Stochastically Equivalent Sequential Auctions with Multi-Unit Demands
Graduation Year
2015
Date of Submission
4-2015
Document Type
Open Access Senior Thesis
Degree Name
Bachelor of Arts
Department
Economics
Reader 1
Yaron Raviv
Terms of Use & License Information
Rights Information
© 2015 Tongjia Shi
Abstract
Past empirical analysis show that in contrast to the theory predictions; prices tend to decline in some sequential auctions, a puzzle known as the declining price anomaly. Several theoretical explanations were proposed demonstrating the possibility of a declining price pattern under certain assumptions. In this paper, we demonstrate that when bidders have private values and multi-unit demand, expected selling price can be increasing, constant, decreasing or even non-monotonic. In our model, price pattern depends on the distributions from which bidder valuations are drawn (including the size of the bidders demand reduction), and the number of bidders.
Recommended Citation
Shi, Tongjia, "Stochastically Equivalent Sequential Auctions with Multi-Unit Demands" (2015). CMC Senior Theses. 1170.
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1170
