Graduation Year


Date of Submission


Document Type

Campus Only Senior Thesis

Degree Name

Bachelor of Arts



Reader 1

Yaron Raviv

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© 2019 Jinyi Jiang


This paper studies the effects of auction mechanisms on the average price of auction results of Shanghai car license plate from 2004 to 2018. We construct two linear regression models and find that an iterated multi-unit auction has a lower efficiency than a seal-bid discriminatory multi-unit auction. We also find that the pre-set price-ceiling is positively correlated with the average winning price. These results suggest that the government can potentially manipulate auction results through the design of the auction mechanism, and through the setting of warning price as a price ceiling.

This thesis is restricted to the Claremont Colleges current faculty, students, and staff.