Graduation Year
2025
Date of Submission
4-2025
Document Type
Open Access Senior Thesis
Degree Name
Bachelor of Arts
Department
Economics
Reader 1
Professor Angela Vossmeyer
Terms of Use & License Information
Abstract
Abstract
The National Football League (NFL) has a type of contract known as the Franchise Tag. The Franchise Tag is a one-year contractual extension often used when a player and a team cannot come to terms regarding the details of a contract extension. Usually, the player expects to be paid more than the organization can afford that year due to restrictions imposed by the salary cap. Because of this, Franchise-Tagged players tend to have a greater incentive to perform well in hopes of being signed into a long-term contract. My findings show that the incentive of future earnings and job security, particularly for quarterbacks, correlates with improved performance in terms of QB passer rating when compared to players under multi-year or standard one-year contracts. Also, Franchise-Tagged quarterbacks capitalize on more opportunities to throw the ball to their receivers (pass attempts) than multi-year contract players, indicating a stronger inclination to perform well. I also find a correlation between contract value and the performance of Franchise-Tagged quarterbacks relative to one-year contract players. The implications of these findings extend beyond professional sports, suggesting that the type of labor contract an employee holds can influence their performance based on whether they are motivated by future financial incentives or job security.
Recommended Citation
Edwards, Justin, "Clutch or Comfortable? How Franchise Tags Influence QB Performance in the NFL" (2025). CMC Senior Theses. 4001.
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/4001
