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Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly

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CLAREMONT MCKENNA COLLEGE

DEMOCRATIZATION IN SUB SAHARAN AFRICA:
THE GOOD, THE BAD AND THE UGLY

SUBMITTED TO

PROFESSOR MYUNG-KOO KANG

AND

DEAN GREGORY HESS

BY

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Introduction

Democracy has become one of the most heavily debated ideas in political science. Indeed, it has made the evolution from mere procedural idea to becoming synonymous with individual freedom itself. So much so that Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen has been able to declare democracy an almost universal value, stating: “While democracy is not yet universally practiced, nor indeed universally accepted, in the general climate of world opinion, democratic governance has now achieved the status of being taken to be generally right.”¹ In the expanse of democratization literature, Sub-Saharan Africa has occupied a troubling space. Possessing some of the world’s worst poverty, while also having some of the worlds most resource rich nations; Africa is truly a continent of contradiction and one were stable governance is in dire need but in short supply.

The prognosis for democracy on the continent has been, historically extremely negative. When applying Freedom House’s measures, which involve analyzing countries according to the political rights and civil liberties, they afford their citizenry. A score between 1 and 7 is assigned to each variable, with 1 indicating complete freedom and 7 none. The scores are combined to then assign a designation; Free indicates a Liberal Democracy; Partly Free an Electoral Democracy; Not Free an autocracy. As we can see from table 1.1, made using the latest Freedom House report, of the 47 countries in sub-Saharan Africa only 9 are considered free, with the rest either autocratic or in a state of ambiguity. Furthermore, adding to the continents poor

¹ Amartya Kumar Sen, "Democracy as a Universal Value," *Journal of Democracy* 10, no. 3 (1999)

political prognosis over half of the Sub-Saharan countries have been involved in ethnic wars since 1980 making Africa a continent sorely lacking in both accountability and stability.²

Table 1 Sub-Saharan Africa Freedom House Designations

Designation	Countries
Free	Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Mali, Mauritius, Namibia, Sao Tome & Principe, South Africa
Partly Free	Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Comoros, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia
Not Free	Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Guinea, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Swaziland, Zimbabwe

Source: Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2010

The consequences of all this strife have been economic stagnation, abused human rights and rampant poverty. There has been much debate on the advantages and disadvantages of democracy in regards to its ability to efficiently handle development³; however, questions on the affects of democratic regime are beyond the scope of this paper. This paper advances on the notion that accountable and representative government is preferable to other systems, especially when it comes to distributing social benefits.⁴ Although democracies have a mixed bag in terms of achieving development goals, it is obvious they are more attentive to the needs of their constituents as it is from them that their power is derived. In addition, leadership

² P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, "On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, no. 1 (2002)

³ S Przeworski, Adam, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well Being in the World 1950-1990*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

⁴ Jackman, Robert. "Political Democracy and Social Equality: A Comparative Analysis." *American Sociological Association* 39 (February 1974).

succession has been a large issue in Sub-Saharan Africa as evidenced by table 2, which shows how leaders have left office on the continent from 1960 until 2004.

Table 2. How Leaders have left office in Sub-Saharan Africa 1960-2004

Reason for leaving office	1960-69	1970-79	1980-89	1990-99	2000-04	Total
Overthrown in coup, war or invasion	27	30	22	22	4	105 (51.4%)
Assassination (not part of coup)	1	1	1	2	1	6 (2.9%)
Died of natural causes	2	3	4	3	0	12 (5.8%)
Retired Voluntarily	1	2	5	9	8	25 (12.2%)
Lost election and left office	0	0	1	12	3	16 (7.8%)
Other (interim regime or impeachment)	6	8	4	14	8	40 (19.6%)
All regime transitions	37	44	37	62	24	204

Source: *Legacies of Power: Leadership Change and Former Presidents in African Politics* (pg. 2)

As one can see, of the 204 cases of leadership change only 20% were by consent those through voluntary retirement and election loss. The vast majority, however, have been through the result of involuntary and often violent measures, which have fostered instability. In fact, over half of the leadership changes on the continent have been due to a coup, war or invasion. It is easy to envisage that with functioning democracies in place leadership succession would not be as murky on the continent leading to more stability. However, there are still positives that can be drawn from the table and one notes an increase in voluntary office departure through the years, which is a positive indicator for democracy. Indeed O'Donnell and Schmitter have highlighted consensual leadership alternation as a sign of political development

and democratic consolidation.⁵ In addition, there is also a sharp decrease in the number of over throw cases showing that, although extremely limited, there has been democratic progress on the continent. Thus, in this vein this paper will draw from all sides of the Sub-Saharan democratization experience, the Good, the Bad and the Ugly, in order to find ways to aid its continual development.

To achieve this end, I intend to do a comparative study analyzing the democratic transitions of three African countries that have had divergent democratic paths; one of success, one of stagnation and one of failure. Consequently, one will examine the cases of Ghana, Kenya and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Each country has had a history of neopatrimonial rule with a long-standing dictator; Jerry Rawlings in Ghana, Daniel Arap Moi in Kenya, and Mobutu Sese Soku in DRC. As introduced by Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, a neopatrimonial regime is defined by: “the award by public officials of personal favors, both within the state (notably public sector jobs) and in society (for instance, licenses, contracts, and projects). In return for material rewards, clients mobilize political support and refer all decisions upward as a mark of deference to patrons.”⁶ This regime characteristic is notable in that neopatrimonial regimes are marked by the reluctance of the leader to relinquish power. This reluctance manifests in the exclusion of all opposition and essentially leaves a system, which in a modification of Robin Theobold’s proclamation is the private instrument of those, connected enough to be in power.⁷

⁵ O'Donnell, Guillermo A., Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

⁶ Bratton, Michael, and Nicolas Van De Walle. "Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa." *World Politics* 46 (1994).

⁷ Theobold, Robin. "Patrimonialism." *World Politics* 34 (1982)

Neopatrimonial regimes have been proven to be characteristic of Sub-Saharan African regimes and have had notoriously few democratic transitions.⁸ Thus given this common regime background and its noted rigidity, that Ghana, Kenya and the DRC are at different stages of democratization is significant and illuminating. Table 3 based on the latest freedom house scores reveals the differences.

Table 3. Ghana, Kenya, DRC Freedom House Designation

Country	Designation	Political Rights	Civil Liberties	Press Freedom
Ghana	Free	1	2	
Kenya	Partly Free	4	4	
DRC	Not Free	6	6	

Source: Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2010, ICRG Risk Ratings Guide

Ghana has a designation of Free meaning it is a Liberal Democracy evidenced by its excellent Political Rights and Civil liberties score. Furthermore, Ghana remains the only Sub-Saharan country to experience more than one peaceful change of power between rival political parties, an achievement integral in democratic consolidation.⁹

Neopatrimonial regimes are extremely resistant to democracy; so finding how and what allowed Ghana to achieve this change is significant. Kenya was once one of the countries viewed with large-scale enthusiasm in regards to democratic progress.

However, after recent false dawns stagnation has resulted with democratic development suspended leading to a Partly Free designation. As most Sub-Saharan countries also inhabit this unclear space, the Kenyan prognosis could provide rich comparative analysis. The DRC is a noted case of state failure with a past conflict

⁸ Ndulu, Benno, and Stephen O'Connell. "Governance and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa." *American Economic Association* 13 (1999).

⁹ Barbara Geddes, "By Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan: Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe," *American Journal of Sociology* 103, no. 2 (1997)

within its borders that was responsible for nearly 1000 deaths a day¹⁰ rampant poverty and human rights abuses. In possession of large mineral resources the country has been constantly stymied by conflict over their control. Despite this, the country has recently begun a transition into democracy. This is not something that can be said for Africa's worst rated autocracies, hence, analyzing the DRC allows one to scrutinize a country representative of Africa's most serious issues but which has still achieved some progress.

In order to understand how each of these countries arrived at their particular stage of democratic development one intends to analyze their transitions into democracy, using the structured contingent approach proposed by Terry Lynn Karl. This approach differs from the actor-centric method of analyzing transitions proposed by Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter by also taking into account past institutions. O'Donnell and Schmitter contend that transitions are defined by uncertainty and that in such a situation past institutions become insignificant.¹¹ However, as Karl contends "Even in the midst of the tremendous uncertainty provoked by a regime transition, where constraints appear to be most relaxed and where a wide range of outcomes appears to be possible, the decisions made by various actors respond to and are conditioned by the types of socioeconomic structures and political institutions already present. These can be decisive in that they may either restrict or enhance the options available to different political actors attempting to construct

¹⁰ Mark Doyle, "DRC Conflict 'kills 1,000 a Day," *BBC News*, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4080867.stm>

¹¹ O'Donnell, Guillermo A., Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986

democracy.”¹² This is evident in Sub-Saharan Africa, where even with democratic opening leaders are installed as heads of states designed to run to their personal benefit and typically fall foul of the temptation. Examples such as Mwai Kibaki in Kenya Joseph Kabila in DRC stand as evidence of leaders who came into power from free and fair elections but still maintained past autocratic approaches.

Thus, the approach of structured contingent approach seems most relevant in this analysis. The approach will involve (a) examining how the transition created the context for actor interactions to occur, (b) then analyze how the transition helped or hindered the survival of democracy, and (c) finally studying the resultant regime.¹³

The paper will be divided into three chapters one on each case country, Ghana representing the Good, Kenya the bad and DRC the Ugly of Sub-Saharan democracy. Each chapter will begin by sketching the political history of the country in question. While applying this sketch one will pay particular attention to the variables of: civil-military relations, ethnic composition and geopolitical environment. These variables have been proven by numerous authors to be significant in the possibilities and outcomes of democracies.¹⁴ By comparing the interaction of these variables one can better understand significant issues, which led to their specific trajectories. From there the chapter will then proceed to specific conclusions reached in regards to each country. With Ghana the author found the gradual nature of the transition ensured Ghana’s relatively stable democratic foundation. For Kenya lack of foresight from

¹² Karl, Terry L. “Dilemma of Democratization in Latin America.” *Comparative Politics* 23 (1990)

¹³ *ibid.*

¹⁴ For civil-military relations see Huntington: *The Soldier and the State; the Theory and Politics of Civil-military Relations*; for ethnic composition see Horowitz: *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*; for geopolitical environment see Starr “Joining political and Geographic perspectives: Geopolitics and International Relations.”

leaders appeared at moments when there was a “golden liberalizing opportunity” identified by O’Donnell and Schmitter as the moment, usually during a period of economic growth, when autocrats could liberalize without losing power and in fact enhance their legitimacy.¹⁵ Kenyan leadership failed to take these opportunities, effectively reversing the possibility for consolidation. For the DRC its combination of resource abundance and rampant ethnic cleavages has greatly deteriorated its democratic chances. The paper will conclude by using the evidence from the country cases to show that democracy is resilient and *can* grow on the continent; however, its largest obstacle is inadequate leadership.

¹⁵ O’Donnell, Guillermo A., Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986

Chapter 1: The Good

Ghana is a country with a rich and varied history, the first nation to achieve independence in the Sub-Saharan continent and increasingly looking like the nation most likely to achieve full democratic consolidation. Although receiving stiff competition from South Africa and Botswana; Ghana can be considered more fully consolidated due to its two peaceful and seamless transitions of power between competing parties. Party change has not occurred in either South Africa or Botswana and until this is achieved question marks will remain over their democracies and whether an incumbent party election loss would lead to significant instability.¹⁶ Hence, Ghana's current political development is unique in the Sub-Saharan context; however, its current democratic trajectory was not always evident.

Political History

Table 1.1 Ghanaian Presidents

President	Political Party	Time in office
Kwame Nkrumah	Convention People's Party	1957-1966
Gen. Joseph Ankrah	National Liberation Council	1966-1969
K. A. Busia	NLC	1969-1972
Col. I.K. Acheampong	National Redemption Council	1972-1978
Dr. Hilla Limann	People's National Party	1979-1982
Lt. J Rawlings	National Democratic Council	1982-2000
John Kufuor	New Patriotic Party	2000-2008
John Atta Mills	NDC	2008-Present

The political history of Ghana is quite uneven with an early political climate characterized by frequent regime change and instability. Ghana achieved its independence from British rule in 1957, due to the growing phenomenon of gold coast nationalism. The movement of Gold Coast nationalism was key in not only securing

¹⁶ Du Toit, Pierre. *State Building and Democracy in Southern Africa Botswana, Zimbabwe, and South Africa*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995

the independence of Ghana from Great Britain but additionally the movement can be traced as the foundation of Ghanaian national and political identity itself.¹⁷ With Kwame Nkrumah as their combative revolutionary leader the gold coast nationalists were able to achieve independence.¹⁸

Nkrumah was initially championed as a liberator and philosopher, his proclamation “We face neither East nor West; We face forward” became famous across the continent. A strong espouser of Pan-Africanism he believed that full social and economic freedom from foreign influence would best achieve his goals. However, his policies became increasingly restrictive undermining Ghana’s democratic founding. This trend culminated in his 1964 ban of all political parties and his self-installation as president for life. Eventually, amid growing social unrest, he was deposed in 1966 by a military junta named the National Liberation Council (NLC).

At this stage, Ghana entered a period of instability during which various military and civilian regimes alternated between power and incompetence. The first of which led by the NLC identified itself as an interim regime and transferred power to the Progress Party (PP) headed by K.A. Busiah after they emerged victorious in the 1969 elections. Busiah and the PP’s tenure in office was brief with a military junta named the National Redemption Council (NRC) led by Col. I.K. Acheampong, assuming power in 1972. The NRC remained in provisional power for six years; during this time they stylized themselves as the Supreme Military Council. The

¹⁷ Kimble, David. *A Political History of Ghana; the Rise of Gold Coast Nationalism, 1850-1928*. Oxford University Press 81 (1982)

¹⁸ *ibid.*

SMC's rule was characterized by "misrule and tussles over the future of democracy"¹⁹ with and plans were initiated for elections in 1979. It was at this stage that another coup took place, this time led by Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, a pivotal figure in Ghana's political development. The 1979 elections were carried out as planned with Dr. Hilla Limann of the People's National Party (PNP) emerging as President. However, a succession of unsuccessful policies led to another coup by Rawlings in 1982, this time he installed himself as president.

Throughout the 1980's Rawlings and his Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) consolidated power. Rawlings was credited with implementing policies which allowed for significant economic improvement.²⁰ However, he was also criticized for his strong arm tactics and use of repression. The economic success of his policies led to an increasingly large majority of people decrying the lack of democracy both domestically and abroad, In addition, due to conditionality's from various financial commitments with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, external pressure was significant. Under increasing pressure and sensing the "golden opportunity to liberalize"²¹ was at hand, Rawlings initiated constitutional reform and started the electoral process. The 1992 elections were significant in their inclusion of numerous opposition parties but condemned worldwide for indiscretions on the part of the PNDC reincarnated as the National Democratic Council (NDC). The elections,

¹⁹ Cowen, Michael, and Liisa Laakso. *Multi-party Elections in Africa*. New York: Palgrave, 2002

²⁰ Jeffries, Richard. "Rawlings and the Political Economy of Underdevelopment in Ghana." *Oxford University Press* 81 (1982).

²¹ O'Donnell, Guillermo A., Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

which took place in 1996 on the other hand, were internationally acclaimed.²² Contested under a new constitution and with an independent electoral commission Rawlings and the NDC won again this time, however, to significantly less skepticism. Stability was maintained during the period as Ghana contested its first back-to-back elections. In 2000, Rawlings reluctantly abdicated power due to the two term limits specified in the new constitution. The New Patriotic Party led by John Kufuor was voted into power and this constituted the first peaceful transition of power between rival political parties. This power transfer was repeated again in 2008 when John Atta Mills of the NDC was voted into the presidency. These dual party power transfers confirm Ghana's political maturity.²³

Ethnic Composition

Ghana, in relation to other Sub-Saharan Countries, has a relatively homogenous population. With the Akan people accounting for the largest ethnic group with 45.3% of the population and the Mole-Dagbon the next largest at 15.2%.²⁴ Ethnic homogeneity has been seen as a distinct advantage for democratic apparition, as a unified identity is necessary in order to believe in the principles of the governing authority.²⁵ Despite this relative homogeneity there has been tension between different ethnic groups as a result of historical issues such as divergence of colonial rule's regional impact and unequal socioeconomic treatment post-independence. In February

²² Cowen, Michael, and Lisa Laakso. *Multi-party Elections in Africa*. New York: Palgrave, 2002.

²³ Barbara Geddes, "By Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan: Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe," *American Journal of Sociology* 103, no. 2 (1997)

²⁴ Ethnic composition data taken from CIA the World Factbook

²⁵ M. Steven Fish and Robin S. Brooks, "Does Diversity Hurt Democracy?," *Journal of Democracy* 15, no. 1 (2004)

1994 conflict between the Konkomba and the Nunumba, Dagomba and Gonja, resulted in more than a1000 deaths.²⁶ This event is noted, however, for its uniqueness and Ghana is largely free of ethnic conflict as such is experienced in the DRC and Kenya. The tension in Ghana has been likely to manifest politically in passive ways such as Akan's being unlikely to vote for a Ewe politician regardless of mandate and vice versa.²⁷ However, unlike the DRC these tensions have not erupted into full-scale conflict. In order to ensure that ethnic fractionalization did not occur in the 1992 election Ghana implemented a no ethnic political parties ban.²⁸ The effects of such bans have generally shown that these types of bans actually encourage more ethnic strife by creating a rallying point²⁹. These bans may have saved Ghana from the domestic instability and circle of retribution that typifies factionalized conflict.

Geopolitical Environment

Table 1.1 Ghana Geopolitical Environments

Country	FH Designation	Ethnic War	Revolutionary War	Genocide
Burkina Faso	Partly Free	No	No	No
Ivory Coast	Not Free	No	No	No
Togo	Partly Free	No	No	No

Source: Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2010, ICRG Political Risk Guide

Another positive variable for Ghana's democratic development is its comparatively stable geopolitical environment. This is evidenced by table 1.1, which

²⁶ "Ghana: Information on Violence between Members of the Konkomba and Nunumba Ethnic Groups in February 1994, Particularly in Adibo Village, and the Government Attitude to This Violence." UNHCR Welcome.
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic,463af2212,497481b02,3ae6ac854,0.html>.

²⁷ Cowen, Michael, and Lisa Laakso. *Multi-party Elections in Africa*. New York: Palgrave, 2002

²⁸ *ibid.*

²⁹ Basedau, Matthias, and Anika Morof. "Parties in Chains: Do Ethnic Party Bans in Africa Promote Peace?" *Party Politics*, 2011.

shows all of Ghana's neighbors, their Freedom House Designation and whether they have had ethnic war, revolutionary war or genocide since their independence. Significantly, none of Ghana's neighbors have had large-scale domestic unrest according to data from the ICRG Political Risk Guide.³⁰ Given that geopolitical environment and more precisely the peacefulness of said environment is significant in the outcome of democracy this is a fortunate situation for Ghana.³¹ Indeed when looking at Ghana's wider regional environment there is also the presence of Mali and Benin two other nations considered Free.³² The stability of Ghana's neighbors means it does not have to be preoccupied with security issues but can instead focus on its own domestic political development.

Civil-Military Relations

Huntington in his work *The Soldier and the State* perfectly characterized civil-military relations contending: "Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism ... The military officer must remain neutral politically ... The area of military science is subordinate to, and yet independent of, the area of politics ... The military profession exists to serve the state ... The superior political wisdom of the statesman must be accepted as a fact."³³ Ghana's experience with military rule has generally lent credence to this contention. Each military government that gained power in Ghana was vastly incompetent although the civilian governments fared little better. However, the first coup that occurred in 1966 set a dangerous precedent for military involvement

³⁰ "ICRG." The PRS Group. Accessed April 26, 2011. <http://www.prsgroup.com/icrg.aspx>.

³² Using Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2010

³³ Huntington, Samuel P. *The Soldier and the State; the Theory and Politics of Civil-military Relations*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957.

within the government. From that initial foray Ghana's subsequent regimes were unable to curb the interference of the army.³⁴ This phenomenon is evidenced in Latin American countries such as Brazil where the military after its initial foray into politics refused to abdicate its role.³⁵ A turning point occurred during Rawlings' presidency because of his army experience and loyalties he was able to slowly reduce the role of the military. This was done in order to insulate him from coup attempts but it also served the function of normalizing the civil-military relations.³⁶ This increased political security combined with economic growth ensured Rawlings felt confident to initiate a transition into multiparty elections and substantively, democracy.

Transition Dynamics

Applying structured contingent choice to the transition in 1992 towards multiparty elections shows the benefits of Ghana's mode of transition. First all the transition was completely incumbent led more so than any Latin America pacted transition with the possible exception of Brazil's gradual transition.³⁷ The fact that the transition was completely elite led gives this transition the designation of a transformation. These transitions are noted for their stability and this transition dynamic allowed for political cleavages and not ethnic cleavages to guide the transition. However, these transitions also left the presence of authoritarian enclaves.³⁸ These enclaves block democratic development and in some ways Rawlings system of

³⁴ Hutchful, Eboe. "Military Policy and Reform in Ghana." *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 1997.

³⁵ Hagopian, F. "Democracy by Undemocratic Means?": Elites, Political Pacts, and Regime Transition in Brazil." *Comparative Political Studies* 23, no. 2 (1990).

³⁶ Jeffries, Richard. "Rawlings and the Political Economy of Underdevelopment in Ghana." *Oxford University Press* 81 (1982).

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Haggard, Stephan, and Robert R. Kaufman. *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995.

patronage still exists. The existence of patronage systems undermines democracy by fostering corruption and lowering accountability.³⁹ Though Ghana, struggles with corruption it is not disproportionate to any other African country, meaning authoritarian enclaves were negligible. Thus all things considered transformation was favorable for Ghana.

Conclusion

Ghana is a country that has had a lot of factors work together positively in order to ensure its path toward a consolidated democracy. Most significant were the economic situation and the civil-military relations Rawlings took advantage of to ensure a gradual transition. This transition mimicked ones in Latin America, which were led by military and were pacted. This transition method has been identified as being most beneficial to democracy apparition.⁴⁰ Although this mode also left authoritarian enclaves that Ghana is still fighting to correct,⁴¹ the gradual transition is stable and allows for democracy to emerge in an environment where ideological cleavages will define politics rather than domestic strife.⁴² In addition, Ghana's peaceful geopolitical environment and relative ethnic homogeneity have fostered a more democratically conducive environment

³⁹ Bratton, Michael, and De Walle, Nicolas Van. *Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa*. East Lansing, MI: Dept. of Political Science, Michigan State University, 1993.

⁴⁰ Huntington, Samuel P. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

⁴¹  Jeffries, Richard. "Rawlings and the Political Economy of Underdevelopment in Ghana." *Oxford University Press* 81 (1982).

⁴² See footnote 25

Chapter 2: The Bad

Kenya was once a nation heralded for its democratic promise, with its stable economic growth and educated citizenry, boasting an impressive 85.1% literacy rate⁴³, Kenya was seen as a country ripe for democracy. Noted African observer Joel Barkan even went so far as to proclaim in 2004: “ Along with Nigeria and South Africa, Kenya is one of the three ‘anchor’ states in Sub-Saharan Africa that is key to the stability of the region because of its location and resources. Egypt is the other anchor state in North Africa. As a result, Kenya has become the platform for U.S. operations in East Africa and the Horn.”⁴⁴ Three years after this proclamation, however, Kenya would descend into mass ethnic violence as a result of disputed election results. This very issue personifies the problems with Kenya’s attempts at democracy, critically, poor leadership has occurred at crucial moments when consolidation was close at hand. Instead of constitutional reform leaders have fallen back on past discriminatory practices to the detriment of Kenya’s political development. However, despite this poor leadership Kenya still has many factors that are necessary for democracy and with more altruistic leadership the promise can become a reality.

Political History

Table 2.1 Kenyan Presidents

President	Political Party	Time in office
Jomo Kenyatta	Kenyan African National Union	1963-1978
Daniel Arap Moi	KANU	1978-2002
Murai Kibaki	National Rainbow Coalition	2002-2008
Murai Kibaki/ Raila Odinga	Party of National Unity/ Orange Democratic Movement	2008-Present

⁴³ Literacy data taken from CIA World Factbook

⁴⁴ Barkan, Joel. “Kenya after Moi”. *Foreign Affairs* 83 (2004)

Kenya is a former British colony, which achieved its independence in 1964. Revolts had been occurring throughout the colony from the early 1950's typified by the Mau Mau emergency, which was a revolt aimed at the British rule but also as a way to assert ethnic dominance. The revolt led to brutal repression by the British with deplorable 'screening camps' devised in order to crush the rebellion's spirit.⁴⁵ This treatment only spurred on more uprisings against British rule, however, there was never the presence of a unified national identity movement in the vein of gold coast nationalism in Ghana. Jomo Kenyatta who was head of the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) emerged as an independence leader, due to his combative and eloquent style, he then went on to become Kenya's first president after the 1964 election.

His tenure in office was characterized by economic growth, ethnic patronage and tension and a border dispute with the Somali Democratic Republic. Kenyatta was a contradictory figure with his blatant preference for his Kikuyu ethnic group and the system of patronage he began has left a persistent scar in Kenya's political make up.⁴⁶ In fact, it is this very system that has seduced all future occupants of Kenya's presidency. However, Kenyatta's tenure was also vastly positive, after independence he managed to establish Kenya as a stable functioning state with solid economic growth.⁴⁷ Using pro-Western practices and playing on the U.S fears of communism in order to receive aid Kenyatta was a shrewd politician. However the longer his rule lasted, the more he fell into autocratic practices. He amended the constitution to

⁴⁵ Ogot, Bethwell A., and William Robert Ochieng' *Decolonization & Independence in Kenya*. London: J. Currey, 1995

⁴⁶ Muigai, G. "Jomo Kenyatta and the Rise of the Ethno-nationalist State in Kenya." *Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa*, 2004.

⁴⁷ ibid

increase his powers in 1966; and in 1969 he made Kenya a one party state. Kenyatta remained in power until he passed away in 1978 and power was then passed on to vice-president Daniel Arap Moi.

Moi continued Kenyatta's ethnic patronage system, this time transferring power from the Kikuyu to his own ethnic group the Kalenjin, further aggravating ethnic cleavages. This aggravation of tensions resulted in two failed coup attempts in 1982, by a group of soldiers from the Kenyan Air force. Moi responded by introducing a brutality and repression absent in the Kenyatta regime. He disbanded the Air Force, sentenced twelve people to death and jailed 900 more. The coup attempt pushed Moi into attempting to acquire more centralized power.⁴⁸ However, frequent uprisings and foreign loan conditionality forced him into allowing multi-party elections. Eventually, the calls for change became too frequent for Moi to silence so he allowed for multiparty elections in 1992. The approval of multi-party elections came with a new constitution, which introduced term limits but failed to curb executive power any further. The election period was characterized by intimidation and wide scale usage of public resources by KANU, in this biased environment Moi easily won the elections. Moi repeated the same manipulative practices for the 1997 elections before stepping down due to the aforementioned term limits before the 2002 elections. However, his brutal legacy of neopatrimonial rule left a distinctly negative mark on Kenya's political development.⁴⁹

His successor in office Mwai Kibaki, although coming into power on a democratic mandate and decrying the autocratic regimes of Kenyatta and Moi, fell into

⁴⁸ Keeschull, H. G. "Operation "Just Missed": Lessons From Failed Coup Attempts." *Armed Forces & Society* 20, no. 4 (1994): 565-79.

⁴⁹ See footnote 1

the same routine. His campaign promises aimed at shielding the fact that he was once a KANU member and decisively part of the 'old guard' viewed as holding Kenya back. Kibaki headed the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), an opposition union born out of necessity rather than pragmatism. This is evidenced by the NARC's complete lack of unity upon Kibaki's ascension into power.⁵⁰ Kibaki similarly wasted no time in falling into old patronage practices, promptly placing his Kikuyu tribe back in a position of dominance. In addition, as there was no real reform of the constitution, one was attempted in 2005 but roundly rejected for not curbing enough executive power; manipulation of ethnic cleavages remained the only way to remain in power. Thus, corruption became rampant once again, with the John Githongo of the Office of Governance and Ethics publishing a particularly scathing indictment. Another liberalizing moment appeared with the 2007 elections, but Kibaki refused to heed the election results, manipulating poll results. Mass violence erupted killing more than 1,500 people and displacing thousands more. Eventually, a power sharing accord was reached between Kibaki and opposition candidate Raila Odinga, however, the government has proven largely ineffective.

Ethnic Composition

In Kenya like most countries on the African continent there is a large amount of ethnic diversity. There is no disproportionately large ethnic group with the Kikuyu being marginally the largest at 22% closely followed by the Luhya at 14% and the Luo at 13%.⁵¹ This ethnic heterogeneity renders democratic transition much more complex. Indeed, there have been numerous ethnic clashes throughout Kenya's history, which

⁵⁰ Mutua, Makau. *Kenya's Quest for Democracy: Taming Leviathan*. Boulder, CO: L. Rienner Publishers, 2008

⁵¹ Ethnic Composition data taken from CIA World Factbook

reflect that tension. The Mau Mau revolution from 1952-56, although one primarily against British occupation, also related to the complex assertion of ethnicity.⁵² Similar ethnicity specific rebellions occurred throughout the country during colonization, which contrasts with the gold coast nationalism of Ghana, as these rebellions developed the idea of ethnic priority instead of national unity. This is not to say, however, that ethnic assertion is undemocratic that is hardly the case. What it does show is that there was the presence of some fractionalization before independence that would need to be addressed by post-independence governments. However, their manner of 'dealing' with the problem, creating patronage systems, has only exacerbated tensions making ethnicity an easily inflamed tinderbox evidenced by the mass violence that erupted post-2007 election.⁵³ The violence was mainly between the Luo, ethnic group of opposition leader Odinga, and the Kikuyu, with the former unhappy at the latter's preferential treatment.⁵⁴ Tensions run so high that ethnic loyalties outweigh democratic process because the system is designed to benefit that allegiance rather than citizenry. Thus, the government needs to be willing to undertake a substantive rethink of their policies in regards to ethnicity in politics. Attempts such as an ethnic party ban attempted in 1993, which resulted in violence, have been few and far between. Until this issue of ethnic representation is sorted out Kenya will have enormous difficulty consolidating its democracy.

⁵² Ogot, Bethwell A., and William Robert Ochieng' *Decolonization & Independence in Kenya*. London: J. Currey, 1995.

⁵³ Berman, Bruce J., Jill Cottrell, and Yash Ghai. "Patrons, Clients, and Constitutions: Ethnic Politics and Political Reform in Kenya." *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 43, no. 3 (2009).

⁵⁴ Ibid.

Geopolitical Environment

Table 2.2 Kenya Geopolitical Environment

Country	FH Designation	Ethnic War	Revolutionary War	Genocide
Ethiopia	Partly Free	1961-91, 1963-64, 1977-78, 1999-00, 2007-09	1975-91	1976-79
Somalia	Not Free	1988-Present	1988-94	1988-91
Sudan	Not Free	1956-72, 1983-02, 2003-Present	No	1983-02, 2003-09
Tanzania	Partly Free	No	No	No
Uganda	Partly Free	1980-06	1983-85	1971-79, 1980-86

Source: Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2010, ICRG Political Risk Guide

Kenya's geopolitical environment is vastly more complex than Ghana's as is evidenced by the above table. Unlike Ghana, which had no neighboring countries that have experienced domestic unrest, all of Kenya's neighbors with the exception of Tanzania have had some sort of experience with each of ethnic war, revolutionary war and Genocide. This sort of conflict ridden geopolitical environment is significant as Huntington points out as it can inspire regional instability, which causes problems for democratization.⁵⁵ In addition, Kenya was engaged in border disputes with Somalia from 1963-1966, having these sorts of disputes is detrimental to chances for democracy. Phillippe Schmitter, when making his reflections on 25 years since the third wave began asserted: "Of all the economic and cultural prerequisites or preconditions of democracy, the one that must command the most urgent attention is the need for

⁵⁵ Huntington, Samuel P. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

prior agreement on national identity and borders.”⁵⁶. This was not present in Kenya, however, though Kenya’s neighbors have been conflict ridden that has not resulted in too much instability for the country as problems have been relegated to their own borders.

Civil-Military

Kenya has a highly professional military that is clearly delineated in the Kenyan constitution and has generally been supportive of the chief executive. Although there were the attempted coups against Daniel Moi, the military has largely been a non-factor in Kenyan politics taking a non-partisan view to political eventualities.⁵⁷

Conclusion

Unfortunately for Kenyans poor leadership has emerged in the country at every true opening for democracy and it has dragged down the countries hopes for consolidation. Constitutional reform is in dire need as the current system has too much power concentrated in the executive. Without this reform, Kenya will likely see a repeat of the same pattern of ethnic patronage erupting into ethnic clashes. However, once this reform is achieved it is clear with Kenya’s advanced economy, educated citizenry and geopolitical influence it has all the ingredients for a successful democracy and influential regional power. The trajectory of the current power sharing government is extremely uncertain; their lack of action up until now has led to resentment and the fostering of lingering tension from 2007. A new constitution has been proposed but its

⁵⁶ Schmitter, Phillipe. "Twenty-five Years, Fifteen Findings." *Journal of Democracy* 21 (2010).

⁵⁷ Mutua, Makau. *Kenya's Quest for Democracy: Taming Leviathan*. Boulder, CO: L. Rienner Publishers, 2008

amendment will still take significant time, hence, there will be yet another chapter to come in Kenya's democratic story, hopefully that one has a new ending.

Chapter 3: The Ugly

The DRC is one of Africa’s most troubled nations, having a brutal legacy of violence that dates back to Belgian colonization. The DRC has been subject to conflict ever since its independence. It was the site of a brutal seven nation war named Africa’s world war, which was responsible for nearly 1000 deaths a day. It’s large mineral resource wealth, which was heralded upon independence, as a medium for growth has instead been a boon. The DRC has become the very embodiment of what Richard Auty termed the “resource curse.”⁵⁸ Instead of providing growth their mineral wealth has fueled a devastating conflict. It is hard to imagine a more difficult environment for democracy to develop but it has begun.

Political History

Table 3.1 DRC Presidents

President	Political Party	Time in office
Joseph Kasa-Vubu	ABAKO	1960-1965
Mobutu Sese Seko	Popular Movement of the Revolution	1965-1997
Laurent Kabila	Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire	1997-2001
Joseph Kabila	People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy	2001-Present

The DRC achieved its independence in 1960, due in part to nationalist riots held, throughout the country and particularly in Kinshasa. Joseph Kasa-Vubu of ABAKO was elected president and Patrice Lumumba his prime minister. The riots were, as in Kenya, born from ethnic loyalties and not necessarily from a larger national identification.⁵⁹ This is evidenced in the fact that very shortly after independence and

⁵⁸ Auty, R. M. *Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: the Resource Curse Thesis*. London: Routledge, 1993

⁵⁹ Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges. *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: a People's History*. London: Zed Books, 2002

elections the army mutinied and the country essentially split into four quasi-independent states. Ensuring the tenure of Kasa-Vubu was largely innocuous.

With the large-scale unrest, that typified the period between 1960-65, Col. Joseph Mobutu head of the armed forces assumed power and dismissed the government. He was able through international financing to launch an attack against the separatist Katanga province. Finally in 1963 unity was achieved with all provinces becoming a part of the republic. Mobutu remodeled himself as Mobutu Sese Soko assumed the presidency and began a campaign of African authenticity, which entailed changing city names and nationalizing industries this culminated in the renaming of the country to Zaire.⁶⁰ Mobutu ran a totalitarian neopatrimonial regime, maintaining all power within the executive. He did little if nothing to develop any institutions in the country deciding instead to build his personal wealth, accruing an estimated \$4 billion fortune.⁶¹

Conflict was omnipresent from independence with foreign involvement needed in 1977 and 1978. Despite independence attempts in the Shaba region and other ethnic conflicts Mobutu was still able to hold tentative control of government at least until the Rwandan genocide of 1994. With his health failing and a large number of Rwandan refugees and combatants spilling into the border Mobutu's end was near. Laurent Kabila head of ADFLC backed by the Rwandan Tutsi rebels overthrew Mobutu in 1996. In 1997 they gained full control of government, changing the country name back to Congo.

⁶⁰ *ibid.*

⁶¹ Milner, Mark, Chris McGreal, and Chris Barrie. "How Mobutu Built up His \$4 Billion Fortune." *Financial Times*, May 12, 1997.

However, in 1998 Rwandan and Ugandan forces were able to take control of parts of the DRC claiming territorial disputes but instead seeking mineral wealth.⁶² Kabila fought back and was aided by Angolan, Namibian and Zimbabwean troops. In 2001, though Kabila was assassinated prompting his son Joseph Kabila to rise into power. Joseph Kabila was quicker to engage the other rebels and initiated peace talks, which culminated in the signing of the Sun City Agreement in 2003, which effectively ended the war, though sporadic fighting ensues.⁶³

In 2005 a new constitution was approved and in 2006 elections were held with Kabila declared the winner, in what was largely a fair campaign. Though he was initially heralded for his peace efforts, democratic prognosis has slipped since his dismissal of his main opposition Jean-Pierre Bemba.

Ethnic Composition

The DRC is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in Africa with four groups tied at 11.4% as the largest group.⁶⁴ The Belgian colonial legacy was harsh on the country with their brand of administration bolstering tensions between indigenous groups. The strong independence movements of the provinces persist from when the country became a republic. This shows that there are identity issues that stretch to the inception of the country and in such a situation reconciliation becomes extremely difficult. The Mobutu administration greatly ignored the issue of fractionalization resorting to autocratic tactics of repression to retain control. This encouraged ethnic differences and when such cleavages are omnipresent they create a political

⁶² "Democratic Republic of Congo | Human Rights Watch." Human Rights Watch. <http://www.hrw.org/africa/democratic-republic-congo>.

⁶³ Lemarchand, R. "Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo." *African Affairs* 106, no. 422 (2006).

⁶⁴ Data taken from CIA World Factbook.

atmosphere characterized by tension and uncertainty.⁶⁵ Such is the fractionalization of society in the DRC that ethnic cleavages have become its *defining* characteristic.

Geopolitical Environment

Table 3.1 DRC Geopolitical Environments

Country	FH Designation	Ethnic War	Revolutionary War	Genocide
Angola	Not Free	1975-02	1975-02	1975-94, 1998-02
Burundi	Partly Free	1972,1988-05	No	1965-73, 1988, 1993
Central African Republic	Partly Free	2005-Present	No	No
Rep. of Congo	Not Free	No	1997-99	No
Rwanda	Not Free	1990-98, 2001	No	1963-64, 1994
Sudan	Not Free	1956-72, 1983-02, 2003-Present	No	1983-02, 2003-09
Tanzania	Partly Free	No	No	No
Uganda	Partly Free	1980-06	1983-85	1971-79, 1980-86
Zambia	Partly Free	No	1964	No

Source: Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2010, ICRG Political Risk Guide

Like Kenya the DRC also inhabits a troubled geopolitical space, however, unlike Kenya the DRC has been involved in external conflict with its neighbors. The distinction of national boundaries is soundly superficial in the DRC. With all the incursions into its territory by neighbors there has been no ability to have “agreement” on national boundaries as Schmitter suggests. This fact has only led to the fostering of conflict. As one can see from table 3.1, most of the DRC’s neighbors have experienced some large-scale internal strife. These conflicts have leaked into the country reflecting the interconnected nature of the vast array of ethnic groups in the

⁶⁵ Lemarchand, R. "Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo." *African Affairs* 106, no. 422 (2006).

region. There is also the evidence of mercenary activity by many of these nations as they mask profiteering activities with ethnic violence. In addition, as proven by Caprioli and Trumbore, countries that experience large-scale internal ethnic conflict are more likely to conduct intra-state conflict.⁶⁶ With this lack of geopolitical stability the DRC has failed to be able to have any ability to focus on internal political development, as external conflict becomes priority.

Civil-Military

There are really no civil military relations to speak of as the DRC is essentially divided into a number of factionalized regional militias. They dominate political life with parties forming along faction lines. This sort of existence reinforces itself in that violence becomes a person's only option for political mobility. O'Donnell and Schmitter identified this effect and it has had devastating affects on the DRC.⁶⁷ With rampant militancy state authority has been extremely weak rendering it unable to complete essential services. The militant characteristic of the DRC has destroyed the political space, leaving a zero-sum winner take all situation.

Transition Dynamics

Applying structured contingent choice to the DRC we see that the transition to democracy has occurred in a revolutionary setting with the president being assassinated. The transition is seemingly elite led but with all the fractionalization in Congolese political space too much uncertainty for one actor to take the lead. The transition included constitution reform, which was an important step, but as it was

⁶⁶ Caprioli, M. and P. F. Trumbore. "Ethnic Discrimination and Interstate Violence: Testing the International Impact of Domestic Behavior." *Journal of Peace Research* 40, no. 1.

⁶⁷ O'Donnell, Guillermo A., Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

done in a conflict setting there are extreme doubts on its longevity. This transition can definitely be viewed moreover as replacement because though the government started the process they have little to no negotiating power making the transition extremely contentious. The result of this transition has been a weak government with an incredibly small sphere of influence.

Conclusion

The DRC's issues are too numerous to recount with significant issues arising from all the key variables, what this indicates is that the DRC's transition to democracy is far from inevitable. The Sun City agreement of 2003 went a long way to ensuring peace but with fighting still occurring around the Congolese borders progress will be difficult. Thus, unless the external conflict is solved democracy will not arise. In addition, at the next opportunity decentralization of power to regional authorities must be attempted. More regional autonomy could help ease the tensions and with reform on party conditions this could aid the process. What the DRC case shows as well is the power of leadership; even though the transition is extremely tense it shows that if there is leaders willing to put aside difference can make progress. Joseph Kabila has already gone back on that promise upon expelling his main political rival but the point remains that altruism in leadership can have positive benefits beyond other measures.

Conclusion

This paper has shown three diverging forms of democratization on the African continent. We had the example of Ghana, a success built from a gradual transition process and favorable domestic and geopolitical environment. Ghana is one of Africa's leading democracies and its future seems very bright. More work still needs to be done there especially in terms of curbing corruption but the progress it has achieved thus far is remarkable.

Kenya was the ambivalent case, a country that always seems on the cusp of democratizing but is foiled usually by some combination of poor leadership and ethnic tension. Kenya's future, like its status, is uncertain: if constitutional reform is achieved and some form of decentralization happens then the future is bright for democracy in the country, but without reform the country is doomed to repeat the same mistakes.

The DRC was the case of failure; a nation seemingly trapped in an endless conflict. Hope for democracy has always been extremely dim in regards to the DRC. However, in 2006 they initiated their first free and fair elections. Though the state remains limited to a small sphere of influence and is weak, this is a positive advance. There are significant domestic and foreign challenges to the consolidation of democracy in the country, given those challenges, the chances of democratic consolidation are limited. For a transition to democracy to occur the external conflicts first need to be resolved. Multi-lateral talks have been initiated toward this end but whether they are fruitful or not remains to be seen. The current regime needs to begin some decentralization as the provinces would benefit from increased revenue and this could ease conflict.

So what do these cases say about democracy in general in the Sub-Saharan continent and its prospects? What they say about democracy on the continent is that there is hope for its incarnation no matter the difficulty of situation. The DRC case proves that even in the most conflict and fractionalized societies on the continent the democratic process is growing. The trend of democratization is expected to, in general, increase around the continent; with the idea of good governance continually gaining traction especially within the African Union contagion could take affect.

The most significant challenge to democratization on the continent and one that does not have a clear solution is the problem of leadership. This issue is best characterized with the case of Kenya, where openings have been spurned due to poor leadership. The DRC under Kabila also seems to be making a shift from the promise of the Sun City Agreement and engaging cooperation, to autocratic practices with the expulsion of opposition leadership.

Ghana's success could be attributed as much to its favorable conditions as it could to Rawlings' perception of the "liberalizing opportunity" and his pursuit of a gradual transition. This is in contrast to Kenya, where independence leader Kenyatta and his successor Moi both faced a similar liberalizing opportunity with large economic growth occurring at some stage of their tenures. However, instead of taking that opportunity both further consolidated their power and entrenched systems that have been to the detriment of Kenya's social cohesion. There is no doubt that had Mobutu Sese Soku faced economic growth he too would have spurned the opportunity and his estimated \$4 billion stolen fortune is evidence of this assertion.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ Askin, Steve, and Carole Collins. "External Collusion with Kleptocracy: Can Zaïre Recapture Its Stolen Wealth?" *Review of African Political Economy* 20, no. 57 (1993): 72-85

This indictment may seem simplistic but it is true no matter what favorable socioeconomic conditions a country enjoys, without effective leadership willing to advance democracy it will not occur. So as simple as it may seem its consequences are vast. This can be evidenced throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, with the contrast of Nelson Mandela and Robert Mugabe a pertinent example. Both were revolutionary heroes, with international acclaim and enormous domestic support heading countries coming from what Huntington termed a Racial Oligarchy; that is a system where a racial minority rules over a majority.⁶⁹ The similarities end there though, while one has been heralded for their altruism the other has been decried for his lack thereof. The fate of their respective countries reflects the power of leadership, where South Africa is now a continental pace setter, as opposed to Zimbabwe, which is a pariah. It bears mention that upon Robert Mugabe's ascension to power Zimbabwe was considered Africa's breadbasket, enjoying strong economic growth. It is now Africa's joke recently abandoning its currency after inflation reached uncontrollable levels.⁷⁰

Therefore, until selfless and responsible leadership emerges that is able to place societal good above personal gain Africa will struggle to democratize. However, as evidenced by the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya there is a new generation of African's who have had enough of the 'Big Men' from the past. Only time will tell if this new generation can avoid the mistakes of the past but there is hope.

⁶⁹ Huntington, Samuel P. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

⁷⁰ "Zimbabwe Abandons Its Currency." BBC News. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7859033.stm>

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