207 |
| Collins, Judith | National | 92 | 73 | 215 | 0.428 | 168 |
| Connell, Brian | National | 88 | 192 | 96 | 0.917 | 266 |
| Copeland, Gordon | United Future | 97 | 185 | 103 | 0.942 | 281 |
| Cosgrove, Clayton | Labour | 31 | 124 | 164 | 0.189 | 155 |
| Craig, Liz | Labour | 3 | 164 | 124 | 0.024 | 52 |
| Creech, Wyatt | National | 42 | 243 | 45 | 0.933 | 272 |
| Cullen, Michael | Labour | 5 | 137 | 151 | 0.033 | 82 |
| Cunliffe, David | Labour | 5 | 124 | 164 | 0.030 | 77 |
| Curran, Clare | Labour | 4 | 152 | 136 | 0.029 | 70 |
| Dalziel, Lianne | Labour | 6 | 126 | 162 | 0.037 | 92 |
| Davidson, Marama | Green | 1 | 165 | 123 | 0.008 | 33 |
| Davis, Kelvin | Labour | 6 | 161 | 127 | 0.047 | 107 |
| Dean, Jacqui | National | 140 | 138 | 150 | 0.933 | 272 |

| | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|-------------------|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|
| Delahunty, Catherine | Green | 0 | 275 | 13 | 0.000 | 1 |
| Donald, Rod | Green | 2 | 154 | 134 | 0.015 | 38 |
| Donnelly, Brian | New Zealand First | 76 | 140 | 148 | 0.514 | 178 |
| Doocey, Matthew | National | 7 | 164 | 124 | 0.056 | 116 |
| Douglas, Roger | ACT | 1 | 286 | 2 | 0.500 | 175 |
| Dowie, Sarah | National | 120 | 166 | 122 | 0.984 | 296 |
| Duncan, Helen | Labour | 4 | 155 | 133 | 0.030 | 75 |
| Dunne, Peter | United Future | 115 | 129 | 159 | 0.723 | 208 |
| Duynhoven, Harry | Labour | 34 | 139 | 149 | 0.228 | 158 |
| Dyson, Ruth | Labour | 7 | 2 | 286 | 0.024 | 59 |
| Eagle, Paul | Labour | 3 | 165 | 123 | 0.024 | 56 |
| Eckhoff, Gerry | ACT | 112 | 165 | 123 | 0.911 | 260 |
| English, Bill | National | 146 | 128 | 160 | 0.913 | 264 |
| Ewen-Street, Ian | Green | 2 | 154 | 134 | 0.015 | 38 |
| Faafoi, Kris | Labour | 4 | 154 | 134 | 0.030 | 74 |
| Fairbrother, Russell | Labour | 4 | 184 | 104 | 0.038 | 96 |
| Falloon, Andrew | National | 9 | 164 | 124 | 0.073 | 119 |
| Fenton, Darien | Labour | 0 | 258 | 30 | 0.000 | 1 |
| Field, Taito Phillip | Labour | 83 | 149 | 139 | 0.597 | 183 |
| Finlayson, Chris | National | 24 | 256 | 32 | 0.750 | 209 |
| Fitzsimons, Jeanette | Green | 2 | 136 | 152 | 0.013 | 35 |
| Flavell, Te Ururoa | Māori Party | 3 | 258 | 30 | 0.100 | 137 |
| Foss, Craig | National | 15 | 259 | 29 | 0.517 | 179 |
| Franks, Stephen | ACT | 124 | 155 | 133 | 0.932 | 270 |
| Gallagher, Martin | Labour | 11 | 145 | 143 | 0.077 | 125 |
| Garcia, Paulo | National | 120 | 165 | 123 | 0.976 | 292 |
| Garrett, David | ACT | 1 | 285 | 3 | 0.333 | 162 |
| Genter, Julie Anne | Green | 1 | 154 | 134 | 0.007 | 27 |
| Ghahraman, Golriz | Green | 1 | 164 | 124 | 0.008 | 30 |
| Gillon, Grant | Alliance | 0 | 242 | 46 | 0.000 | 1 |
| Gilmore, Aaron | National | 6 | 279 | 9 | 0.667 | 198 |

| | | | | | | |
|-------------------------|-------------------|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|
| Goff, Phil | Labour | 6 | 126 | 162 | 0.037 | 92 |
| Goldsmith, Paul | National | 104 | 158 | 130 | 0.800 | 223 |
| Goodhew, Jo | National | 18 | 258 | 30 | 0.600 | 184 |
| Gordon, Liz | Alliance | 0 | 242 | 46 | 0.000 | 1 |
| Gosche, Mark | Labour | 5 | 138 | 150 | 0.033 | 85 |
| Goudie, Sandra | National | 62 | 181 | 107 | 0.579 | 182 |
| Graham, Kennedy | Green | 1 | 275 | 13 | 0.077 | 125 |
| Groser, Tim | National | 15 | 265 | 23 | 0.652 | 196 |
| Gudgeon, Bill | New Zealand First | 76 | 200 | 88 | 0.864 | 245 |
| Guy, Nathan | National | 135 | 137 | 151 | 0.894 | 256 |
| Hague, Kevin | Green | 0 | 275 | 13 | 0.000 | 1 |
| Harawira, Hone | Mana Party | 1 | 258 | 30 | 0.033 | 85 |
| Harré, Laila | Alliance | 0 | 242 | 46 | 0.000 | 1 |
| Hartley, Ann | Labour | 5 | 137 | 151 | 0.033 | 82 |
| Hasler, Marie | National | 41 | 243 | 45 | 0.911 | 261 |
| Hauti, Claudette | National | 0 | 278 | 10 | 0.000 | 1 |
| Hawke, Joe | Labour | 1 | 243 | 45 | 0.022 | 48 |
| Hawkins, George | Labour | 7 | 136 | 152 | 0.046 | 106 |
| Hayes, Jo | National | 123 | 164 | 124 | 0.992 | 304 |
| Hayes, John | National | 22 | 260 | 28 | 0.786 | 219 |
| Heatley, Phil | National | 145 | 126 | 162 | 0.895 | 257 |
| Henare, Peeni | Labour | 4 | 165 | 123 | 0.033 | 80 |
| Henare, Tau | National | 15 | 258 | 30 | 0.500 | 175 |
| Hereora, Dave | Labour | 4 | 186 | 102 | 0.039 | 97 |
| Herlihy, Gavan | National | 45 | 243 | 45 | 1.000 | 311 |
| Hide, Rodney | ACT | 65 | 140 | 148 | 0.439 | 170 |
| Hipango, Harete | National | 122 | 164 | 124 | 0.984 | 300 |
| Hipkins, Chris | Labour | 3 | 152 | 136 | 0.022 | 47 |
| Hobbs, Marian | Labour | 4 | 138 | 150 | 0.027 | 63 |
| Hodgson, Pete | Labour | 5 | 135 | 153 | 0.033 | 81 |
| Horan, Brendan | New Zealand First | 9 | 278 | 10 | 0.900 | 259 |

| | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|
| Horomia, Parekura | Labour | 6 | 124 | 164 | 0.037 | 91 |
| Hudson, Brett | National | 13 | 164 | 124 | 0.105 | 139 |
| Hughes, Darren | Labour | 6 | 181 | 107 | 0.056 | 115 |
| Hughes, Gareth | Green | 1 | 152 | 136 | 0.007 | 26 |
| Hunt, Jonathan | Labour | 4 | 155 | 133 | 0.030 | 75 |
| Huo, Raymond | Labour | 5 | 153 | 135 | 0.037 | 92 |
| Hutchison, Paul | National | 129 | 133 | 155 | 0.832 | 235 |
| Jackson, Willie | Labour | 8 | 119 | 169 | 0.047 | 109 |
| Jennings, Owen | ACT | 44 | 242 | 46 | 0.957 | 288 |
| Jones, Dail | New Zealand First | 76 | 201 | 87 | 0.874 | 248 |
| Jones, Shane | New Zealand First | 13 | 136 | 152 | 0.086 | 130 |
| Joyce, Steven | National | 5 | 273 | 15 | 0.333 | 162 |
| Kanongata'a-Suisuiki, Anahila | Labour | 103 | 165 | 123 | 0.837 | 237 |
| Katene, Rahui | Māori Party | 2 | 285 | 3 | 0.667 | 198 |
| Kaye, Nikki | National | 6 | 152 | 136 | 0.044 | 103 |
| Keall, Judy | Labour | 0 | 242 | 46 | 0.000 | 1 |
| Kedgley, Sue | Green | 3 | 135 | 153 | 0.020 | 44 |
| Kelly, Graham | Labour | 2 | 157 | 131 | 0.015 | 40 |
| Key, John | National | 80 | 172 | 116 | 0.690 | 201 |
| Kidd, Doug | National | 41 | 244 | 44 | 0.932 | 267 |
| King, Annette | Labour | 5 | 124 | 164 | 0.030 | 77 |
| King, Colin | National | 22 | 259 | 29 | 0.759 | 213 |
| King, Matt | National | 25 | 165 | 123 | 0.203 | 156 |
| Korako, Nuk | National | 3 | 285 | 3 | 1.000 | 311 |
| Kuriger, Barbara | National | 6 | 164 | 124 | 0.048 | 111 |
| Kyd, Warren | National | 40 | 247 | 41 | 0.976 | 292 |
| Laban, Winnie | Labour | 11 | 137 | 151 | 0.073 | 121 |
| Lee, Denise | National | 99 | 164 | 124 | 0.798 | 222 |
| Lee, Melissa | National | 135 | 152 | 136 | 0.993 | 310 |
| Lee, Sandra | Alliance | 0 | 242 | 46 | 0.000 | 1 |
| Lees-Galloway, Ian | Labour | 3 | 151 | 137 | 0.022 | 45 |

| | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|-------------------|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|
| Little, Andrew | Labour | 3 | 154 | 134 | 0.022 | 49 |
| Locke, Keith | Green | 2 | 134 | 154 | 0.013 | 34 |
| Logie, Jan | Green | 1 | 154 | 134 | 0.007 | 27 |
| Loheni, Agnes | National | 121 | 165 | 123 | 0.984 | 297 |
| Lotu-Iiga, Pesata Sam | National | 13 | 275 | 13 | 1.000 | 311 |
| Lubeck, Marja | Labour | 2 | 164 | 124 | 0.016 | 41 |
| Luxton, Jo | Labour | 3 | 167 | 121 | 0.025 | 61 |
| Luxton, John | National | 43 | 242 | 46 | 0.935 | 276 |
| Macindoe, Tim | National | 132 | 156 | 132 | 1.000 | 311 |
| Mackey, Janet | Labour | 16 | 157 | 131 | 0.122 | 146 |
| Mackey, Moana | Labour | 4 | 190 | 98 | 0.041 | 101 |
| Maharey, Steve | Labour | 5 | 138 | 150 | 0.033 | 85 |
| Mahuta, Nanaia | Labour | 42 | 4 | 284 | 0.148 | 150 |
| Mallard, Trevor | Labour | 10 | 3 | 285 | 0.035 | 90 |
| Mapp, Wayne | National | 124 | 135 | 153 | 0.810 | 225 |
| Marcroft, Jenny | New Zealand First | 10 | 164 | 124 | 0.081 | 128 |
| Mark, Ron | New Zealand First | 107 | 14 | 274 | 0.391 | 166 |
| Martin, Tracey | New Zealand First | 16 | 154 | 134 | 0.119 | 145 |
| Mathers, Mojo | Green | 0 | 278 | 10 | 0.000 | 1 |
| McAnulty, Kieran | Labour | 5 | 164 | 124 | 0.040 | 99 |
| McClay, Todd | National | 126 | 155 | 133 | 0.947 | 284 |
| McCully, Murray | National | 88 | 144 | 144 | 0.611 | 191 |
| McKelvie, Ian | National | 109 | 154 | 134 | 0.813 | 228 |
| McNair, Craig | New Zealand First | 76 | 201 | 87 | 0.874 | 248 |
| Mitchell, Clayton | New Zealand First | 12 | 165 | 123 | 0.098 | 136 |
| Mitchell, Mark | National | 28 | 155 | 133 | 0.211 | 157 |
| Moroney, Sue | Labour | 0 | 259 | 29 | 0.000 | 1 |
| Muller, Todd | National | 121 | 165 | 123 | 0.984 | 297 |
| Nash, Stuart | Labour | 6 | 161 | 127 | 0.047 | 107 |
| Neeson, Brian | National | 41 | 247 | 41 | 1.000 | 311 |
| Neill, Alec | National | 34 | 254 | 34 | 1.000 | 311 |

| | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|-------------------|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|
| Newman, Muriel | ACT | 122 | 158 | 130 | 0.938 | 279 |
| Ngaro, Alfred | National | 132 | 155 | 133 | 0.992 | 308 |
| Norman, Russel | Green | 0 | 276 | 12 | 0.000 | 1 |
| O'Connor, Damien | Labour | 118 | 19 | 269 | 0.439 | 169 |
| O'Connor, Greg | Labour | 12 | 164 | 124 | 0.097 | 132 |
| O'Connor, Simon | National | 131 | 155 | 133 | 0.985 | 301 |
| O'Rourke, Denis | New Zealand First | 6 | 278 | 10 | 0.600 | 184 |
| Ogilvy, Bernie | United Future | 82 | 200 | 88 | 0.932 | 267 |
| Okeroa, Mahera | Labour | 4 | 140 | 148 | 0.027 | 68 |
| Paraone, Pita | New Zealand First | 88 | 184 | 104 | 0.846 | 239 |
| Parata, Hekia | National | 3 | 277 | 11 | 0.273 | 160 |
| Parker, David | Labour | 13 | 49 | 239 | 0.054 | 114 |
| Parmar, Parmjeet | National | 122 | 165 | 123 | 0.992 | 303 |
| Patterson, Mark | New Zealand First | 12 | 164 | 124 | 0.097 | 132 |
| Peachey, Allan | National | 15 | 268 | 20 | 0.750 | 209 |
| Peck, Mark | Labour | 10 | 155 | 133 | 0.075 | 124 |
| Penk, Chris | National | 123 | 164 | 124 | 0.992 | 304 |
| Perry, Edwin | New Zealand First | 75 | 200 | 88 | 0.852 | 241 |
| Peters, Jim | New Zealand First | 76 | 200 | 88 | 0.864 | 245 |
| Peters, Winston | New Zealand First | 153 | 4 | 284 | 0.539 | 180 |
| Pettis, Jill | Labour | 5 | 137 | 151 | 0.033 | 82 |
| Pillay, Lynne | Labour | 4 | 181 | 107 | 0.037 | 95 |
| Power, Simon | National | 128 | 136 | 152 | 0.842 | 238 |
| Prasad, Rajen | Labour | 1 | 275 | 13 | 0.077 | 125 |
| Prebble, Richard | ACT | 104 | 160 | 128 | 0.813 | 226 |
| Prime, Willow-Jean | Labour | 3 | 165 | 123 | 0.024 | 56 |
| Prosser, Richard | New Zealand First | 6 | 278 | 10 | 0.600 | 184 |
| Pugh, Maureen | National | 120 | 167 | 121 | 0.992 | 302 |
| Quinn, Paul | National | 3 | 285 | 3 | 1.000 | 311 |
| Radhakrishnan, Priyanca | Labour | 3 | 166 | 122 | 0.025 | 60 |
| Reti, Shane | National | 116 | 169 | 119 | 0.975 | 291 |

| | | | | | | |
|-------------------------|----------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|
| Rich, Katherine | National | 56 | 149 | 139 | 0.403 | 167 |
| Ririnui, Mita | Labour | 7 | 135 | 153 | 0.046 | 105 |
| Robertson, Grant | Labour | 3 | 151 | 137 | 0.022 | 45 |
| Robertson, Ross | Labour | 39 | 125 | 163 | 0.239 | 159 |
| Robson, Matt | Jim Anderton's Progressive Party | 12 | 156 | 132 | 0.091 | 131 |
| Roche, Denise | Green | 0 | 278 | 10 | 0.000 | 1 |
| Ross, Jami-Lee | National | 4 | 153 | 135 | 0.030 | 71 |
| Roy, Eric | National | 71 | 214 | 74 | 0.959 | 289 |
| Roy, Heather | ACT | 64 | 182 | 106 | 0.604 | 190 |
| Rurawhe, Adrian | Labour | 101 | 164 | 124 | 0.815 | 229 |
| Russell, Deborah | Labour | 14 | 164 | 124 | 0.113 | 143 |
| Ryall, Tony | National | 138 | 130 | 158 | 0.873 | 247 |
| Sabin, Mike | National | 8 | 279 | 9 | 0.889 | 254 |
| Sage, Eugenie | Green | 1 | 154 | 134 | 0.007 | 27 |
| Salesa, Jenny | Labour | 103 | 164 | 124 | 0.831 | 232 |
| Samuels, Dover | Labour | 22 | 138 | 150 | 0.147 | 149 |
| Scott, Alastair | National | 121 | 165 | 123 | 0.984 | 297 |
| Scott, Lynda | National | 119 | 154 | 134 | 0.888 | 253 |
| Sepuloni, Carmel | Labour | 4 | 162 | 126 | 0.032 | 79 |
| Seymour, David | ACT | 3 | 164 | 124 | 0.024 | 52 |
| Shanks, Katrina | National | 18 | 264 | 24 | 0.750 | 209 |
| Sharples, Pita | Māori Party | 2 | 261 | 27 | 0.074 | 122 |
| Shaw, James | Green | 1 | 164 | 124 | 0.008 | 30 |
| Shearer, David | Labour | 0 | 277 | 11 | 0.000 | 1 |
| Shipley, Jenny | National | 41 | 243 | 45 | 0.911 | 261 |
| Shirley, Ken | ACT | 94 | 154 | 134 | 0.701 | 203 |
| Simcock, Bob | National | 41 | 243 | 45 | 0.911 | 261 |
| Simich, Clem | National | 70 | 137 | 151 | 0.464 | 172 |
| Simpson, Scott | National | 8 | 154 | 134 | 0.060 | 118 |
| Sio, William | Labour | 52 | 154 | 134 | 0.388 | 165 |
| Smith, Lockwood | National | 121 | 135 | 153 | 0.791 | 221 |

| | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|-------------------|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|
| Smith, Murray | United Future | 83 | 200 | 88 | 0.943 | 282 |
| Smith, Nick | National | 271 | 4 | 284 | 0.954 | 287 |
| Smith, Stuart | National | 14 | 167 | 121 | 0.116 | 144 |
| Soper, Lesley | Labour | 0 | 271 | 17 | 0.000 | 1 |
| Sowry, Roger | National | 73 | 155 | 133 | 0.549 | 181 |
| Stanford, Erica | National | 5 | 164 | 124 | 0.040 | 99 |
| Steel, Tony | National | 43 | 242 | 46 | 0.935 | 276 |
| Stewart, Barbara | New Zealand First | 92 | 174 | 114 | 0.807 | 224 |
| Strange, Jamie | Labour | 103 | 164 | 124 | 0.831 | 232 |
| Street, Maryan | Labour | 0 | 259 | 29 | 0.000 | 1 |
| Sutton, Jim | Labour | 7 | 156 | 132 | 0.053 | 113 |
| Swain, Paul | Labour | 7 | 142 | 146 | 0.048 | 110 |
| Swarbrick, Chloe | Green | 1 | 164 | 124 | 0.008 | 30 |
| Tabuteau, Fletcher | New Zealand First | 12 | 164 | 124 | 0.097 | 132 |
| Tamihere, John | Labour | 19 | 157 | 131 | 0.145 | 148 |
| Tánczos, Nándor | Green | 2 | 137 | 151 | 0.013 | 37 |
| Taylor, Asenati | New Zealand First | 6 | 278 | 10 | 0.600 | 184 |
| te Heuheu, Georgina | National | 132 | 135 | 153 | 0.863 | 244 |
| Tinetti, Jan | Labour | 3 | 164 | 124 | 0.024 | 52 |
| Tirikatene, Rino | Labour | 105 | 154 | 134 | 0.784 | 218 |
| Tisch, Lindsay | National | 135 | 126 | 162 | 0.833 | 236 |
| Tizard, Judith | Labour | 4 | 140 | 148 | 0.027 | 68 |
| Tolley, Anne | National | 154 | 92 | 196 | 0.786 | 219 |
| Tremain, Chris | National | 18 | 260 | 28 | 0.643 | 194 |
| Turei, Metiria | Green | 2 | 170 | 118 | 0.017 | 43 |
| Turia, Tariana | Māori Party | 27 | 135 | 153 | 0.176 | 154 |
| Turner, Judy | United Future | 94 | 183 | 105 | 0.895 | 258 |
| Twyford, Phil | Labour | 85 | 151 | 137 | 0.620 | 193 |
| Upston, Louise | National | 129 | 155 | 133 | 0.970 | 290 |
| Upton, Simon | National | 10 | 278 | 10 | 1.000 | 311 |
| van de Molen, Tim | National | 38 | 164 | 124 | 0.306 | 161 |

| | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|-------------------|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|
| Vernon, Belinda | National | 42 | 242 | 46 | 0.913 | 265 |
| Wagner, Nicky | National | 107 | 137 | 151 | 0.709 | 205 |
| Walker, Hamish | National | 114 | 166 | 122 | 0.934 | 275 |
| Walker, Holly | Green | 0 | 278 | 10 | 0.000 | 1 |
| Wall, Louisa | Labour | 6 | 154 | 134 | 0.045 | 104 |
| Wang, Kenneth | ACT | 53 | 210 | 78 | 0.679 | 200 |
| Ward, Mike | Green | 2 | 200 | 88 | 0.023 | 51 |
| Warren-Clark, Angie | Labour | 3 | 164 | 124 | 0.024 | 52 |
| Webb, Duncan | Labour | 2 | 164 | 124 | 0.016 | 41 |
| Webster, Penny | ACT | 44 | 243 | 45 | 0.978 | 294 |
| Whaitiri, Meka | Labour | 100 | 165 | 123 | 0.813 | 227 |
| Wilkinson, Kate | National | 14 | 258 | 30 | 0.467 | 173 |
| Williams, Andrew | New Zealand First | 6 | 278 | 10 | 0.600 | 184 |
| Williams, Poto | Labour | 74 | 165 | 123 | 0.602 | 189 |
| Williamson, Maurice | National | 114 | 128 | 160 | 0.713 | 206 |
| Willis, Nicola | National | 7 | 167 | 121 | 0.058 | 117 |
| Wilson, Margaret | Labour | 5 | 140 | 148 | 0.034 | 89 |
| Wong, Pansy | National | 70 | 142 | 146 | 0.479 | 174 |
| Wood, Michael | Labour | 78 | 167 | 121 | 0.645 | 195 |
| Woodhouse, Michael | National | 115 | 159 | 129 | 0.891 | 255 |
| Woods, Megan | Labour | 3 | 155 | 133 | 0.023 | 50 |
| Woolerton, Doug | New Zealand First | 122 | 139 | 149 | 0.819 | 230 |
| Worth, Richard | National | 128 | 138 | 150 | 0.853 | 243 |
| Wright, John | Alliance | 0 | 242 | 46 | 0.000 | 1 |
| Yang, Jian | National | 15 | 155 | 133 | 0.113 | 142 |
| Yates, Dianne | Labour | 17 | 137 | 151 | 0.113 | 141 |
| Young, Annabel | National | 43 | 242 | 46 | 0.935 | 276 |
| Young, Jonathan | National | 128 | 159 | 129 | 0.992 | 307 |
| Yule, Lawrence | National | 107 | 166 | 122 | 0.877 | 251 |

Source: Author's calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

Appendix Table A.19: Operationalized Ideology Score by Type of MP

| Party | Average | Standard Deviation | Variation | Median |
|------------|---------|--------------------|-----------|--------|
| Electorate | 0.476 | 0.396 | 0.157 | 0.599 |
| List | 0.394 | 0.404 | 0.164 | 0.116 |
| Both | 0.364 | 0.364 | 0.137 | 0.147 |

Source: Author's calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

Appendix Table A.20: Operationalized Ideology Score by Electorate-Based Island

| Party | Average | Standard Deviation | Variation | Median |
|--------------|---------|--------------------|-----------|--------|
| North Island | 0.435 | 0.392 | 0.153 | 0.306 |
| South Island | 0.456 | 0.393 | 0.153 | 0.483 |

Source: Author's calculations based on data from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

Appendix Table A.21.i: Demographic Data by Electorate (2020 General Election Electorates)

| Electorate | Urbanization | Island | Ideology Ranking | Unemployed Rate% | % Personal Income < \$50000 |
|-----------------------------|--------------------|--------|------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|
| Auckland Central | Major Urban Center | North | 17 | 6.2 | 35.8 |
| Banks Peninsula | Major Urban Center | South | 28 | 4 | 38.1 |
| Bay of Plenty | Medium-Size City | North | 53 | 5 | 31.8 |
| Botany | Major Urban Center | North | 44 | 5.7 | 33.4 |
| Christchurch Central | Major Urban Center | South | 20 | 5.5 | 31.3 |
| Christchurch East | Major Urban Center | South | 26 | 6.6 | 28.8 |
| Coromandel | Rural | North | 56 | 4.9 | 23.4 |
| Dunedin | Medium-Size City | South | 11 | 8.1 | 24.6 |
| East Coast | Rural | North | 38 | 8.8 | 23.7 |
| East Coast Bays | Major Urban Center | North | 41 | 4.9 | 36.3 |
| Epsom | Major Urban Center | North | 12 | 3.2 | 43.7 |
| Hamilton East | Medium-Size City | North | 29 | 8.6 | 28.5 |
| Hamilton West | Medium-Size City | North | 34 | 7.7 | 30 |
| Hauraki-Waikato | Māori | North | 9 | 11.8 | 23.8 |

| | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|--------------------|-------|----|------|------|
| Hutt South | Major Urban Center | North | 23 | 5.9 | 38 |
| Ikaroa-Rawhiti | Māori | North | 3 | 10.4 | 19.5 |
| Ilam | Major Urban Center | South | 31 | 5.8 | 32.1 |
| Invercargill | Medium-Size City | South | 51 | 5 | 29.3 |
| Kaikōura | Rural | South | 57 | 3.1 | 29.5 |
| Kaipara ki Mahurangi | Rural | North | 47 | 3.7 | 36.7 |
| Kelston | Major Urban Center | North | 15 | 7.2 | 29.7 |
| Mana | Major Urban Center | North | 22 | 7.4 | 34.9 |
| Māngere | Major Urban Center | North | 16 | 9.2 | 22.1 |
| Manurewa | Major Urban Center | North | 18 | 9.4 | 21.8 |
| Maungakiekie | Major Urban Center | North | 19 | 5.1 | 39 |
| Mount Albert | Major Urban Center | North | 10 | 4.7 | 43.1 |
| Mount Roskill | Major Urban Center | North | 13 | 6 | 30.5 |
| Napier | Medium-Size City | North | 58 | 5.8 | 26.4 |
| Nelson | Medium-Size City | South | 32 | 4.5 | 27.3 |
| New Lynn | Major Urban Center | North | 21 | 5.1 | 35.2 |
| New Plymouth | Medium-Size City | North | 45 | 6 | 29.6 |
| North Shore | Major Urban Center | North | 35 | 4.4 | 41.4 |
| Northcote | Major Urban Center | North | 25 | 4.9 | 37.7 |
| Northland | Rural | North | 43 | 9.1 | 20.9 |
| Ohariu | Major Urban Center | North | | 4.8 | 47.3 |
| Otaki | Rural | North | 37 | 6.9 | 25 |
| Pakuranga | Major Urban Center | North | 62 | 4.9 | 35.5 |
| Palmerston North | Medium-Size City | North | 36 | 7.6 | 27.2 |

| | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------|-------|----|------|------|
| Panmure- Ōtāhuhu | Major Urban Center | North | 14 | 9.5 | 21 |
| Papakura | Major Urban Center | North | 50 | 6 | 37.3 |
| Port Waikato | Rural | North | 69 | 5.3 | 36 |
| Rangitata | Rural | South | 70 | 3.7 | 31 |
| Rangitikei | Rural | North | 65 | 5.1 | 28.9 |
| Remutaka | Major Urban Center | North | 30 | 7.1 | 32 |
| Rongotai | Major Urban Center | North | 7 | 5.6 | 41.3 |
| Rotorua | Medium-Size City | North | 42 | 8 | 26 |
| Selwyn | Rural | South | 64 | 3.1 | 41.9 |
| Southland | Rural | South | 67 | 2.1 | 33.1 |
| Taieri | Medium-Size City | South | 52 | 4.9 | 28.4 |
| Takanini | Major Urban Center | North | | 6.5 | 31.4 |
| Tamaki | Major Urban Center | North | 33 | 5 | 45.4 |
| Tāmaki Makaurau | Māori | North | 2 | 11.1 | 27.3 |
| Taranaki- King Country | Rural | North | 68 | 4.6 | 31.6 |
| Taupo | Rural | North | 66 | 6 | 29.3 |
| Tauranga | Medium-Size City | North | 48 | 5.3 | 29.8 |
| Te Atatū | Major Urban Center | North | 27 | 7.2 | 30.7 |
| Te Tai Hauauru | Māori | North | 1 | 11.6 | 21.5 |
| Te Tai Tokerau | Māori | North | 6 | 11.3 | 24.3 |
| Te Tai Tonga | Māori | South | 4 | 8 | 27.5 |
| Tukituki | Rural | North | 60 | 5 | 25.8 |
| Upper Harbour | Major Urban Center | North | 40 | 5.4 | 35.4 |
| Waiariki | Māori | North | 5 | 11.9 | 20.8 |
| Waikato | Rural | North | 61 | 5.5 | 33.3 |
| Waimakariri | Rural | South | 55 | 4.1 | 33.8 |
| Wairarapa | Rural | North | 54 | 5.1 | 25.6 |
| Waitaki | Rural | South | 59 | 2.6 | 29.8 |

| | | | | | |
|---------------------------|--------------------|-------|----|-----|------|
| Wellington Central | Major Urban Center | North | 8 | 7.2 | 41.6 |
| West Coast-Tasman | Rural | South | 46 | 4 | 25.1 |
| Whanganui | Rural | North | 49 | 7.6 | 23.5 |
| Whangaparaoa | Medium-Size City | North | 63 | 4.2 | 37.6 |
| Whangarei | Medium-Size City | North | 39 | 4.7 | 26.5 |
| Wigram | Major Urban Center | South | 24 | 5.7 | 28.1 |
| Average | | | | 5.8 | 31.6 |

Source: Author's calculations based on data from New Zealand Parliament Electorate Profiles

Appendix Table A.21.ii: Demographic Data by Electorate (2020 General Election Electorates)

| Electorate | % European | % Māori | % Pacific Peoples | % Asian | % No religion | % Bachelor's Degree Achieved+ |
|-----------------------------|-------------------|----------------|--------------------------|----------------|----------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Auckland Central | 58.4 | 6.5 | 3.8 | 33.1 | 54.2 | 48.4 |
| Banks Peninsula | 88.7 | 8.1 | 2.6 | 6.3 | 55 | 30.5 |
| Bay of Plenty | 83.1 | 20 | 2.6 | 5.5 | 52.7 | 20 |
| Botany | 38.6 | 6.7 | 13.7 | 44.9 | 37.8 | 29.2 |
| Christchurch Central | 76.1 | 9.7 | 3.5 | 16.3 | 49.3 | 28.9 |
| Christchurch East | 83 | 15.5 | 5.9 | 6.6 | 54.8 | 16.6 |
| Coromandel | 86.8 | 17.8 | 2.5 | 3.7 | 53.9 | 15 |
| Dunedin | 84 | 9.2 | 3.2 | 10.6 | 56.9 | 31.2 |
| East Coast | 59.4 | 51.5 | 3.9 | 3.2 | 48 | 14.9 |
| East Coast Bays | 61.8 | 4.3 | 1.7 | 34.5 | 53.9 | 34.6 |
| Epsom | 61.6 | 4.6 | 2.8 | 34.8 | 49.7 | 50.5 |
| Hamilton East | 63.2 | 20.6 | 5.8 | 19.5 | 46 | 30.1 |
| Hamilton West | 64.1 | 27 | 6.4 | 16.9 | 46.9 | 23.8 |
| Hauraki-Waikato | 52.4 | 85.7 | 8.4 | 1.7 | 57 | 12.1 |
| Hutt South | 71.3 | 16.2 | 8.1 | 15.9 | 48.2 | 29.6 |
| Ikaroa-Rawhiti | 46.7 | 89.2 | 7.1 | 1.3 | 51.4 | 10.5 |
| Ilam | 75 | 6.6 | 2.6 | 20.4 | 48 | 31.8 |
| Invercargill | 85.7 | 16.4 | 3.2 | 5.7 | 51.2 | 15.4 |
| Kaikōura | 89 | 12.2 | 2.5 | 3.9 | 53.2 | 16.2 |
| Kaipara ki Mahurangi | 85.9 | 12.6 | 4.8 | 7 | 56.6 | 22.2 |

| | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Kelston | 47.8 | 14.2 | 24.5 | 26.8 | 39.9 | 26.5 |
| Mana | 67 | 20 | 21.1 | 8.8 | 46.1 | 25.6 |
| Māngere | 18.7 | 16.4 | 59.7 | 19.6 | 18.1 | 14.1 |
| Manurewa | 23.1 | 24.5 | 39.3 | 29.4 | 23.5 | 15.4 |
| Maungakiekie | 52.4 | 9.2 | 14.4 | 32.3 | 40.4 | 39.4 |
| Mount Albert | 67.5 | 8.5 | 10 | 22.6 | 52.8 | 47.1 |
| Mount Roskill | 34.7 | 6.2 | 15 | 48.6 | 34.1 | 37.2 |
| Napier | 77.7 | 27.1 | 3.3 | 4.4 | 50.8 | 17.6 |
| Nelson | 88.2 | 9.8 | 2.1 | 6.1 | 55.7 | 21.5 |
| New Lynn | 60.1 | 9.3 | 10.6 | 29.1 | 46.6 | 32.7 |
| New Plymouth | 84.4 | 18.8 | 2.3 | 5.5 | 51.7 | 18.6 |
| North Shore | 69.9 | 5.4 | 2.3 | 26 | 52.7 | 40.6 |
| Northcote | 62 | 9.1 | 6.3 | 29.5 | 49.9 | 36.9 |
| Northland | 70.1 | 41.1 | 4.3 | 2.8 | 47.9 | 14.2 |
| Ohariu | 70.9 | 8.2 | 4.7 | 22.8 | 49 | 44 |
| Otaki | 84.3 | 18.9 | 4.2 | 4.5 | 50.9 | 17.8 |
| Pakuranga | 56.2 | 6.6 | 5.2 | 37.4 | 46.2 | 31 |
| Palmerston North | 74.4 | 19.4 | 5.8 | 12.7 | 48.7 | 23.5 |
| Panmure-Ōtāhuhu | 21.7 | 17.3 | 46.4 | 28.3 | 22.8 | 17.4 |
| Papakura | 66.4 | 21.7 | 11.7 | 14.3 | 46.3 | 21 |
| Port Waikato | 78.2 | 19 | 6.1 | 8.8 | 52.4 | 16.6 |
| Rangitata | 86.9 | 9 | 2.5 | 6 | 46.6 | 13.1 |
| Rangitikei | 82.5 | 23 | 3.1 | 3.8 | 51.3 | 16.5 |
| Remutaka | 71.8 | 19.1 | 11.4 | 10.6 | 45.8 | 19.4 |
| Rongotai | 73.6 | 10.4 | 7.3 | 15.1 | 51.5 | 43.1 |
| Rotorua | 64.5 | 37.5 | 5.1 | 10.1 | 49.5 | 18.4 |
| Selwyn | 88.7 | 8.3 | 1.8 | 6.6 | 55 | 22.1 |
| Southland | 85.6 | 8.2 | 1.4 | 7.5 | 54.5 | 21 |
| Taieri | 89.5 | 10.1 | 3 | 4.2 | 54.9 | 18.4 |
| Takanini | 31.9 | 17.2 | 21 | 41.9 | 31.4 | 24 |
| Tamaki | 70.1 | 8 | 8.1 | 19.3 | 43.9 | 43.9 |
| Tāmaki Makaurau | 49.8 | 84.7 | 23 | 3.4 | 49.3 | 16.6 |
| Taranaki-King Country | 82.4 | 23.8 | 2.1 | 3.3 | 54.3 | 16.6 |
| Taupo | 77.6 | 26.6 | 5.6 | 4.7 | 51.2 | 16 |
| Tauranga | 81.2 | 16.4 | 3 | 9 | 49.1 | 22.1 |
| Te Atatū | 48.9 | 16.7 | 18.8 | 29.2 | 41.4 | 24.8 |
| Te Tai Hauauru | 55.7 | 86.7 | 8.1 | 1.3 | 56.3 | 10.5 |
| Te Tai Tokerau | 55.4 | 85.6 | 8.8 | 1.6 | 51.4 | 12.4 |
| Te Tai Tonga | 70 | 80.3 | 5.4 | 1.5 | 62.9 | 14.8 |
| Tukituki | 71.6 | 27.3 | 8 | 5.7 | 46.1 | 18 |

| | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Upper Harbour | 53.7 | 10.6 | 10.9 | 32.5 | 46.4 | 30.4 |
| Wairariki | 46 | 88.8 | 5.4 | 1.3 | 50.7 | 11.8 |
| Waikato | 78.3 | 23 | 3.2 | 6.5 | 51.5 | 17.3 |
| Waimakariri | 91.2 | 8.7 | 1.5 | 4.5 | 52.5 | 16.1 |
| Wairarapa | 86 | 20.7 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 51.2 | 15.9 |
| Waitaki | 90.6 | 7.3 | 1.9 | 4.6 | 52.4 | 18.4 |
| Wellington Central | 78.4 | 7.4 | 3 | 16.8 | 59.7 | 51.4 |
| West Coast-Tasman | 91.6 | 10.5 | 1.6 | 2.9 | 57.2 | 15.9 |
| Whanganui | 80.7 | 25.4 | 2.9 | 3.8 | 49.1 | 12.9 |
| Whangaparaoa | 84.1 | 7.6 | 2.4 | 12.3 | 51.6 | 25.2 |
| Whangarei | 76.6 | 30.1 | 4.1 | 5.2 | 51.7 | 17.6 |
| Wigram | 64.7 | 9.7 | 5.1 | 26.5 | 47.2 | 24.4 |
| Average | 70.2 | 16.5 | 8.1 | 15.1 | 48.2 | 24.8 |

Source: Author's calculations based on data from New Zealand Parliament Electorate Profiles

Appendix Table A.22.i: Demographic Data by Electorate (Most Recent Data of All Electorates Measured)

| Electorate | Urbanization | Island | Ideology Ranking | Unemployed Rate % | % Personal Income < \$50000 |
|--------------------------------|---------------------|---------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Aoraki (2005) | Rural | South | N/A | 3.6 | 6.1 |
| Auckland Central | Major Urban Center | North | 17 | 6.2 | 35.8 |
| Banks Peninsula (2005) | Major Urban Center | South | N/A | 3.2 | 12.9 |
| Bay of Plenty | Medium-Size City | North | 53 | 5 | 31.8 |
| Botany | Major Urban Center | North | 44 | 5.7 | 33.4 |
| Christchurch Central | Major Urban Center | South | 20 | 5.5 | 31.3 |
| Christchurch East | Major Urban Center | South | 26 | 6.6 | 28.8 |
| Clutha-Southland (2017) | Rural | South | N/A | 2.1 | 24 |
| Coromandel | Rural | North | 56 | 4.9 | 23.4 |
| Dunedin North (2017) | Medium-Size City | South | N/A | 5.4 | 18.1 |
| Dunedin South (2017) | Medium-Size City | South | N/A | 3.4 | 22.5 |
| East Coast | Rural | North | 38 | 8.8 | 23.7 |

| | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|--------------------|-------|-----|------|------|
| East Coast Bays | Major Urban Center | North | 41 | 4.9 | 36.3 |
| Epsom | Major Urban Center | North | 12 | 3.2 | 43.7 |
| Hamilton East | Medium-Size City | North | 29 | 8.6 | 28.5 |
| Hamilton West | Medium-Size City | North | 34 | 7.7 | 30 |
| Hauraki-Waikato | Māori | North | 9 | 11.8 | 23.8 |
| Helensville (2017) | Rural | North | N/A | 3.4 | 32 |
| Hunua | Rural | North | N/A | 3.9 | 30 |
| Hutt South | Major Urban Center | North | 23 | 5.9 | 38 |
| Ikaroa-Rawhiti | Māori | North | 3 | 10.4 | 19.5 |
| Ilam | Major Urban Center | South | 31 | 5.8 | 32.1 |
| Invercargill | Medium-Size City | South | 51 | 5 | 29.3 |
| Kaikōura | Rural | South | 57 | 3.1 | 29.5 |
| Karapiro (2005 (Piako)) | Rural | North | N/A | 4.6 | 9.9 |
| Kelston | Major Urban Center | North | 15 | 7.2 | 29.7 |
| Mana | Major Urban Center | North | 22 | 7.4 | 34.9 |
| Mangere | Major Urban Center | North | 16 | 9.2 | 22.1 |
| Manukau East (2017) | Major Urban Center | North | N/A | 8 | 11.6 |
| Manurewa | Major Urban Center | North | 18 | 9.4 | 21.8 |
| Maungakiekie | Major Urban Center | North | 19 | 5.1 | 39 |
| Mount Albert | Major Urban Center | North | 10 | 4.7 | 43.1 |
| Mount Roskill | Major Urban Center | North | 13 | 6 | 30.5 |
| Napier | Medium-Size City | North | 58 | 5.8 | 26.4 |
| Nelson | Medium-Size City | South | 32 | 4.5 | 27.3 |

| | | | | | |
|------------------------------|--------------------|-------|-----|------|------|
| New Lynn | Major Urban Center | North | 21 | 5.1 | 35.2 |
| New Plymouth | Medium-Size City | North | 45 | 6 | 29.6 |
| North Shore | Major Urban Center | North | 35 | 4.4 | 41.4 |
| Northcote | Major Urban Center | North | 25 | 4.9 | 37.7 |
| Northland | Rural | North | 43 | 9.1 | 20.9 |
| Ohariu | Major Urban Center | North | N/A | 4.8 | 47.3 |
| Otago (2005) | Rural | South | N/A | 2.5 | 7.2 |
| Otaki | Rural | North | 37 | 6.9 | 25 |
| Pakuranga | Major Urban Center | North | 62 | 4.9 | 35.5 |
| Palmerston North | Medium-Size City | North | 36 | 7.6 | 27.2 |
| Papakura | Major Urban Center | North | 50 | 6 | 37.3 |
| Port Hills | Major Urban Center | South | N/A | 2.7 | 30 |
| Rakaia (2005) | Rural | South | N/A | 2.4 | 9.2 |
| Rangitata | Rural | South | 70 | 3.7 | 31 |
| Rangitikei | Rural | North | 65 | 5.1 | 28.9 |
| Rimutaka | Major Urban Center | North | 30 | 7.1 | 32 |
| Rodney (2017) | Medium-Size City | North | N/A | 3.4 | 25.9 |
| Rongotai | Major Urban Center | North | 7 | 5.6 | 41.3 |
| Rotorua | Medium-Size City | North | 42 | 8 | 26 |
| Selwyn | Rural | South | 64 | 3.1 | 41.9 |
| Tamaki | Major Urban Center | North | 33 | 5 | 45.4 |
| Tāmaki Makaurau | Māori | North | 2 | 11.1 | 27.3 |
| Taranaki-King Country | Rural | North | 68 | 4.6 | 31.6 |
| Taupo | Rural | North | 66 | 6 | 29.3 |
| Tauranga | Medium-Size City | | 48 | 5.3 | 29.8 |
| Te Atatū | Major Urban Center | North | 27 | 7.2 | 30.7 |

| | | | | | |
|---------------------------|--------------------|-------|-----|------|------|
| Te Tai Hauauru | Māori | North | 1 | 11.6 | 21.5 |
| Te Tai Tokerau | Māori | North | 6 | 11.3 | 24.3 |
| Te Tai Tonga | Māori | South | 4 | 8 | 27.5 |
| Tukituki | Rural | North | 60 | 5 | 25.8 |
| Upper Harbour | Major Urban Center | North | 40 | 5.4 | 35.4 |
| Waiariki | Māori | North | 5 | 11.9 | 20.8 |
| Waikato | Rural | North | 61 | 5.5 | 33.3 |
| Waimakariri | Rural | South | 55 | 4.1 | 33.8 |
| Wairarapa | Rural | North | 54 | 5.1 | 25.6 |
| Waitakere (2011) | Major Urban Center | North | N/A | 3.9 | 15.1 |
| Waitaki | Rural | South | 59 | 2.6 | 29.8 |
| Wellington Central | Major Urban Center | North | 8 | 7.2 | 41.6 |
| West Coast-Tasman | Rural | South | 46 | 4 | 25.1 |
| Whanganui | Rural | North | 49 | 7.6 | 23.5 |
| Whangarei | Medium-Size City | North | 39 | 4.7 | 26.5 |
| Wigram | Major Urban Center | South | 24 | 5.7 | 28.1 |

Source: Author's calculations based on data from New Zealand Parliament Electorate Profiles

Appendix Table A.22.ii: Demographic Data by Electorate (Most Recent Data of All Electorates Measured)

| Electorate | % European | % Māori | % Pacific Peoples | % Asian | % No religion | % Bachelor's Degree Achieved+ |
|-------------------------------|-------------------|----------------|--------------------------|----------------|----------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Aoraki (2005) | 94.1 | 5.4 | 0.6 | 1.3 | N/A | 4.8 |
| Auckland Central | 58.4 | 6.5 | 3.8 | 33.1 | 54.2 | 48.4 |
| Banks Peninsula (2005) | 91.8 | 5.3 | 1.4 | 2.9 | | 13.9 |
| Bay of Plenty | 83.1 | 20 | 2.6 | 5.5 | 52.7 | 20 |
| Botany | 38.6 | 6.7 | 13.7 | 44.9 | 37.8 | 29.2 |
| Christchurch Central | 76.1 | 9.7 | 3.5 | 16.3 | 49.3 | 28.9 |
| Christchurch East | 83 | 15.5 | 5.9 | 6.6 | 54.8 | 16.6 |

| | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Clutha-Southland (2017) | 88.7 | 8.6 | 1 | 4.6 | 45.5 | 12.8 |
| Coromandel | 86.8 | 17.8 | 2.5 | 3.7 | 53.9 | 15 |
| Dunedin North (2017) | 85.6 | 7.7 | 2.5 | 8.9 | 50.5 | 23.5 |
| Dunedin South (2017) | 91.3 | 7.8 | 2.4 | 3.3 | 48.3 | 16.7 |
| East Coast | 59.4 | 51.5 | 3.9 | 3.2 | 48 | 14.9 |
| East Coast Bays | 61.8 | 4.3 | 1.7 | 34.5 | 53.9 | 34.6 |
| Epsom | 61.6 | 4.6 | 2.8 | 34.8 | 49.7 | 50.5 |
| Hamilton East | 63.2 | 20.6 | 5.8 | 19.5 | 46 | 30.1 |
| Hamilton West | 64.1 | 27 | 6.4 | 16.9 | 46.9 | 23.8 |
| Hauraki-Waikato | 52.4 | 85.7 | 8.4 | 1.7 | 57 | 12.1 |
| Helensville (2017) | 89.9 | 9.4 | 2.8 | 5.2 | 54.4 | 19 |
| Hunua | 79.2 | 12.7 | 4.3 | 12 | 44.7 | 14.7 |
| Hutt South | 71.3 | 16.2 | 8.1 | 15.9 | 48.2 | 29.6 |
| Ikaroa-Rawhiti | 46.7 | 89.2 | 7.1 | 1.3 | 51.4 | 10.5 |
| Ilam | 75 | 6.6 | 2.6 | 20.4 | 48 | 31.8 |
| Invercargill | 85.7 | 16.4 | 3.2 | 5.7 | 51.2 | 15.4 |
| Kaikōura | 89 | 12.2 | 2.5 | 3.9 | 53.2 | 16.2 |
| Karapiro (2005 (Piako)) | 81.9 | 18.5 | 1.6 | 2 | N/A | 5.4 |
| Kelston | 47.8 | 14.2 | 24.5 | 26.8 | 39.9 | 26.5 |
| Mana | 67 | 20 | 21.1 | 8.8 | 46.1 | 25.6 |
| Mangere | 18.7 | 16.4 | 59.7 | 19.6 | 18.1 | 14.1 |
| Manukau East (2017) | 21.2 | 15 | 44.8 | 31.1 | 15.9 | 9.1 |
| Manurewa | 23.1 | 24.5 | 39.3 | 29.4 | 23.5 | 15.4 |
| Maungakiekie | 52.4 | 9.2 | 14.4 | 32.3 | 40.4 | 39.4 |
| Mount Albert | 67.5 | 8.5 | 10 | 22.6 | 52.8 | 47.1 |
| Mount Roskill | 34.7 | 6.2 | 15 | 48.6 | 34.1 | 37.2 |
| Napier | 77.7 | 27.1 | 3.3 | 4.4 | 50.8 | 17.6 |
| Nelson | 88.2 | 9.8 | 2.1 | 6.1 | 55.7 | 21.5 |
| New Lynn | 60.1 | 9.3 | 10.6 | 29.1 | 46.6 | 32.7 |

| | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| New Plymouth | 84.4 | 18.8 | 2.3 | 5.5 | 51.7 | 18.6 |
| North Shore | 69.9 | 5.4 | 2.3 | 26 | 52.7 | 40.6 |
| Northcote | 62 | 9.1 | 6.3 | 29.5 | 49.9 | 36.9 |
| Northland | 70.1 | 41.1 | 4.3 | 2.8 | 47.9 | 14.2 |
| Ohariu | 70.9 | 8.2 | 4.7 | 22.8 | 49 | 44 |
| Otago (2005) | 92.5 | 5.5 | 0.6 | 2.1 | N/A | 7.1 |
| Otaki | 84.3 | 18.9 | 4.2 | 4.5 | 50.9 | 17.8 |
| Pakuranga | 56.2 | 6.6 | 5.2 | 37.4 | 46.2 | 31 |
| Palmerston North | 74.4 | 19.4 | 5.8 | 12.7 | 48.7 | 23.5 |
| Papakura | 66.4 | 21.7 | 11.7 | 14.3 | 46.3 | 21 |
| Port Hills | 90.1 | 7 | 2.3 | 4.8 | 47.4 | 22.1 |
| Rakaia (2005) | 93.7 | 5.6 | 0.7 | 1.4 | N/A | 6.9 |
| Rangitata | 86.9 | 9 | 2.5 | 6 | 46.6 | 13.1 |
| Rangitikei | 82.5 | 23 | 3.1 | 3.8 | 51.3 | 16.5 |
| Rimutaka | 71.8 | 19.1 | 11.4 | 10.6 | 45.8 | 19.4 |
| Rodney (2017) | 91.8 | 7.4 | 2.4 | 4 | 45.2 | 14.9 |
| Rongotai | 73.6 | 10.4 | 7.3 | 15.1 | 51.5 | 43.1 |
| Rotorua | 64.5 | 37.5 | 5.1 | 10.1 | 49.5 | 18.4 |
| Selwyn | 88.7 | 8.3 | 1.8 | 6.6 | 55 | 22.1 |
| Tamaki | 70.1 | 8 | 8.1 | 19.3 | 43.9 | 43.9 |
| Tāmaki Makaurau | 49.8 | 84.7 | 23 | 3.4 | 49.3 | 16.6 |
| Taranaki-King Country | 82.4 | 23.8 | 2.1 | 3.3 | 54.3 | 16.6 |
| Taupo | 77.6 | 26.6 | 5.6 | 4.7 | 51.2 | 16 |
| Tauranga | 81.2 | 16.4 | 3 | 9 | 49.1 | 22.1 |
| Te Atatū | 48.9 | 16.7 | 18.8 | 29.2 | 41.4 | 24.8 |
| Te Tai Hauauru | 55.7 | 86.7 | 8.1 | 1.3 | 56.3 | 10.5 |
| Te Tai Tokerau | 55.4 | 85.6 | 8.8 | 1.6 | 51.4 | 12.4 |
| Te Tai Tonga | 70 | 80.3 | 5.4 | 1.5 | 62.9 | 14.8 |
| Tukituki | 71.6 | 27.3 | 8 | 5.7 | 46.1 | 18 |
| Upper Harbour | 53.7 | 10.6 | 10.9 | 32.5 | 46.4 | 30.4 |
| Waiariki | 46 | 88.8 | 5.4 | 1.3 | 50.7 | 11.8 |
| Waikato | 78.3 | 23 | 3.2 | 6.5 | 51.5 | 17.3 |
| Waimakariri | 91.2 | 8.7 | 1.5 | 4.5 | 52.5 | 16.1 |

| | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Wairarapa | 86 | 20.7 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 51.2 | 15.9 |
| Waitakere (2011) | 60.1 | 13.7 | 17.4 | 13 | 35 | 11.5 |
| Waitaki | 90.6 | 7.3 | 1.9 | 4.6 | 52.4 | 18.4 |
| Wellington Central | 78.4 | 7.4 | 3 | 16.8 | 59.7 | 51.4 |
| West Coast-Tasman | 91.6 | 10.5 | 1.6 | 2.9 | 57.2 | 15.9 |
| Whanganui | 80.7 | 25.4 | 2.9 | 3.8 | 49.1 | 12.9 |
| Whangarei | 76.6 | 30.1 | 4.1 | 5.2 | 51.7 | 17.6 |
| Wigram | 64.7 | 9.7 | 5.1 | 26.5 | 47.2 | 24.4 |

Source: Author's calculations based on data from New Zealand Parliament Electorate Profiles

Appendix Table A.23: Actual Operationalized Ideology Score, Predicted Operationalized Ideology Scores, Residual Operationalized Ideology Score for MPs

| Member | Party | Electorate | Urbanization | Island | Actual Score | Predicted Score | Residual Score |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|--------|--------------|-----------------|----------------|
| Adams, Amy | National | Selwyn | Rural | South | 7.5 | 47.1 | -39.7 |
| Anderton, Jim | Jim Anderton's Progressive Party | Wigram | Major Urban Center | South | 10.2 | 10.2 | 0.0 |
| Ardern, Jacinda | Labour | Mount Albert | Major Urban Center | North | 3.0 | 5.6 | -2.7 |
| Ardern, Shane | National | Taranaki-King Country | Rural | North | 70.1 | 61.1 | 9.0 |
| Auchinvole, Chris | National | West Coast-Tasman | Rural | South | 50.0 | 72.3 | -22.3 |
| Banks, John | ACT | Epsom | Major Urban Center | North | 11.1 | 33.9 | -22.8 |
| Barker, Rick | Labour | Tukituki | Rural | North | 3.9 | 11.3 | -7.3 |
| Barnett, Tim | Labour | Christchurch Central | Major Urban Center | South | 2.7 | 8.6 | -6.0 |
| Barry, Maggie | National | North Shore | Major Urban Center | North | 93.2 | 59.3 | 34.0 |
| Bayly, Andrew | National | Hunua | Rural | North | 78.2 | 62.8 | 15.5 |
| Bennett, David | National | Hamilton East | Medium-Size City | North | 84.8 | 82.0 | 2.7 |

| | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|----------|----------------------|--------------------|-------|------|------|-------|
| Bennett, Paula | National | Upper Harbour | Major Urban Center | North | 12.5 | 64.1 | -51.6 |
| Benson-Pope, David | Labour | Dunedin South | Medium-Size City | South | 2.7 | 23.7 | -21.0 |
| Beyer, Georgina | Labour | Wairarapa | Rural | North | 3.0 | 8.7 | -5.7 |
| Bidois, Dan | National | Northcote | Major Urban Center | North | 75.2 | 66.1 | 9.1 |
| Bishop, Chris | National | Hutt South | Major Urban Center | North | 4.1 | 67.1 | -63.0 |
| Borrows, Chester | National | Whanganui | Rural | North | 76.7 | 72.5 | 4.2 |
| Bradford, Max | National | Rotorua | Medium-Size City | North | 93.3 | 83.6 | 9.8 |
| Braybrooke, Geoff | Labour | Napier | Medium-Size City | North | 15.2 | 14.9 | 0.4 |
| Bridges, Simon | National | Tauranga | Medium-Size City | North | 95.4 | 78.6 | 16.9 |
| Brown, Simeon | National | Pakuranga | Major Urban Center | North | 99.2 | 60.7 | 38.5 |
| Brownlee, Gerry | National | Ilam | Major Urban Center | South | 83.2 | 75.1 | 8.1 |
| Burns, Brendon | Labour | Christchurch Central | Major Urban Center | South | 0.0 | 8.6 | -8.6 |
| Burton, Mark | Labour | Taupo | Rural | North | 2.7 | 1.7 | 1.0 |
| Carter, Chris | Labour | Te Atatū | Major Urban Center | North | 3.4 | 9.8 | -6.4 |
| Carter, David | National | Banks Peninsula | Major Urban Center | South | 82.2 | N/A | N/A |
| Carter, John | National | Northland | Rural | North | 94.7 | 82.4 | 12.3 |
| Chadwick, Steve | Labour | Rotorua | Medium-Size City | North | 2.6 | 17.0 | -14.4 |
| Clark, David | Labour | Dunedin North | Medium-Size City | South | 61.7 | 34.1 | 27.6 |

| | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|---------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------|------|------|-------|
| Clark, Helen | Labour | Mount Albert | Major Urban Center | North | 2.7 | 5.6 | -3.0 |
| Clarkson, Bob | National | Tauranga | Medium-Size City | | 76.5 | 76.5 | 0.0 |
| Coffey, Tāmati | Labour | Wairariki | Māori | North | 4.8 | 13.0 | -8.1 |
| Coleman, Jonathan | National | Northcote | Major Urban Center | North | 71.4 | 66.1 | 5.3 |
| Collins, Judith | National | Papakura | Major Urban Center | North | 42.8 | 62.6 | -19.8 |
| Connell, Brian | National | Rakaia | Rural | South | 91.7 | N/A | N/A |
| Cosgrove, Clayton | Labour | Waimakariri | Rural | South | 18.9 | -9.5 | 28.4 |
| Creech, Wyatt | National | Wairarapa | Rural | North | 93.3 | 75.2 | 18.1 |
| Cullen, Michael | Labour | Dunedin South | Medium-Size City | South | 3.3 | 23.7 | -20.3 |
| Cunliffe, David | Labour | New Lynn | Major Urban Center | North | 3.0 | 4.8 | -1.8 |
| Curran, Clare | Labour | Dunedin South | Medium-Size City | South | 2.9 | 23.7 | -20.7 |
| Dalziel, Lianne | Labour | Christchurch East | Major Urban Center | South | 3.7 | 5.3 | -1.6 |
| Davis, Kelvin | Labour | Te Tai Tokerau | Māori | North | 4.7 | 24.6 | -19.9 |
| Dean, Jacqui | National | Waitaki | Rural | South | 93.3 | 67.4 | 25.9 |
| Dooney, Matthew | National | Waimakariri | Rural | South | 5.6 | 57.1 | -51.4 |
| Dowie, Sarah | National | Invercargill | Medium-Size City | South | 98.4 | 78.8 | 19.6 |
| Dunne, Peter | United Future | Ohariu | Major Urban Center | North | 72.3 | 72.3 | 0.0 |
| Duynhoven, Harry | Labour | New Plymouth | Medium-Size City | North | 22.8 | 8.7 | 14.1 |
| Dyson, Ruth | Labour | Port Hills | Major Urban Center | South | 2.4 | 10.5 | -8.1 |

| | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|-------------|------------------|--------------------|-------|------|------|-------|
| Eagle, Paul | Labour | Rongotai | Major Urban Center | North | 2.4 | 2.3 | 0.1 |
| English, Bill | National | Clutha-Southland | Rural | South | 91.3 | 73.4 | 17.9 |
| Fafoi, Kris | Labour | Mana | Major Urban Center | North | 3.0 | 12.0 | -9.0 |
| Fairbrother, Russell | Labour | Napier | Medium-Size City | North | 3.8 | 14.9 | -11.0 |
| Falloon, Andrew | National | Rangitata | Rural | South | 7.3 | 59.6 | -52.3 |
| Field, Taito Phillip | Labour | Mangere | Major Urban Center | North | 59.7 | 31.1 | 28.6 |
| Fitzsimons, Jeanette | Green | Coromandel | Rural | North | 1.3 | 1.3 | 0.0 |
| Flavell, Te Ururoa | Māori Party | Wairariki | Māori | North | 10.0 | 9.9 | 0.1 |
| Foss, Craig | National | Tukituki | Rural | North | 51.7 | 77.9 | -26.2 |
| Gallagher, Martin | Labour | Hamilton West | Medium-Size City | North | 7.7 | 13.6 | -5.9 |
| Goff, Phil | Labour | Mount Roskill | Major Urban Center | North | 3.7 | 11.2 | -7.5 |
| Goodhew, Jo | National | Rangitata | Rural | South | 60.0 | 59.6 | 0.4 |
| Gosche, Mark | Labour | Maungakiekie | Major Urban Center | North | 3.3 | 6.6 | -3.3 |
| Goudie, Sandra | National | Coromandel | Rural | North | 57.9 | 75.1 | -17.2 |
| Guy, Nathan | National | Otaki | Rural | North | 89.4 | 75.6 | 13.8 |
| Harawira, Hone | Mana Party | Te Tai Tokerau | Māori | North | 3.3 | 3.3 | 0.0 |
| Hartley, Ann | Labour | Northcote | Major Urban Center | North | 3.3 | -0.5 | 3.8 |
| Hasler, Marie | National | Waitakere | Major Urban Center | North | 91.1 | 89.8 | 1.3 |
| Hawkins, George | Labour | Manurewa | Major Urban Center | North | 4.6 | 25.8 | -21.2 |
| Hayes, John | National | Wairarapa | Rural | North | 78.6 | 75.2 | 3.3 |

| | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|-------------|-----------------------|--------------------|-------|------|------|-------|
| Heatley, Phil | National | Whangarei | Medium-Size City | North | 89.5 | 86.8 | 2.7 |
| Henare, Peeni | Labour | Tāmaki Makaurau | Māori | North | 3.3 | 41.3 | -38.0 |
| Herlihy, Gavan | National | Otago | Rural | South | 100 | N/A | N/A |
| Hide, Rodney | ACT | Epsom | Major Urban Center | North | 43.9 | 33.9 | 10.0 |
| Hipango, Harete | National | Whanganui | Rural | North | 98.4 | 72.5 | 25.9 |
| Hipkins, Chris | Labour | Rimutaka | Major Urban Center | North | 2.2 | 3.2 | -1.0 |
| Hobbs, Marian | Labour | Wellington Central | Major Urban Center | North | 2.7 | 3.7 | -1.0 |
| Hodgson, Pete | Labour | Dunedin North | Medium-Size City | South | 3.3 | 34.1 | -30.8 |
| Horomia, Parekura | Labour | Ikaroa-Rawhiti | Māori | North | 3.7 | 20.1 | -16.4 |
| Hughes, Darren | Labour | Otaki | Rural | North | 5.6 | 9.0 | -3.4 |
| Hutchison, Paul | National | Hunua | Rural | North | 83.2 | 62.8 | 20.5 |
| Katene, Rahui | Māori Party | Te Tai Tonga | Māori | South | 66.7 | 31.7 | 35.0 |
| Kaye, Nikki | National | Auckland Central | Major Urban Center | North | 4.4 | 70.2 | -65.8 |
| Keall, Judy | Labour | Otaki | Rural | North | 0.0 | 9.0 | -9.0 |
| Kelly, Graham | Labour | Mana | Major Urban Center | North | 1.5 | 12.0 | -10.4 |
| Key, John | National | Helensville | Rural | North | 69.0 | 61.3 | 7.6 |
| Kidd, Doug | National | Kaikōura | Rural | South | 93.2 | 68.4 | 24.8 |
| King, Annette | Labour | Rongotai | Major Urban Center | North | 3.0 | 2.3 | 0.7 |
| King, Colin | National | Kaikōura | Rural | South | 75.9 | 68.4 | 7.5 |
| King, Matt | National | Northland | Rural | North | 20.3 | 82.4 | -62.1 |
| Kuriger, Barbara | National | Taranaki-King Country | Rural | North | 4.8 | 61.1 | -56.3 |
| Kyd, Warren | National | Hunua | Rural | North | 97.6 | 62.8 | 34.8 |

| | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|----------|-------------------|--------------------|-------|------|------|-------|
| Laban, Winnie | Labour | Mana | Major Urban Center | North | 7.3 | 12.0 | -4.7 |
| Lee, Denise | National | Maungakiekie | Major Urban Center | North | 79.8 | 73.2 | 6.7 |
| Lees-Galloway, Ian | Labour | Palmerston North | Medium-Size City | North | 2.2 | 18.1 | -15.9 |
| Lotu-Iiga, Pesata Sam | National | Maungakiekie | Major Urban Center | North | 100 | 73.2 | 26.8 |
| Luxton, John | National | Karapiro | Rural | North | 93.5 | N/A | N/A |
| Macindoe, Tim | National | Hamilton West | Medium-Size City | North | 100 | 80.2 | 19.8 |
| Mackey, Janet | Labour | East Coast | Rural | North | 12.2 | 7.9 | 4.3 |
| Maharey, Steve | Labour | Palmerston North | Medium-Size City | North | 3.3 | 18.1 | -14.8 |
| Mahuta, Nanaia | Labour | Hauraki-Waikato | Māori | North | 14.8 | 16.2 | -1.4 |
| Mallard, Trevor | Labour | Hutt South | Major Urban Center | North | 3.5 | 0.5 | 3.0 |
| Mapp, Wayne | National | North Shore | Major Urban Center | North | 81.0 | 59.3 | 21.8 |
| McClay, Todd | National | Rotorua | Medium-Size City | North | 94.7 | 83.6 | 11.2 |
| McCully, Murray | National | East Coast Bays | Major Urban Center | North | 61.1 | 55.7 | 5.4 |
| McKelvie, Ian | National | Rangitikei | Rural | North | 81.3 | 68.6 | 12.8 |
| Mitchell, Mark | National | Rodney | Medium-Size City | North | 21.1 | 80.1 | -59.0 |
| Muller, Todd | National | Bay of Plenty | Medium-Size City | North | 98.4 | 73.5 | 24.9 |
| Nash, Stuart | Labour | Napier | Medium-Size City | North | 4.7 | 14.9 | -10.1 |
| Neeson, Brian | National | Waitakere | Major Urban Center | North | 100 | 89.8 | 10.2 |
| O'Connor, Damien | Labour | West Coast-Tasman | Rural | South | 43.9 | 5.7 | 38.2 |

| | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------|------|------|-------|
| O'Connor, Greg | Labour | Ohariu | Major Urban Center | North | 9.7 | -7.7 | 17.4 |
| O'Connor, Simon | National | Tamaki | Major Urban Center | North | 98.5 | 64.6 | 33.8 |
| Okeroa, Mahara | Labour | Te Tai Tonga | Māori | South | 2.7 | 34.8 | -32.1 |
| Peachey, Allan | National | Tamaki | Major Urban Center | North | 75.0 | 64.6 | 10.4 |
| Peck, Mark | Labour | Invercargill | Medium-Size City | South | 7.5 | 12.2 | -4.7 |
| Penk, Chris | National | Helensville | Rural | North | 99.2 | 61.3 | 37.9 |
| Peters, Winston | New Zealand First | Tauranga | Medium-Size City | North | 53.9 | 53.9 | 0.0 |
| Pettis, Jill | Labour | Whanganui | Rural | North | 3.3 | 5.9 | -2.6 |
| Pillay, Lynne | Labour | Waitakere | Major Urban Center | North | 3.7 | 23.2 | -19.4 |
| Power, Simon | National | Rangitikei | Rural | North | 84.2 | 68.6 | 15.6 |
| Prebble, Richard | ACT | Wellington Central | Major Urban Center | North | 81.3 | 37.0 | 44.2 |
| Reti, Shane | National | Whangarei | Medium-Size City | North | 97.5 | 86.8 | 10.7 |
| Ririnui, Mita | Labour | Wairariki | Māori | North | 4.6 | 13.0 | -8.4 |
| Robertson, Grant | Labour | Wellington Central | Major Urban Center | North | 2.2 | 3.7 | -1.5 |
| Robertson, Ross | Labour | Manukau East | Major Urban Center | North | 23.9 | 39.5 | -15.6 |
| Ross, Jami-Lee | National | Botany | Major Urban Center | North | 3.0 | 61.3 | -58.4 |
| Roy, Eric | National | Invercargill | Medium-Size City | South | 95.9 | 78.8 | 17.2 |
| Rurawhe, Adrian | Labour | Te Tai Hauauru | Māori | North | 81.5 | 25.1 | 56.3 |
| Russell, Deborah | Labour | New Lynn | Major Urban Center | North | 11.3 | 4.8 | 6.5 |

| | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------------|-------|------|------|-------|
| Ryall, Tony | National | Bay of Plenty | Medium-Size City | North | 87.3 | 73.5 | 13.8 |
| Sabin, Mike | National | Northland | Rural | North | 88.9 | 82.4 | 6.4 |
| Salesa, Jenny | Labour | Manukau East | Major Urban Center | North | 83.1 | 39.5 | 43.5 |
| Samuels, Dover | Labour | Te Tai Tokerau | Māori | North | 14.7 | 24.6 | -10.0 |
| Scott, Alastair | National | Wairarapa | Rural | North | 98.4 | 75.2 | 23.1 |
| Scott, Lynda | National | Kaikōura | Rural | South | 88.8 | 68.4 | 20.4 |
| Sepuloni, Carmel | Labour | Kelston | Major Urban Center | North | 3.2 | 16.0 | -12.8 |
| Seymour, David | ACT | Epsom | Major Urban Center | North | 2.4 | 33.9 | -31.5 |
| Sharples, Pita | Māori Party | Tāmaki Makaurau | Māori | North | 7.4 | 38.2 | -30.8 |
| Shearer, David | Labour | Mount Albert | Major Urban Center | North | 0.0 | 5.6 | -5.6 |
| Shipley, Jenny | National | Rakaia | Rural | South | 91.1 | N/A | N/A |
| Simcock, Bob | National | Hamilton West | Medium-Size City | North | 91.1 | 80.2 | 10.9 |
| Simich, Clem | National | Tamaki | Major Urban Center | North | 46.4 | 64.6 | -18.3 |
| Simpson, Scott | National | Coromandel | Rural | North | 6.0 | 75.1 | -69.2 |
| Sio, William | Labour | Mangere | Major Urban Center | North | 38.8 | 31.1 | 7.7 |
| Smith, Lockwood | National | Rodney | Medium-Size City | North | 79.1 | 80.1 | -1.0 |
| Smith, Nick | National | Nelson | Medium-Size City | South | 95.4 | 81.9 | 13.5 |
| Smith, Stuart | National | Kaikōura | Rural | South | 11.6 | 68.4 | -56.8 |
| Stanford, Erica | National | East Coast Bays | Major Urban Center | North | 4.0 | 55.7 | -51.6 |
| Steel, Tony | National | Hamilton East | Medium-Size City | North | 93.5 | 82.0 | 11.4 |

| | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|-------------|----------------------|--------------------|-------|------|------|-------|
| Sutton, Jim | Labour | Aoraki | Rural | South | 5.3 | N/A | N/A |
| Swain, Paul | Labour | Rimutaka | Major Urban Center | North | 4.8 | 3.2 | 1.6 |
| Tamihere, John | Labour | Tāmaki Makaurau | Māori | North | 14.5 | 41.3 | -26.8 |
| Tirikatene, Rino | Labour | Te Tai Tonga | Māori | South | 78.4 | 34.8 | 43.6 |
| Tisch, Lindsay | National | Waikato | Rural | North | 83.3 | 57.2 | 26.1 |
| Tizard, Judith | Labour | Auckland Central | Major Urban Center | North | 2.7 | 3.6 | -0.9 |
| Tolley, Anne | National | East Coast | Rural | North | 78.6 | 74.5 | 4.1 |
| Tremain, Chris | National | Napier | Medium-Size City | North | 64.3 | 81.4 | -17.2 |
| Turia, Tariana | Māori Party | Te Tai Hauauru | Māori | North | 17.6 | 22.0 | -4.4 |
| Twyford, Phil | Labour | Te Atatū | Major Urban Center | North | 62.0 | 9.8 | 52.2 |
| Upston, Louise | National | Taupo | Rural | North | 97.0 | 68.3 | 28.7 |
| van, de Molen Tim | National | Waikato | Rural | North | 30.6 | 57.2 | -26.5 |
| Vernon, Belinda | National | Maungakiekie | Major Urban Center | North | 91.3 | 73.2 | 18.1 |
| Wagner, Nicky | National | Christchurch Central | Major Urban Center | South | 70.9 | 75.2 | -4.4 |
| Walker, Hamish | National | Clutha-Southland | Rural | South | 93.4 | 73.4 | 20.0 |
| Wall, Louisa | Labour | Manurewa | Major Urban Center | North | 4.5 | 25.8 | -21.3 |
| Webb, Duncan | Labour | Christchurch Central | Major Urban Center | South | 1.6 | 8.6 | -7.0 |
| Whaitiri, Meka | Labour | Ikaroa-Rawhiti | Māori | North | 81.3 | 20.1 | 61.2 |
| Wilkinson, Kate | National | Waimakariri | Rural | South | 46.7 | 57.1 | -10.4 |

| | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|----------|-------------------|--------------------|-------|------|------|-------|
| Williams, Poto | Labour | Christchurch East | Major Urban Center | South | 60.2 | 5.3 | 54.9 |
| Williamson, Maurice | National | Pakuranga | Major Urban Center | North | 71.3 | 60.7 | 10.6 |
| Wong, Pansy | National | Botany | Major Urban Center | North | 47.9 | 61.3 | -13.4 |
| Wood, Michael | Labour | Mount Roskill | Major Urban Center | North | 64.5 | 11.2 | 53.3 |
| Woods, Megan | Labour | Wigram | Major Urban Center | South | 2.3 | 7.3 | -5.1 |
| Worth, Richard | National | Epsom | Major Urban Center | North | 85.3 | 67.1 | 18.2 |
| Yates, Dianne | Labour | Hamilton East | Medium-Size City | North | 11.3 | 15.4 | -4.2 |
| Young, Jonathan | National | New Plymouth | Medium-Size City | North | 99.2 | 75.3 | 23.9 |
| Yule, Lawrence | National | Tukituki | Rural | North | 87.7 | 77.9 | 9.8 |

Source: Author's calculations based on data from New Zealand Parliament Electorate Profiles and from Historical New Zealand Parliament Hansard Reports

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