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## Letter to the Editor: Focus on Technology

Robert J. Bunker  
*Claremont Graduate University*

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anything that might help the process of rehabilitation. Leaders must make the required investments of time and energy. . . . [and] be innovative in attacking this problem.

Involuntary separation should be reserved for those who "do not demonstrate potential for further useful naval service."

**Capt James P. Feeney**

### **Focus on Technology**

□ Kudos to the *Gazette* for its Focus Section on technology in the January edition. As the Marine Corps transitions from the maneuver to the RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) debate, it will begin to come to grips with a whole host of new concerns ushered in by advanced technology.

The central issue will focus on modernization of both the Corps' thinking and its force structure. In tackling this issue, past research suggests that innov-

**Robert J. Bunker,  
Ph.D.**

### **The Focus of Training?**

□ The January issue on technology was interesting but a point or two about priorities is necessary. In Bosnia and countless other places that may eventually attract Marines, technology and mechanization above the squad level will be useless most of the time. The pointman who survives and enables his fire team, squad, and platoon to survive will not be the one who got his skills from the computer or from Marine Corps Institute courses. He will be the one who got to spend every available training hour in the field, in every kind of weather, doing every conceivable exercise, living with his weapon and firing it at every opportunity.

**John H. Stevenson**

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**For an extensive review on three book**

Although our former Commandant issued a White Letter on the subject of this early attrition, and our present Commandant has described it as "a sea anchor on a Marine Corps moving at battle speed," Marine leaders continue to expect the recruit depots to deliver the future Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps with each graduate. Sgt-Maj Lewis G. Lee said it best:

I sincerely hope we have not lost the ability to make Marines out of other than perfect recruits or accomplish our mission with anything other than perfect Marines.

Officers bear the responsibility of accomplishing the mission with other than perfect Marines. . . . Officers must carefully balance their obligation to "make Marines" without sacrificing good order, discipline, and morale. Prior to recommending Marines for separation, officers must ensure that they have undertaken every reasonable effort to improve that Marine's chance of retention through "counseling, retraining, and rehabilitation." (See MCO P1900.6D.)

Commanders must know and exercise their broad leadership tools: nonpunitive censure, formal and informal counseling, nonpunitive letters of reprimand, extra military instruction, nonjudicial punishment, corrective custody—anything that might help the process of rehabilitation. Leaders must make the required investments of time and energy. . . . [and] be innovative in attacking this problem.

active warfighting concepts will be the most difficult to generate, evaluate, and ultimately implement because they will directly question the prevailing military wisdom. The Marine Corps, like any military institution, will seek to follow traditional operating patterns regardless of radically changing battlefield conditions.

In an attempt to break this cycle of institutional inertia and support the Commandant's bold Sea Dragon program, the free exchange of ideas will take on a new fundamental importance. More Focus Sections on attributes of the RMA debate are now critical if a true institutional commitment to innovation is to develop within the Marine Corps. Basic questions must be asked concerning such issues as the future of the tank, the integration of armed robotic systems, and the doctrinal impact of nonlethal systems.

Further, it must be fully recognized that a new form of soldier is developing in much of the non-Western world and, potentially, could appear even within the borders of our own country. This soldier, who owes no allegiance to the nation-state, will provide another set of pressing concerns which must be addressed as the Marine Corps prepares itself for the uncertainties and challenges ahead.

**Robert J. Bunker,  
Ph.D.**

### The Focus of Training?

□ The January issue on technolo-

### Mounted MULEs

□ Bravo Zulu to Maj J.S. Claucherty for his article "Initiative From the Reserves" (MCO Jan96). He succinctly articulate what every Marine knows who has wrestled with the MULE over the years—it is not man-portable and is too cumbersome in its current configuration for fast-moving operations.

Maj Claucherty's idea has merit, but the concept of using vehicular mount is not new. In Southwest Asia, several FMF units fabricated a similar mount. Because of the short duration of the conflict, however, Marines employing the mount did not immediately discover the problems caused by its use. After returning to CONUS, Marines in these units experienced more than 50 percent target misses with laser-guided munitions during training. When inspected, over 55 percent of the lasers failed accuracy and functional tests. Repair costs rapidly climbed to approximately \$1.4 million. In comparison, units that did not use these vehicle mounts avoided the high death rates. Subsequent evaluations showed that severe shock and vibration (as encountered when using vehicular mounts) caused incorrect boresight, beam divergence, and cracks in the tubes. Bottom line: The MULE was not designed to handle the stress associated with a rigid vehicular mount.

In 1991, the Corps initiated the Lightweight Laser Designator/Rangefinder (LLDR) Pro-