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Speaking and Rhetoric in the Community: The Implications of Aristotle's Understanding of Being

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Claremont McKenna College

Speaking and Rhetoric in the Community

The Implications of Aristotle's Understanding of Being

SUBMITTED TO

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FOR

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Preface

"It is worth nothing to say something new; it is only worth saying that which the Ancients already knew"- Martin Heidegger¹

The relationship between individuals and their community has been a key subject in philosophy since ancient times. For Aristotle, the *polis* or city was the most fundamental and important mode of community, and an individual's relationship with others (one's ethics) constituted an inseparable, essential aspect of one's existence as a human being. The fact that we speak is central to the city and to our humanity. Martin Heidegger, in his early interpretations of Aristotle, thus focused on the themes of speaking and being-with-others when explaining Aristotle's understanding of human life. This inquiry led him to explore a wide range of Aristotle's most fundamental concepts, ultimately resulting in an understanding of Aristotle's complete view of a human being and the components of its existence. Aristotle's view, as Heidegger understands it, makes the *polis*, and thus one's place in it, of utmost importance, based on an intricate string of reasoning that is rooted in Aristotle's conception of being itself. This understanding of being, in other words, is applied by Aristotle to the life of the human being, leading to the conclusions in regard to ethics, rhetoric, and community that one finds throughout his works. The reasoning that Aristotle follows, then, ought to be explored in detail if one is to fully enumerate the principles underlying his understanding of government, rhetoric, and ethics. The object of the thesis is thus to gain a deeper understanding of Aristotelian philosophy through analyzing the early interpretations by Martin Heidegger given in his 1924 Summer Session

¹ Last sentence of *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*

lectures.² As a secondary goal, one can also acquire a more complete understanding of the thought underlying Heidegger's own ideas through this analysis of his early work.

Chapter One: Initial Reasons for Exploring Speaking as the Ground of Possibility for Aristotelian Political Philosophy

A central theme of being and its modes, or "οὐσία" (*ousia*), and thus all components of Aristotle's philosophy is *limiting* and thus definition, which is understood to be the act of limiting. Even *eudaimonia*, the ultimate end of human life (which the discussion will eventually lead to), "does not lose itself in the infinite,"³ it can be *limited, determined*. Heidegger disagrees, however, with the way that this aspect of Aristotle's philosophy has been interpreted and incorporated, namely inflated, by subsequent philosophers. "According to traditional logic, the concept is expressed in the genuine sense through definition, that in the definition the concept comes to itself."⁴ In other words, "in this logic, one speaks of *definition as the means by which a concept undergoes determination*."⁵ Here, we are speaking of a *precise* sense of definition, such as that given for a genus or species or that given for a circle.⁶ In the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, there is an understanding that this precise logic, giving definition, *limiting*, is the basic sense in which human beings determine their world in a way that distinguishes it from that of other animals. For Kant, definition is said by Heidegger to be the *genuine* way in which human beings conceptualize the world. In this sense, defining is the *mechanism* of Kant's understanding

² Compiled into a work with the English name *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, henceforth referred to as SS1924

³ SS1924 64

⁴ SS1924 11

⁵ SS1924 9

⁶ In James F. Ward's description of Heidegger's thought, "Today we think about the 'political' in the same manner as we think when we understand 'logic' as the essence of the Greek *logos* [...]. What must be retrieved is the sense that the *polis* had in Greek thinking, which cannot be reached by means of a definition"(173)

of being. It is the *ground* for his philosophy, the starting-point from which the rest of his philosophical determinations flow.

The next step is to understand *why* definition became such a central component of Kant's philosophy.⁷ To start, Kant agrees with Aristotle that a human being's unique conceptualization comes from a perception of an object's "for-what." As Heidegger says, "A savage sees a house and, unlike us, does not know its for-what; he has a different 'concept' of the house than we who know our way around in it. He sees the same being, but the knowledge of its use escapes him [...] He forms no concept of the house,"⁸ forms no understanding of the house, and thus the house does not *exist as a house* in the savage's world. Kant, Aristotle, and even Heidegger in his later work *Being and Time* all take this distinction, an understanding of *practical use*, as a central theme in understanding the human mode of conceptualizing beings. However, for Kant, *definition* becomes *the ground for conceptualization itself*. In other words, defining is the way we *determine* this "for-what" of something like a house, and so the ability to conceive via definition (which can be termed "capacity for reason") is the *primordial* aspect of the human being from which *any* understanding of human life must flow. Heidegger explains that definition thus takes an incredibly central position in almost all modern philosophical traditions, including that of Hegel and analytic philosophy.

Heidegger holds, however, that "neither Plato nor Aristotle knew of 'logic'."⁹ This is an exceptionally bold claim because many understand Plato and Aristotle to be contributors to and proponents of this view of definition as the key component of conceptuality and thus the being of

⁷ As Scott M. Campbell puts it, "Heidegger returns to Aristotle in order to retrieve an understanding of definition and, thereby, an understanding of the conceptuality of the concept that precedes the dominance of traditional logic"(164)

⁸ SS1924 9

⁹ SS1924 9

beings as they are conceived by human beings.¹⁰ Nonetheless, Heidegger does not hesitate to call this view a "misunderstanding" of Greek philosophy. Nobody can deny that Aristotle understands definition to be an incredibly important mechanism for conceptualization, but Heidegger insists that while definition can help *determine* a concept in a precise way in Aristotelian philosophy (and is thus an essential tool in that philosophy), definition is not conceptualization as such, it is not the *ground* of being from which all other human modes of life spring. Rather, Heidegger holds that Aristotle saw *speaking* as the ground of being, and definition as a basic possibility of speaking (so still certainly of central importance). Heidegger puts it more harshly when he states "We go back to Aristotle in order to show that what, in traditional logic, is treated as definition has a *fully determinate origin*, that [this inflation of] definition is a symptom of decline, a mere thought technique that was once the *basic possibility of human speech*. In the definition, the concept becomes explicit. Still, what the concept itself is in its conceptuality is not yet visible."¹¹ The error lies in taking definition as the ground for the concept itself in its conceptuality; according to Heidegger, Aristotle instead places speaking as this ground, and definition (rational thinking) becomes a *valuable thought technique* because it is a basic possibility of this speech. Definition does not become the *ground of being* as such; rather speaking is the ground in which all of Aristotle's views, including those of rhetoric and political philosophy, have their roots. Heidegger explains this misconception beforehand because he believes that many terms in Western languages that are used to translate *ousia*, such as "being", "substance", "essence", and the like, all denote an understanding which places precise definition as the *ground* for the thing's conceptualization.

¹⁰ See pg. 96-97 of McNeill

¹¹ SS1924 11

The common understanding of Aristotle is said by Heidegger to be that his philosophy is based on the *precise* definitions he gives in most of his works, such as those for the soul, *eudaimonia*, and so on. Heidegger, however, does not believe that the meaning of οὐσία can be deciphered in this way, even if definition plays a crucial role in Aristotelian philosophy. Speaking, for example, is important because "the basic function of speaking is the bringing-to-self-showing of beings in their being, of ousia as the 'being' of beings or as 'beingness'. By this is meant that the being of a being itself has determining aspects, and so something can still be discovered about the being in the how of its being."¹² So, speaking comes to great importance in part because of its ability to 'discover' aspects of οὐσία through limitation of the phenomena; but this enumerating still does not capture οὐσία in the complete sense. Heidegger thus makes one of his most important points in this work; "But οὐσία, this 'being in the how of its being' (which speaking defines), is itself ambiguous in Aristotle; it has various meanings." Despite this ambiguity, Aristotle places οὐσία in a position of central importance within his philosophy. Heidegger calls οὐσία "an expression for the *basic concept of Aristotelian philosophy*."¹³ Only through understanding the meaning of οὐσία, Heidegger claims, can we understand the *ground* from which all precise definitions in Aristotle arise. In other words, Heidegger is envisioning an Aristotle who places precise definitions within a context of being, a context of being which itself is still multifarious in meaning and ambiguous at its heart.

If one is to claim that Aristotle's largely definition-based philosophy is rooted in an ambiguous context of being, one must set out to explain *why* the ambiguity arose for Aristotle in the case of οὐσία. Heidegger believes that "the scope of [οὐσία] in its ambiguity arises from a *legitimate relation to, a legitimate familiarity with, the matter*; the multifariousness of meaning is

¹² SS 1924 17

¹³ SS 1924 17

demanded by the matter, an articulated manifoldness of distinct meanings; that the matter is such that it demands, from out of itself, the same expression but with various meanings."¹⁴ This concept of *ambiguity* in Aristotle is central to understanding the basis of his political concepts (or, at least, Heidegger's understanding thereof); for example, the importance of rhetoric in Aristotle's philosophy, as opposed to Plato's, arises from this idea that rhetoric's ambiguity arises *necessarily* from the primordial nature of being itself, human life itself. So, rather than try to "remove this ambiguity", Aristotle "lets the meaning stand in the face of the matters"; he lets being have an *implicit* and thus ambiguous sense. Ambiguity, however, cannot be taken for poor understanding or weak philosophical discipline; rather, Heidegger seeks to demonstrate that "the ambiguity in fact comes from the matters" themselves, in the sense that a word could not encompass the scope of that which is meant by οὐσία if it did not have a multifariousness of meaning. The multiple meanings of οὐσία, which are called "being-characters" by Heidegger, are primarily discussed by Aristotle in the *Metaphysics*.

Before analyzing the being-characters themselves, Heidegger places a particular emphasis on the way οὐσία is used in the common and everyday sense in Greek society, apart from Aristotle.¹⁵ This meaning is understood implicitly, "without qualification", and in the everyday sense οὐσία signified "property, possession, possessions and goods, estate."¹⁶ Heidegger holds that Aristotle's account of οὐσία retains this customary meaning of the word; household beings that have their roots in definite limitations. So, in analyzing Aristotle's understanding of οὐσία, "we will consider the being-characters with a view toward whether and how the sense of being that we have discovered in the customary meaning of οὐσία, namely,

¹⁴ SS 1924 17

¹⁵ Campbell explains that "Heidegger focuses [in SS1924] on the language of the Greeks and how the everyday world of Greek life resonated in Aristotle's philosophical terms"(163)

¹⁶ SS1924 18

'household', in any mode also speaks in these being-characters."¹⁷ A key component of this everyday sense of οὐσία, which Heidegger believes can be observed in four being-characters enumerated by Aristotle in the *Metaphysics*, is that it refers to *definite* things, since property and estate objects as concepts have a particular limit, and as will become important later, an end, a *telos*. This limitation of pragmatic objects arises because of "a pressing manner"¹⁸, in the way that building a house is a pressing manner arising from a definite need, and this in turn arises from the way in which the world is self-evidently and initially encountered by the human being. This is why limiting then becomes of crucial importance to Aristotle's categories of being. "*Limit*, for the Greeks, is a completely fundamental character of the being-there of beings. *Limitation* is a fundamental character of the there." Without limitation, there is no concept, and so Aristotle takes limitation to be a key component in the conception of beings themselves, and the unlimited is understood to be undefinable and nonexistent as an entity.

It is here that we can now enumerate four characters of being that partially constitute the "multifarousness" we have been discussing. It must be said first of all that Aristotle provides no internal hierarchy to these categories, he simply says "οὐσία λέγεται", "being means" or "being is called...", and then lists four categories (although there are ultimately more than four within Aristotelian philosophy). This occurs in 1017b of the *Metaphysics*, from which Heidegger draws most of his discussion on οὐσία. The first way in which οὐσία is expressed is ὑποκειμένον (*upokeimenon*), the things that *comprise* the world in a manner which is "at-hand"; ὑποκειμένον means literally to 'lie under', so this being-character addresses the things which the world of living things are built upon. Aristotle's examples are "earth, fire, water and the like", and they "are called substances because they are not predicated of any substrate, but other things are

¹⁷ SS1924 22

¹⁸ SS1924 22

predicated of them."¹⁹ By "at-hand", we mean that the human being does not have to *do* anything in order for these things to be there, rather the stone and wood are "at hand" long before a house is ever thought of. Aristotle holds that these things are one of the four senses of ousia because they *predicate* and *comprise* all other beings. The second sense of being is "that which, being present in such things as are not predicated of a subject, is the cause of their being, as the soul is of the being of the animal"²⁰. Heidegger says that the soul applies to this category because it "constitutes the being-there of the beings that have the character of living"²¹, and this character of living is comprised of the soul. In other words, these are the beings that comprise the *characteristics* of specific things, such as the soul of an animal or, perhaps, the color of a pigment.

The third being-character was focused on by Plato and, afterwards, Western thought in general. This is the being-character that constitutes the possible being of something, and the examples Aristotle gives are the line being essential to the plane or, by extension, the point being essential to the line. Heidegger states that this character primarily manifests itself in the "surface of a body", since "if I remove the surface of a body from the there, the body is thereby taken away. The surface, then, constitutes the being-there and possible being-there of a body"²², and Aristotle uses a line as an example specifically because a line *constitutes*, in this same way, the possible being-there of a surface. One will notice that these things, as Aristotle says, are "circumscribed"; the point comes into being by being circumscribed from the line. This circumscription, this limiting, is once again a way in which beings are *genuinely* determined.

Heidegger says that "this is possible only *because* limit is a completely fundamental character of

¹⁹ Metaphysics 1017b 14. All English quotations of Aristotle are taken out of Richard McKeon's compilation called *The Basic Works of Aristotle*

²⁰ Metaphysics 1017b 16

²¹ SS1924 22

²² SS1924 22

the being-there-of beings", so Heidegger sees limit as being a key factor in the modes of ousia. This is where Platonic philosophy takes root.²³ Since limitation is as crucial, according to Heidegger, in Greek philosophy as a whole as it is in Aristotle's, "some had the idea to describe as the οὐσία, the limit 'in general' or number in the broadest sense. The Pythagoreans, as well as the Platonists, say in number the genuine mode of being, numbers as the modes of being."²⁴ Plato holds that numbers are of this being-character, that numbers constitute the possible being of all entities. This is a *direct result* of limitation being *exalted* by Plato to its highest limit. Number is the most fundamental, the *broadest*, the *least particular* mode of limitation, you cannot 'get beneath' mathematics so to speak; if one takes limitation to be the *mechanism* by which beings are *genuinely* revealed, then it is no wonder how those like Plato came to take this the position that they did. It is the farthest extension of the position that human beings genuinely understand entities through limitation. As Heidegger understands him, Plato holds that "something numerical, or quantitative, circumscribes beings as such; they are not substances, *daimons* that exist around us." Thus, Plato exalts limitation to the point where he separates limits from the objects *which* they limit, and instead labels the world's self-evident manifestations as "shadows." Thus only the most basic, most *pure* limitations such as number are understood as "genuine" modes of being.²⁵ One again, limit is the *mechanism by which things come into existence*, so number is seen as the genuine basis for existence "on the ground that if it is abolished nothing exists, and that it determines everything."²⁶ This view is only possible, as Heidegger says, if one understands *fundamentally* that limiting is a genuine mode of expressing beings, that human beings can *in fact* perceive things as they actually are through apprehending

²³ See 157-158 of McNeill

²⁴ SS1924 23

²⁵ See pg. 172 of Ward for further critique of Heidegger's view of Plato

²⁶ SS1924 23

them. Aristotle's position on this matter is, according to Heidegger, "the genuine counter-thrust to Platonic philosophy", and it will be discussed after the account of οὐσία is complete.

The fourth being character is "τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι", "*to ti ēn einai*" or "what-being as it was already"²⁷, and the passage concerning it will be referenced by Heidegger extensively in the original Greek because of its significance. The phrase was "not invented by Aristotle, rather handed down to him", and it is in this fourth category that we are actually dealing with an entire complex of being characters which share a common theme. This is the character of a being which makes it "a being in itself with respect to what it was already, from which it stems in its being, with respect to its *descent*, its having come into being there."²⁸ Heidegger is difficult to understand here, but the key characteristic of this being-character is that these beings are *particularized*, this being-character is the sense of οὐσία that relates to *particular things*.

Aristotle understands these to be the beings that are truly "there" for us in an everyday sense, and this is why this complex of being-characters, *particular* beings, come to be of central importance for the investigation of human life. This cognition of beings that are particular does *not* come from natural and everyday interaction with the ὑποκειμένον. "In natural dealings, familiar objects are not really there for me; I overlook them in seeing beyond them. They do not have the character of presence; they are altogether too everyday."²⁹ Rather, in order for a being to become particularized for a human, it must be perceived in juxtaposition with everyday familiarity, and thus "only with some event of an unusual sort [such as need] can something with which I deal on a daily basis become suddenly objectified for me in its presence. Particularity is not initially and directly given"³⁰. One can see how Heidegger understands the meaning of οὐσία to have roots in

²⁷ SS1924 23

²⁸ SS1924 23

²⁹ SS1924 24

³⁰ SS1924 24

the everyday sense of the word as signifying definite household objects. The process by which beings undergo this particularization is through limitation, and thus definition, *orismos*, operates through the *to ti ēn einai* being-character. This is "the basis of which *logos* as *orismos* addresses beings"³¹, so that "every being that is there in its particularity"³², any being that is defined or spoken about, exists through this being-character, namely exists *as particular*. Things like number, as a function of definition, also operates *by virtue* of this being character, namely the ability of humans to conceive of particular things.

Before continuing, we must explore the passage regarding *to ti ēn einai* in the original Greek in order to understand the method by which Heidegger, as opposed to others, interprets it. Heidegger's entire discussion of *orismos* as a function of *logos* (or, rather, his justification thereof) is largely based on this single passage, and he quotes it extensively, but Heidegger unfortunately refuses to give anything more than a "superficial" account of it, saying instead that a complete view "may become clear by the end of the [course]." This is understandable, since a comprehensive account of this being-character would likely require a course of its own, but we must look to the passage in order to continue our investigation of *orismos* and speaking in Aristotle's philosophy (which is the direction that Heidegger very abruptly transitions into). The passage is line 1017 b 23 of the *Metaphysics*, and it says

"ἔτι τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, οὗ ὁ λόγος ὀρισμός, καὶ τοῦτο οὐσία λέγεται ἐκάστου"³³, which is *commonly* translated as "the essence, the formula of which is a definition, is also called the substance of each thing."³⁴ ὀρισμός or *orismos* is the word for definition, and Heidegger understands this to be "the act of limiting" in an explicit way. The τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι being-character is here being called

³¹ SS1924 23

³² SS1924 25

³³ Taken from Perseus Online Dictionary

³⁴ Translation by W.D. Ross, found in McKeon

"essence", and οὐσία is "substance", which Heidegger instead calls "mode of being." We see that this being character is "λόγος ὀρισμός", is "enumerated through definition" or "formulated through definition" in the words of this translation. "Each" is the translation of ἐκάστου, which Heidegger has instead been calling "particular", so instead of "is called the substance of each thing" this means "is the way in which we speak of (enumerate) the mode of being of *particular* things." The root of this word for particular, according to Heidegger, is ἐκάσ, which means 'far'³⁵, and this is why Heidegger holds that the particularity of defined beings arises from them being apprehended *from a distance* rather than the muddled everyday that departicularized beings exist within. By saying that this being-character is "the substance of each thing" or rather the "mode of being" of "particular" things, Heidegger infers that "every being that is there in its particularity is determined through the τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι."³⁶ Once again, Heidegger insists that particularity relies on being-with the matter in a certain mode of interaction, namely 'from a distance', in a way which is removed from disinterested "everydayness" that leads us to ignore and departicularize objects. Here is where Heidegger makes one of his central points; that this sense of *ousia* which *orismos* functions through is *grounded* in the self-evident occurrences of life. Definition addresses the particularity of things, and this particularity arises *through interaction with the matter in an unusual way*, and thus the sense of being that becomes relevant for Aristotle's political philosophy *springs from* our primordial existence in and interaction with the world. So, although limiting is the *governing* aspect of οὐσία, this is only *because* *ousia* arises from the self-evident occurrences in life itself such as the need for a house or, more broadly, well-being (which will ultimately come to depend on the *polis* for Aristotle).³⁷ The tool, the house, the *being* in this sense is always particularized, with the cause of particularization

³⁵ SS1924 24

³⁶ SS1924 25

³⁷ See pg. 25 of Gross

being the fundamental aspect of life from which arise occurrences and our concerns. Limiting, and thus the being-character that pertains first and foremost to limiting, is significant because it is *necessitated* by life, *orismos* is valuable in itself only because these things that jump out at us, such as shelter or fire, are valuable to us in the first place. It is only *through this concern* that we come to apprehend and define beings. In short, "[Aristotle's] being-concept did not fall from the sky, but had its definite ground. If we question basic concepts in their conceptuality, we see that the *orismos* is an issue of being there, of being-in-the-world."³⁸ Heidegger thus laments that these two terms have been translated into "substance" and "essence" (in German, οὐσία is the term that had been coined "essence" or "essenz"), since they do not reflect that Aristotle's concept of being is *grounded* in our self-evident being-in-the-world, but rather suggests that the being of the thing "falls from the sky."

The next position that Heidegger takes is in regard to the phrase λόγος ὀρισμός, "is said through definition" or "is formulated through definition." As Heidegger interprets the meaning of the phrase "λόγος ὀρισμός", it means that definition is a form of speaking which, *as speaking*, reveals the mode of being of particular things. The understanding is that *orismos* is a mode of expressing being, and that it is *speaking* which grounds the possibility for the limitation in the first place. Thus speaking, not *explicitly* *orismos*, becomes the *ground* of possibility for cognition of beings in Heidegger's view.³⁹ This is what he meant when he described definition as "a valuable thought technique" for Aristotle; it is a mechanism for apprehending beings in a particular mode. This can be done genuinely, since *limiting* is seen as the fundamental way to determine what beings "are" in their complete sense. It is only through this understanding of οὐσία as being genuinely determined through limitation that speaking comes to take a central

³⁸ SS1924 29

³⁹ "Definition, concept, and conceptuality all take root in the ground that is constituted by the speaking-together of human beings, and Heidegger returns to Aristotle to reclaim that ground"(Campbell 164)

role as a mechanism for fundamental determination of life, since Aristotle is understood by Heidegger to see definition through speaking as the key enabler for this apprehension of individual beings for humans.

This leads Heidegger to a discussion of a fifth being character that is not specifically enumerated in this part of the *Metaphysics* but is nonetheless central to the conception of *οὐσία* and Aristotelian philosophy in general. This is the *eidos*, and Heidegger understands it to designate "that which constitutes the genuine being-there of a being in its being-completed, so that producedness, as a mode of being-there established by *eidos*, belongs to the full determinateness of being-there as being-present-at-hand."⁴⁰ Thus *eidos* designates the "look" of a thing, the way that it appears to the being who has a practical concern. An example would be the way the unused stone and wood "look" to a human being seeking to construct shelter; the matter itself has the character of *ti to ēn einai* insofar as it is particularized, and it more specifically has the *eidos* of being a house, it looks like a house. Thus *eidos* refers to the aspect of a being that *constitutes* its having of limits, its particularity, its *ti to ēn einai* character. So, for the body of water which has the *ti to ēn einai* character upon a thirsty being coming across it, the body of water is said to have the *eidos* of a watering hole. This becomes important in the discussion of speaking in the polis, since speaking with others most importantly consists of deliberating as to the *eidos* of things, how they look, what they "are" in regard to our concern.

It is here that we can discuss Aristotle's "counter-thrust" to Platonic philosophy. Limitation is understood to be grounded, first and foremost, in the encountering of beings that are present for us, which then leads them to be individually particularized. Heidegger holds that *in general*, "I do not have the time, the occasion, to look with greater precision at the being that is there. This being that is there 'has little or nothing at all of being'. It is so self-evidently there

⁴⁰ SS1924 153

that I see beyond it; I do not notice it." Plato, upon realizing that the everyday world does not *in itself* manifest as particularly limited to us, saw fit to label *all of reality* shadows and only limitation in the most abstract, fundamental sense to be "genuine" expression of being. Aristotle, on the other hand, is said by Heidegger to have seen the very *passing over* of everyday beings in an unparticularized way to be "a *genuine passing over in acquaintance*."⁴¹ One can imagine the *Meno* dialogue, where Socrates teaches the slave mathematical principles out of what seemed to be foreknowledge or "common sense."⁴² Plato took this possession of "common sense" *despite* living in a nominally undefined world to be a sign that there is a "higher" sense of being than the undefined world, a sense of being that our souls are connected to. The fact that the principles of a perfect circle can be inherently understood by someone who has never, in nature, actually seen a perfect circle is taken as a sign that limitation exists above and apart from the "shadows" normally presented to us in everyday being. For Heidegger, Aristotle instead argues that the apprehension of particular objects, which is characterized by being-in-the-world, is the very source, the ground from which the broader form of limitation springs. "Aristotle says: I must have *ground* under my feet, a ground that is there in an immediate self-evidence, if I am to get at being. I cannot, in fantasy, hold myself to a definite concept of being and then speculate."^{43 44} One common example to express Aristotle's sentiment is that the limitation of the type "white", that is to say the Platonic form of "whiteness", can only be defined with some reference to particular objects which are white, and whiteness in turn can only be known through an *encountering* and being-in-a-world.⁴⁵ So, rather than argue that the particulars could not exist

⁴¹ SS1924 27

⁴² Discussion begins in *Meno* 84d

⁴³ SS1924 27

⁴⁴ In Campbell's words, "A genuine appropriation of the things themselves demands that [the mode of human living itself] determines the character of whatever knowledge is going to be attained". (149)

⁴⁵ See Johnson Page 85

without the *forms*, instead Aristotle (in Heidegger's understanding) argues that our definition of forms always occurs within our limitation of particular beings, which in turn is preceded by being-in-the-world.⁴⁶ Thus conceptualization is *not* grounded in a disembodied soul that exists only within the realm of limitation, rather definition *itself* springs from the self-evident presentation of objects to us in the everyday sense. This essentially summarizes Heidegger's counter-argument to Kant and Plato.

We have seen that "I am superficially oriented in my surrounding world, without being able to give an immediate answer to the question regarding what that surrounding world is." Normally, "I do not have the time, the occasion, to look with greater precision at the being that is there"⁴⁷, and it is the pragmatic aspect of things that brings our attention to them. This concern causes the object to become limited in the context of our world, such as the matter of the stone and wood being limited into an object when it is turned into a tool. Once a being has this character, it "is *complete*; it has come to its *end*, to its *completedness*, just as the house is complete." For Heidegger, completedness simply means that the thing has a limit both in time and space, with a determinable end. Speaking is understood by Aristotle to be the unique mechanism by which human beings come to bring beings into existence in this way. "*Logos as orismos* is the type of 'speaking', of 'addressing' the world, such that beings are addressed *with regard to [this] completedness*."⁴⁸ Speaking, in other words, is the horizon within which the

⁴⁶ Campbell, too, says that for Heidegger "The original function of language is not [...] to establish what something is. Rather, the original function of language is to show what something is *as it is encountered* by [human beings]" Pg. 146

⁴⁷ SS 1924 27

⁴⁸ SS1924 26

possibility of addressing beings in their completeness is grounded.⁴⁹ Definition, as a function of language, is a form of *gnorismos* or 'making familiar with',⁵⁰ and it is in this sense that speaking *about things* "shows what is spoken about."⁵¹ It must be made clear that this is said exclusively with regard to the human mode of being, for animals also perceive and are familiar with things but do not speak. In order to understand why speaking takes such a crucial role in the *genuine* regard of human life, distinguishing man from all other beings, we must analyze the concept of life itself as understood by the Greeks. By doing so, it will also become clear how this limiting of the practical and thus speaking comes to be the "fundamental determination of the human being as such"⁵² as opposed to just one of many faculties. We will also come to see Aristotle's reasons for considering speaking to be the foundational manner in which the being of beings is disclosed in a human sense.

⁴⁹ See Pages 24-25 of Gross

⁵⁰ SS1924 14

⁵¹ Or, in Campbell's words, "*logos* is essentially a revealing"(150)

⁵² SS1924 14

Chapter Two: Life as Having a World

Man is not only a living being, but he is ζῶον λογὸν ἔχον, a “living thing that as living has language.” But what does this ζῶον, this “living thing” or “animal”, mean to Aristotle? According to Heidegger, it is not meant in a biological or any other scientific sense. Rather, it is a *mode of being* in the sense of having a world and being in a world. “An animal is not simply moving down the road, pushed along by some mechanism. It is in the world in the sense of having it.” “Having”, “*exon*”, is interpreted by Heidegger to mean to “be in a way because of a ‘drive’ that originates from [a living] way of being.”⁵³ One can see an example of this thought in Heidegger's later work *Being and Time*, where moods become a drive which originates a human's ‘way of being’, their disposition. *All* living things share this quality for the Greeks, and it is not simply any ‘way’ of being that qualifies a body as alive and having a soul. *All* matter can take on a certain way of being originating from an effect within their world, but it is only in living things where the fundamental aspect of *limitation of beneficial and harmful* can govern being-in-the-world. It is only in living things where this effect that governs the way of being becomes a *drive* with determinable ends, only living things can have a *disposition* towards the world in relation to themselves. We have seen that understanding the benefits or harm of a body in a practical sense played a key role in Aristotle's understanding of *ousia* as cognized by human beings, and this is because this having of a world is the very ground by which living things and thus human beings are distinguished. Thus, the expression ‘having a world’ encompasses the basis for which humans come to “need” a tool out of the stone or animals come to “need” a drink from the watering hole; having a world and perceiving beneficial from harmful encompasses the basis by which all living

⁵³ SS1924 14

things encounter *beings* (such as nourishment or danger) as opposed to unnoticed, unparticularized everyday objects. Thus Heidegger understands Aristotle as holding that *limiting* of bodies within a living thing's world, the cognizing of beings as such, is governed by *beneficial versus harmful* rather than an unmoved, unconcerned and purely objective apprehension of objects. Even a bacteria cell, for example, "has a world" of concern in which some bodies, such as alcohol, are harmful, whereas nutrients are beneficial. The bacteria cell's mode of being, its drive for living, is incomprehensible without understanding what it has as beneficial and harmful. Besides being the ground for living things' worlds in general, the perception of beneficial and harmful is also the basis by which living things are *placed* in the world in the sense of a self and the external. Inanimate objects, on the other hand, are neutral in regard to this, they do not have a mode of being in which anything can be good or bad, and they thus lack a mode of being in which bodies as such could even be perceived as "other." They are incapable of having a disposition.

It is here that we must quote Heidegger at length to avoid a common and extremely intuitive misconception. In describing living things as apprehending beings such as a household or watering hole through having a world,

We could understand the matter in such a way that [...] actuality is grasped in a definite respect, namely, that the world is there from a definite 'point of view', from a point of view relative to the 'subject', that is, the world is encountered only from a 'subjective point of view', not genuinely in itself, as if it were a matter of a definite mode of apprehending the world. The orientation toward subject and object must be fundamentally set aside. Not only is it the case that these basic concepts, subject/object, and what they

mean, do not appear in Greek philosophy, but even the orientation of subject/object in Greek philosophy is meaningless insofar as the Greeks are not concerned with characterizing a *mode of apprehending* the world. Instead, their concern is characterizing *being* in it. One may not approach the entire analysis of the encounter-characters of the world as though there were a world in itself, and animals and human beings would have a definite portion of that world, which they always see from their definite point of view ⁵⁴

One is easily confused by this statement from Heidegger, since it is easy to understand what has been described so far in terms of the misconception he dispels. It is here that the middle voice verb form in Ancient Greek becomes relevant for Heidegger, because the middle voice indicates a reciprocal relationship where there is no clearly delimited subject acting upon an object; there is no clearly defined *living thing* acting upon *the objective world* through apprehension.⁵⁵ Rather, the apprehension itself is a function of *being-in-the-world*, and in this sense the world is *always* encountered first and foremost in a genuine and complete way for the being that has it.⁵⁶ There *is* no "objective sense" that can be juxtaposed with the living thing's apprehension of the house; the understanding of beneficial and harmful is an inherent function of being-in-the-world and, for humans, being-with other beings in that world. As Heidegger says "Grasping, and apprehending the world presuppose a being-in-the-world. Apprehending the world is a definite possibility of being in it; only by being in

⁵⁴ SS1924 40

⁵⁵ See Gross and Kaufmann Page 14

⁵⁶ See Brogan, "being reveals itself in beings that are always already interpreted in some way"(28)

the world can one apprehend it."⁵⁷ So, we do not want to investigate human life from the perspective of an "objective reality" that living things then apprehend in a subjective way according to their specific place in it; *all* conceptualization, including that of a house *and* that of an objective world, occurs first and foremost in a reciprocal interaction with phenomena that constitutes *genuinely* being-in-the-world.⁵⁸ So, in that sense, the bacteria cell *has* its own world and is *there* genuinely in it; the perception of alcohol as bad could only be deemed subjective *after* such being-there takes a certain tone for the human observing it. The same goes for the perception of the house or tool being deemed subjective; as Heidegger understands Aristotle, that consideration comes only after the fact. The mode of *ousia* that creates the apprehension of the house comes *first and foremost*, genuinely.⁵⁹ So, it must be made clear that we are not talking of a "subjective reality" that beings exist within, labeling objective objects with beneficial or harmful connotations. The basic function of life, apprehending beings according to their beneficial or harmful qualities, constitutes the *primordial* sense of being-in-the-world that comes *before* disconnected, "objective" consideration, and thus the world that living beings have is understood to be genuine and fundamental, as opposed to the subject/object orientated understanding which comes only *after* *orismos*. So, for Heidegger, Aristotle looked at the self-evident phenomena of human life and deemed that what we now call a *subjective*, pragmatic understanding of the world is the fundamental mode of existence, for "the world is there for this being-in-itself, not just

⁵⁷ SS1924 40

⁵⁸ See McNeill Page 103

⁵⁹ Olafson argues in favor of this view in his own way on Page 96-97

occasionally nor for a while, but it is constantly there."⁶⁰ The objective apprehension of the world, removed from all interest, is *not* always present in the human mind but can be turned on or off and utilized for specific purposes. Being-in-the-world as concerned thus takes the center stage as the self-evident ground which makes *any* apprehension of being possible.⁶¹

Heidegger thus calls concern "the *most fundamental being-character* in Aristotle's doctrine of being."⁶² Aristotle is said to hold that "every [being with concern] has, as [concerned], a definite limitation that is in accordance with its being."⁶³ The concerned being has a disposition towards its world, and for this reason the beneficial and the harmful can be *limited* for it. Nutrition can be delimited from alcohol in a definite way within the context of a bacterium's world, and this means that the bacteria *itself* has a definite limitation within its own world, namely towards the beneficial and away from the opposite. This limitation is what Aristotle calls the *telos*, the *end*, of a being, and since it is the "concern of concern" so to speak, *telos* becomes the fundamental perspective from which Aristotle conducts his analysis of the human being. "The genuine being of life is posited in a certain way in its [concern] as [an end]." The *telos* of living things in general is well-being, and Aristotle famously calls the *telos* of human beings "*eudaimonia*", the highest sense of well-being for human life. This consideration of *eudaimonia*, this asking of the question 'what is the *end* of human being-in-the-world', is what

⁶⁰ SS1924 36

⁶¹ With concern comes the precedence of the social mode of living as well in the case of the human being: "Political community and 'I' are equi-primordial because any subject position I can take presupposes the world of common concern in which and from which I distinguish myself. [...] What Heidegger wants to characterize is the inherent multiplicity in the [self], the simultaneity of being active and being passive, the nature of a life at the same time constructive and constructed. Such could be expressed by the Greeks in the middle voice"(Gross and Kauffman 17).

⁶² SS1924 30

⁶³ SS1924 31

leads the discussion into the realm of speaking and eventually into the subject of the *polis*. This is because Aristotle proceeds by seeking "*basic possibilities* within this concrete possibility of being-there, according to which every concrete being-there decides itself."⁶⁴ The ultimate basic possibility, of course, is existence, and this is understood by Aristotle to be *first and foremost* comprised of being-in-the-world with a *telos*, with some *end* that is possible for oneself. One would not exist in the world as a living thing without some possession of a *telos*, of a *good versus bad*, of a limit within the world that one has set out for oneself (such as within a household). We can say that the human being has a limit in the sense that being inside of a house is good and being lost in open sea is *bad*, but Aristotle does not conduct such a shallow interpretation of a human's limit within the world. Thomas Hobbes understood the basic function of life, the *telos* of human beings, to be self-preservation⁶⁵, but Aristotle instead looks towards well-being, virtuous activity of the soul, to be the *telos* of human beings rather than mere survival. That is, the human being has a *telos* that goes far beyond mere self-preservation, and according to Heidegger this is a basic result of human beings *being with others*, existing *socially*, in their world as opposed to simply apprehending the beneficial versus the harmful in a singular sense. One must keep in mind that we are still discussing the fundamental mode in which humans interact with other beings, not just a political orientation towards a society. In Heidegger's view, Aristotle would thus counter Hobbes by demonstrating that self-preservation and physical health is attained by many human beings who nonetheless do not *live-well*, who nonetheless do not reach their fullest limit for being-in-the-world. Being alive and healthy is *not* this fullest limit, it is a stepping stone, a ground for possibility. To analyze human life with the mindset that self-preservation is the highest limit would be inadequate, for there are goods that

⁶⁴ SS1924 31

⁶⁵ See *De Cive*, Chapter 1, Part 7 onwards

result from our being-with-others that go beyond self-preservation; Hobbes cannot account for the soldier who lays down his⁶⁶ life for the polity. Aristotle recognizes that to find the ultimate *end* of human life, the *purpose* of all this good versus bad apprehension, one must thus set the limit *beyond* being simply alive and rather to being alive in a complete and *fulfilled* sense. This is what Heidegger understands to be meant by *eudaimonia*, the *telos* or end of human life.

⁶⁶ The default to the masculine in the thesis is for consistency both internally and with Aristotle and Heidegger's form of writing

Chapter Three: Speaking as the Ground of Possibility for eudaimonia

It is here that the importance of speaking can be understood within the broader context of Aristotle's philosophy. We have said that all living things are driven by a having a world in which bodies are limited according to the beneficial versus the harmful, which in turn implies that the living thing itself has a limit within its own world that it desires for itself. For animals, this "announcing" or apprehension of the beneficial and the harmful is known by Aristotle as *fone*, and for some animals it is vocal just as for humans. It takes the form of a *transposing* oneself into a *telos*, which is set by having a world with the beneficial and the harmful. But according to Heidegger Aristotle considers speaking, *logos*, to be *distinct from fone*, and it is here that we must analyze the cause of this synopsis. "We want to [see why] *logos* is set apart from other modes of being-in-the-world, from *fone*."⁶⁷ Aristotle holds that while humans have *fone*, and *fone* is "at hand as a mode of living alongside other living things", *fone* is "is not the 'peculiarity' that constitutes the being of human beings."⁶⁸ Speaking is what allows human beings to "have-a-world" that goes *beyond* the limit set by the particularized limiting, *fone*, which is known to animals. To demonstrate this, we must first address the fact that the *function* of speaking is similar to *fone* in that it discloses the world to us in a particularized way; "at once we witness how *fone* and *logos* appropriate the world as encountered in its original and immediate character of being-there."⁶⁹ Like all other modes of being that apply to living things, *fone* is within humans, so that our understanding of the beneficial and the harmful "undergoes a fully determinate modification, in accordance with the mode of being of human beings in a world."⁷⁰ But for Aristotle, man is set apart from *all other animals* by the fact that speaking allows him to

⁶⁷ SS1924 33

⁶⁸ *Politics* 1253 a9

⁶⁹ SS1924 34

⁷⁰ SS1924 38

communicate and thus *have* this telos *in a unique way* with a polity, a community outside of oneself. Aristotle considers man to be an irreducibly social animal, an irreducibly communal animal; the *telos* of a human being thus exists *through speaking*, because in speaking it exists outside of one's own particularized world and instead into a commonly-possessed world, a *polis* with a particular delimitation of the beneficial versus the harmful. This is why ethics (one's disposition towards others), as opposed to merely treating oneself, is the fundamental concern for human well-being in Aristotle's view. "In having language, a fundamental character of the being-there of human well-being becomes visible: being-with-one-another. This is not being-with-one-another in the sense of being-situated-alongside-one-another, but rather in the sense of *being-as-speaking-with-one-another* through communicating, refuting, confronting."⁷¹ Aristotle insists that language is separate from *fone* because "the *polis* is not brought to humans by chance, but rather the *polis* is the being-possibility that itself lies enclosed and traced out in advance in the human being's genuine being."⁷² A human being exists within a world shared with others, and thus language takes center stage as the "fundamental determination of the being of the human being as such."⁷³ ⁷⁴ Without language, a human being could not share the world in a manifest way with others, and he would be *only* an animal in the sense that only his *particularized* would be possessed or cognized by him.⁷⁵

So, in Heidegger's view, *logos* does not exist as an extension or enhancement of *fone* within Aristotelian philosophy but rather is considered co-equal in origin, *logos* exists *alongside fone*. It is tempting to think of *logos* as an extension instead, since *logos* and *fone* do indeed serve

⁷¹ SS1924 33

⁷² SS1924 34

⁷³ SS1924 14

⁷⁴ See Pages 26-27 of Olafson for discussion of this concept in Heideggerian philosophy

⁷⁵ "When Aristotle maintained that 'having speech' was an essential dimension of the human being, he meant that this was the Greek way of 'being-in-the-world'. Therefore, the interpretation of the human being in terms of language requires that the way in which the Greeks experienced language be investigated." Campbell 147

the same function and purpose (namely delimitation of the beneficial versus the harmful), and it seems that since speaking is apparently more sophisticated than the merely animalistic mode, it must be an extension and function of it, in the way that a telescope comes *after* and serves a *function* that is grounded in sight. It does not seem that *logos* is founded in anything other than the *fone*, and it is for this reason that some philosophers, such as Hobbes, traced back human life to a "state of nature" where the communal being-with that arises from speaking can only come *out of* and *after* the nominally self-centered, animal-like *fone*. Neither being-with-others nor speaking is primordial or irreducible to human nature in this view, rather *fone* and thus "raw desire" take center stage. This view would be in effect the opposite of claiming that *orismos* is the ground from which all other human comprehension springs. But Aristotle is instead committed to the view that speaking can reveal the world in a way which is entirely inaccessible to animals, and has little or nothing to do with *fone*. Instead of grounding *logos* in *fone*, Heidegger argues that for Aristotle, the source of *both* is reciprocal being-in-the-world, having-a-world with concern; thus "the determination of being-with-one-another is equiprimordial with the determination of speaking-being. It would be altogether wrong to deduce one from the other; rather, the phenomenon of the being there of human beings as such possesses equiprimordially speaking-being and being-with-one-another"⁷⁶, and being-with-one another is understood to be an irreducible aspect of a human being's world. So, both *logos* and *fone* *spring from the same source* (being-in-the-world) and are alongside one another, but *logos* is not understood by Heidegger to come after *fone*. Rather, "the *logos* is that which is able to constitute the having-with-one-another of the good", and since apprehension of the good versus the bad is *also* the function of *fone*, it is held that they are equiprimordial because speaking arises necessarily from the basic apprehension of human life, having-a-world and being-with-one-another. "The being-

⁷⁶ SS1924 45

with that forms the household is only possible on the ground of *logos*, on the basis of the fact that the being of the human being is speaking with the world."⁷⁷ Since stripping away *logos* entails stripping away the manner in which human beings have their world, it is wrong to understand *logos* as a construction built *on top of* *zōon* that then "constitutes" the human being as an animal *plus logos*. Rather, the human being is indeed *zōon plus logos*, but not because the *logos* flows out of or is an enhancement of what is merely animal. Speaking is instead a *unique* form of apprehending matter, of confronting the world, and thus it exists *alongside* *zōon* rather than as a function of it. Aristotle would thus disagree with Hobbes' procedure of basing political philosophy on a consideration of man as a fundamentally non-political animal.⁷⁸

But what does this "manifest way", sharing the world in a "unique" way with others through speaking, mean? Why is it that speaking is regarded as constituting a *new* understanding of the beneficial and harmful, and makes a deeper mode of being-with-others possible? This seems to be a weak point in Aristotle's argument, since, for example, bees and ants "share" the *telos* of a community rather than an individual, and they communicate with one another to construct this common enterprise. Heidegger confronts this difficulty by again stating that "speaking is a basic mode in which the being of the human being as with-one-another is revealed. The human being is the type of being that is a political animal, that has, in its structure, the possibility of a cultivated being-in-the-*polis*"⁷⁹, but it remains unclear why speaking is the exclusive mode in which human beings share their world, since it seems that animal communities can still share a *telos* and even designate roles for a common pursuit without speaking. How is it that the "uniqueness" in speaking renders the human mode of being-with-

⁷⁷ SS1924 39

⁷⁸ See *De Civ*, Chapter 1, Part 10

⁷⁹ SS1924 45

others, and thus the *polis*, to be of an entirely different nature than the mode of being-with for bees or any other communal animal? Why is speaking so *important* to Heidegger's Aristotle?

The answer lies in the manner in which speaking allows us to live, to limit the beneficial from the harmful. When a human being or animal goes about its world, it has a "good" and "bad" for itself, with health and death being the two most fundamental examples. This necessarily leads, as we have said, to external entities being limited as beneficial and harmful, such as the watering hole or burning forest respectively. An animal can certainly cognize these things in a basic way, but speaking is said to be the ground of possibility for an entirely new mode of living, the human mode. This is because speaking can serve the function of limiting in the utmost and thus most genuine manner through its operation. To understand what is meant by this, imagine the way in which the word "shelter" is used to denote a certain aspect of usefulness, *but not in any one entity or one set of entities*. A human can come across a skyscraper in the city, an oasis in the desert, or a cabin in a forest and the word "shelter" applies equally to all of them, rather than simply denoting one single entity in the way that an animal's cry can denote a threat. It is in this way that speaking can denote a good in a way which is inaccessible to animals; speaking allows an aspect of benefit in the world to become departicularized and apply to all entities, thus allowing the human being to *understand the concept of* shelter. This in turn enables the human being to make shelter out of a diverse range of materials and in innovative ways, because speaking allows a certain *orientation* towards the good of shelter which is not immediately tied to any one object or resource. The beaver, in contrast, can make a dam out of various materials and in many places, but since the word "shelter" is not known to it, there is no concept of building a new shelter on a hillside and using rain to survive should the river dry up. The beaver instead simply looks for another river, since without language the concept of benefit is tied to a

very particular set of entities within its world. Animals thus adapt slowly and usually over many generations, since their minds cannot cognize modes of living (such as being sheltered) in a way which can be abstracted and applied to a diverse set of circumstances. One can see that language depends on these kinds of words, for even names denoting particular entities can only be described with words that can also be applied to other entities. If something is one of a kind, a complete anomaly, bearing literally no form of semblance or relation to any other mode of life, it becomes ineffable, indefinable. This implies that language allows for understanding through contextualization and putting a concept within a web of other concepts, such as the concept of being sheltered existing within our understanding of wood, stone, malleability, and many other factors until the *hut*, the *house*, and finally the *skyscraper* come into view for the human mind. This is what Heidegger means when he says that language allows us to bring things into our world in a way which is *explicit*; being sheltered is allegedly never an *explicit concept* for the beaver, rather Aristotle and Heidegger understand it to only think about its particular surroundings and, in specific situations, how to make a dam out of those surroundings.

This is also the likely meaning of that mysterious word, *genuine*, that Heidegger has used time and again without ever giving a definition for it. The concept "being sheltered" as it exists for the being that has a word for it is said to be *genuinely* understood by that being, humans can understand the *form* of shelter so to speak (one can see that in Heidegger's understanding Plato's way of thinking still had importance for Aristotle, although Aristotle holds that this genuine understanding nonetheless *arises out of* what at first appears as shadows). This abstracted sense of understanding that language allows for, of crucial importance in constructing diverse types of shelter, becomes even more important when discussing the concept of *benefit*, *the good*. Aristotle holds that just as the human word for shelter denotes a concept that no animal could ever

comprehend *explicitly*, (that is, the beaver could never think of shelter *as such*), speaking also allows us to enter a new realm of understanding of the beneficial. This is what is meant by the phrase *zōon logon exon*, a being that as living has language. The very mode of being of human life is described as having language, since it is *only* through speaking that a human being can live, can limit the beneficial and the harmful, in a truly human way. Without speaking, a human being can never have a human world where concepts are understood explicitly, things such as pleasure and nourishment can never be understood *as such*, and thus speaking becomes the very mechanism by which a human being *is* human. One can see, also, why *dunamis*, potential, is such a central concept for Aristotle, the factor that underlies all entities. Without some kind of movement, some kind of change, there is no way for a concept to ever become explicit through speaking, it could never gain status as a named entity in a context with other moved things.⁸⁰ By motion, we mean any kind of change at all in the entity, even if it is merely the electron moving in its cloud. *Something* must move in order for any concept to become explicit.⁸¹ The point of discussing this is to show that conceptualization, such as that of being sheltered enumerated above, is of underlying and central importance for *all* of Aristotle's conclusions about human life and understanding; his conclusions on motion and politics flow out of this view of speaking as the mechanism by which entities become explicit and genuinely known. Thus Aristotle does not look to material in itself, as the connotation "substance" may lead one to believe, rather he looks to the qualities of the material, such as movement, that allow it to become explicitly recognized by the human mode of apprehending. All materials and substances that do not possess this quality of effability through movement, as Aristotle emphatically sets out to demonstrate in the *Metaphysics*, are illimitable, infinite, and thus ineffable and ultimately meaningless as subjects of

⁸⁰ See pg. 30 of Brogan

⁸¹ "The being of nature as it presents itself to us is not determined solely in material, but rather in its Being-moved"(Gross and Kemman 25)

philosophical inquiry. The forms, for Aristotle, are *not* grounded in the infinite but rather are *observed*, understood, through the motions of life. The form of being sheltered comes to the human mind through *motion*, the motion of the rain on one's cold body or the wind blowing away all of one's possessions. One must *be in the world* in order for the world to become *explicit*. Aristotle thus argues that entities which can be a part of a human world must be by definition everywhere and everything that has motion, and Heidegger argues that this is where the modern idea of "nature" came from.⁸² "Nature" becomes everything "out there" that is definable, even if it is not yet defined; the unmoved, the indefinable, the divine, thus come to be understood as "outside of" nature.

The most important mode of being that speaking makes possible is *being with others in a human way*, as we have alluded to earlier. Aristotle holds that

Why man is a political animal in a greater measure than any bee or any gregarious animal is clear. For nature, as we declare, does nothing without purpose; and man alone of the animals possesses speech. The mere voice, it is true, can indicate pain and pleasure, and therefore is possessed by the other animals as well (for their nature has been developed so far as to have sensations of what is painful and pleasant and to indicate those sensations to one another), but speech is designed to indicate the [beneficial]⁸³ and the harmful, and therefore also the right and the wrong; for it is the special property of man in distinction from the other animals that he alone has perception of good and bad and right and wrong and the other moral

⁸² "And because material things must always be construed in terms of a human world and the human world in terms of its materiality, Aristotle's 'nature' is everywhere, as is the movement that it embodies." (Gross and Kemman 25)

⁸³ "Advantageous" changed to "beneficial" for consistency

qualities, and it is partnership in these things that makes a household and a πόλις. Thus also the πόλις is prior in nature to the household and to each of us individually ⁸⁴

The problem presented was that bees seem to have a polis and partnership, yet Aristotle insists man is the only genuinely political animal, that human beings are the only beings that can have their world in a genuine way with others. Aristotle's argument is that speaking is the mechanism by which "being sheltered", "being nourished", and most importantly "being good, being completed" can come into view explicitly, thus placing these things in an understanding of the world that is *shared by many people*. Speaking is what allows us to share an understanding of "the beneficial" or "well-being" that is explicit, applicable to our disposition towards nature as whole, and shared with others. We can see, once again, that this explicitness does not arise *out of* orismos, it arises out of our concern for the world. The human being's ability to look at a forest, a clearing within it, and a stream and conceive of "dwelling, craftsmanship", and subsequently construct a house there does not come from any *precise definition* for the word "shelter." It comes from the concept shelter being understood, and language's naming of "dwelling" is what allows these concepts to become explicit in regard to a context that is *shared with others*.⁸⁵ Thus our having of words for things allows us to truly share a world with other people in a

⁸⁴ Politics 1253 a 10

⁸⁵ See pg 184-185 of Ward for discussion of Heidegger's own, later view of this concept

way which is inaccessible to animals; bees could never speak of let alone abstract "the good" as a concept outside of self-propagation in any particular moment.⁸⁶

Thus Aristotle concludes that the genuine self-sufficiency and completeness of a human being can only be achieved through the *polis*, and man only exists in the *polis* through speaking (and largely, thus, *orismos*). That is, speaking is the ground of possibility for being in a *polis*. This *polis* is constituted by partnership, or *κοινωνία* (*koinonia*), a word of crucial importance to Heidegger. Thus we understand the *polis* to be the sole social construct that can share an *ethic*, a common understanding of the beneficial, rather than simply the drive for self-preservation and propagation that is called *fone*. Without language, human beings are incomplete, they cannot reach their *limit* in regard to the beneficial, and the *fone* of animals cannot constitute the full determination of human life because it lacks the possibility for a disposition towards the good in an explicit, shared-with-others sense. This is what Aristotle means when we says that it is only through speaking that the world, in a human sense, becomes *manifest*. Speaking allows the beneficial and the harmful to become departicularized in a sense that is not accessible to animals, and this then becomes the mode in which humans share their world with others. Once again, the ineptitude of basing political philosophy on a consideration of man as a fundamentally individual animal becomes clear from the perspective of Heidegger's interpretation.

Before proceeding, we can trace Aristotle's approach to the issue of the *polis* by summarizing what has been said so far. We started by saying that Aristotle's very sense of being is based on a multifarious comprehension that does not contain an internal hierarchy, a structure which ultimately rests on the idea that the way beings are presented to us is fundamentally indeterminate. One of the

⁸⁶ In his own later philosophy, Heidegger "is even willing to go so far as to state that we are *for the sake of others*." (Olafson). Aspects of this idea become visible in this early interpretation of Aristotle.

ten forms of beings is *upokeimenon*, lying in advance. This is the character of beings that are "at-hand in advance before one speaks about them"⁸⁷, such as earth and air. This is what is now called the "objective reality", and is one of the modes that speaking addresses. The most important sense in which "being" is used in regard to human beings, however, is not the *upokeimenon* sense but rather the *ti to ēn einai*, the mode of being which addresses a thing's "for-what" and thus "what it was already." The example of this was the stone and wood "being already" a house, although it only exists as a house because of a living being's concern with it. This "house" mode of being is based on a living thing's *being in the world*, which is in turn based on a concern with the world and itself in relation to it. All living things, for Aristotle, share this ability to apprehend a *ti to ēn einai* mode of being, and from this arises the perception of the beneficial and harmful (for oneself) as irreducible components of the being of living things. Since the manner in which living things interact with this world of the beneficial and harmful is reciprocal, rather than strictly subject/object orientated, the fact that there is a *limiting* of the world in accordance with what is understood to be beneficial and harmful entails that the *living thing itself* also has such a limit in relation to the world. In other words, if a human being can delimit what is beneficial and harmful for him in the context of an *otherwise* departicularized world removed from concern, that in turn implies that the human being can also perceive a beneficial limit for *himself* in relation to the world. In other words, this means that there is a definite "beneficial limit" for human life as such, since human and all other life consists of delimiting bodies in terms of the good versus the bad. Thus,

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the understanding of being as such and human beings for Aristotle is *grounded* in a self-evident apprehension of phenomena that occurs freely among all living things. Heidegger thus states that "[Aristotle's] being-concept did not fall from the sky, but had its definite ground." in being in the world. Conceiving of being and indeed all other functions of life, from definition to constructing houses, are an *issue* of having a world, of interacting with a world that presents itself. Being-in-the-world is the ground by which entities take on the character of having a *purpose* for living things, and this is the function of life which Aristotle takes to be most distinctive and indicative in analyzing humans.

Speaking allows the human world to consist of explicit concepts, such as shelter, nourishment, and ultimately "the beneficial" itself, which are shared with others and exist within a world of other explicit concepts. This sets man apart, especially in his possibilities, from all other animals, since the nature of this ability to abstract allows the human being to share a common understanding of the world with others in a way which goes beyond the merely moment-by-moment, pleasure versus pain realm of *fone*. Understanding what is beneficial was understood by Aristotle to be the very defining mechanism of life, so the human being lives in a way in which other animals cannot, the human being becomes *defined* as "a living thing that, as living, has language." Thus we have answered the question as to why Aristotle takes speaking to be the ground of possibility for human life.

Chapter Four: *Telos* and *Teleion*

We established that a being with the character of *ti to ēn einai* has a limit both in time and space in regard to a specific end. Human beings are said to apply to this category, and thus we seek the limit of the human being in regard to well-being. This is known as the *telos*, the purpose or end, of human life. First, we must look to the nature of *eudaimonia*, the *telos* in regard to the individual human being. Aristotle's methodology for examining this issue starts from the observation that "concrete being there has an interpretation of itself that is always carried along with it. This self-evident meaning that being-there has regarding itself, is, in the first place, the source on whose basis explicitly orients himself to the question of how being-there itself thinks concretely in terms of which it has its genuine completedness."⁸⁸ So, human beings (like all living things) constantly interpret their world as a function of seeking the good and/or avoiding what is harmful. That is, the human being creates a structure of the world based on its *telos*, such as sickness being cognized as "bad" and "undesirable" but health being cognized as "good." When looking to the purpose of human life, Aristotle looks to this method of orienting oneself, since this interpreting of the world in regard to one's own benefit seems to be a direct result of pursuing *eudaimonia*. We see that human beings *always* orient themselves in terms of some good, so in order to perceive what may be the *ultimate* form of well-being that is (or rather ought to be) sought by human life, we must enumerate what "the good" is and the various senses in which human beings understand things to be good. By doing this, we can gain insight into how an individual and thus, ultimately, a *polis* can pursue and discern its utmost limit in regard to well-being.

Aristotle holds that in this primordial "orienting oneself" for human beings, there are three main graspings of the good (or, in Aristotle's language, ways of living or simply *Bioi*) that

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are distinct from one another. They are: "1. Pleasure, 2. πόλις, 'the mode of experiencing life that arises in the concern within concrete being-there', and 3. Contemplation."⁸⁹ So, a human being can understand things as 'good', can live his life so to speak, in three main ways. First, the human being limits and interprets bodies as good or bad in terms of pleasure versus pain; this is what guides the interpretation of sickness and health and is also the sole guiding force of *fone*. Second, the human being can orient himself in the world due to his understanding of good or bad in terms of his concern with others in relation to himself. However, Aristotle is not speaking of the good in a *communal* or political sense, such as feeding those who are starving or creating educated, morally upright citizens. Rather, this second category applies to perceiving the good in terms of *one's own relationship with other people*, namely, one's reputation. Aristotle is thus pointing out that humans often limit themselves in terms of the good by pursuing a certain reputation, or limit, in the minds of other people. They indulge themselves in the way *other* people interpret them, and in this way they understand themselves to be pursuing their own good. This is ultimately a function of being-with-others in the *polis*, but it is *not* ethics. The third category, contemplation, is primarily guided by speaking and reason, and it is here that Aristotle finds the "genuine possibility of human existence." This is the understanding of "good" that is present in ethical considerations; they require contemplation as well as being-in-a-world with others through speaking. Before jumping ahead, however, we must analyze the concept of *telos* itself in order to understand *why* contemplation becomes the central focus for Aristotle, the avenue by which a human being can reach his limit in regard to well-being, as opposed to the avenues of pleasure and reputation.

We have said that anything with a purpose, with a *telos*, has a completedness that can be reached in regard to this purpose, just as a house or telescope can be completed. Aristotle is

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asking the crucial question; if the *telos* of the eye is to see, the house to shelter, the telescope to magnify, then what is the *telos* of the human being as such? It is assumed that such a *telos* exists because the human being limits the external for specific purposes via a reciprocal being-in-the-world, meaning that there in turn must be a specific *limit* for the human being in relation to the world for the sake of well-being. That is, the human being must be able to acquire a specific disposition in regard to purpose that is in accordance with the disposition towards purpose which guides him in his external actions, such as building shelter or manufacturing tools. Aristotle thus holds that *every* practical action, every *ti to ēn einai* cognizing of beings, *every* familiarization of oneself in the world in this way appears to be after some *good*. So, as we have said, "practical concern makes the *telos* explicitly visible."⁹⁰ When a shoemaker masters his art, for example, he is oriented in a mode-of-being in which the *telos* of shoemaking (namely, comfortable travel) is explicitly known to him. But Aristotle's understanding of the *telos* itself goes deeper than this, and the method by which he critiques the human *telos* can only be understood in the context of what a *telos*, or end, is as such to Aristotle.

The most important component of any *telos* is *completedness*, *self-sufficiency*, and this is understood by Heidegger to be more or less the central concept guiding Aristotle's political philosophy. He states explicitly in the *Politics* that "ἔτι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος βέλτιστον: ἢ δ' αὐτάρκεια καὶ τέλος καὶ βέλτιστον.", "the object for which a thing exists, its end, is its chief good: and self-sufficiency is an end, and a chief good."⁹¹ So, in short, this means that self-sufficiency (and consequently completedness in Heidegger's sense) is the *telos* of things with a *to ti ēn einai* character, things with a "for-what." This completedness is not merely *present*, but applies to *all* stages of the thing's temporal

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⁹¹ *Politics* 1052b-1053a

character.⁹² This is why the very word for life in Ancient Greek, *Bios*, means (according to Heidegger), "life account, the specific temporality of a life from birth to death. The 'run of one's life' so to speak."⁹³ Thus we cannot look to the completedness of the human being in any one moment; otherwise, of course, hedonism would take center stage as the ideal path to *eudaimonia*. A house does not fulfill its purpose when it is self-sufficient for any one moment, rather it must be self-sufficient in a complete sense; the excellent, or virtuous, house must be self-sufficient throughout its *bios*, throughout the course of its life. Thus the *telos* "carries things through the present" continuously, and is maintained equally at *all* stages of a thing's existence. Furthermore, human beings take on different ends at different times (At one time bathing and at another manufacturing a tool), just as a house in construction takes on many specific ends (creating the ventilation, laying the foundation) before the completeness, the final end, comes into sight. So, *eudaimonia* could not be manifest *completely* in any *one* moment or any *one* action, and this is why it must be a disposition rather than a mere action. Heidegger holds that the idea of limit and consequently *telos* thus transcends the horizon of temporality, and applies to the thing *as a whole*, at all stages of its existence. As extensions of this self-sufficiency concept, Aristotle outlines three other categories that apply to the *telos*. The first two both enumerate that the *telos* must be "at home" in itself, not brought in from without. Third, it must be "what constitutes completedness in the genuine sense." All of these, one can see, have their roots in the core idea that the *telos* must be self-sufficient and must be "at home" within itself rather than transposed from without; a dictator may force otherwise unjust subjects to pursue a *telos*, but that *telos* could never be *eudaimonia* for his subjects because it does not have its home within their own disposition.

⁹² See Pg.34 and 85 of Brogan for further illustration of this concept

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Rooted in the concept of a *telos* is the phrase *teleion*, which will become central to the investigation. In 1021 b of the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle says "[teleion describes]... a being no part of which still remains to be encountered (since this part also constitutes the being in question, so the time for what exists in the moment), is completed in the sense that outside of this time there is no further bit of time to come that also constitutes that thing." We can see that a thing can only reach *teleion* through having its *telos*, for it must be *complete*. This completeness has a definite temporal limit; as Heidegger says. "there is a definite limitation of time outside of which the thing does not exist." We can see that this is indeed true for anything that has an end, for the "house" does not exist anymore as such when it no longer fulfills its *telos*, nor could it have existed before hand before its end (shelter) came into sight. As an extension of this, Aristotle also says that *teleion* refers to *having* the *telos* in the sense of completedness.⁹⁴ A house, for example, cannot be *teleion* if it does not *have* shelter in a complete sense. Furthermore, "what is [called *teleion*] is that which has nothing left in the context of having a genuine being-possibility at one's disposal in its true line of descent. [...] having one's being-possibility at one's disposal is a certain mode of constituting-the-completeness-of-the-being--in-question."⁹⁵ An example that Heidegger uses is the difference between two thieves who comes across a great stash of money, one of whom is an expert and the other a failing amateur. The expert thief has his "being possibility" as a thief at his disposal, whereas the amateur thief is "incomplete" because he does not have the being-possibility of stealing truly at his disposal, even if he is assessing the same situation as the expert. It must be emphasized that in order for the thief to be *teleion*, the end of stealing must truly be at *his* disposal and not anybody else's. In Aristotle's language, " a doctor and a musician are *teleion* when they have no deficiency in respect to the form of their peculiar

⁹⁴ Heidegger uses "completedness" instead of completeness

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excellence.” This is why *teleion* can also be translated as "perfect" and *telos* as "consummation.” Heidegger thus discusses Aristotle's definition of the soul, the "first *entelexia* of a body which carries in itself the possibility for living."⁹⁶

It is here that the meaning of Aristotle's phrase *di auto*, in itself, becomes visible to Heidegger. Through looking at *telos*, Aristotle is searching for that aspect of beings which can be *fulfilled* in regard to a genuine, complete *end*. Strength and robustness for a hammer, comfort and resilience for a shoe, these are the things in which the shoe and hammer exist *for the sake of*. When asking "why does the shoe exist", one would need no further explanation than the *telos* of the shoe itself. In this sense Aristotle takes the signification of *telos* to be *in itself*, it needs no outside explanation. This is why *eudaimonia*, the highest form of well being, in denoting that for the sake of which everything is done, has the quality of being *di auto, in itself*, it needs no further legitimization or justification. It is the good for the sake of which all other goods are carried out, the *telos* of human beings. Aristotle's word for *having a telos* in this sense is *arete*, and a "good" violinist and ultimately "good" human being is said by Heidegger to be the one who "*fulfills himself in arete*", who takes his *telos* seriously and genuinely puts his possibilities to work at achieving his *telos*. We can now see why *telos* is said to pertain to a *limiting* of oneself in relation to what is external, and in this sense one's highest form of consummation is always *looking outward*, *telos* pertains to something that a being can take into himself and acquire, but is not always there to begin with. If human beings commit actions for the sake of *eudaimonia*, the highest good, then it means that *eudaimonia* refers to a *possible* relation of oneself to the external world. This simply means that until the end is actually consummated, the end lies within the realm of *possibility* for the being in question. So, the ambitious violinist is concerning himself with his own *possibility* for being-complete in regard to his *telos* of becoming the perfect soloist.

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All of his actions become *guided* by this concern, and the *guidance* is in regard to what is external until one is actually complete. Furthermore, we judge to quality of the violinist in by how well the possibility for reaching this end has been made actual. Aristotle thus grounds his understanding of the will, desire, our ability to perceive excellence, and all such things to be rooted in this possibility for having an end, *arete*. This is why understanding the nature of eudaimonia then becomes the ground for investigating all of these things within Aristotelian philosophy, and *telos* becomes the "guiding concept" for his human investigations according to Heidegger. The objective here is to demonstrate that Aristotle investigated life from the standpoint of *telos*, and by understanding this *telos* we can see the guiding force of his inquiries.

Aristotle then distinguishes between things that can be *telos* in a certain respect but not *teleion*. An example would be the product of a manufacturer, Heidegger's examples are a shoe and hammer. These things exist alongside the maker as a mode of concern in itself. That is, the hammer exists alongside the hammersmith as *telos* because it can hammer a nail, as opposed to the other objects around him. For things such as these, the conduciveness *constitutes* its existence, "the hammer is, precisely, the *telos* of the hammersmith" when he does his work only insofar as it is the end of his practical action. So "in itself, it is *telos* with respect to its completedness, but not *teleion*; it points away from itself toward another mode of concern made possible by it."⁹⁷ The hammer can only be a part of the *teleion*, the completeness, of the hammersmith, its *praxis* could never give it a completeness outside of the concern of the hammersmith. The hammer is indeed a *telos* for the hammersmith *at a certain time* because it makes hammering possible, but nonetheless the hammersmith would never describe himself as being complete because of any one hammer at any one time. Thus Heidegger holds that "a manifoldness of *telos* appears there with concrete regard to the being-there of human beings", but

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"not every *telos* is already a *teleion*, a genuine end for the being that maintains itself in concern." This is of crucial importance for the investigation of human political life, for Aristotle holds that a community can fulfill many individual concerns and thus *telos* at any one moment (such as successfully raising a military, making shoes, maintaining social order, etc.) without ever attaining *teleion*. "These *telos* are conducive to the society without ever, *in themselves*, constituting the *teleion* of the society."⁹⁸ This is in the same way that a hammersmith could always have *telos* in the hammer that he is trying to make, but he does not reach completeness by virtue of the hammer, he reaches completeness as a hammersmith only by virtue of concern for the *for-sake-of-which* the hammer was made, in this case the concern for hammering in nails that arises from our being-in-the-world. In this sense, "a path through a meadow stops at a garden fence, but the garden fence is not *teleion*. Being-the-path is not as such determined by the garden fence", but rather out of concern for travel. Heidegger thus surmises that "*teleion* is not a being, or a piece of a being, whose end it constitutes. Rather, *teleion* is a way of being, a mode of being itself." So, the *teleion* of the thief is rooted in stealing as such, not the bounties which may be *telos* at any one moment. This is also true for the path, where the garden fence may be the "end" but the *teleion* is ultimately rooted in travel as such, it is not any one part of the path or any one bounty of the thief. One can see that these concepts which are fairly simple in terms of the path, hammersmith, or thief quickly become difficult in regard to the alleged "good in itself", the human *teleion* that for Aristotle exists through the polis. Despite this difficulty, Heidegger insists that Aristotle's consideration of human good "aims at a radical carrying through of the idea of *telos*. For the being-determination of the being-there of human beings, [Aristotle's] basic determination for being is to be radically and consistently laid claim to, and it is to be shown in this way that the good is *telos* in the sense that it is *teleion*." After this definition of *teleion*, it

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should be clear that among all the *telos* that a human being *can* take on during his life, eudaimonia is the *only telos* that also constitutes *teleion*, for eudaimonia is said to be the good *for the sake of which* all other things are done. In more precise wording, eudaimonia is the only *telos* that, when made actual, makes the human being itself *teleion*. Making a perfect hammer or playing the perfect solo, in contrast, do not constitute the completedness of the human being as such but rather the human being insofar as he is a hammersmith or violinist.

Here, we must provide a further account of the meaning of the phrase *eudaimonia*. Aristotle's famous definition is "activity of the soul in accordance with virtue", and the soul itself is the "first entelechia of a body having life potentially within it." It must be made clear that the meaning of this latter passage regarding the soul as the first *entelechia*, taken out of *De Anima*, is much less clear and well-understood than Heidegger makes it out to be, but whether accurate or not Heidegger undoubtedly claims to have a very precise understanding of what *entelechia* means. The perfect violinist that attains his consummate end has *been determined by entelechia* in acquiring his *eidos* ("look") as consummate, in Heidegger's language, so one can understand *entelechia* as *the determination of* "the type of being that maintains itself in its genuine possibility so that the possibility is consummated." Heidegger himself, thus, interprets *entelechia* as referring to the explicit, manifest, determinable *telos* for any being who has it. *Entelechia* is not merely possible, it is *determinable* and manifest, this is why it is commonly translated as "actuality." For living things, *entelechia* is the determination of the *telos* which is explicit and "can be spoken about"⁹⁹, it is the aspect of the violinist's *telos* which can be enumerated and limited, in this case "being the perfect soloist" and all the necessary components of being such a soloist. But being the perfect soloist is not the *first entelechia* of the violinist, well-being or *eudaimonia* is, thus *eudaimonia* is defined as excellent activity of the soul, the *first entelechia*. In this sense it is

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distinct from *arete*, which is the simple capacity for *having* the *telos*. Thus Heidegger takes it to mean "the [aspect] of being that maintains itself in its genuine being-possibility so that the possibility is consummated." That is, for living things, *entelexia* denotes this *telos* aspect, the "good-ness" of the doctor or thief in a consummate sense. A doctor cannot have his virtue merely in the realm of the potential, it must be *determinable* and *manifest*, thus any *telos when possessed* belongs to the realm of *entelexia*. It is thus closely related to *eidos*, but of course the "look" of something like the unused resource can also pertain to its potential, *dunamis*. One can see that human beings operate largely through *entelexia*, we have a *telos* that *can become actual* and thus be explicitly limited, and animals do this too even though they themselves do not ever linguistically define the *entelexia* of their *telos*. That is, we can limit and speak about the ideal good for a bacterium as "self-propagation" since it has a world of benefit, and in Aristotle's understanding it is thus alive and has a soul, and regardless of whether or not the bacterium actually speaks of *entelexia*, its *telos* is explicitly determinable. For Heidegger *entelexia* does not refer to the *action of or capacity to* determine the *telos*, rather it refers to the thing's *telos* in its determinability, insofar as it is manifest. This is why Heidegger is wary of the translation of *telos* as "purpose", since it is really the possibility for being-completed of a thing that *underlies* any of the subsequent volitions it may take upon itself in turning this possibility into an actuality. So, the soul is the first *entelexia* of things with a potential for living, and eudaimonia is virtuous ("excellent") activity of the soul. The first actuality of things with a potential for living is understood to pertain to *telos*, the soul pertains to the becoming-actual of a being that has a *telos* possible for itself. *Eudaimonia*, being excellent activity of the soul, thus becomes *teleion*. It is, as Heidegger understands it, the consummate end that constitutes the completeness and fulfillment of one's very life, one's existence, being-in-the-world. There is no consummate "being-complete"

that any human could reach outside of *eudaimonia*. For the bacterium, well-being may simply be self-propagation, but for humans *eudaimonia* consists also of ethical considerations, for it is one's disposition towards a world¹⁰⁰ that Heidegger argues implicitly contains other people.

It is tempting to then conceive of *eudaimonia* as a "sum" of many goods. For example, it is the sum of being healthy, having a good ethical disposition, excelling at one's occupation, etc. But Aristotle does not want to formulate *eudaimonia* by simply "adding up" all of the particular goods of human life, and saying that the highest good is simply being able to acquire all of these things in sum. Rather, *eudaimonia* is a *way of being* that makes completeness a possibility for humans.¹⁰¹ Heidegger says that "The *teleion* of being-there itself (*eudaimonia* in the case of humans) is not a summative 'what' that one could assemble, but rather a "how" of living that constitutes the genuine *teleion* of being-there itself."¹⁰² This "how" is the reason why *eudaimonia* is called a disposition rather than a series of actions. Thus it is not described as "a good in itself", since it is not good by virtue of any acquisition or one action, nor is it *separate* from the everyday goods that one pursues. It refers to the very *how* of being through which any and all goods are sought after, and Aristotle does not want to look towards a good in itself when trying to understand human life; "it is hard to see how a weaver or a carpenter will be benefited in regard to his own craft by knowing this 'good in itself', or how the man who has viewed the Idea itself will be a better doctor or general thereby."¹⁰³ Thus we cannot describe *eudaimonia* as a good in itself that exists apart from all the ends pursued by a human being that constitute his completeness. Of central importance to Aristotle is the fact that "even if there is some good which is universally predicable of goods or is capable of separate and independent existence,

¹⁰⁰ See Nicomachean Ethics 1139 a 32-35

¹⁰¹ See pg 32-33 of Brogan for his enumeration

¹⁰² SS1924 67

¹⁰³ Nicomachean Ethics 1097 a 10

clearly it could not be achieved or attained by man; but we are now seeking something attainable"¹⁰⁴. Heidegger describes Aristotle as "blazing a new path" by looking into the "being-character" of the good insofar as it is an end and constitutes completeness. Such pursuit of a good is always motion *towards* something outside of oneself, thus the "good in itself" would be unattainable because it could never *reach* completeness or be a going-toward something beyond itself. Eudaimonia, as a mode of actual human living, can both be *reached* and this reaching consists of a going-toward what is outside of oneself, thus investigating it becomes an inquiry into the *how* of attaining completeness.

Now we can analyze the three fundamental modes of determining the *telos* of human life, the modes of pleasure, reputation, and contemplation, in regard to their relationship with *eudaimonia*. As Heidegger states, Aristotle is quick to dismiss pleasure, *hedone*, "since it is clear without qualification that such a "good" steers being-there away from itself and turns it towards the world. In *hedone*, being-there does not come to itself; life is lived by the world in which it moves, fully dependent on the world, not living its own being."¹⁰⁵ A hedonist turns his own possibility for completeness *outward* and attaches it to a being that is outside of himself. Thus Aristotle considers that seeking pleasure as a good in itself prevents one from reaching completeness *in oneself*, rather any hedonist's good is always *contingent* on something that is not consummate in themselves. It seems, however, that this could be said of just about any living thing (since all living things depend on external sustenance of some kind), and a full discussion of what Aristotle *means* by this *in itself* will be outlined after his views on the other two determinations of the good are enumerated. At any rate, he is not saying here that seeking pleasure in any sense is contrary to pursuit of *eudaimonia*, but rather addressing the "masses" of

¹⁰⁴ Nicomachean Ethics 1096b 33-35

¹⁰⁵ SS1924 54

men who "are of the most vulgar type"¹⁰⁶, as he puts it. We are not talking about the hedonist in so far as he commits the action of pleasure seeking, but rather the problem is that he pursues pleasure itself as the highest good. He conforms his possibilities to that understanding, and thus his sense of completeness is always turned towards pursuit of something outside of himself.

Reputation, as Heidegger points out, has qualifications above hedonism at first glance because it at least orients itself towards a disposition regarding other people, it takes being-with-others into account. But regardless, "having a reputation via-a-vis others is a distinctive disposition, which is, however, dependent on others. It is up to those with respect to whom I have a reputation whether to lend a reputation or not."¹⁰⁷ We see that the object of such a person's pursuit is, like the hedonist, contingent on the activity of other entities, completely apart from one's own realm of possibility. Thus Aristotle says that "possession of [reputation] seems actually compatible with being asleep, or with lifelong inactivity, and, further, with the greatest sufferings and misfortunes; but a man who was living thus no one would [call in possession of *eudaimonia*], unless he were maintaining a thesis at all costs."¹⁰⁸ So, in short, one can have a virtuous reputation whether or not he is actually living a good life. Furthermore, reputation is the result of actions that are outside of one's control, and in this sense it is "detachable"¹⁰⁹ from oneself and not a direct result of one's own interaction with the world. When we speak of someone in regard to virtuous activity, on the other hand, "the *arete* of the flute player consists of having the possibility of flute playing at his disposal in a distinctive sense."¹¹⁰ Excellent flute playing, should it be achieved, is at the disposal of the flute player's own mode of being-in-the-world, it does not come from something inherently beyond oneself and out of one's reach. Thus,

¹⁰⁶ Nicomachean Ethics 1095b 14-19

¹⁰⁷ SS1924 54

¹⁰⁸ Nicomachean Ethics 1095b 30-33

¹⁰⁹ SS 1924 54

¹¹⁰ SS 1924 55

the person who seeks the good in itself through having virtuous reputation is engaged in a hopeless pursuit, since good reputation will never be at his disposal, but rather it will always be up to those who are holding the reputation. This leaves the life of contemplation as the final candidate for achieving the *telos* of human life. Before proceeding further, we must address apparent difficulties in what Aristotle has said regarding self-sufficiency.

Heidegger argues that Aristotle's philosophical proceedings are guided by a sense of self-sufficiency, completeness, and that reputation and hedonism were dismissed because they are not at the entities disposal. We must analyze Heidegger's view with a look to Aristotle himself. Aristotle has admitted that any *telos* entails the looking-toward something that is beyond or outside of oneself (until he attains it), so it seems curious that Heidegger argues that Aristotle dismisses hedonism and reputation on the grounds that they are contingent on something that is outside of the person seeking it. The answer that Heidegger perhaps did not emphasize clearly enough in this part of his argument is that Aristotle is focusing on *activity*, *eudaimonia* is *activity* of the soul. In his discussion of pleasure in Book VII, Aristotle says that "[natural pleasures] are only incidentally pleasant"; he explains that sweetness or bitterness, for example, can be pleasures at one time but not another. Furthermore, the pleasure of food as a whole is incidental, it arises only in the instance of hunger and is not inherently a "pleasure" when one is full or sick. Thus Aristotle concludes that we do not experience pleasurable things by virtue of *themselves*, rather "all pleasures are activities and ends, they [arise] when we are exercising some faculty." This means that pleasure is not nominally incompatible with eudaimonia, in fact Aristotle holds quite the contrary; "The view that pleasures are bad because some pleasant things are unhealthy is like saying that healthy things are bad because some healthy things are bad for money-making; both are bad in the respect mentioned, but they are not *bad* for *that* reason- indeed, thinking itself

is sometimes injurious to health."¹¹¹ Here, we can see support for Heidegger's view that Aristotle looks towards the *how* in which things are encountered; he certainly focuses on the *manner of activity* in which things are encountered, Aristotle has no interest in trying to rate the value of "pleasure" as such on some abstract scale removed from all activity. He recognizes, too, "that the complete man needs the goods of the body and external goods [...] Those who say that the victim on the rack or the man who falls into great misfortunes is *eudaimonia* if he is a good person are, whether they mean it or not, talking nonsense."¹¹² Here, we can recall the *reciprocal* relationship that all activity has with the world; one is not an unmoved mover acting upon the external¹¹³. This is why different things are pleasurable for different people, such as the taste of strawberry being pleasurable for some but not others. "There is no one thing that is always pleasant, because our nature is not simple." So, being-in-the-world equally moves and influences a human being's mode of living, and Aristotle does not make the mistake of promising that *eudaimonia* can be reached regardless of one's situation. But just because pleasure, like the pleasure of tasting strawberry, is not a good in itself but rather contingent upon one's mode of being in the world does not mean we can readily dismiss pleasure as a necessary aspect of reaching *telos*; one *needs* the pleasure of food and other basic things before he can proceed to live well.

It is here that Aristotle makes a fundamental distinction in regard to approaching the issue of pleasure. He points out that "the animal nature is always in travail", there are always *pains* such as hunger arising out of an animal's being-in-the-world. Some people are of a highly excitable nature, and an example is the hedonist who is extremely stimulated by any natural pleasure he can acquire; "[such people] always need relief, for even their body is ever in torment

¹¹¹ Nicomachean Ethics 1153 a 18-22

¹¹² Nicomachean Ethics 1153b 17-20

¹¹³ "God [unlike humans] always enjoys a single and simple pleasure; for God does not have an activity of movement but an activity of immobility "(1054b 26-28)

owing to its special composition, and they are always under the influence of violent desire; pain is driven out both by the contrary pleasure, and by any chance pleasure if it is strong, and for these reasons they become self-indulgent."¹¹⁴ Aristotle thus defines his distinction between incidental pleasures and what he calls "natural pleasures"; "By things pleasant incidentally I mean those that act as cures; by things naturally pleasant I mean those that stimulate the action of the healthy nature."¹¹⁵ Thus, Aristotle holds that there are some pleasures that are *not* pleasurable by virtue of their relief from pain or desire, such as with food and shelter. These are the pleasures of contemplation; knowledge of mathematics is pleasurable not because of any desire or need that arises externally, rather the mathematician is seeking pleasure through mathematics as a direct function of his own activity. The pleasure is at his disposal, a result of one's action, rather than being driven to mathematics by some sort of *pain* in the way that hunger drives one towards food. These contemplative pleasures do not *cure* any ailment, and they are valuable to Aristotle because they are allegedly sought regardless of any drive resulting from animalistic pain or desire. It is in this sense that the mathematician seeks the pleasures of mathematics *in himself*, he does not have the desire by virtue of any external drive that is bestowed on him other than his innate capacity for limiting through *logos*, which is of course not said to be animalistic. Thus Aristotle analyzes all action according to the nature of the actor, whether he owes his action to himself or is merely being driven.

One must not be confused by the modern discussions of "free will" or "free action" that Aristotle may appear to be referring to. We are discussing the *telos* of the being in question, and how pleasure can relate to that completedness. Aristotle is not saying that the mathematician's pleasure should be considered above the hedonist's because the mathematician "freely" chooses

¹¹⁴ Nicomachean Ethics 1154b 10-15

¹¹⁵ Nicomachean Ethics 1154b 15-19

his pursuit and the hedonist is "determined" by his desires. Rather, the point is that the contemplative man reaches completedness as a result of action that is *owing to himself*.

Obviously, no man makes a choice as to the nature of this "self", but the point is that hedonistic or reputation-driven actions will always have their *end* in an object that is outside of themselves; in the case of the angry man (a form of hedonist in this understanding), this object of pleasure is the recipient of his angry actions. The angry man reaches completedness in his actions by virtue of the recipient object *being affected* by his anger, and thus the anger does not produce any capacity for well-being *in himself*. The *telos* of the angry man could never be *teleion*. We do, of course, need further enumeration of this concept, so the example of reputation will be returned to in this context.

Heidegger argues that reputation and pleasure are dismissed because they are not *di auto*, but *eudaimonia* itself seems to be rooted in the external because it needs good fortune in order to be carried out. *Eudaimonia* is not reached regardless of one's situation, yet Aristotle is said to still consider it *a result of oneself*. Heidegger's explanation is that Aristotle places a focus on the *action* of the individual, and this distinction becomes clear in the case of reputation. Just as the *telos* of the path is not rooted in the objects that comprise the path, but rather the *telos* is safe travel, the *telos* of a man of reputation is not other people but rather being perceived virtuously. Being perceived virtuously is inarguably a good, and not even the man of contemplation would be well off without it, so the man of reputation is not dismissed because his *telos* is not actually a good. Nor is he dismissed simply because his *telos* is comprised of other people; living politically and being with-others is a fundamental mode of human life, and Aristotle never commends self-indulgence. Thus in dismissing reputation we do not want to paint the virtuous man as one who disregards the views of others and simply indulges in his ownmost and

immediate benefit. The issue is that the *action* of others constitutes the very being-completed for a man who formulates his own good through reputation. In the case of contemplation, the actions of others play a role and are certainly a factor; if one comes across a murderer in the street, the virtuous man's mode of being-in-the-world does not simply go on unaffected. But ultimately the murderer or the possibility for his existence never defines the *how of being* for the virtuous man when he is in possession of well-being. One must recall that Aristotle is investigating the *how of being* for the person who lives well. There is a possibility that misfortune will occur, and a murderer will step in one's path, and at this point one can no longer be in the mode of *teleion*; like the man of reputation, the virtuous man's disposition is still *affected* by external actors, it is still dependent on fortune. But while the how of being of the virtuous man depends on having good fortune, this good fortune does not constitute his virtue or his understanding of what is most valuable. It remains his *ownmost actions*, for example his ethical disposition, things which are at his disposal, that ultimately constitute his being-completed. The hedonist and man of reputation, on the other hand, can never attain this way of living.

All the implications of saying that *eudaimonia* is a *telos* which comprises *teleion* should now be clear. *Eudaimonia* as *teleion* constitutes the completedness¹¹⁶ of the being in question, and like any *telos* it consists of a *limit* in regard to a world. This limit requires a movement of the being in question, and Aristotle has set out to demonstrate that contemplative action is a necessary form of movement for *eudaimonia*. This is because the alternative modes of living, of limiting oneself in regard to what is beneficial and harmful, consist of living in regard to pleasure and in regard to reputation. Aristotle believes that all animals and most men live according to pleasures that *cure*, pleasures that exist incidentally and not as a result of the genuine action of those who seek them. The pleasures of the body, for example, exist through *curing* a need that

¹¹⁶ Or, in Campbell's language, "finishedness"

arises outside of the person themselves, and the being then acts according to that desire which is "given" to him in a sense. The *action* that human beings are capable of committing in regard to their own mode of living is thus not simply pursuing the desires they are given, but instead guiding them with contemplation. It is only through this kind of action that man can become a *zōon logon exon*, a being that *as living* has language, and thus go beyond the way in which animals live.¹¹⁷ We thus see that human beings acquire some sort of contemplative disposition in regard to pleasures, and language allows us to understand *telos* in a way which can be applied to our beings in an omnitemporal way rather than only understanding the beneficial moment-by-moment. Human beings thus acquire some kind of disposition towards towards things such as sex, nutrition, and comfort, and do not blindly go about their lives by following the animalistic inclinations given at any moment. In Heidegger's view, Aristotle does not formulate the hedonist or any other human being as blindly following animalistic desires. In the case of the person who *does* always and consistently follow a drive for pleasure in regard to those things, it is not because he is an animal but rather because he has *taken* an understanding of the highest good as pleasure upon himself. That is, the hedonist is deliberate in his pleasure seeking and understands the pleasure-seeking to be good for him in a complete sense; he apprehends the world and *then* decides that the best way to live is to deliberately follow his momentary desires. This means that one can speak to the hedonist and hear that he *understands* pleasure to be the highest good. The issue for Aristotle is not that the pleasures are bad; the man of contemplation who pursues eudaimonia certainly does not avoid pleasure-seeking entirely. The hedonist's mistake is only in looking for the highest good through desires and objects that are not ultimately a result of himself, thus completeness cannot be reached because this life of pleasure can be lived regardless of one's own virtue or lack thereof. Likewise for the man of reputation, who would

¹¹⁷ See Nicomachean Ethics 1154b

even have to admit that a man who spent most of his life asleep or sick had lived well if he was held in incredibly high regard. For Heidegger, no being that speaks can avoid an apprehension of the world in this way, and by doing so they implicitly address the concept of their own *teleion* in a way which is inaccessible to animals. But the good of the animalistic pleasures arises out of something that is beyond oneself, and specific foods or activities will either be pleasurable or not according to one's nature. It is only contemplation and consequently disposition that is truly one's ownmost, truly what constitutes the uniquely human mode of being, and Aristotle thus takes this avenue for investigating the *teleion* of a human being. His famous conclusion is that one's disposition must avoid excess and deficiency in order to truly live well, and this concept is applied in a wholly universal sense. It is here that Heidegger turns away from *eudaimonia* itself and returns to the role that speaking and rhetoric take as a result the life of contemplation becoming Aristotle's subject of inquiry; "we will not follow out the consideration of [*eudaimonia*]. Rather, [we are interested] in the being of the human beings insofar as it has the character of speaking."¹¹⁸ In doing this, Heidegger is focusing on the way in which *eudaimonia* involves being-with others.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁸ SS1924 71

¹¹⁹ This focus on *Mitsein*, *being-with*, becomes indispensable to Heidegger's later philosophy. In describing it, Olafson states "in the matter of fulfillment our relation to other human beings and to their well-being plays a very prominent role. Not only are they very likely to impinge upon other lives in a way that affects their quality for good or ill; our sense of the value of what we are trying to accomplish is contingent upon the response we get from other people and especially from those who are supposed to benefit from what we do"(6)

Chapter Five: Rhetoric and *Doxa* in Political Philosophy

Speaking is ultimately what allows *teleion* to come into view for humans.¹²⁰ We described the unique mechanism by which speaking can allow humans to understand not only the use of the house, but the concept of *shelter as such*, and in this way having a spoken world can make entities manifest in a so-called "genuine" way, a way which is rooted in concerned living. All actions that arise from any kind of contemplation are contingent, in this way, on speaking's ability to *make manifest* modes of being that are otherwise inconceivable.¹²¹ That is, the being that does not speak can search for and find shelter, but his world never explicitly enumerates shelter as such, so his activity in regard to shelter can never acquire a disposition other than that demanded moment-by-moment, in his everyday appetites. The human being thus has a unique capacity for *teleion* in speaking, and ultimately this means deliberation because humans are speaking beings that exist with-others in their world. Heidegger now leads into a discussion of rhetoric, which is of central importance to Aristotle in a way that, he say, many have not properly understood; "The current way of considering rhetoric is equally a hindrance to the understanding of the Aristotelian *Rhetoric*." Heidegger gives a full account of his understanding of rhetoric:

Rhetoric is nothing other than the discipline in which the self-interpretation of being-there is explicitly fulfilled. *Rhetoric is nothing other than the interpretation of concrete being-there, the hermeneutic of being-there itself.* That is the intended sense of Aristotle's rhetoric. Speaking in the mode of speaking-in-discourse- in public meetings, before the court, as celebratory occasions- these possibilities of speaking are definitively expounded instances of customary speaking, of how

¹²⁰ "Speaking was central to the life of the Greeks and, thus, to how they encountered the world. Speech is a how of encountering" Campbell pg. 147

¹²¹ "There are ontological meanings embedded within language because Dasein's way of Being-in-the-world happens fundamentally through speaking"(163) Campbell

being there itself speaks. With the interpretation of the *Rhetoric*, one aims at how basic possibilities of the speaking of being-there are already explicated therein"¹²²

Speaking becomes the matter of concern because eudaimonia, an end that is a definite possibility of oneself that is at one's disposal, is manifold and not simple. "There is a manifoldness of such possibilities of being of a living thing, and so the question arises as to how this manifoldness should be articulated."¹²³ Heidegger insists that we must look to the full meaning of *zōon logon exon* (the determination of a human as a living being that, as living, has language) when analyzing speaking, and so we take being-with-others into account; "The definition of the human being as *zōon logon exon* turns out to be of much wider significance than it seemed at first." The significance is in human's being-with-others; "the human being is a being that says something to others and therefore *lets something be said*. This is the fully primary meaning of speaking in the sense of *letting-something-be-said-by-others*."¹²⁴ People do not live simply by only speaking to an empty world, the primary aspect of the possibility for speaking is *listening* and *speaking with others*. This is the primary sense in which human beings live, how they apprehend the world and exist in it. Thus eudaimonia cannot be reached without a consideration of rhetoric, and the role that persuasion and being influenced by listening affects one's mode of contemplation and understanding of what is beneficial. The point of the *Rhetoric*, as Heidegger sees it, is to assess the *way* in which human beings determine "being-there itself in the concrete mode of its being in its everydayness."¹²⁵ Thus, in trying to understand human living, we are trying to understand the *action of limiting itself*, and this, according to Heidegger, is largely constituted by our way of looking at the world and understanding it. This, in turn, is said to be determined in the genuine

¹²² S1924 76

¹²³ S1924 76

¹²⁴ In Campbell's words, "His reading of Aristotle [in SS1924] is an attempt to synthesize the rhetorical possibilities of everyday speaking with ontological insights into human life."(163)

¹²⁵ SS1924 78

sense through speaking and thus in being in a world with others where speaking exists. A human being is always looking at *possibilities* in regard to his disposition, and these are expressed through speaking. Rhetoric itself is defined as *dunamis*¹²⁶, potential, which Heidegger takes to mean that it "sets forth a possibility of discourse for those that speak"; humans do not live in a definite world, so rhetoric becomes significant because it a way of expressing understanding of what is ultimately *unknown* and in the realm of possibility. In this sense, rhetoric is present in many aspects of human speech, for even in things such as medicine there is speaking about an uncertainty and sense of possibility. But whereas medicine, mathematics, and other practices have a definite subject area, rhetoric is understood to pertain to a vast multitude of interactions.¹²⁷ This understanding of possibility and indefiniteness in determinations that pertain to eudaimonia thus qualifies rhetoric as a fundamental mode of interaction for Aristotle.

This takes us to the concept of *doxa*, having a view. *Doxa* addresses the fact that "being-with-one-another moves in an indefinite, always modifiable view regarding things; it is not an insight, but a view, *doxa*."¹²⁸ So, we are speaking of the views human beings have on things that area concern and up for debate, and such having-of-views is a main component of any human being's presence in the world and pursuit of *eudaimonia*. The word *pisteuein* describes "holding in a view" as such, but *doxa* specifically denotes holding in a view with respect to *a concern which is up for debate at the time*. We have said that rhetoric deals with these uncertainties, and thus Heidegger defines rhetoric as "cultivating a *doxa*" through speaking with others. Aristotle does not say that rhetoric addresses things as they are themselves in a specific, scientific matter; it is not *orismos*, rather rhetoric addresses *doxa* that pertain to an entire complex of entities.

¹²⁶ Rhetoric 1355 b25

¹²⁷ Rhetoric 1355b 7-9 "It is clear, then, that rhetoric is not bound up with a single definite class of subjects, but is as universal as dialectic"

¹²⁸ SS1924 81

Rhetoric addresses the *way* in which we understand things broadly, such as holding a view that one's society ought to "fight for justice" or another rhetorical construction. These *doxa* are not scientific, but this does not mean that all *doxa* are merely "beliefs" or "opinions." According to Heidegger, Aristotle instead understands *doxa* to address the unconcealable character of beings-that-are-there, and we *doxa* concerns itself with a mode-of-being in the world that does not open itself up to precise enumeration. This does not mean that the uncertainty negates the existence of any legitimate ground for *doxa*, but rather that "things that are true and things that are just have a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites, so that if the decisions of judges are not what they ought to be, the defeat must be due to the speakers themselves, and they must be blamed accordingly."¹²⁹ We are not simply speaking of a fantasy realm of interpretation where any one *doxa* appears just as reasonable as all others. We are instead talking about the fundamental mode in which a human being interprets his world, through *doxa* produced by speaking, thus *doxa* pertains also to science and all other forms of *orismos*. These are not all opinions.¹³⁰

Nonetheless, Aristotle is aware that knowledge does not always guide *doxa* and thus not rhetoric either; "before some audiences not even the exactest knowledge will make it easy for what we say to produce conviction. For argument based on knowledge implies instruction, and there are people whom one cannot instruct." Aristotle thus emphasizes that the excellent rhetorician will be able to address *commonly and universally held doxa* when speaking to his audience.

Heidegger points out that *doxa* does not necessarily imply seeking or deliberately trying to have a view; "I do not seek first; I am not, at first, on the way to the ascertaining of the structure of the

¹²⁹ Rhetoric 1355a 21-22

¹³⁰ In Campbell's words, "The language of being-in-the-world is not abstract or theoretical; it is the concrete way in which human beings speak with each other about the world, and that speaking is a speaking-about. As the ground of conceptuality, this speaking-about is a wholly nontheoretical understanding of objects"(165)

matter, but I am situation thus and so towards the matter."¹³¹ This is why knowledge is not inherently tied to rhetoric; *doxa* are already there in a human's interaction with the world, whether he possesses knowledge or not. This is why *doxa* were described as addressing what is "unconcealable"; the human being *must* have a view wherever he is concerned, regardless of his level of knowledge. What this means is that rhetoric has a more important role in persuasion than pure *orismos* in all but the most specific of cases; this is the aspect of the art that *Plato* criticizes in the *Gorgias*. But here Aristotle insists that unfortunately for *Plato*, the situation is such that exact knowledge of what is beneficial is never enumerated perfectly for every person in every situation, thus sharing a world with others *will* entail more than clear-cut dialectic. This also means that rhetoric has more potential for harm: rhetoric can be used for greater good *or* greater harm to a society than any use of one's limbs. Heidegger's view that rhetoric is an inherent part of being-in-the-world is further supported by Aristotle's statement that "[debating allows us to] see clearly what the facts are", thus rhetoric becomes the manner in which we can *determine* our *doxa*, shape them and change our mode of limiting the world until we have come across a view that we can truly determine as just. This aspect of being is irreducible from human life, one cannot live in the world without uncertainties and matters that require a *doxa* to interpret, and so *doxa* actually "is a definite manner of appropriating beings as they show themselves"¹³², since it addresses the *how* in which we encounter phenomena. The human being encounters a world which must be interpreted, and rhetoric is the mode in which we debate our views or convey them to other people; it, quite simply, allows us to "have a world" with others. Once again, this does not mean that the uncertainty negates the existence for any legitimate ground for *doxa*, but rather that Heidegger asserts that even *logos* as a whole can be understood as having a view, and

¹³¹ SS1924 93

¹³² SS1924 93

rhetoric through *doxa* simply concerns those views about matters that are up for debate and not yet fully enumerated by *orismos*.¹³³

It is here that we must discuss the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic. Aristotle's first statement in the *Rhetoric* is that "rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic"¹³⁴ and that both are inherent in human interaction. Later, however, he also specifies that rhetoric is "an offshoot of dialectic and also of ethical studies"¹³⁵, since knowledge of rational argument and ethical principles are (hopefully) essential to anybody who wishes to effectively persuade. Heidegger explains this by emphasizing that rhetoric is "turned against dialectic" in the first place because "*retorike* is connected with *praxis*, 'concern'." Dialectic pertains to precise *orismos*, discussions pertaining explicit *knowing*, and this kind of discussion obviously plays a role in rhetoric and in all human interactions. Galileo arguing whether or not the sun revolves around the earth, for example, depended on dialectic in the sense of rational presentation of the facts, but this was ultimately not the only factor when he had to debate the matter. Consideration of the factors present in Aristotle's conception of rhetoric, such as the disposition of the listeners, is also necessary to understanding the phenomenon of Galileo's and all other attempts at arguing for a view of things. Aristotle thus says that rhetoric and dialectic are equally broad in their dealings, "neither rhetoric nor dialectic is the scientific study of any one separate subject: both are faculties for providing arguments."¹³⁶ In the Galileo example, it becomes clear why Aristotle describes a "counterpart", a "setting against" between the two; while both are, in Heidegger's language, "[ways of] furthering the discourse that is properly required at each moment"¹³⁷, rhetoric has the

¹³³ As Gross sees it, "In a world of beliefs where things could not be otherwise or in a world mirrored by pure logos, Being itself would be frozen"(Gross 35)

¹³⁴ *Rhetoric* 1354 a1

¹³⁵ *Rhetoric* 1355a 25-26

¹³⁶ *Rhetoric* 1356a 31-33

¹³⁷ SS1924 87

other factor of *concern* and *living* present. Unfortunately for Galileo, the Church's concerns and *doxa* were totally set against the dialectic aspects of his argument. Nonetheless, for Galileo and all other people attempting successful rhetoric, *explicit knowledge* of facts is a key way of furthering their argument that they would doubtless fail without. Rhetoric presents itself in the *context* of what is known. Thus rhetoric is an "offshoot" of dialectic in the sense that rhetoric is not effective where the speaker does not claim to know anything at all, but is also a "counterpart" to it because concern is (often by necessity in many matters of life such as ethics) guided by more than pure interest in explicit knowledge.

In investigating the *ousia* of rhetoric, Aristotle is thus asking *how* matters are debated and how *doxa* are formed. This is central to the investigation of human political life, since it is the main mode in which we limit ourselves in regard to what is beneficial. We interpret our world largely in accordance with views that are inherent and not explicitly determined, thus rhetoric becomes the main concern as it is the activity which pertains to the interaction of *doxa* between people. Being explicitly resolved in regard to a matter is, according to Heidegger, always *limited* in its scope, whereas "the realm of *doxa* is *panta*"¹³⁸, always. Being concerned is not implicitly directed at any one practical goal or any one telos, rather the scope of *doxa* reaches all that is meant by "living" in Aristotle's sense. It refers to "being-for-maintaining that [a] matter is thus and so", and we only have these views of the world by virtue of our *being concerned*. We can extrapolate this to the realm of political philosophy by understanding this central role that *doxa* has in our pursuit of *teleion* as individuals and thus also in polities. Our ethics and all other *doxa* are not mere functions or subsets of politics, rather politics resides *in* ethics, our having of views and thus being-with-others through speaking *constitutes* what is meaningful and significant in politics and any other mode of being. This kind of understanding returns the action

¹³⁸ SS1924 101

of debating our views to the forefront of political science, emphasizing the role that rhetorical processes take in our pursuit of well-being. Heidegger, at any rate, is under the impression that "the current way of considering rhetoric [as political] is equally a hindrance to the understanding of Aristotelian *Rhetoric*."¹³⁹ But the situation was the same in Aristotle's day. As he says, "rhetoric masquerades as political science, and the professors of it as political experts", but in reality rhetoric as a faculty of deliberation encompasses our entire sphere of living, of limiting the world and thus having views.¹⁴⁰ Aristotle recognizes that ethics is of a political nature, "ethical studies may fairly be called political" in that they involve being-with-others, but for Heidegger this does not mean that any apprehension of ethics *belongs to the political sphere*. Instead, speaking pertains to very living itself, and "[The Greeks] *were serious about the possibility of speaking*. That is the *origin of logic*, the doctrine of *logos*. The current interpretation is unsuitable for gaining an understanding of logic."¹⁴¹ The current interpretation is the Kantian understanding of *orismos* as the genuine ground for *doxa*, whereas for Heidegger *orismos* affects *doxa* through the sphere of speaking itself. Rhetoric is said to be present in *any* debate which concerns *doxa*, and although *orismos* usually becomes the main ground for persuasion, the experience of Galileo demonstrates that our being-with-others is primarily guided by *doxa* which are not the explicit result of rational determination, but rather are held "already" and exist as basic functions of life. No living being that is concerned in the world can help seeing an *eidos* in things with a *to ti ēn einai* being-character, and while *orismos* functions *through* this

¹³⁹ SS1924 75

¹⁴⁰ See *Rhetoric* 1354a-1354b

¹⁴¹ SS1924 75

phenomenon, it is not the *ground* of *eidos* nor is it the fundamental mode in which we live politically.¹⁴²

In modern political philosophy, we see an extensive emphasis on the individual, and with the experiences of certain "communist", "fascist" and other totalitarian regimes the prospect of achieving *teleion* as a *polis* is perhaps looked upon all but cynically. Such sentiment is not inconsistent with Aristotle's own discussions. Aristotle did not agree with the principles governing socialist ideology: "If the poor divide among themselves the property of the rich because they are greater in number [and thus more powerful]- is this not unjust?" Aristotle considers the idea that the poor can *take* from the rich to be inconsistent with the idea of *merit*, but he recognizes the opposite problem as well; "Is it just then that the few and the wealthy should be the rulers? What if they, in like manner, rob and plunder the people- is this just?"¹⁴³ To get away from this eternal problem, Aristotle bases his idea of the state on the fostering of virtue and the elevation of virtuous citizens above the rest. "A city can be virtuous only when the citizens who have a share in the government are virtuous, and in our state all the citizens share in the government; let us then inquire how a man becomes virtuous." Like most political philosophers, Aristotle admits that benevolent dictatorship (kingship in his language) would be the ideal form of government, but in the real world "kings have no marked superiority over their subjects, [so] it is obviously necessary on many grounds that all the citizens alike should take their turn of governing and being governed. Equality consists in the same treatment of similar persons, and no government can stand which is not founded on justice."¹⁴⁴ The education of citizens thus becomes of paramount importance, for if citizens are to produce a virtuous

¹⁴² "An authentic sense of community and Being-with-others happens through the average everydayness of life, speaking with others in the *polis*. The good of human life, ethical excellence, is thus not a routine, but rather a posture or orientation that Dasein takes to life itself"(Campbell 185)

¹⁴³ *Politics* 1281a 25-28

¹⁴⁴ *Politics* 1332b 23-26

government they must themselves be educated in virtue (the life of contemplation is not possible without knowledge of rational principles). We do not want a government that treats citizens as subordinates or slaves in an effort to achieve this, for "there is a greater difference between the rule over freemen and the rule over slaves as there is between slavery and freedom [as such]."¹⁴⁵

A *polis* that fosters *eudaimonia* in its citizens must allow for the *activity* of the citizens on the part of themselves. The ruler also cannot treat equals as unequals; thus we should only ever follow as a ruler "any one superior in virtue and in the power of performing the best actions."¹⁴⁶

The most benevolent of kings, whom Aristotle also recognizes is so rare in occurrence to the point of being fantasy, is useless if he cannot commit virtuous *action* in regard to politics.

Ultimately, the answer is not to restrict governance to an oligarchy, but rather to produce a society where the citizenry has collective virtue and an understanding of what constitutes just governance. We can now give one of Aristotle's most summarizing passages in regard to his political philosophy:

If we are right [that] *eudaimonia* is assumed to be virtuous activity, the active life will be the best, both for every city collectively, and for individuals. Not that the life of action must necessarily have relation to others, as some persons think, nor are those ideas only to be regarded as practical which are pursued for the sake of practical results, but much more the thoughts and contemplations which are independent and complete in themselves; since virtuous activity, and therefore a certain kind of action, is an end, and even in the case of external actions the directing mind is most truly said to act. [...] Neither, again, is it necessary that states which are cut off from others and choose to live alone

¹⁴⁵ *Politics* 1324a 25-30

should be inactive; for activity, as well as other things, may take place by sections; there are many ways in which the sections of a state act upon one another. The same thing is equally true of every individual. If this were otherwise, God and the universe, who have no external actions over and above their own energies, would be far enough from perfection. Hence it is evident that the [contemplative] life is best for each individual, and for states and for mankind collectively.¹⁴⁷

One can see why Heidegger's understanding of Aristotelian philosophy finds counter-points; Aristotle clearly says that *eudaimonia* is ultimately reached on account of one's own actions, and excellence is discovered through contemplation, not partnership. It is certainly true that any being that can be described as *teleion*, perfect, must be so in itself. But Heidegger does not take this to mean that we are fundamentally isolated beings, and that *koinonia* (being-with-others, partnership) is irrelevant to *teleion*. One recalls the beginning of the *Politics*, in which Aristotle makes clear that "the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual [because] the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no part of a state."¹⁴⁸ The discussion of *teleion* can help to make clear why Aristotle makes these seemingly contradictory statements. *Eudaimonia* is in itself, it does not require action on account of anything outside of itself. It is ultimately a mode of limiting of oneself in relation to the world according to concern, a disposition, and this is guided by *doxa* which, in turn, is guided by contemplation for the virtuous man. But man is defined as a living being that *as living has language*, so Heidegger does not isolate

¹⁴⁷ *Politics* 1325b 14-32

¹⁴⁸ *Politics* 1253a 29-33

contemplation from the ground of possibility provided by speaking. In speaking, man simply *does not* exist alone in his world, and Aristotle is aware of this. This inherent social character does *not* prevent man from being able to have a completedness in himself and outside of interaction with others, he can have *teleion* in respect to his disposition towards all that is external, including other people. One's completedness is always constitutive of one's own action. But in recognizing this, we cannot ignore the fact that man is *not* a god, and he moves in a world *with* others and thus has *doxa* expressed reciprocally through *logos*. If there were ever a man who could be called *teleion* in regard to his activity, he would still be a man who lived in a world *with-others*, he lived as a political animal, and we have established in the discussion of rhetoric that Aristotle recognizes the necessity of discussing *doxa* through deliberation. Thus it is not correct to formulate man as an individual animal upon recognizing that *eudaimonia* exists in itself and not on account of others; man's being always exists in a with-world, in Heidegger's language.

We have seen that speaking makes possible the contemplation that allows humans to perceive the good in a way which is inaccessible to any other animal. *Orismos*, definition, the sphere of modern logic, allows us to look at the world *genuinely* and *explicitly*. We established that such definition, rather than being the origin of conceptualization in itself, operates as a mode of enumerating particularized beings. Beings become particularized out of disinterested everydayness through a *concern* with them, which arises through a reciprocal affecting and being-affected way of being in the world. Thus Heidegger insists that the significance of *orismos* is grounded in something still deeper; concerned speaking, the basic mode of living in which we develop and change *doxa* in a determinate manner. Rhetoric is an example of a sphere where speaking can fulfill this function of shaping our *doxa* outside the realm of explicit *orismos*, since

not nearly everything that becomes an object of our concern is explicitly known to us.¹⁴⁹ We must deliberate because we are not gods, we are not omnipotent. From Heidegger's interpretation, we can infer that in his view a significance ought to be placed back onto *speaking* instead of exclusively *orismos* when looking into the ground of language and cognition. *Concern* is what makes *orismos* operate in regard to rhetoric, Galileo's *orismos* of the facts failed because rhetorical interactions always include some *view* that is at stake, there is not *only* the purely knowledge-based, disinterested mode of apprehension that occurs within specific fields of study. Thus the manner of our being-in-the-world as concerned becomes the ground for definition *arising* as significant for Aristotle. The point here is that emphasis ought to be taken away from *orismos* as such and placed back into the ground of its possibility, speaking and being-in-a-world with others as concerned. This means that in regard to political philosophy, man cannot be understood as an individual animal that then interacts merely *alongside* others. Humans develop their views, their *doxa*, *through having them in speaking* and in a community. If we were born as gods, this would not be the case, but ultimately no philosopher should deny that man is *first and foremost* in a world with other people, *eudaimonia* never falls out of the sky for a human being. The *doxa* that govern contemplation in the virtuous man are changed and influenced through speaking with others, and certainly not in a disinterested way. The virtuous man will have views regarding *justice*, pertaining to difficult matters such as euthanasia, matters of concern in which a clear answer through *orismos* is not initially granted in each and every case. One cannot, up to now, devise a *formula* for whether or not euthanasia is just and apply it to every instance,-

¹⁴⁹ In Campbell's words, "this return to the world [of concern] does not in any way guarantee that the truth of speaking can avoid error. [...] The authentic *logos* that reveals world and being always reveals some error."(176)

although attempting such a feat can become relevant to rhetorical deliberation about the issue.¹⁵⁰

Because of this way in which we exist, perhaps *every* human being will be forced to have some *doxa* which are never fully formed by *orismos*. Thus, even though individual action is ultimately the source of any completedness for a human, and our actions can be explicitly guided *through* *orismos*, one must remember that *doxa* are primarily acquired and changed through *being-with-others* and primarily by *listening* to others in speaking. Thus we ought to return to rhetoric and the ways in which we share our views with others when trying to analyze human life as such.

While contemplation involves attempts to bring *orismos* into situations and formulate an "answer" as to the matter at hand, the sphere of *speaking itself* and *doxa* go deeper in also constituting our disposition towards issues we are not able to ascertain. What is more significant than *orismos* to Heidegger is the *views* that we have as a result of *concern*, that is what one is really addressing when attempting any formulation of an ethical or political issue. *Orismos* operates *by virtue of* our *doxa*, and humans do not have the aspect of divinity where *doxa* can be determined purely from *orismos* (for you would need omniscience). The *doxa* held communally by a society, in a *with-world*, lose their significance in the formulation of the human as an individual animal, and Heidegger says that the real issue of *how we shape our concerns*, *doxa* and, consequently, rhetoric and the role that this activity plays in one's pursuit of *eudaimonia* has not been comprehensively enumerated or understood by anybody since Aristotle.

¹⁵⁰ In his own later philosophy Heidegger becomes more explicitly opposed to such an attempt itself; "Although Heidegger never dealt directly with questions of normative ethics, there was, in *Being and Time*, a very harsh critique of the whole *conception of* objective criteria for the guidance of our lives"(Olafson 3)

Conclusion

On the whole, we see that Heidegger's assessment can provide insight into a wide array of Aristotelian concepts. It seems that he can account for apparent inconsistencies, and his way of understanding Aristotle's mode of treating *ousia* is consistent with Aristotle's formulation of *eudaimonia*. The goal was to achieve insight into the role of the activity of speaking in shaping our views and influencing ethical and thus, as a result, political concerns. Although he may be overly ambitious in interpreting phrases such as *entelexia*, Heidegger has certainly provided a convincing argument that our *doxa* are guided by a *concern* which is not inherently at our disposal and *orismos* does not always explain to us; we do not always have an *orismos-based* answer for the dilemmas that concerns present.¹⁵¹ Our *doxa* thus do not have their ground of possibility in the act of limiting, *orismos*, rather *orismos* is significant because it can *uncover* the objects of our concern in a *genuine* sense. *Orismos* allows us to *look* at entities in an explicit way, and it does this *by virtue* of language. For Aristotle, man is a political animal because his innermost views come into being through speaking with others, not in pure isolation, although upon achieving *eudaimonia* one can indeed be considered complete in oneself alone. Heidegger has thus presented a counter-thrust to the formulation of man as an individual being, a subject, acting upon an external world and forming concepts first and foremost through the activity of precise definition. The matters which are of most concern arise out of a reciprocal relationship with the world, the human being is reciprocally affected by the world in which he lives, and these concerns of life guide and *make possible* his act of limiting. Ideally, we want to be able to formulate political philosophy in a manner which emphasizes the role of rhetoric and speaking

¹⁵¹ As Daniel M Gross puts it, "Doxa is some particular orientation, always subject to revision. And it is precisely the 'ontological' bracketing of any particular doxa that makes humans uncertain, unfinished, and subject to desire. We must make due in a world of the merely probably and thus we are always susceptible to affect and change." (Gross 32)

with others about views that are not *explicitly known*. We cannot isolate rhetoric to the realm of the statesman alone, for the shaping and deliberation of *doxa* arises out of all matters that involve concern. Apart from this point, Heidegger has also given a unique insight into the nature of Aristotelian concepts and the meaning of the words that Aristotle uses. In Heidegger's interpretation, we can certainly understand the role of politics and rhetoric for Aristotle within the context of broader philosophical concepts, and we can surely see why Aristotle wrote an entire work on the phenomenon of rhetoric. We can also understand the significance of speaking and its role in the very definition of human life for Aristotle, and this is understood by Heidegger to be the very origin of "the doctrine of *logos*" that many are said to have subsequently misinterpreted. Heidegger has succeeded in providing a thorough and comprehensive account of his argument in favor of emphasizing speaking as the ground of *orismos* and dialectic when formulating an understanding of Aristotelian philosophy.¹⁵² By analyzing Heidegger, we have seen a comprehensive account of the reasons for Aristotle's view of the human being as a fundamentally political animal, and such analysis is valuable for the studies of anyone seeking an understanding of Aristotelian concepts regardless of whether or not they come to agree with Heidegger's interpretation.

¹⁵² For another summary of the points of SS1924, see Pg. 184 of Campbell

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