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# Conflictual Foreign Policy of the United States: Between Security and Human Rights

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**CLAREMONT McKENNA COLLEGE**  
**CONFLICTUAL FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES:**  
**BETWEEN SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS**

SUBMITTED TO  
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AND  
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BY  
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## Chapter 1: Introduction

The United States prioritizes human rights rhetorically but not in practice. As a result, United States policy is disjointed and conflictual between human rights and security. The result is an inconsistency in foreign policy. There have been examples of this throughout United States history. Under the Carter Administration, the United States took steps to sever its relationships with the dictatorships of Argentina, Uruguay, and Ethiopia. Yet, Carter maintained ties with other nations such as Iran, the Philippines, and Saudi Arabia. The late Bush administration promoted democracy around the world but did little to promote it in key strategic partners such as Egypt, China, and Saudi Arabia.<sup>1</sup>

The United States pursues such hypocritical policies because security and economic development are the primary policy priority. Once these objectives are secured then the United States often pursues or includes human rights as part of its foreign policies in specific regions and states. However, human rights cannot be placed in the back burner of foreign policy creation and implementation. It must be included as a primary objective of United States policy along the other goals such as security.

Following the constructivist argument of international relations, the United States must perceive its security as pivotal to its existence. Social factors mold the priorities of the United States.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, due to the perceived importance of security, the United States prioritizes it in the creation and implementation of foreign policy. Constructivism allows for change to occur in international relations. Thus, in order to change foreign

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<sup>1</sup> Gelb LH. The rise of ethics in foreign policy: Reaching a values consensus. *Foreign Affairs*. 2003;82(3):September 23, 2012-2-7. Web site. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20033574>

<sup>22</sup> Katzenstein P. Introduction: Alternative perspectives on national security. In: Katzenstein P, ed. *The culture of national security: Norms and identity in world politics*. West Sussex, New York: Columbia University Press; 1996:1, 498. ISBN 0-231-10468-5.

policy and elevate the importance of human rights, United States perception of its priorities must change. Human rights must be perceived as just as important as state security.

The U.S. policy toward El Salvador, Indonesia, and Bahrain represent three examples of the conflictual policies of United States. The three case studies highlight the timelessness of the issue. They span the presidencies from the 1980s, 1990s, 2000s, and current decade. They serve as examples of cases when the United States prioritized security over human rights due to the perceived importance of security.

Several determining factors exist that decide a nation's importance to the United States and thus the security driven initiatives that take precedence over human rights. These factors are the independent variables that determine why the United States acts the way it does currently and in the case studies mentioned above. One factor that determines policy creation and implementation is the perceived threat level from other regional hegemony. For example, in El Salvador it was the USSR; in Indonesia, it is China; in Bahrain it is Iran. A second determining factor is military ties throughout history, a history of friendly relations that determine current decisions. For example, the relationship with Indonesia goes far back to the Cold War and Bahrain's close military ties since the Gulf War. Thirdly, if another country shares the same enemy or same threat as the United States there is likely going to be a security tie between them. For example, in El Salvador the threat was a communist take over; in Indonesia Al Qaeda and terrorism is a threat; in Bahrain, Iranian influence is a threat. Therefore, the perceived importance of a country to the United States is the consistent factor in determining when security initiatives are prioritized over human rights.

The first section of the thesis will cover three case studies: El Salvador, Indonesia, and Bahrain. Each case will 1) provide background information and a summary of human rights violations in order to provide context for the analysis, 2) list and explain the reasons why the United States prioritized security, and 3) analyze when human rights are absent and present in policy. Following a summary of the case studies, the next section will provide a series of recommendations in order to improve the conflictual policies of the United States.

## Chapter 2: Literature Review

During the Cold War, the constructivist theory of international relations emerged to account for the changing international setting that differed from traditional methods of interpreting security. Realism was the predominant school of thought until the Copenhagen school emerged and dictated that changing norms and perceptions result in changing definition of security and thus changes in policies and state perception. Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, and Peter Katzenstein are predominant constructivists who define security after the Cold War. They call for a widening of the definition of security to include non-traditional elements such as human rights.

There is no standard definition of human rights. Thus it is important to establish a definition of human rights that can be element of security policies. The preamble of the Universal Declaration on human rights states that the “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world”.<sup>3</sup> It is followed by 30 detailed articles of human rights outlining the inherent human rights each individual has. The scholars, Campbell and Jost Stellmacher also further define human rights in their articles.

### What are Human Rights?

Before establishing the different arguments of the application of human rights in an international setting, the definition of human rights must be more thoroughly examined. Two sources establish different definitions of human rights. Tom Campbell concerns himself philosophically with the definition of human rights while Jost Stellmacher classifies different types of human rights.

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<sup>3</sup> United Nations. The universal declaration of human rights. The United Nations Web site. [http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/hr\\_law.shtml](http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/hr_law.shtml)

*Rights: A Critical Introduction*

Tom Campbell explores what constitutes rights and the different types of rights in his introductory philosophical book. One of the main rights he discusses is human rights. He describes that everyone possesses human rights regardless of age, sex, race, ethnicity, religion, or any other method of distinguishing and sorting people. He states that human rights take precedence over all other rights because of their inherent characteristics as belonging to all individuals. One of the most fundamental characteristics of human rights, he describes, is their practicability.<sup>4</sup> Human rights can be used in all societies and all people can abide by them regardless of where they are from in the world

*The Cognitive Representation of Human Rights: Knowledge, Importance, and Commitment*

The above article, written by Jost Stellmacher, defines the two different types of human rights: civil and political rights; and economic, social, cultural rights. The first category includes the following: the right to life, prohibition of torture and inhumane treatment, the right to freedom of opinion, and the right to political asylum. The first category can be described as more fundamental than the second. That is, the first category prohibits murder, torture, and ensures personal freedoms. The second category includes the right to work, protection against unemployment, the right to rest, and the right to a standard of living, the right to medical care, social security, and education. This category ensures that people are not just provided the right to life but the right to flourish. For

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<sup>4</sup> Tom Campbell. The reputation of rights, varieties of rights, three human rights. In: David Archard, ed. *Rights A critical introduction*

example, a person can work and provide for his or her family. Thus, a person is guaranteed food and shelter, education, and medical care.<sup>5</sup>

### Security and Human Rights

The place of human rights in security is widely debated. Security can be defined narrowly to military terms and the use of force or widely to include other security sectors. Realism, liberalism, and constructivism argue for different perspectives of what a security threat is. Constructivism allows for the most thorough definition for security and national interests due to its unique ability to allow for change in the perception of what defines threats.

### *Rethinking Security After the Cold War*

Barry Buzan writes about the changing notion of security after the Cold War. During the Cold War, security was defined strictly in military terms.<sup>6</sup> It was narrowly focused and concerned itself primarily with war and the use of force. Realism was the predominant school of thought. However, following the Cold War the narrow focus and definition of security seemed irrelevant in a new world order. Buzan theorizes that the state is less important in the new security agenda; it is still central but not a dominant force in defining security.<sup>7</sup> The definition of security must be widened to include diversified threats such as human rights. Barry Buzan structures his argument on the Copenhagen School framework. Social norms and cultural phenomena dictate what is a

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<sup>5</sup> Stellmacher J, Gert S, Elmar B. The cognitive representation of human rights: Knowledge, importance, and commitment. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*. 2005;11(3):September 27, 2012-267-92. Web site.

[http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/s15327949pac1103\\_4#preview](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/s15327949pac1103_4#preview)

<sup>6</sup> Buzan B. Rethinking security after the cold war. *Cooperation and Conflict*. March 1997;32(1):2. Web site <http://cac.sagepub.com/content/32/1/5.short>

<sup>7</sup> Buzan. "Rethinking Security After the Cold War." 13.

security threat. It allows for changes in the perception of threats whereas realism is unable to account for such changes.

*The Culture of National Security*

Edited by Peter Katzenstein, this book contains several chapters written by different intellectuals about the changing concept of national security and constructivism. The book claims that a constructivist view of international relations that have driven changes in social behavior, perception, and changing norms that account for changes in policy.<sup>8</sup> The book seeks to define what constitutes a state's national interests through the constructivist paradigm.<sup>9</sup> Katzenstein states that "security interests are defined by actors who respond to cultural factors".<sup>10</sup> He criticizes neoliberals and neorealists as being unable to account for change or to predict change.<sup>11</sup> Instead, following constructivism, social determinants to security policy include the idea of the collective identity.<sup>12</sup> State identities are a result of their interactions with the domestic and international environment. Perceptions of the environment a state functions in change the perceptions of what threats are and therefore changes the undertaken policy. In conclusion, Katzenstein argues for "broadening the field of security in two directions, encompassing nonmilitary issues. Concentrate on broader issues of...human rights...because such issues can have direct effects on the military intervention of states."<sup>13</sup> The author studies security in its traditional military focus but states that a

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<sup>8</sup> Katzenstein, Peter, ed. *The Culture of National Security*: 1.

<sup>9</sup> Katzenstein, 1.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 13.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 22.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 524.

widening of what constitutes a threat is important because of its capability to relate back to the traditional sense of security.

### *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*

Ole Waever and Barry Buzan collaborated in their book in order to redefine security. The stated purpose of their book is to establish a new framework for security studies using constructivism.<sup>14</sup> They question the traditional narrow focus of security on the military and use of force.<sup>15</sup> Instead, they argue for a wider view of security issues to include non-traditional threats. Waever and Buzan contend that defining security in non-traditional views is difficult but that “security is defined as perceived threats to anything such as the traditional view of a state to non-traditional views of threats” which include society, the environment, and economic laws. Threats are divided into different sectors. The military sector of security concerns itself with the armed capabilities of a state. The political sector concerns itself with the stability of a state. The economic sector concerns itself with the ability to access resources and the market. The societal sector concerns itself with the security and sustainability of language, culture, and customs. The environmental sector concerns itself with the security of resources.<sup>16</sup> Waever and Buzan conclude that there should be a multi-sectorial approach to security. It is important to see the interconnectedness of different security threats across the different sectors.

### Evaluation

The fundamental issue of the existing literature is the extent of what constitutes a security threat. Is security defined narrowly as only military threats and the use of force?

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<sup>14</sup> Buzan B, Waever O, de Wilde J. Introduction, security analysis: Conceptual apparatus, the military sector, the political sector. In: *Security: A new framework for analysis*. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers; 1998:1. ISBN 1-55587-603-X

<sup>15</sup> Buzan, Waever. *Security: A new framework for analysis*. 2.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

Or is security defined widely to include non-traditional elements of security? The realist paradigm concerns itself narrowly with traditional security concerns and the balance of power between states. Constructivists such as Waever, Buzan, and Katzenstein define security threats more widely to include non-traditional threats such as the threat to human rights. Each scholar has contributed to the knowledge of international relations theories through the development of constructivism in the Copenhagen School of thought.

Katzenstein states that non-traditional threats can be intertwined with traditional security threats. For example, the threat to human rights is a threat to traditional security because of humanitarian intervention or the use of force to ensure human rights. Buzan and Waever view security threats as belonging to different sectors. A threat to human rights is a threat to the societal sector of security.

### **Chapter 3: El Salvador**

In El Salvador, the United States not only privileged security over human rights, but it also strengthened the military that committed human rights abuses. During the Cold War, security concerns took precedence over human rights due to the perceived importance of containing communism. The United States pursued its military assistance in El Salvador despite the military's abuse of power. As the Cold War ended, human rights reemerged in United States foreign policy because of changing priorities. The threat of communism dwindled, and with it the prioritization of securing an El Salvador without communist rule.

#### Background Report

El Salvador's civil war took place between 1980 and 1992. The standing government of El Salvador and its military were financially backed by the United States against the leftist Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front [FMLN]. The funding that the Americans provided resulted in the military's increased independence from the civilian government.<sup>17</sup> Additionally, it made the government more reliant on the United States for assistance and the military less accountable towards its people.

#### Human Rights Violations

Human rights violations by the Salvadoran military were rampant as a result of the decreased accountability towards its own government and citizens. Throughout the

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<sup>17</sup> Burgerman S. First do no harm: U.S. foreign policy and respect for human rights in El Salvador and Guatemala, 1980-96. In: *Implementing U.S. human rights policy*. Liang-Fenton, Debra ed. Washington, D.C.: Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace; 2004:269. ISBN 1-929223-49-8.

entire civil war over 75,000 civilians died.<sup>18</sup> Between the years 1978 and 1983, there were 42,171 deaths reported.<sup>19</sup> Three infamous atrocities highlight the cruelty of the civil war. The first event took place in 1980 and acted as the catalyst for the civil war. Archbishop Oscar Romero was assassinated because he wrote a letter to President Carter. He pleaded with the United States not to support the Salvadoran military and called for the military not to harm civilians.<sup>20</sup> During the archbishop's funeral, snipers shot and killed at least 42 of the mourners.<sup>21</sup> The second incident took place in 1980, when four United States churchwomen were raped and murdered. In the third incident, the 1989 Jesuit Massacre, six Jesuit priests plus a housekeeper and her daughter were murdered. Each of these three incidents was an important moment within the conflict that altered foreign policy within the United States.

#### Perceived Importance of El Salvador

Security is a prioritized policy because of the perceived importance of containing the spread of communism and curbing the USSR's influence in El Salvador. As a result, human rights policy was de-emphasized. El Salvador's Civil War took place during the Cold War, and the United States did not want El Salvador to fall under the communists' sphere of influence. Communism was a threat to American ideology and the idea of

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<sup>18</sup> El salvador 12 years of civil war. The Center for Justice and Accountability: Bringing Human Rights Abusers to Justice Web site. <http://www.cja.org/article.php?list=type&type=199>. Accessed September 23, 2012.

<sup>19</sup> Stanley W. Introduction. In: *The protection racket state: Elite politics, military extortion, and civil war in el salvador*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press; 1996: 3. ISBN 1-56639-391-4.

<sup>20</sup> Doyle K, Willard E. Learn from history, 31st anniversary of the assassination of archbishop oscar romero. The National Security Archive Web site. <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB339/index.htm>. Updated 2011. Accessed September 25, 2012.

<sup>21</sup> El salvador 12 years of civil war. The Center for Justice and Accountability.

another state so close to America, influenced by the USSR, was perceived as a direct threat to American security. United States policy contains traces of human rights concerns throughout the war, but vary in amount and influence over different time periods. In the beginning and end of the war, human rights concerns are implemented into policy in addition to security policy. But, during the middle of the war, security takes complete precedence despite attempts at implementing human rights.

### Human Rights Disregarded

The United States built its security commitment to El Salvador between 1981 and 1989, during the most intense fighting in the country and when a fear of a communist take over was greatest. The United States feared that other communist countries in the region, such as Cuba, and the USSR were arming the insurgents.<sup>22</sup> As a result, the United States elevated its security commitment in El Salvador. Several examples demonstrate the growth of security and weakening of human rights in policy towards El Salvador at the time the perceived threat of communist El Salvador was largest.

First, in the beginning of the conflict the United States sent 19 military advisors in order to supervise, train, and aid in countering the leftist guerrillas.<sup>23</sup> As United States commitment grew, the Department of Defense raised the number of military advisors from 19 to 54 and included experts in combat training.<sup>24</sup> Second, in 1983, the United States made the distinction between military and paramilitary human rights violations, arguing that paramilitary forces, such as the death squads, were right wing extremists. The president tried to avert blame from the Salvadoran military and its support for the

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<sup>22</sup> Grimmett RF. The war powers resolution: After thirty-six years. . 2010:12. Web site.

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41199.pdf>

<sup>23</sup> Grimmett RF. The war powers resolution: After thirty-six years. 19.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 19.

death squads,<sup>25</sup> in order to protect the military against accusations of human rights violations due to the geostrategic importance of upholding the current Salvadoran government against the left wing communists.

Third, in 1984, the Department of Defense appealed to Congress for more money for military aid.<sup>26</sup> The Executive Branch argued that the Salvadoran forces were not large enough to fight the FMLN. Therefore, the United States had to raise the amount of military funding in order to be able to fight the insurgents better, despite rampant human rights violations. In light of this argument, and due to the recent democratic election in the country, Congress raised the amount of funding for the Salvadoran military.<sup>27</sup> In this example, an improvement in human rights conditions were used to justify the increase in funding to support the security driven policies. In reality, there was a lack of any real or substantial human rights improvements on behalf of the Salvadorian military.

During the security driven time of the 1980s, human rights concerns were present in policy only because they never halted or attempted to curb the U.S. security actions and policies in El Salvador at the time. Any attempt to disturb the security agenda in the name of human rights was quickly shut down. The first example of legislation that passed was H.R. 1271, which;

Amends the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 to allow the President to make the fourth certification which is required for continuing aid to El Salvador only if the certification includes a determination by the President that El Salvador has: made good faith efforts since the last

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<sup>25</sup> Burgerman, "First do no harm," 276.

<sup>26</sup> Timeline: U.S. policy in el salvador 1980-2000. PBS Web site.

<http://www.pbs.org/itvs/enemiesofwar/timeline2.html>. Accessed September 30, 2012.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

certification to investigate and prosecute those responsible for the murders of seven U.S. citizens<sup>28</sup>

The law sought to ensure that the military aid that the president wanted to give to El Salvador had to comply not only with general human rights violations but also more specifically with the murder of American citizens.

The second piece of legislation passed by Congress was H.R. 4042 in September 1983. The law sought to continue the requirements established in the 1981 International Security and Development Cooperation Act. It bought the Congress more time to create new legislation pertaining to military aid to El Salvador because it stated that the 1981 law would continue until Congress created a new law or until September 30, 1984.<sup>29</sup> The above two initiatives, passed into law because they were not overly aggressive in restricting the security driven agenda in El Salvador.

Legislation that failed to pass resulted because of the attempt to curb security assistance to El Salvador. The first piece of failed legislation was H.R. 1899, created in March 1983. The document never made it past the subcommittees within the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives. The bill tried to nullify all military assistance to El Salvador unless the president consulted with Congress and submitted a report stating that El Salvador had or had not started negotiations.<sup>30</sup> A second bill that

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<sup>28</sup>Rep. Gerry Studds. H.R. 1271 (98th): A bill with regard to presidential certifications on conditions in el salvador. *Signed by the President*. 1983;H.R.1271(98th Congress). Web site. <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/98/hr1271>

<sup>29</sup>Barnes M. A bill to continue in effect the current certification requirements with respect to el salvador until the congress enacts new legislation providing conditions for united states military assistance to el salvador or until the end of fisca. *Died (At President)*. 1983;H.R. 4042(98th Congress). Web site. <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/98/hr4042>.

<sup>30</sup>Leach J. A bill to provide that, unless the government of el salvador actively participates in negotiations with all major parties to the conflict which are willing to participate unconditionally in negotiations for the purpose of achieving a cea. *Died(Referred to*

was not passed into law was H.R. 2232, created March 1983. This bill hoped to suspend all military aid until there were negotiations between the government and FMLN.<sup>31</sup> A third document that was not passed was H.J.RES.86 in February 1983. The resolution also attempted to prohibit military assistance to El Salvador.<sup>32</sup>

The difference between the bills that were passed into law and the bills that did not make it past committees were that the bills that did not pass were too restrictive on the security driven agenda of the United States. The bills tried to restrict all military aid to El Salvador, something that the United States would never have permitted due to the geostratigical importance of El Salvador. In contrast, the bills that became laws were less restrictive. The laws required congressional oversight of executive actions and required reports on El Salvador but did not seek to eliminate military aid.

During a time of strictly security driven concerns, the human rights legislation that passed into law are important because it marks a period in time when the United States attempted to have human rights as part of its policy despite having a security driven agenda.

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*Committee*). 1983;H.R. 1899(98th Congress). Web site.

<http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/98/hr1899>

<sup>31</sup> Feighan E. A bill to suspend military assistance and sales to el salvador until the government of el salvador has demonstrated its willingness, through the appointment of a peace commission, to enter into a dialogue with the other parties to the co. *Died(Referred to Committee)*. 1983;H.R. 2232(98th Congress). Web site.

<http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/98/hr2232>

<sup>32</sup> Kastenmeier R. A joint resolution to prohibit military assistance for el salvador. *Died(Referred to Committee)*. 1983;H.J.Res. 86(98th Congress). Web site.

<http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/98/hjres86>

## Human Rights Reemerge

During the entirety of the Salvadorian Civil War, human rights were most present at the beginning and end of the conflict. It appeared at the beginning because the United States had not yet completely committed itself to war and it reemerged at the end of the conflict as a result of the end of the Cold War.

For human rights to have emerged in policy during the early 1980s it could not directly interfere with the security policies in El Salvador. The following examples demonstrate the weak but still present influence of human rights in policy towards El Salvador.

First, in response to the rape of four U.S. churchwomen in 1980, Congress initiated H.CON.RES 457. The resolution stated that military assistance to El Salvador should remain suspended until there was proof that the Salvadoran government was not associated with the murders.<sup>33</sup> It was referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and met a dead end. The failed resolution marked the attempt at passing legislation influenced by human rights concerns. Although in this case, human rights concerns only emerged because those that died were American. Because security remained a central policy in the early 1980s and the legislation attempted to block security policy, the human rights agenda was not passed into law.

Second, the Legislative branch made it a requirement of the President to bi-annually submit a report on El Salvador's human rights. In order to receive funding for

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<sup>33</sup> Guarini FJ. A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the congress that all military assistance to el salvador should remain suspended until the president of the united states determines that the government of el salvador was not implicat... *Died(Referred to Committee)*. 1980;H.Con.Res. 457(96th). Web Site. <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/96/hconres457>

military assistance, the president would have to certify that El Salvador was attempting to improve its human rights record as well as control its own military.<sup>34</sup> In addition, the Senate passed S.1196, the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981.<sup>35</sup> This piece of Senate legislation

Prohibits the President from consenting to transfers of defense equipment, articles, or services whose values exceed such trigger price and whose export has been licensed and approved until a specified time after the certification has been submitted to Congress.<sup>36</sup>

Therefore, the President must receive permission from Congress to send any amount over a designated amount established by Congress. In the late 1970s early 1980s, human rights concerns were still present in policy because the United States was not strongly committed to El Salvadorian security until later in the war. Security was beginning to dominate policy but human rights concerns were still present in the policy at this time.

The late 1980s early 1990s mark the draw down of prioritizing United States foreign policy on security in El Salvador for two reasons. First, the Cold War was unraveling and communism became less of a threat to the United States. Second, the 1989 Jesuit murders plus the Moakley report aided in ending the priority of security at the expense of human rights. A congressional task force created the Moakley Report in order to investigate the murders of the priests. They found that 9 of the 26 Salvadoran officers responsible received military training at the U.S. Army School of the Americas.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Burgerman, "First do no harm," 282.

<sup>35</sup> Percy C. International security and development cooperation act of 1981. *Signed by the President*. 1981;S.1196(97th). Web site.  
<http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/97/s1196>

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Timeline: U.S. policy in el salvador 1980-2000. PBS

The report exemplifies the lack of real human rights policy in the conflict. The United States, despite its rhetoric of supporting human rights, instead bolstered the very regime that committed the atrocities. As a result, the incident was an embarrassment to the United States, and instigated immediate Congressional action against military spending. The end of the Cold War began a withdrawal of military security concerns but the Moakley report sped the end of a security driven agenda.

The Legislative branch acted to halt El Salvador's military aid in several different bills. A joint Congress and Senate Resolution signed by the Senate and passed by the President was the H.J.RES.456, titled "Making further continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 1992, and for other purposes." The resolution restricts the amount of aid available to El Salvador to non-lethal supplies.<sup>38</sup> While this particular piece of legislation passed into law, there were several Congressional failed attempts.

The bill H.R.1346 titled, "Peace, Democracy and Development in El Salvador Act of 1991", established three different requirements for El Salvador. First, it hoped to participate in negotiations between the Salvadoran government and FMLN to create a cease-fire. Second, it stated its support of the role of the United Nations. Third, it withheld military assistance, the stationing of US personnel, and financing covert operations.<sup>39</sup> A second bill, created a few months later, was H.R.3497, "El Salvador Peace, Security, and Justice Act of 1991". This bill, built on the previous one, sought to limit the amount of military aid available to El Salvador. It stated that no aid would be

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<sup>38</sup> Whitten J. Making further continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 1992, and for other purposes. *Signed by the President*. 1992;H.J.RES.456(102nd). Web site.  
<http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/102/hjres456>

<sup>39</sup> McDermott J. Peace, democracy and development in el salvador act of 1991. *Died(Referred to Committee)*. 1991;H.R.1326(102nd). Web site.  
<http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/102/hr1326>

provided if 1) the Salvadoran government rejected the UN, 2) El Salvador failed to reach a cease-fire, 3) El Salvador failed to carry out the UN agreement, and 4) El Salvador did not prosecute those responsible for human rights crimes. The bill also stated it would withhold 50% of military aid.<sup>40</sup> Despite not being passed into legislation, 50% of military aid was withheld. Both bills remained within subcommittees in the H.R. Committee on Foreign Affairs, but mark the attempts of Congress to limit the strictly security policy.

Not all of the above initiatives were signed into law, but they were still viewed as series threats. In 1991, after the FMLN killed two American advisors, President Bush tried to pass \$85 million in aid to El Salvador's military.<sup>41</sup> This attempt at raising the aid budget occurred a few months after the UN started hosting peace agreements. As a result, Congress withheld half the amount. It withheld half because of past human rights abuses, but it also gave the President half because of UN negotiations. In this example, human rights and security concerns resulted in compromise of the policy that was implemented.

### Final Analysis

The perception of the importance of security concerns in El Salvador drove United States policy. The major security concern was the fear of a communist take over in El Salvador and the domino effect of that result. Interestingly, through the whole civil war, human rights concerns were never abandoned from the agenda. However, they were never implemented in such a way as to truly ensure human rights improvements or limit

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<sup>40</sup> Levine M. El salvador peace, security, and justice act of 1991. *Died(Referred to Committee)*. 1991;H.R. 3497(102nd). Web site. <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/102/hr3497>

<sup>41</sup> Knight-Riddle Newspapers. Bush to release military aid to el salvador. *The Chicago Tribune*. January 16 1991. Web site. [http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1991-01-16/news/9101050343\\_1\\_el-salvador-six-jesuit-priests-military-aid-package](http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1991-01-16/news/9101050343_1_el-salvador-six-jesuit-priests-military-aid-package)

security. Instead, at the height of the conflict, human rights improvements were used to justify a larger security budget.

As security became less of a priority in El Salvador, human rights gained more foothold in policy directed towards the country. The collapse of the USSR also meant the collapse of the threat of a communist El Salvador. Therefore, security became less important. As security became a less important strategy in El Salvador there was less emphasis on military assistance as a security objective. As a result, human rights legislation became more prominent in foreign policy directed towards El Salvador.

To ensure consistency in foreign policy, the United States should have evaluated human rights concerns and security concerns on the same level. If this was done, it may have been possible to avoid training the forces that committed human rights abuses. Suggestions to improve human rights conditions in El Salvador, without hindering the security agenda is to implement human rights classes into the military training that the Salvadorians receive from the United States.

### Chapter 3: Indonesia

Despite its human rights rhetoric, the United States foreign policy towards Indonesia demonstrates the prioritization of security. Within Indonesia, there are instances when both human rights are absent from policy and implemented in security driven policy.

#### Background Report

Secessionist movements in Aceh, El Timor, and Papua were the main areas of conflict and human rights abuses in the past and even currently. In 1999, El Timor was allowed to vote for their independence after years of conflict and human rights abuses. In 2005, Aceh and Indonesia reached a peace agreement following the devastation of the 2004 tsunami. However, Papua remains a region rampant with human rights violations. In 1962, the United States, United Nations, and Indonesia gave Papuans' the opportunity for independence under the Act of Free Choice. The choice was not representative of the population because local authority voted to remain under Indonesian control. In 2003, Indonesian President, Megawati, decided to divide Papua into three provinces. In 2005, Indonesian President, Yudhoyono, supported a plan to divide the region further, into five provinces. Thus, ensuring autonomy would be impossible for Papua.<sup>42</sup>

The International Crisis Group declared three specific areas that the Indonesian government must address within Papua.<sup>43</sup> Firstly, it must expand its political autonomy because native Papuans' are not represented well. For example, the government created the Papuan's Peoples Council (MRP) but many people do not interpret it as a real

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<sup>42</sup>Vaughn B. Papua, Indonesia: Issues for congress. January 19, 2006:5-15. Web site.

<http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/2733.pdf>

<sup>43</sup> Vaughn B. Indonesia: Domestic politics, strategic dynamics, and U.S. interests. January 31, 2011:17. Web site. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32394.pdf>

representative body because there is no general election.<sup>44</sup> Secondly, affirmative action within the economic sector must be established for native Papuans. Employment for the natives is difficult due to a preference for Indonesians.<sup>45</sup> Lastly, Indonesia must address the fear of migration within Papua. The native Papuans fear the influx of Indonesians living within their land and ultimately the destruction of their way of life.<sup>46</sup>

### Human Rights Violations

The State Department notes that Indonesia has made vast improvement within its human rights record, though most of the improvements are within Indonesia instead of its controversial territories. For example, the State Department's 2004 Human Rights Report states:

During the year, the Government made further progress in its transition from 3 decades of repressive and authoritarian rule to a more pluralistic and representative democracy. The country held successful legislative elections and free, fair, and peaceful direct presidential elections. Previously, the legislature chose the president. The Government further reduced the formal political role of the police and military.<sup>47</sup>

The Indonesian government became more democratic and the influence of the military within the Indonesian government subsided. Yet, human rights violations remain rampant in secessionist areas under Indonesian control. The same State Department report stated that

Serious problems remained...Security force members murdered, tortured, raped, beat, and arbitrarily detained civilians and members of separatist movements,

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<sup>44</sup> Vaughn, "Papua, Indonesia: Issues for Congress," 12.

<sup>45</sup> Vaughn, "Indonesia: Domestic Politics, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Interests," 17.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. Indonesia. U.S. Department of State: Diplomacy in Action Web site. <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41643.htm>. Updated 2005. Accessed October 12, 2012.

especially in Aceh and to a lesser extent in Papua. The government restricted the foreign press from traveling to conflict areas in Aceh, Papua.<sup>48</sup>

There are several categories used to classify types of human rights abuses. The five main ones used to describe the situation within Indonesia are unlawful deprivation of life, disappearances, torture, unlawful detention, and press freedoms.

It is estimated that 100,000 Papuans have died as a result of the military's control within Papua.<sup>49</sup> In El Timor, the estimated number of murders is 200,000 until the peace agreement was signed in 1999.<sup>50</sup> In addition to murders, there are a large number of documented disappearances. In 2003, there was 130 kidnappings reported. The disappearances are mostly within Aceh, whereas Papua has no documented disappearances.<sup>51</sup> All three secessionists regions have a large number of reported tortures. Within Papua, 256 people were reported tortured in 2003. Human Rights watch reports that an average of 24 out of 35 prisoners within Aceh are tortured.<sup>52</sup> El Timor is also documented to have used torture in order to extract information and confessions but no statistical evidence is documented.<sup>53</sup> Within El Timor, Aceh, and Papua there are record of people undergoing detention without warrants or court proceedings. It is estimated that 60% of arrests within Papua are made without a warrant.<sup>54</sup> There is no

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<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Vaughn, "Indonesia: Domestic Politics, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Interests," 19.

<sup>50</sup> East timor: Crimes against humanity under the indonesian occupation. The Center for justice and Accountability: Bringing Human Rights Abusers to Justice Web site. <http://www.cja.org/article.php?list=type&type=198>. Accessed October 1, 2012.

<sup>51</sup> Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Indonesia.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> East timor: Crimes against humanity under the indonesian occupation. The Center for justice and Accountability

<sup>54</sup> Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Indonesia.

reliable data or statistics on the number of arrests without warrants or unlawful holdings within El Timor.<sup>55</sup>

All of the above statistical information regarding the human rights abuses within El Timor, Aceh, and Papua are not thorough or 100% accurate. This is due to the fact that journalists and NGOs are not allowed into the regions by the Indonesian government. Journalists must have permission from the Indonesian government to publish anything, and they face police intimidation.<sup>56</sup>

### Perceived Importance of Indonesia

Security is a prioritized policy because of long established, friendly relations with the nation and the perceived importance of combating terrorism after the 9/11 terror attacks. As a result, human rights policy, while not ignored, is not at the forefront of United States political action in Indonesia. Several factors contribute to the perceived security importance of Indonesia.

First, Indonesia is composed of several islands in the East Asian Sea; as a result the United States is able to monitor several straits near it. The Malacca Strait is a key waterway connecting the Pacific Ocean with the Indian Ocean along Indonesia's northern border.<sup>57</sup> The strait is a major shipping channel connecting the South Asian economies. Thus, maintaining the security and freedom of the waterway is vital to American economic interests. In addition to the Malacca Strait, the United States cooperates with

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<sup>55</sup> U.S. Department of State. Indonesia country report on human rights practices for 1998. . 1999. Web site. <https://www.fas.org/irp/world/indonesia/indonesia-1998.htm>

<sup>56</sup> Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Indonesia.

<sup>57</sup> Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. U.S. relations with Indonesia. U.S. Department of State: Diplomacy in Action Web site. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2748.htm>. Updated 2012. Accessed October 1, 2012.

Indonesia to police the Makassar Strait and surrounding waters for terrorist and pirate activity.<sup>58</sup>

Second, Indonesia is within China's sphere of influence, and Indonesia has expressed concern about its aggressiveness in the region because China is expanding its naval capacity.<sup>59</sup> As a result, Indonesia is a key military ally of the United States in order to balance China's military power and influence in the region.<sup>60</sup>

Third, Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, Indonesia was elevated as a security partner of the United States. Indonesia is composed of the world's largest Muslim population. As a result, the United States' partnership with the country is two fold. Firstly, it demonstrates to other Muslim nations that the War on Terror is not a war on Muslims. Secondly, because it is the largest Muslim nation the United States fears that poverty may be an area for the growth and influence of Al-Qaeda.<sup>61</sup> For example, there have been several terrorists' attacks on Indonesian soil as a result of Al-Qaeda doctrine. In 2002, a bomb killed over 200 people at a popular nightclub in Bali; in 2003, a car bomb killed 14 in front of a hotel in Jakarta; in 2004, a car bomb outside the Australian embassy killed 9; and in 2005, three suicide bombs in Bali killed 23.<sup>62</sup> Therefore, the United States and Indonesia train together in combating terrorism.

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> Vaughn, "Indonesia: Domestic Politics, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Interests," 1, 13.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.,13.

<sup>61</sup> Vaughn, "Papua, Indonesia: Issues for Congress." Summary.

<sup>62</sup> BBC. Indonesia profile: A chronology of key events. BBC News: Asia-Pacific Web site. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-15114517>. Updated 2012. Accessed October 1, 2012.

Due to the reasons listed above, maintaining a security relationship with Indonesia and promoting a United States security agenda remain a policy priority. Despite promoting human rights rhetorically, it falls on the way side of the policy agenda.

### Human Rights Disregarded

Due to the perceived importance of maintaining security in Indonesia, the United States acted to ensure the prioritization of security driven policy. There are several examples of the United States demonstrating the complete disregard of human rights standards.

First, the Department of Defense sold military equipment and military parts from 1992-1997 without congressional knowledge or approval.<sup>63</sup> In 1993, nearly \$4 million dollars worth of equipment was sold to Indonesia. In the same year, Congress banned fighter jets, small arms, and riot control equipment from being sold.<sup>64</sup> In 1994, \$9.3 million dollars worth of equipment was sold to Indonesia, including materials for manufacturing ammunition, explosives, missiles, and spare aircraft parts.<sup>65</sup> Furthermore, in 1995, \$7.3 million dollars worth of equipment was sold; in 1996, \$9.2 million dollars worth of equipment was sold; in 1997, \$5.1 million dollars worth of equipment was sold; in 1998, \$10.6 million dollars worth of equipment was sold.<sup>66</sup> As a result, from 1993 to 1998, a total of \$142,480,963 million dollars worth of military equipment was sold to Indonesia, despite a Congressional ban on military training and

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<sup>63</sup> Berrigan F. Indonesia at the crossroads: U.S. weapons sales and military training. World Policy Institute Web site. <http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/indo101001.htm>. Updated 2001. Accessed September 26, 2012.

<sup>64</sup> Arms Sale Monitor. Federation of American Scientists, 1. Web site. <http://www.fas.org/asmp/library/asm/asm41.pdf>. Updated 1999. Accessed October 15, 2012.

<sup>65</sup> Arms Sale Monitor. Federation of American Scientists, 1.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

certain military articles. The above example demonstrates the prioritization of security policy because the United States sold military equipment to arm the Indonesians against threats and to maintain friendly relations with the country. The actions were done with disregard for the consequences to human rights. In fact, the weapons sold to Indonesian soldiers repressed the individuals in secessionist regions.

Second, while IMET was banned, the Department of Defense trained Indonesian soldiers under the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET). IMET was banned following a massacre in El Timor. From 1992 until 1997, United States and Indonesian military personnel underwent joint training every few months for a total of 36 times without notifying Congress.<sup>67</sup> JCET trained the Kopassus forces, the Indonesian Special Forces who notoriously used torture and other extreme methods on civilians in secessionist regions.<sup>68</sup> Even though the exchange-training program was not illegal, many in Congress viewed it as a way to move around the limitations established on IMET.<sup>69</sup> In this example, the United States trained the Indonesian forces that committed human rights abuses such as torture in secessionist regions. Again, despite verbally committing itself to international human rights, the United States acts contrarily to its statements.

Third, during the War on Terror, the security driven agenda resulted in several changes that bolstered the security relationship between Indonesia and the United States. The United States provided more funding to train and equip the Indonesians in order to fight terrorism and stop it from spreading during the War on Terrorism. In November 2005, restrictions on Foreign Military Financing (FMF) were waved, allowing for over \$6

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<sup>67</sup> Berrigan, "Indonesia at the crossroads: U.S. weapons sales and military training."

<sup>68</sup> Arms Sale Monitor. Federation of American Scientists, 1.

<sup>69</sup> Berrigan, "Indonesia at the crossroads: U.S. weapons sales and military training."

million in foreign aid to go to the Indonesian Navy for maritime security.<sup>70</sup> By May, restrictions on FMF were lifted even further because the embargo of the sale of non-lethal weapons was lifted.<sup>71</sup> By 2006, Congress passed a budget allowing \$990,000 in sales to Indonesia. In 2007, \$6,175,000 was budgeted. And in 2008, \$12,872,000 was budgeted.<sup>72</sup> In February 2005, restrictions on IMET were lifted. In addition, Indonesia received funding for several other security organizations such as the Antiterrorism Assistance Program and the Counterterrorism Fellowship Program.<sup>73</sup> Despite the continuation of human rights abuses in secessionist regions, the United States continued to support, train, and arm the Indonesian forces.

### *Human Rights Reemerge*

While never entirely absent from policy in Indonesia, human rights never took the forefront of the agenda either. Human rights concerns became policy in limited cases. First, an event occurs, such as a massacre, that cannot be overlooked internationally. Second, as long as the human rights policy does not directly interfere with the security driven agenda it can become policy. During the War on Terror there are several successful examples of human rights being written into security driven policies.

First, human rights can result as reactionary policy. In 1991, a massacre occurred in El Timor that resulted in changed policy. The Indonesian military murdered over 200

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<sup>70</sup> O'Brien A. The U.S.-Indonesian military relationship. Council on Foreign Relations Web site. <http://www.cfr.org/indonesia/us-indonesian-military-relationship/p8964>. Updated 2005. Accessed October 1, 2012.

<sup>71</sup> Berrigan, "Indonesia at the crossroads: U.S. weapons sales and military training."

<sup>72</sup> State Department. Foreign military financing account summary. U.S. Department of State: Diplomacy in Action Web site. <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14560.htm>. Updated 2010. Accessed October 15, 2012.

<sup>73</sup> O'Brien, "The U.S.-Indonesian military relationship."

civilians in the Santa Cruz Massacre.<sup>74</sup> The Indonesian military used United States M16s to kill the civilians in the massacre.<sup>75</sup> As a result, Congress banned IMET from 1991-1995.

Second, human rights concerns are successfully implemented into a security driven policy agenda when Congress added additional limitations on IMET. The program was expanding from IMET to E-IMET under H.R. 3121. Under the law, E-IMET included classes on human rights for the nations receiving United States training.<sup>76</sup> The law states that IMET was resumed with human rights clauses because of “the importance of Indonesia as a trade and security partner, on professionalism and human rights sensitivity of the foreign military beneficiaries”.<sup>77</sup> Within this law, Congress recognizes the security importance of Indonesia in addition to the importance of international human rights. Therefore, human rights and security were efficiently compromised under H.R.3121 because IMET was resumed in order to bolster United States security but with human rights concerns. For example, the law states that

This limited restoration of IMET, therefore, should not be interpreted as an expression of congressional satisfaction with the Government of Indonesia's human rights performance in East Timor or elsewhere in Indonesia. The Congress remains concerned about poor human rights conditions in Indonesia and urges the Administration to actively promote better human rights practices. Moreover, the Congress looks for improvements in these areas prior to restoration of the full

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<sup>74</sup> Berrigan, “Indonesia at the crossroads: U.S. weapons sales and military training.”

<sup>75</sup> Arms Sale Monitor. Federation of American Scientists, 1.

<sup>76</sup> Berrigan, “Indonesia at the crossroads: U.S. weapons sales and military training.”

<sup>77</sup> Gilman B. To amend the foreign assistance act of 1961 and the arms export control act to make improvements to certain defense and security assistance provisions under those acts, to authorize the transfer of naval vessels to certain foreign count. *Signed by the President*. 1996;H.R.3121(104th). Web site <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/104/hr3121>

range of security cooperation with Indonesia, as it existed prior to the massacre in Deli, East Timor, in November 1991.<sup>78</sup> Congress states that it is not fully satisfied with human rights conditions in Indonesia but understands the importance of maintaining a security partnership with the country through arms sale and joint training. Therefore, Congress improved the Department of Defense's training program to include human rights classes. In this example, human rights policy is successfully implemented along with security policy in Indonesia.

Human rights and security policies can coexist, but human rights policies are not implemented if they disrupt security rather than work with it. There are several bills that met their end within committees of the House of Representatives as a result of this.

Two bills that died within Congress that tried to limit the powers of the executive due to human rights violations are H.R.1063 and H.R. 3918. H.R. 1063, International Military Training Transparency and Accountability Act, was initiated by the 106<sup>th</sup> congress in 1999. The bill attempted to “prohibit the sale of weapons and training to any foreign country that is not allowed to receive international training or arms sale”.<sup>79</sup> The second bill that failed to pass into law was H.R. 3918, Indonesia Human Rights Before Military Assistance Act. The bill sought to restrict the sale of lethal military equipment, helicopters, building materials, ammunition, and parts to Indonesia unless the president certified that the Indonesian government was improving its human rights record.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> Smith C. International military training transparency and accountability act. *Died(Referred to Committee)*. 1999;H.R. 1063(106th). Web site. <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/106/hr1063>

<sup>80</sup> McKinney C. Indonesia human rights before military assistance act. *Died(Referred to Committee)*. 1998;H.R. 3918(105th). Web site. <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/105/hr3918>

In order for human rights to successfully become part of a security driven agenda, it must not limit arms sales and training programs. For example, in 2006, H.R. 3057: Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs, was signed into law. The law required that no less than \$1,000,000 be available for Indonesia to enhance security. The law specifically includes that the countries that receive aid must be “consistent with the democratic principles and rule of law”.<sup>81</sup> Even though security remains a primary objective in the bill, it also ensures clauses respecting human rights values are stated. Even though the law does not primarily concern itself with human rights, undertones of the objective are written into the security-concerned law. For example, the law states that the President can “issue licenses for the export of lethal equipment only if the secretary of state confirms that the Indonesian government is prosecuting soldiers for human rights violations”.<sup>82</sup> In addition, the law states that the Secretary of State must report to Congress on the status of Indonesian prosecutions for human rights abuses.<sup>83</sup> In this example, Congress implements human rights policy in a more subtle way, such as requiring reports on the country and linking the sale of lethal military supplies to military tribunals.

### Final Analysis

The perception of the importance of security concerns in Indonesia drive United States policy. The major security concern was maintaining a U.S. presence in a strategic region and containing terrorism particularly during the War on Terror. There are

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<sup>81</sup> Kolbe J. Foreign operations, export financing, and related programs appropriations act, 2006. *Signed by the President*. 2005;H.R.3057(109th). Web site. <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/109/hr3057>

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

instances in policy where human rights are completely absent and when human rights are present. But, whether human rights are absent or present from policy, security remains the priority of the United States in Indonesia.

To ensure consistency in foreign policy, the United States should have evaluated human rights concerns and security concerns on the same level. If this was done, it may have been possible to avoid training and arming the security forces committing human rights abuses in Indonesia. A suggestion to improve human rights conditions in Indonesia, without hindering the security agenda, is to have restricted military sales of non-lethal materials. In this example, equipment is still sold to Indonesia, but not harmful material that could have been used to repress people in secessionist regions. An example of human rights and security concerns implemented into coherent policy was the transition from IMET to E-IMET.

## Chapter 4: Bahrain

In light of the Arab Spring and United States' promises towards its commitment to human rights, U.S. relations with Bahrain demonstrates the prioritization of security concerns over human rights. In particular, during the War on Terror, security concerns take precedence over human rights due to the perceived importance of security in war. The United States pursued its military relations and sales with Bahrain despite the country's disregard for its citizens' human rights. As war ended, human rights crept back into United States foreign policy because of changing priorities. Security remains the central factor of policy creation in Bahrain, but human rights concerns are also present.

### Background Report

The small Sunni population controls most of the economic wealth and political representation in the majority Shi'a nation of Bahrain. As a result, the Shi'a majority is underrepresented in the government and does not receive the same economic opportunities as the Sunni population. The problems of Bahrain lingered under the surface of the country for years until the Arab Spring catalyzed the situation and brought the strife into the forefront of Bahraini politics. The Shi'a demands during the Arab Spring were threefold: alter the constitution to give more power to the parliament, end gerrymandering, and provide more equal economic opportunities.<sup>84</sup>

The Arab Revolt reached Bahrain February 17, 2011. Sleeping demonstrators were awoken by tear gas and rubber bullets. Four people were killed on the first day of the protests at the Pearl Roundabout. On February 18, directly following the police

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<sup>84</sup> Katzman K. Bahrain: Reform, security, and U.S. policy. . November 6, 2012:7. Web site. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/95-1013.pdf>

actions, the protests grew larger. On February 19, security forces pulled away from confronting protestors in response to United States' urging. On February 22, the crown prince tried to initiate a formal dialogue to resolve the protestors' demands. After protestors reached the financial district of the country on March 13, Bahrain appealed to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In response, Saudi Arabia sent 1,200 forces and 20 tanks. The United Arab Emirates sent 600 police. The influx of foreign troops represented an overwhelming show of force against civilian populations. By June 29, the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) created a set of recommendations to help resolve the conflict and restore peace in the country. The Shi'a majority rejected the initiative because parliament did not have full authority but was praised by the United States as a step in the right direction. By November 26, King Hamad established a government commission to enact BICI's recommendations, which failed to stop the protests.<sup>85</sup>

### Human Rights Violations

The government's mishandling of the protests received international attention and brought the issues of human rights to the forefront of the conflict. Over the course of the protests, 52 were confirmed dead. Five died from torture techniques such as beating, cables, whips, electrocution, sleep-deprivation, and temperature exposure. Over 1,800 people were detained without warrants, held without hearings, and denied trials. In addition, police threatened detainees and their families with rape and murder. Bahraini

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<sup>85</sup> Kenneth, "Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy," 13.

security forces detained kids under fifteen and destroyed 30 Shi'a mosques.<sup>86</sup>

Additionally, the media and NGOs' access to the nation during the Arab Spring were severely limited. In summary, Bahrain's list of human rights abuses include unlawful deprivation of life, torture, unlawful detention, and media repression.

#### Importance of Bahrain to the United States

Security is a prioritized policy because of the perceived importance of the relationship between Bahrain and the United States. Bahrain is a key geostrategic ally of the United States for three major reasons. First, it is located in the middle of the Arabian Gulf across from Iran. The United States ensures that shipping remains open for vital economic trade in oil and other resources.<sup>87</sup> Bahrain's key location leads to the second reason it is an important ally to the United States. The small country hosts the American Navy's 5<sup>th</sup> fleet, which is composed of 30 warships and over 30,000 sailors.<sup>88</sup> Bahrain is a major logistical center, rest stop, and resupply zone of the United States military operating in the Gulf region and the Middle East. The United States also conducts joint training with the Bahraini military. Bahraini defense forces send their personnel to the United States for training in addition to purchasing American weapons. In the past

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<sup>86</sup> State Department. Bahrain: Country reports on human rights practices for 2011. U.S. Department of State: Diplomacy in Action Web site. Permalink: <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?dliid=186421>. Updated 2011. Accessed August 20, 2012.

<sup>87</sup> Bowman T. Bahrain: Key U.S. military hub. National Public Radio Web site. <http://www.npr.org/2011/02/19/133893941/Bahrain-Unrest-Threatens-U-S-Military-Hub>. Updated 2011. Accessed August 20, 2012.

<sup>88</sup> Cooley A, Nexon DH. Bahrain's base politics: The arab spring and america's military bases. Foreign Affairs Web site. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67700/alexander-cooley-and-daniel-h-nexon/bahrains-base-politics>. Updated 2011. Accessed August 20, 2012.

decade, military sales have reached nearly \$1.5 billion.<sup>89</sup> Third, after 9/11, Bahrain became a major non-NATO ally in the War on Terror for its military partnership as well as its logistical capacity. The relationship has been in place since the first Gulf War with Iraq in 1991. The United States and Bahrain's combined task force interdicts weapons of mass destruction, terrorists, and narcotics in the Arabian Sea.<sup>90</sup> In addition, Bahrain runs support missions for the United States forces acting in Afghanistan. As a result of this military relationship and Bahrain's status as a key ally of the United States, security concerns dominate foreign policy

#### Human Rights Disregarded

Due to the perceived security importance of Bahrain to the United States, the U.S. has acted in ways to ensure the continuation of a security driven agenda. This is especially true during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. Three examples of the prioritization of security are examined below.

First, Bahrain received additional money for various security programs in Bahrain after the terrorist attacks on the United States. For example, between 2002-2004 the United States provided \$143.1 million for the Foreign Military Fund and \$1.442 trillion for IMET.<sup>91</sup> The United States offers a lot of security assistance to the tiny island nation, but the United States receives several security benefits from the relationship. For example Bahrain "provided extensive basing and over flight clearances for a multitude of U.S. aircraft operating in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation

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<sup>89</sup> Bowman, "Bahrain: Key U.S. Military Hub."

<sup>90</sup> Kenneth, "Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy," 25.

<sup>91</sup> Katzman K. Bahrain: Key issues for U.S. policy. March 24, 2005:4. Web site.  
<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/46433.pdf>

Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Bahrain also deployed forces in support of the Coalition".<sup>92</sup> Bahrain hosted 4,000 troops for OEF and 4,500 troops for OIF.<sup>93</sup>

Second, the Defense Cooperation Pact was created during the first Gulf War and allows for the 5<sup>th</sup> fleets presence in the country. It is re-signed every 10 years. The pact was re-signed in 2001 but five years additional years were added to the program. As a result its new signing date is October 2016 instead of 2011.<sup>94</sup> American security and the retention of a key ally within the Gulf drove the president to add the additional years to the defense pact.

Third, there is no legislation criticizing Bahrain or condemning human rights abuses and lack of equality among the Sunni and Shi'a. For example, in 2003 Congress wrote H.CON.RES.211. The resolution expresses gratitude for Bahrain and other gulf countries for their support in Operation Iraqi Freedom.<sup>95</sup> Another example of Congress expressing thanks and friendliness to Bahrain is in H.CON.RES 31: Welcoming His Majesty Shaikh Hamad bin Isa Al-Kalifa, King of the Kingdom of Bahrain, on his visit to the United States in February 2003. Like the other resolution, this document also commends Bahrain for its support in the wars and its support for the relationship between Bahrain and the United States.<sup>96</sup> Both these resolutions thank Bahrain for the security

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<sup>92</sup> State Department, "Bahrain: Country reports on human rights practices for 2011"

<sup>93</sup> Katzman, "Bahrain: Key Issues for U.S. Policy," 25.

<sup>94</sup> Lippman TW. Washington's uneasy alliance with bahrain. *The Washington Post*. August 4, 2011 2011;Opinions. Web site. [http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/washingtons-uneasy-alliance-with-bahrain/2011/08/03/gIQATWw5uI\\_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/washingtons-uneasy-alliance-with-bahrain/2011/08/03/gIQATWw5uI_story.html)

<sup>95</sup> Ros-Lehtinen I. Expressing the sense of congress and appreciation for the support and cooperation from kuwait, bahrain, and qatar in operation iraqi freedom. *Died(Referred to Committee)*. 2003;H.Con.Res 211(108th). Web site. <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/108/hconres211>

<sup>96</sup> Wilson A. Welcoming his majesty shaikh hamad bin isa al-kalifa, king of the kingdom of bahrain, on his visit to the united states in February 2003. *Died(Referred to Committee)*. 2003;H.Con.Res 31(108th). Web site. <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/108/hconres31>

relationship the two countries have at the height of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It was not until later that Congress took a different tone after much of the fighting in Iraq had passed and the war became unpopular.

### Human Rights Reemerge

Human rights began to etch its way into policy at the draw down of the Iraq War as a result of the changing priorities of the United States policies in Bahrain. Strictly military security concerns were deemphasized at the draw down of war and human rights concerns reemerged.

The War on Terror was the reason for the narrowly focused security driven policy in the early 2000s but in the late 2000s security remained a priority because the United States feared the fall of Sheikh Hamad. The U.S. feared the rise of a Shi'a government that would be more perceptible to Iran's influences and less friendly to the United States. It poses a threat to the United States influence in the region and possibility of severing the Defense Cooperation Pact with Bahrain.<sup>97</sup> As a result, security remains central to United States policy in Bahrain but human rights have reemerged in policy as well.

In 2008, a bill was introduced in the Senate that sought to re-introduce the issue of human rights into the strictly security driven policy towards Bahrain. The resolution S.RES.619 is titled "Resolution expressing support for a constructive dialogue on human rights issues between the United States and Bahrain".<sup>98</sup> The Senate calls on the President as well as the Secretary of State to jumpstart the dialogue between Bahrain and the United States about human rights issues in the country. The resolution died within the

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<sup>97</sup> Kenneth, "Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy," 30.

<sup>98</sup> Sessions J. A resolution expressing support for a constructive dialogue on human rights issues between the united states and bahrain. *Died(Referred to Committee)*. 2008;S.Res. 619(110th). Web site. <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/sres619>

Committee on Foreign Relations and was never passed into law or signed by the President. It was not until the Arab Spring and increased international media attention that Congress acted more aggressively in limiting the security driven policy towards Bahrain.

When the Arab Spring started in Bahrain, the Department of Defense tried to pass an arms sales bill through Congress. On September 14, 2011, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible military sale to Bahrain.<sup>99</sup> The United States wanted to sell 44 armored vehicles and hundreds of TOW missiles. The sale was worth \$53 million dollars and announced only seven months after the initial start of the conflict.<sup>100</sup> The arms sale was to be used only to defend against outside threats and thus it did not breach the Leahy Amendment, which states that the United States cannot sell military equipment that is used against the receiving nation's own citizens. Thus, the loophole in the amendment made the arms sale possible. In this example, the Leahy Amendment ensures that security is not met at the cost of human rights in foreign policy. It represents an important piece of legislation that tries to balance security and human rights in foreign policy.

In response to the proposed arm sale, Congress tried to initiate H.J.RES.80, which states that the proposed arms sale to Bahrain is prohibited due to human rights abuses unless the Secretary of State certifies five things: 1) Bahrain is conducting investigations and prosecutions of those responsible for torture and mishandling of protestors,

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<sup>99</sup> Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Defense security cooperation agency: 36(b) arms sale notification. Defense Security Cooperation Agency Web site. [http://www.dsca.osd.mil/pressreleases/36-b/36b\\_index.htm#CY](http://www.dsca.osd.mil/pressreleases/36-b/36b_index.htm#CY) 2011. Updated 2012. Accessed September 12, 2011, 2012.

<sup>100</sup> Kenneth, "Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy," 27.

2) Bahrain is no longer torturing its citizens, 3) Bahrain is rebuilding destroyed mosques, 4) Bahrain lifts government employment restrictions based on religion, and 5) Bahrain implements BICI.<sup>101</sup> The bill was introduced in 2011 and has not been passed by the House of Representatives, Senate, or President. Another resolution, not signed into law, is S.J.RES.28, which reaffirms the forementioned legislation to limit the sale of certain defense items to Bahrain.<sup>102</sup>

The legislation may not have passed, but a Congressional letter sent to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton by the Senate received feedback. The letter, written on October 12, 2011, stated that the proposed military sale would weaken American credibility. The letter stated that:

Completing an arms sale to Bahrain under the current circumstances would weaken U.S. credibility at a critical time of democratic transition in the Middle East. We urge you to send a strong signal that the United States does not condone the repression of peaceful demonstrators by delaying the possible arms sale until the Bahraini government releases its political prisoners, addresses the independent commission's recommendations, and enters into meaningful dialogue with Bahraini civil society and opposition groups.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> McGovern J. Limiting the issuance of a letter of offer with respect to a certain proposed sale of defense articles and defense services to the kingdom of bahrain. *Referred to Committee*. 2012;H.J.Res. 80(112th). Web site.

<http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hjres80>

<sup>102</sup> Wyden R. A joint resolution limiting the issuance of a letter of offer with respect to a certain proposed sale of defense articles and defense services to the kingdom of bahrain. *Referred to Committee*. 2011;S.J.RES. 28(112TH). Web site.

<http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/sjres28>

<sup>103</sup> Casey RJ. Casey to secretary Clinton: Delay arms sale to Bahrain. Robert P. Casey, Jr. United States Senator for Pennsylvania Web site.

<http://www.casey.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?id=8d723fd0-c59c-4eb7-8ec2-d6fb75bcd8d>. Updated 2011. Accessed 2012, 2012.

While the letter may not have been the cause of halting the arms sale, it serves as an example of human rights concerns shaping policy implementation.<sup>104</sup>

The Legislative Branch only found temporary success in halting the Executive Office's initial military arms sale. The initial \$53 million plan was unsuccessful, but a loophole in the law allowed for the President to send military sales under \$1 million without notifying Congress. Additionally, the administration can divide each individual sale to ensure it is below the \$1 million dollar mark to ensure Congress cannot block the deal.<sup>105</sup> In this example, human rights and security are important policies of the United States instead of one over the other. As a result, human rights concerns became policy through the Congressional blocking of the initial military arms deal. However, because military security remains an important priority of the United States, the arms deal is restructured and implemented differently. The two policies may appear to butt heads but the importance of the example is that human rights concerns and security concerns are both implemented in United States foreign policy.

The BICI report was officially released in March 2012, one month later, the United States re-initiated its initial arms sale with modifications. In this example, human rights and security concerns are both elements of the United States policy toward Bahrain. The BICI report is an important indicator of human rights accountability and

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<sup>104</sup> Congress backs Bahrain protesters when white house won't. *The Washington Post*. October 26, 2011 2011;Editorial. Web site. [http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/congress-backs-bahrain-protesters-when-the-white-house-wont/2011/10/25/gIQAgYCEKM\\_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/congress-backs-bahrain-protesters-when-the-white-house-wont/2011/10/25/gIQAgYCEKM_story.html)

<sup>105</sup> Rogin J. Obama administration using loophole to quietly sell arms package to bahrain. Foreign Policy Web site. [http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/01/27/obama\\_administration\\_selling\\_new\\_arms\\_package\\_to\\_bahrain](http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/01/27/obama_administration_selling_new_arms_package_to_bahrain). Updated 2012. Accessed September 12, 2012.

progress. As a result, security driven arms sales are implemented. Lethal materials such as TOW missiles, Humvees, tear gas, and other similar items that could be used against protestors would not be sold. But materials for harbor security vessels and F-16s were among the items sold to Bahrain. The State Department released a statement that they have “made this decision mindful of the fact that there remain a number of serious, unresolved human rights issues in Bahrain, which we expect the government of Bahrain to address.”<sup>106</sup> In response to the arms sale, Congress initiated its own statement that it was pleased that lethal materials were being withheld but worried that the arms sale would send a wrong message to Bahrain.<sup>107</sup> The implementation of both security and human rights policies may not have resulted in perfectly streamlined policy but at least the policy was implemented with regards to human rights. As a result, United States policy is less inconsistent with its National Security Strategy and own established values.

### Final Analysis

The perception of the importance of security concerns in Bahrain drove United States policy. During a time of war, security was perceived as more important than human rights. The major security concern in Bahrain was bolstering a nation friendly to the United States in the Gulf region, especially when the major threat in the region for the U.S. is Iran. Human rights reemerged in policy after the Iraq war, but was never at the forefront of the policy agenda. In fact, human rights policy was often implemented only

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<sup>106</sup> Rogin J. Obama administration seeks to bolster bahraini crown prince with arms deal. Foreign Policy Web site. [http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/05/11/obama\\_administration\\_seeks\\_to\\_bolster\\_bahraini\\_crown\\_prince\\_with\\_arms\\_sales](http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/05/11/obama_administration_seeks_to_bolster_bahraini_crown_prince_with_arms_sales). Updated 2012. Accessed September 12, 2012, 2012.

<sup>107</sup> Quinn A. U.S. resumes bahrain arms sales despite human rights concerns. *Reuters*. May 11, 2012 2012. Web site. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/12/us-usa-bahrain-idUSBRE84A11R20120512>

if loopholes were in the policy that allowed for the prioritization of security. For example, the large arm sale was halted due to human rights abuses, but still allowed for small military sales to continue. Human rights and security remain conflictual policies in Bahrain.

Therefore, to ensure consistency in foreign policy, the United States should have evaluated human rights concerns and security concerns on the same level. If this was done, it may have been possible to avoid a policy tug of war between security and human rights. The example of limiting arms sales due to human rights, is the closest that human rights comes to being on equal footing with security concerns.

## **Chapter 5: Summary of Content**

The United States prioritizes human rights rhetorically but not consistently in its actions in the case studies of El Salvador, Indonesia, and Bahrain. The reason for this is because security is prioritized over human rights. Once security is ensured, then human rights are included in policy. Although there are few cases when human rights and security objectives are both written into coherent policy, it is inconsistent. The United States must consistently ensure human rights and security rhetoric are practiced in policy rather than security over human rights.

Following the constructivist theory of international relations, the United States prioritizes security over human rights in policy because it perceives security as pivotal to its existence. Social factors mold the priorities of the United States, and when those factors change so do the priorities.

In El Salvador, Indonesia, and Bahrain, the United States prioritized security over human rights due to the social factors that drove the securitization of policy. Nonetheless, each case contains elements of when human rights and security are both written into policy. The inclusion of human rights in security policy remains inconsistent in each case study but represents a starting point to create more consistent policy.

In El Salvador, the United States privileged security over human rights and even bolstered the Salvadorian military that committed human rights abuses. The reason for this is because the United States prioritized security due to its perception of the importance of combating communism in Latin America. A social factor that contributed to the perception of prioritizing security was the Cold War against Russia and the spread of communism.

Within El Salvador, human rights were either absent from policy or emerged towards the end of the conflict. During the height of the Civil War during the 1980s, the United States consistently prioritized security over human rights. The United States defended the Salvadorian military against accusations of human rights abuse and continued to train and arm them. Additionally, the Department of Defense used human rights as an argument for increasing security spending in El Salvador. A democratic election in El Salvador was justified as an improvement in human rights and therefore military spending increased despite a lack of real human rights improvement on behalf of the Salvadorian military. Human rights reemerged in foreign policy towards the end of the conflict because of changing social factors. The Cold War was near an end and the threat from USSR subsided. Therefore, the security driven agenda also changed and human rights were considered in policy decisions. For example, in 1992, a law passed stating that any military aid sent to El Salvador was restricted to non-lethal supplies. Therefore, in El Salvador security was prioritized during the height of the Civil War. As the Cold War ended, so did the securitization of policy in El Salvador and human rights concerns were written in policy.

In Indonesia, the United States prioritized security over human rights and again bolstered the Indonesian military that committed human rights abuses. The reason for this is because the United States prioritized security due to its perception of the importance of maintaining influence and a presence in South Asia. A social factor that contributes to the perception of prioritizing security is maintaining a relationship with Indonesia in order to balance the regional hegemon, China. After the attack on the United States' World Trade Center, another social factor that contributed to the

prioritization of security policy was the War on Terrorism. Indonesia became a partner in combating and preventing the spread of terrorism.

United States policy is contradictory in Indonesia because there are cases in which human rights concerns are overlooked and there are cases in which human rights are successfully integrated within security policy. Human rights were not considered in policy when the Department of Defense sold military equipment totaling \$142 million that was used against civilians in the secessionist region. The military sales occurred after the Santa Cruz Massacre of 1991, when United States M16s were used against people in El Timor. Another example occurred under JCET, in which the United States trained the Indonesian Special Forces who were known for committing human rights atrocities. However, there are examples of the successful implementation of human rights policy within the context security policy. The most successful model is the transition from IMET to E-IMET. In this example, education about human rights were added to the military training program for Indonesian soldiers. Therefore, in Indonesia security was and is prioritized but there are limited cases when human rights concerns are written into security driven policy.

In Bahrain, the United States prioritized security over human rights but did not bolster the Bahraini military during the Arab Spring. The reason the United States prioritized security in Bahrain is due to the perception of the importance of maintaining influence and a presence in the region. Social factors that contribute to the prioritization of security are balancing Iran's influence in the region, ensuring the waterways remain open for economic reasons, and ensuring the continuation of U.S. military privileges in the country.

Within Bahrain, human rights were absent from policy at the height of the war in Iraq but reemerged during the Arab Spring. During wartime, the United States provided \$143 million for FMF and \$1 trillion for IMET training despite that during this time there was never fair or equal representation of all peoples within the government of Bahrain. Instead, in 2003, the United States commended the security relationship with Bahrain and thanked the country for its support in U.S. wars. Towards the end of the war the strictly security driven policies diminished and human rights reemerged. For example, at the start of the Arab Spring in 2011, the Department of Defense tried to pass a large military sales initiative to Bahrain. However, due to human rights concerns, the initiative did not pass. In response, the Department of Defense kept military sales under \$1 million dollars each until human rights conditions improved. Once conditions improved the arms sale occurred with the exception that lethal materials were not sold. In this example, human rights appears to have conflicted with security policy. Despite this, human rights concerns resulted in altered security policy. Security remains the prioritized policy in Bahrain, but elements of human rights policy emerge in Bahrain.

In summary, all three cases contain conflictual policy that include human rights rhetoric and security-implemented policy. However, in all three cases, human rights policy emerge under different conditions. United States perception of the prioritization of security must change to further include human rights. Human rights must be written into security driven policy to ensure that human rights rhetoric matches United States foreign policy and actions abroad. The following chapter provides a series of recommendations to embed human rights concerns into security policy.

## **Chapter 6: Concluding Recommendations**

Security remains a central policy of the United States. But the notion of sacrificing human rights objectives for security is false. Both foreign policy goals can co-exist together and even bolster each other when approached and utilized correctly. Therefore, this final chapter seeks to create a set of recommendations to improve the future of American foreign policy in hopes of preventing such conflictual policies of the past.

### **Key Findings**

The following findings from the case studies highlighted in the previous chapter form the basis for the policy recommendation.

- 1) Ever since human rights have risen in importance to the United States, America has engaged in controversial actions in the name of security at the cost of human rights. In El Salvador, the fear of a communist takeover in the region influenced the United States to support a corrupt government and its military at the cost of thousands of civilian lives. In Indonesia, U.S. military partnership with the country has benefited the United States greatly, but many people in secessionist regions have struggled under the Indonesian military. The U.S.-Bahraini military partnership again benefits both countries but the Shi'a population suffered from an unfair governmental system even before the Arab Spring. Therefore, American foreign policy goals must be rectified to ensure human rights do not suffer while promoting security goals.
- 2) There are cases in El Salvador, Indonesia, and Bahrain in which human rights policy is successfully implemented in a security driven agenda. In El Salvador, human rights were written into policy at the end of the conflict when security was no longer a priority

due to the end of the Cold War. Military funding was suspended near the end of the conflict in light of the Moakley report. In Bahrain, human rights were written into policy again at the end of conflict. In this case, the end of the Iraq war marked the reemergence of human rights into policy. The Leahy Amendment ensured that security through an arms sale was not achieved at the expense of human rights during the Arab Spring. In Indonesia, human rights were written into security driven policy inconsistently. However, when written into policy, human rights did not disrupt the security agenda. Instead, it worked with it perfectly to ensure human rights and security concerns were met. These examples from the case studies are what the United States must build off to create more consistent foreign policy.

#### Alternative Policies Considered and Rejected

The following are options of the United States that should not become policy for various reasons highlighted below.

- 1) *Maintain the Status Quo*: As highlighted throughout American history, prioritizing security has heavy costs to the objective of human rights. Therefore, maintaining the status quo is not the answer. Instead, the United States should seek a balanced approach that emphasizes that both security and respect for human rights are equally important in the international setting,
- 2) *Disregarding Human Rights*: Removing the promotion of human rights as an international political agenda would weaken United States authority abroad. The United States values human rights domestically. The United States must project those value abroad and act according to its values.

### A Balanced Approach

A better approach focuses on creating a balance between promoting security and human rights as foreign policy goals. States that are American partners enjoy many benefits of friendships such as security-based alliances. However, within such a relationship an element of human rights respect must also be promoted. A key component of the strategy is to ensure that elements of human rights concerns are written into security driven policies. Therefore, human rights concerns do not necessarily obstruct security driven policy but instead works cohesively within it. Therefore, United States policies can be less conflictual and inconsistent.

### Advantaged

The following are the advantages of the proposed strategy.

- 1) The policy demonstrates American leadership, values, and ideology abroad. The United States is a superpower internationally. Because it is a nation that strongly believes in its own value system, including universal human rights, it has the potential to be the leader in promoting these universal values. But it can only do so by not being hypocritical by supporting human rights sometimes and security other times.
- 2) The policy does not contradict the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights. The United States is a key leader within the United Nations. Therefore, complying with the standards established within the UN document does not tarnish the perception of our leadership internationally. Focusing on security, at the expense of human rights, often promotes corrupt leadership and action that is condoned in the document. Therefore, ensuring that respect for human rights is met within security driven agendas does not contradict the international standard of human rights.

### Key Policy Recommendation

Embedding elements of human rights concerns within security establishments will involve interagency cooperation. Based on the recommendations above, the following are key policy recommendations.

- 1) Department of Defense: As one of the largest Executive Departments, the DoD is responsible for all components of the military and international military programs. IMET is an example of a security driven training tool for partner nations that is funded by the State Department. When the program became E-IMET, human rights training initiatives were included. More programs that include human rights elements in foreign training must be included in DoD programs to ensure the governments the United States is supporting receive training in complying with and understanding the universal human rights norms.
- 2) The National Security Council: The key members of the National Security Council are the President, Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Defense.<sup>108</sup> Therefore, it is important to include an element in this council that focuses its resources on human rights, specifically the effects of human rights in states supported by the United States or that receive military funding.
- 3) State Department: The mission statement of the Department of States is to “create a more secure, democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the international community.”<sup>109</sup> Therefore, the department must cooperate more

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<sup>108</sup> White House. National security council. The White House Web site.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc>. Accessed November 13, 2012.

<sup>109</sup> State Department. Mission statement. U.S. Department of State: Diplomacy in Action Web site. <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/23503.htm>. Updated 2009. Accessed November 13, 2012.

with the Department of Defense in implementing and creating security driven policies with respect for human rights. E-IMET, is the perfect example but must be implemented on an even larger scale under different programs.

- USAID: The cooperation between USAID and DoD can create a strong foundation for security partnerships that respect and promote human rights. USAID is currently promoting good governance as a tool to bolster human rights through anti-corruption, reform, legislative strengthening, decentralization, public management, and security sector reform.<sup>110</sup>

### Concluding Thoughts

The recommended policy is based on a firm belief in the importance of promoting human rights. Developing policy with human rights elements will be difficult due to the securitization of United States foreign policy. Therefore, the United States must change its perception of the foreign policy priorities in order to embed human rights concerns into security policy. Hopefully, such changes will ensure that the United States does not bolster human rights abusers or ignore human rights in its partner nations such as the cases of El Salvador, Indonesia, and Bahrain.

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<sup>110</sup> USAID. Promoting accountability and transparency. USAID From the American People Web site. <http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/democracy-human-rights-and-governance/promoting-accountability-transparency>. Updated 2012. Accessed November 13, 2012.

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