The Los Angeles Police Department after the End of the Consent Decree

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The Los Angeles Police Department after the End of the Consent Decree

Submitted to
Michael Fortner

By
Daniela Corona

For
Senior Thesis
Fall 2022
December 5th, 2022
Dedico esta tesis a Yanira Serrano. El momento que te ve tendida y sangrando en la calle, la vida dejando tus ojos, fue el momento que cambio la trayectoria de mi vida. Yo estoy aquí estudiando porque el oficial de policía te robo de la oportunidad. Yo estoy aquí porque tú falleciste, pero el oficial seguí viviendo sin repercusiones. Deseo que un día yo tenga el poder para evitar tragedias como estas.
Abstract

The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) entered into a consent decree with the Department of Justice in 2001. The LAPD was tasked with reforming a range of behaviors and practices including racial profiling, excessive use of force and corruption. Previous studies suggest that after the implementation of the consent decree the LAPD was able to reduce their uses of force and improve public perception of their department while still maintaining an effective level of policing activity and preventing increases in the crime rate. This paper seeks to revisit the LAPD after the end of the consent decree and assess if these trends continued.
# Table of Contents

Acknowledgements.................................................................................................................. 2
Abstract.................................................................................................................................. 3

Chapter 1.................................................................................................................................. 6
Introduction............................................................................................................................... 6
The Role of Police ..................................................................................................................... 7
Consent Decrees as a Tool for Reform .................................................................................... 11
Corruption in the Los Angeles Police Department ................................................................. 14
Assessing the effects of the Consent Decree .......................................................................... 18
Methodology ............................................................................................................................ 21

Chapter 2.................................................................................................................................. 25
Introduction............................................................................................................................... 25
Police Activity .......................................................................................................................... 26
LAPD Use of Force .................................................................................................................. 31
Los Angeles Crime Rate .......................................................................................................... 33
Los Angeles Resident Perceptions .......................................................................................... 36

Chapter 3.................................................................................................................................. 40
Introduction............................................................................................................................... 40
Proposition 47 .......................................................................................................................... 41
Dispatch and Technology Shifts .............................................................................................. 42
Changes in Leadership ............................................................................................................ 45
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 47

Appendix.................................................................................................................................... 52
Figure 1: Vehicle and Pedestrian stops from 2010 to 2018, by month .................................... 52
Figure 2: Vehicle and Pedestrian stops from 2010 to 2018, by year ........................................ 53
Figure 3: Pedestrian stops from 2010 to 2018, by month and race .......................................... 54
Table 1: Percent of Pedestrian stops by race ........................................................................... 55
Figure 4: Vehicle stops from 2010 to 2018, by month and race .............................................. 56
Table 2: Percent of Vehicle Stops by Race ............................................................................... 57
Table 3: Total Number of Arrests by Year .............................................................................. 58
Table 4 : Percent of Arrest Types ............................................................................................ 59
Figure 5: Number of Arrests, by Month and Race ................................................................. 60
Table 5: Percent of Arrests by Race ....................................................................................... 61
Table 6: Percent Types of Arrests by Race from 2010 to 2018 ............................................... 62
Table 7: Los Angeles City Demographics by Year ................................................................. 63
Figure 6: Number of Deaths by LAPD Officers from 2009 to 2021 ................................. 64
Table 8: Death by LAPD Officers, Highest Level of Force Used ........................................ 65
Table 9: Deaths by LAPD Officers, by Race ......................................................................... 66
Table 10: Differences between Deaths by LAPD Officers Before and After the End of the Consent Decree ........................................................................................................... 67
Figure 7: Investigations into Categorical Uses of Force from 2009 to 2021 ....................... 68
Table 11: Ratio of Use of Force Investigations to Arrests, per 100,000 people .................. 69
Figure 8: California and Los Angeles Violent Crime Rate from 2008 to 2019 .................... 70
Table 12: Percent Difference in Violent Crime Rates from the Previous Year ..................... 71
Table 13: Effect of LAPD Arrests on the Violent Crime Rate in Los Angeles ..................... 72
Table 14: Los Angeles Resident Survey Responses: Public Satisfaction ............................ 73
Table 15: Los Angeles Survey Responses: Fair Treatment .................................................. 74
Figure 9: LAPD Bureau Divisions ..................................................................................... 75
Figure 10: LAPD Arrests in 2010 ...................................................................................... 76
Figure 11: LAPD Arrests in 2011 ...................................................................................... 77
Figure 12: LAPD Arrests in 2012 ...................................................................................... 78
Figure 13: LAPD Arrests in 2013 ...................................................................................... 79
Figure 14: LAPD Arrests in 2014 ...................................................................................... 80
Figure 15: LAPD Arrests in 2015 ...................................................................................... 81
Figure 16: LAPD Arrests in 2016 ...................................................................................... 82
Figure 17: LAPD Arrests in 2017 ...................................................................................... 83
Bibliography ...................................................................................................................... 84
Chapter 1

Introduction

In May 2020 a video once again went viral and sparked outrage and protest of police brutality. Police officer Derek Chauvin knelt on George Floyd’s neck for over nine minutes, the autopsy later deemed Floyd’s death a homicide.1 George Floyd’s name is one of many. Many other people’s deadly encounters with police officers previously reached the national stage: Breonna Taylor, Michael Brown, Tamir Rice, and Rodney King. After each incident a portion of citizens take to the streets and demand change. How can it be that after decades of similar incidents reoccurring, the United States continues to struggle with police and civilian relations?

Across the country, numerous groups have tried to find ways to reform their police departments. At the federal level, the Department of Justice has a legal method of compelling police departments to change their behavior and reform their policies. Consent decrees are mutually binding agreements between police departments and a federal judge, the agreements lay out the proposed reforms and an independent monitor assesses progress until all the terms are met.2 Studies of several police departments while under consent decrees suggest that they may be successful at changing some patterns and behaviors of police departments. This paper seeks to assess if these changes remain in place even after the end of the consent decree.

This chapter will briefly explore the policies and shifts that shaped the modern role of police. The next section will discuss a history of reforms and strategies used to improve police-

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2 Consent Decree: U.S v. City of Los Angeles, California, Board of Police Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles, and the Los Angeles Police Department (United States Central District Court of California 2000).
civilian relations, specifically focusing on consent decrees. After I will look at the Los Angeles Police Department in greater depth and explain the major events that led the department to enter into a consent decree. Then I will summarize the findings of a report that assessed the changes in the LAPD as the consent decree was implemented. Finally, I will conclude with a methodology section that will guide the rest of the paper.

**The Role of Police**

Amid a rise in violent crime Americans sought for a semblance of safety and protection. The period from about 1970 to the 1990s saw a rapid increase in the national homicide rate, many large cities especially saw a rise in violent crime. Accordingly, many politicians presented themselves as “tough on crime”. At the national level, President Nixon declared a war on drugs in 1971. About a decade later, Wilson and Kelling first introduced the broken windows model of policing. These factors caused police across the county to shift towards heavier policing in areas with more violent crime, cracking down on disorderly crimes like loitering, vandalism and property damage, and taking more aggressive measures on drug related crimes. These measures were popular among Americans at the time, including the majority black and brown residents of the areas most affected by the violent crime.

From 1970 to 1990s the national homicide rate hovered at 8 to 10 deaths per 100,000 people. By the end of the 1990s, the homicide rate was at 6 deaths per 100,000 people, almost

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4 Ibid
7 Patrick Sharkey 2018
8 Ibid
9 Ibid
half of peak homicide rate and it continued to drop.\textsuperscript{10} The drop in violent crime is even more pronounced in cities. In 1993, 40 percent of cities had a homicide rate greater than 20 per 100,000 residents, by 2014 that number dropped to 2014.\textsuperscript{11} This decline in violent crime came with a cost. The changes in policing tactics likely contributed to declines in violent crime but created new issues for the communities they policed.

Patrick Sharkey described the crime drop as the most important public health breakthrough for Black Americans. The decline in homicide rate led to a 0.3 to a 1.08 rise in life expectancy for Black men.\textsuperscript{12} This would be equivalent to eliminating the impact of obesity on life expectancy. Yet, these same communities that saw the greatest decline in crime also saw a rise of incidents of police misconduct.\textsuperscript{13} For example, in New York City, the city crime decline was largely attributed to the NYPD’s stop and frisk policy.\textsuperscript{14} Black people were stopped 2.5 times as much as White people while controlling for relative arrests level among racial groups and precincts.\textsuperscript{15} Following the crime drop the U.S prison population began dramatically increasing in the 1970s.\textsuperscript{16,17} These lower-income, minority communities then faced a new issue of over policing and a deteriorating relationship with law enforcement.

At the same time that the government cracked down on crime, they also moved to reduce welfare spending. Joseph Davey details how researchers at the time found a relationship between

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{10} Ibid \\
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid \\
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid \\
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid \\
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid \\
\textsuperscript{17} Patrick Sharkey 2018
\end{flushleft}
the violence and turmoil in cities and welfare enrollment rates. An analysis between cities with major riots and those without shows that the riot cities saw almost double the increase in welfare expenditures than non-riot cities. Along with this rhetoric, President Reagan conjured up the image of the welfare queen and declared his intent to reform the welfare system. In his first year of office, Reagan eliminated most payments to working families, reduced benefits for most Aid to Families with Dependent Children recipients and made cut to low-income public housing assistance. Davey notes how in the years following Reagan’s reforms, the U.S saw a rise in homelessness and poverty rates. For example, before Regan the U.S spent 0.42 percent of GNP on cash assistance programs, by the end of Regan’s presidency in 1988 the number dropped to 0.18 percent. During roughly the same time period the after tax family income of the lowest 10 percent of U.S households dropped 10.5 percent. The government decreased spending on and their support of the poor. Yet, someone needed to deal with the effects of poverty and homelessness that would soon affect cities across the country.

Local governments increasingly turned to police to deal with poverty and mentally ill citizens. One example of this was seen in Los Angles’s Skid Row. Forrest in Down, Out and Under Arrests describes the Safe Cities Initiative in Los Angles that sought to aid the disproportionately unemployed and homeless residents of Skid Row. Police encouraged residents to participate in rehabilitation programs by offering to not issue citations or arrest the

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19 Ibid
20 Ibid
22 Joseph Dillon Davey 1995
23 Ibid
24 Ibid
individual if they agreed to take part in the programs.  

Police took a more active role in the lives of Skid Row residents by encouraging them to take part in government work programs, drug rehabilitation, and homelessness initiatives using their powers of arrests and citations. However, Safe Cities Initiative and other initiatives like it caused more harm than good. Police only have punitive measures at their disposal. According to one Sergeant overseeing the division encompassing Skid Row, prior to the Safer Cities Initiative, police officers rarely arrested people in Skid Row. After the first year of the Initiative, the 50-block area with a population of 10,000 to 15,000 people saw 9,000 arrests and 12,000 citations. The compounding citations and arrests that police threaten civilians with place a heavy burden on an already struggling population. Compounding fees accompany citations. And arrests may disqualify people from housing, social services, and work. Ultimately, the initiative failed to meet its goal.

Governments increasingly ask police to respond to mental health emergencies and people in distress. Almost 20 percent of police calls for services involve people with mental health illness or people in crisis. Without proper training or knowledge with how to deal with such situations, encounters between people with mental illnesses and police become deadly. A report finds that people with severe mental illness make up 1 in 4 of all fatal police encounters. Thus,

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26 Ibid  
27 Ibid  
29 Forrest Stuart 2016  
30 Ibid  
police find themselves taking on more roles that they are ill equipped to handle. In recent years, governments and other organizations developed partnerships and programs to address these issues. The programs range from Crisis Intervention Training (CIT) for police, to mental health response teams or a blended mental health and police response model.

Governments today ask police to take on duties that seem further and further removed from public safety and protection from crime. To tackle increasing crime rates many cities decreased social services and increased spending on enforcement and policing. As poverty and homelessness became more prominent in urban spaces and affected the quality of life in certain areas governments called on the police to control them and take a more active role in their lives. And finally, governments ask police to handle and respond to mental health emergencies. These shifts contributed to a greater amount of police interactions with communities and greater overall police presence in certain areas.

Consent Decrees as a Tool for Reform

Due in part to the Rodney King trial and a series of other high profile police misconduct incidents, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act in 1994. This law allowed the Department of Justice to review the practices of law enforcement agencies. If the Department found a “pattern or practice” by the agency that violated people’s rights or discriminated on the basis of race, color, sex or national origin, the Department had the power to sue and enter into a consent decree with the law enforcement agency, compelling them to reform their practices. Consent decrees are mutually binding agreements employed by the Department of Justice. The implementation of a consent decree requires a federal judge to oversee the case,

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34 Ibid
an independent monitor to assess compliance with the consent decree and usually includes federal support in the form of funding or technical expertise. Once the Department establishes evidence of a pattern or practice of discrimination or abuse, they can begin discussions with the police department about drafting up the consent decree and choosing an independent monitor to oversee them.

The Department of Justice can use a variety of tools at their disposal to compel police agencies to reform. Other examples aside from consent decrees include Collaborative Reforms and Memorandum of Agreements. These agreements are voluntary, unlike the consent decrees. Moreover, these types of agreements could substitute for consent decrees if agencies take action on issues within Departments that may trigger consent decrees. Technical Assistance letters and investigative findings are other voluntary agreements that define best practices and provide guidance to police departments. Consent decrees are the most severe agreements; these agreements are enforced through federal judges and under the threat of the loss of federal funding.

The prevalence of consent decrees varies depending on the administration. The Obama administration entered into 15 consent decrees with police departments not including consent decrees that the Department of Justice inherited from the previous administration. The Trump

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36 Ibid
38 Ibid
39 Ibid
40 Ibid
administration did not enact any new consent decrees throughout Trump’s presidency.\textsuperscript{42} In fact, in 2018, Trump’s Attorney General Jeff Sessions signed a memo curtailing the Justice Department’s use of consent decrees.\textsuperscript{43} Under the Biden administration, Attorney General Garland rescinded the policy limiting consent decrees.\textsuperscript{44} Since then, the Biden administration has opened up two new consent decrees, one with the Orange County police department and another with the Springfield Police department.\textsuperscript{45}

Most researchers find that consent decrees or Memorandum of Agreements produce short term improvements among police departments. One Harvard analysis of the LAPD consent decree by Stone, Cole, and Foglesong found significant improvements of the department several years after the consent decree was first implemented.\textsuperscript{46} Another report found that after the city of Pittsburgh implemented a consent decree, police services improved, and civilian complaints went down.\textsuperscript{47} Analysis of police departments after the end of consent decrees is limited. One such analysis includes an assessment of the District of Columbia police department over 10 years after the end of their consent decree. The report found that the DC police department maintained most of their commitments to limiting uses of force as was outlined in the consent decree but did not maintain the level of rigor that the consent decree required in terms of reporting and


\textsuperscript{45} “Special Litigation Section: Conduct of Law Enforcement Agencies” 2022


investigating uses of force. Thus, the report notes that this led to delays in resolving officer-involved fatal shootings and underreporting of uses of force. Alpert, McLean, and Wolfe state that, “Once the decree is fulfilled, however that is operationalized, and the Department of Justice and the monitors leave, there is no requirement to maintain the standard that earned the resolution of the decree.” It is unclear whether consent decrees produce long-lasting reforms among police departments, or whether police department relax their policies and fall back into old patterns after the consent decree has been lifted.

**Corruption in the Los Angeles Police Department**

The Los Angeles Police Department has a history of excessive use of force particularly geared towards minority residents. In 1943, after various tense and violent interactions between off-duty police officers and U.S servicemen and Latino youth, a number of U.S service members and police officers attacked Latino youth. The violence continued over a couple days and officers and servicemen also attacked Black and Filipino youth, the incident was named the Zoot Suit riots. In 1965, a police officer arrested a black man for drunk driving in a majority black neighborhood. As a crowd formed more police arrived and the incident erupted into violence with 34 dead and thousands injured. In 1983 the Supreme Court reviewed the case City of Los Angeles v. Lyons: Lyons, a black motorist, sought to prohibit chokeholds after he was placed in

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49 Ibid
50 Geoffrey P. Alpert, Kyle McLean, and Scott Wolfe 2017
52 Ibid
54 Ibid
one by LAPD officers following a routine traffic stop. Despite the history of violence against minority groups it was not until the early 2000s that the federal government took action.

Two key incidents spurred the Department of Justice to step in and compel the Los Angeles Police Department to implement reforms. In 1991, Rodney King engaged in a high-speed chase against police. After police ordered him out of the car, the four officers beat Rodney King with batons and kicked him repeatedly for fifteen minutes with numerous other cops standing by. A bystander recorded the incident, and it became one of the first viral videos depicting police brutality. A year later the jury acquits the four officers involved of almost all their felony assault charges. Jody David, a professor of criminal justice and law at USC stated that the verdict shocked people across the country. Hours after the verdict was released, people of Los Angeles began to riot. The unrest lasted for five days and led to over 50 deaths. In 1999, Raphael Perez pled guilty to engaging in perjury, fabrication of evidence, false arrests, stealing drugs from police evidence lockers and reselling them, excessive police force, stealing guns and drugs from gang members and other corruption related crimes. Perez was a part of the Rampart Division and he and others used the discretion that the Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums (CRASH) granted them to engage in corrupt behaviors. Both the Rodney King incident and the Rampart scandal appeared to show two obvious, widely-known, examples of

57 Ibid
59 Anjuli Sastry and Karen Grigsby Bates 2017
60 Ibid
62 Ibid
potentially racist, corrupt behavior from the LAPD. These two incidents triggered investigations by the Department of Justice looking into the LAPD and their patterns of racial discrimination and police misconduct.

In 2000, the Department of Justice announced that it was suing Los Angeles over a pattern and practice of police misconduct unless the city and police department agreed to numerous reforms.63 Months after, the LAPD entered into a consent decree under the supervision of the federal court and it went into effect in 2001.64 The LAPD agreed to improve on a number of different areas within the police department. One area of improvement was to create metrics for police officer performance and to improve data collection, including data collection on the race, gender, and sexual orientation of people stopped and detained.65 They agreed to improve certain aspects dealing with police corruption such as streamlining the processing for investigating complaints against police officers and prohibiting retaliation against employees that speak up.66 The LAPD also agreed to review successful mental health programs and prepare an analysis of their departments’ dealings with people with mental health illnesses. The consent decree was set to last a minimum of five years unless the court found reason to extend the decree. A Federal judge lifted the consent decree in 2009 and set in place a Transition Agreement that the judge then deemed complete in 2012.67

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64 Consent Decree: U.S v. City of Los Angeles, California, Board of Police Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles, and the Los Angeles Police Department (United States Central District Court of California 2000).
65 Ibid
66 Ibid
The LAPD and Department of Justice hired Michael Cherkasky and Kroll Associates as the Independent Monitor overseeing the implementation of the consent decree. Cherkasky and Kroll Associates submitted quarterly reports on the progress that the LAPD was making. In their first report, the Monitor highlighted several concerns. First, a small group of police officers opposed the consent decree and believed that the police that responded to the Rodney King incident had handled it “properly”. And second, the consent decree ordered the LAPD to review and complete investigations into misconduct complaints, however, even after five months the department still maintained a significant backlog in complaints. Two years after the start of the consent decree, Cherkasky and Kroll Associates still reported substantial issues with accepting and processing civilian complaints. The monitor also reported issues with the lack of discipline that officers found to have improperly discharged their weapon faced, they deemed the lack of progress on tackling these issues as “outrageous and discouraging” The monitor determined the police department to be in near complete compliance by the time they released their quarterly report in November 2006.

70 Ibid
72 Ibid
Assessing the effects of the Consent Decree

While the independent monitor reported on compliance with the consent decree, another report released by the Harvard Criminal Justice Policy and Management program, “Policing Los Angeles Under a Consent Decree”, looked at the effects of the consent decree implementation. In particular, the report focused on assessing if the implementation of the LAPD changed the culture of the department and its relationship with the community it serves. The report assessed rates of violent crime, the racial composition of the LAPD, data on vehicle and pedestrian stops, use of force data, and civilian opinions of the LAPD.\(^7^4\) The report noted that they sought to analyze data on pedestrian and civilian stops and crimes rates because of the concerns of “depolicing” that the consent decree might have caused among LAPD officers.\(^7^5\) The concern was that police officers may be hesitant to stop people or use necessary force because they may fear repercussions. The report cites a study conducted in 2003 that found that 79 percent of officers agreed that the consent decree impeded the ability of the LAPD to reduce crime.\(^7^6\) Thus, the belief was that stricter policies on uses of force and greater oversight over police action may lead to increases in crime rates and less police and civilian interactions. The report assessed these claims by analyzing arrests and other police activity.

The report determined that the issue of depolicing did not materialize. The report found declines in both violent crime and property crime rates. The period from 1992 to 1999 saw a 52 percent decline in violent crimes\(^7^7\). In 1992 there were over 80,000 violent crimes reported. In 2008 the number dropped down to 30,000 crimes reported. Yet, there were also more stops and arrests made by police after the start of the consent decree. From 2002 to 2008 there were 49

\(^7^4\) Christopher Stone, Todd Foglesong, and Christine M. Cole 2009
\(^7^5\) Ibid
\(^7^6\) Ibid
\(^7^7\) Ibid
percent more motor vehicle and pedestrian stops made by LAPD officers. Additionally, the report noted that the percentage of vehicle or pedestrian stops that resulted in arrests also increased. About 16 percent of pedestrian stops led to arrests in 2002, that number increased to 34 percent in 2008. Thus, the new policies mandated by the consent decree did not seem to lead to depolicing.

The report found declines in all uses of force among LAPD officers during this time period. The LAPD and the consent decree distinguished between categorical and non-categorical uses of force. They defined categorical uses of force as being lethal uses of force such as use of a firearm, head-strikes with weapons, and carotid artery holds; they defined non-categorical uses of force as being non-lethal uses of force such as physical force to overcome resistance, use of tasers, or stun guns. In 2004 there were over 130 recoded categorical uses of force. By 2008 there were roughly 100 categorical recorded uses of force. Similarly, the report notes that incidents of non-categorical uses of force declines during the same time period from over 500 recorded incidents to less than 400 by 2008. The report notes that these declines in uses of force are significant especially considering the increases in the number of arrests during this period. Notably, the report points out that while overall uses of force declined, in some divisions the reported incidents of uses of force increased. Additionally, Black and Hispanic people are disproportionately more likely to be subject to all uses of force when compared to White or Asian people.

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78 Ibid
79 Ibid
80 Ibid
81 Ibid
82 Ibid
The report stated that public opinion of the LAPD had improved since the department signed the consent decree. When Los Angeles residents were asked if they thought the services of the police in Los Angeles were excellent, good, fair or poor, only about 45 percent of residents said the services were good or excellent in 2005.\(^3\) In 2009 over 60 percent of residents said the services were good or excellent.\(^4\) Again, Hispanic and Black residents tended to have lower levels of positive assessments towards the LAPD. For example, almost 30 percent of Black residents stated that the LAPD would be less likely to bring offenders to justice while respecting their rights and complying with the law as compared to the LAPD three years ago. While only about 15 percent of total residents said the same.\(^5\) In 2005, when asked whether police in the community treat all racial and ethnic groups fairly, 39 percent of residents stated that the statement was “almost always” true or true “most of the time”.\(^6\) In 2009, the number rose to 51 percent of residents. Overall, the report found positive changes in public opinion since the consent decree was signed.

The report, “Policing Los Angeles Under a Consent Decree” found that the implementation of the consent decree had a positive effect on the LAPD and the community it services. Since the start of the consent decree, the relationship between the community and the LAPD has improved. Additionally, the rates of reported police misconduct declined during the same time period. Moreover, these changes coincided with declines in violent crime and property crime rates as well.

\(^3\) Ibid
\(^4\) Ibid
\(^5\) Ibid
\(^6\) Ibid
Methodology

This paper seeks to assess if the trends that the Stone, Foglesong and Cole report found remained consistent from the time that the consent decree was dissolved up until the present day. A federal judge lifted the consent decree in 2009 and the transition agreement was complete in 2012, thus this paper will focus on the time period from about 2009 to the present.87 One concern may be that after the end of the consent decree, the LAPD may have reverted back to their practices from before the consent decree-imposed changes within the department.

I will begin by assessing police activity and interactions with civilians. I will use the arrest data from 2010 to the present published by the city of Los Angeles to assess if there have been dramatic changes in the number of arrests over the years.88 I will also use vehicle and pedestrian stop data published by the city from 2010 to 2017 along with demographic data to assess if there are any racial groups that are disproportionately represented in the data.89 Additionally, I will use reported rates of violent crime in the LAPD published by the FBI from 2009 to 2021.90 Using this data I will assess the trends of police activity and changes in violent crime during the period after the end of the consent decree.

The Stone, Foglesong and Cole report investigates the phenomenon of “de-policing” and determined that it did not occur during the observed time period.91 As previously stated, the report sought to assess if the consent decree would have caused police officers to decrease their police activity out of concern for their actions being more heavily scrutinized. The report noted

87 CBS News Los Angeles 2013
88 “Arrest Data from 2010 to 2019” (City of Los Angeles, August 31, 2022), https://data.lacity.org/browse?q=Arrest%20Data%20&sortBy=relevance.
89Ibid
91 Christopher Stone, Todd Foglesong, and Christine M. Cole 2009
that de-policing could cause a rise in crime rates from lack of police enforcement and surveillance. Therefore, I will also assess the crime rate in the city of Los Angeles and compare it to the total arrests and vehicle and pedestrian stops, while controlling for the violent crime rate in California and the United States. To assess the relationship between violent crime and the number of arrests I will run a linear regression model that takes the follow form:

\[
\ln(\text{Violent Crime Rate in LA}) = \ln(\text{Total Arrests})\beta_1 + \alpha
\]

\[
\ln(\text{Violent Crime Rate in LA}) = \ln(\text{Total Arrests})\beta_1 + \ln(\text{Vehicle and Pedestrian stops})\beta_2 + \alpha
\]

\[
\ln(\text{Violent Crime Rate in LA}) = \ln(\text{Total Arrests})\beta_1 + \ln(\text{Vehicle and Pedestrian stops})\beta_2 + \ln(\text{Violent Crime Rate in CA})\beta_3 + \ln(\text{Violent Crime Rate in the U.S})\beta_4 + \alpha
\]

I use will both data published by the LAPD and independent sources to assess LAPD use of force. The LAPD publishes reports on categorical uses of force for all incidents adjudicated by the Board of Police Commissioners.\textsuperscript{92} I will use the published reports from 2009 to 2021. One issue with these use of force reports is that they are only published for categorical uses of force, these reports are published regardless of whether or not the Board of Police Commissioners deems the use of force to be within policy.\textsuperscript{93} I will also use data collected by the Fatal Encounters organization that seeks to independently collect data on the number of people killed by police.\textsuperscript{94} Fatal Encounters includes data starting from 2000 to the present, I will use their data, filtered to only include deaths caused by the LAPD

\textsuperscript{92} “Abridged Summary Of Categorical Use Of Force Incident Findings By The Los Angeles Board Of Police Commissioners,” Los Angeles Police Department (blog), 2021, https://www.lapdonline.org/police-commission/categorical-use-of-force/.

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid

\textsuperscript{94} “Fatal Encounters” (Brian Burghart, 2022), https://fatalencounters.org/methodology/.
The Harvard report conducted numerous surveys on resident opinion of the LAPD, I will use surveys conducted by different groups to assess differences in public opinion. Two organizations, Justice & Security Strategies and Hart Research Associates conducted a Los Angeles resident survey in 2016 on their perceptions of safety and police.\textsuperscript{95} I chose this survey for its exclusive focus on Los Angeles residents and their use of geographic bureaus and multi-language phone interview to ensure an accurate representation of the city adult residents.\textsuperscript{96} Loyola Marymount University conducted a survey in 2022 in the aftermath of the racial justice demonstrations in 2020 to assess Los Angeles resident opinions on policing in their city.\textsuperscript{97} This survey also includes cross tabulations based on the respondents race or ethnicity. I use these two surveys, one in 2016 and one in 2022 to assess Los Angeles resident public opinion on their police department after the end of the consent decree and after the racial justice demonstrations in 2020. All three surveys include similar questions on LAPD fair treatment and assessment of LAPD performance. Each survey asks nearly identical questions (Table 10 and 11). However, differences in the responses can also be attributed to different wording in questions, sample size differences, sample error, and method of survey response collection.

This chapter reviewed a brief history of the role of police and looked at consent decrees as a tool for reform specifically. Then I looked at the incidents and occurrences of corruption that led to the LAPD consent decree. After, I reviewed the Stone et al report that assessed the impact of the consent decree on the LAPD. Finally, I explained the methodology I will use to revisit the

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid
\textsuperscript{97} “Public Opinion on Policing in Los Angeles: Police Data Brief,” 2022 Police and Community Relations Survey (Thomas and Dorothy Leavey Center for the Study of Los Angeles: Loyola Marymount University, 2022), https://lmu.app.box.com/s/rxjxotx7uaxfs5cm0q07w6m8ignbla26.
trends observed by the Stone et al report and assess if the end of the consent decree affects the observed trends. The next chapter will review the trends in police activity, police use of force, the city crime rate, and city resident’s perceptions of the police department. I will compare these trends to the findings in the Stone et. al report. In the third chapter I will provide some explanations for the observed changes in police activity and changes in racial disparities of stops and arrests.
Chapter 2

Introduction

I will begin by assessing the Los Angeles Police Department’s level of activity. Using vehicle and pedestrian stops and arrest data I will see if police activity has remained consistent after the end of the consent decree or it has significantly changed since the end of the consent decree. The Stone et al. report would predict that police activity is likely to increase after the end of the consent decree since the LAPD officers would no longer be under intense scrutiny over their actions. I will also assess the racial distribution of total stops and arrests to see if the declines in the overrepresentation of minorities continued after the end of the consent decree. Then I will look at LAPD use of force to see if the declines found by the Stone et al report continued. I will use the published categorical use of force investigations published by the LAPD and instances of fatal police encounters published by an independent source.

Afterwards I will look to compare the level of police activity to the Los Angeles violent crime rate. The Stone et al. report hypothesized that the consent decree would cause police officers to limit their police activity because their actions would be more heavily scrutinized. The Stone et al. report then noted that this decline in police activity would cause an increase in violent crime since police were no longer patrolling or enforcing laws at the level that they once were.\(^98\) In fact, the Stone et al. paper found that after the start of the consent decree police activity increased.\(^99\) Thus, the report did not test their theory in comparing violent crime to police

\(^{98}\) Christopher Stone, Todd Foglesong, and Christine M. Cole 2009

\(^{99}\) Ibid
activity. In this paper I will compare police activity and the violent crime level in the city of Los Angeles to assess if there is a relationship between these two variables.

Finally, I will assess changes in Los Angeles resident opinions on the LAPD. The Stone et al. report found improvements in Los Angeles residents’ perceptions of LAPD officer’s job performance and on LAPD officer treatment of racial and ethnic groups. Two surveys conducted on Los Angeles city residents, one in 2016 and another in 2022 also ask respondents about their perceptions of LAPD job performance and their treatment of racial and ethnic groups. I will use the responses from these two surveys to see if there have been any significant changes since the end of the consent decree.

**Police Activity**

Stops and arrests are indicators of police activity. One concern expressed by the Stone et al report was that the consent decree would decrease police stops because of the increased scrutiny on police behavior. One of the driving factors behind the initiation of the consent decree was the “pattern and practice” of racist policing shown through disproportionate stops and arrests of Black and Hispanic people. Continuing to engage in racist practices would lead to the LAPD being in violation of the consent decree. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that police officers may have become more hesitant to engage in stops and arrests after the start of the consent decree. Even if a police officer engages in perfectly sound and legal stops and arrests, the officer may fear that the interaction could be construed as a violation of the consent decree. Therefore, the Stone et al report measure police activity to see if this phenomenon of “de-policing” occurred after the implementation of the consent decree.

\[100\] Consent decree
I first assess vehicle and pedestrian stops to see if the period after the end of the consent decree saw an increase in stops. The city of Los Angeles published all vehicle and pedestrian stop data for the Los Angeles Police Department from 2010 to 2018. From about 2011 to 2015, vehicle stops doubled from about 30 thousand per year to about 60 thousand per month (Figure 1). After 2015, the vehicle stops dropped back to about 40-50 thousand per month. The number of pedestrian stops remained at about 10 to 20 thousand per month during this time period (Figure 1). When looking at both pedestrian and vehicle stops, the total number of stops declined after 2011 from a high of 950,635 stops in 2011 to 417,883 total stops in 2018 (Figure 2). The Stone et al. article reported a 49 percent increase in vehicle and pedestrian stops from 2002 to 2008. However, after the end of the consent decree vehicle and pedestrian stops declined by 56 percent from 2011 to 2018.

Image 3 shows the number of pedestrian stops by race. The data only include Black, Hispanic and White since these three combined make up over 90 percent of all pedestrian and vehicle stops. The Stone et al article found minimal change in the racial distribution of all individuals stopped from 2002 to 2008 despite the fact that pedestrian and vehicle stops increased. For example, Black people made up 22 and 23 percent of all individuals stopped in 2002 and 2008 respectively. Yet, the report did note that Black people made up about 36 percent of all pedestrian stops, showing that they were overrepresented particularly in pedestrian stops. After the end of the consent decree there were increases in pedestrian stops from about

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101 “Vehicle and Pedestrian Stop Data 2010 to Present by Race and Division” (City of Los Angeles, December 31, 2017), [https://data.lacity.org/Public-Safety/Vehicle-and-Pedestrian-Stop-Data-2010-to-Present-b/afaq-3tnp](https://data.lacity.org/Public-Safety/Vehicle-and-Pedestrian-Stop-Data-2010-to-Present-b/afaq-3tnp).

102 Christopher Stone, Todd Foglesong, and Christine M. Cole 2009

103 Ibid

104 Ibid
2011 to 2015, followed by a decline and then another spike at the end of 2017 (Image 3). These patterns were reflected among all three races. Hispanics made up about 44-48 percent of all pedestrian stops during this time period (Table 1). Hispanics also made up about 48 percent of the City of Los Angeles population (Table 7). Black people made up about 30 to 35 percent of all pedestrian stops while they only make up about 8 to 9 percent of the city’s population (Table 1). White people made up 16 to 17 percent of pedestrian stops, yet they make up almost 30 percent of the city’s population (Table 1). Black people continue to be overrepresented in the number of pedestrian stops while White people are underrepresented in the number of pedestrian stops.

Image 4 shows the number of vehicle stops by race, only including Black, Hispanic and White people. The Stone et al report found that Black people made up about 19 percent of all vehicle stops. After the end of the consent decree, 2010 to 2018, the percentage of Hispanics increased slightly from about 37 percent to over 45 percent of all vehicle stops (Table 2). The percentage of Black people stopped by police during this time period nearly doubled from about 16 percent to almost 30 percent of all vehicle stops (Table 2). At the same time, the percentage of White people stopped nearly halved from 33 percent to about 16 percent of all vehicle stops (Table 2). Image 3 shows that 2015 was around the time when a greater percentage of Black people were stopped and the percentage of White people stopped dropped below 20 percent. For the first few years, the percentage of White people in vehicles sopped nearly matched the percentage of White people residing in the city, however, after 2015 White people were underrepresented in the number of vehicle stops (Table 7). Despite the decline in stops, nearly double the percentage of Black people in vehicles were stopped when compared to the percent of Black people residing in the city (Table 7). Once again, Black people were overrepresented and

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105 Ibid
White people were underrepresented in vehicle stops. After the end of the consent decree the racial disparities in vehicle and pedestrian stops increased.

Arrests are another indicator of police activity. Like vehicle stops and arrests, the Stone et al. report feared that the consent decree would have caused a decline in the number of arrests. I assess the arrest data from 2010 to 2019 to see if the level of arrests changed after the end of the consent decree. The Stone et. al report did find that total LAPD arrests declined from 1992 to 2007. Yet they claimed that depolicing did not occur since the number of arrests for non-violent index crimes increased after 2002. The decline in arrests continued after the end of the consent decree. The city of Los Angeles published all arrest data from the Los Angeles Police Department from 2010 to 2019. During the nine years, the number of LAPD arrests nearly halved from a high of 163,659 in 2012 to 92,450 in 2019 (Table 3). Misdemeanors are the most common arrest disposition type making up about 60 percent of all arrests, followed by felony arrests at about 15 percent (Table 4). Notably, city attorney and district attorney rejections increased during this time period from 3 to nearly 9 percent of all arrests (Table 4). This can perhaps be explained by the city attorney policies. City attorney, Mike Feuer was elected in 2012 and is currently still in office. Jackie Lacey served as the district attorney for Los Angeles County from 2012 to 2020. In 2014, city attorney Feuer asked the LAPD to reduce the number of quality-of-life citations or at the least, reduce the misdemeanor citations to mere infractions. Reportedly, when the LAPD did not reduce the number of citations issued, Feuer’s office

106 Ibid
107 Ibid
108 “Arrest Data from 2010 to 2019” 2022
increased the number of arrest rejections. Additionally, after mass demonstrations in the city, such as protests to Trump’s election and protest to the incident in Ferguson, the LAPD arrested hundreds of people and Feuer and Lacey’s offices were known to reject many of these arrests on lack of evidence.

The racial disparities shown in the vehicle and pedestrian stop data are also reflected in the arrest data (Image 5). Hispanics make up 45 to 50 percent of arrests, Black people make up 27 to 30 percent and White people make up 17 to 19 percent of arrests (Table 5). As previously noted, the majority of the arrests are misdemeanor arrests. However, Black people have the greatest percentage of felony arrests among all races. About 21 percent of all arrests are felony arrests for Black people, while Hispanic and White people felony arrests are at 15 and 14 percent respectively (Table 6). Thus, despite the decline in the number of arrests during this time period, racial disparities persisted. The Stone et al report did not analyze the arrest data racial distribution; therefore, we cannot compare the data to assess if there has been a change in the racial composition of the individuals arrested.

Declines in both arrests and vehicle and pedestrian stops suggest that the LAPD decreased their overall police activity after the end of the consent decree. The Stone et al. article concluded that de-policing did not occur after the implementation of the consent decree because of the increases in vehicle and pedestrian stops. The report also claimed that the “quality” of the stops did not decline as the number of stops increased. Stone et. al bases this claim on the fact

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112 Ibid
that the percentage of stops leading to arrests increased during from 2002 to 2008, therefore, these stops were likely legitimate stops.\textsuperscript{115} However, after the end of the consent decree in 2009, both arrests and pedestrian and vehicle stops declined. Even as the number of stops and arrests declined, Black people were increasingly overrepresented and White people underrepresented.

**LAPD Use of Force**

The LAPD’s history of excessive use of force was another reason why the department entered into a consent decree. The Stone et al report reviewed the number of uses of force incidents and found a decline in use of force incidents after the start of the consent decree.\textsuperscript{116} The Stone et al report did not assess the number of deaths by LAPD officers. Deaths by LAPD officers represent the most extreme cases of use of force incidents and are thus relevant to a use of force analysis. Therefore, this section will look at deaths by LAPD officers during and after the end of the consent decree. And I will look at the use of force incidents after the end of the consent decree to see if there are any changes from the reported trends in the Stone et al report.

The Fatal Encounters database independently collects reports of all deaths at the hands of police since 2000.\textsuperscript{117} I used this data and filtered it to only include deaths at the hands of the Los Angeles police department to assess the number of deaths caused by LAPD officers from 2009 to the present. During this time period there was a slight decline in the number of deaths at the hands of LAPD officers (Image 6). In 2015, the number of deaths peaked at 33 and the lowest number of deaths was in 2020 with 10 deaths (Image 6). The majority of the deaths were caused by gunshots, followed by vehicle related uses of force (Table 8). Hispanics or Latinos make up the majority of the deaths followed by some mixed ratio of Black and White people (Table 9).  

\textsuperscript{115} James Queally 2017  
\textsuperscript{116} Stone  
\textsuperscript{117} “Fatal Encounters” 2022
The Stone et al. article did not assess the number of deaths caused by LAPD officers, however, there is no significant difference between the number of deaths before the end of the consent decree (2000 to 2008) and after the end of the consent decree (2009 to 2021) (Table 10). Given the low number of reported deaths, it is difficult to discern if there exists any significant racial disparities among lethal uses of force by the LAPD.

The Los Angeles Police Department publishes summaries of all Categorical Uses of Force investigations by the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners starting from 2006 to the present. The Los Angeles Police Commissioner specifies that categorical uses of force include officer-involved shootings, death or harm of a person in police custody, any use of force that results in hospitalization, deliberate strikes to the head with an impact weapon and neck restraints. The published summaries include investigations into serious uses of categorical force, regardless of whether the use of force was found to be justified or not. Although, the number of investigations that the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners are dependent on open and honest communication between the LAPD officers and the Office of the Inspector General and the assessment of the Inspector General as to whether an incident warrants an investigation. Therefore, these use of force summaries provide a useful record of the number of incidents in which police officers used excessive force, but it is not a perfectly accurate measure of the true number of use of force incidents.

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118 “Abridged Summary of Categorical Use Of Force Incident Findings By The Los Angeles Board Of Police Commissioners” 2021
120 Ibid
From 2009 to 2021, the number of investigations into categorical uses of force declined (Image 7). The use of force investigations peaked in 2011 at 107 investigations and dropped to the lowest point in 2020 with 41 investigations (Image 7). The overall declines in use of force investigations follow in line with the decline in the number of arrests and pedestrian and vehicle stops during this time period. The less arrests or stops made by LAPD officers, the less opportunities there may be for officers to use force and potentially risk using excessive force.

Looking at the ratio of use of force investigations to arrests per 100,000 people, there does not appear to be a clear pattern from 2010 to 2019 (Table 11). The use of force investigations per arrests ratio increased from 46.7 to 69.9 from 2014 to 2015, this was the most dramatic increase during the observed time period (Table 11). However, by 2019 the ratio returned to 55.2, closer to the mean of about 52 use of force investigations to arrests. The consistent ratio during this time period suggests that use of force incidents may have declined as a result of less police and civilian encounters. As previously noted, both total arrests and total vehicle and pedestrian stops declined from 2010 to 2018. Therefore, it follows that the LAPD would also see declines in the number of use of force investigations. The Stone et al report also found declines in the number of the categorical use of force investigations from 2004 to 2008. The use of force investigations declined over 130 investigations in 2004 to 100 in 2008. The trend continued after the end of the consent decree.

**Los Angeles Crime Rate**

After the end of the consent decree the number of stops and arrests declined. Stone et. al believed that there may be a relationship between the number of stops and arrests and the violent

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122 Christopher Stone, Todd Foglesong, and Christine M. Cole 2009
123 Ibid
crime rate.\textsuperscript{124} Thus, the authors sought to determine if the consent decree may have had the unintended consequence of reducing LAPD stops and arrests which in turn may have caused an increase in violent crime. Many critics of the consent decree cautioned that the agreement would hamper the department’s ability to do its job and prevent violent crime.\textsuperscript{125} For this reason the Stone et al report also discussed the violent crime rate in Los Angeles.\textsuperscript{126} Therefore, I will also assess the relationship between the number of stops and arrests and the violent crime rate after the end of the consent decree.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation publishes data on violent crime rates in the city of Los Angeles from 2008 to 2019.\textsuperscript{127} There was a decline in the violent crime rate per 100,000 residents from 2008 to 2013, after 2013 the violent crime rate increased (Image 8). The violent crime rate peaked in 2017, after which the crime rate in Los Angeles plateaued (Image 8). Notably, the violent crime rate in Los Angeles follows a similar pattern to that of the California violent crime rate during the same time period (Image 8). The violent crime rate began to increase in the state as a whole after 2014 following a period of decline (Image 8). California has an overall greater violent crime rate than the city of Los Angeles at about 400 to 500 violent crimes per 100,000 people compared to 150 to 250 violent crimes per 100,000 people in Los Angeles (Image 8). Although, the changes in the crime rate were more pronounced in the city of Los Angeles than in the state of California. In 2014 and 2015 Los Angeles had a 15.67 and 30.83 percent increase in the violent crime rate (Table 12). Whereas in 2015 and 2016, the two years

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid
\textsuperscript{127a}"Los Angeles Violent Crime" (Data Commons Timelines, 2019),
where California had the greatest increase in violent crime, the state only saw a 7.97 and 3.93 percent increase in violent crime (Table 12).

There appears to be a relationship between LAPD arrests and the violent crime rate in the city of Los Angeles. Table 13 shows the regression analysis of total arrests on violent crime while controlling for stops, the California violent crime rate and the United States violent crime rate. Column one shows the model when it only includes arrests and the city violent crime rate, this model shows a near perfect negative linear relationship between violent crime and arrests (Table 13, column 1). A one percent increase in LAPD arrests is associated with a -0.95 percent decrease in violent crime in LA. This result is statistically significant at the 99 percent level (Table 13, column 1). Column three shows the model when all the controls are included, this model shows that a one percent increase in LAPD arrests is associated with a -0.79 percent decrease in violent crime in LA while controlling for stops and the California and country violent crime rates (Table 13, column 3). This result is statistically significant at the 95 percent level and the model explains 95 percent of the variation in the city’s violent crime rate (Table 13). Increases in the state and country violent crime rate are associated with a 0.5 and 1.8 percent increase in the city violent crime rate, however, these results are not statistically significant (Table 13, column 3). This suggests that LAPD arrests can largely explain the variation in the violent crime rate.

Stone et. al.’s theory about the relationship between police activity and the violent crime rate appears to hold true. However, the authors refuted the idea that the consent decree caused a decline in police activity since police activity increased after the implementation of the consent decree. Instead, it appears that the opposite is true. The end of the consent decree appears to have led to decreases in police activity that in turn led to increases in the violent crime rate.
Los Angeles Resident Perceptions

Another one of the goals of the consent decree was to improve relationships between the police and community members. The consent decree noted that the LAPD had a backlog of civilian complaints against police officers that remain unaddressed for years.\(^{128}\) In the first few years of the consent decree the LAPD worked to clear the backlog of complaint. To measure public opinion and any changes over time, the Stone et. al report conducted several surveys on Los Angeles residents.\(^{129}\) The Stone et al. article reported two main public opinion survey findings, public satisfaction and their assessment of the Los Angeles Police Department officer’s treatment of residents. As previously stated, the Stone et. al report found positive trends for both metrics. Public satisfaction increased from 71 percent to 83 percent from 2007 to 2009.\(^{130}\) And positive assessments of fair treatment increased from 39 percent to 51 percent from 2005 to 2009.\(^{131}\) The report noted that Black and Latino residents tended to show more negative assessments on both the public satisfaction and the fair treatment questions. For example, on the question of fair treatment, 23 percent of Black residents answered that LAPD officers “almost never” treat members of all racial and ethnic groups fairly.\(^{132}\) Whereas only 14 and 10 percent of Hispanics and White people said the same.\(^{133}\) However, Stone et al. argued that the observed gaps among racial minorities regarding the positive assessment of the LAPD narrowed since the implementation of the consent decree. To make this claim they point out that when asked the question, “How hopeful are you that the LAPD, three years from now, will routinely bring offenders to justice while respecting their rights and complying with the law?”, Black people

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128 Consent Decree
129 Christopher Stone, Todd Foglesong, and Christine M. Cole 2009
130 Ibid
131 Ibid
132 Ibid
133 Ibid
were among the group that had the largest percentage of people saying they were “very hopeful”.

The Justice and Securities Strategies (JSS) and the Loyola Marymount University (LMU) surveys both asked Los Angeles residents’ questions about their approval of the LAPD officer job performance (Table 14). The JSS 2016 survey found that 73 percent of residents either strongly approve or somewhat approve of the job that the LAPD is doing. The 2016 survey results are similar to the results found by Stone et al. in 2007. The LMU 20022 survey found that 66.3 percent of residents were very satisfied or somewhat satisfied with the overall performance of the LAPD. The 2016 survey shows the greatest disparities in approval rates by race. Only 59 percent of black residents strongly approved or somewhat approved of the LAPD job performance, whereas White and Latino residents’ approval was at 78 and 73 percent (Table 14). The 2009 survey shows a 12-point difference between Black residents’ approval and total residents’ approval. Notably, in the 2022 survey, Black residents had the highest approval rating among the three racial categories. This suggests that the gap between Black and White residents rates of satisfaction with LAPD job performance has narrowed since 2007. At the same time, the overall Los Angeles resident satisfaction with the LAPD’s job performance has declined.

The Stone et al report and the 2016 and 2022 surveys asked Los Angeles city residents for their assessment of LAPD officer’s treatment of their racial and ethnic communities. The JSS 2016 survey found that 49.7 percent of residents strongly agreed or agreed that LAPD officers treat people of all races and ethnicities fairly (Table 15). This rate is about the same as the 51

134 Ibid
136 “Public Opinion on Policing in Los Angeles: Police Data Brief” 2022
percent approval rating from 2009. The 2022 survey found that 42.8 percent of residents strongly agreed or somewhat agreed that LAPD officers treat all racial and ethnic groups equally (Table 15). Since 2009 the differences in approval rates among racial groups, particularly between White and Black residents, have decreased (Table 15). In 2009, only 40 percent of Black residents believed LAPD officers treated all communities fairly compared to 59 percent of white people (Table 12). In 2016 the gap narrowed to 34.5 percent of Black residents and 50.8 percent of White residents. And again in 2022 the gap narrowed to 34.3 percent of Black residents and 39.2 percent of White residents (Table 15). Thus, similar to the job approval assessment, the differences between racial groups have narrowed. Although, positive assessments of LAPD officer’s treatment seem to have declined since 2009.

The more recent survey responses to the public satisfaction and fair treatment questions suggest that the positive trends found by the Stone et al. report did not endure after the end of the consent decree. The Stone et al paper found a 12-percentage point improvement in public satisfaction from 2007 to 2009. Yet, in 2016 and 2022 public satisfaction declined until it reached 66.3 percent, a 16.7 percentage point decrease from the 2009 survey (Table 14). The Stone et. al paper again found a 12 percentage point improvement in the assessment of LAPD officers’ treatment of all racial and ethnic groups from 2005 to 2009 (Table 15). The 2016 and 2022 surveys recorded a slight decline in the assessment of LAPD officer’s treatment as the numbers return back to what they were in 2005 survey (Table 15). Once again it appears as though public opinion reverted back to the level it was at in 2005 before the end of the consent decree.

137 Stone
Some of the trends observed in the Stone et al paper did not continue after the end of the consent decree. Stone et al. reported an increase in vehicle and pedestrian stops, after the end of the consent decree the number of stops dropped dramatically. The report found declines in arrests, these trends did continue after the end of the consent decree. The Stone et al. report found declines in use of force incidents, this trend also continued after the end of the consent decree. Although, the ratio of use of force incidents to arrests remained fairly consistent suggesting that declines in uses of force may be tied to declines in stops and arrests rather than indicating that LAPD officers became less likely to use excessive force. There also appears to be a relationship between the decline in stops and increases in the violent crime rate. Public opinion on LAPD job satisfaction and on positive assessment of officer’s treatment of community members has declined since the start of the consent decree. These changes suggest that the LAPD reverted back to their patterns and practices from before the end of the consent decree. The next chapter will explore some explanations for the declines in police activity and increase in racial disparities. And discuss the implications of consent decrees only showing short term benefits.

138 Ibid
139 Ibid
Chapter 3

Introduction

The Los Angeles Police Department has a long history of racist policing and corruption. The first chapter reviewed the changing role of police officers in cities across the country and the different approaches that governments have taken to tackle issues with their police departments. The federal government uses consent decrees to compel cities to reform their police departments. The consent decree that the LAPD entered into sought to improve the relationship between police officers and community members and end the patterns and practices of racist policing and excessive use of force that the department engaged in. The second chapter reviews the LAPD after the end of its consent decree and found that stops and arrests declined while racial disparities among the stops and arrests increased. There were also declines in public satisfaction of the LAPD’s job performance and in residents’ assessment of LAPD’s treatment of all community members. This chapter discusses several explanations for the declines in stops and arrests and increases in racial disparities, including Proposition 47, changes to technologies, emergency dispatch, and changes in LAPD leadership.

After the end of the consent decree, the Los Angeles Police Department saw a decline in total stops and arrests and an increase in racial disparities among those stops and arrests. There are several possible explanations for these changes. The state of California passed a criminal justice reform, Proposition 47 in 2014. Some researchers suggested that Proposition 47 may affect the number of arrests in California. Several years after the end of the consent decree the LAPD emergency dispatch changed their policies and improved their technologies to make

\[140\] Consent Decree: U.S v. City of Los Angeles, California, Board of Police Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles, and the Los Angeles Police Department 2000
dispatches more effective. This change in dispatch and technologies may impact the number of calls LAPD officers respond to and the areas they frequent. And, after the end of the consent decree the mayor at the time appointed a new LAPD police chief that implemented more community-oriented policing. Several of these changes closely coincided with the end of the consent decree and may help explain the observed declines in stops and arrests and the racial disparities of stops and arrests.

**Proposition 47**

Proposition 47 likely affected the number of arrests in California. In 2014 California passed Proposition 47, the ballot measure lowered certain non-violent property crimes and drug possessions from felonies to misdemeanors. A study conducted by the National Institute of Justice finds that the implementation of Proposition 47 led to declines in arrests in California. Specifically, they noted that shifting away from felony offenses led to declines in rearrests for most crimes that fall under Proposition 47. Moreover, the Public Policy Institute of California also found that Proposition 47, along with other similar reforms at the time, led to declines in arrests because police officers became less likely to arrest individuals for a misdemeanor offense than a felony offense. Therefore, the Proposition led to declines in rearrests and in changing some felonies into misdemeanors, police became less likely to arrest individuals for crimes that

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143 Ibid
fall under Proposition 47. This offers up one explanation for the lower levels of arrests in the City of Los Angeles.

**Dispatch and Technology Shifts**

The Los Angeles Police Department narrowed their service area several years after the end of the consent decree and concentrated their police forces in higher crime communities. Officially, the LAPD patrols and services the city of Los Angeles, including the Central, South, Valley, and West Bureau (Image 9). However, LAPD officers are occasionally dispatched to other parts of the county. For example, from 2010 to 2014, the LAPD arrested people throughout Los Angeles County, outside of the city of Los Angeles (Image 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14). The maps even show some arrests in the far north end of Los Angeles County (Image 10, 11, 12, 13, 14). From 2015 onward the LAPD only arrested people in the city of Los Angeles or near the outskirts (Image 15, 16 and 17).

The shift in the service area can largely be attributed to policy changes in LAPD’s emergency dispatch. In 2014, City Mayor Garcetti called for the revamping of the city’s emergency dispatch system. Garcetti replaced the city’s dispatch system with an integrated Los Angeles Fire Department, emergency services and LAPD system that relied on updated...
technologies maximizing efficiency. As a result, calls for service outside of the city were directed to local departments that were closer in distance.

New technologies contributed to the concentration of police forces in higher crime areas. As a condition of the consent decree, the LAPD was required to implement evidence-based methods to improve and reform their policing methods. LASER and Pred-Pol were two such technologies that LAPD used. Pred-Pol was developed in the LAPD in the 2000s. Pred-Pol is a software designed to predict where a crime was likely to occur within a 12-hour window and a specific 500 by 500-foot area where it was likely to occur. Pred-Pol was launched in 2008 in certain sections of Los Angeles and fully implemented in the city as a whole around 2013. Operation LASER built on Pred-Pol; it is another software designed to target specific repeat offenders that commit crimes in certain areas. LAPD implemented LASER in 2011. As the two technologies run on an algorithm that considers areas with historically higher levels of arrests and crime rates as areas that are more likely to have more arrests and higher rates of crime in the future. One study assessing the city of Los Angeles found that the areas with more

154 Johana Bhuiyan 2021
arrests and violent crime are also areas with higher poverty levels and a greater proportion of Black and Hispanic people. Thus, these technologies encourage the LAPD to direct more officers to majority-minority communities. LAPD officers rely on Operation LASER and Pred-Pol to make decisions about where to deploy more police forces. For example, when police were searching for a robbery suspect in 2016 LASER directed officers to the intersection of Crenshaw Boulevard and Slauson Avenue for its history suspected gang-related activity. Officers then arrested 10 and stopped 161 people over the course of two weeks at that intersection.

The implementation of LASER and Poli-Pred likely led to the concentration of police forces and police activity in lower-income, high crime communities. Critics of the technologies argued that they contributed to the over policing of Black and Brown neighborhoods and called for the department to discontinue their use of the technologies. LAPD ended the use of Operation LASER in 2019. In April of 2020, LAPD Police Chief Moore stated that LAPD would stop using Poli-Pred because of financial constraints caused by the pandemic. The implementation of these technologies provide an explanation for the overrepresentation of Black people and the underrepresentation of White people in stops and arrests.

The narrowing of the LAPD’s service area and the development of new technologies may explain the declines in arrests after the end of the consent decree. Since the number of LAPD

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156 Johana Bhuiyan 2021
157 Ibid
158 Ibid
159 Leila Miller 2020
160 Ibid
161 Ibid
officers asked to respond to calls for service outside the city declined, arrests outside the city also declined. Patrolling over a smaller area may have led to less overall arrests after the change in the dispatch system. The new technologies provided the LAPD with specific people to look out for and specific areas to concentrate their forces. As noted in the previous chapter, the data show that after the end of the consent decree the number of stops and arrests declined but racial disparities increased. As the new technologies directed LAPD officers to Black and Hispanic majority communities, officers may have begun arresting Black and Hispanic people at higher rates. Thus, the changes in dispatch and technologies may explain the decline in stops and arrests and increases in racial disparities.

**Changes in Leadership**

The LAPD had two police chiefs during and after the end of the consent decree with differing policing styles. The differing leadership styles may also explain the changes in police activity during and after the end of the consent decree. William Bratton led the department while the LAPD was under the consent decree. Bratton was known for undertaking more aggressive policing strategies. Charlie Beck took over as chief just as the consent decree ended in 2009. Beck followed a community-policing model approach during his time as chief of the LAPD. Therefore, the declines in police activity may reflect policy differences between the two police chiefs.

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163 Frank Stoltze 2009


165 Ibid
William Bratton supported a data driven, broken-windows policy of policing to drive down crime in Los Angeles. He stated that stop and frisks were instrumental to cutting down crime in the 1990s and thus he implemented a policy of preventative stops in the city of Los Angeles during his time as chief.\textsuperscript{166} One of Bratton’s reform advisors at the time commented on Bratton’s policies saying, “the style of policing in hot zones hasn’t changed. It is still pre-emptive, massive stops, mass arrests.”\textsuperscript{167} A member of the LA Community Action Network discussed what it was like to walk the streets of LA during Bratton’s term, “If you were a person of color, you were definitely approached, you were definitely handcuffed.”\textsuperscript{168} These statements are supported by the findings of the Stone et al. report that found increases in stops and arrests during the consent decree and during Bratton’s term.\textsuperscript{169}

Charlie Beck sought to partner with communities in Los Angeles and shift focus away from punitive measures and towards preventative relationship building. Beck noted that the focus on lower-level crimes can hamper community relations and make those individuals stopped or arrested feel harassed.\textsuperscript{170} Yet, Beck also acknowledged that lower-level crimes can foster “an attitude of lawlessness” with negative consequences for minority communities.\textsuperscript{171} Beck’s solution for these issues is to foster stronger relationships with police officers and affected communities. For example, Beck formed the Community Safety Partnership (CSP) program that partnered with the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles to assign ten officers and a

\textsuperscript{168} Ibid
\textsuperscript{169} Christopher Stone, Todd Foglesong, and Christine M. Cole 2009
\textsuperscript{170} Jim Newton 2015
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid
supervisor full time to one of the four major housing communities. Officers participating in the CSP were tasked with using behavior-changing tactics and moving away from arrests. These tactics could include violence reduction training and community service. Beck noted that for a period of time the housing communities went several years without a single homicide. And when the first one occurred it was solved within a week because residents felt comfortable enough to come forward to the officers. Beck’s leadership and his policies may explain the declines in arrests and stops after the end of the consent decree.

**Conclusion**

“The consent decree: the mandate for training, the mandate for more intense scrutiny on use of force, the mandate for expanding internal affairs, the mandate for having a large and robust audit division...all of those things put us in a position to succeed in a way that we would never have otherwise been able to succeed. We became a much better police department.”

*Charlie Beck LAPD Police Chief (2009-2018)*

The Los Angeles Police Department consent decree started in 2001 and ended in 2009. The Stone et al. report assessed the changes in the department from 2002 to 2009; they found significant improvements in the department during this time period. However, after 2009 the LAPD reverted to its previous patterns and behaviors from the early years of the consent decree. Declines in the use of force investigations remained consistent after the end of the consent decree.

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174 Ibid
175 Ibid
176 Ibid
177 Ibid
178 Christopher Stone, Todd Foglesong, and Christine M. Cole 2009
decree. Yet, while stops and arrests declined after the end of the consent decree, racial disparities increased with Black people being overrepresented and White people underrepresented. The surveys show that racial disparities in Los Angeles residents’ perception of LAPD officers have narrowed. However, overall LAPD job satisfaction and positive assessments of officer’s treatment of all communities have declined. Moreover, the regression of LAPD arrests and violent crime suggests that the declines in arrests led to increases in violent crime (Table 12). These changes show that after the end of the consent decree the LAPD engaged in less overall policing activity while also decreasing their effectiveness at reducing violent crime.

Accountability measures were the ones most impacted after the end of the consent decree. The consent decree required implementations of evidence-based practices to reduce crime and protect communities without keeping the racist practices of the past. As previously stated, the technologies that emerged from the consent decree remained until 2019 and 2020. These technologies may explain increased racial disparities in stops and arrests. The consent decree forced the LAPD to change the way complaints were handled and the way police officers were held accountable and disciplined. The consent decree also required police departments to conduct rigorous data collection on everything from stops and arrests to civilian complaints, use of force investigations, audit, and police officer conduct. One report found that the accountability measures and increased oversight due to the consent decree did influence LAPD officer behavior. Prendergast finds that LAPD officers became more careful about how they approached people and expressed more caution when compared to other local law enforcement.

179 Ibid
180 Leila Miller 2020
181 Christopher Stone, Todd Foglesong, and Christine M. Cole 2009
182 Ibid
officers that were not under a consent decree.\textsuperscript{183} While under the consent decree a federally appointed independent monitor wrote quarterly assessments of the LAPD’s progress including assessments of racial disparities in policing and oversight of use of force investigations.\textsuperscript{184} The independent monitor provided an accountability measure for the LAPD’s performance towards meeting the goals of the consent decree. After the consent decree ended in 2009 so did the oversight of the independent monitor. It is also unclear what policies remained in place after the end of the consent decree and whether the LAPD kept any of the other accountability measures.

This paper supports previous research that shows that consent decrees produce short term benefits. Another previously mentioned study on the DC police department found that ten years after the end of the consent decree the department began relaxing its requirements for reporting and investigating use of force investigations.\textsuperscript{185} The study argued that the relaxation of these requirements led to investigation delays for officer-involved shootings and declines in the quality of the investigations.\textsuperscript{186} Future research should seek to assess how and what makes consent decrees effective in producing short-term successes. A consent decree comes with greater resources in the form of financial and technical support from the Department of Justice.\textsuperscript{187} They also have built in accountability measures in the form of independent monitors and the federal


\textsuperscript{185}“The Durability of Police Reform the Metropolitan Police Department and Use of Force: 2008-2015”, 2016

\textsuperscript{186}Ibid

judge overseeing the consent decree. And lastly consent decrees are a method of legal action against a city or police department. Failing to follow through with the terms in the consent decree comes with a heavy financial cost.\textsuperscript{188} Moreover, consent decrees draw public attention as it is the Department of Justice’s most powerful tool to force local police departments to change their behaviors.\textsuperscript{189} Therefore, consent decrees also come with a certain level of public pressure to successfully and quickly meet the terms of the agreement. One of these features may explain how consent decrees manage to produce short-term successes. In determining what features make consent decrees effective one can devise ways to ensure longer-term success of reforms.

The effects of the LAPD consent decree did not last long after the agreement ended. After more than a decade since the end of the agreement the Department appears to have returned to its original state. Recently, the public voiced outrage about the overrepresentation of minority groups in vehicle and pedestrian stops.\textsuperscript{190} This led to the development of a new reform by the Los Angeles Police Commission in early 2022.\textsuperscript{191} Under the new policy, LAPD officers must have a reason to suspect someone is in violation of a serious crime and record themselves on their body cameras stating their reasoning \textit{before} stopping the individual.\textsuperscript{192} Police officers face additional training and increasingly severe discipline for repeated violations of the new policy.\textsuperscript{193} The LA Times reported that after the policy took effect, stops for minor violations went down by more than 40 percent.\textsuperscript{194} The percentage of Black people stopped for minor violations also

\textsuperscript{188} Ibid
\textsuperscript{189} Ibid
\textsuperscript{191} Ibid
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid
dropped by 10 percentage points. On its face value this new policy seems like another example of a promising reform attempt. Further analysis will be needed to show whether the effects of this new reform will endure. Or, if the patterns of racial disparities in LAPD stops and arrests will continue to plague the city of Los Angeles.

\[^{195}\text{Ibid}\]
Appendix

Figure 1: Vehicle and Pedestrian stops from 2010 to 2018, by month

Figure 1. Source: “Vehicle and Pedestrian Stop Data 2010 to Present by Race and Division” (City of Los Angeles, December 31, 2017), https://data.lacity.org/Public-Safety/Vehicle-and-Pedestrian-Stop-Data-2010-to-Present-b/afaq-3mp
Figure 2: Vehicle and Pedestrian stops from 2010 to 2018, by year

Figure 2. Source: “Vehicle and Pedestrian Stop Data 2010 to Present by Race and Division” (City of Los Angeles, December 31, 2017), https://data.lacity.org/Public-Safety/Vehicle-and-Pedestrian-Stop-Data-2010-to-Present-b/afaq-3mp.
Figure 3: Pedestrian stops from 2010 to 2018, by month and race

![Pedestrian stops by race](image)

Figure 3. Source: “Vehicle and Pedestrian Stop Data 2010 to Present by Race and Division” (City of Los Angeles, December 31, 2017). [https://data.lacity.org/Public-Safety/Vehicle-and-Pedestrian-Stop-Data-2010-to-Present-b/afaq-3mp](https://data.lacity.org/Public-Safety/Vehicle-and-Pedestrian-Stop-Data-2010-to-Present-b/afaq-3mp).
Table 1: Percent of Pedestrian stops by race


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Figure 4: Vehicle stops from 2010 to 2018, by month and race

Figure 4. Source: “Vehicle and Pedestrian Stop Data 2010 to Present by Race and Division” (City of Los Angeles, December 31, 2017), https://data.lacity.org/Public-Safety/Vehicle-and-Pedestrian-Stop-Data-2010-to-Present-b/aftaq-3mp.
Table 2: Percent of Vehicle Stops by Race

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Table 2. Source: “Vehicle and Pedestrian Stop Data 2010 to Present by Race and Division” (City of Los Angeles, December 31, 2017). [https://data.lacity.org/Public-Safety/Vehicle-and-Pedestrian-Stop-Data-2010-to-Present-bafaq-3mp](https://data.lacity.org/Public-Safety/Vehicle-and-Pedestrian-Stop-Data-2010-to-Present-bafaq-3mp)
Table 3: Total Number of Arrests by Year

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Table 4: Percent of Arrest Types

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<td>0.16%</td>
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<td>0.00%</td>
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Table 4. Source: "Arrest Data from 2010 to 2019" (City of Los Angeles, August 31, 2022),
https://data.lacity.org/browse?q=Arrest%20Data%20&sortBy=relevance.
Figure 5: Number of Arrests, by Month and Race.

Figure 5. Source: “Arrest Data from 2010 to 2019” (City of Los Angeles, August 31, 2022), https://data.lacity.org/browse?q=Arrest%20Data%20&sortBy=relevance
Table 5: Percent of Arrests by Race

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<td>46.41%</td>
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<td>30.25%</td>
<td>28.91%</td>
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<td>W</td>
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<td>19.47%</td>
<td>19.25%</td>
<td>18.91%</td>
<td>18.58%</td>
<td>18.50%</td>
<td>18.78%</td>
<td>17.44%</td>
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<td>O</td>
<td>4.70%</td>
<td>5.07%</td>
<td>4.95%</td>
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<td>5.11%</td>
<td>5.35%</td>
<td>5.41%</td>
<td>5.42%</td>
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<td>5.43%</td>
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<td>A</td>
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<td>0.55%</td>
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*Table 5. Source: “Arrest Data from 2010 to 2019” (City of Los Angeles, August 31, 2022), [https://data.lacity.org/browse?q=Arrest%20Data%20&sortBy=relevance](https://data.lacity.org/browse?q=Arrest%20Data%20&sortBy=relevance)*
Table 6: Percent Types of Arrests by Race from 2010 to 2018

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<td>0.51%</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
<td>0.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISTRICT..</td>
<td>3.31%</td>
<td>4.84%</td>
<td>2.49%</td>
<td>3.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXONER..</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FELONY..</td>
<td>15.44%</td>
<td>21.15%</td>
<td>14.89%</td>
<td>15.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUVENIL..</td>
<td>0.45%</td>
<td>0.13%</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
<td>0.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISDEM..</td>
<td>67.48%</td>
<td>63.93%</td>
<td>74.80%</td>
<td>70.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER (..</td>
<td>2.16%</td>
<td>1.83%</td>
<td>1.49%</td>
<td>3.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER D..</td>
<td>0.16%</td>
<td>0.19%</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER L..</td>
<td>0.19%</td>
<td>0.11%</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRE-FILI..</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROBATIC..</td>
<td>0.19%</td>
<td>0.17%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROVED..</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELEASE..</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Los Angeles City Demographics by Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>12.50%</td>
<td>11.60%</td>
<td>11.50%</td>
<td>11.40%</td>
<td>11.60%</td>
<td>11.50%</td>
<td>11.40%</td>
<td>11.50%</td>
<td>12.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>9.50%</td>
<td>9.20%</td>
<td>9.30%</td>
<td>8.90%</td>
<td>8.90%</td>
<td>9.20%</td>
<td>8.80%</td>
<td>9.10%</td>
<td>8.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic/Latino</td>
<td>48.80%</td>
<td>48.50%</td>
<td>48.40%</td>
<td>49.30%</td>
<td>48.60%</td>
<td>48.80%</td>
<td>48.90%</td>
<td>48.90%</td>
<td>48.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>28.40%</td>
<td>28.50%</td>
<td>28.40%</td>
<td>28.20%</td>
<td>28.50%</td>
<td>28.20%</td>
<td>28.50%</td>
<td>28.10%</td>
<td>27.80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6: Number of Deaths by LAPD Officers from 2009 to 2021

Figure 6. Source: “Fatal Encounters” (Brian Burghart, 2022), https://fatalencounters.org/methodology/
Table 8: Death by LAPD Officers, Highest Level of Force Used

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gunshot</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasered</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fell from a height</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical emergency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beaten/Bludgeoned</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asphyxiated/Restrained</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 8. Source: “Fatal Encounters” (Brian Burghart, 2022), [https://fatalencounters.org/methodology/](https://fatalencounters.org/methodology/)*
### Table 9: Deaths by LAPD Officers, by Race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African-American/Bl..</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European-American/..</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic/Latino</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9. Source: “Fatal Encounters” (Brian Burghart, 2022), [https://fatalencounters.org/methodology/](https://fatalencounters.org/methodology/)
Table 10: Differences between Deaths by LAPD Officers Before and After the End of the Consent Decree

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paired Differences</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Std. Error Mean</th>
<th>Lower</th>
<th>Upper</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>During (2002 to 2008) – After the consent decree (2009 to 2021)</td>
<td>23.89</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>1.765</td>
<td>-10.31</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>1.3222</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.2596</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10. Source: “Fatal Encounters” (Brian Burghart, 2022), [https://fatalencounters.org/methodology/](https://fatalencounters.org/methodology/)
Figure 7: Investigations into Categorical Uses of Force from 2009 to 2021

Figure 7. Source: “Abridged Summary Of Categorical Use Of Force Incident Findings By The Los Angeles Board Of Police Commissioners,” Los Angeles Police Department, 2021. https://www.lapdonline.org/police-commission/categorical-use-of-force/
### Table 11: Ratio of Use of Force Investigations to Arrests, per 100,000 people

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of Use of Force Investigations to Arrests per 100,000 people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8: California and Los Angeles Violent Crime Rate from 2008 to 2019

# Table 12: Percent Difference in Violent Crime Rates from the Previous Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City of Los Angeles</td>
<td>9.62%</td>
<td>-11.02%</td>
<td>-6.98%</td>
<td>-7.75%</td>
<td>-11.18%</td>
<td>15.67%</td>
<td>30.32%</td>
<td>14.20%</td>
<td>5.55%</td>
<td>-1.55%</td>
<td>-2.33%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>6.13%</td>
<td>-7.12%</td>
<td>-6.46%</td>
<td>2.99%</td>
<td>-4.94%</td>
<td>-1.54%</td>
<td>7.97%</td>
<td>3.83%</td>
<td>1.91%</td>
<td>-1.28%</td>
<td>-1.21%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>5.82%</td>
<td>-6.34%</td>
<td>-4.30%</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
<td>-4.82%</td>
<td>-2.03%</td>
<td>3.35%</td>
<td>6.37%</td>
<td>-0.65%</td>
<td>-2.91%</td>
<td>-0.68%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13: Effect of LAPD Arrests on the Violent Crime Rate in Los Angeles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect of Total LAPD Arrests on Violent Crime Rate in the City of Los Angeles</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Arrests by the LAPD</td>
<td>-0.946</td>
<td>-0.765</td>
<td>-0.791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.13)**</td>
<td>(3.91)**</td>
<td>(2.74)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle and Pedestrian stops</td>
<td>-0.266</td>
<td>-0.108</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.72)</td>
<td>(0.79)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California Violent Crime Rate</td>
<td>0.575</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S Violent Crime Rate</td>
<td>1.817</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.89)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cons</td>
<td>16.382</td>
<td>17.837</td>
<td>1.708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7.55)**</td>
<td>(8.40)**</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05; **p<0.01

### Table 14: Los Angeles Resident Survey Responses: Public Satisfaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public Satisfaction</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“In general do you think the LAPD is doing an excellent, good, poor, or very poor job?” (Good and excellent)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Do you approve or disapprove of the job the LAPD is doing?” (Strongly approve and somewhat approve)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“How satisfied are you with the overall performance of the LAPD?” (Very satisfied and somewhat satisfied)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>66.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black residents</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>69.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White residents</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>78.7%</td>
<td>68.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino residents</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>73.7%</td>
<td>63.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15: Los Angeles Survey Responses: Fair Treatment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fair treatment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Do you think the police in your community treat all racial and ethnic groups fairly?” (Almost always and Most of the time)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAPD officers treat people of all races and ethnicities fairly” (strongly agree and agree)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAPD officers treat all racial and ethnic groups equally” (strongly agree and somewhat agree)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black residents</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White residents</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>50.8%</td>
<td>39.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino residents</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>51.5%</td>
<td>44.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9: LAPD Bureau Divisions

Figure 9. Source: “LAPD Divisions by Bureau” (Los Angeles Police Department, 2021), https://lapdonlinestrgeacc.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/lapdonlinemedia/2021/09/citywide.pdf.
Figure 10: LAPD Arrests in 2010

Figure 10. Source: “Arrest Data from 2010 to 2019” (City of Los Angeles, August 31, 2022), https://data.lacity.org/browse?q=Arrest%20Data%20&sortBy=relevance.
Figure 11: LAPD Arrests in 2011

Figure 11. Source: “Arrest Data from 2010 to 2019” (City of Los Angeles, August 31, 2022), https://data.lacity.org/browse?q=Arrest%20Data%20&sortBy=relevance.
Figure 12: LAPD Arrests in 2012

Figure 12. Source: “Arrest Data from 2010 to 2019” (City of Los Angeles, August 31, 2022), https://data.lacity.org/browse?q=Arrest%20Data%20&sortBy=relevance.
Figure 13: LAPD Arrests in 2013

Figure 13. Source: “Arrest Data from 2010 to 2019” (City of Los Angeles, August 31, 2022), https://data.lacity.org/browse?q=Arrest%20Data%20&sortBy=relevance.
Figure 14: LAPD Arrests in 2014

Figure 14. Source: “Arrest Data from 2010 to 2019” (City of Los Angeles, August 31, 2022), https://data.lacity.org/browse?q=Arrest%20Data%20&sortBy=relevance.
Figure 15: LAPD Arrests in 2015

Figure 15. Source: “Arrest Data from 2010 to 2019” (City of Los Angeles, August 31, 2022), https://data.lacity.org/browse?q=Arrest%20Data%20&sortBy=relevance.
Figure 16: LAPD Arrests in 2016

Figure 16. Source: “Arrest Data from 2010 to 2019” (City of Los Angeles, August 31, 2022),
https://data.lacity.org/browse?q=Arrest%20Data%20&sortBy=relevance.
Figure 17: LAPD Arrests in 2017

Figure 17. Source: “Arrest Data from 2010 to 2019” (City of Los Angeles, August 31, 2022), https://data.lacity.org/browse?q=Arrest%20Data%20&sortBy=relevance.
Bibliography


Consent Decree: U.S v. City of Los Angeles, California, Board of Police Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles Police Department (United States Central District Court of California 2000).


