Researcher ORCID Identifier
https://orcid.org/0009-0008-6417-7514
Graduation Year
2025
Date of Submission
12-2024
Document Type
Campus Only Senior Thesis
Degree Name
Bachelor of Arts
Department
Physics
Second Department
Economics
Reader 1
Sarah Marzen
Reader 2
Yaron Raviv
Terms of Use & License Information
Rights Information
© 2024 Ann Mahé
Abstract
Games of cooperation are commonly observed in biological systems and can be used to understand their evolution. An example of these dynamics is found in yeast cells, which exhibit cooperative behavior during their growth. Yeast population dynamics can be modeled with three types of cooperation games: the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), the Mutual Benefit Game (MB), and the Snowdrift Game (SD). Previous studies have primarily focused on fixed strains of yeast cells that consistently cooperate or defect. Here, we extend those methods to non-fixed strains capable of switching strategies with each iteration. Using a simple “RSTP” mathematical model based on relative payoffs, a linear model that introduces cost and efficiency parameters, and a non-linear model with the same parameters, we extrapolate the games onto a spatial structure and analyze the evolutionary dynamics. We find that the “RSTP” model mirrors the patterns observed in fixed-strain populations, with cooperators forming cross-like structures. The linear model also aligns with the findings for fixed strains, with the steady state showing the effects of a Prisoner’s Dilemma or a Mutual Benefit Game. However, while the non-linear spatial model exhibits the expected dynamics of a Snowdrift Game, it also reveals that cooperators in non-fixed strains can form robust square structures in the steady state.
Recommended Citation
Mahé, Ann, "Evolutionary Game Dynamics in Non-Fixed Strains of Yeast" (2025). CMC Senior Theses. 3865.
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/3865
This thesis is restricted to the Claremont Colleges current faculty, students, and staff.